By Barry Rubin
During 1997, the US became more engaged in the Israel-Palestinian peace process than at any time since the 1993 Oslo agreement. The year also featured an important crisis in the US effort to isolate Iraq and a potential opening in the long-frozen US-Iran relations.
THE US AND THE ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS
On 1 January 1997, President Bill Clinton contacted both Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Yasir Arafat urging them to make the "brave move" of reaching an agreement over Hebron: "The longer this goes on the
more difficult it is. We need to bear down and go on." A few days later, after three months of effort--including a full month on the scene, US special envoy Dennis Ross warned he was ready to give up and return to Washington. At last, though, an agreement was reached on 15 January.
A key part of the arrangement were secret letters from Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Netanyahu and Arafat, confirming US intentions to continue aiding the process and helping the two sides. Netanyahu was well-received on his mid-February visit to Washington. Clinton praised the Hebron agreement as having brought "a renewed sense of promise in the ME," while Netanyahu
praised him as "an exceptional friend of Israel." Clinton added, "Obviously the US wants to make whatever contribution we can to the continuation of the peace process" and pronounced himself convinced that Netanyahu "has thought through a way consistent with the security of the people of Israel that a comprehensive peace might be achieved." On Syria, Clinton said he was encouraged by ideas "worth working on." In turn, Netanyahu agreed to Clinton's request to recognize UN Security Council Resolution 242 as applying to the Golan Heights.
Thereafter, a number of events led to an impasse, however, including Netanyahu's 26 February decision to build the Har Homa neighborhood near Jerusalem, a 7 March Israeli cabinet decision to make only a small withdrawal from the West Bank, and Arafat's suspension of security cooperation with Israel and organizing of anti-Israel demonstrations.
As the situation worsened, Arafat arrived in Washington on 2 March for his sixth meeting with Clinton--and his first such visit exclusively for that purpose. The White House seemed eager to show him support and encouragement. Clinton said of Har Homa, "I would have preferred the decision not have been made because I don't think it builds confidence, I think it builds mistrust....This is also a difficult moment but I think we can work through it and go forward."
Making a comparison between Hebron and Har Homa, Clinton remarked, "This is also a difficult moment, but I think we can work
through it and go forward." White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry praised Arafat for his efforts to keep Palestinian anger at the proposed housing project from boiling over. "He's been very careful about that, and his restraint is admirable," McCurry said. The State Department announced creation of a joint US-PA committee to meet regularly to discuss diplomatic, economic and cultural concerns. "We really rolled out the carpet for Arafat," a US official said. The president's remarks were to show "that we're a little frustrated with Netanyahu."
Arafat also sought to draw the US deeper into managing the talks, He invited US--and also European and Arab-- envoys to meet in Gaza during March. The US said it was sending representatives only to be briefed on the Palestinian position. US State Department spokesperson Nicholas Burns explained, "We do understand the frustration of the Palestinian leadership. They've been buffeted by some fairly significant Israeli government decisions over the last couple of weeks." Washington believed tensions could be eased by agreements on interim issues like an airport and seaport in Palestinian-ruled Gaza, opening a route for Palestinians to travel across Israel between Gaza and the West Bank, and ending Israeli seizures of Palestinian land.
The US criticized Israel's decision to close four
Palestinian offices in east Jerusalem. Burns said it was hard "to understand why the Israeli government made such a decision at this time when there is a very difficult environment in the relationship with the Palestinians."
But the US also did not want to criticize Netanyahu's policy too much. Urging the UN Security Council to act cautiously, US Ambassador Bill Richardson said on 5 March that the Hebron deal and other progress showed "the parties retain the will, the commitment, and the ability to move forward, despite the considerable obstacles they face." This could only happen, though, by "direct negotiations between the parties....[International intervention] can only provoke mistrust and harden the positions of both sides, which will make further progress much more difficult." Consequently, the US vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning Israel.
During Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's visit on 9 March, Clinton explained that the veto "should not be interpreted as an
approval" of Israel's Har Homa project but rather a rejection of any resolution prefiguring the final status negotiations.
In the same spirit, on 7 March, the US praised--despite dissatisfaction with its extent--Israel's first phase of further redeployment. As State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns put it, "We believe this decision is a demonstration of Israel's commitment to the peace process....We hope the Government of Israel will do more in the second and third phases.
