By Barry Rubin
In 1984-85 the Reagan Administration tried to make use of the conclusions it had drawn about Middle East policy during its first term in office. The framework for its diplomatic activism had been laid down in the September 1982 Reagan Plan, and to this were now added calculations about the difficulty of mediating an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, a recognition of the need to await decisive initiatives from the Arab side, and a higher priority on counter-terrorist actions. In contrast to previous years, there was no regional crisis to force dramatic US tensions, nor internal upheavals, nor threats to Gulf security resulting from Islamic fundamentalist revolutionaries or a widening Iraqi-Iranian war. Instead, there were experiments with new political alignments, including American diplomatic efforts to take advantage of the apparently emerging bloc of Iraq, Jordan and Egypt, as well as an attempted coordination between Jordan and the PLO.
US regional policy continued to be shaped by four primary goals: to limit Soviet influence while maximizing its own, to encourage regional stability against the danger of war or radical revolutions, to support and strengthen allies, and to seek a continued supply of oil at reasonable prices. While, as always, there were numerous points of danger and tension in the ME of 1984-85, the state of these four concerns was reasonably positive.
Some US analysts and academics argued that the strong US-Israeli relationship constantly jeopardized all of these policy goals. They predicted imminent Marxist or fundamentalist revolt in the US and the subsequent loss of America's whole regional position, unless policy was drastically changed to incorporate a quick solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict on traditional Arab terms. Nearly four decades' experience demonstrated this argument's fallaciousness, however, and US policymakers rejected it, even though it had a durable appeal for some observers. Washington's relative edge in the East-West competition in fact resulted from its ability to maintain good relations with a variety of ME countries - Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and even Iraq. This situation, in turn, was based on the unique military, political, economic, and technological resources of the US. Whether the issue was that of mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict or providing the needed training, equipment and guarantees to ensure Persian Gulf security, the US enjoyed powerful advantages.
But given the very real ideological and domestic political constraints in the ME, the nationalism of each country and the conflicting objectives of ME leaders, the US could neither dictate terms nor produce magical solutions to the region's passionate rivalries and problems. The ambiguous nature of regional attitudes was evident in the Arab world's reaction to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit. Middle Eastern rulers and media complained that the superpowers gave very little attention to ME questions, but they would have been equally - or more - upset if they had detected some "new Yalta" (a phrase popular in the region) that would have partitioned or ordered the area.
The US role was especially pivotal because the ME lacked reliably consistent alliance systems or any internationally recognized leaders. As Arab states had implicitly and explicitly developed their separate identities, Pan-Arabism had become an increasingly untenable ideology. The willingness of Egypt to sign the Camp David Accords, of Lebanese Maronite Christians to ally with Israel, or of Syria and Algeria to support Iran against Arab Iraq - all pointed to its decay. While the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism signaled dissatisfaction with existing regimes, it had been unable to seize power anywhere outside of Iran and had also proved divisive - through the Iraqi-Iranian war, terrorism and heightened communal tensions - rather than unifying.
Egypt could not play a leadership role in the region while it continued to be penalized for the Camp David Accords. Iraq was tied up with an expensive war effort. Syria's obvious ambitions had brought isolation. Saudi Arabia's economic leverage had steadily declined as the price and production of oil fell. In this situation of "every state for itself", US leverage became more important. Several rulers regarded the US as deus ex machina, hoping that it could help them realize their respective political dreams.
The very conflict, search for security and disunity that invited US involvement also made it complex and frustrating. First, there were conflicting state objectives, not only between Arabs and Israel but equally among the Arabs themselves. Syria, for example, was determined to sabotage any negotiations that would allow Jordan a role on the West Bank, Egypt a return to the Arab fold, or the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) an independent status. King Husayn and Yasir 'Arafat would compete to dominate any future Jordan-West Bank federation, and so on.
Second, there were internal contradictions in the bargaining position and goals of each State. Jordan would have liked to have the West Bank back but did not want to pay the price of recognizing Israel. Israel wanted peace, but some of its political groups wanted to retain the occupied territory and almost all of them were determined to prevent PLO participation in the peace process. 'Arafat would have liked to have his own West Bank state but would neither recognize Israel nor designate proxies to negotiate, because he feared Jordanian domination, Syrian revenge, and a split in his own ranks.
Third, all of these difficulties were interlocked. It was hard, for instance, to envision a diplomatic solution without Syrian participation but almost impossible to see any framework or outcome that would please Damascus and still be acceptable to Israel, Jordan or the PLO. King Husayn could not step forward to negotiate without 'Arafat and, apparently, could not persuade the PLO leader to make concessions either.
