By Barry Rubin
The US victory in the Gulf War and the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 set the stage for US Middle East policy in 1992. Objectively, the Cold War's end and Kuwait's liberation made possible dramatic changes in US strategy. Yet the Bush Administration limited its regional role during the year and there was no dramatic shift in thinking or policy.
Rather, the US Government was preoccupied by encouraging continued Arab-Israeli negotiations and countering any resurgence by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. A strained relationship between the Bush Administration and the Israeli Government under Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir ended with Shamir's defeat in the June 1992 Israeli elections, ushering in an era of far better relations reinforced by Bush's defeat in the November 1992 US elections. On the peace process, the Administration monitored and encouraged intensive negotiations but did not intervene in the substance of discussions.
On the Gulf front, a strong and generally successful effort was made to maintain the UN sanctions and isolation of Iraq, but the Administration did not succeed in destabilizing the regime there or in forcing it to make significant concessions. An unusual feature of the year was an energetic, often bitter debate over past US policy in the Gulf. Questions about the Bush Administration's relations with Iraq became the main foreign policy issue of the 1992 presidential election.
US-Israeli Relations and the Arab-Israel Peace Process:
The Bush-Shamir Conflict, January-June
In the months before Israel's June 1992 elections, US-Israeli relations were troubled. Aside from any broader rethinking of US interests, the Bush Administration wanted Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to cease Jewish settlement on the West Bank, something he refused to do. Until Israel's policy changed, Bush rejected its request for $ 10bn. in loan guarantees. Israel had officially asked for the assistance in September 1991, but President Bush asked Congress for a 120-day delay in considering this request, ostensibly to avoid damaging the ongoing Arab-Israel negotiations.2 On 24 January, Secretary of State James Baker suggested to Israel's ambassador, Zalman Shoval, that homes already begun in the settlements could be finished but no new ones started. "The choice is Israel's," Bush said in one speech. "She can determine whether she wants to take action which would permit the strong support of both the legislative and executive branches for these loan guarantees or not."3 This stand was endorsed by key senators such as Patrick Leahy, chairman of the committee overseeing foreign aid. Israel did not accept the compromise and, on 17 March, Bush officially rejected Israel's request.4
There were a number of other areas of friction. In January, the US voted for a UN resolution that "strongly condemns" Israel's deportation of Palestinians, the harshest it had ever supported.5 Israel also refused to let US Justice Department investigators question its officials about the scandal in which former Israeli air force procurement chief, Brig. Gen. Rami Dotan, diverted US aid money from General Electric contracts into his own and accomplices' pockets.6
In March, Administration officials leaked a State Department report that spoke of a "systematic and growing pattern" in which Israel illegally sold US military technology - including cluster bombs and aircraft radars - to China, South Africa, Ethiopia and Chile. Another leak claimed that Israel had sold Patriot missiles to China. Inspector General Sherman Funk, whose office wrote the study, demanded disciplinary action against assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs Richard Clarke, who oversaw such matters. Clarke rejected the claims as "specious on their face ... without any smoking guns ever being shown to us. " Those questioning the charges noted that Israel substituted locally- or European-made components for restricted US ones before selling military systems to other countries. A US investigating team cleared Israel of the accusations.'
That same month, US Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Richard Schifter, resigned the post he had held for six years. His motive was said to be a dispute with Baker, who supported issuing State Department human rights reports more critical of Israel than Schifter thought was warranted.8
An even more bitter controversy broke out when former New York City Mayor Edward Koch wrote in his New York Post column: "When Baker was criticized recently at a meeting of high-level White House advisers for his belligerent attitude toward Israel, he responded, 'Fuck the Jews. They didn't vote for us'." The White House and State Department denied that this incident happened. However, Democratic presidential candidate Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, referring to this and earlier incidents, argued that the Administration's "strident rhetoric, public and private, against Israel, against the Jewish community ... has broken down the taboo against overt antisemitism."9 Bush responded with an open letter, ostensibly to a Jewish supporter's sympathetic questioning, which spoke of his "anguish" over US-Israel tensions, while reiterating his opposition to more Jewish settlements in the territories. Baker denied Clinton's charge, saying that "nothing is more abhorrent to me" than antisemitism.10
The Bush Administration made some attempt to ease the US-Israel friction. After all, Israel was still participating in the US-sponsored peace negotiations, whose fourth round ended in early March. Vice President Dan Quayle addressed an April meeting of the pro-Israel, America-Israel Political Action Committee as "fellow Zionists." "I am here as George Bush's vice president," he continued, "to underscore his commitment to Israel. The bumps in the road trouble him and all of us deeply, but they do not change or threaten the basic principles behind our relationship."11
Still, tension continued. In May, State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler, in a daily briefing, routinely affirmed US support for UN Resolution 194 of 1948, unintentionally setting off a controversy since, in the atmosphere of US-Israel strain, some Arab and Israeli observers saw it as a sign of US support for a "right to return" for Palestinian refugees. The US Government denied any such implication.12
There was also some speculation that the US was trying to affect the results of lsrael's upcoming election. Any such impact was more of a by- product of existing Policy, however, than the result of a US plan. Shamir accused the US of seeking to force Israel's return to its 1967 borders, complaining it had ceased to be an "honest broker."
