By Barry Rubin
During 1995, US policy in the Middle East continued to have the same basic goals: to maintain American influence and alignment with a variety of moderate states, promote the Arab-Israeli peace process, and isolate radical regimes. The Clinton Administration toughened its stance against Iran. US efforts also continued, albeit without success, to arrange a breakthrough in Israel-Syrian negotiations.
Given the new situation in the ME resulting from the USSR's collapse, Iraq's defeat in Kuwait, breakthroughs in Arab-Israeli diplomacy and a number of other factors, the US role as the world's sole superpower was critical: as a bulwark for moderate regimes, the protector of Gulf security, and the promoter of successful Arab-Israeli peacemaking.(1)
But this did not mean that the US could achieve its goals in the area. To facilitate Israel-Palestinian or Israel-Jordan peacemaking while isolating such radical regimes as Iran, Iraq, and Libya was possible. To obtain a breakthrough on the Israel-Syria front, or to force radical states to change their rulers or policies, was not. Nor was the Clinton Administration able to increase regional economic cooperation.
At the same time, it had to fight domestic political battles, as its ME positions--and foreign policy in general--came under attack from a stronger, conservative Republican-dominated opposition in Congress, which was critical of US aid commitments while advocating a tougher line against ME radical forces.
To consolidate progress in Arab-Israeli peacemaking, the Clinton Administration put a great deal of high-level effort into mediating in Israel-Syria negotiations--albeit without notable progress. At the same time, the US acted to help strengthen--especially with financial assistance--the Israel-Palestinian and Israel-Jordan peace processes.
In the Persian Gulf, the US worked to build up its defense coordination with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. It struggled to maintain the international embargo against Iraq and intensify its own economic pressures on Iran. Two of the most interesting aspects of US policy were its ongoing effort to deal with revolutionary Islamic movements and the problem of proliferation of unconventional weapons.
PROMOTING THE NEW MIDDLE EAST
Israel-Syria Negotiations
Secretary of State Warren Christopher and other leading US officials continued to put tremendous time and effort into promoting Israel-Syria negotiations. Despite official optimism and Christopher's seven visits to the region in 1994, however, they had made little progress during 1995, taking about eight months to reconvene talks between the two countries' chiefs of staff last held in December 1994, owing to Syrian recalcitrance. The US assured Syria that it wanted a comprehensive regional settlement, and informed both parties that time was short. "Negotiations between Israel and Syria must be accelerated, and the US will do everything to support the efforts," Christopher told the House of Representatives' International Relations committee on 26 January.(2)
The elections due in Israel and the US for 1996 posed a potential time limit. The US argued that only an Israel-Syria agreement could complete the peace process in the area. But by the same token, neither side needed a breakthrough so badly as to rush ahead. Christopher, who visited the ME in March, June, October, and December, at times appeared more eager for progress than either of the parties directly involved.(3)
Thus, asked why Christopher was going to the ME in March, a US official replied, "What would you write if he didn't go, or if he sent [US Special ME Coordinator] Dennis Ross instead, to come back empty-handed?" Asked "How many times can the secretary set out to 'push hard' without results?" an official at the pre-departure briefing said there was no "magic number. He goes when there is a potential to achieve something."(4)
His March trip to the region focused on the Israel-Syria issue. Christopher warned, "This is a time when important decisions will have to be taken by both countries. They must accelerate the process....We must revitalize this process." But, he said, "it is not my task to try to provide new ideas for the parties." The US stuck to the role of intermediary rather than mediator. Its involvement did not require making "bridging proposals," one State Department official explained. "The US will stick to the principle that it does not intervene in the substance of the security provisions." Follow-up trips were made by Ross in early April and again in June.(5)
During the month of May, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres made separate visits to Washington in which the negotiations with Syria were a principal topic of discussion. Clinton and Christopher discussed with them ways to bring Syria back to the table and details of potential security arrangements. These were conveyed by Christopher to Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara'. Unless Syria came back to the talks, Christopher reportedly said, he had no incentive to undertake another round of shuttle diplomacy in the region.(6)
These exchanges allowed the US to announce on 24 May that the two sides had agreed to resume talks on a security framework agreement without preconditions. "This is an important development," stated Christopher, "but there still are significant gaps between the parties."(7)
The US certainly considered the conclusion of an Israel-Syria agreement to be a high priority, arguing that such a breakthrough was necessary to bring about a comprehensive regional peace, including the involvement of other Arab states, especially in the Gulf. The Clinton Administration also wanted such an accord as a badly needed foreign policy success for itself.
