By Barry Rubin
The US Middle East policy came full circle in 1982-83, back to some of the concerns and orientations that marked the Reagan Administration's first days in office. Reagan's peace plan, launched in September 1982, was finally rejected by Jordan in April 1983--a development that discouraged Washington about prospects for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the reliability of Arab "moderates". Consequently, the US-Israel alliance was strengthened, recovering from the blows it had suffered during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and Syria was again identified as the prime obstacle to regional stability.
Parallel with the American efforts behind the Reagan Plan were attempts to remove foreign forces from Lebanon and to reconstitute a viable and pro-Western government there. The presence of the US Marines as part of a multinational force in Beirut was intended as a symbol of America's commitment toward these goals, but they became highly controversial at home in step with the rising toll of American casualties. Ambassador Philip Habib successfully negotiated a Lebanese-Israeli agreement in May 1983, but he failed to shake Damascus in its determination to hang on to its sizeable foothold in eastern and northern Lebanon and Syria eventually forced Beirut to abandon the accord.
THE SHAPING OF UNITED STATES POLICY
During its first eighteen months in office, the Reagan Administration sought to create a "strategic consensus" among the Gulf States to be directed against potential Soviet aggression. Emphasis was put on developing a US Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and on arms sales to countries in the area as a response to the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Seeing little prospect for progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Washington put less effort into issues in that arena.
However, by mid-1982, this concept was under serious challenge. Arab Governments were reluctant to become identified with American objectives and were more worried about actual Israeli and Iranian actions than by any potential Soviet assault. Behind the scenes, much progress was made toward improving the defence of the Gulf region against threats to its stability. Strategic co-operation proved useful as a basis for technical and military co-ordination but, as a public and political policy, strategic consensus remained elusive.
A series of armed clashes in Lebanon turned the Administration's attention to that troubled country and, again, to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In a cycle of escalating violence, beginning in 1981, Syria introduced anti-aircraft missiles in the Biqa' valley, followed that summer by increased Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) artillery attacks against northern Israel. Although Ambassador Habib, the President's ME envoy, obtained a cease-fire, tensions were greatly raised. Israeli forces crossed into Lebanon in June 1982 and proceeded toward Beirut. While Washington was fairly sympathetic toward a limited, forty-kilometer incursion, the overwhelming Israeli victory and negative reaction in the Arab world worried many officials about possible disastrous effects on US-Arab relations. The US media also presented Israeli actions in an extremely negative light, producing some major shifts in public opinion.
With the resignation in June 1982 of the Secretary of State, Alexander Haig--a leading advocate of close relations with Israel--the stage was set for an experiment by a section in the State Department, supported by the incoming Secretary of State, George Shultz, and the National Security Adviser, William Clark that favored a pro-Arab tilt and a top priority effort to find a negotiated se the Arab-Israeli conflict. Influenced by the State Department's Bureau of East Affairs, under the leadership of the Assistant Secretary of State Veliotes, they argued that there was a major opportunity for a breakthrough to peace. Jordan was believed ready to enter negotiations, possibly with the permission or, they hoped, even with the PLO's participation. Habib assured Shultz that Syria was ready to negotiate its withdrawal from Lebanon. All these assertions were proved erroneous during 1983.
THE REAGAN PLAN
President Reagan's speech on 1 September 1982 Prescribed in a more detailed way than ever before a Proposed solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict. He labelled his position as the "next step" in the Camp David autonomy talks to pave the way for permitting the Palestinian people to exercise their legitimate rights". He said that the Lebanese war:
"Tragic as it was, has left us with a new opportunity for ME peace. The military losses of the PLO have not diminished the yearning of the Palestinian people for a just solution to their claims . . . While Israel's military successes in Lebanon have demonstrated that its armed forces are second to none in the region, they alone cannot bring just and lasting peace to Israel and her neighbors.
The question, he said, was "how to reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians?" This must be done through diplomacy rather than on the battlefield, and would involve concessions by both sides. Reagan continued that the US had a "special responsibility....No other nation is in a position to deal with the key parties to the conflict on the basis of trust and reliability. Israel deserved Arab recognition and, Reagan implied, some revisions to the pre-1967 boundaries. Up to that point, he said, Israel had lived in narrow borders, within artillery range of hostile Arab armies: "I am not about to ask Israel to live that way again." He advocated, in line with the Camp David Accords, a five-year transition period after the election of a self-governing Palestinian authority. "The immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action," the President said, "I could create the confidence needed for wider Participation in these talks." But what specifically was Reagan proposing? "Peace cannot be achieved," he stated, "by the formation of an independent Palestinian state...nor is it achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza." His preferred solution was self-government by the Palestinians of the Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan."