Yet even during all these minor crises, the Administration's actual conduct of the peace talks was relatively friendly to Israel's Position. After all, the US Government insisted the talks be along lines coinciding with the Camp David framework, and
without the participation of the PLO or Palestinians representing East Jerusalem or coming from outside the territories. The Administration let the parties negotiate among themselves, Putting forward no plan of its own. 13 Moreover, Baker leaked his criticism of Palestinian negotiators for "posturing" and urged them to focus on negotiating specific proposals, "Pocket the gains" where possible, "and begin real negotiations." The US Government insisted on an interim period of autonomy and made no stipulations about the final outcome.14
THE BUSH-RABIN ERA OF GOOD FEELINGS
This The turning point for US-Israeli relations in 1992 was the Labor party victory in lsrael's 23 June election and the installation of Yitzhak Rabin as prime minister. This event was warmly welcomed in the US. The New York Times editorialized, "The change to a pragmatic Mr. Rabin offers new possibilities for a land-for-peace compromise vainly sought by successive American Presidents." It welcomed the election "with relief and considerable hope....For President Bush, who has suffered harsh criticism from some American Jews, the results vindicate a long, tenacious peace initiative " The Washington Post argued that from an American viewpoint the election result : is a good one. "15
Baker traveled to the ME soon after the Israeli election to survey the prospects for peace talks. He praised Rabin's new government: "It's a real pleasure to be going to Israel under circumstances in which I anticipate that we will not be met with the opening of a new settlement."16
A few hours after Rabin was sworn in, Bush invited him to visit the US. On 10-11 August, Bush hosted Rabin at his Kennebunkport, Maine, home in a friendly atmosphere. Bush promised to seek quick and Positive congressional action on the loan guarantees now that the two countries had an agreement on "basic principles." Bush spoke warmly of Israel as the US's "strategic partner," whose friendship was based on a "shared commitment to democracy, and to common values, as well as a solid [US] commitment to lsrael's security, including its qualitative military edge."17
The Administration also sought ways to improve US-Israel military cooperation. It announced plans to sell Apache and Black Hawk helicopters to Israel from US stockpiles in Europe, and to preposition up to $300m. worth of combat equipment there, in addition to $l00m. in material already in place. These steps had been previously approved by Congress but had been held up by the White House during the era of bilateral friction. These acts were intended to balance pending US sales of F-5s to Saudi Arabia and to signal a warmer relationship with the new Rabin government.18
Both to make progress in the peace talks and to help the Administration's image as a successful international leader, President Bush urged a quick and intensive new round of negotiations. These began in Washington on 24 August and continued for one month. During 1992, the Administration generally left the parties meeting in direct talks to pursue their own discussions. It proposed no plan of its own and when it intervened it did so mainly to resolve procedural roadblocks.19
Meanwhile, the Administration's attention was increasingly turned to the November presidential election. Baker's departure from the State Department, on the eve of the new round of negotiations, to run Bush's reelection effort signaled the changing priorities of a White House faced with a difficult and uphill election battle.
ME issues entered into the US presidential election in two ways, relating to Israel and to Iraq. Clinton, the Democratic nominee, criticized Bush's policy toward Israel during the struggle over loan guarantees as "Callous remarks against the American Jewish community ... an affront to the basic rights of all Americans to speak freely and to try to influence the political process. " At a B'nai Brith meeting in October, Bush who had won one-third of Jewish votes in 1988 - defended his Administration's record as strongly pro-Israel and pledged to support the loan guarantees in Congress.20
Congress passed the loan guarantees on 5 October as part of the Fiscal Year 1993 Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill. Israel would be given $2bn. p.a. in guarantees for five years and it would pay all administrative costs, set at 4.5%. The president, however, was granted discretion to suspend the guarantees for any given future year if he determined that Israel was using the funds in a way that contravened US policies.
Aid was also extended to Jordan in order to strengthen the peace process. King Husayn visited the US twice and met with Bush in March and September, the second trip also involving medical treatment. The Administration was unhappy with Jordan's continuing covert trade with Iraq despite the UN embargo. Congress held up $30m. in economic aid and $27m. in military assistance on this account. Nonetheless, Bush praised the king for his help on the peace talks.21
The election of Bill Clinton as president in November 1992 brought the return of a Democrat to the White House for the first time in 12 years. Before taking office, Clinton promised to continue supporting the peace process. "We have obligations of continuity and obligations of change, " he said soon after the election, and "the pillars of our national security and foreign policy ought to be a different but still very strong defense. 1122 On 22 December, Clinton appointed his foreign policy team, including Warren Christopher as Secretary of State, Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense, and Anthony Lake as National Security Adviser. In particular, Clinton and his appointees stressed a commitment to continue US efforts in regard to the Arab-Israeli peace process.