On the other hand, the White House's assumption that both sides wanted to reach an agreement was not necessarily accurate, and the US often found itself in the role of the most eager participant. The approach of the 1996 US elections was a factor in diminishing the local parties' willingness to make commitments. There was also opposition in the US Congress to putting American troops on the Golan or to providing aid to Syria in the event of an agreement, although this remained immaterial as long as no such accord existed.
Some progress did come, however, at the very end of the year. On 30 October Christopher went to Damascus. Shimon Peres, who assumed Israel's prime ministership following the 4 November assassination of Yitzhak Rabin visited Washington in December, appealing to Asad for peace before a joint session of Congress and meeting with Clinton on 11 December to discuss how to restart negotiations. Clinton telephoned the Syrian leader, putting forth many proposals on ways to organize talks. These reportedly included a Camp David-type summit to bring leaders together for several days; Oslo-style secret talks beginning on a lower level; and a secret channel like the pre-Camp David Egypt-Israel contacts. Repeating an often-sounded policy theme, Clinton stated, "The key to a lasting settlement in the ME is achieving peace between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon." He also telephoned Asad that day.(8)
Following up the discussions in Washington, Christopher went to Damascus on 14 December and to Israel the following day, again suggesting various options for restarting the talks. Finally, on 17 December, Christopher was able to announce that Israel and Syria would renew peace negotiations on 27 December at the Wye Plantation in eastern Maryland. The three days of talks were to set the stage for continuing rounds in 1996.
Promoting Israel-Palestinian and Israel-Jordan Peace
The US government also continued efforts to promote the implementation of the 1993 Israel-PLO agreement, in a political environment wherein the Republican Party had taken control of both houses of Congress for the first time in 40 years. The policy continued to be implemented, however, by continuing aid to Israel, providing funds for the Palestinian Authority (PA), urging other states to donate money, and encouraging additional countries in the region to support or join the peace process. In this context, the US urged the PA to live up to its commitments, especially in regard to trying to reduce terrorism by Palestinian opponents of the agreement.
Such themes were sounded at a February meeting in Washington with Israeli, Egyptian, Jordanian, and PA representatives, as well as in March visits to the region by Christopher and Vice President Albert Gore. For example, Gore announced that the US would provide $73m. for three projects in Gaza designed to generate employment. These programs included: $40m. to improve the sewage system of Gaza City; $25m. to provide thousands of public works' jobs; and $8m. to pave streets and sidewalks and upgrade shelters for the elderly and ill in refugee camps. Gore also said President Clinton had authorized Palestinians to export a range of goods to the United States, duty-free, from the West Bank and Gaza.(9)
An additional aspect of this policy was to promise continued support and aid to Israel, as Gore did on his visit, praising the Israeli government for having "taken bold steps towards peace....We understand that peace is not an unmixed achievement for Israel, that every step you take in its direction not only involves risk, but too often precious and innocent blood." Equally, the US was vetoed a UN Security Council resolution in May critical of Israel's (soon suspended) plan to expropriate land in East Jerusalem. Clinton himself stated, "Our strategic cooperation is now deeper than ever," citing the holding of the largest-ever joint military exercise with Israel and US Defense Department contracts to buy more than $3bn. of military products from Israeli companies.(10)
While urging the PLO to try harder to reduce violence, US officials always publicly expressed confidence that the PA was doing so. After meeting with Gore, PA leader Yasir `Arafat promised that "those who will try to jeopardize and harm peace and security will be prosecuted." Gore said the PLO leader had made clear he would proceed with "criminal prosecution of those who are suspected of terrorist activities."(11) Gore stressed "the importance of the PA's doing everything legally possible to prevent the staging of terrorist actions against Israelis from Gaza, Jericho, and the West Bank and to bring to justice those who perpetuate such acts."(12)
This situation was occurring in a context of growing antagonism toward foreign aid within the US and especially among the opposition, Republican members of Congress. As Gore put it in an April speech, "Given the current mood on Capitol Hill, [allocating foreign aid] will not be easy....Foreign assistance, in whatever guise, has become an easy target."(13) The Administration defended the help to ME parties as a basic US commitment needed to encourage peace and to maintain American credibility. During Rabin's May visit, he met with top Republican and Democratic congressional leaders to urge not only continued aid to Israel but also to Jordan and the Palestinians as well.
