By BARRY RUBIN
U.S. Middle East policy during 1986-87 was preoccupied with old and new problems regarding the Persian Gulf. The former issue involved the Reagan Administration's 1985-86 secret arms deals with Iran. Ostensibly intended to rebuild U.S.-Iran relations their principal object seemed to be the sale of weapons in exchange for the release of Americans who were held as hostages by pro-Iran terrorists in Lebanon. When these activities were revealed in November 1986 the result was a major national controversy seriously damaging the government.
The second development was an important escalation of U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf when the Administration allowed Kuwait to register 11 tankers under American flags. The U.S. Navy convoyed these ships to protect them from potential Iranian assault. There was an apparently accidental Iraqi attack on a U.S. naval vessel and several small-scale clashes between U.S. and Iranian forces but no major confrontation.
On the Arab-Israeli peace process, the United States took relatively little action after King Husayn's abandonment of his 1985-86 initiative. Nonetheless, the exploration of a possible international conference on the issue continued with important implications for future U.S. policy.
THE IRAN ARMS DEAL CONTROVERSY
The Reagan Administration followed a consistent position on the Iran-Iraq war from the time it took office in 1981: neutrality combined with a tilt toward Iraq. This posture avoided entanglement in the fighting, kept open the possibility of future rapprochement with Iran, and reduced the chance that Iran would be pushed into an alliance of convenience with Moscow. Some U.S. allies--including Egypt, France, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia--aided Iraq while others--notably Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey--kept channels to Iran open through overt or covert trade and diplomacy.
The pro-Iraq tilt helped prevent that country's defeat. Washington gave Baghdad trade credits and intelligence. Large amounts of modern weapons and a great deal of military training was provided throughout the 1970s and 1980s to improve the Gulf Arab monarchies' defensive capabilities. No impediment was placed on U.S. allies selling arms to Iraq while Washington made clear to all its allies--under a campaign called Operation Staunch--that it did not want them selling arms to Iran.
As President Reagan began his second term in January 1985, Iran was much on the minds of his top advisers. They had an exaggerated fear of a Soviet takeover and more rational concerns that Iran might defeat Iraq and spread Islamic revolt. The White House found particularly frustrating its inability to free American hostages held in Lebanon by Iran-backed terrorists. But the prospect of either rapprochement with Iran or serious retaliation against it seemed most unlikely.
At this unpromising moment in the spring of 1985, Iranian emissaries appeared claiming to represent moderates who wanted to overturn rivals they accused of being pro-Soviet. Thus began a complex series of talks and arms deals that would shake the Reagan Administration and American public opinion when revealed in November 1986 (1)
Some CIA and NSC officials had developed, in the first half of 1985, an excessive concern that Iran might turn toward the USSR. in 1985. When Iranians approached Israel claiming to represent moderate factions that sought to press their government toward a stance friendlier to the West, the Israelis pursued these contacts and passed them on to the United States. Reagan was informed of these initiatives and sent NSC consultant Michael Ledeen to meet Manouchir Ghorbanifar, an Iranian merchant and intermediary.
Ghorbanifar and other Iranians with whom Ledeen met, mid- levelofficials linked to Majlis speaker Rafsanjani, wanted to buy arms and indicated that American hostages would be released in exchange. The United States had placed an arms embargo against Iran in 1979 and had urged other countries not to sell that country arms in order to weaken Tehran's war effort. Nevertheless, the U.S. government gave permission to Israel to send 504 TOW anti-tank missiles. These were flown to Iran in August-September 1985. On 14 September, the date of the last shipment, Reverend Benjamin Weir, an American hostage in Lebanon, was released.
Hoping to obtain the release of all the hostages, the U.S. government now approved a shipment of 120 HAWK antiaircraft missiles to Iran in exchange for the release of all the hostages. The first 18 missiles were sent from Israel in November but, because they were not the latest model, the Iranians returned them. Meanwhile, however, matters were further complicated as Lt. Col. Oliver North, of the NSC staff, used excess money from Iranian payments to obtain and ship arms for the U.S.-backed Nicaraguan guerrillas, the "Contras."
The Administration was now split over whether to try again, with Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger opposing any further sales while National Security Adviser Admiral John Poindexter and CIA Director William Casey supporting them. Reagan signed a "Finding" authorizing the sale of more arms to Iran and the NSC took over the Administration of the program.
In February 1986, the United States sold an additional 1000 TOWS to Iran. North also supplied some intelligence designed to convince Tehran of a Soviet threat. Additional funds were generated and used for the Contras and other covert operations around the world. could be developed on this basis. But, again, Iran did not live up to the U.S. expectation that it would free all the remaining hostages.
A third round of exchanges with Iran was attempted beginning in May 1986. HAWK missile parts would be offered Iran but only on the condition that all American hostages in Lebanon be released. Robert McFarlane, the former national security adviser, travelled to Tehran with the first load of HAWKs. There he met with Iranian officials, albeit at a much lower level than he had expected. Unable to reach any agreement, he considered the mission a failure.
On 26 July, a second American hostage, Father Lawrence Jenco, was released. Although McFarlane had warned the Iranians that no further arms would be sent, the Administration again conceded and sent more HAWK parts after Jenco was freed.
In September 1986, the NSC began negotiating with a new group, the "Second Channel," apparently members of another Iranian faction linked to Prime Minister Mousavi. The American negotiators promised to press the Kuwaiti government to release 17 Shiite terrorists, members of the Iranian-backed al-Da'wa group, held for a major series of attacks in December 1983. In addition, 500 more TOWs were supplied in late October and a third hostage, David Jacobsen, was released on 2 November, 1986. North and retired General Richard Secord, the man handling the logistics for the Iran and Contra arms supply efforts, also told the Iranians that the United States would help them remove Iraqi leader President Saddam Husayn and that the United States would defend Iran against Soviet aggression. These commitments had not been approved by the President. (2)
According to the President's Special Review Board (known as the Tower Commission) that investigated the affair, the motive for all these activities and maneuvers was, "First, the U.S. government anxiously sought the release of seven U.S. citizens abducted in Beirut...held hostage by members of Hezbollah, a fundamentalist Shiite terrorist group with links to the regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini.
"Second, the U.S. government had a latent and unresolved interest in establishing ties to Iran. Few in the U.S. government doubted Iran's strategic importance or the risk of Soviet meddling in the succession crisis that might follow the death of Khomeini. For this reason, some in the U.S. government were convinced that efforts should be made to open potential channels to Iran.
