By Barry Rubin
The end of the Cold War, the Communist bloc's collapse, and the US-led coalition's victory in the 1991 Gulf War opened a new era for US policy in the ME. As the world's sole superpower, with a clear strategic superiority and a wide range of alliances, the US now enjoyed the greatest potential leverage it ever possessed in the region.
But paradoxically, at the very height of its potential power in the ME, the US was less actively involved there in 1993 than in many previous years. The most important development--the Israel-PLO accord--came about without the involvement or even knowledge of the US government. On other issues of importance--Gulf security and relations with the most radical regional states, Iraq, Iran, and Libya--the Clinton Administration wished to show continuity with its predecessor, and little change occurred. In addition, the end of the US-USSR rivalry and the low priority placed on foreign policy also lessened the scope of US regional aims. During 1993, dramatic progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process and the inauguration of a new US president gave the first signs of this new arrangement.
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
Elected president in November 1992 and inaugurated in January 1993, Bill Clinton was the first Democrat in the White House in twelve years. He entered office at a time of economic recession, and the growing pressure to focus on internal problems seemed to accord with his personal predilections. He had no government experience in international affairs and--on the key ME crisis of the day--had wavered on the use of force to make Iraq withdraw from Kuwait in 1991.
This inexperience in foreign policy, however, coupled with the declining priority of foreign affairs and cutbacks in resources, including military spending, made it all the more urgent to show a continuing commitment in the ME. In particular, the new Administration had to show its commitment to continuing the Arab-Israel peace process, its determination to preserve the assets accumulated by previous events (including the 1991 Gulf War), and its willingness to take strong action against radical regimes. Moreover, having campaigned against President George Bush on the grounds that he had been too harsh on Israel and too soft on Baghdad before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Clinton wished to reverse these emphases. In general, the new US government's team of officials were more favorable toward Israel than any of its predecessors.
The Administration, however, had even more than the usual problems of assembling a new policy team and creating an effective decision-making system. Clinton chose as secretary of state Warren Christopher, who had served as deputy secretary of state under President Jimmy Carter, although lacking in strategic vision or resolve. Christopher's main ME involvement had been the ill-starred US-Iran hostage talks of 1979-81. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, another former Carter Administration official, did not see his role as involving the advocacy of specific strategies or policies. The original Deputy Secretary of State Clifford Wharton had no foreign policy experience and lasted only a few months, being replaced in 1994 by the former journalist Strobe Talbott. At the number-three slot Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff, former head of the Council on Foreign Relations quickly became enmeshed in controversy after a speech urging a limited US international role which became a symbol for the US deemphasis on foreign policy. Defense Secretary Les Aspin was a former congressman with an interest in the Gulf who had supported US military action against Iraq. He, too, resigned within the Administration's first year. Other officials, including Tarnoff and US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright had opposed the use of US force to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Samuel Lewis, a former ambassador to Israel who headed the State Department's Policy Planning Staff went unheeded by Christopher and, facing health problems, also resigned during 1993. Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian, an ex-ambassador to Syria, was named ambassador to Israel during mid-1993 and took up that post at year's end.
In short, the Administration put a low emphasis on foreign policy and had a weak decision-making system. But the Administration had major advantages in the ME which countered these problems. First, the US's overwhelming power made local states either seek its favor or at least try to limit conflict with it. Second, the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict were already moving toward a settlement based on their own interests. Third, direct involvement with the peace process was managed by an experienced team headed by Dennis Ross, who had performed that role during the Bush Administration. There were also no serious policy disputes over the ME within the Administration.
Moreover, the regional situation did not seriously challenge US interests. Though the Arab-Israeli peace process had been bogged down during the first half of the year, the Israel-PLO agreement signed on 13 September brought a major breakthrough. The Gulf remained quiet and neither radical regimes nor terrorism created crises for US policy.
ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS
Deadlock in Washington
During the first half of 1993, US policy sought to advance the Arab-Israeli peace process through the ongoing bilateral and multilateral talks and by exchanges of visits with regional leaders. While the periodic bilateral contacts were held in Washington, the US had agreed to limit its involvement to facilitating talks between Israel and the various Arab parties. The bilateral talks' continuation was put in question at the start of 1993, when the PLO responded to Israel's deportation of Islamic fundamentalist activists to Lebanon by refusing to participate in discussions until all temporary expulsions were canceled. The US made a deal with Israel in which the latter agreed to accept the return of some deportees and to allow the rest to come back by the year's end. The US then persuaded the UN to drop any call for sanctions against Israel from its agenda on 12 February, and urged the Palestinians to return to the negotiating table.(1)
In late February, Christopher traveled to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel--where he also met with Palestinian leaders--to familiarize himself with the regional situation and to press for resuming peace talks on the basis of the compromise on deportees.(2) The US held further talks with the Palestinians and other parties in March and April, obtaining Israel's consent to limiting future deportations, to allowing the return of some Palestinian deportees, and to accepting Faysal al-Husayni as head of the Palestinian delegation.(3) Thereafter, the US and Russia issued invitations for the bilateral talks' ninth round scheduled for April.
As part of these preparations, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin came to the US on 11 March and met with President Clinton on 15 March. The president pledged continued aid to Israel to help "minimize the risks of peace" and to preserve Israel's "qualitative military edge." Defending the compromise on deportees, Clinton urged Palestinians to return to the talks, warning, "Those who seek to divert the peace process will find zero tolerance here."(4) As a step toward the Palestinian position, however, the US also made clear its disapproval of the deportations. While condemning violence, Christopher said on 21 April: "I have reaffirmed the American opposition to deportations, making it clear that we believe that they contravene the Fourth Geneva Convention and are not consistent with the pursuit of peace."(5) He continued to promote progress in the direct talks session in Washington starting 27 April. On 4 May, the US offered $14m. for job creation in the territories. Trying to prevent the Israel-Palestinian talks from ending in deadlock, US officials offered a proposed declaration of principles but neither side accepted the plan.(6)
At the next round of bilateral talks, held from 15 June to 1 July, the US moved toward greater participation in the negotiations. It offered to give Israel security guarantees in the context of a withdrawal from the Golan Heights as part of an Israeli-Syrian settlement. In the Israel-Palestinian talks, it presented on 1 July a paper trying to bridge the differences, though both sides rejected the proposals.(7) This was followed by a mid-July trip to the region by Dennis Ross to meet with Israeli, Syrian, and Jordanian officials and with Palestinian leaders. The US now hinted at a deadline, trying to pressure the sides toward progress. Christopher warned that the US might reduce its role in the peace talks. State Department spokesperson Michael McCurry announced after Ross's return to Washington, "There is a sense that our peace team has that 1993 is the year in which progress can be made." But "if you get to the end of the year and there's been no progress, you really have to assess at that point whether it's wise to continue to use the resources of the US and, specifically the good offices of the secretary to help the parties."(8)
A Lebanese Crisis
In addition to a deadlock in the negotiations themselves, the US briefly faced another obstacle. In mid-July, responding to escalating attacks on its northern border by Lebanese groups sponsored or tolerated by Syria, Israel unleashed a massive artillery barrage on southern Lebanon. Many thousands of Lebanese temporarily fled the area. On 27 July, soon after this clash began, Christopher cut short a visit to Asia in order to urge deescalation and to broker emergency talks on the situation between Israel and Syria. Clinton urged that radical groups who opposed progress not be allowed to "derail the peace process.... I think Hizballah should stop its attacks. I think Israel should stop the bombardments. I think that Syria should go from showing restraint to being an active participant to try and stop the fighting."(9)
Christopher arranged a ceasefire at the end of July and visited the ME. He urged Lebanese leaders to stay in the peace process and donated US relief supplies to Lebanon. He called for "refocusing" the peace talks during meetings in Israel and Syria, while also reportedly carrying some messages between the parties. But Christopher also explained that he had brought no new ideas to break the stalemate: "It is going to be a long process. I hope the deadlock in these discussions may be in the process of breaking, but I don't want to encourage any false expectations."(10)
The US position at this point was well summarized in a 7 July statement by Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian, that the goal of US diplomacy was intended "to demonstrate that peace will bring to the region concrete benefits that will promote the well-being of all the peoples of the region. At the same time all parties recognize that only at the bilateral negotiations and through the resolution of the political issues that divide them, can real peace be achieved." Christopher emphasized that "the parties have to do their part. There is only so much we can do as the honest broker. They have to want peace as well."(11)