AMERICA'S ANTI-SADDAM POLICY
CONTROVERSIES ON US-IRAQ POLICY
The other, higher-profile ME campaign controversy was over the Administration's past policy in that area. During 1992, the history of the Bush Administration's policy toward Iraq became a matter of intense public debate. There were many revelations and a huge amount of media coverage on how the US handled Iraq's growing ambitions in the 1988-90 period, during the war, and in its aftermath.23
Part of the controversy related to the previous, Reagan Administration when Bush had been vice president. A congressional investigation found no evidence that the Reagan campaign in 1980 had conspired with Iran to delay the release of US hostages until after that year's November presidential elections. However, recriminations continued over the secret arms deals to Iran in 1985-86, and the special prosecutor's investigation brought indictments against former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger for perjury and obstruction of justice. He was accused of lying to Congress in 1987 about Saudi contributions to the Nicaraguan Contras, the transfer of HA WK missiles to Iran in November 1985, and the US replacement of Israeli missile stocks used in that transaction.24
With regard to the controversy over US aid to Iraq, investigations by the House of Representatives' Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, chaired by Rep. Henry Gonzalez, found evidence of US government laxness on exports of strategic materials and equipment, continuing aid to Baghdad under questionable conditions in terms of legality and judgment, and shortcomings in intelligence evaluations on Iraq's development of unconventional weapons. These points were hotly debated in Congress and the media, becoming a major issue in their own right. Democrats charged that the Administration had foolishly helped build up Iraq, even after the end of the Iraqi-Iranian War in August 1988. Republicans retorted that this had been a reasonable, if ultimately unsuccessful policy whose failure was being exploited and exaggerated as a partisan issue.25
In July, the Democratic-controlled Committee voted 31 to 19 to widen its investigation of Bush Administration policy toward Iraq. Democrats in the House of Representatives also requested an independent prosecutor to examine whether laws had been broken. "Reagan and Bush supported Saddam Husayn," Rep. Gonzalez charged. "They knew Iraq had a clandestine military procurement network operating in this country. They decided to tolerate Iraq's efforts to build nuclear and chemical weapons, and so they allowed the network to continue operating."26
Republicans criticized Gonzalez's tactics and the White House complained that he had unilaterally released classified material about the Administration's earlier contacts with Iraq.21 Attorney General William Barr rejected the proposal for a special prosecutor in August, but in October named retired judge Frederick Lacey to investigate the handling of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro case, in which an Atlanta, Georgia-based branch of an Italian bank illegally gave Iraq over $4bn. in loans and loan guarantees before the invasion of Kuwait. Lacey concluded - though his report was held until after the November election - that allegations of criminal wrongdoing in the case were credible enough to warrant further investigations
Two different models for explaining US-Iraq interactions thus evolved during the presidential election. Bush tried to use his victory in the Gulf War and the Democrats' hesitations about fighting to defend Kuwait against Clinton. Bush was portrayed by himself and his supporters as the decisive commander in chief as compared to Clinton as a Vietnam War draft dodger. Clinton and his adherents retorted that he had supported the Gulf War and instead stressed the president's failure to stand up to Saddam before the invasion of Kuwait, his decision not to destroy Iraq's regime at the end of the war, and his earlier involvement in the US arms sales to Iran in 1985-86. Two former officials came forward to testify that, despite his denials, Bush had been fully briefed and had supported the secret arms and hostages transactions with Iran.29
The controversy over past US-Iraq relations became the most important foreign policy question of the 1992 presidential campaign. In a major speech in September, the Democratic vice presidential nominee, Senator Albert Gore, argued: "The path leading us to that war and the path which the president has followed after[ward], are deeply shadowed in profound error, in duplicity and in amoral disregard for our most basic values as a nation .... Coddling tyrants is a hallmark of the Bush foreign policy." Gore praised the conduct of the war but said: "George Bush wants the American people to see him as the hero who put out a raging fire. But new evidence now shows that he is the one who set the fire."30
This argument reached its peak in the 19 October Bush-Clinton election debate. Clinton said the president deserved credit "for organizing Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield. It was a remarkable event." But his praises ended there. Earlier, during the Iraqi-Iranian War, continued Clinton, "We knew Saddam Husayn was a tyrant, we had dealt with him because he was against Iran: the enemy of my enemy maybe is my friend." Once that war ended, though, Bush's policy was mistaken, "We know he's dropping mustard gas on his own people, we know he's threatening to incinerate half of Israel. Several government departments had information that he was converting our aid to military purposes and trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. But in late 1989 the president signed a secret policy [directive] saying we were going to continue trying to improve relations with him, and we sent him some sort of communication on the eve of his invasion of Kuwait that we still wanted better relations." Bush was wrong, declared Clinton, "in coddling Saddam Husayn when there was no reason to do it and when people at high levels in our government knew he was trying to do things that were outrageous."31
Bush replied to this critique with sarcasm: "It's awfully easy when you're dealing with 90-90 [sic] hindsight. We did try to bring Saddam Husayn into the family of nations." But when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Bush continued, "I said: This aggression will not stand. And we formed a historic coalition, and we brought him down .... There wasn't one single iota of evidence that any US weapons were on that battlefield," that any US technology was used in lraq's nuclear program, or that US grain credits were used by Iraq to buy weapons. The critics, Bush charged, are "a bunch of people who were wrong on the war trying to cover their necks and to do a little revisionism. '132
THE US CAMPAIGN AGAINST SADDAM HUSAYN
These questions also played a role in the continuing US policy toward Iraq. On the one hand, Bush was compelled by criticism of his past and by the presidential election year to appear tough on Saddam Husayn; but on the other hand, highlighting the Iraq issue also emphasized questions about past policy: why Saddam was still in power after the Gulf War and whether Bush was engaging in military action for political gain. These considerations made the US treatment of Iraq very complex. The result was that the Administration talked in a tough manner but took only limited action. Throughout the year, it hinted at a military confrontation with Iraq to press Baghdad into cooperating with UN inspection and disarmament efforts.