Clinton himself attacked "budget-cutting back door isolationists, on the left and right [who] want to deny us the resources we need to support allies who take risks for peace....If we renege on our commitments to Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians, we will never convince anybody else that we stand behind our commitments."(14)
At a joint appearance before the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the pro-Israel lobbying organization, conference in May, Rabin and Clinton supported each other. The prime minister said that under Clinton's stewardship, US-Israel relations had reached "unprecedented highs" and lauded Clinton's "leadership," "courage" and "vision." Clinton urged support for "this brave man in his attempts to make peace. And let's don't stop until the job is done." Clinton said Israeli risks for peace ould be "minimized" by US help to "defend itself by itself." Rabin was careful not to become involved in the US debate over whether the US embassy should be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.(15)
While Congress reduced foreign aid by 11%--from $13.6bn. for the 1995 fiscal year to $12.1bn. for 1996--assistance to the ME remained unchanged. In June, Congress supported the White House's proposal by giving $75m. for economic assistance to the PA, with Egypt getting $2.15bn. and Israel $3bn., including $475m. which could be spent in Israel and $80m. earmarked for refugee resettlement. Jordan received permission to get surplus US military equipment and had its debt formally forgiven. That same month, Congress also extended by 45 days the ME Peace Facilitation Act, which permitted US aid to the PA. This was a shorter period than the Clinton Administration had sought but the compromise was forced by Republican Sen. Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who opposed foreign aid in general and aid to the PA in particular. Nonetheless, in August, Congress again extended the ME Peace Facilitation Act for 45 days, allowing Clinton to continue aid to the PA by certifying that it was in compliance with the PLO's peace process commitments.
The State Department report required by this Act praised the PA as making great strides in restraining terrorism and punishing those responsible, though saying it needed to do much more: "The success of these steps to control terrorism can only be evaluated over time, but these steps did demonstrate a far more systematic effort to counter and punish those responsible for planning or carrying out acts of terror." But the US also remained "deeply disappointed with the PLO's failure to amend the covenant" calling for Israel's destruction, and continued "to urge the PLO to do so at the earliest opportunity.(16)
Another congressional intervention in this domain was a bill submitted by Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole in May. Though hitherto relatively antagonistic toward Israel, Dole now--as he became a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination--proposed the US move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
"Jerusalem should remain forever the unified capital of the State of Israel," Dole stated. "It seems to me that delaying the process of moving the embassy now only sends a message of false hopes. So what are we waiting for?" His plan urged construction of a new embassy to begin in 1996 and be completed by May 1999. Rabin said Israel "will always warmly welcome the move of any embassy to Jerusalem." However, he added, Israel "will not get involved in domestic discussions on how to do it."(17)
Indeed, the Jerusalem Embassy Relocation Implementation Act--along with opposition to sending US troops to the Golan and aiding the PA--was widely seen as a project encouraged by conservative Israeli and American Jewish forces opposed to the current peace process. Dole, hitherto one of the least enthusiastic congressional supporters of Israel, was running for president in 1996. The Clinton administration's view was that moving the embassy in the near future might damage the peace process, even if the embassy was physically located in the western part of Jerusalem.
On 23 Oct 1995, Congress overwhelmingly approved the bill calling for the embassy's transfer by a vote of 93-5 in the Senate and 374-37 in the House of Representatives. White House spokesman Mike McCurry welcomed Senate amendments giving the president more discretion on the timing and implementation of the plan, but called it a "very unwarranted and unnecessary intrusion in the Middle East peace process."(18) Given the congressional concessions, Clinton did sign the bill into law but these same changes also meant the administration could avoid action. Despite critics' predictions though, there was little anti-American reaction in the region.
To encourage the Jordan-Israel peace agreement of 1994, the Administration had pledged aid to King Husayn. Jordan's remaining debt to the US was to be canceled completely during 1995 and 1996. This effort was embarrassed in March 1995 when a House of Representatives subcommittee voted to give Jordan only $50mn. in debt relief for 1995, rather than the $275mn. the White House had promised Jordan and requested from Congress. King Husayn visited Washington shortly thereafter to urge Clinton to keep his promise. A Jordanian official said canceling the debt was a "test of the seriousness of the American administration in its commitment to secure peace in this region." In the end, Congress yielded to White House persuasion and fulfilled Clinton's request.(19) Thus, the White House was able to win support for its program on helping the Israel-Palestinian peace process, but it did so in the face of more domestic opposition than ever before.
