BY BARRY RUBIN
Middle East policy during the Reagan Administration's second term tackled continuing regional crises when opportunities seemed to arise for making progress. One pair of initiatives involved the Persian Gulf--the Iran arms deal and the reflagging of tankers. Two periods of diplomatic activity also emerged on the Arab-Israeli conflict--the 1985-86 diplomacy arising from the Jordan-PLO joint communique and the 1987-88 efforts following the development of a Palestinian Arab uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
THE IRAN ARMS DEAL CONTROVERSY
The Reagan Administration followed a consistent position on the Iran-Iraq war from the time it took office in 1981: official neutrality combined with a tilt toward Iraq. This posture avoided entanglement in the fighting, kept open the possibility of future rapprochement with Iran, and reduced the chance that Iran would be pushed into an alliance of convenience with Moscow. Some U.S. allies--including Egypt, France, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia--aided Iraq while others--notably Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey--kept channels to Iran open through overt or covert trade and diplomacy. The pro-Iraq tilt helped prevent that country's defeat. Washington gave Baghdad trade credits and intelligence. Large amounts of weapons and military training was provided to improve the Gulf Arab monarchies' defensive capabilities. No impediment was placed on U.S. allies selling arms to Iraq while Washington discouraged allies from selling arms to Iran.
As President Reagan began his second term in January 1985, Iran was much on his top advisers' minds. They had an exaggerated fear of a Soviet takeover and more rational concerns that Iran might defeat Iraq and spread Islamic revolt. The White House found particularly frustrating its inability to free American hostages held in Lebanon by Iran-backed terrorists. But the prospect of either rapprochement with Iran or serious retaliation against it seemed most unlikely.
At this unpromising moment in the spring of 1985, Iranian emissaries approached Israel claiming to be moderates wanting to move their country toward the West. The Israelis passed their Iranian contacts to Washington. Reagan was informed of these initiatives. NSC consultant Michael Ledeen was sent to meet Manouchir Ghorbanifar, an Iranian merchant, and mid-level officials linked to Majlis speaker Rafsanjani. The Iranians asked to buy arms and promised to arrange the release of American hostages in exchange.(1)
Despite its own arms embargo against Iran, the U.S. government gave permission to Israel to send 504 TOW anti-tank missiles to Iran in August-September 1985. On September 14, the day of the last shipment, Reverend Benjamin Weir, an American hostage in Lebanon, was freed.
Hoping to win release for all the hostages, the U.S. government next approved a shipment of 120 HAWK antiaircraft missiles to Iran. Israel sent the first 18 missiles in November but, because they were not the latest model, the Iranians returned them. Meanwhile, however, matters were further complicated as Lt. Col. Oliver North, of the NSC staff, used excess money from Iran's payments to obtain arms for the U.S.- backed Nicaraguan guerrillas, the "Contras."
The Administration was now split over whether to try again, with Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger opposing any further sales to Iran while National Security Adviser Admiral John Poindexter and CIA Director William Casey supported them. Reagan signed a "Finding" authorizing the sales; the NSC took over running the program.
In February 1986, the United States sold an additional 1000 TOWS to Iran. North also supplied intelligence designed to convince Tehran of a Soviet threat. Additional funds were generated and used for the Contras and other covert operations around the world. But, again, Iran did not live up to the U.S. expectation that it would free all the remaining hostages.
A third round of exchanges with Iran was attempted beginning in May 1986. HAWK missile parts would be offered Iran on the condition that all American hostages in Lebanon be released. Robert McFarlane, the former national security adviser, travelled to Tehran with the first load of HAWKs. There he met Iranian officials, albeit at a much lower level than he had expected. Unable to reach any agreement, he judged the mission a failure.
But hopes were reignited when, on July 26, another American hostage, Father Lawrence Jenco, was released. Although McFarlane had warned the Iranians that no further arms would be sent, the Administration again conceded and sent more HAWK parts after Jenco was freed.
In September 1986, the NSC began negotiating with a new "Second Channel," apparently members of another Iranian faction linked to Prime Minister Mousavi. The American negotiators promised to press the Kuwaiti government to release 17 imprisoned Shiite terrorists, members of the Iranian-backed al-Da'wa group, held for a series of bombings in December 1983. North and retired General Richard Secord, handling logistics for the Iran and Contra operations, also told the Iranians that the United States would help them remove Iraqi leader President Saddam Husayn and would defend Iran against Soviet aggression. These commitments had not been approved by the President. Five hundred more TOWs were supplied in late October and a third hostage, David Jacobsen, was released on November 2, 1986. (2)
The President's Special Review Board (the Tower Commission) investigating the affair, summarized the motive for these activities: "First, the U.S. government anxiously sought the release of seven U.S. citizens abducted in Beirut...held hostage by members of Hezbollah, a fundamentalist Shiite terrorist group with links to the regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini.
"Second, the U.S. government had [an] interest in establishing ties to Iran. Few in the U.S. government doubted Iran's strategic importance or the risk of Soviet meddling in the succession crisis that might follow the death of Khomeini. For this reason, some in the U.S. government were convinced that efforts should be made to open potential channels to Iran.
"Arms transfers ultimately appeared to offer a means to achieve both the release of the hostages and a strategic opening to Iran."
