By Barry Rubin
During 1998, the US made important changes in its policies toward Iran and Iraq. The US also remained engaged in the Israel-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace process but was frustrated by a lack of progress. Much of the year was spent in maneuverings leading to the Wye Plantation agreement, a deal that collapsed within a few weeks. In retaliation to bombings of US embassies in Africa, the US also bombed alleged terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan.
Clinton was bedeviled by domestic problems, including a scandal involving his relationship with White House intern Monica Lewinsky and a congressional impeachment which failed to remove him from office. There is no evidence, however, that these matters affected US ME policy, which continued to follow earlier definitions of interests, strategy, and goals.
"A" ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS
The year 1998 was a frustrating one for US policy regarding the peace process. The main theme was an effort to prod Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to make progress in negotiations. The US also moved somewhat closer to the Palestinian position in order to encourage Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Yasir 'Arafat to stay in the process and to reach a deal. The US attempted to be involved in the details of negotiations more than ever before.
These events culminated in the Wye Plantation agreement in October, followed by President Bill Clinton's visit to the region in December. But the new accord quickly ran into difficulties (see chapter on the Arab-Israeli peace process).
The year was full of visits to and from Washington in an attempt to restart Israel-Palestinian negotiations. In January, both Netanyahu and 'Arafat visited the US. To Netanyahu, Clinton proposed the continuation of previously agreed Israeli redeployments in the West Bank, asking that the total withdrawal include at least 10 percent of the territory.(1)
The US followed up on these efforts with a February visit to the area by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.(2) US ME envoy Dennis Ross visited Netanyahu and 'Arafat in March. Ross repeated the same process in April. 'Arafat was basically supporting the US call for an Israeli withdrawal of about 13 percent. For its part, the Israeli government insisted on prior PA security pledges.(3)
Vice-President Al Gore talked with 'Arafat and Netanyahu during his visit to the area in April and May, while Albright met with the two leaders in London during May. Nevertheless, State Department spokesperson James Rubin noted on 4 May that the situation remained "relatively unchanged." To get things moving, Albright suggested that the US host final status negotiations beginning in mid-May if there could be agreement on the next stage of withdrawals.(4)
Ross returned to the area again in May, followed by more meetings between Albright and the two leaders. Told that Israel could not meet the US's 11 May deadline to decide on a withdrawal, the US extended the date to 28 May, but did nothing when no progress resulted. Throughout June, the US continued to debate the percentages, places, timing, and Palestinian concessions that should make up a package deal for an Israeli withdrawal.(5)
The US was now playing a more central part in the Israel-Palestinian negotiations than it had ever done before during the Oslo process. It was actually presenting detailed proposals and trying to persuade both sides to accept them as the central element in its diplomacy. This situation was due to a combination of factors, mainly the two parties' inability to make progress on their own, their mutual desire for a larger US role, and an American sense that time was limited.(6) But ironically the same deadlock that led to the US taking this role also meant that the US effort would essentially fail during 1998.
During the summer of 1998, the US goal was to get the parties to respond to its proposals. It also constantly stressed the urgency of making progress, ironically at a time when both of the parties directly involved were using time to try to improve their bargaining positions. As Rubin put it, "We would like to see the negotiators put specific proposals on the table. We think they should deal with each other with...a greater sense of urgency and meet intensively so that they can make sure they've done everything they can to try to reach an agreement." The key phrase used was that Israel and the Palestinians should "refine" the American ideas until both sides reach agreement. (7)
Continually, the US leadership stressed that it had not changed its own position. The two parties would have to settle the main issues in the final status talks through bilateral negotiations, Clinton stated. "Unilateral actions and statements by either party concerning these issues are not helpful to the peace process."(8)
While the US was careful not to place blame or go far beyond repetition of its basic positions, a more candid, accurate assessment of official thinking was given by US ambassador to Israel Edward Walker in August 1998:
"In a very short time, we have gone from a situation where Israel had some form of negotiation, relationship or promising contact with virtually every Arab state, to a situation in which stalemate is eroding regional cooperation across the board. The problems in the peace process have limited contact between Israelis and Arabs and have caused optimism to be replaced by a sense of fatalism....
