By Barry Rubin
United States policy toward the Middle East in 1981-82 was marked by a shift away from primary attention toward questions of Gulf security and toward major diplomatic efforts over Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The central new initiative on the latter issue was presented by President Ronald Reagan in September 1982. The prime development pressing this changing focus was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and subsequent American attempts to clear Lebanon of foreign troops.
THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN POLICY
The Reagan Administration, during its first 18 months in office, stressed the creation of a "strategic consensus" among Arab states in the Gulf to be directed against potential Soviet aggression. This program involved the build-up of the US Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) as well as expanded arms sales to countries in the region. Such a viewpoint was largely a reaction to the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. To project American forces into the region, the new Government built on previous plans of the Carter Administration for base construction, the acquisition of rights to use airfields, and the pre-positioning of supplies aboard nearby ships. Washington hoped to mobilize Arab regimes against what it perceived as the threat of Soviet invasion or Moscow-backed subversion in an area whose oil and petroleum-earned wealth made it increasingly important for US strategic interests.
By early 1982, however, this conception was under serious challenge due to three factors:
(1) The Arab states proved largely unresponsive to the material and ideological thrust of US policy. They remained far more worried about actual Israeli and Iranian actions rather than a potential Soviet assault. Given Arab nationalist feelings and the reluctance of many regimes to being over-identified with US objectives doomed Washington's Gulf political strategy from the start, although the development of the RDF and other military planning efforts did continue with some success.
(2) The survival of Ayatollah Khomeyni's regime in Iran and its military success in first expelling Iraqi troops from its own territory and later invading Iraq itself, in the Summer of 1982, made Tehran seem a more immediate threat to the Gulf and highlighted concern over internal-particularly Islamic fundamentalist-threats to the stability of the oil-producing Gulf Arab states.
(3)Perhaps most important, a series of armed clashes and Israeli policies turned the Administration's attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict. A serious military conflict seemed likely to occur unless action was taken, prompting an effort to prevent Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Several events had already strained US-Israeli relations and had raised bilateral antagonisms to a relatively high level even before the invasion of Lebanon. After the defeat of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Syrians in Lebanon, new opportunities and requirements faced US policy in those issue areas.
The series of new Arab-Israeli crises began shortly after the Reagan Administration came to office in January 1981. Fighting between Syrian and Christian forces in eastern Lebanon led to Israeli attacks against Syrian helicopters, followed by the deployment of Syrian anti-aircraft missiles in the Biqa' Valley. In May, Reagan sent Ambassador Philip Habib to negotiate a resolution of the missile crisis. When, shortly thereafter, PLO-Israeli artillery fighting broke out along the Lebanon-Israel border, Habib obtained a ceasefire. The June 1981 Israeli destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, and the July air raids against PLO offices in Beirut, coupled with the earlier events, increased feelings in Washington that Jerusalem's actions might produce broader regional conflict.
The Reagan Administration was already engaged in a major effort to further strengthen its ties with several Arab regimes, most notably Saudi Arabia, motivated by their growing importance for US security interests and the goal of strategic consensus in the Gulf. The sale of AWACS early warning planes to the Saudis was designed to protect the Gulf and oil-fields, but was seen by Israel as a threat to its defenses. In September, trying to assuage some of the Israeli worries about Washington's course, the Government signed a vague strategic cooperation agreement with Prime Minister Menahem Begin.
This accord did not, however, prevent Begin from making strong statements against the AWACS sale during his trip to the US-speeches which Reagan felt violated a promise to remain quiet about the deal. Congress agreed to sell the planes in October, in part motivated by concern over regional stability in the aftermath of the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat. Indeed, at that time, Reagan publicly stated that he would not "permit" Saudi Arabia "to be another Iran." The Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, interpreted this as a warning: "We would not stand by and allow in the event of Saudi requests . . . a government . . . totally unfriendly to the US and the Free World to take over" Saudi Arabia.