The Commission concluded the operation was "directly at odds" with other important policies, including the Administration's stance on terrorism and the Iran-Iraq war. The concern over hostages became the dominating factor, surpassing and even contradicting any effort to rebuild the bilateral strategic relationship. Arms sales created, "An incentive for further hostage-taking [and] could only remove inhibitions on other nations from selling arms to Iran. This threatened to upset the military balance between Iran and Iraq, with consequent jeopardy to the Gulf States and the interests of the West in that region [and] rewarded a regime that clearly supported terrorism and hostage-taking. They increased the risk that the United States would be perceived, especially in the Arab world, as a creature of Israel. They suggested to other U.S. allies and friends in the region that the United States had shifted its policy in favor of Iran. They raised questions as to whether U.S. policy statements could be relied upon." And in the end, the offer did not free the hostages. (3)
A separate congressional investigation noted:
--"The United States armed Iran, including its most radical elements, but attained neither a new relationship with that hostile regime nor a reduction in the number of American hostages.
--"The arms sale did not lead to a moderation of Iranian policies....And Iran to this day sponsors actions directed against the United States in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.
--"The United States opened itself to blackmail by adversaries who might reveal the secret arms sales and who, according to North, threatened to kill the hostages if the sales stopped.
--"The United States undermined its credibility with friends and allies, including moderate Arab states, by its public stance of opposing arms sales to Iran while undertaking such arms sales in secret." (4)
The Administration maintained it was acting to gain influence in Iran and to help moderate factions rather than merely to free hostages. On November 13, 1986, Reagan explained in a national address that he had sought "to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody 6-year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and subversion, and to effect the safe return of all the hostages....The United States has not swapped boatloads or planeloads of American weapons for the return of American hostages." Instead, he stated, only one planeload of arms had been sent to confirm his negotiators' credentials. (5)
There was overwhelming public disapproval of the affair on a variety of grounds. The Administration's behavior blatantly contradicted its own stated policy of not negotiating with terrorists and discouraging other countries from selling arms to Iran. Terrorists would be encouraged to take more hostages; allies would be discouraged from taking a tough line against terrorism and from refusing to provide Iran with weapons.
On strategic grounds, the policy seriously misestimated the Soviet threat to Iran, the state of the Iran-Iraq war, and U.S. interests. On procedural grounds, it was amateurishly implemented; White House lines of authority and decisionmaking methods were found to be inadequate. Undersecretary of State John Whitehead told a hearing, "We in the State Department found it difficult to cope with the National Security Council's operational activities." (6)
Constitutional objections were raised over the systematic exclusion of Congress from information or involvement on these decisions. The president had even ordered CIA director William Casey in January 1986 not to submit these covert operations to the congressional intelligence committees for approval. The divesion of money for the Nicaraguan Contras, contrary to Congress's refusal to permit aid, also seemed an act of bad faith. On legal grounds, questions were raised about the use of U.S. funds and weapons, the enrichment of private individuals, and the destruction of official documents.
National Security Advisor John Poindexter and NSC staff member North were ousted on November 25 following disclosure of the diversions. White House chief of staff Donald Regan resigned a few weeks later. Hearings were conducted by a specially appointed Tower Commission, a House-Senate committee, and an independent prosecutor. The congressional committee's hearings were televised and widely discussed during the summer of 1987.
The President himself rejected the more substantive criticisms. "What is driving me up the wall," he complained, "is that this wasn't a failure until the press...began to play it up. I told them that publicity could destroy this, that it could get people killed. They then went right on." (7)
The number of American hostages held by terrorists in Lebanon actually increased during the course of the secret U.S.- Iran contacts despite the release of three people in exchange for arms. This fact reinforced the assertion that concessions to terrorists only encouraged them to carry out more attacks. Those still held in 1988, (with the date of kidnapping in parantheses), were: Terry Anderson, chief Middle East correspondent for the Associated Press, and Thomas Sutherland, an administrator at the American University of Beirut (1985); Frank Reed, head of the Lebanese International School and Joseph Cicippio, deputy controller of the American University of Beirut (September 1986); Edward Tracey, an itinerant poet (October 1986); and Professors Allen Steen, Jesse Turner, and Robert Polhill (January 1987).
Many observers felt that the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran made it harder for the United States to urge other countries to take a tough line against terrorism. Earlier, sympathy for Americans held in Lebanon produced widespread approval for active government efforts to obtain their release. But the Iran affair hardened popular opinion, according to polls, against making concessions to terrorists.
The Iran-Contra scandal was generally regarded as the Reagan Administration's most colitically costly error.
DEEPENING ENGAGEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF: REFLAGGING
The U.S. policy aimed at avoiding direct involvement in the Gulf was based both on the desire to avoid entanglement in the Iran-Iraq war and the fact that the local Arab states rejected-- and might be damaged--by an increased U.S. presence.
By 1987, however, the Administration believed that new developments warrented a change in this strategy. The main U.S. objectives in the region were: 1.To block Soviet control or influence; 2.Deter Iran from attacking or fomenting Islamic fundamentalist revolutions; 3.Ensure the export of oil at levels required by the United States and its allies; and 4. To protect Gulf security and friendly regimes.
By the summer of 1987, high U.S. officials believed that these four interests were critically endangered by Kuwait's request that Moscow lease it three ships. Washington reversed its earlier lack of enthusiasm about putting Kuwaiti tankers under a U.S. flag.
