By Barry Rubin
The US continued to promote the Arab-Israeli peace process during 1994, focusing especially on Israel-Syria negotiations. Secretary of State Warren Christopher traveled to the region six times, while President Bill Clinton visited once and met several times with ME leaders in pursuit of a breakthrough. The US considered a softer policy toward the possibility of an Islamic fundamentalist revolution in Algeria while maintaining its strategy of "dual containment" to preserve Gulf security and support for sanctions against the radical regimes in Iraq, Iran, and Libya.
The basic US regional strategy during 1994 involved the following elements:
1.The US helped implement the Israel-PLO accords as well as the new Israel-Jordan agreements through financial and diplomatic support, while trying to broaden the peace process to include other Arab states. The task, however, was no longer to mediate but merely to assist parties already engaged in bilateral negotiations. Clinton stated that the US would "stand shoulder to shoulder with those who are taking risks for peace" and ensure the defeat of "a new wave of terrorism and violence" seeking to sabotage the peace process. In this vein, he noted, peace "must produce tangible improvements in the quality of ordinary citizens' lives, and in so doing, give [them] a real stake in preserving the peace." The goal, as depicted by Christopher, was "an Israel that is secure and at peace with every Arab and Islamic state of goodwill [and] an Arab world able to devote its resources to economic development and the needs of its people."(1)
Economic relations contributed to peace, Christopher said, with talks on regional cooperation and the decline of the Arab boycott against Israel offering "enormous trade and investment opportunities both for Israel and American business." The partly US-sponsored Casablanca ME regional business conference held in October opened new chances for private investment, trade and joint ventures that, he stated, would help "transform peace between governments into peace between peoples.... Governments...must reduce economic barriers and build the infrastructure that joins the ME by road, air, fax, and microchip."(2)
2. The biggest US effort during 1994 was trying to promote an Israel-Syria diplomatic breakthrough, a goal which the Clinton Administration was extremely optimistic about achieving. Only this step, US policy-makers claimed, could bring about a comprehensive regional solution. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake predicted that Israeli agreements with Jordan and Lebanon would quickly follow an accord with Syria. Moreover, this was the one area where the US could still play the role of intermediary. "An Israeli-Syrian agreement," Christopher stated, "will inevitably widen the circle of Arab states making peace with Israel. And it will build the confidence of all that peace will endure." Lake suggested that an Israel-Syria diplomatic settlement would "bolster the network of ME moderation," while weakening radical states and groups.(3)
3. Creating a broad bloc of moderate states aligned with the US was seen as a way to protect regional security and US interests. Christopher, voicing strong optimism as a result of his contacts with Arab leaders, stated, "You get a sense that the ice is breaking up and the opportunities ahead are enormous." Strengthening US "security ties with Israel and our key Arab friends" would allow the building of "a new future for the ME." Lake said that a new regional alignment including "moderate Islamic states, from Turkey in the north to Saudi Arabia in the south, from Morocco in the west to Pakistan in the east" would constrain and isolate radicals. Moderate regimes would thus be able to "find the strength to counter extremism at home as well as abroad," "concentrate on the economic well-being of their people," and "feel more secure in meeting their citizen's demands for greater political participation and accountability."(4)
4. Opposing radical regimes as well as violent revolutionary groups and their efforts to challenge the peace process or Gulf security was a continuing priority for US policy. "If peace brings nothing but more terror," explained Christopher, "the process of reconciliation surely will not succeed." Action must be taken to cut off foreign sources of funding for Hamas and other groups, including from the US. "Front organizations based abroad that are linked to terrorism must be shut down. And the perpetrators and organizers of terror must be punished."(5)
US-backed moderates, in Lake's words, would be "a bulwark against aggression by the region's rogue regimes, especially Iraq and Iran" to stop them and groups they aided, like Hamas and Hizballah, from killing the "prospects for peace." Lake concluded that "progress in Arab-Israeli peacemaking helps place the extremists on the defensive and increases their isolation." CIA Director R. James Woolsey labeled as threats to peace, regional stability and US interests:
Political extremism hiding behind the mantle of Islamic religious fundamentalism, terrorism, and the policies and ambitions of...Iran and Iraq which have not abandoned their dream[s] of dominating the region, threatening their neighbors, subverting peace, and acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.(6)
5. While condemning radical fundamentalist groups, US policy-makers nevertheless stressed their respect for Islam and even acceptance of moderate Islamic fundamentalist groups. The contest was not between Islam and the West, said Clinton, "but in the ME, as elsewhere across the world...a contest between forces that transcend civilization; a contest between tyranny and freedom, terror and security, bigotry and tolerance, isolation and openness."(7) Thus, in dealing with political unrest in Algeria, the Administration suggested a compromise between less militant forces on both sides.
