By Barry Rubin
The eruption of a Palestinian uprising in the Gaza Strip and West Bank in December 1987 opened a new era in the Arab-Israeli conflict's history. But this event did not by itself, however, change U.S. policy. The main factor prompting a higher U.S. priority and different tactics on the peace process was a major PLO policy shift which offered an opportunity for diplomatic progress.
This distinction is extremely important. American activism is motivated not by fear of the uprising or its consequences--which have little impact on U.S. interests--but on the belief that a negotiated solution was now possible. Thus, a U.S. priority on the issue was conditioned on an apparent chance for success but in no way did U.S. interests demand urgency or a settlement at any price.
PRINCIPLES OF U.S. POLICY
The late Reagan and early Bush administrations were also guided by several other principles in formulating and implementing their Middle East policies. They were more interested in finding a workable resolution than in steering the process toward a specific, predetermined outcome. U.S. policymakers know that the only realizable settlement would be one on which both Israel and Palestinians could agree. Thus, they had no hidden agenda for achieving either what many Israelis fear--an independent PLO-led state--or what Palestinians and the PLO fear--permanent Israeli occupation or some purely Jordanian solution. U.S. policy has tried to be a successful mediator by proposing steps which both sides will find acceptable, even if not preferable.
Another aspect of U.S. thinking was an assumption that diplomacy can only succeed if the local parties make it possible through their own actions. After all, those directly engaged in the conflict would presumable benefit most from its resolution. Progress is impossible without their cooperation and willingness to make concessions. This contrasts with the view of Israeli doves and Arabs who complain that their own leaders are unable to make peace so the United States must be the catalyst or impose a settlement. While willing to help along the process and to bridge differences, U.S. policymakers know that there is little use in exerting themselves unless the local parties do so as well.
Moreover, the United States understood that any negotiated settlement must be accepted by Israel's government, which was led by the Likud. Pressure would only be efficacious in affecting close decisions, not in reversing Jerusalem's basic conception of Israel's national interest. If the United States adopts a position too contrary to that of Israel's leaders and the Likud--demanding direct Israel-PLO talks, agreeing to establish a Palestinian state--it would wreck the process. Israel is a U.S. ally and must be treated as such, for reasons of strategic interest as well as domestic political considerations. While this relationship lay partly in Israel's role in countering Soviet influence--a factor whose importance might be declining--it also discouraged ongoing threats from radical, anti-American local regimes.
In contrast, the PLO was never regarded as friendly to U.S. interests. If it wanted to be included in negotiations, it must be forced to adopt a reasonable position through U.S. pressure and demands that it meet certain conditions. These standards might be stretched to achieve and preserve a U.S.-PLO dialogue, but the United States had no intrinsic need to make concessions to the PLO. Despite the intifadah, it was the PLO--not the United States--which required a change in the status quo and must pay for it.
Changes in Arab and Soviet policies were also factored into U.S. policy. The Arab states' growing disinterest in the Arab-Israel conflict undermined the old argument--never fully accepted by U.S. policymakers even during its heyday--that a settlement along terms acceptable to the Arabs was a necessity to preserve U.S. regional interests and prevent a pro-Soviet Middle East. An inward-oriented Soviet policy and lessened Cold War competition also relieved any strategic pressure for a settlement, or even for a high U.S. priority on the Middle East. In partial recompense, the hope that Arab states or the USSR might be more helpful toward diplomacy made that route more attractive.
A step-by-step process was considered more effective than a belief in any dramatic breakthrough. The mistrust and conflicts were so great, the questions at stake so delicate, that a peace process was needed to bridge the gap by increments. Finally, the peace process's cost to the United States was very low. The effort, mostly conducted by a team of mid-level State Department officials, took few resources, little political capital, and only rarely involved the government's top level.
TRADITIONAL POLICY
The Arab-Israel conflict rarely, if ever, materially damaged U.S. interests during the 1980s. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the 1985 Jordan-PLO agreement had seemed to the Reagan Administration to provide opportunities for diplomatic efforts. Yet after failing in both situations, U.S. policymakers concluded that progress could be made only when regional forces were ready to take the necessary steps. Otherwise, the United States had neither the interest nor the ability to break the deadlock.