Begin's Cabinet was upset by the AWACS deal and by the belief that the tightening US commitment to Saudi Arabia would increase Riyadh's leverage in Washington and undermine the US-Israel alliance. But Israeli government actions only further increased potential estrangement. The Golan Law in December, which marked a step toward annexation of that territory, was harshly criticized within the US and resulted in suspension of the new, though vague, strategic cooperation agreement. The US condemned the move in the UN and 30 of 41 leading American newspapers criticized Israel in editorials on the law; only two were mildly supportive. Resentment toward Israel developed from the belief of many in the Administration that Jerusalem's actions distracted attention from the Gulf security issue, undermined regional stability, and produced strains in US-Arab relations due to continued American support for Israel.
But the Reagan Administration-particularly the Secretary of State, Alexander Haig-was not yet ready to give a high priority to the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the early months of 1981 while awaiting the results of the Israeli elections, many American officials hoped that Begin would be defeated. After the re-election of the Begin coalition, follow-up negotiations on Camp David were held up by Sadat's assassination. Haig went to Cairo in January-February 1982 to explore the Possibility of restarting talks, but chose to wait until after the forthcoming Israeli Withdrawal from Sinai scheduled for April 1982. Washington entertained some worry that if Begin were pressed on the issue of Palestinian autonomy he might not complete the Sinai withdrawal.
In addition to these considerations of timing there were also two other, longer-term factors. First, there was the possibility that Begin might move toward annexation of the occupied territories in retaliation for American pressure. Second, Washington feared that a major initiative on these issues might lead to a breakdown in the ceasefire along the Lebanon-Israel border and an Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Thus, Washington was restrained in its reactions to the harder Israeli line on the West Bank and the removal of mayors there in March and April 1982.
Meanwhile, the US continued to cement its Arab links-and it was hoped, strategic alignments-by arms deliveries to various local states. In early 1982, US. built F-15s began to arrive in Saudi Arabia, and Weinberger spoke of F-16s and mobile anti-aircraft missiles during a visit to Amman, even though such sales had not yet been agreed to by the State Department. Clearly, Haig and Weinberger had different priorities within the framework of administration policy. Haig accented the idea of a strategic consensus as a partial replacement for progress on the Arab-Israeli front while Weinberger accepted Arab arguments that they would be more forthcoming on Gulf security if given concessions on the other issue.
Haig, though, was aware of the dangers of a new explosion on the Lebanese border. Habib and the US Ambassador to Israel, Samuel Lewis, had already prevented several potential Israeli offensives against the PLO. Haig made a major ME speech in May that put a high priority on settling the Lebanese civil war: "Lebanon today is a focal point of danger," he warned. "All of those conditions are present in abundance that might be ignited into a war with far-reaching consequences." He was planning new efforts for July, but any such approach was shattered by Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June.
THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON
Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and its defeat of the PLO and Syrian forces there posed both opportunities and serious problems for the US (see essay "The War in Lebanon: An Overview"). On the one hand, the defeat of two groups seen as Soviet allies-and the clear impotence of Moscow to prevent this result might strengthen American leverage in the region while weakening that of its rival. With the shattering of the stalemate of the Lebanese civil war, some settlement of that long-enduring conflict seemed possible.
Not only was the new Government in Beirut pro-American-with the dominating Christian leadership eager for good ties and aid in reconstruction-but most political factions in the country came to look on the US as protector of Lebanon's sovereignty. Rashid Karami, the most militant of the traditionalist Muslim leaders, said: "We expect guarantees from the US and Saudi Arabia to guarantee the survival of Lebanon." Walid Junblat, leader of the Arab nationalist forces, agreed with this view, and Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan added: "Decisive and concrete measures are needed to put an end to this tragedy in Lebanon and in the ME. The US, more than others, is facing a critical test today."
But Israel's action had also put US policy to a "critical test." Washington had to face the complex diplomatic difficulties of moderating the internal Lebanese conflict and obtaining the departure of foreign troops-Israeli, Palestinian and Syrian. Much worse was the possible effect of Arab anger over the military action by a country aided and supplied by the US. Many Arab politicians and journalists professed to believe that the US had a hand in the invasion and warned of coming political upheavals unless the balance was redressed.