THE ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS
US policy-makers spent the first part of 1994 defining their role regarding implementation of the September 1993 Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles (DOP). In general, this meant refusing to be drawn into direct involvement, for example rejecting a request from PLO and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasir `Arafat in January 1994 that the US intervene to speed up implementation of the Israel-PLO agreement.
This principle was partly and temporarily revised after the February 1994 Hebron massacre of 29 Palestinians by a Jewish settler. Within hours of hearing the news, Clinton asked Israeli and Palestinian negotiators to move their talks from Egypt to Washington. "Extremists on both sides are determined to drag Arabs and Israelis back into the darkness of unending conflict and bloodshed," he said. "We must prevent them from extinguishing the hopes and the visions and the aspirations of ordinary people for a life of peaceful existence." Christopher called `Arafat to express condolences. But while US officials announced that both sides agreed to come to Washington, they apparently never accepted the US invitation.(8)
The US, however, continued its own separate dialogues with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Chairman `Arafat to suggest ideas on how to restart talks, which the Palestinian side was boycotting.(9) The US expressed sympathy for the Palestinian reaction to the Hebron massacre, but still refused `Arafat's direct request for an active US role in the bilateral talks, suggesting that the best way to solve problems was for the two sides to move forward in negotiations and implementation.(10)
To facilitate progress, Clinton urged Rabin, during a visit by the prime minister to Washington in March 1994, to make concessions in order to bring the PLO back to the negotiating table. The US also accepted a UN resolution critical of Israel. Though voting against two clauses specifically identifying East Jerusalem as "occupied territory," it accepted such a reference in the preamble as part of a deal to secure the PLO's return to the bargaining table. After a US delegation headed by peace process coordinator Dennis Ross visited `Arafat and the other parties in mid-March, and several telephone calls to ME leaders by Clinton, Christopher was able to announce a new round of bilateral talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors.(11)
The US also sought to encourage Israel and the PLO to move forward in the peace process through practical assistance. Noted Christopher: "America's strategic commitment to Israel's security is unshakable. We will maintain Israel's qualitative military edge and its ability to defend itself, by itself." This involved both minimizing "the risks it takes for peace" and building Israeli confidence in US reliability, including such steps as letting it sell equipment for civilian satellites in the US; agreeing to sell it the US F-18I advanced fighter plane as well as two super-computers which had potential military applications; providing more aid for the Israeli Arrow anti-missile missile program; and pressing for an end to the Arab economic boycott.(12)
The warmth of bilateral US-Israel relations was illustrated by a statement from a senior Israeli Defense Ministry official who listed completed accomplishments, "Our contacts with the Pentagon on Lebanon, the peace process, weapons procurement, information exchanges, the purchase of the advanced F-15s and the Arrow project demonstrate in unequivocal terms the level of cooperation that exists, and the nurturing environment in which relations are conducted."(13)
To facilitate help for the PLO, Congress passed legislation waiving previous laws prohibiting US assistance to the organization and barring it from opening an office in the US. In August, though, it passed a measure prohibiting formal meetings in East Jerusalem between US and Palestinian Authority officials. The State Department told Congress that the "PLO is abiding by the commitments...[but] should do more to condemn violence in a timely, authoritative and unambiguous fashion." In a 10 June letter to Christopher, members of the House of Representatives group monitoring the peace process complained that this report did not hold the PLO to "a high enough standard [and] repeatedly seeks to limit the responsibility of `Arafat and the PLO to meet their commitments." Christopher, however, reaffirmed `Arafat's centrality in the process, describing the Palestinian leader as "the flag and the `Star-Spangled Banner'" of the movement and "the indispensable person for us to deal with."(14)
At the same time, the US urged `Arafat to live up to his agreements. It criticized a hard-line speech the PLO leader gave in Johannesburg, South Africa, with Christopher urging `Arafat to restate his commitment to the DOP, but also pronounced itself satisfied by his efforts toward that end. "Our measure," explained State Department spokesperson Mike McCurry, "is what are the parties doing to follow through on these very solemn commitments that they made to each other." In a similar vein, US Ambassador to Israel Edward Djerejian stated: "It is up to the new Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian police to fulfill their own responsibility...so that those who are opposed to the peace process [and] advocate violence and terrorism are controlled."(15)
Christopher noted: "Palestinians need proof that peace will improve their lives. That is why the US has mobilized the donor community to support Palestinian self-government" and to encourage aid projects. But, he cautioned "more must be done to facilitate the flow of assistance and maximize its effect. It is imperative that Chairman `Arafat fulfill his responsibility to root out terror in the areas he controls. The same courage he demonstrated in making peace must now be shown in fighting the enemies of peace."(16)