The Reagan plan approach grew out of the belief that the US must show progress towards solving the Arab-Israeli issue--or, at least, make energetic attempts in that direction--to retain US influence in the Arab world. The policy was meant to show the Arabs that America was trying to respond to their grievances. There was also an important domestic component since dramatic action was deemed necessary to Prove that the Administration's ME policy was under control. It was hoped that a broad consensus at home could be built in support of the proposals.
The Administration hoped that Israel's continuing integration of the West Bank and the PLO's Lebanon defeat had so chastened the PLO and convinced Jordan of the need for haste that these events would persuade the two to co-operate lest the territories be lost to Israel forever. As had happened in the past, the Administration was over-optimistic about a supportive Saudi response. Israel had not been consulted since Washington feared a leak and a probable rejection before the new initiative was even announced. Washington's handling of the issue made both of these outcomes inevitable.
The response of the Arab summit meeting in Fez, only a week after Reagan's speech, was discouraging. Behind the scenes, Washington had asked Saudi Arabia to work for a final resolution that would not attack the Reagan Plan and, preferably, would even endorse it. Washington reacted optimistically to the summit's general statement, which did not mention the US proposal and adopted a watered-down version of the Fahd Plan; but, clearly, King Husayn had not received the hoped-for mandate to negotiate over the territories' future. Vice-President George Bush said the Fez resolution meant implicit Arab recognition of Israel. Shultz thought the Fez summit could be a "genuine breakthrough," and added: "There might be an implied recognition of Israel. I hope that is so."
Meanwhile, the US Marines who had gone to Lebanon as part of a multinational force to supervise the PLO's departure, left Beirut on 10 September, despite local expressions of concern over the safety of the West Beirut population. After the assassination of President Bashir Jumayyil, Israeli troops entered West Beirut. Several hundred Palestinian refugees were murdered by Christian Phalange troops in the Sabra and Shatila camps.
The US Administration reacted angrily to the Israeli advance, which it criticized as conflicting with the agreement worked out by Habib. Israeli prestige in the US was further eroded by the massacre; several dozen members of Congress wrote to Begin asking for a full-scale investigation. The 1,200 US Marines again returned to Beirut, despite some domestic concerns over the commitment. Washington called on the Lebanese Government to safeguard Palestinian rights and voted at the UN to condemn the Israeli incursion and the massacre.
However, the US generally defended Israel at the UN, opposing strong resolutions condemning the invasion of Lebanon, vetoing a ban on military aid to Israel, and fighting attempts to suspend Israel's membership. Shultz told the General Assembly in late September that Israel must yield territory to gain peace, and that the Palestinians had an "undeniable claim" to some form of self-rule.
The question of foreign troops in Lebanon and of continued Israeli settlements in the occupied territories assumed particular importance as King Husayn had designated progress on these issues as pre-conditions for his participation in negotiations. He hinted at a possible Jordanian-Palestinian delegation including West Bank notables responsive to, though not members of, the PLO. The US tried to encourage Husayn's participation by linking his decision with future supplies of American arms to Jordan.
US aid to Israel was untouched by the political frictions. Not only did Israel obtain $2.5 billion in economic and military assistance from the 1983 Budget--$1.7 billion for economic support and $785 million for military aid--but, in addition, it got $51O million in outright grants, which the White House had originally proposed as loans. US military aid to Israel had remained steady at around $1 billion a year between 1977 and 1980. This last step was taken despite the opposition of the White House and four of key congressional committees--Charles Percy and Mark Hatfield of the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations committees, and Clement Zablocki and Jamie Whitten of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs and Appropriations committees.
But, clearly, mutual credibility in the bilateral relationship had declined. Reagan, who remained his Government's strongest supporter of Israel, was dismayed over bilateral differences on Lebanon; the Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, was hostile to the US--Israeli alliance; the Secretary of State, George Shultz and National Security Adviser, William Clark, were hopeful of a major breakthrough for peace made possible by a tilt toward Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other Arab states.
