By Barry Rubin
The year 1990 could be described as the first test of US Middle East policy in the post-Cold War era. It was a time for dramatic developments and dynamic rethinking, featuring the breakdown of the US-directed Arab-Israel peace process and the Bush Administration's full-scale intervention in the Gulf during the Kuwait crisis.
Thus, the Middle East emerged as a continuing high priority for US policy. For the first time, large numbers of American troops were sent there to fight in a regional conflict. The US alliance with several Arab states was proven under severe stress; a US role in leading a global coalition and in coordinating a common position with the Soviet Union was also demonstrated.
ISSUES OF POST-COLD WAR POLICY
The Middle East proved to be a region of high priority and of relative success for US interests in 1990. Despite the new alternatives available with the decline of US-Soviet competition, US interests had more continuity in the Middle East than anywhere else in the world. That region's turbulence and the importance of its oil resources forced US involvement there. The area's middle-range powers (including Egypt, Iran, Israel, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia) had motives, conflicts, and ideologies operating independently of historical Cold War patterns. Their quarrels were not stilled nor their systems undermined by declining Soviet influence and activism.
Equally, the strong US regional position was due not only to the Soviet bloc's decline but even more to its own political, strategic, military, economic, and technological strength and to its wide variety of alliances. The capacity of the United States as the most likely mediator of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the only potential organizer of a worldwide coalition against Iraq's takeover of Kuwait were impressive resources.
Historically, US policy in the Middle East opposed two types of threats. The highest priority was given to countering Soviet influence in the East-West Cold War. A second level was to oppose radical anti-American dictatorships which fought US influence, attacked US allies, and disrupted regional stability for their own purposes though they often made common cause with Moscow. The removal of the first layer did not substantially alter the posture toward the second, though it made this task easier. Thus, even in a period of declining Soviet influence, US policy had opposed Iranian expansionism in the 1980s and Iraqi expansionism in the 1990s even though these two states were not Soviet clients.
While Moscow ended the zero-sum game in the US-Soviet relationship, US policy was able to overcome any zero-sum aspect in its own ties with Israel and Arab states. Needing US assistance, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait -- and even Jordan, Syria, and Iraq when to their advantage -- overlooked the special relationship between the United States and Israel, as well as America's nature as a non-regional, non-Moslem power. This was clear in the Iran-Iraq war and the Kuwait crisis as well as in the diplomacy around the Arab-Israeli conflict. By abandoning the rules of Arab politics in invading Kuwait, Saddam gave license to his Arab rivals who were then freed to accept an unprecedented direct involvement of US forces in the area.
Another element in the development of US policy was the growing orientation to the Persian Gulf sub-region. The roots of this change lay in the growing importance of that area's petroleum exports and oil income after the mid-1970s and the ingredient of instability brought by Iran's revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. The Carter doctrine -- mandating US intervention against states acting aggressively in the Gulf (aimed explicitly at the USSR and implicitly at Iran) -- and the Reagan doctrine --expressing determination to prevent the destabilization of Saudi Arabia, lay the foundation for the Gulf as the center of US regional and even global activism.
Thus, the failure at Arab-Israeli mediation did not inhibit the success at Gulf intervention. And the varying fortunes of these two parts of US policy may indicate the shift of priorities from the former to the latter.
THE SUSPENSION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS
The early Bush administration was guided by several principles over Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy. It was more interested in finding a workable resolution than in steering toward a specific, predetermined outcome. US policymakers know that the only realizable settlement would be one on which both Israel and Palestinians could agree. Thus, they had no hidden agenda for achieving an independent PLO-led state, permanent Israeli occupation, or some purely Jordanian solution. US policy tried to be a successful mediator by proposing steps which both sides would find acceptable, even if not preferable.
Another assumption was that diplomacy could only succeed if the local parties make it possible through their own actions and willingness to make concessions. After all, those directly involved were to be the beneficiaries of progress and their own needs supposedly furnished the fuel for a breakthrough. While willing to help along the process and bridge differences, US policymakers had learned that there was little use in exerting themselves -- and little likelihood of success -- unless the local parties did so as well.
Moreover, the United States understood that any negotiated settlement must be accepted by Israel's government, which was led by a conservative party. Thus, any US position too much at odds with that leadership would wreck the process. At the same time, a breakdown in diplomacy -- even if caused by Israel's leaders --would reduce, but not terminate, the bilateral special relationship.
In contrast, the PLO was never regarded as friendly to US interests. Its inclusion in negotiations, or even recognition, was based on eless, the main action lay in direct US-Israel and US-Egypt contacts, with Cairo serving as an intermediary to the PLO and Palestinians.