Breakthrough Without America
The very interest of Israel and the PLO in reaching a solution and their doubt that this would come in the US-brokered negotiations were key factors in their holding secret talks in Europe. Only on 29 August, when an agreement had already been reached, did Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres brief Christopher, making a special visit to the US for this purpose.(12)
The US government, though not previously involved in this effort, responded to the agreement with extreme enthusiasm. Clinton promised his full support, saying, "I am extremely happy that this finally happened" and recounted that he had told Rabin, "Yitzhak, congratulations. We're proud of you." "Nothing in this agreement is viewed by us as an excuse to withdraw our involvement in the ME, or to weaken our commitment," he explained. "This gets us more involved, but in a way that opens up a whole new vista of options for the US." Clinton called the agreement, "The first step in replacing war with peace and giving the children of the ME a chance to grow up to a normal life.... I never thought I would be in this position, but then I never thought [PLO chairman] `Arafat would be doing what he is doing." Although still opposed to an independent Palestinian state, he said it was up to the two sides to decide the outcome. "The beauty of this moment is that each of them, in a funny way, has given the other the chance to have a normal life." "We are living in truly revolutionary times," he stated.(13)
Clinton emphasized that with the agreement now set, the US had become a "hand-holder, fund-raiser and protocol chief." He did, however, claim some credit for the breakthrough: "I want the American people to understand that their country had something to do with bringing this day about," in part through his own government's "keeping the peace negotiations from veering off track" in critical moments. Former Secretary of State James Baker emphasized the long-term role of the US in noting, "I don't think it's bragging, but I think that the US defeated Communism, and I think the US defeated Arab radicalism in the Gulf War. And I think those two things more than anything else made possible the general political atmosphere which had led to what has happened."(14)
Many "taboos are being broken in the last few days," said Christopher. At the 13 September event on the White House lawn, Clinton put his arms around Rabin and `Arafat as they shook hands, symbolizing the central US role in the peace process.(15) Clinton also emphasized, however, that, while a turning point, the signing of the Israel-PLO agreement did not signal an end to the conflict. The US, he said, had continuing obligations "as a sponsor of the peace process to try to see that the next steps are taken to carry out and widen the agreement." "Every day that goes by where something good happens will make the opposition melt away a little more."(16)
The US strategy after 13 September consisted of three main efforts: First, to support the accord's implementation;
second, to broker an Israeli-Syrian agreement; third, to encourage Arab states to join in supporting the Israeli-PLO accord and to make peace with Israel.(17)
In pursuit of the first of these objectives, the US made gestures toward both Israel and the PLO. In terms of US-Israeli relations, Clinton stated, "I emphasize trying to build a sense of security among the...people in Israel which will manifest itself in the freedom of maneuver by the government in pushing for peace."(18) He tried to demonstrate support for Israel in several ways. Clinton told Rabin after the accord's signing that the US was prepared to share some advanced military technology previously withheld, that it wanted "more joint strategic thinking," and that the US would use its "influence and power" to make sure Israel felt "more secure, not less secure" because of the agreement. He also offered Israel the chance to buy the most advanced US-built combat planes.(19)
Dennis Ross, in a late October speech to the National Association of Arab Americans, announced that the US would "look for ways...to try to help Israel defray those costs" incurred in implementing the agreement. He also insisted that the Arab boycott against Israel, and against companies dealing with Israel, should end. Clinton, too, stated, "I am confident that in the course of time, we will get the boycott lifted."(20) The Administration's bid to end the boycott was reinforced by Congress. Sen. Patrick Leahy (Democrat-Vermont) criticized the "refusal of moderate Arab nations to terminate the anachronistic, self-defeating and senseless boycott of Israel," a point made especially cogent since he chaired the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations which would handle requests for US aid to the Palestinians. A joint resolution of Congress condemned economic sanctions against Israel, given the agreement with the PLO. Rep. Benjamin Gilman (Republican-New York) said, "Peace cannot flourish in this atmosphere of economic blackmail." Sen. Hank Brown (Republican-Colorado), insisted, "We're not going to have progress on this until we show [the Arab League] we mean business." Responding to congressional requests, US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor ordered an investigation of the boycott's cost to US companies.(21)
Clinton and Rabin met in Washington in mid-November, providing an opportunity to reinforce the peace process. "We must not allow the opponents of that agreement to derail the new progress that this year has brought." Clinton pledged to continue the annual US aid of $3bn. to Israel, to let that country use US loan guarantees for financing costs of withdrawal from the territories, and to revise US export laws to allow Israel to buy computers for military purposes. US exports to Israel in 1992 stood at $9.8bn. and rose 12.5% during the first nine months of 1993. In 1993, the US received 32.4% of all Israeli exports, up from 30.5% in 1992. Israel's imports from the US rose 17.2% in 1992 and 18.6% in 1993. Rabin asked Clinton to shorten the jail term or release Jonathan Pollard, serving a life sentence since 1984 for spying for Israel. Clinton said he must await a Justice Department review of the case. Both the Justice and Defense departments, however, leaked rumors tending to oppose this request.(22)