Consequently, the US Government had tended to focus on other, more pressing or promising - areas of the world except when developments in the ME forced action or gave hope that activism might succeed. During the Reagan Administration's first term in office, its ME policy passed through three distinct phases. First, from January 1981 to August 1982, the Administration explicitly and implicitly placed a lower priority on the Arab-Israeli conflict, in order to concentrate on security problems emerging in the Persian Gulf as a result of the Iranian revolution, the activity of Islamic fundamentalist groups and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. A series of events culminating in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon made a change in focus both necessary and potentially opportune.
Thus, from September 1982 through May 1983, the Administration pursued an activist policy aimed at developing a settlement for the Lebanese Civil war and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Reagan Plan proposed the establishment of a Jordanian West Bank federation as a framework for Palestinian self-determination. It also suggested that, in exchange for Israel's yielding most of the occupied territory, the Arabs would recognize its statehood and agree to territorial compromise on the West Bank that would enhance Israel's security. The US efforts failed to end either the Lebanese civil war or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria refused to withdraw from Lebanon; the Lebanese political factions could not settle their differences. Heavy losses among the US Marines created problems at home. And meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin, PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat and Jordan's King Husayn had rejected President Reagan's Plan.
With the Administration's disillusionment, its ME policy entered the third period, one of low activity in the region, continuing to February 1985. This was a logical reaction to the recent failures, and there was, in addition, a belief that opportunities for progress were lacking. Only an initiative by regional forces, reasoned US policymakers, would merit American involvement.
A conjunction of regional developments in the opening months of 1985 - a new, more flexible Government in Israel and King Husayn's seeming success in establishing a joint Jordanian-PLO bargaining position - set the stage for a fourth phase of US policy. Washington hoped to encourage the formation of such a joint delegation, to nudge it toward recognition of Israel and to create the basis for direct negotiations which would produce a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict within the general context of the 1982 Reagan Plan. Despite the changing fortunes and shifts in policy in earlier periods, there had been among US policymakers a continued preference for some form of "Jordanian solution". As Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam expressed this view in a may 1985 speech, US policy was that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, in association with Jordan, offered the best chance for a durable,just and lasting peace. The key barriers remained the conditions under which the PLO would be involved in negotiations, the framework for any resulting peace talks and the extent to which US energy and initiative would be required to move the process forward.
Prospects for renewed diplomatic efforts looked good to the US for several reasons. In Israel, Labor Party leader Shimon Peres had become Prime Minister of a National Unity Government; Peres was friendly to the Reagan Plan and eager to negotiate with Jordan. Further, one of the new Cabinet's first actions was to withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon (from January through June 1985), a step that Jordan had earlier made a condition for pursuing negotiations. Another important consideration was that, by the terms of the coalition agreement, Peres was scheduled to hand over his office to Yitzhak Shamir of the Likud bloc in October 1986. While Labor favored territorial compromise with Jordan on the West Bank (indeed, Peres and other party leaders had periodically met secretly with Husayn to discuss these matters), the Likud was more skeptical about the possibility of successful negotiations and more interested in permanently retaining the territories captured by Israel in the 1967 war. Thus, since the Government of Israel would soon change hands, time became central to all parties interested in negotiations.
It mattered especially to Jordan's King Husayn, who saw 1985 as a window of OPPortunity for seeking a political settlement. Husayn knew that Peres was more open to compromise than Shamir, his predecessor and scheduled successor, and he feared that Israel was becoming permanently entrenched on the West Bank. He warned the November 1984 Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting (held, significantly, in Amman) that time was not on the Arabs' side. In this exigency, Husayn recognized an opportunity: the PLO, weakened by having been driven out of Lebanon and split by pro-Syrian forces, would be easier for Jordan to influence and perhaps even to control, if moves towards negotiations were made soon.
Husayn thus sought to adapt the concepts of the Reagan Plan to his own needs and constraints, incorporating the PLO into his plans as a subordinate partner. By seeking Yasir 'Arafat's consent for a joint Jordanian-PLO negotiating delegation, Husayn hoped to develop with the US a series of talks leading to some form of negotiations with Israel. The object was a peace agreement based on mutual recognition between the Arab side and Israel, and on the establishment of a Jordanian-West Bank confederation with Amman as senior partner. The first step was the 1 February 1985 communique between Husayn and 'Arafat.