From the beginning, the Bush Administration sought a process under its own control. Secretary of State James Baker explained, "We are concerned that if we act too precipitously we might preempt promising possibilities that could surface if we adopted a more reasoned and measured approach." US urging succeeded in encouraging Israel into producing a 14 May, 1989 peace plan.(1)
The United States reacted positively to Israel's plan but stressed the provision for elections in the West Bank and Gaza, while ignoring the call for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. The basic principles supported by the United States were confidence-building measures, steps toward mutual recognition, opposition to any idea of Israeli annexation, and a dialogue between Israel and non-PLO Palestinians from the territories. Egypt was seen as playing a central role and as mediating contacts with the PLO to get that organization to reduce any direct role in the talks.(2)
The PLO, however, resisted this idea, opposing the elections plan. At this point, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak's ten-point peace plan filled the gap. Designed to be compatible with Israel's plan (and echoing Labor Party positions), it proposed ground rules for elections and linked the balloting to a comprehensive settlement exchanging land for peace. The Labor party portion of Israel's national unity government endorsed the Egyptian proposal and Egypt expressed confidence -- albeit in conflict with PLO statements -- that the PLO would accept the idea. US officials urged Israel to agree but, in October 1989, the Likud members of Israel's inner cabinet voted down the plan.
Almost immediately, the United States came up with an additional idea, which became known as Baker's five-point plan. Instead of going directly to elections, an additional set of preparatory meetings would take place. First, a US-Egypt-Israel foreign ministers' conference would approve a Palestinian delegation; next an Israel-Palestinian meeting would be held in Cairo to plan elections. Israel would approve the Palestinian group, so it would not include PLO officials and would consist of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. But the United States also affirmed that Egypt was not substituting itself for the Palestinians. In other words, the PLO would have an active, if unofficial, role in approving the list and advising (or directing) the delegation. Moreover, while elections would be the primary topic of the Israel-Palestinian meeting, the Palestinians could raise other issues.(3)
Thus, US policy proposed the following sequence of events: -- Israeli and Egyptian acceptance of Baker's five points.
-- A meeting of US, Israeli, and Egyptian foreign ministers to approve a Palestinian delegation.
-- An Israeli-Palestinian meeting to plan elections in the West Bank and Gaza.
-- Negotiations between Israel and those elected for an interim and a final status solution.
The Baker framework then became entangled, however, in still more negotiations over the composition of the Palestinian delegation, including the inclusion of those resident in East Jerusalem and of deportees from the territories. On 5 November, 1989, Israel's cabinet voted to accept the Baker points, but only with reservations over these additional provisions. PLO leaders also did not want to accept the plan, demanding a direct and open role from the beginning and preferring an international conference. Finally, however, Egyptian pressure had some effect and, on 6 December, 1989 Mubarak informed the United States that Egypt accepted Baker's points. Again, Washington chose to ignore any reservations, making no further concessions and yet refusing to believe that Israel would say `no' as an answer.(4)
This, then, was the complex situation at the beginning of 1990. For over a year, the State Department's staff level -- under the direction of Assistant Secretary of State Dennis Ross, head of Policy Planning, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dan Kurtzer -- had played a clever but increasingly intricate strategy, interpreting every Israeli or PLO "Yes, but..." as a "Yes." They tried to make Israel's government an offer too much in line with its own position to refuse, while heeding the Egyptian government's more moderate reinterpretations of the PLO's harder line stand.
During January and February the Bush Administration concentrated on trying to persuade the Shamir government to accept a Palestinian delegation including members from East Jerusalem and deportees. Shamir and his Likud colleagues, however, doubted the assurances from Cairo and opposed these two specific categories of participants. The White House response -- manifested for example in Baker's 23 February meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens in Washington -- was that the United States would abandon its efforts.
"Risk for peace can only be taken if Israel is confident about its security and the US commitment to it," Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney suggested in March.(5) But rather than offer Shamir new assurances or concessions, the Administration pressured and criticized Israel in a number of ways. A great deal of publicity was given to allegations that some Soviet Jewish immigrants were settling in the West Bank. The United States ostensibly withheld accepting Israel's request to guarantee $400 million in housing loans unless settlements in the occupied territories ceased, though this point was also being used for overall leverage on the peace process plan.