There were, however, some secondary conflicts in US-Israeli relations. One had to do with the US announcement that it intended to cut $437m. from its $2bn. in loan guarantees for 1994 to match the amount spent by Israel on construction in the West Bank and Gaza. Ironically, this deduction was originally intended to discourage the Rabin government's predecessor from large-scale Jewish settlement in the territories, a policy the new government had ended. A CIA report also asserted that Israel was selling military technology to China, though there was no accusation--unlike in earlier US intelligence claims--that this included illegal transfers of US technology.(23)
To help and encourage the PLO to fulfill the agreement, the US government in September renewed its dialogue with that organization, frozen since June 1990 when `Arafat refused to denounce a terrorist attack on Israel by a PLO member group. During his visit to Washington, `Arafat also met 20 senators to seek financial support and to ask for changes in legislation barring aid to the PLO. Many US leaders expressed amazement at the turn of events. "I never expected to see Chairman `Arafat drinking coffee" at the Capitol, said Senate Republican leader Robert Dole. On 18 November, Congress passed a bill extending to 1 July 1994 Clinton's authority to waive legal provisions prohibiting loans to PLO by international financial organizations and barring it from opening offices in the US.(24)
Another element of US policy was the coordination of aid for Palestinian self-rule. After the pact was signed, Clinton called a conference for prospective donors to pledge money. Christopher lobbied to persuade reluctant governments to contribute, arguing, "The international community must move immediately to see that the agreement produces tangible improvements in the security and daily lives of Palestinians and Israelis." At the 1 October meeting, $2bn was pledged over five years by the 43 states attending. Christopher described the gathering as "a striking success however you measure it." For its part, the US agreed to provide $500m. over two years, including $150m. of technical assistance grants and $100m. for loan guarantees and insurance from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to encourage US businesses to participate in development efforts. This amount was double the original projected offer, reportedly at Clinton's insistence.(25) The Administration also endorsed private initiatives such as "Builders for Peace"--announced by Vice-President Al Gore--to stimulate private sector business projects. This group's co-presidents were Mel Levine, a former California congressman, and James Zogby, head of the Arab-American Institute.(26)
Persuading other Arab states to participate in these fund-raising efforts was one way the US tried to draw them into backing the Israeli-PLO agreement. Clinton wrote letters to nine Arab leaders urging their support for the accord. He urged Saudi Arabia's King Fahd to contribute financially to help the Palestinians, "Your Majesty, you have been a great ally of the US and a great force for peaceful resolution of this conflict for a long time. This is not like Camp David where the US basically had to assume financial responsibility because of the interplay of world politics."(27) Similarly, Clinton telephoned King Husayn, telling him that the White House was releasing $30m. of US aid frozen since the Gulf crisis. In the 1993 Foreign Operations bill Congress had barred aid to Jordan unless the president certified that it had complied with UN sanctions against Iraq and backed the ME peace process. Dennis Ross warned that a continuing Arab refusal to recognize Israel could harm the Palestinian cause.(28)
But the US was also ready to criticize the PLO in order to press it to have it abide by the agreement. For example, Clinton asked `Arafat on 12 September to condemn Palestinian attacks killing four Israelis in previous days. After Fath cadre reportedly killed a Jewish settler on 30 October, Clinton stated: "We all recognize that [`Arafat] may not have total control over everyone who acts in the name of Fath but he is now bound by the...clear terms of that agreement to condemn it." Clinton also expressed concern over `Arafat's slowness in setting up Palestinian security and economic institutions--"I wish that the pace had been more rapid," he said--but recognized that the PLO had "never had the responsibility" of handling the kind of practical measures needed to administer the territories and raise Palestinian living standards there.(29)
But Christopher refused to become involved as a mediator in the Israel-PLO accords, despite `Arafat's plea that the US pressure Israel to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho more quickly. The US secretary of state simply called for "timely implementation" of the agreement and offered "non-lethal assistance" to equip Palestinian police. He also assailed the "enemies of the peace process [who] are trying to snuff out the hope that burns so brightly for peace here."(30)
Brokering Israeli-Syrian Negotiations
Another element in US efforts to consolidate and expand ME peacemaking was a diplomatic drive to advance negotiations between Syria and Israel. Syria had been on the US government's terrorist list since 1979. In 1986, Washington put sanctions on Syria after a Syrian-sponsored attempt to place a bomb on an El-Al flight from London. These measures included limits on the sale of aircraft and helicopters, a ban on Export-Import bank credits, a reduction in diplomatic representation, and cancellation of an aviation agreement.