Experience had bred skepticism about the willingness of the PLO or Arab regimes to play a constructive role. U.S. policymakers understood the importance of continuing efforts to move forward the peace process but were realistic about the constraints on success and the limited costs of failure. U.S. officials--notably Secretary of State George Shultz--had been genuinely frustrated by efforts to negotiate seriously with the Arabs, bring the PLO into a diplomatic process, or persuade Jordan to enter talks. King Hussein would not negotiate without the PLO and could not persuade it to make enough concessions to be acceptable to the United States or Israel as an interlocutor. By 1986-87, to an unprecedented extent, leaders concluded from the political and regional situation that the United States could neither dictate terms nor unilaterally produce solutions for the Middle East's passionate rivalries and problems. Consequently, the U.S. government tended to focus on other, more pressing--or promising--problems.
Negative experiences with the region in general--the Marines in Lebanon; the Iran arms deal--and the peace process in particular--the Reagan Plan's failure--made the White House consider the area the political equivalent of quicksand. The Reagan Administration was extremely cautious about launching any new Middle East initiative, being skeptical about Arab attitudes, knowing Israel's national unity government was split, and approaching the end of its own term in office. The lack of clear opportunity or danger, coupled with the urgency of arms control, U.S.-Soviet relations, and Central America, meant that the Middle East was placed on the back burner.
Israel's Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Egyptian President Husni Mubarak backed the international conference idea in their September 1986 meeting, forcing the United States to consider the idea more seriously if not enthusiastically. In January 1987, after a trip to the region, Assistant Secretary of State for Near and South Asian Affairs Richard Murphy said he felt the beginnings of a possibility that a conference might go somewhere. When Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir met President Reagan on February 18, Reagan said Washington was prepared to consider an international conference as a way to stimulate direct talks.
In April 1987, Peres asked Shultz to support an international conference. Shultz responded in June by expressing willingness to accept Soviet participation in such a conference. In Shultz's concept, the UN secretary-general would invite Israel, Arab confrontation states--including a joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation--and the five permanent UN Security Counsel members to an opening session. There would be no veto or imposed settlement. To be represented, the PLO must either accept UN Resolution 242 or could choose non-member delegates. Peres went to Washington in September to discuss the matter further and the following month Shultz went to Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan for talks. Shultz said, "The Palestinians must be involved in the peace process if it is to mean anything. There isn't any question about that. [But] it's also true there isn't a role in the peace process for people whose tactics are violent and refuse to renounce violence, who refuse to recognize that Israel is there as a state[. Instead they must be] ready to talk and try to make peace." (1) Despite these efforts, no one expected a breakthrough. The PLO had disappointed earlier hopes that it might change its policy. The U.S. Congress, citing PLO involvement in terrorism, passed a law to close its Washington office which operated under Arab League auspices. The order was implemented in September 1987. (2) In 1986 and 1987, to an extent greater than ever before, American leaders in all political camps concluded from the regional situation and political framework that the United States could neither dictate terms nor produce magical solutions for the Middle East's passionate rivalries and problems. Some major change was needed in the region before diplomatic progress was possible.
SHULTZ AND THE INTIFADAH, November 1987-November 1988
The eruption of demonstrations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in December 1987 was given an extraordinary amount of coverage in the American media, prodding public debate and some U.S. government criticism of Israeli policy. But there was no dramatic change in U.S. policy since the same basic framework of regional politics and U.S. interests still prevailed.
There was, however, some more intense, higher-profile U.S. efforts. Shultz and other officials held extensive meetings with Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli leaders. Among the options considered were the Camp David accords, the international conference model, and attempts to implement some interim autonomy. The Administration seemed to favor the last alternative and to stress a central role for King Hussein in negotiations.
To respond to the situation and show U.S. engagement, Shultz produced a new plan, presented in January 1988, which combined elements of the Camp David accords, the Reagan plan, King Hussein's proposals, and Peres' ideas. He travelled three times to the region between February and June 1988 to promote his plan.