As part of its efforts to implement Arab-Israeli peace and to support regional security, the US also tried to encourage more economic cooperation among moderate ME states. The US also urged Arab states to reduce their boycott of Israel and welcomed a 30 September 1994 announcement and 11 January 1995 Diplomatic Note to the US that the GCC would end secondary and tertiary aspects of the boycott.(20) But it was not clear that this pledge was implemented.
Pursuant to the November 1994 Casablanca economic summit, the US urged the creation of an international development bank with a capital base of about $5bn. to co-finance projects with the private sector. In March, the State Department held a Task Force for Economic Development in the ME conference with experts from about 30 countries and organizations. Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Joan Spero claimed the US-proposed plan had been developed at the behest of Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the PLO.(21)
The crowning event of US efforts on the peace process in 1995 was the signing of the interim Israel-PLO accord at the White House on 28 September, reinforcing the implication that the US was the international sponsor, if not a participant, in that venture.
US-Israel relations were also strengthened by the outpouring of sympathy and support from the US government following the murder of Prime Minister Rabin on 4 November and by Clinton during his attendance at the funeral. Bilateral links were again tightened during Prime Minister Peres's mid-December trip to Washington. He discussed Israel-Syrian negotiations in detail and supported US aid to Jordan. A bilateral alliance agreement was discussed, though not pressed by either side. After their meeting, Peres stated that the United States and Israel would engage in strategic cooperation against the threat from the radical Islamic regime in Iran. Clinton said there would be joint US-Israeli cooperation in space, including training Israeli astronauts to fly aboard the space shuttle.(22)
DEFENDING THE NEW MIDDLE EAST
The second major element in US policy was the building of an unofficial Gulf security network coupled with the containment of radical forces, especially Iran and Iraq. Striving to maintain the post-1991 international embargo against Baghdad, the US also tightened up its own sanctions against Tehran. While facing reservations by European and some ME allies, the US was able to implement this tough policy on both fronts during 1995.
Clinton summed up this US position in a May speech calling Iran, Iraq, and Libya "rogue nations" and advocating "firm action" against them. "Today Iran is the principal sponsor of global terrorism [and] is bent on building nuclear weapons."(23)
At the same time, the US sought to tighten cooperation with the GCC states with the most immediate goal of maintaining Gulf security, but also to build a structure of peace in tandem with Arab-Israeli negotiations. US Secretary of Defense William Perry, for example, hailed Saudi Arabia as "an island of stability in a sea of trouble."(24)
Building up the alliance with Saudi Arabia and GCC
In March, Christopher, Perry and Gore were all in Saudi Arabia within a two-week period. Perry had already visited the ME in January; this time his mission--which also included trips to Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar--was to bolster defense ties and affirm US support for GCC security. As a US official put it, America intended to secure "an additional US presence in the region, and seek support for the strategy of containing Iraq, including by preserving economic sanctions", while also expressing a "growing concern about Iran." Another official said the goal was to show both Iraq and Iran that "we take our defense role in the Gulf very seriously [and] will be there to help" block any threat.(25)
After visiting US units and Saudi bases, Perry presented to his hosts satellite pictures showing Iraq's effort to rebuild its military strength, including missile plants. He stressed that the US believed in a "continuing threat from Iraq and in the necessity of our having a unified coalition military capability for dealing with that. We agreed that continued US access to Saudi bases and ports is the key to quick, forceful response to aggression," and that pre-positioning US military equipment and "vigorous training and military modernization programs" by the GCC states were crucial.(26)
Material to equip one US brigade was already stored in Kuwait, and Qatar agreed to store material for a second. Perry said Riyadh accepted in principle a plan to stockpile enough arms for a third US armored brigade in the Gulf region. This would support a US armored division of 15,000-17,000 men.(27)
Christopher asked GCC foreign ministers to help tighten the blockade of Iraq by allowing US personnel to search vessels suspected of trading with Iraq in their ports rather than at sea. In Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain he visited military bases and US military personnel. In Qatar, he thanked authorities for agreeing to pre-position US armor on their territory and in the UAE he discussed possible future US arms sales.(28)
In a joint statement issued during Christopher's visit, the GCC foreign ministers concurred in demanding Iraq's immediate implementation of the UN resolutions, which were the consequence of the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, and in supporting the Arab-Israeli peace process. Christopher said the GCC had given strong support for the US position.(29) Despite continued GCC reservations over regional economic cooperation and direct participation in peacemaking with Israel, then, the level of US-GCC cooperation remained quite high, showing no signs of diminishing from the level reached since the 1990-1991 events.
