By Barry Rubin
US policy on the main ME issues fluctuated greatly in 1999, though its
goals and basic positions remained the same.
On the peace process, the US adopted a pessimistic stance between January
and May due to its criticisms of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government.
It focused on encouraging the PA to postpone a unilateral declaration of
independence.
With the election of Prime Minister Ehud Barak in May, however, the US
stepped up activity in the process and pushed proposals for the timetable of
further talks. At the end of the year, the US made progress in urging a renewal
of Syria-Israel negotiations.
Regarding Iraq, the US worked on a strategy that would maintain some
mixture of sanctions and inspections. It managed to maintain the sanctions
regime despite opposition from other great powers. In the absence of
inspections, the US pressured Iraq by a large number of bombing attacks on that
country.
In dealings with Iran, the US renewed efforts for a rapprochement which
had fizzled the previous year. But the lack of a positive Iranian response
limited progress.
"A" ARAB-ISRAELI
PEACE PROCESS
US involvement on this issue during 1999 can be divided into two distinct
periods. Before the May 1999 Israeli elections, the US was pessimistic about
progress. Netanyahu's government had accepted the US-mediated Wye accord but had
then stalled on implementing it and had fallen in a coalition crisis. The US
reduced its efforts on the process and limited contacts with Netanyahu.
With the election of Ehud Barak in May, US leaders felt there was renewed
chances for action and increased their own efforts both on the
Israel-Palestinian and Israel-Syrian negotiating fronts.
Clearly, the US favored Barak's victory. Nevertheless, the US
government's policy was set not by a desire to affect the election but merely to
implement its strategy of pressuring Netanyahu to move forward on implementing
the Wye agreement and other issues. Essentially, the US government have acted in
the same way if there was no election campaign in progress.
The administration also, however, had to battle Congress to fulfill its
own promises regarding implementation of the Wye accord. President Bill Clinton
had to veto a foreign operations bill that did not provide the $800 mn.
requested for Wye funding in 1999 and the $500 mn. sought for 2000.1
At the time the Israeli election was scheduled, US-Israel relations were
at a low point. [See MECS, 1998] Netanyahu's concept of the way to advance was
quite different from that of the US. It had taken US policy almost one year to
persuade Netanyahu to sign another agreement-the Wye agreement-which almost
immediately collapsed due to Netanyahu's reluctance to implement it and his
government's fall over the issue. Friction also arose over other issues. The US
was not in the mood to reward Netanyahu. If there had been no election-assuming
the Wye agreement was not being implemented-bilateral relations would have
continued to be cool as they had been for most of the three years since
Netanyahu had taken office.
Thus, American actions were not designed to defeat Netanyahu but to
punish him for disagreements and what the White House saw as his bad faith.As
one US official said of him, "He signed agreements and then stalled....When
Israeli leaders tell us they've stopped settlement activity, we hope that it'll
have really stopped."2
At the same time, Clinton knew that meeting Netanyahu or giving him other
benefits would help him in the election, simultaneously letting him argue that
his policies had done no damage to Israel's relations with the US. The pressure
the US was applying was intended to force a policy shift, either before the
election or after it, if Netanyahu won.
American journalists, however, viewed the US position as intervention.
One journalist wrote, "[The Administration] has made little effort to
conceal its interest in a victory for Ehud Barak." Another noted, "It
does not take much detective work in the corridors of Washington to see how the
Clinton administration is cold-shouldering Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and
subtly trying to help his more conciliatory challengers.3
More accurate was the statement of a senior US official:
"Notwithstanding all reports to the contrary, we really don't want to
intervene in the Israeli campaign. We are doing our best to avoid it although
all sides are trying to schlep us in. It's a no-win situation for us. We are
assumed to be intervening."4 He continued, "As long as we keep a low
profile and stick to the posture of supporting the implementation of the Wye
agreement and opposing unilateral acts, where it is new Jewish settlements or a
Palestinian declaration of statehood, I think we are on safe ground. We've been
in a couple of Israeli elections before and we know where the land mines are. If
we got into showing a direct preference, we would step on those
landmines."5
Among the main US-Israel interactions during the election campaign were
the following:
--Clinton refused to meet with Netanyahu. In the context of the peace
process, such meetings had become rewards to be given for reaching agreements
with the other side. If there had been no election, the likelihood of such a
meeting would have been equally low. And, as noted above, any such meeting would
have been used as "proof" that Netanyahu was doing a good job in
preserving relations with the Untied States.