Shultz's proposal was to begin negotiations in the context of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 as soon as possible, between Israel and any neighbors willing to talk. Israel would also negotiate with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation on arranging for a three-year transitional period for the territories. These meetings would be interlocked with separate negotiations for a final settlement. (3)
The talks would be launched by a meeting hosted by the five UN Security Council members--the United States, USSR, Great Britain, France, and China--and attended by all parties accepting UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and renouncing violence and terrorism. The Palestinians would be represented by a joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation. But the international forum would have no veto over the result of bilateral talks. In Shultz's words, "This conference will facilitate negotiations--not interfere with them, impose a settlement, or veto agreements reached bilaterally." (4)
Essentially, Egypt, Jordan, and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres supported the plan. Shamir questioned the timetable, international forum, and territory-for-peace formula; the PLO and Syria were very critical and West Bank/Gaza Palestinians refused to meet with Shultz, apparently on orders from the PLO. Shultz was able to maintain that no party had said "no" to his proposal but, by the same token, none took it up enthusiastically. (5)
The problem with the Shultz plan stemmed not from its specific components so much as the divergent state or factional interests and mistrusts which had stymied earlier efforts. The Administration's brief remaining life made its interlocutors stall for time or, conversely, unwilling to commit themselves since there was no assurance about the continuity of U.S. policy. The prevailing feeling in Washington was that further progress would await the new Administration in January 1989. Thus, as months passed in 1988, the United States went into a waiting mode. (6)
Murphy commented in June, explaining this attitude, that while major changes were taking place elsewhere in the world, "In the Middle East, however, old attitudes prevailed and traditional illusions persist. Outdated concepts produce outdated actions and result in policies which fail to meet the needs of today." (7)
Giving his main policy statement in September 1988 address, Shultz called on Palestinians to act credibly and pursue achievable goals, "All participants must renounce violence and terrorism. Each must agree to negotiate on the accepted international basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338....Peace cannot be achieved through the creation of an independent Palestinian state or through permanent Israeli control or annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, each party is free to bring any position it chooses to the negotiating table. Israelis are free to argue for annexation. Palestinians are free to argue for independence. The United States will not support either of these positions during negotiations." President George Bush spoke in similar terms in April 1989. (8)
The initiative shifted to the regional actors, particularly the PLO. A debate in the PLO initiated by a paper distributed at the June Arab summit by Bassam Abu Sharif, led to the Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in November. PLO leaders made a major policy reevaluation because they felt it possible to make material gains from the uprising and necessary to respond to pressures for progress from the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Yasir Arafat decided that the main component of this initiative would be a serious diplomatic overture to the United States in order to achieve a bilateral dialogue and to persuade Washington to pressure Israel for concessions. (9)
Specifically, the PLO attempted to take the minimal steps needed to fulfill U.S. preconditions for holding meetings with it. Arafat had finally recognized that "nothing can get done in the region without the United States." (10) But he also saw this rapprochement as a solution in itself, believing Washington would respond by pressuring Israel to meet the PLO's demands.
Conditions for U.S. contact with the PLO were set by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in a 1975 U.S.-Israel memorandum of agreement. Kissinger promised that the United States "will not recognize or negotiate with the PLO as long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338." This memorandum--and later the Camp David accords--conditioned any party's participation at a peace conference on "the agreement of all the initial participants." Thus, Israel could veto PLO presence. In later years, presidents frequently reiterated these commitments. In 1985 Congress passed, and President Reagan signed a law codifying them and adding that the PLO had to renounce the use of terrorism before the United States would "recognize or negotiate with [it]." (11)
The U.S. strategy was to continue excluding a radical, terrorist PLO and to use its leverage to press it toward moderation. History has shown this U.S. policy to be a success, ultimately being a key factor forcing the PLO to revise its stance.
Yet while the debate was going on in the PLO, the U.S. government used several secret channels to explore whether its conditions might be used as leverage to achieve a change in PLO policy. Beginning in April and May 1988, Sweden, Egypt, the USSR, and a number of private individuals--most notably Palestinian-American Muhammad Rabie and Middle East expert William Quandt--began encouraging an attempt at rapprochement. The State Department, in its June 21 press briefing, asked whether the Abu Sharif document represented official PLO policy. Arafat sent a message signalling interest in meeting U.S. conditions for a dialogue. The United States laid out what it deemed appropriate language.