In his speech at the 13 September ceremony, Clinton quoted Asad in stating, "A peace of the brave is within our reach." He also urged Asad not to sabotage the Israeli-Palestinian accord and to make peace on his own. In discussions at the time of the Israel-PLO accord, Clinton said Asad claimed he was ready to endorse the agreement if there was a breakthrough on the Israeli-Syrian track. "I really believe we have a chance now to continue through toward a comprehensive peace," said Clinton. "I very much want to see an agreement between Israel and Syria, and I want to emphasize my personal commitment to making progress on all fronts of the peace process." Clinton reported that he told Asad, "I am strongly--and I think you should be--committed to the whole process," and called on him to speed up the peace talks with Israel and to curb opposition from Palestinians who were under Syrian influence.(31)
As early as October, Syrian officials suggested an Asad-Clinton meeting help in breaking the impasse, but the Administration wanted to wait for signs of a new Syrian position.(32) Clinton also realized that a pressing for an Israeli-Syrian agreement might interfere with the more immediate priority of implementing the Israeli-PLO plan. "The pivotal question is what the traffic can bear in Israel and in Syria. And that is a function of how well this initial agreement is received in Israel." While ready "to create the strongest possible conditions" to encourage a diplomatic solution between Israel and both Syria and Lebanon, the White House recognized that Rabin might have political difficulties in simultaneously handling multiple agreements requiring Israeli concessions.(33)
When he met with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak at the end of October, Clinton remarked that he believed "Prime Minister Rabin wants a comprehensive peace in the ME [and thus needs] to have the support of the people of Israel, which means we have to implement the present agreement between Israel and the PLO. We have to continue to make progress in opening up other Arab nations' attitudes toward Israel. We have to continue to make progress on the other tracks." But, Clinton concluded, Rabin needed "some time" to build domestic political support. At that time, Ross reportedly urged Christopher to delay his trip until December rather than early November, since he saw no immediate chance for breaking the Israeli-Syria deadlock.(34)
In December, Christopher travelled to the ME for eight days, visiting Syria, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. "I don't know that there is an appropriate role for me," he said before leaving. If asked by both Israel and the PLO "to do something, I certainly would. But I certainly don't want to interpose myself in any way." He intended to renew direct bilateral talks in Washington and to encourage Arab states to normalize relations with Israel. He met Yasir `Arafat in Amman on 7 December, and then, in Tunis on 11 December, becoming the first senior US official to visit PLO headquarters. After his meeting with `Arafat there, Christopher stated, "This is a new day in relations between the US and the PLO.... The Israelis and the PLO are the best ones to interpret the agreement. It is quite important that no one else try to interpose themselves." In addition, Christopher announced that a Clinton-Asad meeting would be held on 15 January, 1994. "It is appropriate and, indeed, natural for [Clinton] to be meeting with President Asad at this time," argued Christopher, citing a Syrian promise to help in discovering the fate of missing Israeli soldiers in Lebanon, and setting a deadline for letting Syrian Jews go. Syria also gained some immediate rewards from the US--bypassing the 1986 sanctions--including approval of a World Bank loan to Syria and permission for Kuwait to transfer three US-built passenger jets to Syria.(35)
US POLICY AND THE CONTAINMENT OF IRAQ
US strategy toward Gulf security underwent change in 1993. Historically, US policymakers perceived the sub-region's stability as requiring a balance of power between the two strongest states, Iran and Iraq. Until the 1979 Iranian revolution, Washington backed the Shah to contain Baghdad's radical Arab nationalism. But in the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq war, US policy turned to Iraq to contain a radical Islamic fundamentalist Tehran. This era ended with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
