By Barry Rubin
During 1996, the priority for US ME policy continued to be on the Arab-Israeli peace process but it also focused on issues concerning the Persian Gulf and terrorism.
Israel-Palestinian negotiations had progressed to the point that they were now being conducted on a bilateral basis between the parties. Washington continued to be the mediator in Israel-Syria talks but was discouraged by a lack of progress. Benjamin Netanyahu's election as Israel's prime minister in May was a new factor requiring adjustments to US strategy.(1)
On the Gulf front, US efforts focused on tightening sanctions against Iran and gaining international support for them. Maintaining sanctions against Iraq while trying to contain Saddam Husayn also played an important role in US policy, escalating to a short-lived deployment of troops against Iraq in September.
Terrorist attacks within Israel, against US forces in Saudi Arabia, and even within the US itself--though not always ME related--pushed American attention toward that issue to a record high. For the first time, ME terrorism became a domestic problem in US politics and society.
The November US presidential elections also had some effect on US ME policymaking, though it is not really clear that this factor made the US less active or do things differently than it would have otherwise.
US ME policy continued its overall strategy of trying to strengthen moderate countries and increase regional stability, while seeking to weaken and isolate radical states. The former goal was pursued by backing the Arab-Israeli peace process, basing military forces in the area to preserve Gulf security, and providing aid and arms sales' programs. The latter effort involved maintaining and tightening sanctions against Iran, Iraq, and Libya.
I. THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS
Israel-Palestinian negotiations, January-May 1996
The US continued its task as sponsor of the Israel-Palestinian peace process though, for most of the year, it played a less direct role in this regard than in previous years.
While Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited the ME in February, the first major US engagement of the year came in response to the wave of terrorist attacks against Israel during February and March.(2) The US saw this wave of assaults as jeopardizing progress in the peace process.
President Clinton called an anti-terrorist meeting of world leaders at Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, in March which promised support for the peace process and international cooperation against terrorism. Immediately afterward, he flew to Israel on 14 March, addressed the Knesset, and met with both Prime Minister Shimon Peres and opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu. He pledged to provide $100 m. in anti-terrorist technology including sensors to find explosives so that goods and people could move faster through checkpoints between the Palestinian Authority-administered lands and Israel.(3)
Israeli ministers said they were very moved by Clinton's unprecedented attendance at a cabinet meeting. "There sat the President of the US, going over the details of the personal security of every one of us," said one of the ministers.(4)
But it was also revealed that the US government had previously withheld some such anti-terrorist equipment for more than a year, over concern that Israel might transfer technology to other nations or over payment arrangements. A State Department official said, "In retrospect, we probably should have found a way to provide it. More than preventing attacks like we saw last week, which it may have, we should have been concerned with criticism of turning a blind eye towards Israel's security needs."(5)
Following up on these talks and the Lebanon crisis, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres visited Washington in late April, where he reached agreements on increased cooperation over counterterrorism and developing early-warning systems against missile attacks. Under this new arrangement, said US Defense Secretary William Perry, the US would Clearly the truce was violated by Hizbollah."(9)
Christopher shuttled between Israel, Syria, and other countries during late April, until achieving a ceasefire on 25 April. During one visit to Damascus, the secretary of state was snubbed by Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad. It was difficult for the Americans to reconcile Syrian expressions of its desire for peace with the Syrian leader's refusal to accept Israel's reported offer to return the Golan Heights, and his continued backing--or at least permissiveness--toward Hizbollah and extremist Palestinian groups.(10)
Afterward, Christopher stated, "I am more concerned than ever as to whether [Asad] will be able to execute his intention [for peace] because of his suspicion and fear....His hesitancy and mistrust is so deep that it causes apprehension, worrying, that somehow he's been taken advantage of by the Israelis."(11)