Examining the November 1988 PNC Resolution, however, the U.S. government concluded that its conditions had not yet been met since the document did not explicitly recognize Israel's right to exist and was ambiguous on accepting the two UN resolutions and on terrorism. On November 26, 1988, Shultz rejected Arafat's request for a visa to address the UN in New York because of the PLO's continued involvement in terrorism against Americans. (12)
Behind-the-scenes efforts continued, however. During November, a message giving a presidential pledge to start a dialogue if the PLO met the conditions was sent by National Security Advisor Colin Powell through a private individual meeting with PLO officials in Stockholm. Meeting with American Jewish activists there, Arafat hinted at willingness to meet this standard. In early December, Shultz said the Stockholm statement was not sufficient but again said there would be an immediate dialogue if Arafat did so.
When the United States denied Arafat a visa, the UN General Assembly voted to meet in Geneva, Switzerland. Arafat secretly pledged to the United States that he would fulfill its conditions in his December 13, 1988 address. But Arafat broke this promise and the United States found his statement unsatisfactory. To avoid losing the opportunity, Arafat went further at a press conference the next day. "Our desire for peace is strategic and not a temporary tactic," he said. He accepted U.N. Resolution 242 and recognition of Israel, while renouncing terrorism. He concluded, "We want peace...we are committed to peace, and we want to live in our Palestinian state and let others live." (13)
In a historic change--though one responding to the PLO's shift rather than revising existing policy--Shultz quickly announced the U.S. conditions were met and a U.S.-PLO dialogue began in Tunis. Meetings were held periodically, though not frequently, between U.S. Ambassador Robert Pelletreau and a PLO delegation in which the sides explained their stand. The United States warned against PLO groups' continuing terrorist acts as--in the State Department's words, "contrary to the peaceful objectives of the dialogue"--while seeking to avoid suspending the dialogue. (14) Yet the real diplomatic action lay elsewhere.
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, January 1989-December 1990
The PLO erroneously interpreted these developments, believing that the uprising, international pressure, and the regional situation would force Washington to accept the PLO's demand for a Palestinian state, and that U.S. pressure would, in turn, force Israel to accede to this result.
On the former point, commenting on Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's view that the United States held 99 percent of the cards for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arafat responded, "I say that the opposite is true, because 99 percent of the cards...are in Arab hands." On the latter issue, he stated, "Israel implements what America says" and claimed, "Peace is not in Israel's hand, but in the hand of the United States, because Israeli decisionmaking is in Washington and not in Tel Aviv." (15)
In turn, Israeli leaders were unsure about U.S. intentions, worrying about an end to the close bilateral alliance. Yet the United States had little incentive to split with Israel for the PLO's sake, a step which would any way undermine any chance of bringing along Israel in a negotiations process. U.S. pressure on Israel will come only if the American government believes there is a viable peace process which Jerusalem might find acceptable. In other words, only if the PLO makes an extremely attractive offer would the United States press Israel but, in that event, Israel would be far more willing to respond favorably. At any rate, U.S. leverage could not force Israel into taking decisions that most of its people and politicians saw as threatening their survival.
Nor was a political solution so urgent as to convince the United States it must make major concessions to the PLO. There was no prospect of regional war; Arab regimes seemed increasingly apathetic toward the issue. Nor would the USSR sacrifice improved relations with the United States or its own ambition to be a credible mediator for Arafat's sake. Thus, U.S. policy was motivated by potential opportunity for success by pursuing a gradual, cautious, mediation process.
In Israel, the Labor party was enthusiastic, the Likud was suspicious, motivated by the desire to maintain good relations with the United States and in hope that the PLO would reject the mediator's proposals. But most important was that both sides in the conflict were willing to go along for their own reasons, despite their inevitable doubts and reservations.