--Clinton met with former Defense Minister and candidate for Prime
Minister Yitzhak Mordechai at a 17 March fund-raising event for the Yitzhak
Rabin Center for the Study of Israel. Aides to Mordechai said he had been
invited by White House officials. Clinton had earlier written Mordechai a letter
praising his role in the peace process. But promoting Mordechai in Israel's
election would have contradicted Washington's supposed policy of ensuring that
Barak defeated Netanyahu. At any rate, Mordechai fell steadily in the polls and
was not helped by this meeting.6
--Vice-President Al Gore also refused to meet with Netanyahu.7 But when
US Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Israel for just one day in March
1999 to meet with his own counterpart, Defense Minister Moshe Arens, as part of
a regional tour, he added Netanyahu to his schedule to avoid seeming to snub the
prime minister. Then, "in order to maintain neutrality," Cohen said,
he met with Barak and Mordechai.8
During the first five months of 1999, the US did articulate a program for
continuing the peace process. It tightened somewhat relations with the PA in
order to discourage Arafat from declaring independence unilaterally in May.
In January, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described US goals for
the year as "the implementation of the Wye Accords, the negotiation of
final status agreement and pursuit of a comprehensive peace." Albright
praised the Palestinians and criticized Israel's government: "The
Palestinians have been fulfilling some aspects of what they are supposed to do
in terms of their security obligations under Wye. And I think that the Israelis
also need to fulfill their obligations."9
Arafat was well-received in Washington during his early February visit.
The State Department signaled efforts to improve US-PA relations while opposing
any unilateral PA declaration of independence.10 At that time, Albright referred
to delays in the peace process and repeated--albeit with somewhat more
nuance--her previous statement by saying, "The Palestinians have fulfilled
some of their obligations, and some of them they have not; and we are concerned
about that. The Israelis need to fulfill theirs.11 Clinton held a brief private
meeting with Arafat and also with Leah Rabin, widow of the assassinated Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin.12
In March, Clinton again hosted Arafat. One major purpose of the close
US-PA contacts were to discourage Arafat from making a unilateral declaration of
independence he had scheduled for 4 May. The NYT noted on 23 March,
"Clinton gives Arafat a kind of international recognition just by meeting
with him in the White House--especially given what the Israelis have dubbed the
American "snub diplomacy" toward...Netanyahu. Netanyahu has not
visited the White House at all this year, although Yitzhak Mordechai, his former
defense minister who is challenging him for prime minister in the 17 May
elections, was a guest there last week."13
Regarding the unilateral declaration of independence, the State
Department explained, "We have made our views clear:
we are opposed to all unilateral actions, including a unilateral
declaration of statehood. The issues of permanent status can only be resolved in
negotiations between the parties and not by unilateral acts or declarations by
either side."14
Another sign of growing US-PA ties was the formation of a US-Palestinian
Joint Committee in an effort to "enhance the emerging working
partnership," in the words of State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns on
3 March.15
The most important statement of US policy was a letter to the
Palestinians sent in late April. This was timed to come just before the 4 May
date that marked the supposed end of the five-year transition period stipulated
by the Oslo agreement and the declared date for a unilateral Palestinian
independence declaration.
According to the 26 April White House briefing on the letter, its major
points were:
"First, the US calls upon both parties to continue to adhere to the
terms of reference of the peace process as defined in Madrid and Oslo. The
objective of the negotiating process is the implementation of the UN Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, including land for peace and all other
agreements under the Oslo process.
"Second, the US calls on the parties to continue to carry out all
their interim period responsibilities, including full implementation without any
further delay of the interim agreement and the Wye River memorandum, and
continued cooperation between the PA and the Israeli government.
"Third, the US...calls on both parties to engage in accelerated
permanent status talks, status negotiations and to rededicate themselves to the
goal of reaching an agreement within a year.