Both sides now sought increased US involvement. On 11 March, Palestinians called on the US to intervene in peace talks. Nine days later, Netanyahu proposed an immediate jump to intensive final status talks under US auspices. Ross was again sent to the region to rebuild talks. "It is essential to reestablish calm as a way to move forward the process," he said. "We cannot see a continuation of violence."
Clinton urged Israel and the Palestinians to restore an "environment of security and confidence" to revive the peace process and that he had some ideas on how to do it. "This is a difficult time in the peace process and we have a lot to talk about," he remarked at the start of a White House meeting with Jordan's King Hussein on 31 March. Jordan received two gifts: another $100mn. in US aid--half each taken from the Israeli and Egyptian aid budgets, for a total of $408mn. to Jordan for 1997--and US cancellation of the last $63.4mn. in Jordan's debts to it--the last of a canceled $700mn Jordanian debts, as the US had promised when Amman signed its October 1994 peace treaty with Israel.
In April, Clinton again met Netanyahu and rejected his proposal for a US-led Mideast summit, saying the current process offered the best hope for success. "Neither the US nor anyone else is going to impose a settlement," Ross told the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. "Obviously, we have a role to help, but we can not impose an outcome....We can't wave a magic wand and put things back on track."
Once again, on 15 April, Ross returned to the ME to follow up on the talks that had been held in Washington. Three weeks later, he went back another time for talks with Netanyahu and Arafat. The US proceeded slowly and cautiously, suggesting for example that Israel need not add buildings to West Bank settlement since so many already constructed remained empty. US Consul to Jerusalem Edward Abington suggested that the US was expressing its concerns that "Israeli settlements in disputed territory and Palestinian attacks on Israelis [are] damaging the peace process." Despite carefully balancing its rhetoric, the administration was more angry at Netanyahu than at Arafat.
As it had done with Jordan in January, during the Hebron negotiations, the US now gave Egypt a chance to mediate. In June, presidential advisor Osama al-Baz visited Washington to make proposals. "The US role is important as the sponsor of the process that started in Madrid (in 1991)," Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa explained. Yet there was still no breakthrough.
In the US government there was a debate on how to respond: present a plan, pressure one or both parties, call a Camp David-style meeting (Arafat's suggestion) or go straight to final negotiations (Netanyahu's suggestion). Many contacts were held to try to restart Israel-PA talks and security cooperation. The administration thought US pressure counterproductive, a senior official remarking, "It would have been devastating to back either one of them in the corner." Some frustration showed, though, in a 26 June speech when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said Netanyahu had "forgotten or decided to ignore" the need for talks, not unilateral acts, to solve issues, while the PA had not been sensitive enough to Israeli security concerns. But the US could do only so much if the two parties are not prepared to make hard decisions. Similarly, White House press secretary Michael McCurry said: "We cannot do for the parties what they must do for themselves, which is reconcile their differences."
A renewed series of terrorist attacks, however, brought a US tilt back toward Israel. Asked earlier if Arafat had given a green light for such operations, Albright noted, "There is clear perception of the green light but no concrete evidence....There have been efforts on his part, 100 percent efforts, to stop the violence and the terrorism, but the result has not been 100 percent," she said."He has condemned the violent acts, but there needs to be some improvement."
Referring to a 30 July bomb in Jerusalem, Clinton proclaimed, "The only answer can and must be concrete steps by the PA to increase security operations and the strengthening of security cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis." Albright echoed Israel's demand for a PA crackdown on the "infrastructure" of terrorism in the territories. On 6 August, in a major speech at the National Press Club, Albright laid out a new US approach, putting the main emphasis on a PA effort on the security side before renewing talks, albeit also calling on Netanyahu to cease provocative act, especially on settlements. Clinton also criticized the PA's effectiveness in blocking terrorism. Ross again went to the region for talks, 10-13 August.