"Arms transfers ultimately appeared to offer a means to achieve both the release of the hostages and a strategic opening to Iran."
In its critique of the operation, the Commission found it to have been "directly at odds" with other important policies, including the Administration's stance over terrorism and the Iran-Iraq war. The concern over hostages became the dominating factor, pushing out and even contradicting any effort to rebuild the strategic relationship between the United States and Iran. The arms sales created "an incentive for further hostage-taking [and] could only remove inhibitions on other nations from selling arms to Iran. This threatened to upset the military balance between Iran and Iraq, with consequent jeopardy to the Gulf States and the interests of the West in that region [and] rewarded a regime that clearly supported terrorism and hostage- taking. They increased the risk that the United States would be perceived, especially in the Arab world, as a creature of Israel. They suggested to other U.S. allies and friends in the region that the United States had shifted its policy in favor of Iran. They raised questions as to whether U.S. policy statements could be relied upon." And in the end, the offer had not even brought the release of the hostages. (3)
The congressional investigation made similar points and concluded:
--"The United States armed Iran, including its most radical elements, but attained neither a new relationship with that hostile regime nor a reduction in the number of American hostages.
--The arms sale did not lead to a moderation of Iranian policies....And Iran to this day sponsors actions directed against the United States in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.
--The United States opened itself to blackmail by adversaries who might reveal the secret arms sales and who, according to North, threatened to kill the hostages if the sales stopped.
--The United States undermined its credibility with friends and allies, including moderate Arab states, by its public stance of opposing arms sales to Iran while undertaking such arms sales in secret. (4)
The Administration maintained it was acting to gain influence in Iran and to help moderate factions in the country rather than merely to free hostages. On 13 November, 1986, Reagan explained in a national address, that he had sought "to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody 6-year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and subversion, and to effect the safe return of all the hostages....The United States has not swapped boatloads or planeloads of American weapons for the return of American hostages." Instead, he stated, only one planeload of arms had been sent to prove his negotiators' credentials. (5)
Indeed, this argument echoes an NSC memo written by Lt. Col Oliver North in December 1985: "Achieving a more moderate Iranian government depends on [winning] credibility as one who can `deliver' on what the Iranians need."
There was overwhelming public disapproval and the affair was widely criticized on a variety of grounds. The Administration's behavior blatantly contradicted its own stated policy on not negotiating with terrorists and on discouraging other countries from selling arms to Iran. Thus, U.S. credibility on these issues was severely damaged. Terrorists would be encouraged to take more hostages; allies would be discouraged from taking a tough line against terrorism and from refusing to provide Iran with weapons.
On strategic grounds, the policy seriously misestimated the Soviet threat to Iran, the state of the Iran-Iraq war, and the reading of U.S. interests. It might damage U.S. relations with Iraq and the Gulf Arabs. On procedural grounds, it had been amateurishly implemented and had failed to produce results. White House lines of authority and decisionmaking methods were found to be inadequate.
Constitutional objections were raised on the fact that Congress was systematically excluded. The President, it was argued, had even ordered CIA director William Casey (in January 1986) not to follow procedures for allowing the intelligence committees to pass on the covert operations. The fact that money had been diverted for the Nicaraguan Contras, contrary to congressional decisions to withhold aid from them, also seemed an act of bad faith. On legal grounds, questions were raised about the use of U.S. funds and weapons, the enrichment of private individuals, the destruction of official documents, and the authority used by individual officials in their actions.
National Security Advisor John Poindexter and NSC staff member North were ousted on 25 November following the disclosure of the diversion of funds to the Contras. The President's chief of staff, Donald Regan, resigned a few weeks later. Hearings were conducted by a specially appointed Tower Commission, a House-Senate committee, and an independent prosecutor. The congressional committee's hearings were televised and widely discussed during the summer of 1987.
Even within the executive branch there was dissent. Secretary of State Shultz had opposed the Iran arms sales policy, though not strenuously, in internal discussions. The open criticism by Undersecretary of State John Whitehead in congressional testimony was virtually unprecedented. "We in the State Department found it difficult to cope with the National Security Council's operational activities. I don't like to have to differ with my President, but I believe there is...evidence of continuing Iranian involvement with terrorists." (6)
The President himself generally rejected the more substantive criticisms. "What is driving me up the wall," he complained, "is that this wasn't a failure until the press...began to play it up. I told them that publicity could destroy this, that it could get people killed. They then went right on." (7)
The number of American hostages held by terrorists in Lebanon actually increased during the course of the secret U.S.- Iran contacts despite the release of three people in exchange for arms. This fact reinforced the assertion that concessions to terrorists only encourages them to carry out more attacks. Those still held in 1988,(with the date of their kidnapping in parantheses), were: Terry Anderson, chief Middle East correspondent for the Associated Press, and Thomas Sutherland, an administrator at the American University of Beirut (1985); Frank Reed, head of the Lebanese International School and Joseph Cicippio, deputy controller of the American University of Beirut (September 1986); Edward Tracey, an itinerant poet (October 1986); and Professors Allen Steen, Jesse Turner, and Robert Polhill (January 1987). The kidnappers of the last three threatened to kill them if Mohammed Ali Hamadeh, suspected of hijacking the TWA flight to Beirut in 1985 and murdering an American passenger, was extradited from West Germany to the United States.
Many observers felt that the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran made it harder for the United States to urge other countries to take a tough line against terrorism. U.S. public opinion, however, changed in the opposite direction. Earlier, sympathy for Americans held in Lebanon produced sentiments favoring active government efforts to obtain their release. But the Iran affair hardened popular opinion, according to polls, against making concessions to terrorists.
But the general assessment was that the President had not fully understood the issues at stake. The Iran arms deal was generally regarded as his Administration's greatest single mistake and its most costly error.
DEEPENING ENGAGEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF: REFLAGGING
The U.S. policy aimed at avoiding direct involvement in the Gulf was based both on the desire to avoid entanglement in the Iran-Iraq war and the fact that the local Arab states rejected-- and might be damaged--by an increased U.S. presence.