The invasion made it both possible and necessary for a major US initiative on the Arab-Israeli dispute. While Israel's victory brought America some gains, it also produced several points of friction between them and incentives for a Washington gesture toward the Arabs. If the US could be said to hold the cards in resolving the conflict, this leverage would need to be used to demonstrate to Arabs the benefits of aligning themselves with-or at least not against-US objectives. If defeat had made the PLO more pliant and the Jordanians more willing to enter into negotiations, Washington could seize the chance to make a breakthrough.
Israel's invasion also produced a strongly negative reaction from American public opinion. This may have been nurtured in part by media coverage, perceived an often unfair by supporters of Israel. At the same time, however, this also reflected the structure of events. The war had been offensive and not clearly one based on self-defense; the relative ease of Israel's victory seemed to throw into question the intensity of the threat. There were many civilian casualties. The war's supposed scope and purpose had been altered in mid-course. Israeli bombing of West Beirut during the siege and the later massacres of Palestinian refugees at Sabra and Shatila camps at the hands of Lebanese Christian Phalange troops, in an area under Israeli military control, also upset Americans.
Polls indicated that the reaction within the US could easily be exaggerated, but there could be no question that Israel's image had been eroded although the public's view of the PLO had not necessarily been improved. A Washington Post-American Broadcasting Company poll in August 1982 showed that Americans, by a margin of 42% to 22%, thought Israel's invasion and the PLO's removal from Lebanon had changed the ME for the better. They were sympathetic to Israel rather than the Arabs by 52% to 18% (with 16% saying they leaned toward both or neither). But only 33% had a somewhat or very favorable attitude toward Begin, 32% were somewhat, or very, unfavorable. The figures the previous March had stood at 39% to 22%.
A September poll, immediately after the massacres, showed a deeper, though ultimately temporary, trend. By a two-to-one margin the public still considered Israel's motivation for entering Lebanon was self-protection and thought that the PLO's departure from Lebanon improved the ME situation. But Israel's standing as a "reliable ally" had fallen from 64% in October 1981 (24% thought it was not) to only 40% in September 1982 (45% said it was not) Egypt was better regarded than Israel in this category. Begin's favorable rating had declined to 26%, with negative sentiments rising to 47%. sympathy for Israel over the Arabs was by a margin of 48% to 27%, a far narrower gap than in the past
US officials and politicians had additional reasons for friction with lsrael. Perhaps most worrisome for the Administration was that public approval of its handling of ME issues had declined to 45% as opposed to 42%; before the invasion the positive rating of its handling of ME issues ad been 48% to 37%. Several administration took this as a sign requiring them to demonstrate their ability to "control" Israel.
More immediately, they felt that the Begin Government had misled them. First, they had not expected the Israeli invasion. Only a few days before Washington felt it had stopped such a move. There was also surprise at the change from a limited Israeli action in South Lebanon to a march on Beirut. A particular source of friction were different strategies in removing the PLO from West Beirut. While Israeli pressure, in the form of aerial and ground attacks on the PLO conclave, may have helped the negotiating process, American officials believed that the extent and timing of these offensives made their task more difficult and resulted in avoidable civilian casualties.
The resignation of Haig-particularly as it related to power struggles with Administration over the handling of Lebanon and other issues-also prod changes in the overall US position. Haig had been more tolerant of Israeli act in Lebanon and took a line favoring more pressure on West Beirut to obtain a PLO withdrawal. Weinberger and William Clark, the President's national security adviser, put more emphasis on restraining Israel and meeting Saudi concerns. In one key confrontation, Haig wanted to give the impression that further stalling by the PLO would bring another Israeli advance, while Clark was busy assuring the Saudis that the US would not allow this to happen.
Haig's replacement, George Schultz-an economist with past Cabinet experience on international trade and business issues-immediately put great effort into producing a major US initiative on the key ME conflicts. He also depended to a greater extent on the State Department's Bureau of Near East Affairs and tried to rebuild, with varying degrees of success, the Department's links with the National Security Council and the White House.
