By Barry Rubin
Nineteen ninety-one was one of the most momentous years in the eventful history of relations between the United States and the Middle East. The year began with the US-led coalition expelling Iraq from Kuwait in the January-February Gulf War. When the war ended, the US government decided neither to overthrow the regime of Saddam Husayn nor to help anti-government Kurdish and Shi'i revolts. Although there was some effort to build a security structure in the Gulf and maintain pressure on Iraq, the focus of US attention turned to the Arab-Israeli peace process, culminating in the October-November Madrid peace conference and direct negotiations in Washington which started in December.
The US role in the region had been important for many decades. Nonetheless, 1991 heralded the beginning of an unprecedented US role in the ME. Since the mid-1950s, the US had been engaged in a Cold War with the USSR with significant consequences for regional politics. In 1991, with the decline of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the US became the world's only superpower. Its wealth, military might, range of alliances, technological superiority, diplomatic indispensability, and strategic assets made it the most powerful force in the region. The US was the sole potential mediator for the Arab-Israeli conflict and the only likely guarantor of security in the Gulf.
Much of US involvement in the ME had developed as a result of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not put an end to conflict between the US and local extremist countries. The US opposed Iranian and Iraqi aggression in the Gulf; bombed Libya; and sent Marines to Lebanon to block a Syrian takeover. Yet none of these specific issues directly involved the Soviet Union and the local regimes were not acting as Moscow's client in these cases.
Washington's power was further enhanced by its willpower and ability to respond to Iraq's aggression, assembling and preserving such a disparate anti-Iraq alignment, and decisively winning the Gulf War. Thus, the US possessed an almost unprecedented degree of authority in the ME for any outside power. Even if overall US involvement in world affairs was declining, the ME remained a relatively high priority.
The highest levels of the Bush Administration were engaged in ME policymaking. Key decisions on these matters were made by President Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. The National Security Council (NSC), whose chief ME staffer was Richard Haass, worked more closely with White House Chief of Staff John Sununu and was particularly concerned with Arab demands in the peace process.
Within the State Department, Baker worked with a small, trusted group of "outsiders" to the bureaucracy, especially Policy Planning Staff director, Ambassador Dennis Ross, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dan Kurtzer. The Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, John Kelly, and his bureau's staff handled more routine matters and had less influence. Compared to most US administrations, there was a relatively low level of internal conflict in the Bush Administration. Both Bush and Baker took a keen interest in the region. It was mainly because of these two men's personal views that such particular emphasis was placed on identifying Israeli settlements in the West Bank as a chief barrier to peace and putting a high priority on opposing them.(1)
US priorities for the postwar period were named by Bush in his 6 March victory speech to a joint session of Congress. These were a mutual security arrangement in the Gulf; controlling proliferation of unconventional weapons; an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict; and he Intercontinental Hotel in Geneva, Baker tried to warn Iraq but failed to convince Saddam that the US was intent on war if Iraq did not pull out of Kuwait. The US had retreated from Vietnam and Lebanon, and deserted the Shah, Iraqi officials claimed that this policy would remain consistent.
Although the Bush Administration was intent on fulfilling its threat, the US's own past record and domestic dissent over the policy undermined its credibility. "Within six months," said Senator Ernest Hollings, a Democrat from South Carolina, "every fundamentalist mullah, every Arab nationalist, will say, `the US came here and invaded this Third World country for oil.'...And, face it, they will be speaking the truth!" Former Undersecretary of State George Ball, a veteran Arabist, commented, "There will be bitter talk of the Crusades and Western colonialism, and all the occasions in history where the Western world has appeared to intervene in what the Arabs regard as [their] own affairs."(5)
New York Times columnist Tom Wicker proclaimed, "Bush stands warned -- Congress is unlikely to support a war." Opposition continued during the last-minute congressional debate in January. Senate Democratic leader George Mitchell, cautioned, "There has been no clear rationale, no convincing explanation for shifting American policy from one of sanctions to one of war." The risks included high casualties, "billions of dollars spent, a greatly disrupted oil supply and oil price increases, a war widened to Israel, Turkey or other allies, long-term American occupation of Iraq, increased instability in the Persian Gulf region, long-lasting Arab enmity against the US, a possible return to isolationism at home."(6)