By 1987, however, the Administration believed that new developments warrented a change in this strategy. The main U.S. objectives in the region were: 1. to block Soviet control or influence; 2. deter Iran from attacking or fomenting Islamic fundamentalist revolutions; 3. ensure the export of oil at levels required by the United States and its allies; and 4. preserve U.S. credibility to protect Gulf security and friendly regimes.
By the summer of 1987, high U.S. officials believed that these four interests were critically endangered by Kuwait's request that Moscow lease it three ships. Although Washington had earlier been unenthusiastic about the idea of putting Kuwaiti tankers under a U.S. flag, this attitude was reversed literally overnight in the face of a possible Soviet initiative.
The sequence of events was as follows: On 1 November, 1986, Kuwait told the Gulf Cooperation Council that it was seeking international protection for its tankers. The Kuwaitis inquired about the technical requirements for re-registering tankers as U.S.-flag ships on 10 December. The first request about the possibility of reflagging came on 13 January, 1987. About the same time, the United States learned that Kuwait was discussing a similar arrangement with the Soviets.
On 23 January, Reagan restated his commitment to maintain the free flow of oil from the Gulf, as the White House informed Congress that it was requesting the sale of a squadron of F-16 fighter planes to Bahrain and of Bradley fighting vehicles to Saudi Arabia. Six days later the State Department told Kuwait that it could reregister the ships and, on 6 February, that the United States would protect them. Kuwait applied for reflagging on 2 March and was offered protection five days later. Kuwait agreed on 10 March and the Administration informed Congress of the offer on 12 March. On 2 April, Kuwait formally accepted the offer. The point of these three rounds of exchanges was first to work out the agreement between the White House and Kuwait before Congress or the U.S. public was informed.
The Administration then stated its case boldly. If the United States did not act, said National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci, our allies "will be faced with either giving in to Iranian intimidation or accepting Soviet offers of protection, and not just for shipping." Secretary of State George Shultz spoke in apocalyptic terms: "The worst thing that can happen to the United States is to be sort of pushed out of the Persian Gulf....One of the worst things in the world that could happen would be to find the Soviet Union astride the supplies of oil to the free world." President Reagan summed up, "In a word, if we don't do the job, the Soviets will." (8)
Attention was also drawn to the Gulf by a dramatic event on the night of 17 May. An Iraqi Mirage fighter plane fired an Exocet missile at the U.S. Navy guided missile frigate Stark about 70 miles northeast of Bahrain, resulting in the deaths of 37 crew members. The Iraqi Government said the attack was a mistake and the U.S. Government accepted the apology although U.S. Navy investigators were not allowed to interview the pilot.
The controversy over the reflagging issue took on both procedural and policy aspects. On the procedural level, there was criticism that the Administration did not present Congress with CIA assessments, which warned that the U.S. naval presence might lead to armed conflict, but only with the far more optimistic assessment of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
In addition, there were questions about whether congressional approval for reflagging was needed and whether the War Powers Act applied. Many senators and representatives clearly felt uncomfortable with the new Gulf policy. In the colorful words of Representative Toby Roth (Republican, Wisconsin), "At best the Persian Gulf is a snakepit and we're going to be bit again." Senator Dale Bumpers (Democrat, Arkansas) said, "There's not one member of this body that doesn't know we're courting disaster in the Persian Gulf...that a lot of sons aren't going to come back from the Persian Gulf." Even the relatively hawkish Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) said the plan "poses substantial risks" of violent confrontation with Iran. Nunn concluded that the U.S. had "vital strategic interests" in the Gulf but they were "not being substantially challenged at this time." (9)
The Administration denied the jurisdiction of the War Powers Act which required that the President report to Congress within 48 hours when US troops are in danger of hostilities. Unless Congress approved the military operations within 60 to 90 days, he must remove the troops. Many Democrats wanted to to apply the law to the situation in the Gulf but a Republican filibuster blocked action for several weeks. The Senate finally refused by a 50-41 vote to invoke the Act.
But Congress also had tremendous respect for the president's role as commander-in-chief and a great fear of appearing indifferent to a Soviet advance into such a critical region. Representative Lee Hamilton (Democrat, Indiana), chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, said: "I think the Congress would approve the President's policy in the Gulf if it was called upon to vote. Part of the reason is that there's no clear alternative." (10) Once convoying began, its members largely accepted the argument that the United States could not revoke such a public commitment.
The general public took a similar attitude. Asked if they supported a U.S. military presence in the Gulf to protect the free flow of oil, 75 per cent of those polled agreed and only 24 per cent disagreed. They were less sure of the U.S. ability to defend itself in the Gulf--46 per cent having "a great deal of confidence," 42 per cent "some confidence," and 12 per cent little or none. Asked if the United States should take all steps including the use of force to ensure an adeqate supply of oil, those queried agreed by a relatively narrow 57-39 margin. They approved of "U.S. ships escorting those reflagged oil tankers even if the U.S. ships risk being attacked," by only 53-44 per cent. (11)
On the substantive plane, many wondered whether the reflagging and convoying were either necessary or beneficial. Even Secretary of the Navy James Webb questioned, in a tough memo, whether it was wise to send a force without clear military objectives. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote, "The odd aspect of the crisis is that nothing significantly new has happened. The rate of attacks continues about at the level of last year, when no Western country--including the United States--bothered to protest, and the United States was clandestinely shipping arms to Iran. The best evidence that there is no new threat is that ship insurance rates for the Gulf have not changed appreciably in 1987." Yet despite this lack of urgency, "America thus risks being drawn into an expanded military role that cannot be decisive."(12)
A Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report in October concluded, "Over all, American policy toward the warring nations has comprised first a tilt toward Iraq, then arms sales to Iran and now an even stronger involvement on Iraq's side. This incoherent policy has been confusing to the nations of the region and debilitating to American credibility."
The Soviet threat was also arguably overstated by the Administration. Kuwait's strategy, so it seems, was to play off the superpowers against each other, avoiding dependence on either one while trying to align both of them against Iran. As they had hoped, their small gesture set off alarm bells in Washington. Soviet involvement, ran the Administration's argument, meant that the United States must rush in to prove itself the real defender of Gulf security. Even the Kuwaitis seemed bemused. "The United States' problem," commented Sulayman Majid al-Shahin, undersecretary at the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry, "is that the mentality of Hollywood tends to influence it sometimes. As for Soviet tankers, these have been quietly sailing in the Gulf for some time. So what has changed?" (13)
The second main U.S. objective was to bring the war to an end and thus reduce the possibility that the fighting might spread or that Iran could intimidate the Gulf monarchies. The United States announced, on 7 May, its willingness to support sanctions against any country refusing to cooperate in ending the war. On 20 July, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 598 calling for a total ceasefire, a withdrawal of troops to the international boundary, and a political settlement to the war. It seemed likely that another resolution, number 599, would soon be passed involving sanctions, including an arms embargo, against Iran for refusing to comply.