On 20 August, Habib finally concluded the intricate negotiations on the PLO's removal from Lebanon and the dispersal of its forces in West Beirut to several Arab countries. A multinational force, including American troops, was put into place and successfully supervised the evacuation. One minor incident during the PLO's departure-the buzzing of an American navy ship by Israeli aircraft further augmented feelings of tension within the US Administration toward Israel, while Israel was no less unsettled by Washington's tendency to claim all the credit for Habib in obtaining the PLO's removal from Lebanon. Moreover, on I September, Reagan made a major speech calling for a new initiative on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the problems of the Palestinians and the occupied territories.
THE REAGAN PLAN
Even during the negotiations over West Beirut, the Administration had been planning its longer-term response to the changed conditions in the region. As soon as Shultz became Secretary of State on 16 July he made this his top priority. The former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, explained the "Jordanian option" to Shultz, who modified a draft from Near East Bureau, specialists which tended further in the direction of a Palestinian State to reflect this viewpoint.
The Reagan speech was in line with previous US policy as it had developed in the aftermath of the 1967 war through the Rogers Plan, Camp David, and other initiatives; but it prescribed, in a more detailed way than ever before, a proposed solution for the political and territorial issues at stake. Only further diplomatic efforts would show whether the plan's objective and approach could win Israeli, Arab or Palestinian support. (See chapter on Israel.)
Reagan described his position as the "next step" in the Camp David "autonomy talks to pave the way for permitting the Palestinian people to exercise their legitimate rights." He said the Lebanon war, "tragic as it was, has left us with a new opportunity for ME peace ... The military losses of the PLO have not diminished the yearning of the Palestinian people for a just solution of their claims ... while Israel's military successes in Lebanon have demonstrated that its armed forces are second to none in the region, they alone cannot bring just and lasting peace to Israel and her neighbors." The question is "how to reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians." This must be done at the negotiating table, rather than on the battlefield, and would involve concessions by both sides.
The US, Reagan continued, had a "special responsibility ... No other nation is in a position to deal with the key parties to the conflict on the basis of trust and reliability." Israel deserved Arab recognition and, Reagan implied, some revisions to the pre-1967 boundaries. Up to that point, said the President, in a phrase he personally added, Israel had lived in narrow borders, in artillery range of hostile Arab armies: "I am not about to ask Israel to live that way again."
While the US had hitherto functioned as mediator, he went on, it would now express its own view. As provided at Camp David, there would be a five-year transition after the election of a self-governing Palestinian authority to prove the Palestinians could run their own affairs. Meanwhile, the US would not support the
construction of any more Israeli settlements: "The immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks."
But what specifically was Reagan proposing? "Peace cannot be achieved," he stated, "by the formation of an independent Palestinian state." The preferred American solution was "self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan." Such a Jordanian reluctance had prevented any serious effort being made along these lines. The Reagan Administration considered whether the proliferation of Israeli settlements on the West Bank and the PLO's setback in Lebanon had so chastened the PLO and had so convinced Jordan of the need for haste that the two would co-operate lest the territories be lost to Israel forever. This could lead them toward negotiations and recognition of Israel on a basis acceptable to the US.
Israel had not been consulted before Reagan's announcement of his new plan since Washington feared a leak. Begin quickly rejected the proposal. As had happened in the past, the Administration also seemed to have been overoptimistic about a supportive Saudi response, although Jordan reacted very positively toward the idea. Washington tried to follow up the program with a series of diplomatic efforts.
To put the Reagan speech in perspective, it is necessary to understand that this approach grew out of the growing feeling that the US must show progress in solving the Arab-Israeli issue-or, at least, to demonstrate energetic attempts in that direction-to retain its influence in the Arab world. The policy was meant to show the Arabs that America was trying to respond to their grievances. There was also an important domestic component since dramatic action was deemed necessary to prove that the Administration had ME policy under control. It was hoped that a broad consensus at home could be built on behalf of the proposals. This last effort seems to have been relatively successful as even a number of prominent Jewish leaders endorsed Reagan's approach.