Clearly, there was a shift in the US analysis of the situation. The hope of an Israeli-Syrian deal in 1996 had dissipated already by May, even before Israel's elections. One high-ranking US official explained that "real peace...is not within sight. Asad has defined a set of peace requirements that are not compatible with Israeli requirements." Asad was now perceived as posing as flexible to maintain his importance to the US, while playing such radical cards as his influence over Hizbollah, Lebanon, and Turkish Kurdish rebels, as well as an alignment with Iran.(12)
While the cease-fire agreement Christopher brokered in Lebanon included a provision calling for an early resumption of peace talks after Israel's 29 May election, a senior aide to Christopher said, "The experience of negotiating that cease-fire was so tough it taught us something about Asad." It would be tough to go forward. Publicly, Christopher usually maintained his optimism, saying that diplomatic efforts "have provided a solid foundation for progress when negotiations resume, and I hope they'll resume very soon."(13)
Thus, American rethinking resulted in no actual change in US policy. The administration still refused either to put more pressure on Syria or to reduce its efforts on that front.(14)
Israel's election
The NYT remarked--with some hyperbole--that Israel's 29 May 1996 balloting was the most internationally scrutinized election in modern history: "President Clinton has virtually campaigned for Prime Minister Shimon Peres."(15) It was obvious that the Clinton administration preferred the reelection of a Labor party-led government. But the US government also did not alter its regional agenda or tactics in order to seek such an outcome. It did not revise its agenda by slowing the peace process, giving Israel unusual benefits, or putting more pressure on Syria and the Palestinians for concessions in order to help Peres.(16)
The main claim of US interference arose from some remarks by Clinton shortly before the balloting:
"We believe that, ultimately, [the peace process] is the only way to bring peace and security. And we want both peace and security. I think that's what they all want. I think that's why the race is so close....If they decide to stay on the path of peace, we will share the risk....Whatever decision they make, we, obviously--all countries--will accept and respect. But if they decide to stay with peace, we will do what we can to make sure they can have security as well."(17)
Clinton's statement that the Israeli election largely hinged on attitudes toward the peace process could be interpreted as saying that a Likud victory would be bad for the cause of peace and mean diminished US support. The text indicates, however, that this was not his intention. Clinton was clearly attempting to give a noncommittal answer.
The US president noted that he believed all the candidates sought "both peace and security." The "race is so close" because the differences were not so broad. If the winner chose "to stay on the path of peace" US help in doing so would be available. Whatever decision Israeli voters made, the US would accept and respect it. If Israel did not make compromises that could entail risks by, for example, giving up territory--a common US formulation for many years--additional security assistance to make up for such concessions would not be required.(18)
Asked in a 28 May press briefing whether Clinton, "by implication, is...saying one candidate is for peace and the other is not," White House spokesperson Mike McCurry replied, "No, I think he made it very clear that's a decision that has to be made by the people of Israel....The President reiterated...that as Israel takes further risks for peace towards the goal of a just and comprehensive lasting peace in the region, the US will stand with Israel.....I'm not going to endorse any candidate and neither did the President." As an example of a need for US assistance, he added, an Israel-Syria agreement would involve "substantial security risks that Israel would need to look at carefully, and we are prepared to be there."(19)
While there can be no doubt that the Clinton administration preferred a Peres victory, there was no significant interference in Israel's election. Nor is there any reason to believe that Israeli voters were swayed by this US preference.
In short, the US carried out business as usual during the period leading up to the Israeli elections, though some perceived the Sharm al-Shaykh summit and Clinton's visit to Israel as intended to help Peres. Aside from the arguable wording of a single Clinton statement, though, there was no hint of explicit partisanship or interference. If Washington was following a strategy largely parallel to that of Peres, this was simply a result of a long-standing American policy and perception of its own interests unrelated to the imminence of an Israeli election.