The agreement articulated in this communique was apparently drafted by the Jordanian side, and it provided for and regulated bilateral cooperation. It called for a solution involving an exchange of "land for peace", the acceptance of conditions "cited in United Nations [UN] resolutions", total Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, a Palestinian "right to self-determination" within the framework of a confederation between Jordan and Palestine, and an international conference that would include the PLO within a joint Arab delegation. Almost immediately after the Jordanian Government announced the communique, however, both individual PLO leaders and the PLO Executive Committee presented their interpretations and demanded that its contents be changed to include a joint delegation of all Arab governments and the PLO, an independent and PLO-led Palestinian State, criticisms of the "land for peace" formula, insistence on PLO refusal to recognize Israel or to accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and refusal to cede representation (even temporarily) to non-PLO Palestinians (even those willing to follow 'Arafat's orders). Said PLO leader Hani al-Hasan, "Frankly and clearly, I say that we reject [UN] Resolution 242. We rejected it in the past and will reject it in the future." Warned PLO Foreign Minister Faruq Qaddumi, "If Jordan sees any contradiction between its view of the draft formula and our understanding and point of view, then it is better to call a halt."
The PLO's obduracy resulted from a number of factors. Having barely escaped Syrian domination,'Arafat was not about to accept Jordanian hegemony. And rather than freeing him from the need to appease his most hard-line colleagues, the secession of pro-Syrian rejectionists actually added credibility to the threats of those militants remaining in or close to the PLO.'Arafat, moreover, retained both a deep mistrust of US and Israeli intentions and his survivor's habit of keeping all options open while committing himself to no single course of action.
In short, the situation in February 1985, while promising, was reminiscent of the intra-Arab impasse that had forced Husayn , s rejection of the Reagan Plan in 1983. This time, Husayn rushed to publicize the draft agreement before the PLO could reverse its preliminary acceptance, but apparently the accord had not actually been finalized. Thus, Jordan's action, while outmaneuvering the PLO, could not completely restrict 'Arafat to the corner into which Husayn had forced him.
Consequently, while the 1 February Accord, at least as interpreted by Jordan, was generally in line with US policy, it lacked some vital clarifications, including an unambiguous expression of the PLO's position and intentions. These were the issues on which US diplomacy would concentrate for the rest of 1985, in seeking to push forward a peace process. Two basic problems - the indeterminate policy of the PLO and the framework within which negotiations would be conducted - made the US task difficult and complex.
First, PLO policy and intentions. The US had to explore whether 'Arafat was really willing to accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338, to negotiate seriously with Israel, to abandon the use of terrorism, and to agree to final recognition of Israel. Previous experience, reinforced by 'Arafat's behavior in 1985, showed that he was too restricted by conflicts within the PLO, Syrian threats, fear of being controlled by Jordan, historic ideological commitments and lack of control over his own organization to take such a major step. He might simply be maneuvering for US recognition without making any concomitant concessions; he might also be seeking a stronger position, e.g., a military presence in Jordan or even control over the West Bank, from which to continue a long-term revolutionary and terrorist campaign against Israel. Successive US administrations had preferred a Jordanian option precisely because they deemed an independent Palestinian state under 'Arafat's leadership to be contrary to US national interests. Policymakers asked such questions as: Would such a state really be a stabilizing force in the region or would it have revanchist ambitions against Israel or even Jordan that would lead to further, chronic violence? Would the radical stance of many of the PLO's leaders and its long alliance with the USSR seriously threaten the standing of the US in the region? Because of these issues Husayn's approach appealed to the Administration. But, by the same token, it wanted to be sure that Husayn could keep the PLO within the terms of the agreement, leading to a successful diplomatic process and a lasting peace.
Second, framework for negotiations. Husayn and 'Arafat insisted on an international conference that would include the members of the UN Security Council and representatives from all relevant Arab states. Washington and Jerusalem wanted direct negotiations, arguing that an all-inclusive international conference would be doomed. Damascus could be expected to interfere with the meeting by urging the Arabs to intransigence. Moscow would curry Arab favor and undermine the moderates by raising maximalist demands. These very considerations had led both the Carter and Reagan Administrations to abandon a framework like that of the Geneva Conference, in which the US and USSR would be co-chairs.
During the six months after the 1 February communique, the US emphasized diplomatic explorations with Jordan and Israel for ways to solve the issue of Palestinian participation. Failing to find an acceptable joint delegation, Washington shifted its emphasis to gaining a compromise on the diplomatic framework for talks. The fundamental US approach on the representational issue was to give the PLO a choice. Either 'Arafat could find some format for indicating his willingness to recognize Israel or he could designate pro-'Arafat but non-PLO Palestinians to represent his interest in preliminary exchanges.