The Iranians, however, outmaneuvered U.S. diplomacy by pronouncing themselves ready to accept a ceasefire if the UN first found Iraq responsible for starting the war. Yet given the continued domination of Khomeini's hardline, this might only be a first step. Once negotiations began, Iran would use Iraq's war guilt as justification for its demands to overthrow of the Saddam Husayn regime. Tehran also courted Moscow, persuading the Soviets not to back a UN resolution involving sanctions. Although the Administration repeatedly stated its belief that the Soviets would support the resolution, few hopes remained after Prime Minister Gorbachev's December visit to Washington.
The third U.S. objective was the continued free flow of oil from the Gulf. The Gulf provided about 66 per cent of Japan's imported oil and 40 per cent of petroleum imported by Western Europe. Despite the numerous attacks, mainly by Iraqi planes most often against Iranian-flag boats, and the dozens of seamen killed, ships suffered relatively minor damage and a tanker glut made shipping companies eager to undertake the Gulf run. Oil prices generally fell and there was still so much petroleum available that OPEC was hard-pressed to hold down production.
By and large, reflagging Kuwaiti tankers did not greatly contribute to protecting this commerce, as U.S. warships ignored Iranian and Iraqi attacks on non-U.S. flag ships. The administration was far more successful, however, in gaining the support of Western European allies. Britain, France, Italy, and other countries followed the U.S. lead in sending naval forces to convoy tankers.
In addition, the administration stressed another objective: the need to preserve U.S. credibility. Washington's basic assumption was that the Gulf Arab states will fully cooperate with the United States as soon as they were persuaded that it was serious and consistent in protecting them. But the policy of Arab states was a largely independent variable based not on a yearning for U.S. guardianship but on the rulers' domestic and regional political requirements. They wanted the option of enjoying American help in ending the war without the risk of direct involvement in the war or providing too much assistance to the United States.
Defending the credibility argument, Richard Murphy argued in congressional testimony on 19 May, 1987, that "in the light of the Iran-Contra revelations, we had found that the leaders of the Gulf states were questioning the coherence and seriousness of US policy in the Gulf along with our reliability and staying power. We wanted to be sure the countries with which we have friendly relations--Iraq and GCC states--as well as the Soviet Union and Iran understood the firmness of our commitments." (14)
Murphy also assessed positively the actual operations in the Gulf: "To date, Iran has been careful to avoid confrontations with U.S. flag vessels when U.S. Navy vessels have been in the vicinity. U.S. Military Sealift Command and other commercial U.S. flag vessels have transited the Gulf each month under U.S. Navy escort without incident. We believe that our naval presence will continue to have this deterrent effect. Iran lacks the sophisticated aircraft and weaponry used by Iraq in the mistaken attack on the USS Stark. Moreover, we will make sure in advance that Iran knows which ships have been reflagged and are under US protection." (15)
This situation essentially continued throughout the rest of the year. The Iranians went around the Americans instead of attacking them but this use of guerrilla tactics also created problems for the United States and the Gulf states. Thus, Iran mined Kuwait's harbors and the open Gulf waters, used Silkworm missiles to strike at Kuwait, and the Revolutionary Guards used hundreds of small speedboats for stepped-up attacks on tankers flying the flags of countries not participating in the convoys.
The GCC states also continued to evince great doubt about the nature of U.S. credibility in the face of both the superpower conflict and the threat from Iran. For example, Al Wahdah (UAE) said the war must be ended "to ensure that the Gulf is not converted into a U.S. and Soviet arsenal under the pretext of protecting their military presence and strategic interests." Kuwait's Ambassador to Washington complained that "Iran is now settling its score with America at the expense of Kuwait." The GCC states were reluctant to offer the United States even minimal military facilities even in cases where the U.S. Defense Department said assistance was forthcoming. Kuwait, for example, would not allow minesweeping helicopters to take off from its territory. Nonetheless, the Administration drew comfort from the fact that the Amman Arab summit supported the measures Kuwait was taking in its defense, an implicit endorsement of the U.S. presence. (16)
The revision of the traditional GCC position opposing the presence of any U.S. warships in the Gulf was, indeed, a dramatic change brought about by the war and the fear of Iran. AWACS surveillance planes based in Saudi Arabia and P-3 reconnaissance aircraft taking off from Kuwait provided vital intelligence for the convoys. But the need to base U.S. Sea Stallion mine-hunting helicopters on ships made it harder to clear the obstacles, particularly in the upper Gulf. In private conversations, American officials and offers indicated their dissatisfaction with the level of GCC assistance.
The Administration's policy on the military aspect of the reflagging policy was provided by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger who promised the U.S. protection of ships was "not part of an open-ended unilateral American commitment to defend all nonbelligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf." Rather, "We're there to ensure that there will be the free passage of vitally important cargoes in international waters." As part of "the normal course of patrolling," U.S. military forces would "make sure of no additional minelaying, no additional concentrations that might be attempting to interfere with the free passage of navigation." Most important was to ensure "that Iran did not succeed in being dominant in the Persian Gulf by intimidating and bullying the Gulf states, and that the Soviet Union did not become in a sense, the protector of these vital supply routes." (17)
The 835-kilometer run from the mouth of the Gulf to Kuwait's oil terminal took two days. The Straits of Hormuz provided a channel that was only 35-kilometers across at its widest point, bringing ships in sight of Larak island with its Iranian refinery. Through this chokepoint flowed 7-8 million barrels of oil a day. The first convoy entered the Gulf on 22 July. The U.S. Navy force in the Gulf included 11 warships and 17 supply, patrol, and minesweeping craft, involving about 4000 personnel. An additional 16 ships, including an aircraft carrier and a battleship, crewed by about 12,000 personnel, remained outside the Straits. The cost of the operation was estimated at $15-20m per month.