The US and the Netanyahu Government
Both aspects of this American attitude were clear immediately after Netanyahu's victory. On an official and public level, Clinton said, "We ought to give the new prime minister a chance to put his government together and develop a policy," while promising to continue support for Israel. At the same time, a US official said he himself was "absolutely devastated" by the outcome and predicted that "the consequences will be catastrophic." The NYT editorialized that Netanyahu's victory meant the peace process which the administration had worked so hard on "is effectively dead."(20)
Whatever people in the Clinton administration thought, it made every effort to smooth out any differences with the new Israeli government. Christopher visited Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians in June to test the situation following Israel's election and the Arab summit. He said he would encourage Netanyahu to foster "good communications" with the Palestinians and would offer Netanyahu a "history lesson" on course of negotiations.(21)
On 9 July, Netanyahu met Clinton in Washington and the next day was well received when he addressed a joint session of Congress. Clinton stated that "Israel has changed governments, but the historic relationship between the US and Israel has not and will not change. The bonds that unite us are as strong as ever today." He professed to believe the new prime minister would pursue the peace process vigorously, being "encouraged" by Netanyahu's statements that he would work to implement the agreements with the Palestinians fully and continue talks with Syria. Clinton said he didn't "believe the US could make peace on behalf of Israel, that only Israel and its neighbors can make these decisions through direct negotiations."(22)
While the Clinton administration was increasingly involved in its own reelection bid, contacts continued on the Arab-Israeli peace front, especially to restart Israel-Syria talks. During a visit to Washington on 31 July, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak asserted, "The continuation of an active American role is essential to the success of our endeavors." Asked about the new Israeli government's policies, the American president responded that he did not want "to blame them for something they haven't done yet....We expect and believe that Israel will adhere to the agreements it has already made." He added that letting existing Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza areas grow naturally--as opposed to establishing new ones--was not considered to be a violation of the Israel-Palestinian accords.(23)
Between July and September, a number of efforts were made to restart the Israel-Syria talks. US coordinator on the peace process Dennis Ross visited the ME to search for ways to reenergize the Israel-Syria talks. US Senator Arlen Specter carried messages between the two countries. The issue was a central subject during Netanyahu's September visit to the US.(24)
When rioting erupted in the West Bank and Gaza later in September, following the opening of a tunnel near Jerusalem's Temple mount, Clinton called on both sides to "avoid unnecessarily provocative actions" and hurriedly convened a two-day summit meeting of Netanyahu, `Arafat, and King Husayn in Washington. While it seemed probable that this meeting would achieve no gains, "the greatest risk, frankly, was to do nothing," said Burns. "That would be to abdicate our responsibility." In ME affairs, Burns declared, "We're the indispensable country."(25)
Having invested so much effort in the issue, and given US responsibility for the process, Clinton knew a failure would make him look bad and be costly for US interests. But despite his Republican opponent Robert Dole's criticisms of Clinton and call to give "full support" for Netanyahu, ME issues had little or no effect on the US election. At the same time, however, a return to US mediation arguably marked a major step back for a process requiring intimate and on-going contacts between the two parties.(26)
Clinton let Netanyahu and `Arafat meet alone most of the time, while officials, including Christopher, held three-way talks. Burns explained that Netanyahu and `Arafat "are in control of this summit, and they should be in control."(27) Israeli officials said they rejected Clinton's request to set a date for the previously agreed partial withdrawal of troops from the West Bank city of Hebron. But Cristopher played a role in persuading the two sides to agree to begin holding daily talks. Christopher attended the first session, held at Erez checkpoint, in early October.(28)
Clinton claimed his goal for the meeting was achieved, "to seek to curb the terrible violence and death that we saw last week [and] get the Israelis and the Palestinians talking again at the highest levels" so negotiations could progress. "We've come a long way in the last three years. No one wants to turn back."(29)
Other assessments were more pessimistic, with the WP reporting there was no "narrowing of the explosive differences." after 40 hours of round-the-clock negotiations in the White House and nearby Blair House, Even Clinton acknowledged that results had fallen short of his hopes. Still, Clinton himself said a little sadly: "We have not made as much progress as I wish we had." But he urged Palestinians, "Please, please give us a chance to make this thing work in the days ahead."(30)
Netanyahu, in effect, defended Clinton from Dole's criticism, "Did you want him to do nothing? We had a major rupture. [Clinton] offered his good offices and we both agreed that he could perform an important service by...facilitating the talks between us. He did exactly that." Clinton conceded that Netanyahu and `Arafat had "failed to resolve their differences," but added: "We are in better shape than we were two days ago."(31)
American officials said they expected Netanyahu to keep his promise to settle the Hebron issue, and said that a failure to do so would harm US-Israel relations. "Netanyahu's message seems to be: Oslo, but no farther," one official said.(32)
During October and November, Ross participated actively in Israel-PA talks over the withdrawal from Hebron, suggesting bridging proposals. Christopher met with `Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy in Cairo during the November economic conference there and also discussed this issue. "A final set of very specific understandings on Hebron is close at hand," he announced. But Ross left the region in mid-November without having achieved a breakthrough.(33)