After another bombing, on 4 September, Albright made her first visit to the ME, a week-long trip to Israel, the PA-ruled area, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Expectations in Washington were low since, as one US official claimed, "The ability to act on ideas in an environment like this is profoundly limited." The themes of mixed praise, criticism, and on the need for the local parties to take needed actions, were repeated. In her 10 September press conference in Jerusalem, Albright laid out the US position:
"Clearly, we are at a very difficult moment. Negotiations have stalled, and Israelis and Palestinians are locked in a crisis of confidence which has threatened the historic gains achieved in recent years....The PA must take unilateral...actions to root out terrorist infrastructure....There is no moral equivalence between killing people and building houses. It is simply not possible to address political issues seriously in a climate of intimidation and terror.
"At the same time, real security depends ultimately on real peace....Clearly Israel also has a responsibility to shape an environment which will give that process a chance to succeed. This means that Israel should be taking steps that build confidence and to refrain from actions that undermine confidence and trust....It is very difficult to create a serious environment for negotiations when unilateral actions are taken that prejudge or pre-empt issues reserved for permanent status negotiations."
Later that day, a US official further refined these concepts, explaining that while Arafat had to act first against terrorism he had to be given hope of an eventual political payoff. Albright's message to Israel, the official said, was that it would be "harder and harder" for Arafat to sustain a crackdown over time "in the absence of a better climate" created by Israeli actions or by Israel not taking actions that might "undermine peacemaking."
The next day, Albright urged Israel to freeze Jewish settlements and avoid "what Palestinians perceive as the provocative expansion of settlements, land confiscation, home demolitions, and confiscation of IDs....We believe that a time-out from these kinds of unilateral actions will create a climate in which...an accelerated approach can succeed in achieving a final Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement." Blaming both sides for a crisis she called "neither inevitable nor accidental" and said both failed to live up to "their full obligations as partners in peace....I am a realist and not a magician and I cannot pull a rabbit out of a hat if there is not the making of it there."
Ending the trip, she hinted that the US might walk away from a stalled process: "I cannot dedicate all of my time to the leaders of the ME. They must make decisions by themselves." Claiming some progress had been made on Israel-PA relations, she added that on the Israel-Syria track, "in the absence of an elevator, we have decided to take the steps. At least we agreed to talk about future talks."
Indeed, there seemed to be some advance. On 28 September,
Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy and PA chief negotiator Mahmud `Abbas (Abu
Mazin) met with Albright. Her proposal was to take both sides goals and combine
them into a four-part package: another Israeli redeployment and a
"time-out" on settlement expansion in exchange for Palestinian
security cooperation and accepted of accelerated final status talks. Israel and
the PA announced they were ready to resume the joint committees' meetings in
October. "We all agreed," remarked Albright in announcing this
development, "that it is essential to re-energize the Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations and to create the kind of environment necessary for those
negotiations to succeed," Signalling an even more intense American
involvement, she added, "The US is prepared to do everything possible to
assist the parties in these efforts. Indeed, the parties have asked us to play a
role." On 8 October, Arafat and Netanyahu met together for the first time
in eight months.
Yet again there was no smooth progress, despite Ross's returning to the region in early October. Albright reportedly refused to accept a phone call from Netanyahu as a signal of discontent after he announced new housing units in a settlement which he had not mentioned to her in a conversation shortly before.
The US, however, pursued the same strategy. Clinton told visiting Israeli President Ezer Weizman that he did not want to invite Netanyahu and Arafat to Washington for a summit since he feared such an effort would fail because of the wide gap between the sides. Pressure would be used to give a final push to resolving specific issues, since it was not expected to help in the overall atmosphere. The US also took a strong stand encouraging Arab participation in the November Qatar economic summit, which Albright attended.
Finally, on 3 November (almost a month later than originally planned), talks in Washington began between Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy and PA chief negotiator Abu Mazen, even then these conversations were limited in extent and the negotiators were given only limited authority by their respective leaders.
Giving his views at a Washington ceremony honoring Netanyahu's predecessor, Shimon Peres, Clinton gave the most comprehensive picture of his view on the issue:
"Both sides have got to realize the need for urgency. The window...will become smaller with time....That is why we want the parties to work intensively on the matters that Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat have undertaken to discuss: security cooperation, redeployment of Israeli forces, a time-out on provocative actions, the acceleration of permanent status talks. By addressing these issues, we can establish for Israelis and Palestinians that peace will bring tangible benefits. By speeding the progress on this track, we can move closer to invigorating negotiations between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria to establish a lasting and comprehensive peace. In recent weeks, as Iraq has challenged the United Nations, we have been reminded again... that the absence of that peace makes the other difficulties, tensions and frustrations all the more troubling because it compounds them and undermines our ability to seek a unified solution.