In the words of Judith Kipper, a Brookings Institution fellow and the ME expert most often appearing on American television, "We will be seen as the big bullies, no matter how many Arabs we have around us." Professor Michael Hudson of Georgetown University declared, Saddam was "going over the heads of the Arab leaders and appealing directly to the people. And he seems to be having some success." Professor L. Carl Brown of Princeton, who had earlier opined that Europe was replacing the US as the area's chief power, warned, "A crushing military defeat of Saddam Husayn will convert the bully of Baghdad into a martyr."(7)
Like Arab support for Saddam, the terrorist factor, was also overestimated. Representative Lee Hamilton, a Democrat from Indiana, considered the most knowledgeable member of Congress on the ME, said, "If war comes, it will be difficult to imagine where Americans will be safe in the ME for some time to come." Senator John Kerry, a Democrat from Massachusetts, former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, the columnists Evans and Novak and many others agreed that terrorism would be widespread and effective.(8)
Many American politicians and experts still doubted that the coalition would be able to sustain itself in battle as it had in peace. Hamilton said a few days before the war began, "Support for the US from coalition partners will be questionable in the case of hostilities." War, he added, would "split the coalition; estrange us from our closest allies; make us the object of Arab hostility; endanger friendly governments in the region; and not be easy to end, once started." Ball claimed, "The coalition would almost fall apart overnight" and the US would be left "with not a single friend except Israel" in the region.(9)
Iraq's biggest American advocates from the 1980s became the most ardent pessimists on America's chances. The columnists Evans and Novak claimed that almost all Arab leaders agreed that if one Iraqi soldier were killed, they would all leave the coalition. They insisted that Iraq's conquest of Kuwait, "cannot now be undone from outside." They further proclaimed that Syria and Iran would not act against Saddam and also claimed that Bush's policy was losing support at home and abroad.(10)
Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was the originator of the idea that the US could make Iraq an ally in the 1970s, warned that an attack on Iraq would lead to a split with European allies, Arab anti-American hostility, financial disaster and the loss of any gains from the US victory in the Cold War. He forecast "a global wave of sympathy for Iraq." He also claimed that Israel might "take advantage of an expanded war to effect the expulsion of all Palestinians from the West Bank," a notion which reflected the most extreme Arab propaganda.(11)
But the US refused to back down after sending over 500,000 soldiers to the Gulf and Saddam failed to provide a peaceful alternative. Five days after Baker and Aziz met in Geneva on 7 January, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing Bush to use force. This resolution was only passed after a sharp debate: in the Senate, 52 for and 47 against; and in the House, 250 for and 183 against.
After Bush obtained Congress's support to attack, Senator Joseph Biden, Democrat from Delaware, warned the president on the Senate floor, "The Senate and the nation are divided on this issue. You have no mandate for war." Senator Edward Kennedy, Democrat from Massachusetts, added in his speech, "There is still time to save the president from himself -- and save thousands of American soldiers in the Persian Gulf from dying in the desert in a war whose cruelty will be exceeded only by the lack of any rational necessity for waging it." These powerful Americans were so against war that it was natural that Saddam did not expect the US to fight.
There were already constant stories in the US media about low morale among the soldiers, frictions in the coalition, the problems of repairing equipment and the troops' longing for alcohol. If Bush had retreated, he would have faced the next election as an apparent fool and an appeaser; if he had procrastinated, he would have had to face the rising costs and domestic complaints entailed in keeping several hundred thousand soldiers marooned in the Saudi desert. Bush was so eager to end the crisis that he wanted to attack Iraq sooner rather than wait longer. In the days up to 15 January, this congenital American impatience operated against Iraq.
The US Commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, commented on the war's first day, "The Iraqis have no concept of what they were getting involved in." Yet this lack of comprehension was partly due to a failure on the part of US policy in better showing them the consequences of Iraq's intransigence.(12)
In one sense, however, Saddam was correct. The US eagerness to bring its troops home and end its foreign responsibility had made it spoil the diplomatic outcome after winning military victories in two world wars. The Vietnam War and Iran hostage crisis turned into political disasters because, regardless of their outcome, they could not be concluded fast enough. Saddam understood that the US could not fight a war if it could not secure a swift victory, keep casualties low and get out quickly. The dictator's mistake was that he did not think that Bush could defeat Iraq and fulfill these conditions. Nevertheless, this same need to keep the war short, losses to a minimum, and bring the troops home as soon as possible also meant that the US did not have the willpower and staying power to bring down the Iraqi dictator.
Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger came to Israel just before war broke out to urge patience and promise that the US air force would knock out the missile launchers. At the end of December 1990, the US had offered two batteries of Patriot defensive missiles, but Israeli crews were still training at Ft. Bliss, Texas. The US then rushed batteries manned by American crews to defend Israeli cities, requesting that Israel wait for the coalition's bombing and secret commando raids to knock out the Scud launchers rather than attack them itself. It argued that any Israeli action might make Arab members drop out of the coalition.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR
On 27 February, Bush announced the ceasefire and ordered a suspension of attacks on Iraqi forces, on condition that Iraq comply with all UN resolutions and release prisoners of war and detained Kuwaitis. As the war came to an end, Bush's policy was highly praised in the US. His approval rating in an April poll stood at a phenomenal 80 percent. Shortly thereafter, however, both Bush's domestic popularity and an expectation for a "New Order" in the ME began to decline.(13)
The key element in this growing criticism was the fact that the US had not tried harder to topple Saddam or to help the Shi'i and Kurdish revolts which ensued after the end of the fighting. Secretary of State James Baker held out an olive branch to Iraq even before the shooting stopped. "The time of reconstruction and recovery should not be the occasion for vengeful actions against a nation forced to war by a dictator's ambition. The secure and prosperous future everyone hopes to see in the Gulf must include Iraq."(14)
A number of arguments were marshalled to justify Bush's decision to stop short of overthrowing the Iraqi leader either directly or indirectly. First, it was asserted that to bring down Saddam would necessitate a US occupation of Baghdad and a commitment to keep troops in the country for an extended period of time. The US would become bogged down in Iraq, it was argued, suffering casualties and becoming increasingly unpopular there. This clearly reflected the bitter lessons learned in Vietnam and Lebanon.
Second, it was suggested that the US destruction of Iraq's government would encourage a dangerous anti-American backlash because much of the Arab and Moslem worlds would be convinced that the US was aggressive and imperialistic. Third, officials argued that the overthrow of Saddam would lead to a disintegration of Iraq itself, leaving a vacuum which would then be filled by Iran or Syria so that one of these states would then become the dominant, threatening power in the Gulf.
Fourth, the Bush Administration suggested that such a step would be opposed by US allies, such as Turkey, which feared a successful Kurdish insurgency would spill over into its own country, and Saudi Arabia. Fifth, it was hoped that the defeat and continued sanctions would bring about Saddam's downfall without any US military or covert action being necessary. Finally, Bush had never considered Saddam's removal from power as an official war aim, although he had indicated that this was what he hoped would happen. "Our policy," said a member of the White House's NSC staff, "is to get rid of Saddam Husayn, not his regime."(15) Bush, though, overestimated the likelihood that Saddam would be thrown out by his colleagues and generals.
Overthrowing Saddam, claimed one official, "would have meant deploying troops throughout the country, occupying Baghdad, going after helicopters, airplanes, tanks, artillery." Another official said, "We achieved a military victory, from which a political victory would ensue and for us to redefine our mission would have been trouble with American voters and the armed forces, who had been told for several months, 'You win this and you're out of there.'"(16)
Former State Department official, James Akins, wrote that the US did not need to eliminate Saddam since he would "soon be dead at the hands of his own countrymen" or in exile. The US would be seen as the "destroyers" not "the saviors of Arabs or Islam." There would be growing anti-American demonstrations and terrorism, US allies in Egypt, Syria and Morocco "will be shaken and could be overthrown," and the Saudi regime would only last a few years longer.(17)
Even rejecting such extremely pessimistic scenarios, the Administration did not want to intervene further militarily in the area. Once a truce with Iraq was signed, the US was not firm in insisting that Iraq fulfill its conditions. Iraq fooled him, Schwarzkopf told interviewer David Frost, by breaking promises it had made at the truce talks. When Iraq's delegates asked to be trusted, Schwarzkopf recalled, "You almost feel like coming back and saying `Why.'" If Iraq's rulers "broke the rules," he asserted, "they would pay for it."(18)
But the US did not retaliate when Iraq failed to fulfill its promises. Bush said that Iraq's use of combat helicopters violated the truce and Schwarzkopf warned that Iraqi aircraft flights did the same. The White House then publicly announced that it would not involve itself in Iraq's internal strife. In early April, US troops began withdrawing from southern Iraq.(19)
When Kurdish and Shi'i Iraqis revolted against the regime in March, Bush denied that the US had any commitment to help them. This was technically true, but Iraq's Kurds and Shi'is interpreted Bush's clear, oft-voiced wish that the dictator be deposed as a call to action and an offer of help. Bush disclaimed all responsibility for the upheaval and made it clear that he had no intention of helping out. The US let Saddam survive and, consequently, its plan for a postwar new world order was badly subverted though not altogether ruined.