In mid-December the Clinton administration expressed some criticism of Netanyahu's policies and unease at the lack of progress in the process. Burns voiced disappointment at the lack of a breakthrough on Hebron, saying the US blamed Israel and the Palestinians equally for the impasse. He called the Israeli government's decision to restore special economic benefits to Jewish settlers, "troubling.....Settlement activity clearly complicates the peace process." Clinton told a press conference on 16 December that "the talks were at a critical juncture....The situation is full of tension, and full of frustration." He added that "the time has come to make" an agreement on Hebron and stated that he thought nothing should be done concerning settlements "which would in effect be seen as pre-empting the outcome of something they have already agreed...should be part of the final negotiations."(34)
Ross returned to the region on 21 December to press for a resolution over Hebron. The US was now placing blame on `Arafat for holding up a deal. Said a senior US official, `Arafat was "unwilling to bring it to closure and if it doesn't happen soon, he's going to be the loser." The Palestinians, he said, appeared to be trying to squeeze further concessions out of Israel before signing the agreement, which had been all but complete for weeks. The unusually strong comments followed Christopher's statement that "the Israelis have made some moves in connection with Hebron. We think it's time for the Palestinians, for Chairman `Arafat, to respond to those moves, to reciprocate those moves." When he returned to Washington to brief Clinton on 25 December, however, Ross expressed optimism that the talks were succeeding.(35)
US-Jordan relations
In steps toward closer US-Jordan relations, the US sold Jordan $300m. worth of used planes (including 16 F-16 fighters), tanks, and other equipment, while providing $200m. more for military construction, training, and maintenance. Two months later, the US sent 34 fighter planes to Jordan to perform reconnaissance missions in the "no fly" zone of Iraq. Clinton also designated Jordan as a major non-NATO ally of the US in November, giving it "priority consideration" for military aid and equipment.(36)
II. RADICAL FORCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF TERRORISM
As the world's sole superpower, sponsor of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and leader of the coalition which had defeated Iraq in 1991, the US felt a key responsibility for maintaining ME stability and the survival of allied governments. Equally, those who opposed the ME status quo wished to combat and reduce US influence and prestige in the region. The US strategy of "dual containment" toward Iran and Iraq was the counterpart to its policy on the peace process.
The US State Department list of countries sponsoring terrorism including five ME states: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Sudan. Defense Department and State Department reports called Iran, "the premier state sponsor of international terrorism." They accused Iran of developing nuclear, biological, and missile systems; Libya of building a chemical warfare plant; and Iraq of being able to renew germ weapon production if UN inspections ended.(37) Christopher also accused Iran of trying to sabotage the Arab-Israel peace process, saying the US possessed mounting evidence that Iranian-trained terrorists had been dispatched to attack Israel.(38) A series of events heightened US concerns over radical regimes and the threat posed by terrorism. These included the investigation and conviction of Islamic militants charged with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and two attacks within a year on US military installations in Saudi Arabia which killed 23 Americans; the anti-Israel terror campaign endangering the peace process; and arrests or trials of several accused ME terrorists within the US. The crash of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 off Long Island on 17 July killing 230 people, and the small but psychologically devastating bomb explosion at an Atlanta park during the Olympics--though not directly ME-linked--brought heightened national concern about terrorism within the US. Clinton saw this confrontation as a major issue. "Fascism and Communism may be dead or discredited," he said, "but the forces of destruction live on....America will remain a target because we are uniquely present in the world."(39)
On 25 June, a truck full of explosives blew up outside an apartment complex housing US soldiers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 and wounding 200 Americans, 64 of them seriously. Christopher traveled to Saudi Arabia to inspect the site personally. Some US officials were critical of the Saudis for not having previously cooperated more to provide better security. In interviews and congressional testimony, Perry stated that there was an international connection behind this attack and that Iran was the leading suspect, though other officials played down the accusation against Tehran. The goal of such attacks was to drive US forces out of the Gulf by weakening support for their staying there among both Americans and Saudis. "We cannot let them succeed so therefore we have to strengthen our forces so we reduce their vulnerability to attack," he said.(40)
A US Defense Department report found that American military commanders ignored repeated warnings of terrorist threats to the apartment complex and later exaggerated the size of the explosion in defending their lack of basic security precautions. While officers claimed they had asked the Saudi government for permission to move the complex's fence further out, investigators could find "no record of a written request to Saudi officials" on such security issues. The report faulted the Pentagon for failing to provide proper guidelines for security precautions and to improve anti-terrorist intelligence-gathering in the ME.(41)