During a visit to the ME in April-May, Christopher witnessed the signing of the Israel-PLO Cairo accord for implementing the Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian authority in Gaza and Jericho. Returning to the region two weeks later, Christopher went to Jericho to show that the agreement was working and to make the Palestinians feel that they enjoyed US support, calling the visit "a tremendous thrill." In July and December, he visited `Arafat in Gaza. The secretary of state pressed the PLO for more financial openness in order to persuade donors to start providing large-scale aid as well as to attract private investment. "I think the chairman will live up to his responsibilities," Christopher said after the July meeting. Clinton himself met the Palestinian leader in Cairo to stress similar themes during a trip in October.(17)
Throughout these events, the US maintained its position of refusing to intervene in the bilateral Israel-Palestinian talks or to take a stand on controversial issues such as Jerusalem. As Christopher said after meeting `Arafat in August at Egyptian President Husni Mubarak's summer palace in Cairo, "It is not the US position that governs here but it is the parties" directly involved.(18)
MEDIATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA
The primary US diplomatic activity in the region during 1994 was urging progress and trying to mediate on the Israel-Syria front. Clinton met Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad in Geneva in January, afterward calling it a "constructive and encouraging meeting." "I have always viewed Syria's involvement as critical," said Clinton, adding that he told Asad, "I believe Syria is the key to the achievement of an enduring and comprehensive peace that will finally put an end to the conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors." While Asad was less forthcoming in their joint press conference, Clinton quoted him as seeking "the establishment of real and comprehensive peace with Israel that will ensure normal, peaceful relations among good neighbors."(19) Christopher called the meeting "a step forward that set the stage for the resumption of negotiations in Washington on all four bilateral tracks."(20)
Clinton did raise such difficult bilateral issues in the meeting as Syrian sponsorship of terrorism and involvement in drug-smuggling. The US also urged Syria to help curb attacks against Israel from Lebanon lest these endanger the peace process, and kept Syria on the State Department list of countries sponsoring terrorism. In general, though, Syria was courted so as to obtain its cooperation. Clinton went so far as to express the hope that 1994 would be "the breakthrough year" for an Israel-Syria accord.(21)
During his April-May and mid-May trips to the ME, Christopher met with Rabin and Asad and transmitted proposals between Israel and Syria, while also briefing Mubarak and other regional leaders. The schedule for each visit was kept flexible so that the secretary of state could go on to his next stop if there was some progress, and stay longer or cancel meetings if a roadblock developed. During the second round of shuttles in May, which he called the "early stage" of negotiations, Christopher spent four days in Jerusalem and Damascus. On one occasion, underscoring his role as more of a messenger than arbiter, Christopher stated, "I took today to Syria the responses, ideas from Israel that I had gleaned from my meeting" with Israeli leaders. "The questions are exceedingly difficult. The sub-questions are exceedingly difficult and it's a long road ahead."(22)
The basic US analysis was that while the talks would be a long process, "inexorable pressures," in one US official's words, would ensure success. Lake claimed: "We already have good reason to believe that Syria is now committed to real peace in the way that Israel and others define it." The US would facilitate the gradual coming together of the two sides and help provide the guarantees necessary to ensure the ability to reach and maintain an agreement. "We can and will help Israel minimize the risks at hand," Lake stated. "The US stands ready to participate in the security arrangements that the parties negotiate."(23)
This official optimism was maintained through Christopher's five-day shuttle to the ME in late July. A senior US official explained: "We feel that the discussions between the Israelis and the Syrians are in a new phase," and confirmed that the US objective was a diplomatic breakthrough before the year's end. Another official said: "The broad outlines are there. Both sides have presented detailed proposals." Though Christopher, while in Jerusalem on 18 July, acknowledged that serious obstacles remained to an Israel-Syria peace, and there was "sharp controversy" between the two sides, he declared, "There is every indication" that the Arab-Israeli conflict "is about to come to an end."(24)
During his August visit, Christopher voiced similar optimistic sentiments. Though the secretary of state reportedly pressed Syria's leader to deter attacks on Israel from Lebanon, he maintained, "Only a comprehensive peace is the best solution to the tensions in Lebanon." But he canceled a projected September trip to the region apparently because of deadlocks in the Syrian-Israel negotiations.(25)
Discussing the Israeli-Syrian negotiating track in October, Christopher explained his view of its progress and problems, his reasons for optimism and for making the issue such a US priority:
We have succeeded in narrowing differences, but important gaps remain. In my view, the time is fast approaching when some very difficult decisions must be made. If these talks are to succeed...then the deliberate pace of the current negotiations must give way to a bolder approach.