"Toward that end, and in an effort to facilitate that process, the
US is ready to help launch those negotiations after the Israeli elections, and
once the Israeli government has been formed, and to review and monitor their
progress. The US is also prepared, with the consent of the parties, to bring
them together within six months to review the status of their efforts and to
facilitate reaching an agreement.
"Finally...it is critical to the interest both sides share in
enhancing the security of their people, and that the Palestinians continue their
efforts to fight terror and the Israelis and Palestinians maintain their
security cooperation.
"Furthermore,
Palestinians and Israelis must avoid unilateral acts and declarations that
prejudge or predetermine issues reserved for permanent status negotiations.
Indeed, negotiations and a credible peace process offer the only way to reach an
enduring agreement on permanent status issues...."16
Much of this was a restatement of previous policy. But the letter was
given to the PA in exchange for Arafat's agreement to postpone declaring
independence. The key aspect was to indicate US support for accelerated talks
after the Israeli election and a relatively short deadline for reaching
completion of the final status negotiations. In short, the US was laying out the
timetable and priorities for the peace process's future. Yet how the US would
actually handle these matters depended largely on the outcome of Israel's
elections and the attitude of the government that emerged.17
Barak's victory sparked US enthusiasm that these goals could be
implemented. US officials were effusive in their praise for Barak. "He
knows the only way for Israel to make peace and finally move on is to finish the
peace process that's been started," one said. "That's obviously a
hopeful sign for the US and its efforts. It's a hopeful thing."18
Clinton himself spoke about the new "chance to move the peace
process forward in the Middle East." In a 1 July statement, for example, he
explained, "I think that the people of Israel have sent us a loud message
that they want the process to be kept alive and they want it to be seen
through....I believe that...the principal difficulty that Mr. Netanyahu had was
the nature of his coalition, and because...his majority was so small and it
included people who were so hostile to the peace process, that no matter what he
tried to do, they could always threaten to bring him down.
"Now, the reason I think it will be different now is, number one,
Prime Minister-Elect Barak was a much more open and heartfelt supporter of the
Oslo process....Number two, he got a big vote from the people of Israel with
peace being the major issue. And, number three, he has constituted a
government...with quite a large voting majority in the Knesset, obviously geared
toward the peace process....So for those reasons, I think the chances of success
are now greater.19
Shortly after taking office on 6 July, Barak traveled to the US, 14-20
July, to meet Clinton and other top officials. The main topic was how to advance
the peace process, though they also discussed plans to restructure US aid to
Israel by phasing out economic funding while maintaining or even increasing
military assistance.20
The first step was to be implementation of the Wye agreement, followed by
final status talks between Israel and the PA, with the goal of reaching a full
peace accord some time during the year 2000. This basic plan was embodied in the
September 1999 Sharm al-Shaykh agreement.
Perhaps the most thoroughgoing US statement of its perceptions, role, and
aims on this issue was National Security Sandy Berger's article, "The
Middle East on the Eve of the Millennium," published in the WP of 20
October 1999. Berger wrote:
"The most salient feature of the current landscape is the new,
albeit fleeting, opportunity for peace....Compare the US role in two recent
agreements: the agreement signed at Wye in October 1998 and the agreement
reached in Sharm [al-Shaykh] in September [1999]. Wye came about at a time of
deep mistrust and shallow communication between the parties, a time of
skepticism regarding the viability and the very premises of the journey begun at
Oslo. With Israelis and Palestinians showing too much appetite for recrimination
and too little stomach for compromise, we stepped in to prevent a collapse. If
they wouldn't actually talk to each other, then they would have to talk through
us. The President brought the two parties together; closeted them at Wye; helped
draft the agreement....
"With Ehud Barak's election, the parties no longer need an
interpreter, they began speaking to each other in a common language, even if it
meant disagreeing in a common tongue. And
so, we played a different role at Sharm [al-Shaykh], different, but not
lesser....The prologue began with Prime Minister Barak's victory and the
President's sustained efforts to help Barak and Arafat understand each other
better. In meetings that lasted over 12 hours with the new Prime Minister and
countless telephone calls to both, he would send parallel messages: to Chairman
Arafat, that the Prime Minister was seriously committed to peace, that he was a
man of his word, and that the Palestinians ought to listen to his proposals with
an open mind. To Prime Minister Barak, that he had to take account of what the
past three years had done to sap the Palestinians' confidence....In a mere five
weeks, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators sat together and drafted a new
agreement. We may have offered ideas or suggestions, but this would be their
agreement, an agreement more likely to be implemented precisely because both
sides wrote every word and understood every nuance.