The Administration approved an intelligence finding in November 1991, that US policy sought the overthrow of Saddam Husayn. During the opening months of 1992, the Administration increased its efforts against Iraq. In conjunction with Saudi Arabia, it moved to provide rebel groups with arms and intelligence. As a New York Times article put it in January 1992, "The White House remains deeply concerned that the Iraqi leader is still in power at the outset of a Presidential election year in which his survival has become a political issue."33
Bush put on a more optimistic face in a 17 January speech celebrating the first anniversary of the US attack on Iraq that began the Gulf War:
"We can all take pride in the results of that effort Kuwait is liberated and the legitimate government restored, the fires set by Saddam's retreating army are extinguished, the flow of oil from the Gulf is secure from political and economic blackmail A critical region of the world vital to its economic well-being is secure. Thanks in large part to our efforts, direct peace talks between Arabs and Israelis are under way for the first time, multilateral negotiations on regional arms control have begun, and America's hostages in Lebanon are home Much of Iraq's arsenal is destroyed and what remains is now under international supervision.34
The president vowed further: "The American people and I remain determined to keep the pressure on Saddam until a new leadership comes to power in Iraq," and again called on the Iraqi people to overthrow their ruler. The previous day, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Robert Gates had warned Congress that Iraq could rebuild unconventional weapons within a few years.35
The White House further built its theme of urgency in February when it notified Congress that it would use contingency funds for the CIA to finance covert operations to oust Saddam Husayn and help dissidents in the army and opposition. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft met with the UN inspectors to discuss the situation and the White House pledged support for the UN's effort to destroy Iraq's capacity to make missiles.36
The Administration also committed itself to maintaining sanctions and urged other countries to block trade with Iraq. A State Department report commented, "It is not the international sanctions which starve Iraq's innocent civilian population. It is the policies of Saddam Husayn's regime.""
During the following months, US government statements continued to warn Iraq about its behavior in terms of internal repression and noncooperation with the UN arms inspectors. The Bush Administration gave the impression that it was increasing pressure and might escalate steadily toward a military confrontation. Officials gave off-the-record interviews in which they seemed to be spoiling for a fight, waiting for a pretext, or preparing plans to attack Iraq. Bush himself said publicly, "Id like to see him out of there. I'll just leave it right there, " and he ordered a study of possible US responses if Saddam Husayn blocked UN inspectors.38
Most of this campaign was designed to frighten Iraq into compliance. As one official suggested, the hints of military action were "only smoke and mirrors .... We have no strong reason for doing anything [new]. But we have a lot of reasons to be seen to be doing something," to be perceived as acting. Another skeptic, Rep. Les Aspin (Democrat-Wisconsin), then chairman of the House Armed Services' Committee, noted, "We have made something that sounds like threats in the past and then not followed through on them ... and I'm very much afraid that's what we may be doing again."39
Nonetheless, the public, verbal campaign against Iraq remained intense. In March, US Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering told the UN Security Council that Iraq's al-Athir nuclear scientific research center "should be immediately and completely destroyed .... An unfortunate pattern has developed. Iraq makes declarations which are clearly meant to misinform, misdirect and conceal .... This is not compliance, but hide-and-seek, cat-and-mouse, cheat-and-retreat. "Gen. Joseph Hoar, commander of US forces in the ME, said in a congressional testimony: "My concern has always been that Saddam Husayn has not been able to read the perseverance of decisions that have been made in the UN. "40
To back up these decisions, the Pentagon sent Bush an options list in March that included plans for bombing Iraq's unconventional weapons assets, to punish Baghdad for not complying with UN inspections. Other proposals suggested banning Iraqi helicopter flights in the country's north and south, fomenting a coup or supporting one already begun, coordinating antiregime activities with the opposition, and seizing the $1.5bn. in previously frozen Iraqi assets and giving them to the UN to finance its arms inspection and destruction program in Iraq .41