Building on the I February communique and the expected relative flexibility of Israel's Prime Minister Peres, the Administration began a major effort to promote a resolution to the conflict in April. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy explained the new policy: "The parties in the region have imparted a new Momentum to the search for peace... We strongly support King Husayn's efforts to move toward negotiations, but only time will tell whether the agreement will ultimately enable him to do so." Shortly thereafter, with Peres expressing his willingness to negotiate with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Murphy went to the ME to assess the Situation. This marked the beginning of an attempted coordination of such a meeting. On a visit to Washington in late May, King Husayn presented a comprehensive plan for moving the process forward. This four-stage blueprint demonstrated both the promise and the weaknesses that distinguished the current phase of the diplomatic process:
1. The US would meet with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would include Palestinians who were not PLO members but who would take orders from the PLO.
Israel worried that such a meeting would constitute US recognition of the PLO without there being any commensurate Arab concession. The Israeli Government wanted no PLO members to be involved, and it argued that members of the PNC, the Palestinian 'Parliament', should be counted as PLO members.
The Administration was willing to meet with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that included even PNC members, but it believed that the meeting should not take place until it was clear that the exchange would not lead to a dead end. Hence, Washington wanted a clear indication, if not outright guarantees, that a meeting would produce progress toward direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israel.
Husayn was asked to submit the names of potential Palestinian participants, and he in turn requested a list from 'Arafat. The result was disappointing: the list presented by the PLO in July consisted (even after Jordanian vetting), almost entirely of PLO activists. When Peres accepted two of the delegates proposed but rejected the rest, the PLO withdrew the two men's names. Despite its less demanding requirements, Washington too found the PLO-Jordanian list unacceptable, because almost all those named on it were clearly mid- and top-level PLO leaders. This fact contradicted not only the US position that there would be no recognition of the PLO until it expressed a willingness to recognize Israel and stop its terrorism, but also Husayn's own formula.
2. The purpose of the US meeting with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was to allow for US recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, within the context of a confederation with Jordan. According to King Husayn, PLO leader Yasir' Arafat would then be ready to announce his willingness to recognize and negotiate with Israel by accepting UN Resolution 242.
Shultz wanted, but never obtained, PLO confirmation of Husayn's claim. Although 'Arafat did not denounce Husayn's efforts, his most important colleagues repeatedly contradicted the Jordanian King's assertion. This greatly contributed to US skepticism. Just as the Administration wanted a meeting between Murphy and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to lead to direct negotiations, it also expected the meeting's immediate aftermath to include an unambiguous recognition of Israel by 'Arafat. In short, events cast doubt on Husayn's ability to put his, own plan into operation.
3. Husayn proposed that, after the exchanges of recognition in Step 2, the US would hold another meeting with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would include PLO officials, and they would discuss the details for an international peace conference. As has already been indicated, however, the statements of PLO leaders and the composition of the proposed delegation seemed to eliminate Step 2 entirely. The US Government was in effect asked to recognize the PLO and accept an international conference without prior assurances of any changed PLO policy or of eventual direct negotiations.
4. An international conference of the five Security Council members and Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and the PLO would convene to produce a peace agreement. The us, opposed to an international conference, wanted this fourth stage to be a direct, face-to-face peace conference between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. While Washington was more flexible about permitting PLO involvement, Israel eventually proved more willing to compromise on a multilateral negotiating framework.
Israel's immediate response to Husayn's ideas was given in Prime Minister Peres' five-point plan on I June. He called for a Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli summit with US participation. The UN Security Council's members would merely endorse the meeting, without participating in it themselves. Commented Peres, "I believe that Husayn needs peace [and] that he cannot proceed without the Palestinians and, possibly in his opinion, without the PLO either."
Despite the very real problems and differences, the Administration knew that the gap was at least narrower than it had ever been. To encourage Husayn, whose sincerity was admired in Washington, the State Department obtained from Congress $250 million in economic aid for Jordan (previous assistance had reached only $20 million a year) and indicated the possibility of a major arms sale as well. But the Administration also expected a resolution to the problems of the joint delegation, PLO recognition of Israel, linkage between the steps proposed by Husayn, and direct negotiations as opposed to an international conference. This required a better offer from Husayn and 'Arafat. Murphy said in late June, "If 1985 is the year of opportunity, as Arab leaders say, then the Arabs themselves are going to have to make some, hard decisions."