A US Defense Department report in May noted that the world was becoming even more dependent on oil from the Gulf, noting that two-thirds of total proven reserves were nearby, and listing continuing access to this petroleum as Washington's top security concern in the region. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait alone could not pay indefinitely for these security requirements against the potential threat from Iraq and Iran, the report concluded, "especially in the present environment of depressed oil prices, without potentially dangerous domestic fiscal and political challenges."(30)
The Struggle to Maintain the Boycott Against Iraq
The US alliance with the GCC was closely linked to American opposition to any effort by Iraq to gain influence in or seize control of the Gulf. A centerpiece of US policy was to maintain the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990-91 despite eroding international support for them. This US effort succeeded at least during 1995.
Citing evidence that Iraq was building biological weapons, Christopher expressed deep concern "that Saddam Husayn could be regaining the ability to build weapons of mass destruction." US officials said that UN reports had done "nothing to reassure us about the concern and fears we have" about Iraq's weapons programs, especially if the embargo were to be lifted.(31)
Perry stated, "At a time when Iraq was under sanctions and claiming to be impoverished...at the same time [it was] diverting large amounts of resources toward rebuilding the war plants... and to build palaces" for Saddam Husayn. This was the real reason the Iraqi people are suffering, he said.(32)
On a world tour, US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright used satellite photos of rebuilt Iraqi plants to urge Security Council members to vote for an extension of sanctions, making the same point in congressional testimony. The oil embargo was necessary, she argued, because if Baghdad were allowed to earn oil revenue freely, it might expel UN inspectors and convert civilian factories into military facilities that could soon be producing missiles, chemical weapons and even nuclear arms.(33)
While trying to maintain pressure on Iraq, the US did not increase efforts to overthrow Saddam, despite some CIA activities in support of the regime's opponents and prior knowledge of an abortive March 1995 coup attempt.(34) The US continued its support for Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, including an August effort to mediate between the quarreling governing factions there, while refusing to criticize the Turkish army's incursions into the area to fight Turkish Kurdish rebels.(35)
Two Americans employed in Kuwait by the McDonnell Douglas Corporation were sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in March after they inadvertently crossed the border into Iraq. The US demanded their release, and they were freed as an Iraqi gesture toward the Clinton Administration on 16 July.(36)
Despite the tension between the US and Iraq there were no armed confrontations between the two countries for the second year in a row.
Proliferation of Unconventional Arms
As in the case of Iraq, US concern about radical states was partly focused on their efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. The fact that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was up for renewal in May 1995 brought this issue to center stage, as did an Egypt-led effort to link the renewal of the treaty with Israel's adherence to the agreement. But US concern was directed at Iran and Iraq, while there was no significant pressure against Israel.
Perry warned in January that the threat of "a rogue nation or terrorist" acquiring nuclear weapons was "the biggest security threat that is facing the world this decade." He estimated that Iran could get nuclear weapons in seven to fifteen years and urged Russia not to sell it technology that could shorten this period.(37) "We're deeply concerned," Christopher said. "It is simply not healthy to be building up Iran's capacity in the nuclear area. We regard Iran as a proponent of terrorism. They are seeking to undermine the ME peace process."(38)
During his March visit to Israel, Gore expressed sympathy for that country's argument that it could not forego nuclear weapons as long as there was a chance that Iran or Iraq might develop them. He stated, "When I refer to the long-term dimension of the threat posed by Iran and Iraq, there must be understanding of the effect that this problem has on the approach to security by other states in the region. An indefinite extension of the NPT should not be linked to a decision by any additional state to be a signatory."(39)
Christopher concurred. After a two-hour meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo, he remarked, "The US believes the [NPT] should--as a goal--be universal. But until there is complete peace in this area, there is unlikely to be the kind of confidence that will enable all the parties in the region to become members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty."(40)
The US also put more effort into discouraging Russia from selling nuclear technology to Iran. During his 9 May visit to Moscow, Clinton persuaded that country to withhold one element from Tehran but not to cancel the deal as a whole.(41)
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake argued that no matter how long it took Iran to get nuclear weapons, these would "pose an existential threat to Israel and threaten other neighbors."(42)
The US won a victory when the NPT was extended despite Israel's refusal to join. It also succeeded in helping to discourage an Argentina-Syria nuclear deal in July. But despite its placing a high priority on the issue, the US was very limited in its ability to stop the flow of such technology.