The rapid leaking of these ideas and actions to the media indicated once again that they were designed as much or more to frighten Iraq into compliance with UN resolutions than they were to be implemented. In contrast to these tough words was the absence of any US reaction when Iraq's air force began flying missions again in April. While warning that any Iraqi flight "raises the risk of a serious incident," Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams also stated they were "technically ... not a violation" of the cease-fire terms barring such operations because UN Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 did not specifically mention them. Similarly, when Iraq moved antiaircraft missile batteries into the north, the US declared that this step risked renewed confrontation, but Washington again did nothing material to effect their removal.42
US National Security Adviser Scowcroft said on 12 April that he would not rule out US military action if Iraq interfered with the U-2 reconnaissance flights the US was carrying out under UN auspices. The Iraqis, he insisted, "will not get away with anything" and the US was talking with allies about appropriate responses. Yet again, the tough talk was not as it seemed to be. It was reported that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell argued that bombing would be ineffective.43
Indeed, contrary to Scowcroft's assertion, US intelligence was reporting that Iraq was getting away with a great deal. Gates told Congress that Iraq still had a few hundred Scud missiles hidden in storage. If sanctions were removed, US officials warned, Iraq's force could reach pre-Gulf War levels in three-to-five years. "Long before then, Iraq's forces could be strong enough to threaten its neighbors." The US intelligence community's National Intelligence Estimate said Saddam Husayn was still firmly in control of Iraq, though it expressed a hope that continued sanctions would increase pressure against him. Resistance by US allies and the Iraqi opposition's weakness suggested that covert operations were unlikely to succeed. Despite Gates's effort to rally support from Arab states during February and June trips to Cairo and Riyadh, the CIA expected that Saddam Husayn would remain in power for some time to come. Other government agencies more closely tied to Bush's policy - the White House, Defense Department and State Department - nevertheless optimistically portrayed Saddam Husayn's grip in Baghdad as weakening.44
In an effort to make the dream of Saddam Husayn's demise come true, in June the House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence approved $40m. in covert aid for fiscal 1993 - up from $15m. for the previous year -- to overthrowing Saddam Husayn's regime.45 Baker and Scowcroft met with a six-man delegation of Iraqi opposition leaders in late July, including the competing Kurdish chiefs - Mas'ud Barazani and Jaial Talabani -and Shi'ite activists. At the same time, US policy still regarded the Kurdish Workers' Party, operating from northern Iraq against Turkey, as a terrorist group and supported Ankara's raids into the Kurdish sanctuary to attack it.46
On another front, the US tried to block illegal shipments of goods and equipment to Iraq. However, despite sending Gates to Amman, the Administration could not close that route. The need for Jordan's taking part in the Arab-Israel peace talks also constrained US policy in pressing Jordan to stop this commercial traffic.47
The month of August marked a peak of US-Iraq tension, due both to US plans to press Saddam Husayn and other developments in the region.48 The first crisis came over Iraq's refusal to let a UN investigation team search for documents on unconventional weapons programs it believed were hidden in the Ministry of Agriculture building in Baghdad. For three weeks during July and August Iraqi authorities refused to let investigators enter there, provoking a tense standoff. The US supported the UN demand that no place be off-limits to the inspectors. To threaten Iraq, Bush said that "all options are open" for US retaliation if Iraq did not back down.49 "The US has plans to be sure that Saddam Husayn does what he is supposed to do," said Bush. Iraq's leader will no longer be allowed "to dictate what can and cannot be inspected .... We're determined that UN Resolution 687 will be fully implemented. This requires UN teams to inspect and destroy the Iraqi network of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical, biological and missile." Saddam Husayn, Bush continued, had "deliberately and callously harassed and abused the UN inspectors" in a long "pattern of willful noncompliance and obstruction of the UN special commission...[and] lied about the extent of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and sought to conceal them."50
The Bush Administration called on the UN to accelerate its inspections and Baker visited the ME to discuss the situation in southern Iraq and the possibility of military action. On his return, the secretary of state briefed Congress, emphasizing the need for a tougher stand. Leaks about imminent US military strikes and covert action were released to the media to frighten Iraq during the Agriculture Ministry crisis. This was the sixth time since the Gulf War's end that the US Government had issued serious warnings to Baghdad about its blocking of inspections or refusing to destroy weapons.51