We have frequently defined the fundamental problem between Israel and the Palestinians as a lack of trust, lack of credibility....Indeed, we seem to have gone from a situation where no problem was too big to solve between the partners to a situation where no issue is too small to be `negotiated' endlessly.(9)
Indeed, there were no comprehensive designs or strategy involved in the US effort but rather a pragmatic, short-range effort to restart progress in any way possible going on throughout the year. On the one hand, the issues were the details of redeployment and Palestinian proof of compliance on providing security. On the other hand, the two parties were using the US to try to score points against each other, hoping that the Americans might deliver concessions from the other side. One senior Administration official admitted, "We went through a long hiatus where they were not dealing with each other, they were dealing separately with us. And the ability to make very much headway at all in an environment where they're not talking to each other is almost nonexistent."(10) They were in far less of a hurry to reach agreement than was the US.
Throughout August, Clinton continued his involvement in calls to Netanyahu and 'Arafat. A high-ranking US official said. "We are closer than we have ever been before" to an agreement on redeployment. "Very slow progress is [being] made," he added. "It is frustrating. We need closure." At the same time, Clinton complained to 'Arafat about the latter's telling the Non-Aligned Movement leaders that the US was stalling the peace process.(11)
Ross returned to the region, 9-14 September, in the words of the State Department briefer, Rubin, "close the remaining gaps and narrow the remaining differences," the details which "can become insurmountable obstacles." Rubin credited the Israelis with making "a significant movement on the size of the withdrawal" and with accepting, in principle, "the outlines of the American ideas." But with Israel having accepted a 13 percent redeployment, the Palestinians were now balking over the extent of their commitments.(12)
Following a meeting between Albright and Netanyahu in New York, on 23 September, Clinton invited Netanyahu and 'Arafat to Washington. As the two sides came closer to agreement, the level of US involvement increased.(13) Clinton met the leaders on 28 September -- hosting their first face-to-face meeting in a year -- and found enough of a basis existed to justify a Camp David-type summit meeting.(14)
A key factor in the US view was the feeling that progress was urgently needed. As Albright put it after the three-way meeting of 28 September, "We all know that the interim process, the date for it is coming...to an end, and that it's very important to give it this extra push."(15) This view was echoed by senior Administration Officials, with one explaining, "The clock is ticking -- May 4th is not that far away. To deal with the hardest issues that were reserved in this process for permanent status, we need to get on with it."(16)
Unilateral steps by either side, went US thinking, should be avoided in order not to endanger the future negotiation of all the key issues. Thus, the US criticized Israeli plans to expand Jerusalem's urban boundaries and to build more West Bank settlements. Equally, the US was concerned that the PA would unilaterally declare independence on 4 May 1999, an act that White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry said would be "a setback in the effort to achieve comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the region."(17)
Finally, after meeting with Netanyahu and 'Arafat on the Gaza-Israel Frontier, Albright was able to announce mutual agreement for a summit meeting to be held in mid-October.(18) The meeting, held at the Wye Plantation estate on the eastern shore of Maryland, from 15 to 23 October, produced an agreement along the lines that had been discussed over the previous year (see chapter on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process). Clinton praised the agreement as benefiting both sides:
"This agreement is good for Israel's security. The commitments made by the Palestinians were very strong....They include continuous security cooperation with Israel and a comprehensive plan against terrorism and its support infrastructure. This agreement is good for the political and economic well-being of Palestinians. It significantly expands areas under Palestinian authority to some 40 percent of the West Bank. It also offers the Palestinian people new economic opportunities, with an airport and industrial zone, soon safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, and in time a seaport. The Palestinian people will be able to breathe a little easier and benefit from the fruits of peace....