As a sign of displeasure, Clinton avoided inviting Netanyahu to meet with him, even during Netanyahu's trip to the US. Netanyahu responded by complaining, "The Americans are treating me like Saddam Hussein."
At year's end, amidst hints that the US might lower its involvement in the peace process if no progress was made, Albright conducted a series of meetings with Netanyahu and Arafat--on 14-15 November and 6 and 18 December--to discuss restarting progress in the peace process and especially requesting Netanyahu's plan for a second withdrawal. "Time is not on the side of those who would make peace," she said but nonetheless agreed--given Netanyahu's request and his government's coalition disputes--to postpone receiving a detailed Israeli plan until early 1998. At this time, Clinton also issues an invitation for Netanyahu to visit him in 1998.
The US had not been able to achieve much progress on the Israel-Palestinian track, and none whatsoever on the Israel-Syria track, during most of 1997. The Clinton administration had placed the emphasis on the local parties being flexible, while encouraging them to create an atmosphere in which advances could take place. At best, the administration could argue that the peace process was still alive and that no serious confrontations had taken place.
DEALING WITH IRAQ
In terms of US-Iraq relations, however, there were a number of confrontations. Regarding the Iraqi government, the US wanted Saddam Hussein to fall, using sanctions--and a limited covert operation--toward that end. At the same time, though, the US had to maintain that sanctions would be removed if Iraq complied with all the UN requirements, especially eliminating his weapons of mass destruction. A number of domestic critics claimed that the White House was too soft and indecisive on Iraq, while foreign allies demanded a further easing of sanctions against Baghdad. These various pressures erupted in a major crisis during November and December.
Clearly, US efforts to overthrow Saddam had faltered. These included leaflet drops from unmanned aircraft, military training and supplies to Kurdish guerrillas in northern Iraq, and radio and television propaganda denouncing the Saddam Hussein regime. During 1996, the CIA ran anti-Saddam radio stations in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and Jordan. As Kurdish groups fought among themselves and Iraqi soldiers advanced northward, about 6,000 anti-Saddam Kurdish activists were evacuated from Iraq and resettled by the US. Over $110mn. was spent on all these efforts, which WP columnist Jim Hoagland called one of "the agency's most expensive and embarrassing flop[s] since it was founded."
In a letter to Congress, 23 September, Clinton detailed US policy on the Iraqi Kurdish issue. The US sought to reconcile feuding Kurdish groups and limit Iranian or Iraqi influence in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq. The leaders of the two Kurdish groups were invited to the US and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani visited the US in late July to meet high-ranking US officials. Humanitarian relief was also provided.
To maintain leverage against Iraq and Iran while ensuring the defense of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, the US maintained a variety of military forces in the Gulf. For example, 30 F-15 and F-16 fighter jets were sent to Qatar for three months in February 1997. About 200 US planes were permanently stationed in the Gulf region, along with naval units patrolling there. Joint military exercises were also held with Kuwait, for example the March ("Intrinsic Action") and September 1997 operations and the April naval training maneuvers. In September, two US Air Force B-1 bombers also flew on a training exercise to Bahrain, including a simulated bombing near the Kuwait-Iraq border.
On 11 June, the US supported a proposed UN resolution seeking a tougher anti-Iraq stand if Baghdad's behavior did not change. But Washington was aware of eroding support for sanctions on the part of allies, especially France and Russia. Clinton tried to persuade Russian President Boris Yeltsin to support such measures during their July meeting. The US-backed resolution did not succeed.
The area remained fairly quiet until October, when Iranian planes attacked anti-regime opposition group bases in Iraq, followed by Iraqi sorties in the southern "no-fly" zone. The US Defense Department announced on 2 October that the USS Nimitz was being rushed to the Gulf. While warning Iran to stay out of that airspace, Secretary of Defense William Cohen said the Nimitz's dispatch was "to send a signal to Iraq that the coalition is serious about enforcing the no-fly zone over Southern Iraq." If Iraqi planes sent aircraft into the no-fly zone, they are going to risk being shot down.