Although Bush promised that the US would "help guarantee" UN access to all buildings it wished to inspect, the president was also aware that the UN and most US allies were not eager to escalate the crisis. On 26 July, a compromise was reached on the Agriculture Ministry issue, with Saddam Husayn permitting a team to enter, but only on his own terms. A US official commented, "The real test of Saddam Husayn's behavior will be in future inspections. Behavior along the lines we have just witnessed will not be tolerated." Many US observers criticized the Administration, arguing that Husayn had outmaneuvered it by stalling in order to remove any incriminating documents.52
The second major controversy came when Bush worked out a plan with Britain, France and Saudi Arabia - acting on the basis of UN resolutions - to ban Iraqi warplanes from the southern part of that country. The allies stated that they were prepared to shoot down any planes entering this exclusion zone. "I have made it very clear," Bush announced, "that we have the right under UN resolutions to use force if necessary. " "There is increasing evidence that [Husayn] is pursuing genocidal policies in the south," claimed Scowcroft. US officials warned that the US might have to step in and protect the Shi'ites in the south if government repression continued there.53
The new plan was hotly debated in the US. For instance, New York Times columnist Leslie Gelb supported the basic idea but charged that the story behind the decision "shows the lengths to which President Bush will go to win reelection, and how far his foreign friends will lean to help him." Why, asked Gelb, had Bush switched his stand after ignoring the use of helicopters for the 18 months since the cease-fire? Gelb's answer was that Clinton led in the public opinion polls. The president "found new resolve to confront the bully who had made him so popular in the first place and whose smiling presence hangs gloomily over the Bush Presidency. "54 A Washington Post editorial took a similar tack, pointing out that electoral considerations might also restrain Bush from acting even if there were a need to punish Saddam Husayn. A New York Times editorial was more critical of the whole idea, arguing that helping the Shi'ite rebellion against Baghdad could undermine Arab support for isolating Iraq and make Husayn more powerful at home. "President Bush would be wiser to support UN enforcement of the cease-fire agreement without pushing beyond that agreement into new and dangerous territory." These comments indicated that Bush lacked popular support for the kind of assertive policy about which he was talking.55
For his part, Bush denied any political motive in heating up the situation with Iraq, attributing his actions to Baghdad's increasing military activity in the south.56 Meanwhile, the US built up the force necessary to enforce the ban. Saudi Arabia allowed its air bases to be used for this purpose and over 70 US warplanes were on hand to enforce the decision. Several more aircraft, including reconnaissance, tanker and radar-jamming planes, plus an air war planning unit of 30 experts, were sent to Saudi Arabia as reinforcements. The aircraft carrier USS Independence also entered the Gulf and previously scheduled US maneuvers in Kuwait near Iraq's southeastern border, involving 2,400 soldiers sent from the US, was moved up in time.57
On 26 August, Bush accused Iraq of "harsh repression" against its Shi'ite majority and announced an exclusion zone for all Iraqi flights below the 32nd parallel. "We seek Iraq's compliance, not its partition," Bush said, "The US continues to support Iraq's territorial unity and bears no ill will toward its people." He stopped short of committing the US to military action. Democratic presidential candidate Clinton said he supported the zone as "an appropriate thing to do" given Husayn's resistance to UN resolutions. George Stephanopoulos, Clinton's communications director, added: "Saddam Husayn has to know that the American people are unified." In September, two US F-16s intercepted an Iraqi F-I Mirage fighter, perhaps to test the exclusion zone defenses, and turned it back.58
The US also admitted 3,000 Iraqi refugees from the 1991 war and antiregime rebellions who had until then been in Saudi refugee camps.59
Throughout the year, Washington continued to insist that sanctions against Iraq be maintained given Baghdad's failure to meet UN demands for full disclosure of its weapons program, long-term monitoring and recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty and border. "Iraq makes declarations of minimal content," said US Ambassador to the UN Edward Perkins, "declarations which are clearly meant to misinform, misdirect, and conceal. Iraq divulges information about weapons programs only after confronted with incontrovertible proof... This record is not compliance."60
US GULF SECURITY EFFORTS AND CONCERNS OVER IRAN
Although the US had failed to create a formal Gulf security framework after the Gulf War, it had built an informal structure by becoming the region's protector. US dominance, based on military power, was entrenched through bilateral defense pacts signed with Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain, and the expansion of an existing agreement with Oman.