Israeli leaders were baffled by changing US signals on Syria, the PLO, and their own action in Lebanon. The feeling was that the invasion benefitted the US by weakening its enemies and enhancing its leverage in the Arab world. The Reagan Plan was believed to be in conflict with the Camp David Accords. The then Defence Minister, Ariel Sharon, was also hostile toward Washington, accusing it of attempting to divide Israel politically and to force a return to the 1967 borders.
LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS
During the closing months of 1982 and throughout 1983, the US sought to negotiate the removal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. Shultz accepted the State Department's argument that if arrangements were made for an Israeli withdrawal, the Syrians and the PLO would quickly follow suit. Habib therefore spent relatively little time on an internal Lebanese settlement. Progress on Lebanon was deemed essential to encourage King Husayn's entry into peace negotiations. in the Lebanon-Israel talks, Washington argued that the Lebanese Government could not sign a peace treaty due to domestic and Arab pressures. Israel disagreed and Sharon claimed the US was blocking a political arrangement. The talks dragged on for months. In the meantime, the US provided $82 million for emergency relief in Lebanon and $30 million to supplement housing and essential services, as well
as military supplies and training for the Lebanese Army.
US-Israel tensions reached a peak in February-March 1983 because of Washington's interest in convincing Husayn of its willingness to apply pressures on Israel and to address the differences over Lebanon. President Reagan stated that it would be "wrong" for Israel "to wait for a peace treaty" with Lebanon before withdrawing. On the Palestinian issue, the President reiterated his belief that the US had to provide "something in the nature of a homeland", but not a State. He also said that some moderate Arab nations "do want peace and that this would involve recognition of Israel's right to exist".
The particular acrimony between the two Defence Ministers was reflected by some minor confrontations between the two countries' military forces in Beirut. On one much-publicized occasion, a US Marine officer drew his pistol when stopping Israeli tanks from crossing into what was deemed the US-controlled sector. Such differences were partly due to a refusal of the US to agree on clear demarcation lines or to carry out proper liaison.
In March 1983, the US Defence Department made public a letter from the Marine Corps commandant to Weinberger saying that Israeli troops had involved US forces in "life-threatening situations" and provocations. The Under-Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, said the two countries were "working very hard to try to establish a situation in which [confrontations] will not happen again."
Washington also obstructed Israeli efforts to build the new Lavie fighter-bomber by holding up licenses and delaying its sales of the US-built F-16. The breakdown in communications also prevented an exchange of military information gained by Israeli experiences in the Lebanon fighting.
When Israel's Kahan Commission issued its critical report on Israeli mistakes leading up to the Sabra-Shatila massacres and Sharon was forced to resign as Defense Minister. Sharon's replacement, Moshe Arens, had served as Israel's well-regarded Ambassador in Washington; he was known to be determined to resolve the earlier difficulties and to negotiate an agreement in Lebanon.
Israel's image was also getting better in American public opinion. One Washington Post survey in March 1983 showed that while 29% of Americans believed Arab leaders sincerely wanted peace, 52% thought they did not. Of those asked, 52% sympathized more with Israel, 16% preferred the Arab nations. In addition, 45% said Israel was America's best ME ally, compared with 28% who ranked Egypt first (A September 1982 poll showed an Egyptian preference by a 46%-36% margin. (This while there were lasting scars, much of the conflict over the 1982 Lebanon offensive had been dissipated.
The atmosphere was further improved as Washington sought to encourage israel to make concessions in an accord with Lebanon. During a visit to tie up the agreement in April, Shultz predicted success because Jerusalem's withdrawal was "in both the Israeli and Lebanese interests....And anyway, as a negotiator and mediator you have to be very optimistic. You have to think it will succeed. Otherwise you won't get anywhere". The trip was a success. After two weeks in the region in May, Shultz obtained the agreement ending the state of war and providing security arrangements for South Lebanon. It was signed on 17 May.
Shultz announced that he was "confident" that Syria would withdraw its troops in the future, despite Damascus's strong opposition to the new bilateral treaty. "Lebanon will again have a chance to be a sovereign country, to decide for itself how it wants to live", said the Secretary of State. This optimism, conditioned partly by the reports Schultz was receiving from his negotiating team, was not to be fulfilled.