We understand the risks and costs involved. For Syria, peace requires overcoming decades of suspicion and ending policies geared to confrontation. In an environment of genuine and comprehensive peace in which there will be no place for terrorists on Israel's borders, we also look to the day when relations between Syria and the US will improve. For Israel, peace with Syria will require difficult decisions. But the reality of peace will be powerful: An end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, an end to the threat of war, and Israel's full integration into the political and economic life of the ME.
There are stern tests for peace between Israel and Syria. First, it must be a real peace that reflects an active commitment to reconciliation. It is significant that President Asad has said that Syria has made a strategic choice for peace with Israel and is prepared to meet its objective requirements. The requirements of real peace are clear to all: Agreed-upon withdrawal, full diplomatic relations, borders that facilitate the movement of people and goods, and a commitment never to threaten each other again.
Second, peace between Israel and Syria must provide security for both sides. After decades of hostility, each side needs to be sensitive to the security concerns of the other. If requested, the US stands ready to participate, in an appropriate form, in the security arrangements negotiated between the parties.(26)
Christopher told Congress in January that the US would send troops to the Golan Heights if the security guarantees for an Israel-Syria agreement required such a step. Some conservatives suggested that they might oppose implementation of such a plan in the future.(27) The Administration's position was that the US must do what was necessary to ensure the success of peacemaking. Critics spoke of dangers to US troops, though this was basically a cover for those opposing any deal by the two parties. But this issue would only become a concrete issue if and when an Israel-Syria agreement was reached.
THE ISRAEL-JORDAN BREAKTHROUGH
In January, King Husayn visited Washington to discuss US-Jordan bilateral relations, at one point expressing the hope that he would meet Rabin "before too long." The US urged him to advance the peace process with Israel. On another matter important to Amman, in May the US accepted Jordan's request to stop searching ships en route to Jordan's port of Aqaba to prevent material being sent to Iraq.(28)
Clinton met again with King Husayn on 22 June, which the king later said was the turning point in prompting his decision to sign a treaty with Israel. A month later, on 20 July, Christopher, during one of his o Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
In departure remarks at the White House, he said:
This trip is more than a celebration of another important step toward peace. It's an opportunity to pursue new steps. My goal is to make clear that the time has arrived for all parties to follow the brave and hopeful inspiration of Israel and Jordan.... No step on this long journey requires more patience, more discipline, more courage than the steps still to come.(31)
With US congressional elections approaching in early November, and the two signatories seeking US aid to implement their treaty, the signing of the Israel-Jordan peace agreement was turned into a virtual pro-Clinton rally. Several hundred guests came from the US, while the speeches delivered by King Husayn and Rabin stressed their gratitude to the US president. Clinton replied, "I thank you for trusting America to help you arrive at this moment."(32)
Clinton's speech in Israel expressed strong support for that country. Nevertheless, he canceled a tour of East Jerusalem rather than be accompanied there by Mayor Ehud Olmert, which Palestinians asserted would constitute endorsement of Israel's claim to that part of the city. In Amman, where his address was boycotted by Islamic opposition legislators, Clinton pledged US help to meet Jordan's "legitimate defense requirements," avowed American respect for the religious tenets of Islam, and promised US aid for Jordan's development. "I say on behalf of the US, we will not let you down," he declared, but warned against the "forces of reaction" trying to destroy the peace process.(33)
Meeting with `Arafat, Clinton discussed implementing the Israel-PLO agreement as well as US aid to the Palestinians, suggesting that an organized Palestinian tax-collection system and greater disclosure in the handling of revenue would facilitate the flow of aid. Clinton also discussed, in his words, "The absolute necessity to combat Hamas and all other extremist groups using terror.... Terrorists must not be allowed to intimidate the peoples of this region into abandoning the peace process."(34)
The US president carefully stated the combination of support for `Arafat and pressure on the Palestinian leader to implement his promises which characterized the US position:
I felt that we got a very firm and unambiguous response....Chairman `Arafat said he would continue to do all he could to combat terrorism, specifically Hamas, but other groups as well.... I am satisfied with the response that he gave, and I believe he will attempt to implement it. He understands, I think, clearly that Hamas is his enemy now; that once you become a partner in the peace process you have to fight for peace. And those who seek to undermine it are seeking to undermine you.... I think that we would all admit that it is impossible to guarantee 100% success in any effort.... There has been an increasing effort in the last several weeks on the part of Chairman `Arafat and the authorities in the territories to do what they can on this front.(35)
Clinton expressed hope that his visit to Syria would narrow the gap between Syria and Israel, saying he was encouraged by the progress already made. "I believe we should move as quickly as possible, and I am pushing it as quickly as possible." Although acknowledging that terrorism was still an issue in US-Syria relations, he averred: "The most successful way to end terrorism in this part of the world is to have a comprehensive peace in the ME.... I believe President Asad wants a comprehensive peace and wants an end to terrorism as a part of that."(36)
In their post-meeting press conference in Damascus on 27 October, however, Asad seemed less forthcoming than Clinton had hoped, a repetition of the pattern at their meeting nine months earlier. There were reports that the president was disappointed and angry with the outcome of the talks, and Christopher postponed a planned round of Israel-Syria shuttle diplomacy. Rabin visited the US and discussed the Syria issue at the White House on 21 November. In early December, America's business and workers."(39)
A prime US goal was to persuade Saudi Arabia to move toward peace with Israel and to give financial and diplomatic support to Jordan and the Palestinians in order to encourage their participation in the process. This effort was more successful in eliciting promises than on obtaining any actual aid or investment. Christopher met Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa`ud al-Faysal and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign ministers during his April trip to the ME, thanking them for supporting the peace process, reducing the indirect economic boycott against Israel, and backing continued sanctions on Iraq.(40)
US military involvement in the Gulf was not without some cost. In April, US warplanes accidentally shot down two US helicopters carrying an aid team to the northern Iraq no-fly zone, resulting in the death of over 20 Americans. But for the first time since the 1991 war, the year passed without any US-Iraqi military clashes. In June a Kuwaiti court sentenced five Iraqis and a Kuwaiti citizen to death for their involvement in an earlier, Iraqi-inspired plan to assassinate former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait in 1993.(41)
During his October visit, Clinton met King Fahd and was awarded the Order of King `Abd al-Aziz, the kingdom's highest decoration. The president was accompanied by the commander of the US Central Command, responsible for military operations in the area, to show the US interest in drawing up plans for practical defensive cooperation. The US-Saudi joint communique called recent Iraqi troop movements toward Kuwait's border, shortly before Clinton's visit to the region, a "threat to regional peace" that showed Baghdad's persistent ambitions and warning that it was "premature" to consider removing sanctions before Iraq fully implemented all UN resolutions. Compromise, they cautioned, might encourage Baghdad to commit more aggression. In Kuwait, Clinton visited some of the US soldiers who had been previously deployed in response to Iraq's military maneuvers near the border.
Christopher characterized the US response in the following terms, "The rogue state of Iraq has tested our resolve, and we have met the test." Comparing the crisis to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, he declared that due to the decisive US response, "Saddam got the message, stopped dead in his tracks, and pulled back.... Saddam has shown himself to be a repeat offender, trusted neither internationally nor in the Arab world. We have put him on notice that any repetition of his recent threats will be met by all means necessary, including military force."(42)
US officials repeatedly emphasized the importance of keeping up the pressure against Iraq, especially in the face of growing opposition to continued sanctions by France and Russia, as well as some debate within the US on the issue. US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright said Washington would "do all it can to avoid a premature [UN] debate on the requirements and conditions for lifting the oil embargo" against Iraq. Christopher defined the US goal as "Iraq's full compliance with all UN Security Council resolutions, including long-term monitoring."(43)
This "active containment" approach was somewhat different from US policy toward Iran. In Tehran's case, the US thought that economic sanctions might force the regime to change--or at least reduce Iran's ability to pursue--its policy and stop its quest for weapons of mass destruction, support for terrorism and subversion, violent opposition to the peace process, and human rights abuses. Any US dialogue with Iran, however, required such a major behavioral shift as a precondition.