Every effort will have to be exerted to ensure the faithful implementation of this agreement -- not because the parties do not want to do so, but because the agreement covers many things, was developed over many days, involved many discussions and sleepless nights....(19)
The Wye Plantation agreement included a number of provisions for direct US involvement as mediator, helper, and assessor of each side's compliance with its commitments. This role included: a US-Palestinian committee to review "the steps being taken to eliminate terrorist cells and the support structure that plans, finances, supplies and abets terror;" a trilateral committee to help prevent arms smuggling; a trilateral anti-incitement committee; and "a high-ranking" trilateral committee "to assess current threats, deal with any impediments to effective security cooperation and coordination and address the steps being taken to combat terror and terrorist organizations." The US also promised to provide significant aid to both sides in order to help them implement the agreement.(20)
But, in fact, the implementation quickly bogged down, as Netanyahu charged that the Palestinians had not kept their commitments. To fulfill his pledge to oversee Palestinian abrogation of the PLO Charter (for an earlier version, see MECS 1996, pp. ), and also to help restart the fulfillment of the Wye agreement, Clinton made a three-day visit in mid-December to Israel and to the PA-ruled areas. The timing was especially dramatic given the congressional impeachment process against him going on at the same time.
Clinton sought to show US support for both Israel and the Palestinians. He promised additional aid if Israel were to take "risks for peace," including a large package to help Israel implement the Wye accord. He also became the first president to visit Palestinian-ruled territory and to speak to a PLO meeting.(21)
Clinton's historic 13 December 1998 speech to a meeting of Palestinian leaders -- including many PLO and PA officials -- clearly presented both the American and Clinton's personal perspective on the peace process. He praised the Palestinians for reaffirming their commitment to the peace process by again abrogating the PLO's Charter: "I believe it is the only way to fulfill the aspirations of your people (see chapter on Palestinian affairs)."
That same day, Clinton cut the ribbon opening the Gaza international airport, an event made possible by the Wye agreement. He asked the Palestinians to think "about how we can get beyond the present state of things-where every step forward is like- as we say in America-pulling teeth." He added, "I want the people of Israel to know that for many Palestinians, five years after Oslo, the benefits of this process remain remote. That for too many Palestinians, lives are hard, jobs are scarce, prospects are uncertain and personal grief is great....America is determined to do what we can to bring tangible benefits of peace."(22)
Shortly thereafter, Clinton(23) claimed successes in his meetings with Netanyahu and 'Arafat as both of them agreed "to energize the permanent status talks." and "to vigorously pursue the security issue." No detail was deemed too small for Clinton to involve himself with, from education for peace to how many Palestinian prisoners Israel would release. Clinton concluded, "I have achieved what I came here to achieve."(24)
Nevertheless, Netanyahu froze implementation and in late December Israel's Knesset voted to dissolve itself and hold new elections in 1999. The State Department briefer, Lee McClenny, maintained, "It's our expectation that the Wye River memorandum will be implemented as signed and without new conditions." He also indicated a US tilt toward the Palestinian position on the Wye agreements, claiming, "The Palestinians have worked hard to implement many of their commitments under the agreement, including annulling the clauses in the PLO Charter and stepping up the fight against terror."(25)
Other instances of better US-PA relations included the CIA's role in training Palestinian security forces and Hillary Clinton's sympathetic statement on creating a Palestinian state -- though the US government denied that this represented the US position on the issue.(26)
On an unrelated but interesting point, the US Defense Department reported that ME imports of US weapons were declining. In fiscal year 1997, US arms sales throughout the world totalled $8.8bn. This was, due to declining ME orders, the lowest figure in 10 years and a 15 percent decline since 1996. Egypt's purchases were 25 percent lower than 1996 levels, falling more than $350 million to $1.06bn. Jordan also reduced its purchases in 1997 by 92 percent to $18mn.(27)
"A" US POLICY AND IRAQ
During 1998, the US government had to choose among three policies toward Iraq. Since the end of the war over Kuwait in 1991, the main US emphasis had been on trying to force Iraq to implement the UN resolutions mandating that it give up Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and all facilities or materials used in making them. Thus, the first option was to try to enforce the UN resolutions and support the weapons inspectors from the UN Security Council Special Commission (UNSCOM). Occasionally, the US threatened to bomb or did bomb Iraq in order to press for its cooperation (see MECS, ).
Among the problems with this policy was that international support for it seemed to be eroding. On the one hand, several countries -- including France, Russia, and China -- were pushing for an end to sanctions altogether. On the other hand, these and other countries -- including Gulf Arab monarchies -- often seemed reluctant to support US bombing raids against Iraq.