Senator Robert Dole, the Senate Republican leader who worked closely with the White House, proposed on 16 January that US aid be cut by 5 percent for the biggest recipients -- Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan -- to provide money for new democracies in East Europe. Baker's 1 May confirmation that he would accept cuts for Egypt and Israel was another signal to Jerusalem of US displeasure. He linked US aid for resettling Soviet Jews to public Israeli government assurances that no settlements would be begun or expanded in the West Bank or Gaza.(6)
The main incident was President George Bush's offhand --possibly unintentional -- remark on 3 March, including East Jerusalem as an area where the US opposed "new settlements."(7) Calling the latter neighborhoods "settlements" emphasized the ultra-sensitive Jerusalem issue, the main sticking point to Shamir's accepting the US invitation. The timing, just as Shamir was making his final decision on the peace process, was not fortuitous. Israel had already given private assurances on settlements, few immigrants wanted to live in the territories, and it would be quickly known if immigrant housing projects were put in the West Bank.
At any rate, at the 11 March Israeli cabinet meeting, Shamir and the Likud refused to vote on accepting the modified Baker plan. They wanted to exclude East Jerusalem residents and agree that Israel would walk out of a meeting with Palestinians if it concluded that the PLO was directing that delegation. The Labor ministers walked out of the session and four days later the cabinet lost a no-confidence vote in Israel's parliament.
Given that Israel now had only a caretaker regime, US policy had to wait until a new cabinet was formed. Meanwhile, however, the Bush Administration continued to express criticism of the Shamir position and tried to encourage the PLO. On 19 March, for example, the State Department issued a report which concluded that the PLO had adhered to its pledge not to use terrorism. This conclusion required a claim that, despite nine terrorist attacks by member groups, there was no evidence that the PLO Executive Committee or Arafat personally had approved them. The State Department also refused to examine Israeli evidence about a number of other attacks carried out by PLO groups including Arafat's own al-Fatah organization.
By May, the Bush Administration was trying to negotiate the language of a UN resolution condemning Israeli settlements with Arab states. A US veto would be avoided if the declaration was worded moderately. Baker also expressed interest in sending UN observers to the West Bank and Gaza to observe the intifada and Israeli policies. When Arafat explored the possibility of receiving a visa to address the UN, the US government avoided the problem by convincing the UN to hold the event in Geneva. But Arafat was told that if he made a moderate speech, the level of the US-PLO dialogue would be raised and he might receive a visa in the future. On 24 May, Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly sent the PLO another signal by testifying to Congress that it had kept its promise not to engage in terrorism.
The next day, Arafat spoke to the UN in Geneva but his talk had no new material and was relatively hardline. At the UN, the refusal of the PLO and some Arab states to soften the language led to a US veto. Thus, the opportunity to exploit US-Israel differences was lost by the Arabs.
This trend was very much expanded by the 30 May large-scale attempted terrorist attack on Israel's coast, assisted by Libya and carried out by a PLO member group. The US government, by the terms of the December 1988 PLO promises and of the bilateral dialogue, had to insist that the PLO criticize the action and punish those responsible. But the PLO heightened its criticisms of the United States and, during an Executive Committee meeting in Baghdad, 5-7 June, threatened to halt the dialogue. In turn, Bush urged the PLO to "speak up" against the attack; Baker said he was trying to avoid breaking the dialogue. Finally, on 20 June, the United States announced that the dialogue was suspended but, if the PLO changed its position, it could be restarted.(8)
Meanwhile, on 9 June, Shamir had formed his new government. Again, the Administration warned that unless Israel accepted its earlier proposal, for east Jerusalem and deportee members to the Palestinian delegation, it would suspend efforts. The same day Bush suspended the dialogue he announced writing to Shamir asking if he was serious about the peace process. But with so many procedural problems, the Shamir government's opposition to its specific plan, and the PLO's opposition to the proposed framework and behavior over terrorism, the Administration had to acknowledge the end of that round of the peace process.
US POLICY IN THE GULF CRISIS
At the beginning of 1990, the Bush Administration was a staunch advocate of good US-Iraq relations and opposed pressure against Baghdad. After Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, however, the White House shifted sharply and became the leader of a worldwide coalition opposing Saddam Husayn.
US Relations with Iraq, January-July 1990
The rough alignment of US-Iraq interests began in their mutual opposition to Iran's Islamic revolution and its attempts to spread fundamentalist revolt in the Gulf. Bilateral cooperation, though still limited, increased throughout the 1980s. The United States tilted toward Iraq in the war. Vice-President George Bush condemned Israel's 1981 destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor as "not in keeping with international standards" and supported US participation in drafting a UN resolution "to protest Israel's actions."
Baghdad's suave Ambassador Nizar Hamdoun, stationed in Washington between 1982 and 1987, was astute in courting officials to persuade them of Iraqi moderation. Iraq expelled the Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal and was removed from the State Department's list of countries supporting terrorism. While initiating Operation Staunch to block arms sales to Iran in 1983, the United States encouraged its allies to provide weapons to Iraq. Formal diplomatic relations were reestablished in 1984.