US policymakers remained highly critical of Iran's current actions. As depicted by CIA director R. James Woolsey, these included efforts to undermine other Gulf states, "to derail the peace process, and to support Hizballah and other terrorist organizations and groups operating today from Algeria to Tajikistan." He charged that Iran authorized terrorist attacks on the highest level and was racing to build up its military power and obtain weapons of mass destruction, including the prospect of having nuclear weapons in eight to ten years.(44)
US officials suggested that Iran was involved in the bombing of the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and Christopher pledged that the US would lead a "concerted international response" to the bombing, send experts to Argentina, and share intelligence. Criticizing European allies for trading with Iran, he declared: "Iran is an international outlaw, yet some nations still conduct preferential commercial relations with Iran and some take steps to appease that outlaw nation. They must understand that by doing so, they make it easier for Iran to use its resources to sponsor terrorism throughout the world."(45)
Christopher was particularly sharp on this issue:
Radical groups could not continue their atrocities without the support of rejectionist states.... Iran is the world's most significant state sponsor of terrorism, and the most ardent opponent of ME peace. The international community has been far too tolerant of Iran's outlaw behavior. Arms sales and preferential economic treatment, which make it easier for Iran to divert resources to terrorism, should be terminated. The evidence is overwhelming: Iran is intent on projecting terror and extremism across the ME and beyond. Only a concerted international effort can stop it.(46)
At the same time, however, the US contradicted its own anti-Iran policy on the commercial level. Direct US-Iran trade, granted case-by-case permission from the US government, totaled $3.8bn. with an additional $1.2bn. in goods sold by US companies through foreign subsidiaries. Exxon, Mobil and Texaco bought up to one-third of Iran's total oil exports.(47) In a more conciliatory mode, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau told a congressional committee in March that the US believed Iran's regime would remain in power but hoped it "will adopt new policies that are more in line with being a good neighbor...being more supportive of the peace process and not supporting militant guerrilla groups." A senior US official told an interviewer: "The US would welcome direct dialogue with Iran provided it is authorized and recognized on their side...not under the table or by the back door."(48)
During a November tour of the Gulf, the US undersecretary of state for political affairs Peter Tarnoff discussed regional security arrangements to confront the Iraqi and Iranian threats to states in the region and to US interests. He stated that while Iraq's formal recognition of Kuwait and its new border was a positive step, Baghdad still had to comply with other UN resolutions, including those requiring it to account for Kuwaitis missing since the Gulf War, restore seized Kuwaiti property, and submit fully to UN plans for the long-term monitoring of its weapons industry. Tarnoff listed as US concerns about Iran its development of "weapons of mass destruction," sponsorship of "international terrorism," support for groups opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and internal repression.(49)
In the category of hard-line states, US policy also criticized Libya whose behavior, said Pelletreau, "placed it outside the parameters of acceptable interstate action." US policy-makers spoke of tightening sanctions, dismissing any direct dialogue with Libya or compromise short of total compliance. "We insist upon full compliance with UN Security Council resolutions 731, 748, and 883.... We also desire to see Libya end support for destabilization activities, abandon chemical weapons and other non-conventional warfare programs, and cease pursuit of offensive ballistic missile capabilities."(50) No action, however, was taken by the US to tighten sanctions.
THE RESPONSE TO REVOLUTIONARY FUNDAMENTALISM
"America refuses to accept that our civilizations must collide," Clinton told the Jordanian parliament in October. "We respect Islam as one of the great religions in this cradle of civilization." US policy carefully tried to avoid any appearance of being anti-Islamic while it opposed radical fundamentalist forces like Iran and such groups as Hamas and Hizballah. Portraying the situation another way, Clinton continued: "On one side stand the forces of terror and extremism, who cloak themselves in the rhetoric of religion and nationalism. These forces of reaction feed on disillusionment, poverty and despair.... To them I say--you will not succeed. You are the past, not the future."(51)
Equating Islam with Islamic fundamentalism and extremism was a mistake, explained Assistant Secretary of State Pelletreau. Indeed, he said, the Islamic movements were motivated by a desire to find a more accountable, responsible leadership. Moreover, a Muslim desire to revive or maintain traditional values did not necessitate conflict with America. "We as a government have no quarrel with Islam. There are many legitimate, socially responsible Muslim groups with a legitimate political role."(52)
This was not merely an abstract controversy, since many American ME specialists advocated a US rapprochement with Iran and the acceptance of the inevitability of radical fundamentalists taking power in Algeria or Egypt. Moreover, the US itself had been a direct target of radical fundamentalist attacks. In March 1994, after a five-month trial, all four defendants accused of bombing New York's World Trade Center in 1993 were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. In May, a Lebanese immigrant in that city shot four Jewish students, one of whom died.(53)
Reportedly, some US embassy dispatches from Algeria stated that the triumph of militant Islam there was "unavoidable" and urged US backing for a "democratic solution" incorporating some fundamentalist groups. "The regime must find a means of bringing disaffected elements of the populace into a process to chart a new democratic course for Algeria," said acting assistant secretary of state Mark Parris. "It would be refreshing if we can avoid being labeled the Great Satan in this one," a senior US official said, referring to Iranian anti-Americanism that had emerged in part from American opposition to the revolution there.(54)