A number of critics outside the government had argued that this strategy was ineffective. The government of President Saddam Husayn survived and continued to reject full disclosure or cooperation. Consequently, they argued for a second option: the US should carry out heavy punitive bombing raids in response to Iraqi behavior, and step up efforts to overthrow the Iraqi regime, through heightened support for dissident elements or even by a full-scale attack. (28)
President Clinton responded that while "the Iraqi people would be better off if there were a change in leadership, that is not what the UN has authorized us to do." He cited an executive order issued by President Gerald Ford stating that the assassination of foreign political leaders is "against American foreign policy interests."(29)
One vocal critic, Washington Post columnist Jim Hoagland, wrote: "Clinton appears to be veering back and forth from day to day, agonizing over options that range from a spine-breaking aerial assault that would inevitably produce heavy civilian casualties, and some US losses, to an essentially cosmetic attack that would minimize Arab and European criticism of American actions."(30)
But the Clinton administration was unwilling to take the risks or use the level of resources necessary for such an attempt. It did continue to support anti-government dissidents, though having little belief in their effectiveness. The LAT reported on 15 February that the FBI "conducted a top-secret criminal investigation of CIA officials on charges of attempting to murder Iraqi leader Saddam Husayn in 1995." But the officials were exonerated and given awards.(31) Skeptics in the CIA and Congress, the article noted, took, the fact that "CIA officers were the subject of a lengthy criminal investigation for their alleged actions in Iraq...as a strong indication that the Clinton administration is not committed to a determined effort against Husayn."(32) (For the failure of a CIA-led attempted uprising in northern Iraq in 1996[?] see MECS, pp. ).
Instead, the US government shifted to a third option, a policy of stressing the maintenance of sanctions above all. If the Iraqi government refused to cooperate with the inspectors, or even expelled them, this helped the U.S. goal of showing that sanctions were still needed against Iraq. Rather than fight to keep inspections going, then, the Clinton administration was now willing to sacrifice this scrutiny, which had already dismantled much of Iraq's WMD capacity and faced continuous Iraqi sabotage blocking further progress.
US bombings would now be used not so much to pressure Iraq to cooperate with inspections -- assuming this would not really succeed any way -- but rather to remind the world of Iraq's intransigence. Three times during 1998, the US came close to attacking Iraq, and finally did so in December.
The year's events revolved around Iraq's determination to stop the inspections and a US attempt to develop a counter-strategy. On 13 January, Iraq barred a UN inspection team led by the American William Scott Ritter Jr. from inspecting suspected weapons' storage sites and accused Ritter of espionage. Ritter left the country three days later. Saddam Husayn called for a three-month freeze on inspections and threatened to expel all UNSCOM inspectors within six months if sanctions were not lifted.(33)
In response, Clinton warned that the US might be prepared to take military action against Iraq with or without the support of the UN Security Council.(34) A key question was whether the US did enjoy backing from European allies and Gulf Arab states for such tough action. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright claimed that there was unity behind the US on this issue, saying after an international tour to mobilize support: "While they do prefer diplomatic means, not one of them urged me to tell the president not to use force."(35)
Others, however, were more doubtful on this point. The Washington Post reported:
"In Jordan and elsewhere, officials worry that a bombing campaign in the absence of an overarching strategy to oust Saddam Hussein will only win him Arab sympathy while giving him an excuse to end entirely his cooperation with the UN inspectors. For that reason, Saudi and other Arab officials have argued that the US should not attack Iraq unless it intends to threaten the regime seriously."(36)
The Kuwaitis and Saudis did hint, however, that they would support US action, and Albright stated that Bahrain and Egypt also agreed.(37) The US told the Saudis that it would not ask to use bases in that country for an attack on Iraq.(38) The crisis was defused, though, on 23 February by an agreement negotiated by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in which Iraq promised to let inspections continue (see chapter on Iraq; for more on Arab views during the year, see chapter on Inter-Arab Relations).(39)