The secret US dealings with Iran in 1985-86 seemed to contradict this orientation. But the war's end in August 1988 brought no change in US policy. The US government did not protest the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in 1988 and the Bush White House continued to oppose congressional calls for sanctions on Iraq because of human rights violations and development of unconventional arms.
In the late 1980s, Iraq was a large market for US agricultural exports, which supplied 25 to 33 percent of its needs, virtually all under US government credit -- $400 million a year -- and subsidy programs. Iraq was the second largest export loan recipient and seventh largest subsidy recipient during this period, receiving about $4 billion. It was also expected that Iraq would be a major market for construction and other contracts as it rebuilt from the war. Baghdad was also seen as a continued bulwark against Iran.(9)
There was some growing attention paid to the Gulf in February 1990. That month, the Defense Department's new 28-page Defense Planning Guidance plan for the 1992-1997 period was released. No longer was a Soviet invasion of Iran seen as the main regional contingency, instead there was a switch to more direct efforts to defend Saudi Arabia, the Gulf shaykhdoms, and the oilfields from a threat inside the region. This reevaluation was due to the army's need to find a new role as the Soviet threat in Europe declined and also to develop enduring justifications for the Central Command which was responsible for the Middle East.(10)
Moreover, the Central Command's chief, General Norman Schwarzkopf, told Congress in February that Iraq was receiving a large amount of Soviet military equipment being pulled out of Eastern Europe. US policymakers were also jarred by Saddam's February 1990 speech calling for American forces to leave the Gulf. But the fact that Iraq's army did not shrink after the war's end or Iraq's threats against Israel in April and its bid for Arab leadership at the Baghdad summit in May did not alter US policy. Within the Administration, the National Security Council in particular but also the State Department argued for a continued policy of conciliation toward Baghdad. Talk about a policy reevaluation within the Administration went nowhere.(11)
There was, however, more attention paid to the problem of weapons' proliferation. Shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, US investigations began, in cooperation with Britain, into Iraqi attempts to smuggle high-technology goods capable of being used in making nuclear and other unconventional weapons. The Commerce Department had generally favored very loose controls on technology exports to Iraq in order to help American business. The effort to block Iraq from obtaining materials useful in making chemical or nuclear weapons produced a number of successes in intercepting goods and arresting those responsible. The accusations and publicity involved in exposing such smuggling led to an increase of US-Iraq tension in the spring of 1990.
Iraq's armament efforts included financial subterfuge within the United States as well. The Atlanta branch of the Italian Banca Nazionale di Lavoro managed to provide Iraq with $2.9 bn in loans, two-thirds of them eventually uncollectible, through letters of credit and a commodity loan between February 1988 and July 1989. A grand jury in Atlanta secured convictions of bank officials for illegal practices.(12)
In March, a US intelligence report stated that Iraq was building six launchers in western Iraq for Scud missiles capable of hitting Israel. Western businessmen and Iraqi agents were arrested trying to make US-made triggers, high-speed capacitors, and pieces for an exceptionally long-range artillery piece to Iraq. An Iraqi diplomat at the UN was charged with planning the murder of two Iraqi dissidents in the United States. This was the background for Saddam Husayn's 2 April speech threatening Israel and the United States and saying he did not need nuclear weapons since he had chemical arms.(13)
In this context, the United States cooperated with Israel's efforts to gain defenses against a potential missile attack. A month after Iraq's successful testing of long-range ballistic missiles in December 1989, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin agreed with Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz on orders for two batteries of US Patriot missiles. These arms, costing $200 million, were scheduled for deployment in late 1991.(14)
Again, though, the main theme in US policy toward Iraq remained the preference for good relations. In April, a group of five senior US senators led by Senate Republican leader Dole, visited Saddam Husayn in Mosul for two hours, gave him a conciliatory letter from President Bush, and returned with favorable impressions.
According to a transcript of the conversation, Dole recalled that he had condemned Israel's 1981 attack destroying Iraq's nuclear reactor. In the context of Saddam's complaints about criticisms in the US media, the senators sympathized; when he cited a Voice of America commentary noting his murdering thousands of Kurds, Dole replied that the US employee responsible had been fired.
"I realize you are a strong and an intelligent man and that you want peace," said Senator Howard Metzenbaum, the leading Democrat there. "If a certain shift in your thinking makes you concentrate on the peace we need in the Middle East, there will be no other leader in the Middle East who can be compared with you."
Back in the United States, Dole told the Senate on 20 April, "We asked Husayn a number of difficult questions. I think we came away feeling that this is an intelligent man" whose long war with Iraq and large debt would incline him toward seeking peace. Iraq's status as the Middle East second-largest petroleum exporter and the Gulf's second most populous country made it important, and indispensable for any Arab-Israel peace process.