In a comprehensive analysis of the US position on Islamic fundamentalism and regional politics, in May 1994, National Security Advisor Lake posited two alternate futures for the ME: one in which "extremists, wielding weapons of mass destruction hold sway over a region torn by intercommunal and interstate conflicts," and another which allowed "democratic progress, the free movement of people and goods and a dialogue leading to national security." Conflict in the ME was not between Islam and the West, he said, but "between oppression and responsive government, between isolation and openness and between moderation and extremism." The source of rebelliousness was not ideology or group loyalty but rather, "Disillusionment, from a failure to secure basic needs, from dashed hopes for political participation and social justice [which] breeds an extremism of hatred and violence." Revolutionary fundamentalism had little to do with Islam but merely used religion "to cover its real intentions--the naked pursuit of political power." Clinton, too, offered a mainly materialist view of the problem: "Seventeen of the 22 Muslim states have falling incomes. Seventy percent of Muslims in the world today are young people. The potential for explosion is great."(55)
Algeria was the most obvious place where this analysis seemed apt. In order to do so, the US tried to draw a distinction between the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), portrayed as a potentially moderate group which might be acceptable as a government in Algeria, and more extremist organizations. The chief State Department counter-terrorism official blamed most violent attacks against civilians in Algeria on the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), depicting the FIS as less involved and as a primarily political, rather than a terrorist, group.(56) Clinton himself accepted this division when he acknowledged low-level US contacts with FIS members abroad by calling them representatives of "dissident groups...who themselves have not been involved in violence." He expressed concern that the situation was getting out of control. "We have also encouraged this government to reach out to dissident groups who are not involved in terrorism, who disavow terrorism."(57)
A senior US official predicted that Islamic fundamentalists would triumph in Algeria, although they would not be able to consolidate power there or spread revolution to other Arab states. He suggested that Algeria would face internal chaos and a splitting off of primarily Berber areas. A fundamentalist takeover would not set off "some Khomeini-like Islamic wave," he said. The US supported the Algerian government's attempts to reestablish security but wanted it to broaden a narrow political base through "dialogue with political forces" including Islamic fundamentalist ones "who reject violence and terrorism."(58)
Pelletreau, speaking to a congressional hearing in September, commented that "these reprehensible acts of terrorism" did not "advance in any way the principles of Islam, a religion which preaches tolerance and respect for human life.... Islamist figures who are sincere about finding a non-violent solution to Algeria's problems should clearly disassociate themselves from this type of blind fanaticism."(59)
At the same time, though, "Algeria's leaders cannot ease this crisis through overreliance on repressive policies.... The US condemns violations of basic human rights by all sides." The cause of the civil war, he said, was "frustration arising from political exclusion, economic misery, and social injustice.... Large numbers of Algerians seek a more meaningful voice in their political system and the opportunity to build a better life.... The US government has thus repeatedly stressed to Algerian leaders at the highest levels the need for concrete steps to establish a dialogue with opposition elements--secular and Islamist--willing to work towards a non-violent solution to Algeria's crisis." The best strategy, he recommended, was "to reinforce pragmatic tendencies within the Islamist movement and to marginalize the most violent extremists."(60)
Pelletreau said that the US calls on all parties to engage in a process which broadens political participation, prepares for an eventual return to elections, and protects the rights of all Algerians. Those who say that the US is resigned to--or is willing to condone--a victory of extremism in Algeria are wrong.... Beyond the far-reaching consequences for Algeria itself, further radical Islamist gains there could embolden extremists in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco--key US allies in the region. Instability in Algeria could provoke an influx of refugees into France and elsewhere in Western Europe. The goal of US policy toward Algeria is to avoid such developments.... We are convinced that attempts to suppress the insurgency through military means alone will prove insufficient. That is the lesson of the past two years. The best hope for a solution which will guarantee Algeria's internal peace and prospects, as well as its contribution to long-term regional stability, lies not in a strategy of repression, but one of inclusion and reconciliation.(61)
NOTES
1. Clinton's speeches in Cairo, cited in Mideast Mirror 25 October. Text of Clinton's speech to Jordanian parliament in Mideast Mirror, 27 October. Text of Christopher speech, "Maintaining the Momentum for Peace in the ME," at Georgetown University, 25 October 1994.
2. Christopher speech, ibid.
3. Transcript of Lake's lecture at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 17 May; WT, 17 May 1994.
4. Press stakeout with Rabin and Christopher, 18 July, Israel Foreign Ministry text. On US practical efforts toward achieving this goal, see Deputy Secretary of State Daniel Kurtzer, 16 February in US Department of State Dispatch, 28 February 1994, pp. 111-12. Ibid.
5. Christopher speech, op. cit.
6. Ibid.; R. James Woolsey, Peacewatch No. 33 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington DC), 26 September. These ideas are most clearly expressed in Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994, pp. 45-55.
7. Clinton's speech to Jordanian parliament, op. cit.
8. NYT, WP, 26 February 1994.
9. WP, 18 March; NYT; 3, 4 March 1994.
10. NYT, 2, 4 March; WP, 5 March 1994.
11. NYT, 12, 16, 17 March; WP, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22 March 1994.
12. Yedi`ot Aharonot, 21 January; Davar, 1 February; NYT, 12 April; Christopher speech, (see note 1 above). For an interesting analysis of the role of Jews in Clinton's Administration and the good bilateral relations between Israel and the US, see Ma'ariv, 2 September 1994.