Nevertheless, humanitarian action was taken to help the Kurdish refugees. US troops were sent into northern Iraq to establish a safe haven for them. On 5 April, Operation Provide Comfort (a name indicating its non-political intent) began to transport emergency supplies and food. This was the largest such US relief effort in modern history. In June, US forces were withdrawn from northern Iraq but a 2500-member multinational contingency force, including US troops, was stationed in southeastern Turkey to protect the refugees from any Iraqi attack.(20)
"In about two weeks," wrote a New York Times reporter, "Mr. Bush moved from refusing to become involved in Iraq's internal problems, to a small-scale food drop, to a major direct intervention. He went from threatening Mr. Husayn with a war-crimes trial to wondering, almost wistfully, if there were some broker who might arrange for the Iraqi leader to take shelter in another country."(21)
Similarly, the US criticized Saddam's refusal to cooperate completely with UN inspectors and destroy his unconventional weapons. Yet, other than maintaining the embargo, no action was taken. In May, the US ended its air patrols in southern Iraq and began withdrawing its troops from Kuwait.(22)
From then on, US policy was tough but largely passive toward Iraq. As summarized by Baker, "We respect Iraq's territorial integrity and sovereignty and do not wish to see Iraq fragmented as a state. We have no quarrel with the people of Iraq....We intend to continue to act with others to isolate Saddam Husayn's regime. That means we will never normalize relations with Iraq so long as Saddam Husayn remains in power." Sanctions would also continue until Saddam was no longer ruling Iraq. Bush affirmed that the US opposed lifting the trade embargo completely while Saddam remained in power. The US wanted 50 percent of any Iraqi oil revenue permitted by a partial lifting of the embargo to go to Kuwait and other victims of Iraq's actions as reparations.(23)
As part of its effort to reward coalition allies and to strengthen its position in the Gulf region, the US gave Turkey $200m. in supplementary aid immediately after the termination of fighting. Bush paid a brief visit to Turkey in July.(24)
US POLICY AND THE GULF SECURITY SYSTEM
Paradoxically, the overwhelming US strategic advantage rendered all the more unnecessary the formal Gulf security structure advocated by Washington, secured by treaties and guarded by the permanent presence of outside troops. The Saudis wanted to keep the arrangement informal since their recent invitation to US troops made them want to show their independence by not having them stay. The Saudis were was also not interested in hosting more politically acceptable Egyptian or other Arab troops. After all, the Saudis felt that the US army, which was the best in the world, was on retainer as a guard to be summoned when needed. The new reality in the region was that the US had become the guarantor of Gulf stability and security, even without having troops on the scene or formal defense treaties with the local states. This situation was quite sufficient for US purposes since it did not involve a constant or large-scale American presence.
The US favored an "Arab solution" to Gulf security to the greatest possible extent. Even before the fighting ended, Baker stressed his expectation that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would take the lead in "building a reinforcing network of new and strengthened security ties."(25) In March, Baker met with eight Arab foreign ministers from the anti-Iraq coalition -- the GCC states, Egypt and Syria. In Damascus, an agreement was reached to station Egyptian and Syrian troops in the Gulf. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney took a trip to the Gulf in early May to discuss pre-positioning and joint exercises. "Responsibility for security in the Gulf ultimately rests with those nations most directly involved -- the Gulf states themselves," said Assistant Secretary of State Kelly, "We therefore are encouraging close defense cooperation among the states of the region."(26)
The Saudis themselves rejected the idea of accommodating politically correct foreign Arab units, which might prove subversive. After all, the Saudis felt they had the US army, the world's best, waiting in the wings, so to speak, whenever necessary. Saudi Arabia paid the US about $19.8bn. as reimbursement for the cost of the war. It also wanted to buy large amounts of arms from the US to build up its own armed forces. The Saudis insisted that all US equipment be withdrawn, rather than pre-positioning supplies for a division. The Kuwaitis also preferred US to Arab protection, while, at the same time, keeping the Americans at arm's length. They did, however, allow some pre-positioning of US equipment in Kuwait, maintained by civilian US contractors.(27)
ARMS CONTROL
In a speech on 29 May, at the US Air Force Academy, Bush made his main statement on arms control. He announced an initiative aimed at, "Halting the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons in the ME...while supporting the legitimate need of very state to defend itself." Specific proposals included a verifiable ban on the production or acquisition of weapons'-grade nuclear material by ME countries; that the region's states join the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Chemical Weapons Convention; the strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention; and a freeze, and eventually destruction, of surface-to-surface missiles. This plan would have no effect on conventional arms.(28)
US leaders believed that the war showed the need for greater arms control, especially with regard to unconventional weapons, and demonstrated a change in the strategic situation. Scowcroft and others claimed, for example, that the Gulf War had showed that territory was not important, and hence that Israel should be more willing to give it up. Baker commented, "It does not appear to me that the occupied territories played any part in mitigating the Scud attacks. Some could argue just the reverse -- that in this day of weapons of that nature -- that ground, the occupied territories as such, does not afford the kind of security that it might have in the past."(29)
US policy found arms control to be a tougher issue than Gulf security or the Arab-Israeli peace process. After all, explained the British magazine, The Economist, the lessons of the Kuwait crisis "point in the other direction. Iraq's neighbors have learnt that it was a mistake to let their own power fall so far behind Saddam Husayn's. Israelis will conclude that, but for their country's undeclared nuclear deterrent, Iraq would already have doused them in toxic chemicals. And Mr. Husayn has been taught to acquire nuclear arms, if he has the chance, before next pouncing on a weaker neighbor."(30)
Nevertheless, there was little progress on any of these fronts. Just as the region preferred American protection to mutual agreements, it had a similar attitude toward arms limitations. In fact, the US victory in the Gulf eased the pressure on the arms race by lessening the risk of local war. Moreover, the Administration's interest in selling more conventional arms to Saudi Arabia and other ME states, so they could better defend themselves, also undermined attempts at limitations.