There also remained a 26-ship US naval task force in the Gulf with about 24,000 military personnel. "We've got ships going into ports left and right. We've got ships and airplanes doing bilateral exercises left and right," said Rear Admiral Raynor Taylor, who headed the force. During August, US soldiers engaged in a training exercise in Kuwait - Operation Intrinsic Action -which, said Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, would "demonstrate our capacity to return rapidly to the region in the event of a crisis."61 In addition, enough food, fuel and military equipment was prepositioned in Kuwait for a US army battalions
Arms sales were another element in the evolving US strategic posture in the Gulf. The Bush Administration proposed to sell Kuwait weapons costing $2.5bn., including 450 Patriot missiles and also 342 HA WK missiles, constituting six batteries of launchers. These sales, said the Pentagon statement, "will help improve the security of a friendly country which has been and continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. 1163 Kuwait also agreed to buy 236 advanced US-made M- I tanks instead of British-made ones. This decision came after lobbying by Bush, Quayle and Cheney. The order, which included spare parts, training and ammunition, was worth $4bn. in contracts. The Bush Administration's effort was motivated partly by its election-related effort to produce more jobs for US workers.64 The Bush Administration also announced the planned sale of 72 F-15 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia - 48 of them the never-previously exported, most advanced F-15E version, though the specific models sold to Riyadh did not include the most sophisticated navigation and weapons systems. This $9bn. package included $5bn. for the planes, $2.1bn. for support and spare parts, $800m. for infrastructure construction, $400m. for munitions and $120m. for training. The Saudis already possessed 80 F-I 5s. Bush said he had taken into account the impact on Israel's ability to maintain a "qualitative edge" over Arab armies. Clinton supported the deal. Earlier, the US had asked Saudi Arabia to move F- I 5s to Tabuk air base, near Israel - in efforts to bar Iraqi military flights over southern Iraq - despite the 1978 US insistence and Saudi pledge that the planes would not be stationed there. After Israel complained, the planes were removed and the State Department wrote Israel a letter promising the new Saudi planes would neither be used in a hostile manner toward Israel nor be deployed in a hostile fashion.65
In the context of monitoring the proliferation of unconventional weapons in the region, US forces were ordered in March to follow a North Korean freighter delivering ground-to-ground missiles in the area. The ship ultimately docked at Iran's port of Bandar Abbas. Since the US determined that the arms were going to Syria. not Iraq, it did not intervene.66
Aside from Iraq, Iran was the main threat to the security of the Gulf monarchies that the US was committed to protect. US policy during 1992 was marked by increasing concern over lran's growing power and intervention abroad, combined with a desire to avoid any direct confrontation with that country.
CIA director Gates repeatedly called attention to Tehran's military buildup, telling Congress on 15 January that Iran "has embarked on an across-the-board effort to develop its military and defense industries. This effort includes programs in weapons of mass destruction not only to prepare for the potential reemergence of the Iraqi special weapons threat, but to solidify Iran's preeminent position in the Gulf and Southeast Asia. "67 Iran, he warned, "continues to shop Western markets for nuclear and missile technology and is trying to lure back some of the technical experts" who had emigrated. Gates spoke of Iran's import of long-range Scud missiles, as well as battlefield and cruise missiles, from North Korea and nuclear technology from China. Officials also stressed Iran's continued hostility to US interests. The Bush Administration succeeded in discouraging China and Argentina from providing Iran with a reactor and nuclear fuel fabrication equipment, respectively, while unsuccessfully trying to convince Saudi Arabia to pay Russia in order to cancel the sale of two submarines to lran.68
US officials also worried about Iran's efforts to expand its influence to Central Asia and Sudan. When Baker visited Turkmenistan in February to cultivate good relations with newly independent ex-Soviet republics, President Saparamurad Niyazov told him that Iran's foreign minister had been there first.69 US officials also warned that "the Iranians have a dangerous program. It's vast. The target is not just the north Egypt and North Africa - but also the south, into (sub-Saharan] Africa, with the creation of Islamic states being the goal. " Sudan "is the first place where they have had a regime that's a willing supporter. "70 Similarly, when the exclusion zone in southern Iraq was initiated in August, the US warned Iran not to take advantage of the plan in order to back a pro-Tehran Shi'ite rebellion in Iraq.71 However, when author Salman Rushdie, condemned to death by Iran for his book The Satanic Verses, visited Washington in March, the State Department and White House refused to meet with him in order to avoid offending Iran. A State Department spokesperson said, "At this time we felt that such a thing could and possibly might be misinterpreted .... There's no reason for us to have any special interest in him."72 In addition, in April the State Department recommended approving the resale of US-made engines and other components for two Airbus jetliners that the European manufacturers wanted to sell to Iran. The licensing, the department said, was not meant as a political gesture.71 Moreover, in September, when Iran expelled Arab residents from three strategic islands in the Gulf - seized by the Shah in 1971 - the US refused to become involved. Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger noted, "I don't think there is any question that the issue could become very serious if the Iranians were to decide to resort to force. "The US believed the dispute "should be settled peacefully .... We're totally opposed to the use of force."74
US PRESSURE ON LIBYA
US policy also tried to put increased pressure on Libya during 1992. In particular, Washington pushed for UN sanctions in order to force Libya to turn over two intelligence officials indicted in the US for planning the bombing attack on a US airliner - Pan American Airlines flight 103 - over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988. On 21 January, a UN Security Council resolution called on Libya to respond to the Anglo-American request to extradite the two men.75 The US Government urged all US citizens - there were an estimated 500- 1,000 of them, mostly working in the oil industry there - to leave Libya. When Libya ignored the extradition demand, Bush called for imposing sanctions. He met with European allies on the matter and stated, "Terrorists and their state sponsors must know there will be serious consequences if they violate international law." On 15 April, the UN accepted the US request in voting to impose sanctions against Libya,76 but Libya still refused to extradite the suspects.