Hopes for success were growing dim by July, when the Arabs failed to produce a list acceptable to either the US or Israel. Drawing on its experience with the Reagan Plan, the Administration put the burden of ensuing progress on the regional actors themselves. Certainly, explained Murphy, there had been a "sea change" in the attitudes of some Arabs, but the timing for "a big push" was "not... exclusive [to the] American calendar". In contrast to the emphasis put on the Reagan Plan in 1982-83, the ME was not in 1984-85 the Administration's top priority. And in contrast to its attitude in the initial 1981-82 era, the US was now ready to make serious efforts if the Possibility of success seemed promising. Until negotiations were imminent or prospects more fluid, the White House would leave the exploratory phase in the hands of the State Department's middle level.
An August visit by Murphy to Jordan did not succeed in removing the obstacles to the negotiations. In fact, Jordanian Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i stated that his country would reject any US demand that a meeting lead to direct Arab-Israeli talks. Trying to find a way out of the impasse, the State Department pursued options. One much-discussed idea was that a major US arms sale to Jordan might prod Husayn toward further action. There were two problems, however, with this notion. Most immediately, the sale was ensured of defeat in Congress, many of whose members regarded it as an appropriate reward for - rather than an incentive to - Jordan's recognition of, and negotiations with, Israel.
As for Syria, its ambitions for regional power, including complete domination of Lebanon and the Palestinian question, would pose a threat to Jordan if King Husayn were to proceed with serious negotiations. Syria's assets included its hegemonic position in Lebanon, control over some of the Palestinian forces, and status as the USSR's most important regional ally. Damascus had proven its determination by outlasting Israeli and US attempts to put anti-Syrian factors into power in Lebanon; Syria's control over Lebanon was limited and, further, based on skillful manipulation of its warring elements, but President Hafiz al-Asad was no better equipped than any other outside force to impose a political solution.
Certainly, by committing himself to the support of anti-'Arafat Palestinians, Asad had forfeited the very flexibility that had gained him his position in Lebanon. Syrian attempts to control the PLO only drove 'Arafat closer to Husayn, and this new alignment increased the determination of Damascus to block any process that would coalesce its enemies (Israel and the US) and rivals (Egypt, Jordan, and 'Arafat's PLO). For Syria, successful negotiations were anathema, not because they might prevent it from regaining the Israel-occupied Golan Heights (a relatively minor issue) but, rather, because they would create a new balance of power permanently threatening to reduce Syria to second-rate status in the Arab world.
Nevertheless, considering the undoubted US support of Jordan in the event of a Syrian invasion, as well as the strength of hostile Israeli and Iraqi forces on its border, Damascus was unlikely to send its Army into Jordan. The real danger was that it would intensify its campaign of terrorism, assassination, and subversion against Amman. Further, the underlying problems of the peace process had less to do with the question of Jordanian confidence in the US (which the arms sale would supposedly strengthen), or with Husayn's fear of a Syrian attack, than they did with the constraints that PLO inflexibility imposed on the Jordanian Government. Jordan's possessing more guns would not change the necessity that, if the peace process were to continue, 'Arafat be forthcoming about recognizing Israel and engaging in direct negotiations.
The Administration's hopes were pinned on Husayn's visit to the US in September. The White House sent notification of the $1.9 billion arms sale - which included forty advanced fighter planes and twelve mobile anti-aircraft missile batteries, as well as Stinger surface-to-air missiles - to Congress on 17 September 1985. It was hoped that the sale would give Husayn an additional push at that critical moment. If the King did not give assurances persuasive to Congress, the Administration could withdraw the proposal.
Husayn declared at the UN, "We are prepared to negotiate, under appropriate auspices, with the Government of Israel, promptly and directly, under the basic tenets of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338." He maintained, of course, that an international conference provided appropriate auspices for negotiations, but he went a bit further, defining it as an umbrella framework for direct talks rather than as a substitute for them.
After his meeting with Husayn on 30 September, President Reagan remarked, "Jordan has been moving steadily and courageously forward in the search for a peaceful negotiated settlement in the conflict in the ME [and] has not wavered despite attacks and threats." Washington's goal was still "direct negotiations, under
appropriate auspices, before the end of [the] year."
But Husayn's visit was disappointing to the Administration. The King had brought no new ideas and would not publicly declare an end to the state of belligerency with Israel. The two sides were no closer to setting up a meeting with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The peace process seemed stalled after eight months of intensive efforts. When Congress postponed consideration of the arms sale until I March 1986 (if direct talks started before then, the sale would be dealt with earlier), the White House did not forcefully object. Jordan responded by easing its relations with Syria (Amman pledged to cease support for Syrian Islamic fundamentalist revolutionaries) without sacrificing its option to continue the peace process when, and if, that seemed a promising move.