Questioned two days later on "The David Brinkley Show," Dole said "I must say that I only report what Saddam Husayn told us. He thinks there is a conspiracy with the U.S, Britain and Israel, particularly in the media, to tarnish his image of his country." Saddam admitted having chemical weapons but denied possessing any nuclear or biological weapons. An impressed Dole told reporters "There might be a chance to bring this guy around." Dole's home state of Kansas was one of the main beneficiaries from Iraq's grain purchases. Dole opposed sanctions against Iraq.
The Bush Administration was distinctly not interested in any confrontation. Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly said it wanted "a trial period to see whether there's potential for improvements in their behavior and in our relationship." A senior official told the Washington Post in April 1990 that Saddam Husayn "is more moderate than he was in the past and there is a good chance he will be more moderate in the future."
The May 1990 Arab emergency summit seemed to show Arab support for Saddam as well. "Nobody...has the right to enjoy our [oil] resources while it opposes us," said the Iraqi leader in criticizing the United States. The meeting's final declaration denounced US support for Israel and the Soviet Jewish immigration while endorsing Iraq's "right to take all necessary measures to guarantee and defend its national security." While the Arab states built up Iraq, their support also implied to the United States that opposition to Baghdad would damage its interests in the Middle East.(15)
But the US policy of seeking rapprochement with Iraq did not change during the summer. In July, a Pentagon official told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel and a right-wing government in Israel were factors forcing Iraq to a more "adversarial" position. "Saddam will attempt to generate a more unified Arab bloc -- under his own leadership," but while doing so he wanted regional stability in order to engage in economic reconstruction and deterring an Israeli attack. The United States should develop its ties with Iraq rather than try to isolate Baghdad. "Measures such as sanctions will work best if they are threatened, rather than used," said the official, "and if they must be imposed carefully calibrated to accord with Iraqi behavior. Without some positive underpinning, such as trade with the U.S and U.S participation in Iraq's non-military industrialization, the current political dialogue -- though mainly acrimonious -- will cease."(16)
Why didn't the United States put more pressure on Iraq? One reason was a bureaucratic inertia in the National Security Council and the State Department. It was always easier to maintain than to change policy. Once the United States was on Iraq's "side," ran this line of thinking, it had to find excuses for Baghdad's actions. Some officials were unwilling to revise their own conception, being convinced that Iraq would have to stay on a moderate course that was in Baghdad's interests. Congressional efforts to bring sanctions brought an Executive Branch counter-reaction, rejecting this "interference" in its own prerogatives.
A related factor lay with deep-seated American attitudes toward foreign policy. As early as 1980, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski had expressed an eagerness to win over Iraq from the Soviet to the US camp. Radical regimes would work with the United States if only convinced of American good intentions. Often believing that all Arabs and Moslems would stick together against an outside threat, American officials and experts wanted to avoid any confrontation. In general, the United States felt that force was counterproductive, breeding resentment rather than compliance. And in this specific case, broad rhetorical support for Iraq among other Arab governments gave some material reason to believe that this was true.
Thus, the Administration defined its task as persuading Saddam that he was misreading events and that the United States meant him no harm. Similar wishful thinking and soft words greeted Iraq's threats to Kuwait. The White House refused to cut off credits to Iraq, vigorously opposing proposed sanctions up to the day before Iraq's invasion. In fact, American policymakers were concerned that they might provoke an Iraqi attack on Kuwait by too much involvement in the issue. This was the context of the meeting, one week before Iraq's invasion, between US Ambassador April Glaspie and Saddam.
On 25 July, Saddam asked Glaspie to meet him on very short notice. In retrospect, the meeting was clearly his effort to explore US attitudes in the event Iraq went ahead with the invasion. "Yours is a society that cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle," he told Glaspie, according to the transcript Baghdad later released, and the US was vulnerable to terrorist attacks. He also complained of Kuwait's "economic war" against Iraq.
Seeking to avoid any confrontation, Glaspie praised Saddam's "extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country." To the Iraqi leader's comments on Iraq she replied, "I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait....James Baker has directed our official spokesman to emphasize this instruction."