There was certainly a clear recognition that the US must play a central role in any emerging peace process. In Schultz's words, the events in Lebanon "demonstrated that we Americans have a special responsibility in the efforts to bring peace to the area. No one else has the credibility-and therefore the ability-to
provide the crucial link to all sides."
Reactions were more mixed at the Arab summit of Fez, a week after Reagan's speech (see essay on inter-Arab relations). Behind the scenes, the US asked Saudi Arabia to work for a final resolution that would not attack the Reagan Plan and, preferably, would even endorse it. Washington reacted optimistically to the Rabat statement even though it did not mention the US proposal and adopted a watered down version of the Fahd Plan, and although King Husayn had not received the hoped-for mandate to negotiate over the territories' future. Vice-President George Bush claimed that the Fez resolution meant implicit Arab recognition of Israel. Shultz thought the Fez meeting could be a "genuine breakthrough." He added: "There might be an implied recognition of Israel. I hope that is so."
Meanwhile, the US marines who had come to Lebanon as part of a multinational force to supervise the PLO's departure, left Beirut on 10 September despite local expressions of concern over the safety of the West Beirut population. After the assassination of President Bashir Jumayyil, Israeli troops entered West Beirut and several hundred Palestinian refugees were murdered by Christian Phalange troops in the Sabra and Shatila camps. (See essay on Lebanon.)
Washington reacted angrily to the Israeli advance, which was stated to be in conflict with the agreement worked out by Habib. Israeli prestige in the US was further eroded by the massacres at Sabra and Shatila. Dozens of Congressmen wrote to Begin asking for a full-scale investigation. The 1,200 US marines again, returned to Beirut, despite some domestic concerns over the commitment. Washington called on the Lebanese Government to safeguard Palestinian rights there and voted at the UN to condemn the Israeli incursion and the massacre.
At the UN, however, the US generally defended Israel, opposing militant resolutions calling for punitive measures against Israel over the invasion of Lebanon; vetoing a proposed ban on military aid to Israel; and resisting attempts to expel Israel from the organization. Shultz told the General Assembly in late September that Israel must yield territory to gain peace, and that the Palestinians had an "undeniable claim" to some form of self-rule.
In the following months, the main focus of US attention was to negotiate a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon, using Habib and other envoys to achieve this aim. The American position was that the Lebanese Government could not afford to reach a peace treaty with Israel due to domestic and Arab pressures. Israel disagreed and its Defence Minister, Ariel Sharon, even accused the US of blocking a political arrangement. While talks dragged on without much progress being made by early 1983, the US provided $82 million for emergency relief in Lebanon and $30 million to supplement housing and essential services.
The question of foreign troops in Lebanon and of continued Israeli settlements in the occupied territories assumed even greater importance once King Husayn had made the withdrawal of troops and a freeze on settlements as pre-conditions for his participation in negotiations. During a visit to Washington, he also suggested that he might organize a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation with West Bank notables responsive to, though not members of, the PLO. Reagan chose to await a more definite offer from Husayn, and tried to encourage steps in that direction by linking his decision with future arms supplies.
US aid to Israel was untouched by the friction on the political level. The Administration repeatedly asserted that direct pressure on Israel involving such funds would be counter-productive. Israel obtained not only $2.5 billion in assistance from the US 1982 Budget-$1.7 billion for economic aid and $785 million for military aid but an additional $510 million by way of earlier loans converted into outright grants. US military aid to Israel remained steady at around $1 billion a year between 1977 and 1980.
The White House was opposed to improving the aid terms, and four powerful chairmen of key committees had supported this position-Senators Charles Percy and Mark Hatfield of the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations committees, and Representative Clement Zablocki and Jamie Whitten of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs and Appropriations committees. Mutual credibility in the bilateral relationship had clearly declined. The President who remained the Administration's strongest supporter of the Israel alliance, felt deceived by the revival of Begin's opposition to the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia in September 1981, by the extension of the campaign in Lebanon beyond the 45 km line, by the continued attacks on West Beirut while Habib was trying to negotiate the PLO's withdrawal from the city, and by Israel's entrance into West Beirut after Jumayyil's assassination. Further frictions resulted from the slow pace of negotiations for Israeli military withdrawal from Lebanon. Israel was also blamed for lack of progress on autonomy talks.