The sequence of events was as follows: On November 1, 1986, Kuwait told the Gulf Cooperation Council that it would seek international protection for its tankers. The Kuwaitis inquired about the technical requirements for re-registering tankers as U.S.-flag ships on December 10. The first query on possible reflagging came on January 13, 1987. About the same time, the United States learned that Kuwait was discussing a similar arrangement with the Soviets.
On January 23, Reagan restated his commitment to maintain the free flow of oil from the Gulf as the White House informed Congress on a propose sale of a squadron of F-16 fighter planes to Bahrain and of Bradley fighting vehicles to Saudi Arabia. Six days later the State Department told Kuwait that it could reregister the ships and, on February 6, that the United States would protect them. Kuwait applied for reflagging on March 2 and was offered protection five days later. Kuwait agreed on March 10 and the Administration informed Congress of the offer on March 12. On April 2, Kuwait formally accepted the offer. The point of these three rounds of exchanges was to work out the agreement between the White House and Kuwait before Congress or the U.S. public was informed.
The Administration then stated its case boldly. If the United States did not act, said National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci, our allies "will be faced with either giving in to Iranian intimidation or accepting Soviet offers of protection, and not just for shipping." Secretary of State George Shultz spoke in apocalyptic terms: "The worst thing that can happen to the United States is to be sort of pushed out of the Persian Gulf....One of the worst things in the world that could happen would be to find the Soviet Union astride the supplies of oil to the free world." President Reagan summed up, "In a word, if we don't do the job, the Soviets will." (8)
Attention was also drawn to the Gulf by a dramatic event on the night of May 17. An Iraqi Mirage fighter plane fired an Exocet missile into the U.S. Navy guided missile frigate Stark about 70 miles northeast of Bahrain, resulting in the deaths of 37 crew members. The Iraqi Government said the attack was a mistake and the U.S. Government accepted an apology.
The controversy over the reflagging issue took on both procedural and policy aspects. On the former level, there was criticism that the Administration did not present Congress with CIA assessments warning that a U.S. naval presence might lead to armed conflict, but only with the Defense Intelligence Agency's far more optimistic assessment.
In addition, there were questions about whether congressional approval for reflagging was needed and whether the War Powers Act applied. Many legislators felt uncomfortable with the new Gulf policy. In the colorful words of Representative Toby Roth (Republican, Wisconsin), "At best the Persian Gulf is a snakepit and we're going to be bit again." Senator Dale Bumpers (Democrat, Arkansas) said, "There's not one member of this body that doesn't know we're courting disaster...that a lot of sons aren't going to come back from the Persian Gulf." Even the relatively hawkish Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) said the plan "poses substantial risks" of violent confrontation with Iran. Nunn concluded that the U.S. had "vital strategic interests" in the Gulf but they were "not being substantially challenged at this time." (9)
The Administration denied the jurisdiction of the War Powers Act which required that the President report to Congress within 48 hours when US troops are in danger of hostilities. He must remove the troops unless Congress approved the military operations within 60 to 90 days. Many Democrats wanted to to apply the law to the situation in the Gulf. A Republican filibuster blocked action for several weeks and the Senate finally refused by a 50-41 vote to invoke the Act.
But Congress also had tremendous respect for the president's role as commander-in-chief and fear of appearing indifferent to a Soviet advance in such a critical region. Representative Lee Hamilton (Democrat, Indiana), chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, said: "I think the Congress would approve the President's policy in the Gulf if it was called upon to vote. Part of the reason is that there's no clear alternative." (10) Once convoying began, its members largely accepted the argument that the United States could not revoke such a commitment.
The general public took a similar attitude. Asked if they supported a U.S. military presence in the Gulf to protect the free flow of oil, 75 per cent of those polled agreed and only 24 per cent disagreed. They were less sure of the U.S. ability to defend itself in the Gulf--46 per cent having "a great deal of confidence," 42 per cent "some confidence," and 12 per cent little or none. Asked if the United States should take all steps including the use of force to ensure an adeqate supply of oil, those queried agreed by a 57-39 margin. They approved of "U.S. ships escorting those reflagged oil tankers even if the U.S. ships risk being attacked," by only 53-44 per cent. (11)
On the substantive plane, many wondered whether the reflagging and convoying were necessary or beneficial. Even Secretary of the Navy James Webb questioned, in a tough memo, whether it was wise to send a force without clear military objectives. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote, "The odd aspect of the crisis is that nothing significantly new has happened. The rate of attacks continues about at the level of last year, when no Western country--including the United States--bothered to protest, and the United States was clandestinely shipping arms to Iran. The best evidence that there is no new threat is that ship insurance rates for the Gulf have not changed appreciably in 1987." Yet despite this lack of urgency, "America thus risks being drawn into an expanded military role that cannot be decisive." (12)
The Soviet threat was also arguably overstated by the Administration. Kuwait's apparent strategy was to play off the superpowers against each other, avoiding dependence on either one while trying to align both of them against Iran. When their small gesture set off alarm bells in Washington, even the Kuwaitis seemed bemused. "The United States' problem," commented Sulayman Majid al-Shahin, undersecretary at the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry, "is that the mentality of Hollywood tends to influence it sometimes. As for Soviet tankers, these have been quietly sailing in the Gulf for some time. So what has changed?" (13)
The second main U.S. objective was to bring the war to an end and thus reduce the possibility that the fighting might spread or that Iran could intimidate the Gulf monarchies. The United States announced, on May 7, willingness to support sanctions against any country refusing to cooperate in ending the war. On July 20, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 598 calling for a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops to the international boundary, and a political settlement to the war. It seemed likely that another resolution would soon be passed involving sanctions, including an arms embargo, against Iran for refusing to comply.