"Finally, as we approached the end-game, President Clinton and
Secretary Albright helped the parties cross the finish line, encouraging them to
make the leap from agreement in principle to signature on paper.
"....More has been done in terms of peacemaking during the past
three months than in the preceding three years. Security cooperation between
Israel and the [PA] is yielding real results, enhancing the safety of
both." These developments included Israel's turning over of more territory
in the West Bank to PA control and prisoner releases. "Issues long
postponed or deferred, like the safe-passage between Gaza and the West Bank or
construction of the Gaza seaport, finally are seeing concrete movement. In other
words, peace is doing what it ought to do: bearing fruit."21
But the year 2000, and not 1999, was seen as the time for completing the
peace process. Clinton remarked in November, for example, that US policy would
be in "high gear" to try to achieve a framework agreement by February
2000.22
While pressing for progress on the Israel-Palestinian front, the US also
began extensive efforts to promote Israel-Syria talks. In September, Albright
went to Damascus to talk with President Asad.23 The next month, Clinton invited
Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Sharaa to the White House to examine what were
Syria's terms for renewing negotiations with Israel.24 These initiatives would
lead to a short-lived breakthrough early the following year.
The US maintained good links with Jordan and worked to establish a
special relationship with the new King Abdallah II, who made his first visit to
Washington in May. Clinton reaffirmed strong US support for Jordan.25 Agreements
were signed to enhance economic cooperation.26
Regarding Lebanon, the US was less active but maintained its support for
an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The US urged Syria and Lebanon to
discourage attacks against Israel which produced tension in the border area.27
"A" US POLICY AND THE GULF
Iraq
The basic US position on Iraq was that Saddam Husayn would continue
seeking to rebuild weapons of mass destruction and not fulfill his agreements.
Consequently, sanctions had to remain in effect for a long time, until the
distant day that the regime changed. To
maintain international support for sanctions, however, the Clinton
administration had to pledge that sanctions would end if and when Iraq met its
promises to the UN to disarm. To maintain congressional backing, the White House
had to promise help to Iraqi opposition groups, while doubting they would
achieve anything.28
Thus, for example, Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe stated in 28
January congressional testimony that the US thought Saddam Husayn's regime would
never "comply fully with its obligations, or fundamentally change its
international behavior." Consequently,
"a change of regime in Iraq" was necessary." But "no one
should underestimate the difficulties of the task(or the time it may
take."29
Similarly, on 23 April, Bruce Riedel, Middle East director for the
National Security Council, explained, "US policy today is to counter the
threats Iraq poses until there is a change of regime and a new leadership that
demonstrates it is prepared to accepts the requirements of the UN Security
Council resolutions and live in peace with its neighbors and its people."30
Facing pressure from some allies to end restrictions on Iraq, the US had
to accept compromises easing economic sanctions. While the US favored a new arms
inspection system, it did not want an approach that would certify Iraqi
compliance with UN demands and thus bring an end to sanctions. Meanwhile,
frequent US air attacks were used to weaken the Iraqi regime and limit its
military power.