Iraq was also thought to be seeking excuses to block UN weapons' inspections. Responding to a report by the UN inspectors citing Iraqi harassment, State Department spokesperson Jamie Rubin said the UN wanted "the strongest possible action" by the UN Security Council to back the inspectors. "The whole world knows that an Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction is a threat to the whole world." US policy was that if Iraqis did not comply, "They are never going to have the sanctions lifted and they will never be able to rejoin the community of nations."
But despite these threats and military build-up, the US proceeded cautiously because it lacked international support. Within the US itself, a number of articles criticized the US policy for being too willing to delegate authority to the UN and too unwilling to use force or try harder to overthrow Iraq's government. "We are stumbling over ourselves as we run around, reacting to the challenges to sanctions by the bad guys and their friends, and dealing with an unilateralist Congress," admitted one senior administration official. "It would be farcical if it were not such serious business."
The US case for a stronger anti-Iraq effort was stated by Ambassador Richardson on 23 October:
"It is amazing to me that, after six and a half years, this body still must consider new approaches to convince Iraq to comply with its international obligations. Only one party is responsible for this sad state of affairs -- the Baghdad regime.
Six and a half years after the liberation of Kuwait, Iraq still refuses to meet its most basic obligations.... UNSCOM cannot complete this task, frankly, because Iraq will not cooperate....Iraq has lied about its programs for too long, and too recently, for us to settle for anything less than absolute certainty that Iraq's nuclear ambitions have been completely neutralized. When accounting for nuclear weapons, close is not good
enough. If you fail to account for just one nuclear device, that could mean the destruction of an entire city.
Nevertheless, a watered-down resolution barely passed the Security Council. Albright's statement that "Saddam Hussein remains trapped in a strategic box, unable to threaten Iraq's neighbors -- or us" seemed an optimistic assessment of the situation.
Indeed, only two days later the crisis intensified with a new Iraqi offensive. Iraq announced that it would expel all Americans participating in the UN inspection effort. The US turned to the UN to handle the crisis and, when no progress was made, asked the Security Council to bar the travel abroad of Iraqi officials involved in the weapons' program, a rather mild sanction. On 13 November, however, Iraq expelled the Americans, the UN pulled out the rest of the inspectors, and on 14 November Clinton announced the sending of another aircraft carrier to the Gulf.
Meanwhile, US and British diplomats prepared a resolution condemning Iraq and putting a travel ban abroad on Iraqi officials involved in that country's weapons' program. But they did not seek to say Iraq was in violation of its commitments, a formulation that would have authorized using force against it.
On 16 November, Albright made an unscheduled trip to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain seeking support for stronger US action--and apparently finding little backing. Her staff also leaked that the US was ready to offer Iraq a "little carrot" for cooperating.
Criticizing this US policy, Hoagland wrote:
"Each new confrontation saps respect for America [and]...demonstrates the futility of military force that is not harnessed either to an effective political strategy or to the political will to deal with a declared enemy who has secreted away deadly VX poison gas, several score Scud missiles and anthrax weapons."
The US did have considerable forces in the region by November, including the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz with its 50 combat aircraft and 20 support aircraft, together with two cruisers, four destroyers and three guided missile frigates, plus one attack submarine, and 120 Air Force fighters. They were joined by the USS George Washington and its battle group, plus 6 B-52s, 4 KC-135 tankers, and a 30-plane Air Expeditionary Force consisting of F-15 and F-16 fighters. The US thus had 29,000 soldiers in the area as well as 200 combat aircraft.
The US also had reason to believe that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction, from sources including defectors and US interception of arms smuggling efforts. Assistant Secretary of Defense Kenneth H. Bacon explained, "We assume...this is a real and present danger, and that's why this current dispute between Iraq and the United Nations has such strong and dramatic consequences, and that's why the UN is taking it so seriously.
Finally, after a 19 November meeting between Albright and the British, French, and Russian foreign ministers in Geneva, Switzerland--where she accepted a Russian compromise--Iraq agreed to accept back the UN monitors. The US claimed victory. Briefing reporters on 20 November, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, said Saddam had "set back the date by which...one can imagine UNSCOM completing its work, because...there has been disruption," reunited and focused the international community "on the threat that Saddam Hussein poses by his weapons of mass destruction program, and made it possible to maintain, "the most pervasive sanctions regime in the history of mankind which has been imposed on him since the Gulf War remains intact. I have a hard time computing that as anything except a setback for him."