The Iranians, however, outmaneuvered U.S. diplomacy by pronouncing themselves ready to accept a ceasefire if the UN first found Iraq responsible for starting the war. Yet given the continued domination of Khomeini's hardline, this might only be a first step. Once negotiations began, Iran would use Iraq's war guilt as justification for demanding the Saddam Husayn regime's outser. Tehran also courted Moscow, persuading the Soviets not to support sanctions. Although the Administration repeatedly stated its belief that the Soviets would support the resolution, few hopes remained after Prime Minister Gorbachev's December visit to Washington.
The third U.S. objective was the continued free flow of oil from the Gulf which provided about 66 per cent of Japan's imported oil and 40 per cent of Western Europe's petroleum. Despite the numerous attacks, mainly by Iraqi planes most often against Iranian-flag boats, and the dozens of seamen killed, ships suffered relatively minor damage and a tanker glut made shipping companies eager to undertake the Gulf run. Oil prices generally fell and there was still so much petroleum available that OPEC was hard-pressed to hold down production.
By and large, reflagging Kuwaiti tankers did not greatly contribute to protecting this commerce since U.S. warships ignored Iranian and Iraqi attacks on non-U.S. flag ships. The administration was far more successful, however, in gaining support from West European allies. Britain, France, Italy, and other countries followed the U.S. lead by sending naval forces to convoy tankers.
Finally, the administration stressed the need to preserve U.S. credibility. Washington's basic assumption was that the Gulf Arab states would fully cooperate with the United States when persuaded that it was serious and consistent in protecting them. But the Arab states' policy was largely an independent variable based not on a yearning for U.S. guardianship but on the rulers' domestic and regional political requirements. They wanted American help in ending the war without providing too much assistance to the United States or risking their own direct involvement in the war.
Defending the credibility argument, Murphy argued in May 1987 congressional testimony that "in the light of the Iran- Contra revelations, we had found that the leaders of the Gulf states were questioning the coherence and seriousness of US policy in the Gulf along with our reliability and staying power. We wanted to be sure the countries with which we have friendly relations--Iraq and GCC states--as well as the Soviet Union and Iran understood the firmness of our commitments." (14)
Murphy also assessed positively the actual operations in the Gulf: "To date, Iran has been careful to avoid confrontations with U.S. flag vessels when U.S. Navy vessels have been in the vicinity. U.S. Military Sealift Command and other commercial U.S. flag vessels have transited the Gulf each month under U.S. Navy escort without incident. We believe that our naval presence will continue to have this deterrent effect. Iran lacks the sophisticated aircraft and weaponry used by Iraq in the mistaken attack on the USS Stark. Moreover, we will make sure in advance that Iran knows which ships have been reflagged and are under US protection." (15)
This situation continued as the Iranians went around the Americans instead of attacking them, mined Kuwaiti and Gulf waters, used Silkworm missiles to strike at Kuwait and hundreds of small speedboats for stepped-up attacks on tankers flying the flags of countries not participating in the convoys.
The GCC states also continued to evince great doubt about the nature of U.S. credibility in the face of both the superpower conflict and the threat from Iran. For example, Al Wahdah (UAE) said the war must be ended "to ensure that the Gulf is not converted into a U.S. and Soviet arsenal under the pretext of protecting their military presence and strategic interests." Kuwait's Ambassador to Washington complained that "Iran is now settling its score with America at the expense of Kuwait." The GCC states were reluctant to offer the United States minimal military facilities even in cases where the U.S. Defense Department said assistance was forthcoming. Kuwait, for example, would not allow minesweeping helicopters to take off from its territory. Nonetheless, the Administration drew comfort from the fact that the 1987 Amman Arab summit supported the measures Kuwait was taking in its defense, an implicit endorsement of the U.S. presence. (16)
TheGCC's revision of its traditional position opposingthe presence of any U.S. warships in the Gulf was, indeed, a dramatic change brought about by the war and fear of Iran. AWACS surveillance planes based in Saudi Arabia and P-3 reconnaissance aircraft taking off from Kuwait provided vital intelligence for the convoys. But the need to base U.S. Sea Stallion mine-hunting helicopters on ships made it harder to clear the obstacles, particularly in the upper Gulf. In private conversations, American officials and offers indicated their dissatisfaction with the level of GCC assistance.
The Administration's official view, provided by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, promised the U.S. protection of ships was "not part of an open-ended unilateral American commitment to defend all nonbelligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf." Rather, "We're there to ensure that there will be the free passage of vitally important cargoes in international waters." As part of "the normal course of patrolling," U.S. military forces would "make sure of no additional minelaying" or attempts "to interfere with the free passage of navigation." Most important was to ensure "that Iran did not succeed in being dominant in the Persian Gulf by intimidating and bullying the Gulf states, and that the Soviet Union did not become in a sense, the protector of these vital supply routes." (17)
The first convoy entered the Gulf on July 22. The U.S. Navy force in the Gulf included 11 warships and 17 supply, patrol, or minesweeping craft with about 4000 personnel. Another 16 ships, including an aircraft carrier and battleship with 12,000 crew members, remained outside the Straits. The operation cost an estimated $15-20 million per month.