In this respect, State Department Deputy Spokesman James Foley said US
policy on Iraq "remains unchanged." Its priorities were to force
Iraq's compliance with all previous UN resolutions, the return of arms
inspection teams "implementing a robust, effective arms control
regime," and the continuation of both sanctions and limits on the regimes
"control of Iraq's oil revenues" until Baghdad implemented its
commitments.31
Given the breakdown of the UNSCOM system, as Iraq refused to allow its
presence, the US accepted that a new framework for carrying out inspections
might be necessary and desirable. But any such system had to be effective in
ensuring Iraqi disarmament."32 In Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's
words, "We have always favored improvements and welcomed suggestions for
improvements. But the verification of a monitoring system has to be in place in
order to be able to carry out the job that it was assigned."33 On 15 July,
State Department Spokesman Jamie Rubin said the only effective way to know
whether Iraq is trying to reconstitute its weapons programs would be to have
inspectors in the country.34
US support for a new inspection regime was inspired both by
reports suggesting that Iraq was using the absence of inspectors to rebuild its
military capacity and by some key powers' demand for a system aimed at quickly
certifying Iraq's compliance so that sanctions could be ended. On 23 July, a CIA
report to Congress confirmed that Baghdad had rebuilt industries that might be
converted to produce chemical weapons "within a few weeks or months"
and had materials that could be used to make biological weapons.35
In September, China, France, and Russia introduced an inspection plan
that might prepare the way for ending sanctions. Albright responded that any new
system had to maintain controls on the regime's income and capacity to build
weapons.36 While the US wanted agreement on a new program, Albright explained,
it would not accept "consensus at any price."37 In formulating the new
resolution, the US rejected any guarantee that an Iraqi acceptance of inspection
would soon bring sanctions to an end or make it too easy for Iraq to evade
controls.38
When the UN Security Council finally passed UNSCR 1284 in December,
setting up a Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the
US was satisfied with the result. US Ambassador Peter Burleigh praised the vote
as "profoundly
important."39 While Assistant Secretary of State David Welch added that
"charts a way forward on the key issues of disarmament, Kuwait and
the missing people, and humanitarian concerns vis-a-vis the people of
Iraq."40
A unilateral way that the US could keep up the pressure on Iraq was by a
new, intensified bombing campaign. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said
these attacks functioned as a substitute for inspections: "It would
obviously be better to have monitors on the ground, but I believe that through
our continued patrolling of the northern and southern no-fly zones, we are able
to keep Saddam Husayn in his box."41 Between January and August 1999, the
Pentagon confirmed, Western planes conducted 108 air strikes against Iraq.42
This policy began on 26 January, when National Security Advisor Sandy
Berger announced that Clinton had authorized the US military to respond more
aggressively to Iraqi challenges to aircraft patrolling the "no-fly"
zones. These expanded "rules of engagement", Cohen said, resulted from
Iraq's recent aggressive and intensive offensive against Allied planes.
For example, on 28 February, US Air Force F-15 fighters attacked an Iraqi
air defense headquarters, a radio relay site and a surface-to-air missile site
after planes patrolling the northern no-fly zone came under anti-aircraft fire.
US and British jets attacked two targets in southern Iraq on 19 March in
response to Iraqi MIG jets flying in the no-fly zone. On 2 April, US and British
planes destroyed a key control center of the main pumping station used by Iraq
to export oil via the southern terminal of Mina-al-Bakr.43
The Administration argued that this policy had forced Iraq to leave alone
these patrols. For instance, on 19 August, Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon,
said "we have scared [Saddam Husayn] to the point where he doesn't want to
turn on his radars, and missiles that aren't guided by radars aren't
particularly threatening or dangerous." Bacon claims that the attacks had
reduced by 40 to 50 percent the number of Iraqi anti-aircraft missile batteries
in the no-fly zones.44 Civilian casualties were attributed to Iraqi actions.