13. JP, 21 April 1994.
14. NYT, 2 March; WP, 19 June. On US aid pledges, see Mideast Mirror,
11, 12 May 1994.
15. Texts from Mideast Mirror, 19, 26 May; JP, 10 July 1994.
16. Christopher speech, see note 1 above.
17. WP, NYT, 16, 17, 18 May. On Christopher's visit to Gaza in July, see Mideast Mirror, WP, 22 July 1994.
18. WP, 7 August 1994.
19. Text in US Department of State, Dispatch, January, pp. 36-38. See also NYT, WP, 17 January 1994.
20. Warren Christopher, "Advancing the Strategic Priorities of US Foreign Policy and the FY 1995 Budget," Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 23 February 1994, text in US Department of State, Dispatch, 7 March 1994, p. 117.
21. Guy Bechor, Ha'aretz, 17 January; WP, 4 January, 25 February, 31 March; Mideast Mirror, 24 February; NYT, 1 April. The US was also sympathetic toward Israel's periodic reprisal raids against groups attacking it from Lebanon. See Mideast Mirror, 6, 7 May 1994.
22. WP, 1, 3, 19 May; Mideast Mirror, 19 May 1994.
23. NYT, 21 May 1994.
24. Transcript, White House Background Briefing by Senior Officials,
25 July; NYT, 20 July; WT, 23 July 1994.
25. WP, 8 August; NYT, 7, 10 August 1994.
26. Christopher speech, see note 1 above.
27. WP, 4 January 1994. On the debate over sending US troops to the Golan, see for example, WSJ 27 December 1994; Peter Rodman and Douglas Feith, "Policing the Golan," National Interest, Winter 1994/95, pp. 51-55.
28. NYT, WP, 27 January, 26 April; Mideast Monitor, 9 May 1994.
29. JP, 10 July; NYT 26 July; WP, 27 July. US State Department, Text of Christopher's press briefing, 25 July 1994.
30. Reuters dispatch from Amman, 24 September 1994; NYT, 22 November, 1994.
31. Text in Mideast Mirror, 25 October 1994.
32. Text in White House press release, 26 October 1994.
33. Mideast Mirror, 27 October; text in White House press release, 26 October 1994.
34. Text of Clinton's remarks in Mideast Mirror, 31 October 1994.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Mideast Mirror, 14 November 1994.
38. Mideast Mirror, 11 November 1994.
39. NYT, 18 January, 17 February; WP, 17 February; New Republic, 14 March 1994, pp. 10-11.
40. NYT, WP, 28 April 1994.
41. NYT, WP, 15 May, 5 June 1994.
42. Text in Mideast Mirror, 25 October 1994. See also WP, 12 October 1994.
43. Lally Weymouth, "The Saddam Lobby," WP, 8 May 1994; Mideast Mirror, 18 May 1994. Warren Christopher, "Advancing the Strategic Priorities of US Foreign Policy and the FY 1995 Budget," (see note 20 above).
44. R. James Woolsey, speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, (see note 1 above).
45. WP, 29 July 1994.
46. Christopher's speech, (see note 1 above).
47. "Just Doing Business," ME, January 1995, pp. 28-29.
48. Bernard Edinger, "Algeria will Survive Fundamentalists, US Says," Reuters, 15 July. For an Iranian peace feeler toward the US, see Mideast Mirror, 8 June 1994.
49. Mideast Mirror, 14 November 1994.
50. Ibid.
51. Mideast Mirror, 27 October 1994.
52. Transcript of Pelletreau's lecture at the ME Forum, Voice of America, 26 May; WT, 27 May; WP, 19 May; Newsweek, 30 May 1994.
53. NYT, 4, 5 March, 25 May; WP, 2 March. For the debate on Iranian moderation and dealing with Islamic fundamentalism, see Peter Rodman, "Co-opt or Confront Fundamentalist Islam?" ME Quarterly, December 1994, Vol. 1 No. 4, pp. 61-4.
54. WP, 19 May; WT, 27 July; IHT, 20 May 1994.
55. Transcript of lecture by Lake at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 17 May; Reuters, "Clinton Calls on Algeria to Talk to Opponents," 7 June. See also Lake's article, WP, 24 July 1994.
56. Mideast Mirror, 2 June 1994.
57. Reuters, "Clinton Calls on Algeria to talk to Opponents," 7 June 1994.
58. Edinger, op. cit.
59. Text of Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau, testimony to House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on North Africa, 28 September 1994.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.