The experience of this epoch seemed to prove three points to US leaders, permitting a policy which the Clinton Administration would call the "dual containment" of Iran and Iraq. First, a reliance on either Iran or Iraq would not promote stability, since both regimes were bent on dominating the area through intimidating, subverting, or attacking each other and the Arab monarchies. Second, a series of events, beginning with the US convoy of neutral tankers in the Iran-Iraq war and culminating in the US-led coalition's defeat of Iraq, meant that the US was now the dominant power in the Gulf. Third, the conservative Arab states belonging to the GCC were ready to accept and cooperate with a direct US military and strategic role in the sub-region in order to preserve their own wealth and sovereignty. The weakening of Iran and Iraq, and the large-scale US arms sales to the GCC states ($20bn. to Saudi Arabia alone between 1991 and 1993, and $25bn. on order as of the end of 1993) made these countries better able to defend themselves and less eager to appease Tehran and Baghdad. The region's radical regimes were also hurt by the collapse of the USSR, their superpower patron.(36)
Clinton expressed the hope that, in the long run, the Israeli-PLO agreement would be a step toward a "flowering of the ME" and cause radical states like Iran and Iraq "to reassess their own positions in terms of what is in their interests and what kind of conduct they ought to pursue."(37)
Meanwhile, the main US emphasis was on continuing the anti-Iraq sanctions put into place as a result of the 1990-91 Kuwait crisis. Even before the Clinton Administration actually took office, on 20 January 1993, it faced an Iraqi test of its determination. On 27 December 1992, two Iraqi fighters entered the no-fly zone over northern Iraq and confronted US planes, which shot down one of them. In early January 1993, Iraq repeatedly sent workers to seize equipment left behind on Kuwait's side of the border. Iraq also ordered a halt to UN planes transporting inspectors, insisting they charter Iraqi commercial airliners. Iraqi anti-aircraft guns were redeployed in the south to threaten US patrol planes. On 6 January, President Bush gave Iraq 48 hours to disperse the guns. At first, Baghdad complied, but then returned the batteries on 11 January. Another US ultimatum was issued on 15 January, and an attack using cruise missiles was staged on 17 January in retaliation for the restrictions on UN inspectors. That same day, a US fighter shot down an Iraqi plane over the northern no-fly zone. A US battalion of 1,700 soldiers was sent to Kuwait to underline US commitment to its security.(38)
President-elect Clinton voiced support for Bush's actions. If Iraqi President Saddam Husayn wanted "a different relationship with the US," said Clinton, "all he has to do is change his behavior."(39) At first, -led patrol was fired on by Iraqi soldiers for the first time in the Kurdish sector on 23 December.
Although the Administration released $100m. for Iraq's purchase of necessary commodities, it continued to put economic and political pressure on Iraq. It maintained control of $1.3 bn in frozen Iraqi assets and handled thousands of claims against Iraq for US companies. In addition, the US maintained contacts with the Iraqi opposition. Calling for democracy, human rights, equal treatment for people, and adherence to norms of international behavior, the White House stated, "The Iraqi National Congress espouses these goals."(43) A State Department spokeswoman defined continuing US suspicions of Iraq's government in November, proclaiming that it had "made and broken many promises in the past. It must now demonstrate on the ground, over a sustained period of time, its full cooperation with an effective monitoring and verification regime."(44)
Clinton explained his tough line in a November report to Congress on the issue: "It is extremely important that the international community maintain current sanctions and continue its efforts to establish the long-term monitoring regime required by UN Security Council Resolution 715.... Inspections and sanctions have significantly debilitated Iraq's ability to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction programs in the near future.... Continued vigilance is necessary, however, because we believe that Saddam Husayn is committed to rebuilding [this] capability, especially nuclear weapons, and is most likely continuing to conceal weapons-related activities from the UN."(45)
RADICAL MIDDLE EAST REGIMES
The truck-bomb attack on New York City's tallest building, the World Trade Center on 26 February, which resulted in six deaths and extensive damage, became an issue for US ME policy as the act was traced to a group of Islamic fundamentalists residing in the US. Among those arrested for involvement in the attack were Shaykh Umar `Abd al-Rahman, a leading Egyptian oppositionist implicated in the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat and leader of the al-Salam Mosque in New Jersey. Another member of the mosque, Muhammad Sulama, had rented the van used to carry the bomb into the Center's parking lot. A third member, Sayyid Nusayir, had assassinated Israeli rightist (Kach) leader Rabbi Meir Kahane in New York City in June 1990.