During the first stage, the United States continued to oppose almost all anti-Israel UN resolutions while using mild pressure, by postponing meetings with Israeli leaders, to urge Jerusalem toward coming up with a peace initiative of its own. Similarly, the United States tried to block PLO and Arab efforts to win international acceptance of a Palestinian state in the UN and its subsidiary organizations without a negotiated settlement. (16)
Clearly, Washington preferred a process under its own control. President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker generally evinced skepticism toward any international conference. "We are concerned," explained Baker, "that if we act too precipitously we might preempt promising possibilities that could surface if we adopted a more reasoned and measured approach." (17)
The basic idea was to combine two things. The first was an election in the West Bank and Gaza--first proposed by Palestinian leaders from those territories in January 1988 and taken up by Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin in October 1988. The second was a dialogue between Israel and non-PLO Palestinians from the territories in order to pave the way for peace negotiations. Bush also stressed that negotiations should take place in a context of land for peace and an eventual end to Israel's occupation.(18)
The United States thus reacted positively to Israel's election proposal of May 14. This support for Israel's position was then balanced by a gesture to the Arabs. In a speech to the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the official pro-Israel lobbying group in Washington, Baker called on Israel to give up "the unrealistic vision of a greater Israel." He asked Palestinians to "end the economic boycott. Stop the challenges to Israel's standing in international organizations. Repudiate the odious line that "Zionism is racism....Speak with one voice for peace....Amend the covenant....Reach out to Israelis and convince them of your peaceful intentions." (19)
Having in hand an Israeli offer, and having made gestures toward Palestinian political rights and eventual Israeli withdrawal from the territories--the United States now turned again to pressure the PLO to accept an elections plan. As a further gesture to the Arabs, Baker coupled his enthusiastic endorsement of Israel's plan with a call for Israel to help find a "creative solution...to enable the participation of Palestinians who do not currently reside in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," as well as those living in Israeli-annexed East Jerusalem people.
An Administration official summarized the argument: Israel has given us something serious. If you are serious, show it by allowing a dialogue between people in the territories and Israel to prepare for elections. U.S. officials lobbied for this plan with the PLO--expanding meetings to include Abu Iyad (which set off domestic criticism, because of his past involvement in terrorism, which ultimately forced a bar on further talks with him) and West Bank/Gaza Palestinians. Nonetheless, the PLO rejected Israel's proposals, demanding a prior guarantee of a Palestinian state and without suggesting a workable procedural alternative. (20)
Facing a roadblock from the PLO, U.S. policy now had to confront a challenge from Likud's hardline faction, which demanded more restrictions on Israel's plan. Baker reacted strongly, even raising the threat that he might support an international conference if other routes were blocked. Shamir reassured his political allies but made no revision in the plan. (21)
But deadlock with the PLO continued. In August, the United States criticized a tough resolution by al-Fatah's congress for "derogatory rhetoric on Israel, its tone of confrontation and violence and its preference for unrealistic principles and solutions instead of practical ideas for peace are unhelpful." (22)
At this point, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak's ten-point peace plan filled the gap. Designed to be compatible with Israel's plan (and echoing Labor Party positions), it proposed ground rules for elections and linked the balloting to a comprehensive settlement exchanging land for peace. In September, Labor Party leader (and Finance Minister) Peres went to Cairo to discuss the proposal and his faction in Israel's government endorsed it. Egypt expressed confidence--albeit a belief at odds with PLO statements--that the PLO would accept the idea. U.S. officials urged Israel to agree but, in October, the Likud members of Israel's inner cabinet voted down the Egyptian proposal.
Almost immediately, the United States came up with an additional idea, which became known as Baker's five-point plan. This proposal suggested that a U.S.-Egypt-Israel conference of foreign minister would meet to approve a Palestinian delegation and otherwise prepare for an Israel-Palestinian meeting to plan elections. Israel would have to approve the group, meaning it would not include PLO officials and would be composed primarily (if not exclusively) of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. On the other side, the United States said that Egypt was not substituting itself for the Palestinians. In other words, the PLO would have an active, if unofficial, role in approving the list and in advising (more likely, ordering) the delegation. Moreover, while the elections would be the primary topic of the Israel-Palestinian meeting, the Palestinians could raise other issues. (23)
Thus, the United States proposed the following sequence of events for the peace process:
--Israeli and Egyptian acceptance of Baker's five points.
--A meeting by U.S., Israeli, and Egyptian foreign ministers to approve a Palestinian delegation.
--An Israeli-Palestinian meeting to plan elections in the West Bank and Gaza.