Clinton stated that the inspectors' "unconditional return is an important achievement for the international community. It shows once again that determined diplomacy backed by the potential of force is the only way to deal with Saddam Hussein."
Soon, however, there was a new confrontation over Iraq's closing many areas to the inspectors. "It is clear that there is a massive amount of work that has to be done there, especially in the chemical and biological inspection areas," Clinton stated. "The sanctions will stay in place, the US secretary defense, William Cohen, said. "There is no hope of them being lifted" unless Iraq's policy changed.
But the US had also made concessions over Iraq's oil-for-food sales and on some aspects of the inspection rules, been unable to mobilize strong international pressure against Iraq, and saw the coalition weakened further.
AN OPENING TO IRAN?
Throughout 1997 there was a debate about the advisability of a US policy shift toward seeking better links to Iran alongside a growing American concern about Iran's unconventional arms' build-up and eroding sanctions against that regime.
Vice-President Al Gore said that US intelligence showed "a vigorous effort by Iran to obtain the technologies it needs to build a ballistic missile and to build nuclear weapons." Gore and the President's special envoy on Russian-Iranian proliferation issues, Ambassador Frank Wisner, met Russian leaders on several occasions to express US concern about their help to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Two men, one an Iranian citizen, were arrested in January on charges of conspiring to ship chemicals that could be used to make nerve gas to Iran, in violation of the US trade embargo.
The US also protested a $2bn. deal involving French and Russian companies to develop an offshore Iranian natural gas field at South Pars. The Clinton administration vowed to "take whatever action is appropriate under the law" passed in 1996 to permit sanctions against such investments.
The 26 May Iranian election of a relative moderate, Muhammad Khatemi, as president sparked further discussion. Albright remarked in congressional testimony, "What is most important is actions" to show Iranian behavior was changing. "We face an extremely difficult and complex situation." In July, 222 members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to Clinton urging the administration to maintain tough sanctions against Iran, encourage Europe to join this effort, and do more to condemn Iran's role in backing terrorism.
In speeches during December, Khatemi made overtures going far beyond previous Iranian statements toward renewing talks with the US, making this an issue with which administration policy would have to contend in 1998. (See chapter on Iran.)
GULF SECURITY AND US-SAUDI RELATIONS
The US policy in the Persian Gulf included an effort to contain both Iran and Iraq, along with help for the Arab monarchies in protecting their security through arms sales and a direct military presence.
Between 1990 and 1997, the six GCC members signed contracts to buy $36bn. worth of US arms, constituting 32 percent of the total $110.8bn. in US arms exports during that period. During 1997, such new sales included, for example, a $1bn. contract to modernize the Saudi Arabian National Guard's light armored vehicles; a $53mn. communications package for Saudi Arabia; $27mn. for 72 Seasparrow missiles for the United Arab Emirates (UAE); and $90mn. for 24 Harpoon missiles to the UAE. Clinton said he would "seriously consider" a Saudi request for 102 F-16 jet fighters for about $5bn., along with up to $15bn. for parts and maintenance, while promising to preserve the US commitment for an Israeli qualitative military edge over neighbors.
There was some strain between the US and Saudi Arabia, however, over the investigation following a truck bomb attack on a US military housing complex there which killed 19 US soldiers. There were complaints by the Attorney General Janet Reno and the FBI over a lack of cooperation in seeking those responsible. US intelligence sources said the Saudis attributed the attack to Iranian-backed saboteurs. One angry US official said that in the Saudis' eyes, "We are not partners and we are not friends. We are just the people at the top of their food chain of hired help." To improve security, a new base was built at the isolated Prince Sultan Air Base for 4,000 US personnel.
Questions were also raised about the future relationship when Saudi ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar ibn Sultan, suggested that Saudi Arabia viewed the US troop presence in the Gulf as a temporary necessity that could wane once Saddam Hussein would be out of power in Iraq.
But after Prince Sultan, second deputy prime minister and defense minister of Saudi Arabia, visited Washington to discuss threats from Iran and Iraq. US officials said, "US-Saudi relations are strong and will remain so." Clinton pledged to "work with Saudi Arabia to respond to any external threats to our mutual interests."