In a mid-September speech to the United Nations, Reagan called on Iran to accept "clearly and unequivocally" a ceasefire. At the September 25 UN Security Council meeting, the Soviet Union blocked an Anglo-American effort to introduce a mandatory arms embargo against Iran. (17) Four days earlier, U.S. helicopters sighted the Iran Ajr, an amphibious landing ship, dropping mines in the Gulf, 50 miles northeast of Bahrain in international waters. American forces attacked and seized the ship. Some 26 crew members were captured and later returned to Iran. Three Iranians were dead and two were missing. A second military incident took place on October 8 when U.S. helicopters sank three Iranian gunboats after they allegedly fired at a helicopter 15 miles southwest of Iran's Farsi island. At least two Iranians were killed. Thereafter, the Iranians were more careful to avoid impinging on the U.S. rules of engagement that permitted ships to fire if they determined an approaching ship or plane had "hostile intent." (18)
"We do not wish to get into a conflict with the United States and we say so explicitly," explained Iran's Parliamentary Speaker Rafsanjani. American policymakers concluded that this was indeed Iranian policy but also had to take into account the continuing fiery rhetoric emerging from Tehran. Thus, one Iranian statement alluded to terrorist attacks on the U.S. Marines and Embassy in Beirut, "We are ready to repeat the events of Lebanon which resulted in their flight." (20)
On October 17 the reflagged tanker Sea Isle City was hit off Kuwait by an Iranian Silkworm missile. The American captain was wounded. According to orders governing the convoying, U.S. protection did not apply within Kuwait's waters. Nevertheless, the attack required some response. U.S. forces warned Iranian personnel to leave an Iranian oil platform in the Gulf being used as a communications station and then destroyed it.
The United States thus showed its ability to convoy the 11 ships and to muster support from European allies. But the wider problems remained unresolved. A GCC leader commented, "The whole issue is out of focus when one talks about accompanying or escorting ships. The issue is the war and how to end it." A Saudi official complained that the United States was merely "administering pinpricks." "Hitting small boats doesn't matter. What matters is that the American military presence, in order to be justified by us, must insure our total security by insuring Iran to total paralysis." Certainly, the United States had entered into a long commitment whose direction and results were still unclear. (21)
ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS
The idea of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is understandably attractive for U.S. policymakers. A success in negotiating peace would bring great honor on the mediator and simplify the problems for U.S. Middle East policy. U.S attempts to mediate--and failure to resolve--the Arab-Israeli conflict might seem to produce acrimonious reactions in the area, yet it was still universally acknowledged that only Washington could foster any peaceful settlement.
But the very factors that invite U.S. involvement also make it a complex, frustrating endeavor. In addition to the long, bitter and entangled conflict itself, there are three additional difficulties for U.S. mediation. First, not only do the Arab states and Israel have conflicting objectives but so do the Arabs states themselves. Syria is determined to sabotage negotiations that would allow a Jordanian role on the West Bank or the entrenchment of an independent PLO. King Husayn and Yasir Arafat compete to dominate any future Jordan-West Bank federation. The United States must consider whether concessions to Syria or the PLO--its own enemies and Soviet allies--might weaken U.S. allies and strengthen Moscow's regional position.
Second, there are conflicts within each state over its bargaining position and goals. Jordan would like to have the West Bank back but does not want to pay the price of recognizing Israel. Israel wants peace but not at the price of a PLO state that might be more threatening than the current situation, while the Likud prefers to retain the territory. Arafat would like to have his own West Bank state but will neither recognize Israel nor designate stand-ins for talks because he fears Jordanian domination, Syrian revenge, and a split in his own ranks.
All these difficulties are interlocked. It is hard to envision a diplomatic solution without Syrian participation but almost impossible to see any framework or outcome that would please Damascus and still be acceptable to Israel, Jordan or the PLO. King Husayn cannot step forward to negotiate without Arafat and, apparently, cannot persuade the PLO leader to make concessions either. Consequently, the U.S. government had tended to focus on other, more pressing--or promising--areas of the world except when regional developments forced action or gave hope that activism might succeed.
During the Reagan Administration's eight years in office, its Middle East policy went through six distinct phases:
From January l981 to August l982, the Administration downplayed the Arab-Israeli conflict's relative importance to concentrate on Persian Gulf security issues emerging from the Iranian revolution and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Events culminating in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon made a change in focus both necessary and potentially opportune.
From September l982 to May l983, the Administration pursued an activist policy aimed at settling the Lebanese civil war and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Reagan Plan proposed a Jordanian- West Bank federation as a framework for Palestinian self- determination and suggested Israel yield territory in exchange for Arab recognition and some border modifications. These U.S. efforts failed. Syria refused to withdraw from Lebanon; Lebanese political factions could not resolve their differences. U.S. Marines in Beirut were killed, provoking domestic criticism. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin, PLO leader Arafat, and Jordan's King Husayn rejected Reagan's plan.