The failure to bring in minesweepers--intelligence had earlier warned about the danger of Iranian-planted mines--turned out to be an embarrassing military oversight. The reflagged tanker Bridgeton was damaged by a mine on 24 July. Minesweeping ships and helicopters were then dispatched. The convoys continued, each consisting of two to four reflagged ships and two or three warships. In the speech citeed above, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated that each time ships passed through safely it was a victory.
In his mid-September speech to the UN, President Reagan called on Iran to accept "clearly and unequivocally" a ceasefire. But events soon escalated. On 21 September, nightflying U.S. helicopters sighted the Iran Ajr, an amphibious landing ship, dropping mines in the Gulf, 50 miles northeast of Bahrain in international waters. American forces attacked the ship, set it on fire, and took it into custody. Some 26 crew members were captured, 3 were dead, and 2 were missing. The mines found on the ship were displayed before the international media and the Iran Ajar was later scuttled by the United States and the crewmen returned to Iran.
In his UN speech the next day, Iran's President Khamenei charged the attack created a "grave and immediate danger." Khamenei also "objected to but did not reject" UN resolution 398 but added that "a principal problem remains punishment of the aggressor before a cease-fire can come into effect." The U.S. delegation walked out as he spoke. At the 25 September meeting of the UN Security Council, the Soviet Union blocked an Anglo- American effort to introduce a mandatory arms embargo against Iran. (17)
A second military incident took place on 8 October when U.S. helicopters sank three Iranian gunboats after they allegedly fired at a helicopter 15 miles southwest of Iran's Farsi island. At least two Iranians were killed.
After this point, the Iranians were more careful and avoided impinging on the U.S. rules of engagement even when they attacked foreign flag tankers very close to U.S. convoys. U.S. ships were permitted to fire in the event they determined an approaching ship or plane had "hostile intent."(18)
"We do not wish to get into a conflict with the United States and we say so explicitly," explained Iran's Parliamentary Speaker Rafsanjani. American policymakers concluded that this was indeed Iranian policy but also had to take into account the continuing fiery rhetoric emerging from Tehran. Thus, one Iranian statement alluded to terrorist attacks on the U.S. Marines and Embassy in Beirut, "We are ready to repeat the events of Lebanon which resulted in their flight." (20)
One point of controversy within the United States was whether armed assistance should be extended to tankers owned by U.S. companies but flying the flags of other nations whose regulations for operating ships were less strict and less expensive. One such tanker, flying a Liberian flag, was struck by an Iranian Silkworm missile in Kuwait's harbor on 15 October. The Administration repeatedly refused to extend such protection.
It was a different matter, however, on 17 October when the reflagged tanker Sea Isle City was hit off Kuwait by another Iranian Silkworm missile. The American captain was wounded. According to the orders governing the convoying, U.S. protection did not apply within Kuwait's waters. Nevertheless, the attack required some response. U.S. forces warned Iranian personnel to leave an Iranian oil platform in the Gulf being used as a communications station, and then destroyed it.
The United States thus showed its ability to convoy the 11 ships and to muster support from European allies. But the wider issues remained unresolved. A GCC leader commented, "The whole issue is out of focus when one talks about accompanying or escorting ships. The issue is the war and how to end it." A Saudiofficial complained that the United States was merely "Administering pinpricks." "Hitting small boats doesn't matter. What matters is that the American military presence, in order to be justified by us, must insure our total security by insuring Iran to total paralysis." Certainly, the United States had entered into a long commitment whose direction and results were still unclear.(21)
ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS
The idea of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is understandably attractive for American policymakers. A success in negotiating peace would bring great honor on the mediator and greatly simplify the problems of U.S. Middle East.
But the very factors that invite U.S. involvement also make it a complex, frustrating endeavor. In addition to the long, bitter and entangled conflict itself, there are three additional difficulties for U.S. mediation. First, not only are their conflicting objectives between the Arab states and Israel but also among the Arabs states themselves. Syria, for example, seemed determined to sabotage any negotiations that would give control of the West Bank to Jordan and entrench a Jordan-PLO alignment. King Husayn and Yasir Arafat, will compete to dominate any future Jordan-West Bank federation, and so on. The United States must consider whether steps to improve relations or make concessions to one side--Syria or the PLO might weaken and antagonize the U.S. allies which are their enemies. Washington is also reluctant to make concessions that might strengthen Soviet allies like Syria or the PLO or a direct Soviet role in the peace process.
Second, there are also problemmatic points in the bargaining position and goals within each state. Jordan would like to have the West Bank back but does not want to pay the price of recognizing Israel. Israel wants peace but not at the price of a PLO state that might pose a greater threat than the current situation and leading parties also seek to retain sizeable blocs of occupied territory. Arafat would like to have his own West Bank state but will neither recognize Israel nor designate stand-ins to negotiate because he fears Jordanian domination, Syrian revenge, and a split in his own ranks.
All these difficulties are interlocked. It is hard to envision a diplomatic solution without Syrian participation but almost impossible to see any framework or outcome that would please Damascus and still be acceptable to Israel, Jordan or the PLO. King Husayn cannot step forward to negotiate without Arafat and, apparently, cannot persuade the PLO leader to make enough concessions to be acceptable to the United States or Israel as an interlocutor. Consequently, the U.S. government had tended to focus on other, more pressing--or promising--areas of the world except where developments in the region itself forced action or gave hope that activism might succeed.
During the Reagan Administration's eight years in office, its Middle East policy went through five distinct phases:
From January l981 to August l982 (when it formulated a response to Israel's intervention in Lebanon), the Administration downplayed the relative importance of the Arab- Israeli conflict to concentrate on Persian Gulf security issues emerging from the Iranian revolution and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Events culminating in the Lebanon crisis made a change in focus seem both necessary and opportune.
From September l982 to May l983, the Administration pursued an activist policy aimed at settling the Lebanese civil war and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Reagan Plan proposed the establishment of a Jordanian-West Bank federation as a framework for Palestinian self-determination and suggested that, in exchange for Israel yielding territory, the Arabs would recognize Israel and agree to some border modifications to enhance its security. (See MECS 1981-82, pp. 30-33.) The U.S. efforts to end the Lebanese civil war and the Arab-Israeli conflict both failed. Syria refused to withdraw from Lebanon; the Lebanese political factions could not settle their differences. Heavy losses among the U.S. Marines created problems at home. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin, PLO leader Yasir Arafat, and Jordan's King Husayn all rejected President Reagan's Plan.