The one case where there was an effective consensus and controls on proliferation was in Iraq. In June, a defecting Iraqi scientist gave the US information about how Iraq had hidden its nuclear research installations and equipment. He also warned that the US military had greatly exaggerated its success in destroying Iraq's unconventional weapons during the war and pointed out that much of these arms and materials remained intact.(31)
Assistant Secretary of State Kelly said that the US would continue vigorously to press for implementation of UN Resolution 687, calling for international supervision and destruction of Iraq's remaining weapons of mass destruction and its missiles with ranges over 150 km., and for a continuing embargo on military equipment to Iraq. In his September speech to the UN, Bush warned, "Saddam continues to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction...[and] continues his contempt for UN resolutions....We must keep sanctions in place as long as he remains in power. We cannot compromise for a moment."(32)
The only way to counter a threat of proliferating missiles and nuclear arms was by US-led international efforts to limit an influx of them. Since there were enough ambitious companies and indigenous scientists to ensure that such arms could be smuggled or locally produced, US deterrence would have to block their use. US policy did not intend to apply pressure equally: The US sold arms to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia while trying to block the spread of nuclear arms to Syria, Libya, and Iraq, and tacitly accepting Israel's possession of them.
THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, many of the circumstances previously hindering progress on the Arab-Israeli peace process were altered. Formerly, the Arab states had appeased the most radical forces among them. After the war, however, the Arab countries needed to have good relations with Washington and, therefore, had to show some interest in making peace. This gave the US an opportunity to use its power as leverage. For the Bush Administration and Baker this issue had a high priority. Consequently, it could arguably be considered the most important effort in US foreign policy during this period.
As soon as the war ended, Bush and Baker began working on the peace process. "We have got to find a way for the Arab states and Israel to make peace," said Baker in early March. "And we have got to find a way for Israel and the Palestinians to begin a dialogue. That, therefore, suggests a two-track approach to this problem." "We cannot let this historic opportunity pass," said Baker, "The time is now" to move forward.(33)
The Administration did not intend to reestablish the US-PLO dialogue. The PLO leaders, Baker said, had "damaged themselves significantly" by siding with Saddam in the Kuwait crisis. In the projected peace process, "It was not contemplated that the Palestinians would be represented by the PLO." Baker added that, "the PLO knows what is required if there is to be a reopening of the dialogue." But negotiating with the PLO would be "very difficult with its present leadership." In his own victory speech to Congress on 6 March, Bush said that any diplomatic settlement must be based on trading "territory for peace" and respecting "legitimate Palestinian rights."(34)
He had "no illusions" about the difficulty of the task, said Baker. "But I also had a strong sense that the Gulf War might have created some new possibilities for peacemaking in the region and that the US has a unique obligation to help explore the possibilities. It would be very sad, of course, if it turns out that the old obstacles are more formidable than new opportunities. But I think it would be sadder still if the US failed to energetically pursue a chance for peace, because such chances don't come along very often in the ME."(35)
The effort was based on an attempt to start direct negotiations. The Gulf War, Baker said, was a "grim reminder" of the danger of conflict and escalating military competition. It was also a reminder that the state-to-state dimension of the Arab-Israeli issue remained important, and that Israel and the Arab states "sometimes find common ground between them." Baker stressed five points: agreement on the need for a comprehensive settlement based on UN resolutions 242 and 338; a two-track process involving simultaneous negotiations between Israel and Arab states and between Israel and the Palestinians; the Camp David formula of an interim arrangement to be followed by an agreement on the permanent status of the territories; Palestinian representation by residents of the territories; and co-sponsorship of the conference by the US and USSR as a "launching pad" for direct talks. The US would not try to impose a settlement. Baker argued that the agreement of the GCC to attend regional talks with an important breakthrough.(36)
In his endeavors to promote negotiations, Baker made eight trips to the ME between March and October, each of which included meetings with the leaders of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, along with talks with a Palestinian delegation in Jerusalem. In his trips in March, two in April, mid-May, June, and July, he tried to resolve barriers to initiating talks. Baker also met with Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy in Washington on 13 June.(37)