Disillusioned with these efforts, the Administration entered a third period of low activity until February l985. This was a natural course given the recent failures and disillusionment. Only an initiative by regional forces, reasoned U.S. policymakers, would make American involvement worthwhile.
That event came when the February 1985 Jordan-PLO accord ushered in a fourth period. Washington sought formation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation willing to deal with Israel, creating a basis for direct negotiations that would produce a solution within the context of the Reagan Plan. After King Husayn's abandoned this effort in April 1986, another lull ensued until a Palestinian Arab uprising in the territories began a sixth era in November 1987, continuing into the Administration's final year.
The 1985 Jordan-PLO communique called for an exchange of "land for peace," the acceptance of conditions "cited in UN resolutions," total Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Palestinian "right to self-determination" but only in the framework of a Jordan-Palestine confederation, and a joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation to an international conference.
As soon as the communique was announced, however, individual PLO leaders and the PLO Executive Committee demanded amendments including: a joint delegation of all Arab governments plus the PLO, independence for a PLO-led Palestinian
state, criticism of the "land for peace" formula, refusal to recognize Israel or to accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and unwillingness to cede representation (even temporarily) to non- PLO Palestinians (even those willing to follow Arafat's orders).
Thus, the U.S. had to explore whether the PLO might really accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338, negotiate seriously with Israel, abandon the use of terrorism, and agree to recognition of Israel. Arafat seemed too restricted by internal PLO conflicts, Syrian threats, fear of Jordanian control, ideological obsessions, and lack of control over his own organization to take such a major step. He was either seeking U.S. recognition without making concomitant concessions or even seeking a stronger position--a military presence in Jordan or control over the West Bank--from which to continue a long-term revolutionary and terrorist campaign against Israel.
Successive U.S. Administrations had preferred a Jordanian option precisely because they deemed an independent Palestinian state under Arafat's leadership as contrary to U.S. national interests. Policymakers believed it would not be a stabilizing force in the region and that its revanchist ambitions against Israel or Jordan might bring further, chronic violence The PLO's long alliance with the USSR and the radical stance of many of its leaders would threaten U.S. interests.
Nonetheless, the United States tried to solve the issue of Palestinian participation by giving the PLO a choice: Either Arafat could find a way to indicate his willingness to recognize Israel or he could designate pro-Arafat, but non-PLO, Palestinians to represent his interest in preliminary exchanges.
Hussein and Arafat insisted on an international conference including the UN Security Council's members and all relevant Arab states as the framework for negotiations. Washington and Jerusalem wanted direct negotiations, arguing that an international conference would be doomed to failure. Damascus could be expected to wreck it by pushing the Arab side toward intransigence. Moscow could seek Arab favor and undermine moderates by raising maximalist demands. These considerations had led the Carter and Reagan administrations to abandon a U.S.- USSR-chaired Geneva meeting. Since the major asset for a U.S. policy of reducing Soviet influence was Washington's monopoly as mediator, bringing in Moscow seemed counterproductive.
On a May 1985 visit to Washington, King Husayn presented a comprehensive plan for advancing the process, a blueprint demonstrating both promise and weaknesses:
1. The United States would meet a Jordan-Palestinian delegation including Palestinians who were not PLO members but who would take orders from the PLO.
Israel worried that such a step would constitute U.S. recognition of the PLO without any commensurate Arab concession. Israel wanted no PLO members involved and argued that members of the Palestine National Council (PNC) should be counted as such. The Administration was willing to meet a group including even PNC members but only if there was a guarantee it would produce progress toward direct negotiations.
Asked to submit the names of potential Palestinian participants, Husayn requested a list from Arafat. The PLO's response in July was disappointing, consisting--even after Jordanian vetting--almost entirely of PLO activists. When Peres accepted two proposed delegates, the PLO withdrew their names. Washington, too, found the PLO-Jordan list contrary to its positiono and even to Husayn's formula.
2. After a U.S. meeting with a joint delegation, Washington would accept Palestinian self-determination through a confederation with Jordan. Arafat, according to Husayn, would then announce his willingness to recognize and negotiate with Israel by accepting UN Resolution 242. The United States could never obtain PLO confirmation of Husayn's claim. Arafat's top colleagues repeatedly contradicted the king's assertion, making Washington skeptical about PLO intentions and Husayn's ability to deliver on his own plan.
3. After the exchange of recognitions, Husayn proposed another U.S. meeting with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would include PLO officials to discuss the details for an international peace conference. But since steps 1 and 2 appeared unlikely to work, the U.S. government was, in effect, asked to recognize the PLO and accept an international conference without prior assurances of any new PLO policy or eventual direct negotiations.
4. An international conference of the five Security Council members plus Israel, the PLO, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria would convene to make a peace agreement. The United States, opposed to an international conference, preferred that the fourth stage be direct talks between Israel and a Jordanian- Palestinian delegation.
Responding to Husayn's ideas, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres issued a plan on June 11 for a Jordanian-Palestinian- Israeli summit with U.S. participation. The Security Council members would endorse it without participating themselves. The Administration thought the gap had narrowed considerably but was still unable to resolve the problems of the joint delegation, PLO recognition of Israel, linkage between Husayn's proposed steps, and direct negotiations even within an international conference. This required a better offer from Husayn and Arafat but none was forthcoming.