Disillusioned with these efforts, the Administration entered a third period of low activity on the Middle East which continued up to February l985. This was a natural course of policy--given the recent failures and disillusionment, and the belief that opportunities were lacking--rather than a mere response to the presidential election year. Only an initiative by regional forces, reasoned U.S. policymakers, would make American involvement worthwhile.
Such an initiative apparently appeared in the February 1985 Jordan-PLO accord that ushered in the fourth period. It suggested that two key Arab factors would cooperate in moving toward talks through a mechanism that might simultaneously implement the Jordanian option and bring PLO-approved Palestinians to negotiations. (See MECS 1984-85, pp. .)
There were still, however, major problems. Husayn and Chairman Arafat insisted on an international conference attended by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and all relevant Arab states. Washington and Jerusalem wanted direct negotiations, arguing that an all-inclusive international conference would be doomed to failure: Damascus could be expected to try to wreck the meeting by pushing the Arab side toward intransigence; while Moscow would try to seek Arab favor and undermine the moderates by raising maximalist demands.
There were other reasons for U.S. scepticism. After all, a central goal of its regional policy had been to reduce Soviet influence. The major American advantage in the superpower competition had been its monopoly in the role of mediator. President Carter's 1977 call for a Geneva conference with the United States and USSR as co-chairs had been ridiculed as a senseless unilateral concession. Nor did Washington trust Moscow's interest in peace, fearing an international conference would be turned into a propaganda meeting where the Soviets would pose as champion of the Arabs.
Nonetheless, during the six months after the February ll accord, the United States explored ways to solve the issue of Palestinian participation. The fundamental U.S. approach on the representational issue was to give the PLO a choice: Either Arafat could find some format to indicate his willingness to recognize Israel or he could designate pro-Arafat but non-PLO Palestinians to represent his interest in preliminary exchanges. After failing to assemble an acceptable joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation, Washington shifted its emphasis to gaining a compromise on the diplomatic framework for talks.
Shortly thereafter, with Israel's government expressing willingness to negotiate with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Murphy went to the Middle East to assess the situation. On a visit to Washington in late May 1985, King Husayn presented a comprehensive plan for moving the process forward. This four-stage blueprint demonstrated both the promise and weaknesses that marked the current phase of the diplomatic process:
1. The United States would meet a Jordan-Palestinian delegation including Palestinians who were not PLO members.
Israel worried that such a meeting would constitute U.S. recognition of the PLO without any commensurate Arab concession. The Israeli government wanted no PLO members involved and argued that members of the Palestine National Council (PNC) should be counted as PLO members. The Administration was willing to meet a group including even PNC members, but believed the encounter should only take place if there was a guarantee it would produce progress toward direct negotiations.
Husayn was asked to submit the names of potential Palestinian participants and he, in turn, requested a list from Arafat. The result was disappointing: the PLO's list presented in July, even after Jordanian vetting, consisted almost entirely of PLO activists. When Peres accepted two of the proposed delegates, after rejecting the rest, the PLO withdrew the two men's names. Despite its less-demanding criteria, Washington also found the PLO-Jordan list unacceptable since almost all those named were clearly mid- and top-level PLO leaders. This fact contradicted not only the U.S position--no recognition of the PLO until it expressed a willingness to recognize Israel and cease the use of terrorism--but also Husayn's own formula.
2. A U.S. meeting with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation would discuss recognition of a Palestinian right of self- determination within a confederation with Jordan. PLO leader Yasir Arafat, according to King Husayn, would then be ready to announce his willingness to recognize and negotiate with Israel by accepting UN Resolution 242.
Shultz wanted, but never obtained, PLO confirmation that Arafat would so act. Arafat's top colleagues repeatedly contradicted the king's assertion, making the United States skeptical. Just as the Administration wanted a meeting between Murphy and a Jordan-Palestinian delegation to lead toward direct negotiations, it also expected Arafat to respond with an unambiguous recognition of UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Events cast doubt on Husayn's ability to deliver on his own plan.
3. After the exchange of recognitions planned in step 2, Husayn proposed that the U.S. hold another meeting with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would include PLO officials to discuss the details for an international peace conference. As has already been indicated, however, the statements of PLO leaders and the composition of the proposed delegation seemed to eliminate step 2 entirely. The U.S. government was, in effect, asked to recognize the PLO andaccept an international conference without prior assurances of any changed PLO policy or eventuall direct negotiations.
4. An international conference of the five Security Council members plus Israel, the PLO, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria would convene to make a peace agreement. The United States, opposed to an international conference, preferred that the fourth stage be direct negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. While Washington was more flexible on permitting PLO involvement, Peres was more willing to compromise on a multilateral negotiating framework and Soviet involvement.
Israel's response to Husayn's idea came in Prime Minister Peres five-point plan on 11 June, calling for direct negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, with U.S. participation. The Security Council members would merely endorse the meeting without participating themselves. Commented Peres, "I believe that Husayn needs peace [and] that he cannot proceed without the Palestinians and, possibly in his opinion, without the PLO either."
The Administration thought the gap had narrowed considerably but was still unable to resolve the problems of the joint delegation, PLO recognition of Israel, linkage between the steps Husayn proposed, and direct negotiations even within the framework of an international conference. This required a better offer from Husayn and Arafat. As Murphy put it in late June, "If l985 is the year of opportunity, as Arab leaders say, then the Arabs themselves are going to have to make some hard decisions."
By July, the Arab failure to produce a list acceptable to either the United States or Israel was dimming hopes for success. Building on its experience with the Reagan Plan, the Administration put the onus on the regional actors for ensuring progress. Certainly, explained Murphy, there had been a "sea change" in the attitudes of some Arabs but the timing for "a big push" was "not an exclusive American calendar."
Shortly thereafter, Husayn told the UN, "We are prepared to negotiate, under appropriate auspices, with the government of Israel, promptly and directly, under the basic tenets of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338" through an international conference that would serve as an umbrella for direct talks rather than as a substitute for them. In his own October 1985 speech at the UN, Peres accepted an international forum and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. This consensus might lay a basis for future efforts.
But hopes for a breakthrough faded. Jordanian Prime Minister Zayid al-Rifa'i rejected any U.S. demand that a meeting lead to direct Arab-Israeli talks. The PLO had already reinterpreted the accord in a much more restrictive sense. Syrian pressure and terrorism against Jordan, PLO intransigence and internal conflicts and the PLO's own terrorist activity (most notably the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in October) brought the initiative to an end when King Husayn announced he was abandoning his efforts in the March 1986.