During these months, Bush successfully maintained a high level of secrecy about the details of the negotiations. The prospects for achieving success often looked poor. Baker particularly criticized the construction of new Jewish settlements on the West Bank, saying, "It is easier to obstruct peace than to promote it." While in the Soviet Caucasus, Baker was asked if he could see his way to peace in the ME. "About as clearly as I can see Mount Elbrus," he replied, gesturing at a fog-shrouded peak in the distance.(38)
Baker and the Administration believed that the US could not impose a settlement, but that the local forces had to be willing. "It goes the US would force Israel to hand them the West Bank, Gaza, and Golan without their giving up anything directly. The US accepted the Saudi and Kuwaiti decision not to participate in bilateral negotiations, though they agreed to join regional talks. Saudi authorities, though, refused to let US Senator Frank Lautenberg (Democrat-New Jersey) enter the country because had an Israeli stamp in his passport. Rather than protest, the US State Department issued him with a second, unmarked, passport. An angry Washington Post editorial called this "an offense against the US [letting the Saudis] and not the US government determine the validity of an American passport."(42)
To encourage Israel to participate in talks, the US also took some steps to improve bilateral relations. In March, Congress agreed to give Israel $650m. to offset costs incurred during war. In his speech to the UN in September, Bush urged the repeal of the UN "Zionism as racism" resolution. "This body cannot claim to seek peace and at the same time challenge Israel's right to exist," he said. The US spearheaded a successful effort to annul the resolution.(43)
The Administration also made clear, though, its strong opposition to continued Israeli settlements in the West Bank. When the Israeli housing minister, Ariel Sharon, visited Washington in May, US Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Jack Kemp was ordered not to receive his counterpart officially, in order to punish Sharon for his active role in building settlements. Instead, the two men met at Israel's embassy.(44)
The key breakthrough on the Arab-Israeli peace process came in June and was confirmed directly during Baker's sixth trip in July: Syria accepted the US proposal for direct talks at a peace conference. That step, Baker commented, "gives us something to work with." He then pressed Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians for their agreement to attend. "In our view," he said, "the Palestinians have the most to gain from a viable and active peace process than do almost anyone else." Baker also said to Israel, "This is a moment of historic opportunity [since] Israel now has Arab partners willing to engage in direct negotiations."(45)
The problems in structuring negotiations were gradually resolved. In October, Baker met with a delegation of West Bank and Gaza residents in Washington and then made his eighth trip to the region. Finally, on 18 October, the US and USSR issued a formal invitation to the ME conference, starting 30 October to be held in Madrid. "The road to peace," said Baker, "will be extremely difficult, with many problems, many hitches and probably many interruptions along the way." Nevertheless, the peace conference and the ensuing bilateral meetings were genuine achievements for US diplomacy. The Bush Administration's thinking, summarized the New York Times was that "only on the basis of 'real peace' and Arab respect for Israel's 'reasonable' security needs does Mr. Bush expect Israel to make concessions. But, he made clear, he does expect concessions, specifically including territorial concessions as well as 'fairness' to Palestinians."(46)
Bush, in his speech at the Madrid meeting, stressed that the US would be a "catalyst", but the parties must make their own decisions. "Our objective...is not simply to end the state of war in the ME" in exchange for nonbelligerency, but rather to achieve "real peace....Treaties, security, diplomatic relations, trade, investment, cultural exchange, even tourism. What we seek is a ME where vast resources are no longer devoted to armaments," and war. "We aim to reach agreement within one year." Any agreement must be acceptable to all sides and give the "Palestinian people meaningful control over their own lives and fate and provides for the acceptance and security of Israel....And now is the ideal moment for the Arab world to demonstrate that attitudes have changed, that the Arab world is willing to live in peace with Israel and make allowances for Israel's reasonable security needs."(47)
The Administration wanted the peace process to succeed but was also aware that it could not impose a settlement. The object was to move the parties as close as possible, then try to bridge the remaining gaps. Pressure from the US could move each of the parties marginally, but would not drastically change their stands. The US had no blueprint of its own, but, in line with its traditional policy, opposed both Israeli annexation of the territories and an independent Palestinian state.