Although US citizens and property had been subject to attack in the ME itself, this was the first major ME terrorist operation to be successfully carried out in the US. Involvement by radical ME states was suspected but could not be fully proven. In addition to showing that radical Islamic fundamentalist had become a domestic security issues, the possibility that ME crises or US policy actions would spill over into the country added an additional dimension to decision-making.
On 27 August, 14 men were arraigned in New York on 20 counts, including the World Trade Center bombing, plans to attack UN headquarters, and assassinate President Mubarak, and the killing of Kahane.(46) US authorities accused the counselor and third secretary at Sudan's UN mission of involvement in this conspiracy, and added that country to the terrorism list on 17 August.(47)
While Clinton expressed hope that Iran would "change course," there was no improvement in bilateral relations. The State Department's annual terrorism report labeled Iran the world's "most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism." The US government reportedly developed a plan to isolate Iran diplomatically and economically to discourage it from using terrorism. In June, Christopher urged a US-European containment policy on Iran.(48) Thus, the change of presidents and political parties in power in the US did not alter the pattern of US-Iran relations set by the 1979 hostage crisis. Although there was some debate in US academic circles about possibilities for a US initiative to improve bilateral links, this had little or no effect on US government policy.
Although US citizens and property had been subject to attack in the ME itself, this was the first major ME terrorist operation to be successfully carried out in the US. Involvement by radical ME states was suspected but could not be fully proven. In addition to showing that radical Islamic fundamentalist had become a domestic security issues, the possibility that ME crises or US policy actions would spill over into the country added an additional dimension to decision-making.
On 27 August, 14 men were arraigned in New York on 20 counts, including the World Trade Center bombing, plans to attack UN headquarters, and assassinate President Mubarak, and the killing of Kahane.(49) US authorities accused the counselor and third secretary at Sudan's UN mission of involvement in this conspiracy, and added that country to the terrorism list on 17 August.(50)
While Clinton expressed hope that Iran would "change course," there was no improvement in bilateral relations. The State Department's annual terrorism report labeled Iran the world's "most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism." The US government reportedly developed a plan to isolate Iran diplomatically and economically to discourage it from using terrorism. In June, Christopher urged a US-European containment policy on Iran.(51) Thus, the change of presidents and political parties in power in the US did not alter the pattern of US-Iran relations set by the 1979 hostage crisis. Although there was some debate in US academic circles about possibilities for a US initiative to improve bilateral links, this had little or no effect on US government policy.
Libya was another state with which US policy had a conflict over its government's sponsorship of terrorism. The US supported UN sanctions against Libya for its refusal to extradite two Libyan citizens who were allegedly involved in a 1988 bomb attack on a US plane flying over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people, and a 1989 French commercial flight over Africa. As Libya continued to refuse this demand, the Clinton Administration threatened escalated measures. On 30 March, Christopher stated that the US would seek a global oil embargo against Libya. On 16 August, the US gave Libya until 1 October to hand over the suspects or else it would escalate the pressure on Libya. In November, the US warned Libya that refusal to surrender the wanted men might lead to a global oil and total trade boycott. No such actions were taken during 1993. While the Clinton Administration thus maintained the tough nominal policy of its predecessor, it showed no interest in making the anti-Libya policy a higher priority nor on implementing earlier threats to take action.(52)
NOTES
1. On these U.S. efforts, see WP, 23 January, 4 February; NYT, 27, 30 January, 13 February 1993.
2. WP, 5 February, 15 April; NYT, 20, 22, 23, 24 February 1993.
3. WP, 15 April 1993.
4. WP, 16 March, 10 April 1993.
5. Press conference transcript, WF, 21 April 1993.
6. NYT, 28 April, 14 May; WP, 28 April, 6, 14 May; WSJ, 29 April 1993.
7. NYT, 2, 5 July; text of bridging paper, JP, 6 July 1993.
8. NYT, 5 July; WT, 17 July 1993.
9. WP, 29 July; WT, 28 July 1993.
10. WP, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 August 1993.
11. Text in WF, 8 July 1993.
12. WP, 29, 31 August 1993. Reportedly, Christopher learned of the talks while on his ME visit but did not understand their extent or seriousness.