In response to criticism that the US had "sold out and given far too much away" by accepting this agreement, Albright responded, "We have, in fact...gained, because...Saddam Husayn has reversed course, and we still have all the options open to us if he fails the test."(40) Indeed, the Clinton Administration did again warn Iraq that the US reserved the right to use force if Iraq did not permit weapons' inspections.(41)
On 5 March, Scott Ritter returned to Iraq to restart inspections.(42) Nevertheless, despite the agreement an impasse continued.(43) UNSCOM accused Iraq of concealing poison gas while Iraq responded by demanding the immediate lifting of sanctions and accusing UNSCOM personnel of being spies.(44) A proposed US concession to Iraq, offering an automatic renewal of permission to sell oil every six months, was rejected by Baghdad.(45)
Given the failure to make any progress during the first half of 1998, US-Iraq friction heated up. On 1 July, a US jet attacked an Iraqi radar site which had locked onto an allied surveillance flight.(46) On August 3, the US House of Representatives joined the US Senate in passing, by a vote of 406 to 7, Senate Joint Resolution 54, which found the Iraqi government to be in "material and unacceptable breach" of its international obligations as required by the Gulf War cease-fire.(47)
Undeterred by such moves, on 5 August, Iraq again ended its cooperation with UNSCOM. The inspectors left the country on 9 August. In September, the Iraqi parliament voted to end cooperation with UNSCOM and informed the UN of its action, calling surprise inspections "provocations" and again demanded the immediate lifting of sanctions.(48)
Again, the US had to formulate a response to a critical situation, while Republicans were criticizing the administration for ignoring Iraqi violations of its agreements in order to avoid a showdown.(49) On 27 August, UNSCOM inspector Ritter resigned, bitterly criticizing administration policy as "hampering UNSCOM’s work in an effort to avoid a new confrontation with Iraq." The State Department denied these charges.(50)
The point was that the US government was not going to escalate in an effort to force Iraq to restart inspections. It did not seem to believe that this would work any way, or that renewed inspections would not go on very long before Iraq again stopped them. The view was that by stopping inspections Iraq was acting in a manner that would extend sanctions.
This policy was indicated by the US government declaration in November that sanctions would not be lifted even if a review showed Iraq in compliance with most of its agreements. Iraq would have to implement all the UN's demands to merit a removal of sanctions.(51) To avoid further airstrikes, Secretary of Defense William Cohen responded, Iraq must cooperate fully: "Total compliance [with agreements] and unfettered access [for inspectors]...means precisely that....No more hiding and seeking and no more playing games."(52) At the same time, though, US credibility had to be maintained by the ultimate threat of force.
Once again, at the last minute, Iraq let the UN inspectors return, on 17 November. Within a short time, however, the previous pattern repeated itself, with Iraq blocking inspections.
Finally, on 16 December, the US -- along with Britain -- staged a three-day bombing raid on Iraqi targets. This step was immediately triggered, said Cohen, by a report by UNScom head Richard Butler saying that UNSCOM could not perform its functions.(53) Clinton stated that Iraq had failed to cooperate and had actually placed new restrictions on the inspectors.(54)
This action, too, was criticized by Clinton's Republican opponents. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott explained, "I am opposed to endangering the lives of brave American men and women in the military for action in Iraq that will not effect real change in that nation. He preferred military options aimed at removing Saddam Husayn from power and stepped-up support for Iraqi dissidents.(55)
Thus, while US strategy toward Iraq seemed consistent, the debate among different policy options continued.
"A" US POLICY TOWARD IRAN
US policy on Iran in 1998 was characterized initially by optimism and talk of progress in relations between the two countries that gradually, at least temporarily, diminished. American strategy toward Iran had long been premised on objections to three of that country's activities: opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, development of WMDs, and sponsorship of international terrorism.
The ultimate US goal was to pressure Tehran into changing its behavior. But the Clinton administration was also satisfied with isolating and weakening Iran, making it harder for that country to act in ways objectionable to the US. With the election of President Muhammad Khatami in 1997 (see MECS 1997, pp. ), the US sought an opening toward better relations, though this would only be possible if Iran shifted its position on the three areas of friction.