Opposition to Iran
This concern did, however, contribute to a toughening of US policy toward Iran. In part, the Clinton Administration's hand was forced by the newly active conservative opposition in Congress, captured by Republican majorities in the November 1994 election.
On 25 January, Republican Sen. Alfonse D'Amato introduced a bill, the "Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act," which would implement a total trade embargo except for humanitarian items; mandate a US vote against loans or credit for Iran by international institutions; and provide for regular reports about Iran's military capacity and involvement in terrorism.(43) A US trade embargo against Iran had been in force since the onset of the 1979 hostage crisis. Yet ironically, it had recently been disclosed that the US was Iran's single largest trading partner, with about $4bn. a year in commerce, including the purchase of nearly one-quarter of Iran's annual crude oil exports.
The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, a Republican, was also vocal on this issue. Regarding Iran's attempt to get nuclear weapons he asserted, "What should we do, wait until Tel Aviv is gone? Wait until they can threaten Chicago? At what point do we decide this is truly a threat?"(44)
He urged that aid to Russia be cut off unless it halted sales of nuclear technology to Iran. "We need to take a grip on how dangerous Iran is, and we need to have a strategy that says this current regime cannot be allowed to get weapons of mass destruction--period--under any circumstances."(45) Gingrich rejected Iranian claims that its nuclear program is strictly for peaceful purposes: "There is a worldwide phenomenon of Islamic totalitarianism funded and largely directed by the state of Iran."(46)
While these positions pressured the Clinton Administration, it was not averse to taking a harder line against Iran. During his trip to the Gulf, for example, Perry had warned of a stepped-up Iranian military presence on islands it controlled, which could threaten shipping and the export of oil from the region. "It's a deployment of force beyond any reasonable defensive requirement and can only be regarded as a threat to shipping in the area," he told a news conference. The US also worked to block sales of nuclear materials by Russia and China to Iran.(47)
Matters were brought to a head by the announcement of the Conoco company, a subsidiary of DuPont, on 1 March that its Dutch affiliate had signed a $1bn. deal with Iran to develop two major offshore oil and gas fields. The project was expected to generate revenues of $12.5bn. in oil exports and $250m. in natural gas exports for Iran.(48) While this arrangement was not against US law, Christopher said, "We feel that it is inconsistent with [our] containment policy" against Iran. "Wherever you look, you find the evil hand of Iran in this region."(49)
Clinton blocked the deal by issuing a presidential order prohibiting US nationals from entering into contracts for Iran's development. There was some opposition to this step within the government as having little affect on Iran and hurting US companies. Clinton and Christopher supported the move but as the NYT pointed out, "Even under Clinton's directive, American companies would still be permitted to buy oil from Iran and to resell it to third countries," the mechanism accounting for one-fourth of Iran's oil sales.(50)
Therefore, on 30 April 1995, Clinton went further by announcing an executive order barring all forms of US trade and investment in Iran--including purchases of Iranian oil overseas--as a way to prevent it from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and weaken its ability to support terrorism.(51) This was followed by a trip by Albright to the ME to seek regional support, although the US realized, she said, "the difficulties some of our allies might face with this subject."(52)
Clinton himself acknowledged the lack of European support for his heightened Iran embargo: "I don't know that we're on the same wave length" with allies. "The evidence is that constructive engagement with the Iranians has, at least so far, failed to produce any positive results." The US continued to charge Iran with involvement in international terrorism. For example, US intelligence warned of Iranian diplomats in Bonn trying to disrupt a planned opposition rally in Germany, perhaps by assassinating a leading Iranian dissident.(53)
At the UN's opening session in September, Christopher criticized Iran and urged stronger sanctions against it: "Every dollar that goes into the government coffers of a state sponsor of terrorism such as Iran helps pay for a terrorist's bullets or bombs....Iran's role as the foremost state sponsor of terrorism makes its secret quest for weapons of mass destruction even more alarming."(54)
Libya
The third radical regime, Libya, was largely forgotten by the US during 1995. In March, however, Lake met with families of victims of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, which killed 270 people. The administration renewed its "unwavering opposition to Libyan terrorism and its continuing effort to bring about justice on behalf of Libya's victims," according to White House spokesman Mike McCurry. Washington urged other countries to impose added sanctions--including an oil embargo--on Libya, since the existing three-year-old sanctions had not made it yield two intelligence officers accused of planning the attack. The FBI put them on its Ten Most Wanted list and posted a $4m. reward--the largest ever offered by the US government--for information leading to their arrest.(55)
Relations with Radical Islamic Fundamentalism
The US continued its search for a policy toward revolutionary fundamentalist movements, though this remained a fairly abstract exercise. While urging `Arafat to crack down on radical groups using violence against the peace process, the US generally avoided public involvement in such struggles or, as with Algeria, tentatively urged compromise with moderate Islamic groups.