NOTES
1. For a discussion of US policy toward the ME and its actions in the Gulf, see Barry Rubin, Cauldron of Turmoil.- America in the Middle East (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992). See also NYT, 3 August 1992. For a critique of Administration policy, see Barry Rubin, US Policy and the Radical Middle East States (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993).
2. WP, 18, 23 March 1992; NYT, 22 March 1992.
3. WP, 5 February, 18 March 1992.
4. NYT, 7 February 1992.
5. WP, 7 January 1992.
6. WSJ, 4, 25 June 1992.
7. NYT, 15 March; WP, 16 March, 2, 3 April 1992.
8. WT, 3 March 1992.
9. NYT, 28 March, 2 April 1992.
10. Ibid.; WP, 2 April 1992.
11. WP, 8 April 1992.
12. NYT, 15 May 1992.
13. NYT, 16 May 1992.
14. WP, 6 March 1992.
15. WP, NYT, 25 June 1992.
16. WSJ, 20 June 1992.
17. NYT, 12 August 1992.
18. WP, 27 September 1992.
19. WP, 28 July 1992.
20. WP, 9 September; David Twersky, "Jews For Bill," New Republic, 12 October 1992, p. 12.
21. WP, 13 March, 6 September 1992.
22. WP, 13 November 1992.
23. NYT, 20 March, 20, 27 April, 18, 22, 24, 29, 30 May, 8, 9, 13, 14, 19, 24, 27 June, 2, 8, 19 July, 5 August; WP, 17, 22 March, 20, 28, 29 April, 9, 22,
23, 30 May, 5, 6, 7, 11, 24, 26, 27 June, 7, 13, 22, 25, 27 July, 4 August; WSJ, 29 April, 12, 22 May; LA T, 27 April 1992.
24. WP, 30 September, 24 November 1992.
25. WP, 22 May, 13 July 1992.
26. NYT, WP, 7 August 1992.
27. WP, 5 August 1992 on the Republican criticism. CIA director Robert Gates also criticized Gonzalez, WP, 19 May, 31 July, 2 August; WSJ, 31 July 1992.
28. NYT, 11 August; WP, 9, 12 August, 17 October 1992. For critical editorial comment on Barr's initial decision, see NYT, 15 August 1992. WP, 12 August, 13 November 1992.
29. WP, 27 September 1992.
30. WP, 30 September 1992.
31. WP, 20 October 1992.
32. Ibid.
33. NYT 19 January 1992,
34. lbid,
35. Ibid.
36. WP, 14 February 1992.
37. NYT, 4 January 1992.
38. WSJ, 3, 7 February; NYT, WP, 9 February 1992.
39. WP, 9 February, 9 March 1992.
40. Ibid.
41. NYT, 19 January, 14 March; WP, 19 March, 19 May 1992.
42. WP, 8 April 1992; WSJ, 9 April 1992.
43. WP, 10 March, 13 April, 20 May; NYT, 15, 19 March 1992.
44. WP, 7 February, 28 March, 20 June; NYT, 7 February, 16 June, 1 July 1992.
45. NYT, 2 June 1992.
46. WSJ, 29 July; WP, 5 April, 30 July, 7 August 1992.
47. NYT, 1 July; NYT, WP 7 February 1992.
48. NYT, 29 July 1992.
49. WSJ, 17 August 1992.
50. NYT, 27 July, 18 August 1992.
51. WP, 16, 24, 28 July 1992; NYT, 6, 16, 23, 26 July 1992.
52. Charles Krauthammer, "Saddam Won," WP, 29 July; David Kay, "Giving in to Iraq," NYT, 30 July; A.M. Rosenthal, "Saddam and Gore," NYT, 28 July; Jim Hoagland, "We Won't Let You Down," WP, 4 August; Lally Weymouth, "Lost Victory?" WP, 17 July 1992.
53. WSJ, 18, 25 August; NYT, 12, 19, 20 August; WP, 12, 20 August 1992.
54. NYT, 23 August 1992.
55. WP, 27 August; NYT, 19 August 1992.
56. NYT, 18 August 1992.
57. NYT, 24 August 1992.
58. WP, 27 August, 11 September; NYT, 18 August 1992.
59. WP, 19 October 1992.
60. WP, 24 November 1992.
61. WP, 2 August 1992.
62. WP, 5 September 1992.
63. WP, 12 March 1992.
64. NYT 13 October 1992.
65. WP, 12 September, 17 October 1992.
66. WP, 13 March 1992.
67. WP, 2 February 1992.
68. WP, 2 February, 28 March, 30 October, 17 November 1992.
69. WP, 14 February 1992.
70. WP, 31 January 1992.
71. NYT, 25 August 1992.
72. WP, 2 April 1992.
73. WP, 9 April 1992.
74. WP, 25 September 1992.
75. WP, 8 February; NYT, 20 March 1992.
76. See FT, 23 July; NYT, 1 February, 24, 28 June 1992.