--Negotiations between Israel and those elected for an interim and a final status solution.
Obtaining agreement on the Baker framework took more time. Israel (at the Likud ministers' behest) sought additional assurances over limiting the agenda and excluding the PLO from an Israel-Palestinian meeting. The United States refused to make any further changes and applied some pressure by apparently making Shamir's visit to Washington contingent on a favorable Israeli response. On November 5, Israel's cabinet voted to accept the Baker points, but only with reservations. (24)
Meanwhile, the United States was also trying to obtain a favorable response from Egypt, in the face of strong PLO objections. PLO leaders still wanted a direct and open role from the beginning (rather than using West Bank/Gaza intermediaries), while preferring an international conference. Finally, however, Egyptian pressure had some effect and, on December 6, Mubarak informed the United States that Egypt accepted Baker's points. Again, Washington chose to ignore any reservations, making no further concessions and yet refusing to believe that Israel would say 'no' as an answer. (25)
Two statements, however, led to an at least temporary breakdown of the process. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir implied that a big Israel was necessary to hold so many Soviet Jewish immigrants.
For over a year, the State Department's staff level had played a tactically brilliant match, interpreting every Israeli or PLO "Yes, but..." as a "Yes," making Israel's government an offer too much in line with its own position to refuse. But the Administration's top tier bumbled the end-game by neglecting the basic rule of diplomacy: concentrate on one's priority.
Shamir sought to stall the diplomatic process but was being pushed into a corner. One more small U.S. gesture might have maneuvered him into accepting a historic Israel-Palestinian rendezvous to plan West Bank/Gaza elections.
Instead, the White House launched a largely uncoordinated barrage against Shamir and the consensus position in Israel. First, Secretary of State James Baker confirmed support for Senator Robert Dole's call to cut aid to Israel. Second, the State Department was so set to argue that no PLO group committed any act of terrorism that it refused to examine Israeli evidence to the contrary. Third, Baker linked U.S. aid for resettling Soviet Jews to public Israeli assurances that no settlements would be begun or expanded in the West Bank or Gaza. (26)
The main incident was President George Bush's offhand remark on May 3, opposing "new settlements in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem." (27) Calling the latter neighborhoods "settlements" emphasized the ultra-sensitive Jerusalem issue, the main sticking point to Shamir's accepting the U.S. invitation. All this difficulty was over a non-issue which could easily have waited until after Shamir made his choice. Israel had already given private assurances on settlements, few immigrants want to live in the territories, and it would be quickly known if immigrant housing projects are put in the West Bank.
"Risk for peace can only be taken if Israel is confident about its security and the U.S. commitment to it," Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney explained. (28) By subverting that confidence, Washington gave Shamir an added motive to dig in. At the March 11 Israeli cabinet meeting, Shamir said he was not yet ready to make a decision. In the consequent crisis, his government fell on a no-confidence vote on March 15.
These events set the stage for future efforts in the peace process. Both sides in the conflict wanted U.S. mediation, though they often differed with its specific positions and proposals. Both were also compelled by underlying forces and trends in a serious effort toward resolution. Yet the stakes for the United States in successful mediation were much lower, since its interests were likely to be preserved whether talks succeeded or failed. Perhaps this factor, allowing more flexibility, assisted--rather than detracted from--U.S. effectiveness.
FOOTNOTES
(1) Washington Times, October 16, 1987.
(2) Washington Post, March 3, 1988.
(3) The plan is officially explained in U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Policy in the Middle East," Selected Documents No. 27, June 1988. See also Shultz's article in Washington Post, March 18, 1988 and the Washington Post, March 6, 1988.
(4) Ibid., "Statement Following Meeting with Foreign Minister Pres," May 17, 1988, p. 6.
(5) In Shultz's words, "I would say no one has signed up to our proposals but everybody wants us to keep working. So we'll keep working." Washington Post, March 12, 1988. On Egypt's support, see Washington Post, February 29, 1988. For Shultz's critique of Shamir's position, see Washington Post, March 11, 1988. Thirty senators sent a letter to Shultz expressing their dismay at Shamir's refusal to accept the land for peace formula as a basis for negotiations. See Washington Post, March 7 and 8, 1988.