Indeed, some US regional allies worried that the Clinton Administration was too soft on the issue. Thus, Egyptian President Mubarak warned Americans, "Your government is in contact [with terrorists]. You think you can correct the mistakes that you made in Iran, where you had no contact with the Ayatollah Khomeini and his fanatic groups before they seized power. But I assure you, these groups will never take over [Egypt]; and they will never be on good terms with the US. These contacts will never be of any benefit to you...."(56)
In response to a major Hamas attack in Israel, Clinton declared in his State of the Union message in January: "I call on all our allies and peace-loving nations throughout the world to join us with renewed fervor in a global effort to fight terrorism....I know that in the face of such evil, it is hard for the people in the ME to go forward. But the terrorists represent the past, not the future. We must and we will pursue a comprehensive peace between Israel and her neighbors in the ME."(57)
On 23 January Clinton signed an executive order barring any transfer of charitable contributions and freezing bank deposits and other assets in the US of groups and individuals said to be involved in terrorism, including the Jewish extremist organizations Kach and Kahane Chai as well as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This measure had little practical effect. A Senate resolution called on `Arafat to "take immediate steps to bring to justice those responsible" for terrorism and prevent future attacks, and urged Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad to stop supporting terrorism.(58)
Despite constant efforts to gain Syrian cooperation for the peace process, the US also warned that country about its continued support for terrorist groups. In August, for example, Christopher warned Damascus, "It is particularly disturbing that some of the statements threatening the US are being made by groups and individuals based in Syria."(59)
ME-originated terrorism was also an internal problem for the US. On 30 January, the trial began of `Umar `Abd al-Rahman and 11 followers accused of having planned bomb attacks, including the blast at the NY World Trade Center. They were found guilty in October. In April, FBI agents went to Saudi Arabia seeking to capture Imad Mugniyeh, a high-ranking Hizbollah official involved in the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut and the hijacking of a 1985 TWA flight. But despite US requests, including a call from Lake, the Saudis foiled the operation by refusing to let the plane land on which Mugniyeh was travelling.(60)
On 28 July, the head of Hamas's Political Department, Musa Abu Marzuk, was seized at NY's Kennedy Airport when he tried to return to the US, where he had previously resided for many years. Israel announced it would request his extradition and Hamas threatened attacks on the US if that country agreed. In Saudi Arabia, a 13 November terrorist attack on a US-managed training school for the Saudi National Guard killed six people, four of them Americans. And when the head of Palestinian Islamic Jihad was assassinated in Malta, his successor was a US citizen, Ramadan `Abdallah Shallah, an adjunct professor of ME politics at the University of South Florida and director of a think tank affiliated with that school.(61) The tough US line against terrorism had bipartisan support. Gingrich advocated a "coherent US strategy for fighting Islamic totalitarianism" that would "help Algeria survive, help secularism survive in Turkey and Egypt, [and] ultimately is designed to force the replacement of the current regime in Iran."(62)
But the US was also careful to separate its position on revolutionary or terrorist Islamic movements from its attitude toward Islam itself. Thus, while visiting Saudi Arabia, Gore met with Hamad al-Ghabid, secretary-general of the Islamic Conference Organization (OIC). Gore said at a joint press conference that the American people had a deep respect for Islam and understand the "distortion that some advocates of violence promote when they seek secular political power through violent means and then falsely cloak themselves in the name of Islam."(63)
US officials also pointed to close ties with Islamic governments in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and its stated sympathy to Islamic causes in Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chechnya. Lake stated, "I am concerned that the equation in the American mind of extremism and Islam does a great disservice to Muslims." Washington "is concerned about the spread of (Islamist) extremism and we mean to contain it," but not all Islamist groups should be viewed as enemies.(64) While offering some economic assistance to Algeria's embattled regime--$2bn. in Export-Import Bank guarantees--the US continued to urge a peaceful and inclusive settlement of the civil war there.(65)
NOTES
1. These developments are discussed in detail in Barry Rubin, Assessing the New Middle East, BESA Center for Strategic Studies (Tel Aviv, 1994).