The ensuing crisis over terrorism and reprisal, then, did not in itself stymie the peace process, for unresolvable problems and conflicting positions had already been well defined. Still, the PLO's continued terrorism, long a factor inhibiting American and Israeli willingness to recognize and negotiate with the organization, became a primary issue in late April. The PLO was supposedly following a new, "diplomatic" course, when Israel intercepted and sank a boat carrying a PLO terrorist task force which had been dispatched to Israel from Algeria by Khalil al-Wazir,'Arafat's right-hand man. US Secretary of State George Shultz warned against terrorism, saying, "Those who perpetrate violence deal themselves out of the peace process."
The issues that had inhibited that process from February to September had beer, political ones. Now international tensions and attention increased with a series of dramatic events involving terrorist attacks and reprisals. These developments posed a number of challenges for US policy which echoed earlier concerns. During its first year in office, responding to President Carter's problems with the Iran hostage crisis, the Reagan Administration had declared that countering terrorism was one of its top priorities. Nevertheless, little or nothing had been accomplished during the years since to reduce attacks against Americans or to develop ways of dealing with the growing state sponsorship of terrorism.
Terrorism had earlier been instrumental in destroying the Marines' mission in Lebanon. Also, seven Americans had been kidnapped and held hostage for well over a year by Islamic fundamentalist groups in Beirut. The Administration quietly warned Iran that retaliation would follow if any of them were harmed. The White House had courted a reputation for toughness, but, in fact, in various terrorist incidents it did not carry out reprisals or even attempt rescue missions.
Both the political entanglements that terrorism could create and the cautious US Policy belied by the hard-line rhetoric were vividly illustrated when, in June 1985, a TWA airliner was seized by Shi'ite fundamentalist hijackers and flown to Beirut. One American passenger was murdered and thirty-nine others were held for seventeen days.
The Administration faced a complex situation. While the hijacking had been carried out by pro-Iranian Fundamentalists, much control over the situation quickly passed into the hands of Nabih Barri, leader of the Amal Shi'ite group. Barri was an ally of Syria and a Communal Nationalist who had little interest in Islamic revolution or in war with the US or Israel as ends in themselves. The crisis, then, had more to do With the ramifications of Lebanese politics, each group trying to prove its militancy and effectiveness, than it did with US policy or interests. The hijackers' primary demand was that Israel free Shi'ite militiamen and terrorists captured in South Lebanon. Israel was already in the process of letting them go, but the real political prize was the credit for this which different Shi'ite groups tried to appropriate.
Officially, the US refused to negotiate with, or meet the demands of, terrorists. In practice and in private, it urged Israel to release the prisoners. Syria, worried about the spreading of pro-Iranian Islamicism in Lebanon, used its leverage with the Shi'ite groups, and the hostages were finally released safely.
Terrorist incidents may attract a great deal of attention for a short period of time, but they rarely alter political circumstances. Media coverage of the TWA hostage crisis reached unprecedented proportions in the US, but the affair had little or no lasting political impact. It produced neither a US-Syrian rapprochement nor any serious US-Israeli friction. But it did demonstrate the continued uncertainty of US political leaders and the general public about how to deal with terrorism. Polls showed that most Americans wanted the hostages to be released even if this required acquiescing to terrorist demands. A US attempt to organize an international boycott of Beirut's insecure airport gained almost no support, even from allies. In a major speech, President Reagan attacked Iran and Libya, but not Syria or Iraq, as countries which supported terrorism, but the debate within the US Government about how to deal with it remained unresolved.
Some observers claimed that the situation lowered US credibility. One of the terrorists jeered, "The American war machine is nothing but a child's toy", and argued that the hijacking demonstrated the "ability of the oppressed to confront America". Yet, even after the fall of the Shah, the US withdrawal from Lebanon, and numerous other policy setbacks, few ME leaders seemed to doubt that America was a great power. Instead, complaining that the US was a bully, they clamored for American aid, arms, technology, support and mediation on a range of issues.
The series of events in September-October 1985 revived some of these controversies throughout the region. Several attacks against Israeli civilians culminated on 25 September 1985 in the brutal murder of three Israelis in Cyprus. Israel blamed the PLO and bombed PLO offices in Tunisia on I October. Six days later, Palestinian terrorists with close links to the PLO hijacked an Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, murdering an elderly, crippled American. Three days after that, an Egyptian airliner carrying the three terrorists was forced by US fighter planes to land in Italy, where the three men were tried and convicted.