Thus, on 24 August, a US military spokesman, explained, "Saddam Husayn is
killing his own people by firing at us. If the artillery doesn't explode when
it's fired up, it will come down and explode on the ground."45
Another aspect of US policy was support for the Iraqi opposition, though
Congress forced this tactic on an unenthusiastic administration. CENTCOM
Commander Gen. Anthony Zinni bluntly told a Senate hearing, "I don't see an
opposition group that has the viability to overthrow Saddam at this point...It
is possible to create a situation that would be worse."46 Riedel stated,
"We can help Iraqi opponents of Saddam organize themselves and give them
aid, but we cannot put them in power."47 In response, leading members of
Congress from both parties sent a critical letter to Clinton on 11 August
claiming, "The Administration is not giving the Iraqi opposition the
political support it needs to seriously challenge Saddam."48
Another type of criticism were accusations that US policy was causing
harm to Iraqi civilians. The administration responded by seeking ways to ease
such problems and by blaming the suffering on Saddam Husayn. In January,
Vice-President Al Gore announced a new US initiative to let Iran sell more oil
to buy food, streamline the contract approval process for purchasing
humanitarian goods, and to help Iraq produce more oil.49, 50 A few days later,
acting US Ambassador to the UN Peter Burleigh said the US wanted to create
additional programs to help children and elderly people."51
On 12 August, following a UN report on child mortality in Iraq, State
Department Spokesman James P. Rubin insisted, "Clearly the blame for the
suffering of the Iraqi people falls squarely on the shoulders of its tyrannical
leader."52 He added that Iraq was refusing to use the program to buy food
and medicine.53 The next day, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs Elizabeth Jones said, "The Iraqi regime has ordered only a
fraction of the nutritional supplies that are needed for vulnerable children,
pregnant women, and nursing mothers." According to Jones, Iraq had only
ordered $1.7 mn. of $25 mn. allotted under the UN oil-for-food program. In
contrast, she said that the program in the north, controlled by the UN and
Kurdish administration there, had lowered the infant mortality rate.54
The US saw efforts to aid Iraqi civilians as a key component in the
ability to maintain sanctions. Thus, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson praised
the UN oil-for-food program since by addressing the Iraqi people's humanitarian
needs, it "has helped us maintain sanctions" by encouraging
international support for actions against the Baghdad regime."55
Iran
In contrast to US policy on Iraq, US policy on Iran moved another step
toward detente during 1999. The high expectations of the previous year had been
disappointed, but there was hope that President Muhammad Khatami was moving
toward a more flexible policy and that the reform movement's power would be
further increased--as it was--in the February 2000 elections.
The US had urged Iran to change course regarding three issues, and saw
improvements as a precondition for rebuilding bilateral relations: Iran's
continuing support for terrorism, race to obtain weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles, and active opposition to the ME peace process. But the US
now wanted a dialogue to discuss and narrow these differences.
Of particular significance was a speech by President Clinton on 12 April
1999, which many interpreted as a partial apology for past US actions toward
Iran. Clinton said, "It may be that the Iranian people have been taught to
hate or distrust the US or the West on the grounds that we are infidels and
outside the faith. And, therefore, it is easy for us to be angry and to respond
in kind. I think it is important to recognize, however, that Iran,
because of its enormous geopolitical importance over time, has been the subject
of quite a lot of abuse from various Western nations."56
The US suggested that Iran was moving in a moderate direction and tried
to respond in various ways. For example, State Department spokesman James Foley
praised Khatami for opposing repression and seeking "the rule of law"
in Iran.57 Another important US initiative was a secret message sent to Khatami
in August, seeking his help in solving the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in
Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 American servicemen and urging him to try to stop
other terrorist actions. The administration also sought talks on reopening US
consular offices in Tehran, removed Iran from its list of major drug producers,
and made favorable references to Iranian cooperation in handling crises in
Afghanistan and Kosovo. The US Treasury issued revised sanctions regulations
that made it easier to invite Iranian scholars to visit, while the State
Department said it would let agricultural commodities and medicines be sold to
Iran as well as to Libya and Sudan.58
At the same time, though, the administration maintained sanctions,
turning down a request by the Mobil Oil Company to conduct oil swaps with Iran.
Congressional sentiment continued to oppose US-Iran rapprochement, and US
intelligence officials said they had hard evidence that Iran was behind the
Khobar towers bombing. Senator Sam Brownback, (R-Kansas), said of the Khobar
case, "My big fear is we won't pursue it because of some rapprochement with
Iran."59
In short, while some small steps were taken toward Iran, the distance
traveled during 1999 remained limited, and the lack of Iranian response or
policy change prevented further developments in bilateral relations.
During 1999, the US maintained good relations with the GCC states. The
main objectives of US policy were to protect those countries' security, urge
them to support US positions regarding Iran and Iraq, and ask them to support
the Arab-Israeli peace process. But the US did not object to GCC steps to
improve relations with Iran, since such efforts paralleled American efforts to
ease tensions with Tehran.
Arms' sales and strategic cooperation continued to be important factors
in US-GCC relations. For example, On 8 March, while visiting the UAE, Secretary
of Defense William Cohen offered to provide GCC states with immediate access to
intelligence on Iraqi and Iranian missile launches.60 In late May, US defense
authorities agreed to provide the UAE with the source codes for weapons systems
aboard the F-16C/D Block 60 combat aircraft. Although the sale of the 80 fighter
jets would not be finalized until the following year due to financial
arrangements, transfer of the codes removed the final technical obstacle to the
$6 billion sale of the aircraft. This
was the first time the US agreed to release the source codes for advanced combat
aircraft acquired by an Arab state.61
****
Thanks for research assistance to Cameron Brown.