13. IHT, 10, 11-12 September; NYT, 10, 12 September 1993.
14. WP, 13 September; NYT, 9, 14 September 1993.
15. On the ceremony see NYT, WP 13, 14 September 1993.
16. WP, 13 September; NYT, 9 September 1993.
17. NYT, 17 September 1993.
18. WP, 13 September; NYT, 9 September, 19 November 1993.
19. Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 September; NYT, 12 November 1993.
20. WP, 30 October; NYT, 17 September 1993.
21. Congressional Quarterly, 20 November 1993 p. 3213; 27 November 1993, p. 3281. NYT, 9 November 1993.
22. NYT, 11, 13 November; WP, 13, 16 November, 1993. See Israel Government Press Office, 12 January 1994. For the public debate on the Pollard case, see NYT, 7 December, and op-ed pieces in WP by Leonard Garment, 8 December; David Geneson, 13 December; and Theodore Olson, 20 December, 1993.
23. WP, 6 October; NYT, 13 October 1993.
24. NYT, 15 September; Congressional Quarterly, 18 September 1993, pp. 2469-71.
25. NYT, 17, 21, 30 September; WP, 28 September, 2 October 1993.
26. Gore's speech, 30 November--WF, 30 November 1993, p. 12.
27. NYT, 9, 12 September 1993.
28. NYT, 16 September; WP, 16 September, 30 October 1993.
29. WP, 16 November 1993.
30. WT, 7 December; text of Christopher's remarks, WF, 7 December 1993, p. 3.
31. Ibid.; WP, 16 September; NYT, 16 November 1993.
32. WP, 6 October 1993.
33. NYT, 12, 16 September; WP, 30 October 1993.
34. NYT, 26 October; WP, 30 October 1993.
35. NYT, 5, 7, 10, 11 December 1993.
36. These issues are discussed at length in the author's Cauldron of Turmoil: America in the Middle East (NY, 1992) and Radical Middle East States and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C., 1993). WP, 13 December 1993.
37. WP, 13 September 1993.
38. New Republic, 8 February 1993, pp. 9-10; WP, 18, 19 January; NYT, 18 January, 1993.
39. NYT, 17 January 1993.
40. NYT, 22, 23 January; 15 February; WP, 22, 24 January, 2 February 1993.
41. WF, 6 April 1993.
42. NYT 26, 30 June; WP, 27 June; on the assassination attempt see WP, 27 April, 8 May, 6 June, 1 July; NYT, 11, 20 May, 6, 8 June 1993.
43. NYT, 19 April, 24 May; Congressional Quarterly, 30 October 1993, p. 2990. On meetings between high-level US officials and the Iraqi opposition, see WP, 1 May, 23 December 1993.
44. WT, 27 November 1993.
45. Clinton's letter to Congress, 29 November--WF 30 November 1993, pp. 10-11.
46. WP 5, 6, 9, 11, 16, 18, 24, 26, 28, 29 March, 1 April, 8 May, 25 June, 3 July, 1, 29 August, 3 October; NYT, 5, 6, 11, 19, 20, 25, 26, 28 March, 8, 19 May, 25 June, 3, 15, 16 July 1993. On US policy toward terrorism, see WP, 7 November, 1993.
47. WT, 17 August 1993.
48. NYT, 7 March; 1, 27 May, 10 June, 12 September 1993.
49. WP 5, 6, 9, 11, 16, 18, 24, 26, 28, 29 March, 1 April, 8 May, 25 June, 3 July, 1, 29 August, 3 October; NYT, 5, 6, 11, 19, 20, 25, 26, 28 March, 8, 19 May, 25 June, 3, 15, 16 July 1993. On US policy toward terrorism, see WP, 7 November, 1993.
50. WT, 17 August 1993.
51. NYT, 7 March; 1, 27 May, 10 June, 12 September 1993.
52. WP, 31 March, 14, 16, 17 August; 6 November 1993. On Libya's public relations' campaign in the US, see WP, 2 October 1993.