Saddam told Glaspie that he wanted to send a message to Bush. He reviewed the secret US-Iran arms deal, presented as an example of American participation in an anti-Iraq conspiracy, but said he accepted Reagan's "apology." Now, however, he suggested the US was supporting a Kuwaiti effort to wage economic war against Iraq. Instead, it should be grateful to Iraq for having stopped Iran militarily, which the US could not have done. He warned the US, "If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force" and criticized US support for Israel, the UAE, and Kuwait. Glaspie rejoined that Bush rejected sanctions, wanted better relations, and was not going to declare an economic war. In short, she tried to defuse Saddam's fear while actually increasing his confidence. As part of her flattery, Glaspie called an ABC television interview with him "cheap and unjust....I am pleased that you add your voice to the diplomats who stand up to the media." Saddam concluded that if he could not find a solution with Kuwait, he would not accept death. Glaspie left Baghdad on 30 July for a visit to Washington.(17)
This meeting would become very controversial. Did Saddam feel emboldened in his plans after this meeting? Apparently he concluded that the US would not act against him, but Washington also spoke this way because it did not think an attack was imminent. The State Department hinted that Glaspie had sent Saddam a wrong signal, but she was accurately conveying the policy toward Iraq developed by Secretary of State Baker and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. The Arab states --including Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia states -- were all encouraging Washington to conciliate rather than provoke Iraq and were stating that Baghdad would not invade Kuwait. In later congressional testimony, Glaspie would comment that the Iraqi transcript left out her statements that the US would not respond only as long as the Iraq-Kuwait dispute was settled peacefully. The US had never thought, she added, that Saddam would be so "stupid" as to invade Kuwait.
Still, after evincing no strong international reaction to Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, threat against Israel, or ultimatum to Kuwait, US policy had helped create a set of conditions in which Saddam thought he could get away with occupying and annexing his neighbor. According to later interviews, Baker said that US intelligence had begun to indicate major Iraqi military movements between 24 and 27 July. An actual invasion was only predicted about 24 hours before it occurred.(18) The US had sought to avoid a confrontation with Iraq, concentrating on European and Soviet problems, but this very diffidence had helped produce a crisis.
RESPONSE TO THE INVASION OF KUWAIT, AUGUST-DECEMBER 1990
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Bush immediately condemned the assault, called it aggression, and demanded a quick withdrawal. He warned Saudi Arabia that it, too, was in danger and imposed sanctions on Iraq using the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Bush also accepted King Fahd's invitation to send forces, a massive airlift of US forces to Saudi Arabia. By 12 September, over 100,000 American soldiers had arrived there.(19)
Bush quickly formulated a policy and strategy to deal with the crisis. He declared Saudi Arabia's defense a vital US interest and enunciated four goals: the safety and protection of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf; the protection of US citizens; an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi troops; and restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. He commented that he would not be disappointed if the Iraqi people overthrew Saddam but that this was not US objective. On 4 September, Baker he called for a new regional security structure and a week later described world order as "our fifth objective."(20)
To implement these objectives, Bush carried out two lines of activity. First, he led a multinational effort to embargo Iraq and to isolate it physically and politically, including a series of UN resolutions. Second, he built up military forces in Saudi Arabia to give Iran an incentive to withdraw and to attack if it did not do so. The US Navy closed the Jordanian port of Aqaba and began intercepting ships in the Gulf and Red Sea.(21)
The administration took a variety of measures including putting Iraq on the list of countries considered supporters of terrorism, a two-thirds reduction of the Iraq embassy's staff in Washington (after Baghdad closed the US embassy in Kuwait), and canceling Egypt's debts. US policy was not swayed by the holding of hundreds of Americans as hostages.
On 11 September, Bush told a joint session of Congress, "We will not let this aggression stand." Five days later, in a speech broadcast over Iraqi television, he said that US efforts were directed not against Iraq's people but to counter an unprovoked attack, "The pain you are now suffering from is a direct result of the course of action chosen by your leadership." As soon as the crisis would be over sanctions would end but, before then, "Allow me to say clearly that it is impossible for Iraq to succeed."(22)
While Bush was pessimistic about a diplomatic solution and not inclined to compromise with Saddam, he faced three problems. First, he had to consolidate support in his own administration. Second, he needed to win the backing of public opinion and Congress. Third, he had to hold together a coalition whose members had disparate interests and policies. Saddam made all of these tasks easier by refusing to offer an attractive compromise which might have split the US government, public, and coalition.
Of course, in terms of the administration, the president's will set the policy. In addition to Bush himself, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was willing to go to war from the beginning if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait. Nonetheless, three other leading figures -- Secretary of State James Baker, National Security Advisor Scowcroft, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell -- were far more doubtful.
Although Baker was a long associate of the president, he had little experience in foreign policy and was particularly concerned with what he perceived to be a European and Arab reluctance to fight Iraq. He preferred a compromise which might involve making concessions to Baghdad on the immediate issues or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Scowcroft, a West Point graduate and air force pilot who had worked with Henry Kissinger and the Reagan Administration, had been the main architect of the pro-Iraq policy before the invasion. His Middle East staffer, Richard Haass, had blocked any effort to pressure Baghdad and insisted that Saddam had no intention of invading Kuwait.