NOTES
For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full
name of the publication, news agency, radio station or monitoring service where
an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the
case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of
publication noted here.
1. WP, 19 October 1999.
2. JP, 19 May 1999.
3. NYT, 17 May 1999; Reuters, 27 April 1999.
4. Reuters, 27 April 1999.
5. Reuters, 27 April 1999.
6. Ha'aretz, 19 March 1999; Jerusalem Report, 12 April 1999.
7. Ha'aretz, 1 February 1999; Yediot Aharonot, 15 June 1999.
8. JP, 14 March 1999.
9. Transcript, Albright, Moussa briefing in Cairo, 27 January 1999,
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990127.html>.
10. Transcript: State Department Noon Briefing, 3 February 1999,
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9902/990203db.html> .
11.. Transcript Secretary of State interview on FOX-TV, 8 February 1999.
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990208c.html>.
For a similar statement, see Transcript State Dept. Noon Briefing, 30
March 1999, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9903/990330db.html>
.
12. WP, 5 February 1999.
13. NYT, 23 March 1999.
14. Transcript State Dept. Noon Briefing, 23 March 1999,
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9903/990323db.html>. See
also: Transcript: White House Daily Briefing, 23 March 1999,
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/3/23/4.text.1>.
State Department background briefing on Arafat visit, 23 March 1999,
<http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/1999/march/me0323b.html>;
and Remarks with Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat following a meeting with
U.S. President Bill Clinton, 23 March 1999. See also Text: Transcript of State
Department Noon Briefing, 26 March 1999,
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9903/990326db.html>.
15. Text: Burns Statement on U.S.-Palestinian Joint Committee, 3 March
1999, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/970303c.html>.
See also Press Statement by James B. Foley, Deputy Spokesman,
19 February 1999
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1999/ps990219a.html>.
16. White House Press Briefing, 26 April 1999.
17. Reuters, 26 April 1999.
18. JP, 19 May 1999.
19. Press Conference by Clinton and Mubarak, 1 July 1999.
<http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/1999/july/me0701a.html>
20. Text: Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud
Barak, 19 July 1999
<http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/1999/july/me0719b.html>;
see also Text: Press Conference by President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak,
19 July 1999
<http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/1999/july/me0719c.html>.
21. WP, 19 October 1999.
22. Remarks by the President After Trilateral Meeting With Prime Minister
Barak and Chairman Arafat, The Ambassador's Residence, Oslo, Norway, 2 November
1999,
<http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/1999/november/me1102b.html>
23. Press Conference by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and
Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara, Syria, 4 September 1999,
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990904b.html>.
24. NYT, 10 November 1999.
25. Background Briefing by Senior Administration Official, 18 May 1999,
<http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/1999/may/me0518a.html>.
26. Text: U.S., Jordan sign trade and investment agreement, 15 March
1999, <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/990315_barshef_jordan.html>;
Text: U.S. designates second duty-free zone with Jordan, Israel, 15 March 1999,
<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/990315_barshef_zone.html>;
27. See, for example, Transcript: State Department Noon Briefing, 1 March
1999.
28. See Amin Tarzi, "Contradictions in U.S. Policy on Iraq and Its
Consequences," MERIA Journal Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000)
<http://meria.biu.ac.il>.
29. Text: Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe addresses Senate
Armed Services Committee, 28 January 1999.
<http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/hearings/1999/c990128.htm>
30. Text: NSC Director Bruce Riedel At Middle East Forum, 23 April 1999.
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/gulfsec/ried0426.htm>
31. Text: James Foley, Daily Press Briefing, 17 June 1999.
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9906/990617db.html>.
32. Text: James Rubin, Daily Press Briefing, 11 January 1999.
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9901/990111db.html>
33. Text: Press remarks with Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and
Argentine Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella, 12 January 1999.