2. Akiva Eldar, Ha'aretz, 3 January 1995; NYT, 27 January 1995.
3. NYT, 9, 10, 11, and 13 March, and 12 June 1995.
4. Mideast Mirror, 10 March 1995.
5. Mideast Mirror, 10 March 1995.
6. WP, 9 and 18 May 1995.
7. WP, 25 May 1995.
8. Reuters, 11 December 1995; JP, 13 December 1995.
9. Mideast Mirror, 23 and 24 March 1995.
10. Mideast Mirror, 24 March 1995. Clinton's statement is from his speech to the AIPAC conference, 7 May 1995. Text in Near East Report 15 May 1995, pp. 66-67.
11. Ibid.
12. Text of 4 April 1995 speech in John Wilner and Dan Blumenthal, America and the Middle East (Washington DC, 1995), pp. 11-13.
13. Ibid.
14. Speech to the AIPAC conference, 7 May 1995. Text in Near East Report 15 May 1995, pp. 66-67.
15. Mideast Mirror 9 May 1995.
16. Text of State Department semi-annual report on the Palestinian Authority's compliance, 4 June 1995.
17. Text of the Dole and Rabin speeches to the AIPAC conference, 8 May 1995, in Near East Report 15 May 1995, p. 62.
18. Reuters, 24 October 1995.
19. Mideast Mirror, 10 March 1995.
20. Mideast Mirror, 20 March 1995.
21. Mideast Mirror, 10 March 1995.
22. WP, NYT, 12 December 1995.
23. Speech at AIPAC conference, 7 May 1995. Texts in Near East Report 15 May 1995, pp. 66-67.
24. Mideast Mirror, 20 March 1995. This was a remarkably inept choice of words since it was precisely the same formula that President Jimmy Carter used to praise Iran during his 1977 trip there, just before the Iranian revolution began.
25. Mideast Mirror, 17 March 1995.
26. Mideast Mirror 20 March 1995
27. Reuters, 30 May 1995.
28. Mideast Mirror, 17 March 1995.
29. Text of the US-GCC declaration," Mideast Mirror, 14 March 1995.
30. Mideast Mirror, 18 May 1995.
31. IHT, 4 April 1995; WP, 14 April 1995; WSJ. 5 April 1995.
32. Mideast Mirror 20 March 1995.
33. Mideast Mirror, 27 March 1995.
34. Mideast Mirror, 15 March 1995.
35. WP. 4 and 9 April 1995.
36. NYT, 26 March 1995.
37. WSJ, 11 January 1995; NYT, 15 January 1995.
38. Chicago Tribune, 26 February 1995.
39. Mideast Mirror, 24 March 1995.
40. Mideast Mirror, 10 March 1995.
41. WSJ, 30 April and 11 May 1995; LAT, 30 May 1995. See also Reuters, 27 February 1995; NYT, 11
May and 28 June 1995.
42. WP, 11 February 1995.
43. WP, 11 February 1995.
44. Chicago Tribune, 26 February 1995.
45. WT, 22 February 1995.
46. Chicago Tribune, 26 February 1995.
47. NYT, 3 March, 3 and 18 April 1995; WP, 4 May 1995.
48. WSJ, 30 April and 11 May 1995; LAT, 30 May 1995; NYT, 7 and 15 March 1995.
49. Mideast Mirror, 10 March, 1995. See also Mideast Mirror, 9 March 1995 for Iran's approaches to US.
50. NYT, 14 March and 1 April 1995; Mideast Mirror, 16 March 1995.
51. NYT, 2 May 1995; Mideast Mirror, 3 May 1995.
52. Mideast Mirror, 3 May 1995.
53. NYT, 25 June 1995.
54. Reuters, 25 September 1995.
55. White House statement, 27 March 1995.
56. New Yorker interview, cited JP, 24 January 1995.
57. NYT, 26 January 1995.
58. NYT, 26 January 1995. White House press release, 24 January 1995.
59. WP, 30 August 1995.
60. On the trial, see WP, 31 January 1995 and NYT, 2 October 1995. On the Saudi issue, see LAT and WP,
21 April 1995.
61. NYT, 9 August 1995.
62. AP dispatch, 8 February 1995.
63. NYT, 23 March 1995.
64. Farhan Haq, "Algeria-US: Washington Reaches out to Muslim Moderates," Inter Press Service, 6 March 1995.
65. Gideon Gera, "An Islamic Republic of Algeria?" Washington Institute Research Memo, 29 June 1995. See also Edward G. Shirley (pseudonym), "Fundamentalism In Power," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1995.