Powell's doubts were related to the military's concern that it have the forces and public support necessary to achieve victory. Otherwise, they might become caught in some new Vietnam situation in which their performance was criticized and reputation tarnished. The crisis also came at a time when the military budget was being forced downward because of the Cold War's end, with preparations being made to shut down M-1 tank production, put battleships into mothballs, and withdraw many of the US troops in Europe.
Several factors pulled together the government team by the end of October. The fact that Bush himself was so determined made his subordinates fall into line. But there were also increasing doubts about the willingness of Saddam to compromise or the embargo's effectiveness to succeed by itself, and anger over news of atrocities in Kuwait. For Powell and the Pentagon, the commitment of the president to give them the tools, freedom of action, and size of forces they deemed necessary consolidated their support.
Powell, the 53-year-old son of Caribbean immigrants, was the first black, the first non-service academy man, and the youngest officer ever to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had served two tours of duty in Vietnam, but for him the Vietnam Syndrome was a signal for caution rather than reluctance to use force altogether. There was also some debate in the armed forces over which strategy to follow if fighting proved necessary. Air Force commander General Dugan was fired in mid-September for publicly threatening devastating air attacks on Iraq. The size of the build-up, which would eventually total 540,000 troops and which necessitated the first peacetime call-up of reserves since Vietnam, assuaged the military's concerns.
As for public and congressional backing, a president set on a position has a great deal of political capital through his credibility, the loyalty inspired by patriotism and party, an ability to reward or punish legislators, and a certain leverage over the events and images reported by the news media. There was also a great deal of genuine outrage at the events unfolding in the Gulf, while the broad international support for US actions were also heartening. Still, in late August the sympathetic chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Les Aspin (D.-Wisconsin) said of Bush that he still did not yet have "the political mandate to conduct a military attack."(23)
Bush's task was more difficult in part due to his weakness at explaining the reasons for US policy and at stirring emotional support. Perhaps the best expression of the government's reasoning was Baker's speech -- which also signaled his own conversion to the cause -- to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council Los Angeles on 29 October.
"America's involvement in world politics came about from conviction based on hard and terrible experience," Baker explained. Iraq's aggression, he said, "challenges world peace" at "one of those rare transforming moments in history," shattering "the vision of a better world in the aftermath of the Cold War." "Trying to drag us back into the 1930s" of appeasement is self-defeating because Saddam would only become stronger. Iraq's development of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons as well as its role as safe haven for international terrorists would only intensify. Surely, Saddam did not expect "this aggression, first against Iran and now against Kuwait to be his last." The reference to Iran was ironic in view of US support for Iraq during their eight-year war. In addition to menacing the world's new era, Saddam was also a regional challenge: "If his way of doing business prevails, there will be no hope for peace in this area." By seizing control of so much oil he could also plunge the world into deep recession.
In contrast to these threats was the success being made at countering them. "Never in its existence has the potential of the UN as a force for peace and stability been clearer." The US and USSR were cooperating and "we are exhausting every diplomatic avenue to achieve such a solution without further bloodshed." "Every day as the sun sets, Iraq gets weaker. Every day as the sun rises, the international community remains firmly committed to implementation of the Security Council resolutions." But force must be used if necessary and in no way could Iraq reap any reward for its aggression. "So let no nation think it can devour another nation and that the United States will somehow turn a blind eye. Let no dictator believe that we are deaf to the tolling of the bell as our the US was the only country which could lead the campaign against Iraqi expansionism.(26) While rejecting linkage, or concern that the US might seek to document the Gulf - as Iraqi efforts to change the subject and stall for time -- Bush wanted to address these points. In his 1 October UN speech, the president said that the US would address the Arab-Israeli conflict and pull its troops out of the Gulf as soon as possible after the crisis ended.
While the administration wanted to show that it was exhausting all peaceful means to resolve the dispute, it also concluded that time was not unlimited. By the end of October, US officials assessed that the sanctions would take too long to work by themselves. Intelligence reports concluded that Iraq was quickly dismantling Kuwait and many believed in a point of no return after which the country could not be rebuilt. There was also worry that the Saudis would not indefinitely host so many US forces; that Ramadan and the hajj season might be times of high tension; that the spring weather would be unfavorable to an offensive; and that domestic, European, and Arab support would diminish over time. On 22 November, Bush himself visited Saudi Arabia. And, in the meantime, the US pushed for the imposition of a deadline, adopted at the UN on 29 November, that Iraq must withdraw or face war by 15 January, 1991.