The year began with Khatami addressing the American people in a CNN interview, urging dialogue between Americans and Iranians. But he was careful not to propose any formal ties between the two governments, or even a state-to-state dialogue. The US State Department issued a statement praising Khatami's comments but arguing that it did not go far enough and insisting on direct talks between the two governments. Members of Congress urged caution and said they would be loathe to lift sanctions on the Iranian regime until Tehran demonstrated its good will toward the US.(56)
Demonstrating Washington's cautious openness to warmer relations with Iran, US Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson at one point shook hands with the Iranian foreign minister and noted that the Clinton administration had expressed a willingness to discuss improving government-to-government relations. Iran responded that cultural and educational ties should come first. "While Iran's democratically elected president speaks positive words," Richardson said, "their religious leaders send us a different signal."(57) The U.S. government also continued to report that Iran was the leading state sponsor of international terrorism.(58)
In contrast to the firm enforcement maintaining international sanctions against Iraq, however, the US made significant concessions toward other countries reluctant to adhere to its embargo on Iran. The Clinton administration ruled that while France's Total, Russia's Gazprom and Indonesia's state oil group Petronas were "sanctionable" under a US law penalizing foreign companies that invested in Iran, it would not try to enforce this measure against them.(59) Further, while the US had some complaints about Iranian cooperation on certain anti-drug activities --including stemming illicit cultivation and production -- it acknowledged that Iran had improved its record in trying to block drug smuggling and enacting legislation to stop the flow of drugs internationally.(60) Nor did the US try to counter moves by such allies as Egypt, Bahrain, and especially Saudi Arabia to improve relations with Tehran (see chapter on Iran and Saudi Arabia).(61)
The main US policy statement toward Iran was given in a June 1998 speech by Albright.(62) Neither the US nor Iran "has forgotten the past," she explained, but were "now focused on the future." Iran could, she argued, be "fully open to the world" without sacrificing any of its independence.
She identified the key new development as Khatami's election as president, "providing him with a mandate for change," including domestic reforms "and a more moderate foreign policy aimed at ending Iran's estrangement from the international community." Clinton, she continued, welcomed Khatami's call "for a dialogue between civilizations."
Albright also noted certain positive steps by Iran including some statements easing its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, condemning terrorism, stepping up anti-drug efforts, helping to mediate conflict in Afghanistan, and improving relations with neighbors. If Iran implemented these views, she suggested, there would be a friendly US response.
At the same time, she pointed to continuing problems:
"The reality that Iran's support for terrorism has not yet ceased; serious violations of human rights persist; and its efforts to develop long-range missiles and to acquire nuclear weapons continue. The US opposes, and will continue to oppose, any country selling or transferring to Iran materials and technologies that could be used to develop long-range missiles or weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, we oppose Iranian efforts to sponsor terror."
But the US wanted to change certain Iranian policies, not its regime or overall posture: "We fully respect Iran's sovereignty. We understand and respect its fierce desire to maintain its independence. We do not seek to overthrow its government. But we do ask that Iran live up to its commitments to the international community....Iran would be welcome to participate in multilateral security and peacekeeping efforts if it were willing to play a constructive role."
Finally, Albright cited some US steps toward easing bilateral relations including easing policies for travel between the United States and Iran and also cultural and academic exchanges. "We are ready to explore further ways to build mutual confidence and avoid misunderstandings. The Islamic Republic should consider parallel steps." Such a process could produce "a road map leading to normal relations. Obviously, two decades of mistrust cannot be erased overnight. The gap between us remains wide. But it is time to test the possibilities for bridging this gap."