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990112.html> A front-page
story in the 12 January NYT suggested that the US "is finding itself
increasingly isolated in its Iraq policy as a growing number of Security Council
members and Arab nations support lifting an embargo on Iraqi oil sales or
significantly relaxing sanctions in other ways to relieve the suffering of the
Iraqi people."
34. Iraq Chronology, August 1999.
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/gulfsec/irqchr12.htm>
35. Iraq Chronology, July 1999.
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/gulfsec/irqchr11.htm>
36. Text: Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Statement on Free
Iraqi Leaders, 20 September 1999.
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990920.html>
37. Text: Secretary of State Albright, Media Roundtable, Waldorf-Astoria
Hotel, New York, New York, 22 September 1999.
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990922a.html>
38. NYT, 11 December 1999
39. Text: Peter Burleigh Explains US Position on Omnibus Iraq Resolution,
17 December 1999.
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/991217_burleigh_un-iraq.html>.
Also see NYT, 18 December 1999.
40. Iraq Chronology, December 1999.
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/gulfsec/irqchr15.htm>.
41. Text: Secretary of State Albright, Press remarks on trip to Europe
and International Family Planning, 24 November 1999.
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/991124.html>.
42. During a press briefing on 23 December 1999, a reporter asserted that
coalition aircraft had attacked Iraq over 400 times during 1999, but this was
unconfirmed by Ken Bacon, Pentagon spokesman. Text: Kenneth Bacon, Defense
Department News Briefing, 23 December 1999.
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1999/t12231999_t1223asd.html>
43. Iraq Chronology, February-April 1999.
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/gulfsec/irqchr6.htm>.
44. Text: Defense Department News Briefing, Ken Bacon, 19 August 1999.
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug1999/t08191999_t0819asd.html>
45. Iraq Chronology, August 1999.
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/gulfsec/irqchr12.htm>
46. Text: Gen. Anthony Zinni, USMC addresses Senate Armed Services
Committee, 28 January 1999.
<http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/hearings/1999/c990128.htm>
47. Text: NSC Director Riedel at Middle East Forum, 23 April 1999.
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/gulfsec/ried0426.htm>
48. Text: Letter to the President by Trent Lott, Joseph I. Lieberman,
Jesse Helms, J. Robert Kerrey, Richard C. Shelby, Sam Brownback, Benjamin A.
Gilman, Howard L. Berman on August 11, 1999.
49. Iraq Chronology, January 1999.
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/gulfsec/irqchr5.htm>.
50. Text: James Foley, Daily Press Briefing, 14 January 1999
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9901/990114db.html>
51. Text: US Proposes Reforms To Iraqi "Oil-For-Food" Program,
21 January 1999.
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/gulfsec/burl0121.htm>
52. Text: Press Statement by James Rubin, 13 August 1999.
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9908/990812db.html>
53. Text: Press Statement by James Rubin, 27 October 1999.
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9910/991012db.html>
54. Text: Elizabeth Jones, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs, The Foreign Press Center briefing, UNICEF Report on
Sanctions on Iraq, Washington, DC, 13 August 1999.
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990813_jones_iraq.html>
55. Text: Richardson on UN 'oil-for-food' program, 17 March 1999.
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/gulfsec/rich0317.htm>
56. Text: Remarks at Millennium Evening: The Perils of Indifference:
Lessons Learned from a Violent Century, 12 April 1999.
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/4/13/4.text.1>
57. Text: James Foley, State Department Noon Briefing, 12 July 1999.
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9907/990712db.html>
58. NYT, 3 December 1999
59. NYT, 3 December 1999
60. Associated Press, published in Washington Times, 9 March 1999. See
also Bruce Riedel's statement: Excerpt: State Department Report, 17 February
1999.
61. Jane's Defense Weekly, 21 May 1999. See also Jane's Defense Weekly 13
August 1999, and Defense Department News Briefing, William Cohen, 20 October
1999. <http://www.defenselink.mil:80/news/Oct1999/t10211999_t1021uae.html>
Barry Rubin is Deputy Director of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies
and Editor of The Middle East Review of International Affairs. His books include
The Transformation of Palestinian Politics (1999);
Revolution Until Victory: The Politics and History of the PLO (1994);
Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (1982); Cauldron of
Turmoil: America in the Persian Gulf (1991), and Modern Dictators (1987).