Within a few days of the treaty's conclusion, the US was already noting an accelerated Syrian military build-up and stepped-up Soviet arms aid as dangerous. Damascus refused to accept further talks with Ambassador Habib, the leading architect of the agreement. Arab pressure on Syria, a main aim of the US effort, also did not live up to expectations.
REJECTION OF THE REAGAN PLAN
The course of Lebanon negotiations, the intensified focus on the Lebanon-Israel talks and the improvement of US-Israel relations were also conditioned by developments on the other track of Washington's ME policy--the Reagan Plan. During the spring of 1983, the PLO rejected the proposal and King Husayn announced his inability to join in the negotiations.
The US had pushed to secure an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in response to one of King Husayn's conditions. Between September and April assurances on other matters--including forthcoming US military aid and a willingness to press Israel for a freeze on settlements--were sent by Reagan to Husayn. The President also sent a letter to President Hafiz al-Asad urging Syrian participation in negotiations that would include the Golan Heights. The US embassy in Amman reported Optimistically about the King's intentions. The State Department was remarkably confident about the prospects for a breakthrough.
By March, however, US impatience with the King's postponements was beginning to show. Shultz said on 13 March that he thought "it's time" for the King to decide on entering negotiations. But Husayn could neither obtain PLO cooperation, nor would he enter talks on his own. The Palestine National Council, meeting in February 1983 had rejected the Reagan Plan and Yasir 'Arafat could not deliver backing even after Husayn had made further concessions to him. The absence of Saudi and other Arab support and the King's apparent belief that the US could not secure Israeli concessions were other factors in his decision. While Israel's own opposition to the plan can be cited as a further discouraging point, that position would not have prevented--rather it would have enhanced--the King's opportunity to use diplomatic means in driving a wedge between Israel and the US to Jordan's and the Arab's advantage. On 11 April, Husayn announced his decision not to accept the Reagan Plan.
Reagan, understandably, insisted that his plan was still alive. While there was an element 0 political and diplomatic expediency in such pronouncements which continued in the following months--his initiative's poor prospects did not negate its persistent importance. The objective of a West Bank and Gaza Strip federated to Jordan was now official US policy, remaining the linchpin of Washington's efforts toward solving the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The most immediate effect of Husayn's decision was to produce American denunciations of the PLO and an even sharper turn toward improved relations with Israel. For example, only a week after Husayn's announcement. Washington reversed an earlier decision and agreed to allow Israel to buy American-designed components for its new Lavie aircraft. Two months later, Eagleburger announced that US-Israel relations were "back on an even keel", and two days later, Weinberger indicated his willingness to reinstate the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding which had been suspended following Israel's extension of its Law to the Golan.
Recognizing the erroneous advice he had received over Jordanian, Saudi and Syrian intentions, Shultz proceeded to shake up the State Department hierarchy during the summer. The Assistant Secretary of State, Veliotes, was named Ambassador to Egypt and was replaced by the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Richard Murphy. Habib went back into retirement, a step he personally recommended since Syria would no longer talk to him; he was replaced by former State Department Counsellor and Deputy National Security Adviser, Robert McFarlane, who was closer to a White House line favoring strong relations with Israel and pressure on the Syrians. Habib's deputy, Morris Draper, was also given a new assignment.
Shortly thereafter, McFarlane was promoted to National Security Adviser, and the former Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, became the new ME negotiator. Both these shifts added to the discontinuity of US regional policy and produced a new alignment in Washington. By the end of 1983, McFarlane and Shultz were allied both on a policy of strategic co-operation with Israel and on a position of maintaining the Marines in Lebanon, having gained Reagan's support for these measures. They were opposed by Weinberger and the Central intelligence Agency (CIA) Director, William Casey, who wanted a quick pull-out of the US forces, and who were worried that the new alignment with Israel would damage US-Arab relations.
If Husayn had agreed to enter negotiations, the Reagan Administration was prepared to put pressure on Israel for concessions; but the failure to take up the US offer opened a new period of much closer US-Israel co-operation. One reason for this development was Washington's attempt to threaten Syria enough to convince it to make a deal over Lebanon. This objective required the US to show enough determination to stay in Lebanon and a willingness to escalate the conflict with Syria--with the added threat of potential military efforts--to frighten Damascus without actually becoming involved in a war.