The Administration's hopes were pinned on Hussein's September visit to the United States. It proposed a large arms sale to Jordan if the king gave assurances on his diplomatic intentions persuasive to Congress. Husayn made clear his willingness to accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and to negotiate with Israel at an international conference that would be an umbrella rather than a substitute for direct talks. But Hussein's visit disappointed the Administration. He brought no new ideas for resolving the impasse on the joint delegation and would not publicly end the state of belligerency with Israel. The peace process seemed stalled after eight months' intensive efforts. When Congress postponed considering an arms sale, the White House did not forcefully object.
Meanwhile, a dramatic series of events involving terrorism further stymied an already staggering peace process. In June l985, Shiite fundamentalist hijackers seized a U.S. airliner and took it to Beirut. An American passenger was murdered and 39 others were held for l7 days. The hijackers demanded that Israel free Shiite militiamen and terrorists captured in southern Lebanon. But Israel was already in the process of releasing them and the real issue seemed a battle among Shiite groups to claim the credit. While officially continuing to refuse concessions to terrorists, the Administration urged Israel to release the prisoners. The hostages were then let go.
The crisis showed the nation's fixation with terrorism, as media coverage reached unprecedented proportions and polls showed that most Americans wanted the hostages freed even if this required giving in to terrorist demands.
The U.S. response to Libyan support for terrorism was more direct. Libya was implicated in the December 1985 machinegunning of passengers at the Rome and Vienna airports. In March 1986, Libyan forces attacked U.S. naval maneuvers in the Gulf of Sirte. In an ensuing confrontation, Libyan patrol boats were sunk and onshore radar installations were destroyed. After a bomb on a TWA plane killed four Americans over Greece and one in a West Berlin discotheque killed a U.S. soldier, the Reagan Administration retaliated by bombing Libyan installations and Qadhafi's personal compound in April 1986.
A series of terrorist attacks in September-October l985 had a direct impact on the peace process. After the brutal September 25 murder of three Israelis in Cyprus, Israeli planes bombed PLO offices in Tunisia on October l. Six days later, terrorists from a PLO group hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, murdering an elderly, crippled American. U.S. fighter planes later forced an Egyptian airliner carrying the terrorists to land in Italy where the three men were tried and convicted.
The Achille Lauro affair made the PLO seem less attractive as a negotiating partner and less credible as a moderate force. A planned meeting between a joint Jordan-PLO delegation and Great Britain, which seemed like a dress rehearsal for the long- awaited U.S. meeting, fell through after the PLO refused to authorize them to sign a statement implying willingness to recognize Israel.
Chances for a breakthrough dimmed considerably, even after Peres conceded that direct talks could be held in conjunction with an international forum and hinted that he would accept PLO delegates if that group's policy changed.
Following King Husayn's announcement that the joint communique initiative was dead, the Administration entered a fifth period. Negative experiences with the region in general and with the peace process in particular made the White House feel that the area was a patch of quicksand. The lack of clear opportunities or clear dangers, coupled with the urgency of other issues pushed the Middle East onto the back burner.
Both Peres, now Israel's foreign minister, and Egyptian President Husni Mubarak pressed for the international conference idea, forcing the United States to consider the idea more seriously if not enthusiastically. Thus, beginning in February 1987, Reagan and Shultz spoke of considering an international conference as a way to stimulate direct talks. In June, Shultz agreed to invite Soviet participation in such a project. He suggested the UN secretary-general would invite Israel, the Arab confrontation states, a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, and the Security Council's permanent members to an opening session. There would be no veto or imposed settlement.
On the Palestinian aspect, Shultz stated, "The Palestinians must be involved in the peace process if it is to mean anything. There isn't any question about that. [But] it's also true there isn't a role in the peace process for people whose tactics are violent and refuse to renounce violence, who refuse to recognize that Israel is there as a state, and [instead they must be] ready to talk and try to make peace." (22)
The eruption of demonstrations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank in November 1987 led to an upsurge of U.S. activity. Shultz's new plan, presented in January 1988, combined elements of the Camp David accords, the Reagan plan, King Husayn's proposals, and Peres's ideas. There would be negotiations beginning as soon as July over granting limited autonomy to the the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These terms would be implemented during a three-year transition period.
An international forum of the five UN Security Council members--the United States, USSR, Great Britain, France, and China--would convene to launch these talks but would have no veto over the results.
These would be followed within six months--whether or not they were complete--by peace talks, also in the context of an international event. Governing principles for this negotiation would be the exchange of "territory for peace" and UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Although Shultz did not publicly stress the nature of Palestinian representation at these meetings, he favored it to be in the form of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. He also, at times, seemed to suggest that a U.S.- Soviet co-hosted meeting might be acceptable instead of the broader five-party structure.
Essentially, Egypt, Jordan, and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres supported the plan while Israeli Prime Minister Shamir, Arafat, and the Syrians were critical. Jordan, however, began to speak about a separate Palestinian delegation while Shamir questioned the timetable, international forum, and the territory-for-peace formula. According to Shamir, the future of the territories would be determined in the peace negotiations rather than prior to them.