A number of apparent, but ultimately short-lived, frictions arose for the US from these developments. Much was made of conflicting statements between President Reagan and State Department officials about Israel's raid against PLO facilities in Tunisia. The President said that Israel and other nations had the right to strike back at terrorism if "they [could] pick out the people responsible". George Shultz's statement was more critical and stressed regret for Tunisian casualties. The US abstained on a UN resolution that condemned Israel for the attack without mentioning the foreign-backed terrorist attacks that had motivated it. Although the ambiguity need not have been so marked, it did reflect diverse American interests: an ally of Israel and enthusiastic supporter of counter-terrorism, the US was also an ally of several Arab states, including Tunisia, and a mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Relations were strained with Italy, which had refused US requests to extradite the terrorists while letting PLO leader Abu Abbas, the apparent mastermind of the hijacking, flee the country; they were also strained with Egypt, which resented the US having taken action against one of its planes despite the fact that President Husni
Mubarak had been instrumental in securing the release of the Achille Lauro passengers. These tensions should not be overstated. The Italians were soon forced to admit that Abu Abbas had organized the Achille Lauro attack; the Egyptians later accepted US assistance, when terrorists hijacked one of their planes to Malta. the heat of specific terrorist incidents dissipated, tempers cooled as well.
As for the peace process, which was already in significant trouble, the Achille Lauro affair made the PLO seem less attractive as a negotiating partner and less credible as a moderate organization. Plans for a meeting between a Jordanian-PLO delegation and Great Britain (which was intended as a dress rehearsal for the long-awaited US conference with this Arab group) collapsed when the PLO refused to sign a statement that would imply willingness to recognize Israel. Amman joined London in criticizing 'Arafat.
Hopes of progress survived but the chances of a breakthrough diminished considerably, even after Peres made a conciliatory speech at the UN in late October. The Israeli Prime Minister put forth the idea that direct talks could be initiated with support from an international forum - a concession to Jordan's desire for such an umbrella framework. He also expressed willingness to meet with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation "comprising delegates that represent peace, not terror", an implication that he would accept PLO delegates if that organization's policy changed.
Perhaps Shultz provided the best summary of the situation after the year's experience with the peace process. "The PLO", he said, "has been involved in recent weeks, as in the past, in acts of terror and violence; and I don't see how those who are perpetrating terror and violence against one of the parties deserve a place at a peace table. So, those who are ready to sit down with Israel and try to work out peace, those who accept Resolutions 242 and 338, and those who are prepared to stop the so-called `armed struggle' deserve a place at the peace table, whatever their label may be - and those who aren't willing to do that don't deserve a place, in my opinion."
As this statement indicates, 1985 was generally a year of close US-Israeli cooperation. Aid from the US was at an all-time high, amounting to one-quarter of the entire US foreign assistance program. This relationship was used successfully to pressure Israel toward an economic austerity program to deal with its severe inflation. In April, the US ratified a Free Trade Area agreement to encourage the transfer of trade and technology. However, in November 1985, US Navy employee Jonathan Pollard was arrested for stealing intelligence reports on the Arab world for Israel, and bilateral friction and some restrictions on the exchange of information followed.
Compared to the US diplomatic efforts on the peace process, other ME issues remained secondary during 1984-85. In the Iraqi-Iranian war, the US remained Supportive of Baghdad. The two Governments reestablished diplomatic relations, US companies helped build new Iraqi oil pipelines and the Administration gave Iraq import credits. At Iraq's request, the US also urged friendly nations to stop selling arms to Iran.
As with the Arab-Israeli conflict, varied US interests in the Gulf forced some complex calculations over the Iraqi-Iranian war. While the greatest immediate threat was an Iranian victory or subversion that would endanger the friendly Persian Gulf monarchies, US leaders also had to take into account the danger that, cornered, Iran might turn to the Soviet Union for help. The resulting policy was one of public neutrality regarding the war combined with a tilt toward Iraq. American willingness to criticize Iraq about its use of poison gas in combat demonstrated the former stance; Baghdad's long-awaited decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with Washington evidenced the latter. The frequent and mistaken suggestions of Iraqi leaders and some other Gulf Arabs - i.e., that a determined US could bring the war to an end demonstrated their continued belief in, and even exaggeration of, US power.
The oil glut and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' declining control over the international petroleum market meant that the Gulf region, while still important, was less strategically critical for the US than it had been. This development, and past disappointments in Saudi help with earlier US peacemaking efforts, heightened the Administration's skepticism about Saudi Arabia's potential for helpful diplomacy.