(6) The Middle East peace process, Shultz said, can becoming all-consuming and "takes up all the time you've got." That combination of fascination, challenge, humanitarian zeal, and hopes for historical reknown (or even a Nobel Peace Prize) which makes the issue a Sword in the Stone by which leaders test themselves. But Shultz retained a healthy skepticism, too. "We worked very hard on the problem" even when apparently disengaged. "If I was going to go out and engage, I should have at least a 0.1 probability of accomplishing something." High-visibility can be counterproductive, "If you aren't careful when you're travelling and nothing takes place." Washington Post, January 6, 1989.
(7) Speech to Council on Foreign Relations of June 14, 1988, in U.S. Department of State, "Middle East Peace: Facing Realities and Challenges," Current Policy No. 1082. Murphy specified the challenge for Palestinians as being "to turn away from the dead-end path of violence and rejectionism and to forge an effective, forward-looking political program. Israel's existence and security are non-negotiable. But the shape and content of a future settlement are exactly what negotiations are about." After discussing the Iran-Iraq ceasefire in congressional testimony on July 27, Murphy continued, "Unfortunately, I have no comparable breakthrough or dramatic development to report on the Middle East peace process." U.S. Department of State, "Review of U.S. Policy in the Middle East," Current Policy No. 1097, p. 3.
(8) George Shultz, speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 16, 1988, "The Administration's Approach to Middle East Peacemaking," U.S. Department of State Current Policy #1104, pp. 2-3.
(9) For a detailed discussion of developments in the PLO, see Barry Rubin, Inside the PLO: Officials, Notables, and Revolutionaries (Washington Institute for Near East, Policy Focus No. 12, December 1989); The PLO's New Policy: Evolution Until Victory? (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper #13, June 1989); and The PLO--A Declaration of Independence? (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 8, November 1988).
(10) Quoted in FBIS, December 28, 1988, p. 1.
(11) Text in John Norton Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 1222.
(12) The State Department issued a list of 22 attacks by PLO elements--including Arafat's al-Fatah--since 1985. It concluded, "The PLO through certain of its elements has employed terrorism against Americans. Mr. Arafat, as chairman of the PLO condones, and lends support to such acts; he, therefore, is an accessory to such terrorism." Text is in New York Times, November 27, 1988. The U.S. government did not define the intifadah itself, demonstrations, throwing rocks at soldiers, as terrorism. But its complaints included: an Arafat security man, Abdallah abd al-Hamid Labib (Colonel Hawari) was under a 10-year sentence by a French court for the April 1986 bombing of a TWA plane in which four Americans (one an infant) died and for attacks on U.S. facilities in Europe. The PLO tried to block U.S. efforts to extradite a Hawari operative, Muhammad Rashid, from Greece for the 1982 bombing of a Pan American plane to Hawaii in which a passenger was killed and l5 were injured. Force-17, Arafat's personal security unit, reportedly claimed responsibility for an abortive March 1988 bomb attack in Jerusalem as an attempt to kill Shultz. The State Department announced that Arafat threatened terrorist attacks on American targets in retaliation for the killing of Abu Jihad in April 1988. Abu Abbas, responsible for the kidnapping and murder of Americans, was on the PLO Executive Committee.
(13) Text from Voice of the PLO (Baghdad), December 15, 1988. Translation in FBIS, December 15, 1988, p. 3. For the U.S. statement on Geneva, see New York Times, December 14, 1988. The State Department found it contained "some interesting and some positive developments. But it continued to be ambiguous on the key issues which must be clearly addressed in order for the United States to enter a substantive dialogue with the PLO....There are clearly those in the PLO who are trying to move in a constructive way."
(14) February 28, 1988 State Department briefing. The U.S. position rejected attacks on military or civilian targets inside or outside Israel. When Arafat threatened moderate Bethlehem mayor Elias Freij, Shultz complained that such a threat fit "very badly" with Arafat's rejection of terrorism. Glenn Frankel, "West Bank Mayor Drops Truce Call," Washington Post, January 4, 1989; John Goshko, "Arafat Threat Against Truce Advocates Hit," Washington Post. January 5, 1989. Shultz commented that the United States would not accept Arafat saying, "I renounce all terrorism except in Israel or the West Bank." "The U.S government," said Ambassador for Counterterrorism L. Paul Bremer III, "has always considered politically motivated attacks against noncombatants anywhere (including Israel and the occupied territories) to be terrorism." L. Paul Bremer III, "Countering Terrorism, U.S. Policy in the 1980s and 1990s," speech at George Washington University, November 22, 1988. pp. 10-11; Shultz quoted in Goshko, op. cit. See also David Ottoway, "U.S. Again Says PLO Violating Vow," Washington Post, March 1, 1989.