The problem with the Shultz plan stemmed not from its specific components so much as the structural problems and divergent state and factional interests, and mistrusts that had stymied earlier efforts. Moreover, the uprising itself affected the stands of the different parties. The Administration's own limited life expectancy made some of its interlocutors willing to stall for time or, conversely, unwilling to commit themselves since there was no assurance about the continuity of U.S. policy.
CONCLUSION
Despite the inevitable vicissitudes and uncertainties of Middle East politics, then, the overall strategic and political situation in the region was not unfavorable to U.S. interests during this period. Terrorism, often aimed against Americans, hypnotized the media and caused a terrible loss in human terms but hardly destabilized the U.S.'s fundamental standing in the Middle East. Islamic fundamentalism had proved incapable of mounting successful or even serious revolutionary challenges to friendly regimes. The Lebanese civil war raged on but the nightmare of absolute Syrian domination had faded. A bloody Iran-Iraq war remained indecisive but showed no sign of spreading or endangering the Persian Gulf's oil exports. Most significant ly, the United States retained a wide variety of allies and was seen as the only plausible mediator of the Arab-Israeli conflict and protector of the Gulf Arab states, while the USSR's influence on both fronts remained extremely limited.
Another conclusion accepted by the Reagan Administration was that regional forces had to take the lead in seeking to solve their own conflicts. The United States could help this process but was unable to make a breakthrough against the resistance of those directly involved in any dispute. The Administration's experience made it somewhat disillusioned by the possibility that the PLO, Saudi Arabia, or Syria were willing to play a constructive role. U.S. policymakers understood the importance of continuing efforts to move forward the peace process but were more realistic about the constraints on success and the limited costs of failure.
While the strong U.S.-Israel relationship was reinforced by Reagan's personal thinking, a key role in this trend was also played by the power of experience. Officials like Shultz had been genuinely frustrated by their efforts to negotiate seriously with the Arabs, to bring the PLO into the diplomatic process, to gain assistance from Saudi Arabia, and to improve relations with states like Syria and Libya.
U.S. regional objectives were defined by four principles: limit Soviet influence while maximizing its own, encourage regional stability against the danger of war or radical revolution, supporting and strengthening allies, and seeking the continued supply of oil at reasonable prices. While, as always, there were numerous points of danger and tension, the overall picture on these four concerns was a reasonably positive one.
Some U.S. experts argue that the strong U.S.-Israel relationship constantly jeopardizes all of these policy goals. They predict imminent Marxist or fundamentalist revolt and the loss of the U.S.'s whole regional position unless policy is drastically changed and incorporates a quick solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict on traditional Arab terms. Nearly four decades' experience demonstrated this argument's fallaciousness and has led U.S. policymakers to reject it, though failing to reduce its appeal for some academics and analysts.
In fact, Washington's relative edge in the East-West competitionrested on an ability to maintain good relations with a variety of Middle Eastern countries--Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even Iraq. This situation, in turn, was based on the U.S.'s unique military, political, economic, and technological resources. Whether the issue was mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict or providing the needed training, equipment and guarantees to underpin Persian Gulf security, the United States enjoyed powerful advantages.
But in 1985-88, to an extent greater than ever before, American leaders in all political camps concluded from the regional situation and political framework that the United States could neither dictate terms nor produce magical solutions for the Middle East's passionate rivalries and problems.
FOOTNOTES
(1) The source for the breaking of the story was an article in Al-Shira, November 3, 1986. See DR (Daily Report), November 6, 1986, pp. I 1-3.
(2) President's Special Review Board, The Tower Commission Report, (New York, 1987), p 73. Members of the Commission were former Senator John Tower, former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft.
(3) Ibid., pp. 18-19, 63.
(4) Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the
Iran-Contra Affair (Washington 1987), p. 12.
(5) Text in Department of State, Current Policy #890, "U.S. Initiative to Iran," November 13, 1986.
(6) Washington Times, November 25, 1986.
(7) Washington Post, December 1, 1986.
(8) Washington Post, June 17 and 29, 1987.
(9) Washington Post, June 3, 1987; June 30, 1987; September 19, 1987.
(10) Christopher Madison, "A Reflagged Policy," National Journal, November 28, 1987.
(11) Washington Post, June 3, 1987.
(12) Henry Kissinger, "Wandering in the Gulf," Washington Post, June 21, 1987.
(13) DR, June 30, 1987, p. J2.
(14) Text in U.S. Department of State, "International Shipping and the Iran-Iraq War," Current Policy No. 958, May 19, 1987.
(15) Text in U.S. Department of State, "International Shipping and the Iran-Iraq War," Current Policy No. 958, May 19, 1987.
(16) DR, May 20, 1987, p. C 6. See also Washington Post, June 26, 1987, p. A25. Ambassador Sa'ud Nasir al-Sabah, Kuwait News Agency, 26 October, 1987 in DR 27 October, 1987, pp. 16-17; see also DR June 23, 1987, p. J1.
(17) New York Times, September 23 and 26, 1987.
(18) Washington Post, October 18, 1987.
(19) See, for example, Loren Jenkins, "Iranians attack Ship Near American Convoy," Washington Post, November 12, 1987.
(20) The Economist, August 29, 1987; Washington Post, August 13, 1987.
(21) Washington Post, October 11, 1987; New York Times, October, 16, 1987.
(22) Washington Times, October 16, 1987.