TERRORISM AND US ME POLICY
Meanwhile, the US case against the attackers of the US installation in Saudi Arabia fell apart when Hani Abdel Rahim Hussein Sayegh, a Saudi dissident linked to that bombing, rejected the plea agreement that was the basis of his deportation from Canada to the United States. US officials believed Sayegh to be an Iranian-trained terrorist who was a driver and lookout during the bombing. Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi dissident whose citizenship had been taken away, said that if US troops did not withdraw from Saudi Arabia, a battle against them would begin, "If someone can kill an American soldier, it is better than wasting his energy on other matters," Omar Bin Ladin said. "We have focused our declaration of jihad on striking at the US soldiers inside Saudi Arabia." Threats of attack were reported against US personnel in Saudi Arabia and the 1,000 Americans stationed in Bahrain.
The State Department's annual report on terrorism labeled Iran "the primary state sponsor" of this problem. Specifically, US and Saudi intelligence linked a senior Iranian government official to a group of Shiite Muslims suspected of the 1996 bombing in Saudi Arabia. State Department officials said there was "credible evidence that a small group of Bahraini militants with a stated aim of overthrowing the [Bahraini] government had received assistance and training from Iran."
FBI Director Louis J. Freeh told Congress that he had tripled the bureau's counter-terrorism efforts in the past three years to 2,600 positions. He warned that ME terrorist groups--including Hamas and Hizballah--had established cells in the US and that during 1997, two US embassies had been targets of bomb plots. The US also sought to deport Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzouk. On 4 May, Marzouk gave up his US residency permit and was deported to Jordan. He had been detained in July 1995 as a suspect of involvement with planning terrorist attacks against Israel. Hamas threatened to attack Americans if he were sent to Israel and `Arafat asked that he not be deported. In May, US District Judge Kevin Duffy ruled, "There is more than sufficient evidence to show [he] was a member of the conspiracy known as Hamas" and could be extradited to Israel. Israel withdrew its extradition request for "reasons linked to security and the prevention of terrorism."
In July, the Clinton Administration lifted a 10-year-old ban on the travel of US citizens to Lebanon, to avoid their being taken hostage, after receiving assurances from Lebanon's government that it would cooperate "across the board" to fight terrorism. Albright warned, however, that it was still unsafe for Americans to travel to Lebanon. On 10 November, Clinton announced that he had dropped Syria and Lebanon from the US list of major drug trafficking countries.
Despite the administration's strong stand against terrorism, there was no counter-terrorism coordinator appointed at the State Department for most of 1997. Two laws passed in 1996--the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act--gave the White House more tools but these were not actually used. No sanctions were imposed on foreign companies for making deals with Iran. The Administration exempted Syria and Sudan from the ban on financial transactions with state-sponsors of international terrorism.
The US attitude to Syria was conditioned by that country's role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Between 1992 and 1997, US companies sold Syria nearly $1bn. in goods, including $250mn. in 1997, making the US the sixth largest exporter to Syria. The part of this commerce involving "dual use" goods, generally prohibited to countries which sponsor terrorism, rose from $1mn. in 1991 to $81mn. in 1997.
The exemption to Sudan allowed Occidental Oil, a contributor to Clinton's campaign, to take a $930mn. stake in a Sudanese oilfield project in August, though the deal fell through. The US, however, gave military aid to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda to aid Sudanese rebels. Albright described Sudan as a "viper's nest" of international terrorism but the State Department announced an intention to return diplomats to Khartoum, then reversed the decision. Meanwhile, Libya circumvented the embargo against it by buying US goods--including some with military applications--through the US's NATO allies.
The US encouraged its European allies to maintain pressure on radical states. For example, Albright told European leaders she was disturbed by the policy of maintaining trade and political links with Iran and Libya. "Supporting states that support terrorism," said Albright, creates genuine problems for us.
A brighter spot in US strategic efforts was the resignation of the Turkish government of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns remarked, "We trust that the secular democratic foundation of the Turkish Government will continue," He also endorsed Israel-Turkish military cooperation as a US "strategic objective....If certain Arab countries don't like that, that's just tough."
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