The one exception to this general approach was the Administration's tough line in opposing Israeli settlement in the territories. This was largely due to the personal views of Bush and Baker that such activity was the major stumbling block in the way of peace and a central concern of the Arabs. On 22 May, Baker told Congress that the settlements were the biggest obstacle to peace in region. He had been particularly angered by the establishment of small new settlements, timed to coincide with his visits to Israel.(48)
The question became the most contentious issue in US-Israel relations when Israel requested a US guarantee of $10 billion in loans Israel wanted to borrow to build housing for Soviet Jewish immigrants. Aside from US policy's traditional opposition to Jewish settlements and Bush's own position, the White House's hostility to the proposal was heightened by a post-Cold War domestic mood in favor of reducing foreign aid, the US economic recession, and some criticisms of Israel's economic policy.
In July, Bush said that there "ought to be a quid pro quo" between freezing settlements and receiving the guarantees. On 25 July, Quayle warned Israel Defense Minister Moshe Arens, during a
Washington visit, that linkage between the two was possible. Baker asked Shamir to delay the request. A joint letter, though, was signed by 71 senators urging going ahead with the guarantees.(49)
In September, Bush met with Senate supporters of Israel and asked them to accept a four-month delay in the consideration of guarantees in order to head off congressional approval of the plan. Bush claimed that immediate action on the issue would threaten prospects for the ME peace conference. "If Congress chooses to press forward now, we stand a very real chance of losing the participation of either our Arab or Israel's negotiating partners." He promised not to seek any further delay after January 1992.(50)
As part of its campaign on the question, the Administration leaked critical reports on the Israeli economy. When pro-Israel citizens came to Washington to urge congressional support for the proposal, Bush spoke at a press conference of "a thousand lobbyists descending on Capitol Hill." Bush, wrote New York Times columnist Leslie Gelb, "stepped in front of the cameras...and declared political war on Israel." He threatened to veto the loan guarantees' measure if it was passed by Congress. Congress accepted the requested delay as it did not want a confrontation and wanted to avoid seeming responsible for damaging the peace process. Furthermore, it lacked the necessary votes to override a veto. Moreover, there was an economic recession in the US and a general public interest in cutting foreign commitments.(51)
THE END OF THE US HOSTAGE ISSUE
The postwar power of the US was acknowledged even by Iran, which tried to settle old quarrels and economic disputes. All the remaining US hostages held in Lebanon were released unconditionally during 1991.
The US government reminded Iran that releasing the hostages was a precondition for normalizing bilateral relations. It also urged Syria to help in this effort. "Since the war," said this message, as summarized in the New York Times, "it has become clear that we're the ones you have to do business with in the ME and we've made it clear that for some players -- especially Iran -- there will be no business while there are American hostages still being held."(52)
A UN official, Giandomencio Picco, handled the actual negotiations, which also included trying to free British and Israeli hostages. Official US policy opposed making deals with hostage-holders. Consequently, the Administration did not want to ask Israel to release Lebanese prisoners as Hizbollah demanded. It did, however, make clear its wish on this matter, and Israel complied. Edward Tracy, a book salesman, (kidnapped in November 1986) was released on 11 August. Bush called for an end to hostage holding in his September UN speech.(53)
Other releases quickly followed: Jesse Turner, a teacher at Beirut University, (kidnapped in January 1987) was released on 21 October; Thomas Sutherland, dean at the American University of Beirut, (kidnapped in June 1985) was freed from captivity on 18 November and a week later, the US and Iran settled their last bilateral financial conflict from the pre-revolutionary era. The US paid Iran $278m. in compensation for military equipment ordered by the Shah but never delivered.(54)
The last three US hostages were set free shortly thereafter: Joseph Cicippio (seized in September 1986), deputy comptroller of the American University of Beirut, was released on 1 December; Alan Steen, a teacher at Beirut University (taken in January 1987) was freed on 3 December; and Terry Anderson, the Associated Press' chief ME correspondent (kidnapped in March 1985) was set free on 4 December. Bush praised Iran and Syria for their assistance.(55)
Although US policy was in the midst of its effort to implement its postwar policies, at the end of 1991, a new era had clearly begun for the country's role in the region.
NOTES
1. Morton Kondracke, "Baker's Half Dozen," New Republic, 24 February, 1992; Christopher Madison, "Scrambling Vicar," National Journal, 20 April, 1991, pp. 924-28.