Given Syria's awareness of domestic opposition to staying in Lebanon in both Israel and the US, it was obviously difficult for such a bluff to succeed. Syria continued to have many more incentives for staying rather than withdrawing from Lebanon. Shultz's July visit to Syria made no headway. At the same time, Washington favored Amin Jumayyil's suspension of the Lebanon-Israel pact in a futile attempt to keep the door open for changes that might win Syrian acceptance.
THE MARINES UNDER ASSAULT
Meanwhile, Israel was moving toward a partial pull-back in Lebanon. The issues leading Jerusalem toward this step included: continuing casualties, domestic opposition, disillusion with Jumayyil's willingness to accept bilateral normalization of relations and his ability to gain control of the country, and frustration with US policy. The frustration developed out of a paradox in the American position or, rather, from conflicts in the successive and contradictory stands emanating from Washington. From January to April 1983, the US had pressed for a rapid Israeli withdrawal of Israeli troops. Once the Reagan Plan was rejected and the US adopted a tough policy toward Syria, there was a complete turnabout. Now, from June 1983 onwards, the US wanted Israel to stay in Lebanon-perhaps even to initiate threats against Syria--and hinted Beirut might suspend the bilateral agreement worked out by Washington itself only weeks earlier.
Worried that a partial Israeli pull-back from the hotly-contested Shuf mountains would be a step toward permanent partition of Lebanon and would only further encourage Syrian intransigence, Washington tried to convince Begin to hold the line. It won two postponements of the withdrawal to give US negotiators more time to make headway with Damascus. But the failure to make progress shifted Washington toward finally accepting the Israeli move in August.
With the Shuf now under the control of pro-Syrian Druze forces, the US Marines guarding the airport in Beirut's southern suburbs came under increasing artillery and sniper fire. They had originally arrived in August 1982 to monitor the PLO's retreat from Beirut. After that was accomplished, they left on 10 September, but 1,600 Marines returned nineteen days later, after the Sabra and Shatila massacres. Reagan announced: 'There is no intention or expectation that US armed forces will become involved in hostilities'.
At first, the Marines were left alone by the local forces, although the US embassy in Beirut was hit by a suicide car-bomb on 18 April 1983, with the loss of forty lives, mostly Lebanese employees. A month later, the US and Israel signed a confidential agreement recognizing Israel's right to retaliate against terrorist attacks and accepting a delay in Israeli withdrawal until Syria and the PLO did so. During July and August, shelling and sniper attacks increased against the Marine position near Beirut airport. About a dozen American soldiers were killed during those two months. Reagan's reaction was to order an additional 2,000 Marines onto US warships off Lebanon's coast, and to permit US artillery to wage 'aggressive defence' tactics against harassing gun positions. In mid-September, US Navy guns fired in support of Lebanese army forces defending themselves against advances by the Druse militia.
The casualties and change in Reagan's military strategy provoked much debate in Congress. A compromise was reached giving the President eighteen months to maintain US forces in Lebanon. This timing was important because two weeks later, on 23 October, a suicide truck-bomb destroyed the Marines' barracks and killed 241 American soldiers. The strong reaction in the US greatly increased domestic political opposition to a continued American presence. Public opinion, however, remained mixed. A New York Times poll taken just after the heavy casualties showed that 48% supported the Marines going to Lebanon, and 34% thought that the Government had adequately explained why the Marines were there. About 50% thought the Marines could not keep peace, against 37% who were more optimistic. Over 35% favored withdrawal against only 21% who wanted to continue the present mission. With 1984 a presidential election year, partisan and popular criticism had a reinforcing effect. The Reagan Administration at first argued against a pull-out, but, in February, abruptly withdrew the Marines.
An additional factor was a US air raid against Syrian positions in December after reconnaissance flights were fired upon. Two American planes were shot down, with one airman killed and another captured. The latter officer was freed through the intervention of the Democratic presidential candidate, Jesse Jackson, who made a highly publicized visit to Damascus in January 1984.
STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC ISSUES
US concerns continued over the regional activities of Libya's leader, Col. Mu'ammar Qadhafi, and the Iranian Islamic regime under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni's guidance. Four US AWACS reconnaissance planes were sent to Egypt in February 1983 after Washington charged Qadhafi with planning a coup in Sudan. The US Ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, stated: 'The US has a strong strategic interest in assuring that Qadhafi is not able to upset governments or to intervene militarily in other countries, as is currently happening in Chad'.
US-Egyptian relations remained strong, although somewhat more distant than during their high point under President Anwar al-Sadat. There were worrisome reports of growing anti-Americanism and about the ineffectiveness of the US aid program, which totalled around $1 billion in 1973. Washington's efforts focused on important infrastructure programs, such as improving the Cairo sewers.
President Husni Mubarak was supportive of the Reagan Plan and of joint military maneuvers. "Operation Bright Star 83" was held in August. The two countries were unable to agree, though, on terms for upgrading the Egyptian base at Ra's Bands for US use in regional contingency planning.
While the turn toward Lebanon and the Reagan Plan meant less public attention toward Gulf security and the RDF, such concerns still retained a high priority for Washington. Yet the Administration's earlier single-minded emphasis on these problems had so declined that it was necessary, periodically, for official spokesmen to reiterate continued interest.
By the end of 1982, the RDF had 230,000 Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force personnel theoretically available to the Florida-headquartered Central Command force in time of emergency. The RDF's jurisdiction covered US activities in the Gulf and twenty countries, but not including Israel. In practice, however, the US was still a long way from having an effective regional strike force.
The Pentagon's Defense Guidance statement--its five-year master plan for the 1984-88 period--ranked the defense of South-west Asia as second only to the defence of North America and Western Europe. This study explained:
"Our principal objectives are to assure continued access to Persian Gulf oil and to prevent the Soviets from acquiring political-military control of the oil directly or through proxies. It is essential that the Soviet Union be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict should it seek to reach oil resources of the Gulf. Whatever the circumstances, we should be prepared to introduce American forces directly into the region should it appear that the security of access to Persian Gulf oil is threatened."
A Congressional Budget Office report warned in February 1983 that reinforcement of the RDF would leave gaps in Europe that would weaken NATO in the event of a conflict there. The report continued that the RDF, as currently constituted, had little chance of stopping a major Soviet thrust but "could probably support of friendly Arab states involved in regional conflicts." The Defense Department prepared secret plans to provide Jordanian strike force to act in the event of a Gulf crisis. After news of this proposal became public in the autumn of 1983, Congress cut the funds for the project.
A fresh concern for the US in 1983-84 was the possibility that Iraq would use its new French-built Super-Etendard planes equipped with anti-ship Exocet missiles to attack tankers going to Iran. The Iranians, in turn, threatened to close the Gulf to oil tankers. The US made it clear that in such a contingency its military forces would make sure that the Gulf remained open to shipping. The Secretary of State stated in October 1983 that Washington would not accede to blackmail in closing the Gulf.
To avoid even the need for such military action--and responding to reports that Iraq might crumble under the Iranian onslaught--the Reagan Administration carefully considered a tilt toward Iraq. Such ideas were bolstered when, in the middle of the policy reassessment, terrorist attacks organized by Iranian-supported elements struck at the US Marines in Lebanon and the US embassy in Kuwait.
The problem was how the US might actually help Iraq. Direct and indirect economic assistance was granted, as was encouragement for Baghdad to find ways of increasing its oil exports. Some intelligence information was already being shared. In December, Ambassador Rumsfeld became the highest US official to visit Baghdad in six years. Yet the US remained cautious in avoiding involvement in the Iraqi-Iranian war.
SUMMING UP
The years 1982-1983 saw swings in US-Israel relations and in the Reagan Administration's hopes for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the end of the period, the status of the Washington-Jerusalem alliance was at a high point without having caused clear material damage to US-Arab relations. The absence of a major crisis in the Gulf had eased some American fears of the post-Iranian revolutionary era.
Lebanon had emerged as a focal point for American concerns and involvement after a serious attempt to reestablish Lebanese sovereignty under a pro-American government. While hopes for progress on Lebanon and the Reagan Plan continued to motivate the Reagan Administration, those months had provided a lesson in the difficulty of finding solutions to regional problems. At the same time, the lack of any immediate major regional flare-up had prevented the need for any major shifts of policy or intervention.