(15) "Year-Old Palestinian Uprising Will Continue--Arafat," Reuters, December 9, 1988; interview in al-Dustur, November 17, 1988. Translation in FBIS, November 17, 1988, p. 4; Voice of the PLO (Baghdad), January 26, 1989. Translation in FBIS, January 30, 1989, p. 6. The PNC Resolution states: "The [Israeli] authorities with the American administration behind it cannot continue their policy of refusing to respond to the international will which is today unanimous on the necessity of holding an international conference for peace in the Middle East and of enabling the Palestinian people to obtain its national rights, with its right to self-determination and national independence in the forefront." Nabil Sha'th comments, "The United States is a realistic country. The longer the uprising continues and the wider Palestinian peace movements spread or gain supporters in the world, the more the United States is forced to change its line." Al-Siyasah, January 30, 1989. Translation in FBIS, February 1, 1989, p. 4. In the words of PLO Executive Committee member Abdallah Hourani, "Let us face it, the party that decides...is neither us nor Israel. It is the two superpowers and the Security Council's permanent member states."
(16) Washington Post, May 2, 1989. In his AIPAC speech, Baker called on Palestinians to "practice constructive diplomacy, not attempts to destroy international organizations....Amend the [PLO] covenant. Translate the dialogue of violence in the intifada into a dialogue of politics and diplomacy. Violence will not work. Reach out to Israelis and convince them of your peaceful intentions. You have the most to gain from doing so and no one else can or will do it for you. Finally, understand that no one is going to 'deliver' Israel for you." Text of AIPAC speech is in U.S. Department of State, "Principles and Pragmatism: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Current Policy No. 1176.
17) New York Times, February 12 and 22, March 11, 14, and 16 1989; Washington Times, February 16, 1989; Washington Post February 24, 1989. 1989. "We can and must," said Baker, "find a way to move ahead which, at one and the same time, addresses Israel's legitimate security needs and addresses the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people,"
(18) The PLO's immediate reaction was to reject elections under occupation and especially any prior halt to the uprising. Shamir and Foreign Minister Moshe Arens first said this approach was only Rabin's personal idea. Washington Post, January 21, 1989; New York Times, March 22 and 23, and April 4, 1989.
(19) See note 16. See also New York Times, March 31 and April 7, May 24 and 28, and June 25,1989; Washington Post, May 24, 1989.
(20) Washington Post, June 29, 1989; New York Times, May 28 and June 30, 1989; Washington Times, June 8 and July 19, 1989;
(21) Carol Giacomo, Reuters, "Secretary of State Baker Toughening U.S. Attitude Toward Israel," July 11, 1989; Washington Times, July 17, 1989; Washington Post, July 18, 1989.
(22) New York Times, August 11 and 15, 1989; Washington Times, July 13 and August 11, 1989.
(23) Text of the Baker five points is in New York Times, December 7, 1989. See also Washington Post, October 7 and 11, 1989; New York Times, October 8 and 11, 1989.
(24) Washington Times, November 2, 1989; Washington Post, November 9, 1989.
(25) Robert Greenberger, "Bush Administration at Last Is Optimistic On Progress for a Middle East Peace Plan, Wall Street Journal, November 13, 1989.
(26) Testimony to the House Appropriations Committee, transcript, March 1 and 7, 1990.
(27) Text of press conference in Palm Springs, California, March 3, 1990. From the context, it seems apparent that Bush meant to say "Gaza Strip." See also Thomas Friedman, "Bush Questions Israeli Claims to East Jerusalem, Creating Uproar," New York Times, March 9, 1990.
(28) Speech to UJA Young Leadership conference, March 13, 1990.