2. Ibid.; International Herald Tribune, 8 March, 1991.
3. Lionel Barber, Financial Times, 17 June, 1991.
4. Testimony to the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, 17 June, 1991.
5. Morton Kondracke, "Party Pooper," p. 10 and Jacob Weisberg, "Gulfballs," p. 19, New Republic, 25 March, 1991.
6. New York Times, 2 December, 1990; Washington Post, 11 January, 1991.
7. 11 October and 13 December, 1990, cited in Washington Times, 22 March, 1991; Weisberg, op. cit. On Kipper's background, see David Segal, "Shrink Rap," New Republic, 25 March, 1991, p. 18.
8. 11 January, 1991, cited in Washington Times, 20 and 21 March, 1991; 27 November, 1990 and 7 January, 1991, cited in Washington Times, 11 and 12 March, 1991.
9. 11 and 12 January, 1991, cited in Washington Times, 21 March, 1991.
10. Columns of 13, 29, 30 and 31 August; 21 September; 22 October; 7, 12, 16, and 30 November; and 28 December, 1990, and 7 January, 1991.
11. Washington Times, 22 March, 1991; Weisberg, op. cit.
12. Middle East Mirror, New York Times, Reuter, 18 January, 1991.
13. New York Times, 21 April, 1991.
14. Baker testimony, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 6 February, 1991.
15. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Civil War in Iraq (Washington, 1991), p. 15.
16. New York Times, 21 April, 1991.
17. James Akins, International Herald Tribune, 4 March, 1991.
18. New York Times, 28 February, 1991; Televised interview with David Frost.
19. New York Times, 14 and 16 March and 9 April, 1991; Washington Post, 16 and 27, March 1991.
20. New York Times, 12 and 13 April, 22 June, and 13 July, 1991. 1991.
21. Andrew Rosenthal in New York Times, 21 April, 1991.
22. New York Times, 20 April, 7 and 8 May 1991.
23. Baker testimony to House Foreign Affairs Committee, 22 May, 1991; Bush speeches of 29 April and 20 May, 1991. New York Times, 21 May, 1991; Washington Post, 4 June, 1991.
24. New York Times, 23 March, 1991; Washington Post, 24 March, 1991.
25. Baker testimony, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 6 February, 1991.
26. New York Times, 7 and 8, May 1991. See, for example, Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly's testimony to the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, 20 March and 17 June, 1991.
27. New York Times, 10 March, 1991; Washington Post, 20 October, 1991.
28. New York Times and Washington Post, 30 May, 1991.
29. International Herald Tribune, 8 March, 1991.
30. The Economist, 6 October, 1990, p. 45.
31. Washington Post, 14 June, 1991; New York Times, 15 June, 1991.
32. Testimony to House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, 17 June, 1991; New York Times and Washington Post, 25 September, 1991.
33. "Meet the Press" and "This Week with David Brinkley," 3 March, 1991; Jerusalem Post, 12 March, 1991.
34. Ibid.; Jerusalem Post, 18 February, 1991; Madison, op. cit.; International Herald Tribune, 8 March, 1991.
35. Testimony to House of Representatives Foreign Operations Subcommittee, 22 May, 1991.
36. Ibid.
37. New York Times, 14 and 19 June, 1991.
38. International Herald Tribune, 25 and 29 April, 1991.
39. Los Angeles Times, 17 May, 1991.
40. New York Times, 23 March, 1991; Washington Post, 24 March, 1991.
41. Testimony to House of Representatives Foreign Operations Subcommittee, 22 May and 17 June, 1991.
42. Washington Post, 16 April, 1991.
43. New York Times, 6 March, 1991; International Herald Tribune,
24 September, 1991.
44. New York Times, 2 May, 1991.
45. International Herald Tribune, 19 July and 3-4 August, 1991; The Economist, 20 July, 1991; Text of Baker's remarks in Jerusalem,
22 July, 1991.
46. New York Times, 31 October, 1991; Washington Post, 18, 19, and 27 October, 1991.
47. The Economist 2 November, 1991; Text, Washington Post,
31 October, 1991.
48. New York Times, 23 May, 1991; Jerusalem Post, 24 May, 1991.
49. International Herald Tribune, 6 September, 1991.
50. New York Times, 10 September, 1991.
51. International Herald Tribune, 19 June and 13 September, 1991.
52. New York Times, 18 August, 1991.
53. International Herald Tribune, 24 September, 1991.
54. New York Times, 28 November, 1991; Washington Post,
19 November, 1991.
55. Washington Post, 5 December, 1991 and 19 January, 1992.