By the end of the year, the US maintained that before lifting sanctions and reestablishing diplomatic relations, it "still need[ed] to see signs of change in Iran's behavior in several important respects: its support for terrorism, its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and its support for violent opposition to the ME peace process."(63)
"A" ISSUES OF ME TERRORISM
On 7 August 1998, bombs exploded at the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 300 people including 12 Americans and wounding over 1,000 others. After an investigation, the US struck back at the alleged perpetrators on 20 August with bombing attacks on Zhawar Kili Al-Badr camp in Afghanistan and the Shifa pharmaceuticals factory in Khartoum, Sudan. Although these attacks were criticized by many Arabs, the reaction had no negative effect on US relations with regional states. Serious questions were also later raised about whether the Sudanese plant was in fact owned by bin Liden or involved in the production of chemical weapons' substances. (64)
Clinton said the US targets were, respectively, "one of the most active terrorist bases in the world" and "a factory in Sudan associated with the [Usama] Bin Ladin network...involved in production of materials for chemical weapons" (for the vigorous Sudanese denial, see Chapter on Sudan). He continued, "Countries that persistently host terrorists have no right to be safe havens."(65)
Clinton called "the bin Ladin network of radical groups probably the most dangerous, non-state terrorist actor in the world today"(66) (for more on bin Ladin, see MECS, ; and chapter on Saudi Arabia). In justifying the reprisal attacks, Clinton gave four reasons for US action:
"We have convincing evidence these groups played the key role in the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Second, because these groups have executed terrorist attacks against Americans in the past. Third, because we have compelling information that they were planning additional terrorist attacks against our citizens and others. And, fourth, because they are seeking to acquire chemical weapons and other dangerous weapons.(67)
Secretary of Defense William Cohen argued that "rarely do numerous sources converge so uniformly and persuasively as they have in this instance....Rarely have we come to some conclusions as fast as we did; rarely has been the quality of [evidence] we collected as high as it has been."(68)
****
Thanks for research assistance to Malaika Martin and Cameron Brown.
NOTES
For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.
1. NYT, 7, 21, 22 January 1998; WP, 17 January 1998.
2. WP and NYT, 2 February 1998.
3. WP 29, 30, 31 March 1998; NYT, 26 April 1998; FT, 27 April 1998; WSJ, 30 April 1998.
4. NYT, 3, 5, 6 May 1998; WP, 1, 5 May 1998.
5. NYT, 9, 19, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19 May 1998. For details of the US plan, see NYT and WP, 5 June 1998.
6. For an example of an Israeli request for US mediation, see NYT, 23 July 1998. For an instance on the Palestinian side, see FT, 13 July 1998.
7. Transcript, State Department noon briefing, 3 August 1998.
8. Text of Clinton letter to Representative James Saxton, 6 August 1998.
9. U.S. Ambassador Edward S. Walker, Jr., text of speech at Ben Gurion University, 6 August 1998.
10. USIS, Text, Press Briefing by Senior Administration Officials,
14 October 1998.
11. AFP, 2 September 1998.
12. US Department of State daily press briefing, 8 September 1998. See also NYT, 11, 13, and 14 September 1998; WP, 13, 15 September 1998.
13. NYT, 24, 25 September 1998; WP, 28 September 1998.
14. NYT, 30 September 1998; White House, "President Clinton's Remarks After Meeting with PM Netanyahu, Chairman 'Arafat, 28 September 1998".
15. Transcript: Albright White House Briefing, After President Clinton's Meetings on ME Peace, 28 September 1998.
16. Text, Briefing by Senior Administration Officials, 14 October 1998.
17. NYT and WP, 20 June 1998; briefing by White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry, 28 May 1998.
18. Text, "Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright Following Meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman 'Arafat, Erez Checkpoint," 7 October 1998. NYT and WP, 6, 7, and 8 October 1998.
19. Text, Remarks By President William Clintonat ME Signing Ceremony, The East Room, 23 October 1998.
20. Text of Wye Plantation Agreement, 23 October 1998 (see chapter on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, Appendix One).
21. Reuters, 13 December 1998.
22. Text, Clinton speech. See also AP, 14 December 1998.
23. Text, White House, "Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with Chairman 'Arafat (Gaza City, Gaza), 14 December 1998.
24. White House, "Remarks by the President to the Press Pool, Erez," 15 December 1998.
25. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 22 December 1998.