To increase security, 4,000 US air force personal were now moved from the Khobar Towers housing complex where the bombing occurred to the al-Kharj base 60 miles south of Riyadh. Another 1,000 advisors stationed in Riyadh and training Saudi troops, one of whose offices had been the site of a previous attack, would be moved to a well-guarded site. About 700 family members would leave the country. The US and Saudi Arabia would split the cost of these changes, estimated to be over $200m. The number of American dependents in Kuwait would also be reduced. "We see our military forces in Saudi Arabia under terrorist attack," Perry explained after a trip to the Gulf. "We expect more terrorist attacks."(42)
By year's end the Clinton administration was considering preemptive strikes and expanded covert operations against terrorists in the ME. CIA Director John Deutch said the CIA had drawn up a list of military options against terrorist groups planning or responsible for attacks. Former CIA director James Woolsey argued that if the United States could deal "effectively" with Iran and Syria, "the problem [of terrorism] would go from being an extremely serious one to being an occasional one....It wouldn't go away, but it would be considerably more manageable." Philip Wilcox, head of the State Department's counter-terrorism office, contended, "The role of states in promoting terrorism is in sharp decline" compared to the importance of independent Islamic extremist groups supported by private sources rather than state backing.(43)
Pressure on Iran
The principal means for the US to pressure Iran to change its policy or to weaken that country was through economic sanctions. The US government also sought to persuade reluctant allies to join this policy, which seemed to be enjoying some success in discouraging investments there.(44)
Calling Iran the "terrorist leader opposing the peace process," Christopher criticized European countries who did not cooperate with sanctions. "The US believes that Iran will change its behavior when the world compels it to pay a high political and economic price....We must eliminate the resources of the Iranian leadership to finance its dangerous policies," he said.(45)
There was some embarrassment when it was revealed that the US had done nothing to discourage secret Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia between 1994 and 1996. This approach was labeled by former US Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger "the height of insanity" helping increase the influence of "a terrorist state that wishes us as much harm as they can possibly inflict." The controversy, however, quickly dissipated.(46)
In contrast, the level of economic sanctions was increased when Congress passed legislation penalizing new investment of over $40m. by non-US companies in Iran or Libya. Aware of strong European objections to this legislation, Clinton remarked after signing the new law, on 5 August, "You cannot do business with countries that practice commerce with you by day while funding or protecting the terrorists who kill you and your innocent civilians by night."(47)
This regulation required the president to impose at least two sanctions in this situation. Penalties included denying the two countries large loans from US government or private banks, blocking export licenses to sell them US goods, rejecting them as financial agents for the US government, forbidding US government purchases from such companies, and even barring them from exporting to the US altogether. He could, however, waive sanctions in a specific case if deeming it to be in the national interest.
The first potential case under this law came quickly. Less than a week after Clinton signed it, Turkey's new Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan of the Islamic, Welfare party, visited Iran and signed a $23bn. deal with Tehran to export natural gas to Turkey. The installation of an Erbakan-led coalition had already upset the US, since Turkey was the third-largest recipient of US aid and an important ally.
The US was concerned at the direction of Turkey's new regime. Former US ambassador to Turkey Morton Abramowitz asked, "How do you deal with a NATO ally led by a man who is fundamentally anti-NATO, fundamentally antisemitic and fundamentally pro-Islamist, even when he's largely behaving himself?" State Department spokesperson Nicholas Burns, however, said, that one could not "play games" with this relationship. Turkey was "a NATO ally, we have interests, and we would want to have early and frequent contact with a new prime minister from a religious party, to be sure those interests are met."(48)
In this context, Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff visited Ankara in early July, though some officials worried this might enhance the credibility of Erbakan's government. The US was pleased that Turkey's parliament extended Operation Provide Comfort to help the Kurds in northern Iraq. Aiding Turkey's economy was one factor the US took into account in accepting a UN plan to let Iraq sell some oil to pay for humanitarian needs.(49)
Erbakan's deal with Iran, then, came as a shock, if not a surprise. "We're disappointed that Turkey is pushing toward a broader and more active relationship with Iran," a White House official responded. "Iran's use of terror to try to erode support for the Mideast peace process is well known and documented. And we find it perplexing that Turkey, which has itself been a victim of terror, has taken these steps....Whether or not it is a violation of US law, it is certainly bad policy." US officials said they would have to study the contract to see whether it conflicted with the new law. But Glyn Davies, the State Department's deputy spokesman, said, "We certainly don't expect that this will cause a major rift in our relationship."(50)
While angry, the Clinton administration wanted no confrontation with Turkey. A senior administration official said Washington recognizes that Turkey has "some very important energy needs and not a lot of good options" and pointed out that Japan was a major purchaser of Iranian oil, without harming relations with the US.(51) Moreover, Christopher supported Turkey's temporary creation of a security zone along its border with Iraq to counter the PKK's cross-border raids.(52)
Confrontation with Iraq
Since 1991, the US had been the champion of maintaining a strong international embargo on Iraq and forcing that country to divest itself of unconventional weapons. It also made a commitment to limit Baghdad's power in the northern Kurdish and southern largely Shi'i sectors of the country without ever denying Iraq's sovereignty over that territory. The US engaged in some efforts to overthrow Saddam Husayn but never made this a high priority.