Following King Husayn's announcement that the joint communique initiative was dead, the Reagan Administration entered a fifth period that again put a low priority on the Middle East peace process. Negative experiences with the region in general--the Marines in Lebanon--and with the peace process in particular--the Reagan Plan's failure--made the White House feel that the area was a patch of quicksand. The lack of clear opportunities or clear dangers, coupled with the urgency of arms control, U.S.-Soviet relations, and Central America, meant that the Middle East was placed on the back burner.
The Reagan Administration was extremely cautious about becoming involved in a new Middle East initiative. It was skeptical about Arab attitudes, knew Israel's national unity government was itself split on the issue, and the end of its own term in power was in sight. The Iran-Contra scandal not only preoccupied the White House, but also seemed another case where involvement in the Middle East seemed inevitably tied to political disaster for it.
Both Peres, now Israel's foreign minister, and Egyptian President Husni Mubarak pressed for the international conference ideain their September 1986 meeting, forcing the United States at least to consider the idea more seriously if not enthusiastically. In January 1987, after a trip through the region, Assistant Secretary of State for Middle and South Asian Affairs Richard Murphy said he felt the beginnings of the possibility that a conference might go somewhere. Thus, on 18 February, when visiting Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir met with President Reagan, the latter said that Washington was prepared to consider an international conference as a way of stimulating direct talks. Having tried the selection of delegations first, in the joint communique effort, the Administration was now prepared to try to set up a negotiating framework first.
In April 1987, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres appealed to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to travel to the region and work on promoting an international conference. Given these efforts at encouragement and pleas from Peres, Shultz continued to consider the idea and in June stressed his willingness to accept Soviet participation in such an international conference. In Shultz's conceptions, the UN secretary-general would invite Israel, the Arab confrontation states, and the five Security Council permanent members to an opening session. There would be no veto or imposed settlement. There would be a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the PLO must either accept UN Resolution 242 to be represented or it could choose delegates. This latter point corresponded to the joint communique proposal.
Peres went to Washington in September to discuss the matter further and the following month Shultz travelled to Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan to discuss the issue and talked to these countries about plans for the peace process. He also met with the Soviet foreign minister and other officials in Moscow, although the Middle East was a secondary priority on these meetings preparatory to the coming Reagan-Gorbachev summit.
On the Palestinian aspect, Shultz stated, "The Palestinians must be involved in the peace process if it is to mean anything. There isn't any question about that. [But] it's also true there isn't a role in the peace process for people whose tactics are violent and refuse to renounce violence, who refuse to recognize that Israel is there as a state, and [instead they must be] ready to talk and try to make peace." (22)
Congress cited the PLO's involvement in terrorism in passing legislation demanding the closure of its bureau in Washington which operated under Arab League auspices. The State Department ordered that office's closing in September 1987.
During this interregnum in 1987, some problems marked U.S.- Israel relations although they were generally resolved without serious, lasting damage to the alliance. The first was the Pollard case. Jonathan Pollard was a U.S. Navy intelligence analyst arrested in November 1985 and charged, along with his wife, with passing classified information to Israel. Three Israeli officials were accused of involvement with Pollard. Israel said the activity was a rogue operation and promised assistance. The U.S. Justice Department later complained, however, that Israel did not help enough in the investigation.
On 4 June, 1986, Pollard pleaded guilty. But despite his cooperation, he was sentenced to life imprisonment on 4 March, 1987. His wife, Ann Henderson Pollard, was given a five-year sentence. The severity of the sentences was attributed by many observers to Secretary of Defense Weinberger's position that the information passed by Pollard did the gravest danger to U.S. national security. While the Pollard case extended over 18 months, the most intense publicity and the most serious bilateral tension took place in the wake of the sentencing. The greatest point of friction was the fact that Colonel Aviam Sela, named as Pollard's controller, had been promoted to command a major Israeli air force base. The U.S. government publicly criticized this action. Sela resigned a few weeks later.
A second issue was Israel's Lavie fighter plane, built in large part with U.S. aid. Again, the controversy extended over several years, with Defense Department officials arguing that the plane was too costly and unnecessary, but the most intense bilateral debate took place during the summer and autumn of 1987. After long resisting this viewpoint, for both defense and economic reasons, the Israeli cabinet finally abandoned the project. The United States promised compensation by allowing Israeli companies to bid on some U.S. defense procurement projects on terms equal to those enjoyed by NATO allies. There were also negotiations about U.S. aid to Israel for research on defenses against strategic missiles. Talks about these matters continued into 1988.
The basic U.S. attitude toward the peace process in late 1987 was that there was little hope for progress based on the Administration's experience during the preceeding years. The December Reagan-Gorbachev summit focused on arms control and did not spend any significant time on the peace process. With President Reagan's term ending in January 1989, the peace process was assigned a low priority.
The eruption of demonstrations in the Gaza Strip and soon spreading to the West Bank in December 1987, however, led to an upsurge of U.S. activity beginning in January 1988. The American media gave an extraordinary amount of coverage for the riots, prodding public debate and Government criticism of Israeli policy. On one occasion, the Administration voted for a resolution to this effect in the UN Security Council though it vetoed a number of other anti-Israel resolutions there.
Secretary of State Shultz and other State Department officials held extensive meetings with Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli leaders. Among the options for seeking diplomatic progress were the Camp David accords, the international conference model, and attempts to implement some interim autonomy measures. The Administration seemed to favor the last of these three alternatives, stressing also a central role for King Husayn in any negotiations.
To respond to the situation and show U.S. engagement, Shultz produced a new plan, presented in January 1988, which combined elements of the Camp David accords, the Reagan plan, King Husayn's proposals, and Peres's ideas. There would be negotiations beginning as soon as July over granting limited autonomy to the the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These terms would be implemented during a three-year transition period.
An international forum of the five UN Security Council members--the United States, USSR, Great Britain, France, and China--would convene to launch these talks but would have no veto over the results.
These would be followed within six months--whether or not they were complete--by peace talks, also in the context of an international event. Governing principles for this negotiation would be the exchange of "territory for peace" and UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Although Shultz did not publicly stress the nature of Palestinian representation at these meetings, he favored it to be in the form of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. He also, at times, seemed to suggest that a U.S.- Soviet co-hosted meeting might be acceptable instead of the broader five-party structure.