Two other countries attracted more US attention: Libya and Egypt. Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi's increasingly active and open support of terrorism raised growing concern in Washington. Evidence of Libyan involvement in some of the terrorist incidents in the fall of 1985, and of subsequent attacks on civilians at the Rome and Vienna airports in December, produced growing tensions. The US increased economic pressure on Libya by reducing its remaining bilateral trade and forbidding US citizens and companies to work in Libya.
In March 1986, US naval forces held maneuvers in the Gulf of Sirte, which despite Libya's claiming it as its territory, had been recognized as international waters. When American ships crossed into the Gulf, past what Qadhdhafi had proclaimed to be the "Line of Death", they were attacked by Libyan planes. In the ensuing confrontation, several Libyan patrol boats were sunk and radar installations on shore were destroyed.
Additional terrorist attacks - particularly a bomb that was detonated on a TWA plane over Greece, leading to four deaths, and a bomb set off in a West Berlin discotheque where an American soldier was killed - stirred the Reagan Administration to retaliate. US planes bombed targets in Libya, including Qadhdhafi's personal compound and airfields, in April 1986. The raid was assisted by Great Britain but was criticized by other West European states.
Although the immediate US concern with Libya was terrorism, Qadhdhafi's activities in Sudan were also a matter of concern. After the successful April 1985 coup against Sudan's pro-Egyptian and pro-US President, Ja'far al-Numayri, Libya sent a great deal of money and many agents to Sudan in an effort to influence its politics. While US-Sudanese relations were still fairly good, anxiety about Libyan influence remained, and they may become a major issue in the future.
In Egypt, President Husni Mubarak moved slightly away from the late President Anwar al-Sadat's policy of a highly publicized, close alignment with the US, but he protected the relationship that had provided Egypt with $ 10 billion in aid over the last decade. Egypt remained the second-biggest recipient of US assistance in the world; with Israel's repayment of earlier loans taken into account, Egypt received in fact the largest amount of net US aid in 1984-85.
A potential area of friction in this regard, however, was the fact that Egypt was also host to the largest number of US Agency for International Development (AID) employees in the world. While AID tried to ensure that the money was well and honestly spent, some Egyptians resented the process. They were also angered by the US seizure of its plane after the Achille Lauro affair. Bilateral relations remained strong, however, and when,an Egyptian plan was hijacked by terrorists a few weeks later, Cairo asked for US assistance in handling the crisis.
Despite the inevitable vicissitudes and uncertainties of ME politics, then, the overall strategic and political situation in the region was not unfavorable to US interests during the period under review. Terrorism, often aimed at Americans, hypnotized the media and caused a terrible loss of human life, but it hardly destabilized the fundamental position of the US in the ME. Islamic Fundamentalism proved incapable of making successful, or even serious, revolutionary challenges to regimes friendly to the US. The Lebanese civil war raged on, but the nightmare of absolute Syrian domination faded. A bloody Iraqi-Iranian war remained indecisive but showed no sign of spreading or endangering the Persian Gulf's oil exports. Most significant, the US retained a wide variety of allies, while the USSR's influence remained extremely limited.
If the Iranian revolution and the failure of US leverage in Lebanon demonstrated the limits of American power, especially military power, in the region, 1984-85 provided a lesson on the continuing importance of the political and diplomatic roles of the US. Its attempts to mediate - and its failure to resolve - the Arab-Israeli conflict often seemed to elicit acrimonious reactions in the area, yet it was still universally acknowledged that only Washington could foster any peaceful settlement.
In line with its broader ideological framework, the Administration was willing to act strongly on terrorism despite the reluctance of European allies. By the end of the period analyzed here, this had become an issue of paramount importance in US policy.
Another conclusion accepted by the Reagan Administration was that regional forces had to take the lead in solving their own conflicts. The US could assist in this process but could not break through the resistance of those directly involved in any dispute. The Administration was somewhat disillusioned about the possibility that the PLO, Saudi Arabia, or Syria might play a constructive role in negotiations, but US policymakers understood the importance of trying to move forward. They would now be more realistic about the process. The strong US-Israeli relationship had been reinforced by President Reagan's personal thinking, but the year's experience had registered with officials like Secretary of State Shultz. They had been genuinely frustrated by their efforts to negotiate seriously with the Arabs, to bring the PLO into the diplomatic process, to gain assistance from Saudi Arabia, and to improve relations with states like Syria and Libya.