The key priority was keeping up the sanctions to deny Saddam the products and money he needed to rebuild his military forces and to escape from his isolation. The US forces in the area to protect the Gulf Arab monarchies against threats from Iran or Iraq included 21 warships and 23,000 military personnel, with planes based in Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. But several important powers--especially France and Russia--wanted an easing of the trade restrictions.(53)
Thus, the US hoped that, as long as international supervision was effective, the UN plan to let Iraq sell oil to buy food and medicine would reduce pressure to end the blockade completely as well as giving Turkey economic benefits as the transit point for the petroleum.(54) In August, the US finally accepted the plan, after blocking it for almost three months, having been assured that Baghdad would not be able to cheat, the Kurds would get their share of supplies, and the new step would not weaken the sanctions against Iraq.(55)
Just as agreement was reached on this issue, however, the US became engaged in a new crisis over northern Iraq. As fighting grew among Kurdish factions, the State Department arranged two ceasefires among the Kurds, on 23 and 28 August. When the CIA became convinced that Iraqi troops were moving north, the State Department warned Iraq not to intervene. "Part of [the Kurds] were working with us for a ceasefire," a US official said, "and part of them were looking for advantages, for a way to put it to the other." Protecting the Kurds from Saddam and from themselves, "has been a difficult and obviously, somewhat tragically, an impossible process," McCurry said.(56)
As Iraqi troops marched north, the US warned Baghdad that it "would view any aggressive moves by Iraq with utmost seriousness." "The Iraqis are in no doubt of our views on this." Clinton said the situation "caused me grave concern. I have placed our forces in the region on high alert, and they are now being reinforced." The US consulted with allies and stepped up air patrols over the area.(57)
On 3 and 4 September, US B-52 planes and two navy ships fired 27 cruise missiles at Iraqi anti-aircraft and military command centers in the center and south of the country. Announcing the attacks, Clinton stated: Our objectives are limited but clear: to make Saddam pay a price for the latest act of brutality, reducing his ability to threaten his neighbors and America's interests." He extended the no-fly zone in southern Iraq and called for suspending the UN oil-for-food plan until the delivery of supplies could be monitored.(58)
"Husayn's objectives may change, Clinton continued, "but his methods are always the same: violence and aggression--against the Kurds, against other ethnic minorities, against Iraq's neighbors. Our answer to that recklessness must be strong and immediate, as President Bush demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm, as we showed two years ago when Iraq amassed its forces on Kuwait's border, and as we showed again today."(59)
Except for Britain, however, France, Russia, China, and others did not support the US effort. London had to drop its attempt to get a UN resolution supporting the American reaction. Embarrassed, Clinton responded, "I can only tell you what I believe is right...and I have done my best to cooperate with others." The weakening of the international coalition could be described as an Iraqi victory.(60)
There were reports that the CIA had begun in January 1996 a small day, every hour."(66) Clinton said US air strikes against Iraq had "Tightened the strategic straitjacket on Saddam Husayn, making it harder for him to threaten Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and easier for us to stop him if he does....If we had failed to answer Saddam's provocation, he would have been emboldened to act even more recklessly and in a manner more dangerous to our interests."(67) "Our mission," he concluded, "has been achieved," asserting the US had forced Iraqi troops to stop their offensive. Expanding the no-flight area by 60 miles north brought US-led air patrols to within 30 miles of Baghdad, thus widening a buffer zone between Iraqi forces and Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Saddam "is strategically worse off [and now] knows there is a price to be paid for stepping over the line."(68)
But Saddam Husayn emerged politically stronger, CIA Director John Deutch told the Senate Intelligence Committee, because the confrontation left "a perception" of a weaker coalition and growing worldwide sympathy for Iraq that eventually could win it relief from UN economic sanctions. "We should anticipate that Saddam will continue to challenge the coalition" for some years to come. "There will be no stability in the region...until Saddam Hussein and his regime [are] replaced."(69)
At any rate, the US response slowed Saddam's ability to regain control of the whole country, a precondition for his reassertion of foreign ambitions. "Maintaining security and stability in Southwest Asia is apt to be a long-time problem for which there's no single solution," Perry concluded.(70)