As a last-ditch effort to avoid war, Bush tried to hold high-level negotiations before the UN deadline. Iraq stalled for time. Finally, on 7 January, 1991 Baker had a face-to-face negotiation with Tariq `Aziz in Geneva. No progress was made in the long session. Five days later, a joint resolution was passed by both houses of Congress after a sharp debate -- in the Senate, 52 to 47; in the House of Representatives, 250 to 183 --authorizing Bush to use US forces. The deadline came on 15 January and, with no Iraqi pullback, the US-led coalition, implementing the UN ultimatum, attacked on 17 January, 1991.
NOTES
1. WP, 2 May, 1989. In his AIPAC speech, Baker called on Palestinians to "practice constructive diplomacy, not attempts to destroy international organizations....Amend the [PLO] covenant. Translate the dialogue of violence in the intifada into a dialogue of politics and diplomacy. Violence will not work. Reach out to Israelis and convince them of your peaceful intentions. You have the most to gain from doing so and no one else can or will do it for you. Finally, understand that no one is going to `deliver' Israel for you." Text of AIPAC speech is in US Department of State, "Principles and Pragmatism: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Current Policy No. 1176. See also, NYT, 12 and 22 February; 11, 14, and 16 March 1989; Washington Times, 16 February, 1989; WP 24 February, 1989. 1989. "We can and must," said Baker, "find a way to move ahead which, at one and the same time, addresses Israel's legitimate security needs and addresses the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people,"
2. The PLO's immediate reaction was to reject elections under occupation and especially any prior halt to the uprising. Shamir and Foreign Minister Moshe Arens first said this approach was only Rabin's personal idea. WP, 21 January, 1989; NYT, 22 and 23 March, and 4 April, 1989. See also NYT, 31 March and 7 April, 24 and 28 May, and 25 June, 1989; WP, 24 May, 1989.
3. Text of the Baker five points is in NYT, 7 December, 1989. See also WP, 7 and 11 October, 1989; NYT, 8 and 11 October, 1989.
4. Washington Times, 2 November, 1989; WP, 9 November, 1989; Robert Greenberger, "Bush Administration at Last Is Optimistic On Progress for a Middle East Peace Plan, WSJ, 13 November, 1989.
5. Speech to UJA Young Leadership conference, 13 March, 1990.
6. Testimony to the House Appropriations Committee, transcript, 1 and 7 March, 1990.
7. Text of press conference in Palm Springs, California, 3 March, 1990. >From the context, it seems apparent that Bush meant to say "Gaza Strip." See also Thomas Friedman, "Bush Questions Israeli Claims to East Jerusalem, Creating Uproar," NYT, 9 March, 1990.
8. NYT, 22 June, 1990.
9. Susan Epstein, "The World Embargo on Food Exports to Iraq," Congressional Research Service, 25 September, 1990. On the US-Iraq economic relationship and sales of equipment having uses for military purposes, see WP, 8 August and 13, 16 and 17 September, 1990; LAT, 7 August, 1990. See also Paul Gigot, "A Great American Screw-Up," The National Interest, Winter 1990-1991. Stephen Bryen, former deputy undersecretary of defense who headed the Defense Technology Security Administration, fought against allowing the export of U.S products to Iraq that could be used in war. Among them were an advanced computer that might control long-range missiles which was blocked.
10. WSJ and WP, 7 February, 1990.
11. WP, 9 February, 1990; author's interviews.
12. Economist, 27 October, 1990.
13. NYT, 30 March and 9 April, 1990; WP, 30 March, 1990.
14. LAT, 9 March, 1990. An LAT editorial of 10 March, 1990, was entitled, "Why Israel Needs Those Missiles," pointing to the threat of Iraqi attack.
15. WP, 29 May, 1990; Speech text in DR, 31 May, 1990.
16. Phebe Marr, House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, 17 July, 1990.
17. WP, 13 September, 1990.
18. Interviews with U.S. officials.
19. IHT, 12 September, 1990.
20. NYT, 29 August 1990; Baker testimony to Senate, 5 September 1990.
21. Ibid. The king, caught between the US and Iraq, tried to play on his relationship with Bush, whom he called, "an old friend of mine." NYT, 17 August, 1990.
22. NYT, 12 September, 1990; Speech of 16 September--DR, 17 September, 1990. See also the text of Baker's testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 5 September 1990.
23. NYT, 28 August, 1990.
24. Text of speech, which was also based on his testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 4 September, 1990.
25. On pro-administration groups, see the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf, press release of 12 December, 1990 and "The Stakes in the Gulf," New Republic, 7-14 January, 1991. The critical remarks are from Tom Wicker, "The Wrong Strategy," NYT, 14 November, 1990.
26. Saudi Gazette, 2 October, 1990