26. NYT, 5 March, 7, 10 May 1998.
27. US Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales Program, cited in Arms Trade News, February 1998.
28. See, for example, Charles Krauthammer, WP, 6 February 1998; Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth Pollack, "The Crisis with Iraq: Reviving the Military Option," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch, No. 295, 23 January 1998; US House of Representatives, H.R. 3579, Sec. 2005: Support for Democratic Opposition in Iraq," 30 April 1998; Fred Hiatt, "Iraq Make-Believe," WP, 18 January 1998; Laurie Mylroie, "Iraq's Illegal Arms: Saddam Must Go," WT, 28 January 1998.
29. US Information Service, Transcript: "Clinton, Blair Oval Office Q & A with Reporters," 5 February 1998.
30. Jim Hoagland, WP, 11 February 1998.
31. James Risen, LAT, 15 February 1998.
32. Ibid.
33. NYT, 17, 18 and 22 January; WP, 18 January, 1998. For a critical view of US policy toward UNSCOM during this period, see Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem -- Once and For All (NY, 1999).
34. NYT, 22 January 1998.
35. USIS, Transcript: "Secretary of State's On-Board Briefing," 3 February 1998.
36. WP, 28 January 1998.
37. NYT, 2, 3, 4 February 1998.
38. NYT, 9 February 1998.
39. NYT, 24 February 1998.
40. USIS, "Transcript of Press Conference with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright following her Appearance before a House Appropriations subcommittee," 25 February 1998.
41. NYT, 4 March 1998.
42. NYT, 6 March 1998.
43. FT, 18, 19 April 1998.
44. WP, 20 April 1998; NYT, 24 April and 24 June 1998.
45. WSJ, 22 May 1998.
46. NYT, 1 July 1998.
47. JINSA Report #79, 10 August 1998.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., NYT, 12 August 1998.
50. NYT, 28 August 1998.
51. AP, 17 November 1998.
52. USIS, Transcript: "Cohen Says Iraq Leader "Has Been Completely Isolated."
53. USIS, Transcript: "DoD News Briefing, 16 December 1998, Presenter: Secretary of Defense William Cohen."
54. USIS, "Transcript: Statement by the President, The Oval Office," 16 December 1998.
55. USIS, "Senator Lott's Statement against Bombing Iraq."
56. Reuters, 8 January 1999.
57. AP, 3 February 1998.
58. NYT and WP, 1 May 1998.
59. AFP, 2 February 1999.
60. USIS, "US Government Drug Control Fact Sheet, 26 February 1998.
61. See, for example, Reuters, December 13, 1998; AFP, 13 December 1998. See also Joseph Kostiner, "The United States and the Gulf States: Alliance Need," MERIA Journal, Vol. 2 No. 2 (December 1998) and Joshua Teitelbaum, "The Gulf States and Dual Containment," MERIA Journal,
Vol. 2 No. 3 (September 1998).
62. All citations below are from US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Remarks at 1998 Asia Society Dinner,
17 June 1998," 18 June 1998. A full text is also available at <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980617a.html>.
63. USIS, "Transcript: NSC Advisor Bruce Reidel Briefing on Iraq," 26 February 1998.
64. For an analysis, see Patrick Clawson, Michael Eisenstadt,
Alan Makovsky, and David Schenker, "What do the Sudan/Afghanistan Strikes Harbinger?" Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch #337 21 August 1998.
65. US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman
"Transcript: Clinton Oval Office Remarks on Anti-Terrorist Attacks," August 20, 1998.
66. From Clinton's "Radio Address to the Nation," 22 August 1998;" from US Department of State, "Key Quotes on US Strikes Against Terrorism (Statements on August 20 actions in Afghanistan, Sudan)"
28 August 1998.
67. White House Office of the Spokesman, "Statement by the President, Transcript: Clinton Announces Anti-Terrorist Strikes,"
August 20, 1998, Edgartown Elementary School, Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts.
68. U.S. Department of Defense, "Transcript: Defense Department Background Briefing on Airstrikes," 20 August 1998.
Barry Rubin is Deputy Director of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies and Editor of Global Journal and The Middle East Review of International Affairs. His books include The Transformation of Palestinian Politics (1999); Revolution Until Victory: The Politics and History of the PLO (1994); Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (1982); Cauldron of Turmoil: America in the Persian Gulf (1991)., and Modern Dictators, (1987.)