The US-Iraq situation remained quiet afterwards, though on 3 November, a US Air Force F-16 jet fired a missile at an Iraqi radar installation that allegedly locked onto it.(71)
Sudan
The US gave $20m. in surplus military equipment to Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda starting in December 1996, reportedly to gain their support for Sudanese opposition groups trying to topple Sudan's Islamic regime. The US closed its embassy in Khartoum and concluded that Sudan was taking only "tactical" and "cosmetic" steps to end support for terrorism in order to avoid further UN sanctions. "Our policy is to isolate, pressure and contain Sudan and to compel it to modify its behavior," said a senior administration official. The US regarded Sudan as second only to Iran as a supporter for revolutionary Islamic movements and terrorists. He continued, however, "We do not have an active policy of trying to overthrow the government of Sudan."(72)
Internal Reverberations of ME Terrorism
Terrorism springing from ME causes and groups had more of an effect within the US--and hence on US policy toward the ME--than in any other previous year. Clinton tried to focus the summit of industrialized states, held in late June, on terrorism.(73)
In addition to the incidents mentioned above, the trial of Ramzi Ahmad Yusif focused attention on this issue. Yusif was extradited from Pakistan and accused of planning to blow up a dozen US airliners over the Pacific Ocean. He was also charged with masterminding the bombing of the World Trade Center. Yousef and two co-defendents were found guilty in September and sentenced to life imprisonment.(74)
Given such developments, the administration introduced an anti-terrorist bill aimed largely against ME groups entering or operating within the US. The proposed law made it easier to deport aliens, block fundraising by organizations accused of terrorism, put markers in explosives to make their sources easier to identify, and widen wiretapping guidelines. These proposals faced surprisingly tough opposition in Congress, mainly from conservative forces and the pro-gun lobby which saw them as giving the federal government excessive powers.(75)
In September, after the still-unexplained crash of TWA flight 800, US government officials announced plans to improve airport security, recommending $300m. be spent to install advanced explosives-detection devices, add more bomb-sniffing dogs, and conduct selected "profiling" of passengers at airports. More personnel and resources were to be devoted to counterterrorism by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Vice-President Al Gore said that "we may never see an end to terrorism, but we are sure going to do our level best to combat it." Civil liberties groups and Republicans again expressed concern about the effects on citizen rights.(76)
The US election and the debate over ME policy
Its role in fostering the Arab-Israeli peace process had been one of the Clinton Administration's main foreign policy achievements. The president could also claim to have maintained and increased pressure against radical regimes while improving bilateral relations with several Arab states.
While not a major campaign issue, the Republicans did attack Clinton on several aspects of ME policy. They claimed they would give Israel more support and combat the radical regimes more effectively. Their platform stated, "We strongly oppose the Clinton Administration's attempts to interfere in Israel's democratic process" and claimed that "terrorist states have made a comeback during Bill Clinton's Administration. He has treated their rulers with undue respect and failed to curb their acquisition of weapons of mass destruction." The Republicans charged that Clinton had not used existing anti-terrorist legislation well and declared that "to take away the liberty of the American people while fighting terrorism is repugnant to the history and character of our nation."(77)
The September attacks on Iraq also provoked Republican criticism. Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole backed the military action itself: "America and its allies...can no longer tolerate Saddam's repeated attempts to erode the restraints that have been placed on his regime and to violently reassert his authority," But he agreed with his close ally Sen. John McCain who criticized Clinton at a campaign rally, asserting that "the enormous prestige that was gained [in the Gulf war) has been squandered by this administration's feckless, photo op[portunity] foreign policy which has no meaning." Dole blamed Clinton's "weak leadership" for Iraq's action, though Dole himself had been a strong advocate of US aid to Iraq and of Saddam's moderation prior to 1991.(78)
In the end, though, Clinton easily won re-election as president in the November balloting.
NOTES
1. For an evaluation of current and future trends in US-Israel relations, see Adam Garfinkle, "US-Israeli Relations after the Cold War," ORBIS, Fall 1996, pp. 557-575.