Essentially, Egypt, Jordan, and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres supported the plan while Israeli Prime Minister Shamir, Arafat, and the Syrians were critical. Jordan, however, began to speak about a separate Palestinian delegation while Shamir questioned the timetable, international forum, and the territory-for-peace formula. According to Shamir, the future of the territories would be determined in the peace negotiations rather than prior to them. The PLO and Syria were outspokenly critical. Shultz could maintain that no party had said "no" to his proposals but, by the same token, none took it up in a way calculated to bring progress.
The problem with the Shultz plan stemmed not from its specific components so much as the structural problems and divergent state and factional interests, and mistrusts that had stymied earlier efforts. Moreover, the uprising itself affected the stands of the different parties. The Administration's own limited life expectancy made some of its interlocutors willing to stall for time or, conversely, unwilling to commit themselves since there was no assurance about the continuity of U.S. policy. In Washington, the feeling grew that any further progress would await the arrival of a new Administration in January 1989.
CONCLUSION
Despite the inevitable vicissitudes and uncertainties of Middle East politics, then, the overall strategic and political situation in the region was not unfavorable to U.S. interests during this period. Terrorism, often aimed against Americans, hypnotized the media and caused a terrible loss in human terms but hardly destabilized the U.S.'s fundamental standing in the Middle East. Islamic fundamentalism had proved incapable of mounting successful or even serious revolutionary challenges to friendly regimes. The Lebanese civil war raged on but the nightmare of absolute Syrian domination had faded. A bloody Iran-Iraq war remained indecisive but showed no sign of spreading or endangering the Persian Gulf's oil exports. Most significant ly, the United States retained a wide variety of allies and was seen as the only plausible mediator of the Arab-Israeli conflict and protector of the Gulf Arab states, while the USSR's influence on both fronts remained extremely limited.
Another conclusion accepted by the Reagan Administration was that regional forces had to take the lead in seeking to solve their own conflicts. The United States could help this process but was unable to make a breakthrough against the resistance of those directly involved in any dispute. The Administration's experience made it somewhat disillusioned by the possibility that the PLO, Saudi Arabia, or Syria were willing to play a constructive role. U.S. policymakers understood the importance of continuing efforts to move forward the peace process but were more realistic about the constraints on success and the limited costs of failure.
While the strong U.S.-Israel relationship was reinforced by Reagan's personal thinking, a key role in this trend was also played by the power of experience. Officials like Secretary of State Shultz had been genuinely frustrated by their efforts to negotiate seriously with the Arabs, to bring the PLO into the diplomatic process, to gain assistance from Saudi Arabia, and to improve relations with states like Syria and Libya.
U.S. regional objectives continued to be defined by four principles: limit Soviet influence while maximizing its own, encouraging regional stability against the danger of war or radical revolutions, supporting and strengthening allies, and seeking the continued supply of oil at reasonable prices. While, as always, there were numerous points of danger and tension in the Middle East of l984-85, the overall picture on these four concerns was a reasonably positive one.
Some U.S. experts argue that the strong U.S.-Israel relationship constantly jeopardizes all of these policy goals. They predict imminent Marxist or fundamentalist revolt and the loss of the U.S.'s whole regional position unless policy is drastically changed and incorporates a quick solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict on traditional Arab terms. Nearly four decades' experience demonstrated this argument's fallaciousness and has led U.S. policymakers to reject it, though failing to reduce its appeal for some academics and analysts.
In fact, Washington's relative edge in the East-West competitionrested on an ability to maintain good relations with a variety of Middle Eastern countries--Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even Iraq. This situation, in turn, was based on the U.S.'s unique military, political, economic, and technological resources. Whether the issue was mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict or providing the needed training, equipment and guarantees to underpin Persian Gulf security, the United States enjoyed powerful advantages.
But in 1986-87, to an extent greater than ever before, American leaders in all political camps concluded from the regional situation and political framework that the United States could neither dictate terms nor produce magical solutions for the Middle East's passionate rivalries and problems.
FOOTNOTES
(1) The source for the breaking of the story was an article in Al-Shira, 3 November, 1986. See DR (Daily Report), 6 November, 1986, pp. I 1-3.
(2) President's Special Review Board, The Tower Commission Report, (New York, 1987), p 73. Members of the Commission were former Senator John Tower, former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft.
(3) Ibid., pp. 18-19, 63.
(4) Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the
Iran-Contra Affair (Washington 1987), p. 12.
(5) Text in Department of State, Current Policy #890, "U.S. Initiative to Iran," 13 November, 1986.
(6) Washington Times, 25 November, 1986.
(7) Washington Post, 1 December, 1986.
(8) Washington Post, 17 and 29 June, 1987.
(9) Washington Post, 3 June, 1987; 30 June, 1987; 19 September, 1987.
(10) Christopher Madison, "A Reflagged Policy," National Journal, 28 November, 1987.
(11) Washington Post, 3 June, 1987.
(12) Henry Kissinger, "Wandering in the Gulf," Washington Post, 21 June, 1987.
(13) DR, 30 June, 1987, p. J2.
(14) Text in U.S. Department of State, "International Shipping and the Iran-Iraq War," Current Policy No. 958, 19 May, 1987.
(15) Text in U.S. Department of State, "International Shipping and the Iran-Iraq War," Current Policy No. 958, May 19, 1987.
(16) DR, 20 May, 1987, p. C 6. See also Washington Post, 26 June, 1987, p. A25. Ambassador Sa'ud Nasir al-Sabah, Kuwait News Agency, 26 October, 1987 in DR 27 October, 1987, pp. 16-17; see also DR 23 June, 1987, p. J1.
(17) New York Times, 23 and 26 September, 1987.
(18) Washington Post, 18 October, 1987.
(19) See, for example, Loren Jenkins, "Iranians attack Ship Near American Convoy," Washington Post, 12 November, 1987.
(20) The Economist, 29 August, 1987; Washington Post, 13 August, 1987.
(21) Washington Post, 11 October, 1987; New York Times, 16 October, 1987.
(22) Washington Times, 16 October, 1987.
This chapter originally appeared in Ami Ayalon, Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. 11, 1987 (Westview, 1989). Reprinted with permission of the Dayan Center.