2. Reuters, 7 February 1996.
3. UPI, 6 March; NYT, 14, 17 March 1996.
4. NYT, 14 March; Ma'ariv, 14 March 1996.
5. UPI, 6 March 1996.
6. Text of Clinton's speech to AIPAC, 28 April in Near East Report, 6 May; 30 April joint statement; NYT, 29 April 1996.
7. NYT, 1, 2 May 1996.
8. Reuters, 10 January 1996.
9. NYT, 16 April; USA Today, 17 April 1996.
10. NYT, 24, 25 April 1996.
11. LAT, 3 May 1996.
12. WP, 22 May 1996.
13. Ibid.
14. LAT, 3 May; WP, 22 May 1996.
15. NYT, 28 May 1996.
16. Barry Rubin, "U.S.-Israel Relations and Israel's 1992 Elections," in Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, Elections in Israel, 1992 (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994).
17. JP, 29 May 1996.
18. Ibid.
19. White House Office of the Press Secretary, 28 May 1996.
20. Jerusalem Report, 27 June 1996, p. 32; NYT, 2 June 1996; WP, 9 June 1996.
21. LAT, 25 June; NYT, 26 June 1996.
22. WP, 10, 11 July 1996. Text of 9 July joint press conference in Near East Report, 15 July 1996.
23. WP, 31 July; NYT, 29 July 1996.
24. LAT, 9 October 1996.
25. NYT, 27, 30 September 1996.
26. NYT, 2 October 1996.
27. Ibid.
28. WP, 2 October 1996.
29. Ibid.; Reuters, 3 October 1996.
30. Ibid., NYT, 7 October 1996.
31. WP, 3 October 1996.
32. NYT, 7 October 1996.
33. AP, 12 November 1996.
34. WP 15, 18 December; Reuters, 16 December 1996.
35. LAT, 21 December; WP and NYT, 26, 30 December 1996.
36. NYT, 9 April 1996; William Perry in Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch Number 185 (Washington, DC, 8 February 1996); Reuters, 14 November 1996.
37. Philadelphia Inquirer, 1 May 1996.
38. Ha'aretz, 22 May 1996.
39. AP, 5 August 1996.
40. Ibid.; NYT, 26 June, 7 July; WP, 27, 30 June; LAT, 30 June; Reuters, 3 August 1996. There were also some suggestions of Syrian involvement. WP, 3 July 1996.
41. NYT, 17 September 1996.
42. WP, 4 August; AP, 3 August; Reuters, 15 August 1996.
43. WP, 17 October 1996.
44. Journal of Commerce, 29 January 1996. For an analysis arguing that US pressure damaged Iran's military build-up, see Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power (Washington DC, 1996).
45. Text in Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Fighting Terror, Waging Peace (Washington, 1996), p. 23.
46. NYT, 6, 15, 17, 24 April; WP, 14 April; LAT, 4 April. William Safire column, NYT, 18 April 1996.
47. NYT, 20 June; Reuters, 5 August 1996.
48. NYT, 10 August 1996.
49. Ibid.; NYT, 3 July 1996.
50. NYT, 13 August 1996.
51. WP, 13 August 1996.
52. WP, 8 September 1996.
53. NYT, 9 April 1995.
54. AP, 15 April 1996.
55. NYT and LAT, 8 August 1996.
56. NYT, 5 September 1996.
57. NYT, 31 August, 1 September 1996.
58. White House text of statement, 3 September 1996.
59. Ibid.; NYT, 3 September 1996.
60. AP, 3 September; NYT, 5 September 1996.
61. NYT and WP, 14 September 1996.
62. WP, 17 September. NYT, 17 September 1996.
63. WP, NYT, LAT, 12 September 1996.
64. WP and LAT, 14 September 1996.
65. NYT, 17 September 1996.
66. NYT, 23 September 1996.
67. NYT, 15 September 1996.
68. NYT, 5 September 1996.
69. LAT, 20 September 1996.
70. AP, 5 September 1996.
71. Reuters, 3 November 1996.
72. WP, 10 November 1996.
73. LAT, 29 June 1996.
74. LAT, 6 September 1996. See also, LAT and NYT, 9 May 1996; NYT, 14 August 1996 for cases involving Hamas activists.
75. NYT, 16 April 1996.
76. LAT, 6 September. See also WP, 26 July 1996 for Clinton's order for heightened security.
77. Text of Republican Party Platform, August 1996.
78. AP, 3 September; LAT, 1 September 1996. For a discussion of the crisis's political implications, see R.W. Apple, NYT, 2 September 1996.