On the Israeli side, leaders were baffled by changing signals on US attitudes toward Syria, the PLO, and Lebanon (see chapter on Israel). The feeling was that the invasion had benefitted the US by weakening its enemies and enhancing its leverage in the Arab world. The Reagan Plan was believed to be in conflict with the Camp David accords. Ariel Sharon, before his removal in February 1983, frequently criticized the US, accusing it of attempting to divide Israel politically return to the 1967 borders. American negotiators generally supported the Lebanese regime's view that recognition of Israel would bring unacceptable costs for it at home and in the Arab world. This produced Israeli government charges that the US was slowing down the negotiations.
Washington's Arab strategy, reinforced by the Reagan Plan approach, was to encourage Saudi Arabia and Jordan to support some form of negotiations and de facto recognition of Israel. Such a development could include some implicit role arrangement. But by early 1983, hopes of changing Arab positions had also not been fulfilled.
STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC ISSUES
While the events of 1981-82 meant less American attention toward Gulf security and the RDF, such concerns still retained a high priority for Washington. Yet the Administration's single-minded emphasis on these problems had so declined that it was necessary for official spokesmen periodically to reiterate continued interest.
By the end of 1982, the RDF had 230,000 army, navy, marines and air force personnel, theoretically available in time of emergency, coordinated by the Florida headquarters of the "Central Command." The RDF's jurisdiction covered US activities in the Gulf and 20 other countries, but not including Israel. In practice, however, the US was still a long way from having an effective regional strike force. The Pentagon's Defence Guidance statement-its five-year master plan for the 1984-88 period-ranked the defence of South-West Asia as second only to the defence of North America and Western Europe. This study explained:
"Our principal objectives are to assure continued access to Persian Gulf oil and to prevent the Soviets from acquiring political-military control of the oil directly or through proxies. It is essential that the Soviet Union be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict should it seek to reach oil resources of the Gulf. Whatever the circumstances, we should be prepared to introduce American forces directly into the region should it appear that the security of access to Persian Gulf oil is threatened."
While the RDF's ability to project forces into the region remained limited, it was steadily improving. According to Defence Department estimates, a tactical fighter unit could be on the scene in several hours, an amphibious battalion of 1,800 marines would be deliverable within 48 hours, an army airborne brigade of 3,000 within four days, and the rest of an army division within two weeks. But 35 days would be required to bring in supporting heavy artillery and a mechanized division. The goal set for the RDF was to have the entire force transferred to the Gulf in five weeks, but this would be attainable only in the late 1980s.
Arrangements were made for the use and, sometimes, the improvement of existing facilities and for the pre-placement of supplies in the region on board ships. But Congress cut in half funds for construction work at the projected Ra's Bands airfield for 1982-83 because Egypt refused to sign an agreement guaranteeing US use of the base. On the other hand, Turkey agreed to America's proposals for Military co-operation (see chapter on Turkey). Morocco signed an agreement allowing the American use of airbases there for training and in case of an emergency. Similar agreements had already been reached with Somalia and Oman, and for the expansion and use of the base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
The line-up of American alliances and enmities in the region remained essentially the same during 1981-82. Relations with Syria continued to be frigid; Damascus strongly opposed the Reagan Plan; and Iranian hostility toward the US continued unabated (see chapters on Syria and Iran). Progress was slow in resolving American companies' commercial claims despite the efforts of a special commission established as part of the settlement of the hostage issue.
Libyan diplomatic representatives were ordered out of the US in May 1981. Several years earlier, the Carter Administration had decided not to hold maneuvers in the Libyan-claimed Gulf of Sirte to avoid any confrontation. The Reagan Administration, determined to reassert American strength, disdained such diffidence. On 19 August 1981, during naval exercises, American carrier planes were attacked by Libyan fighters and shot down two of the interceptor aircraft 60 miles off the coast. In the following months, American intelligence sources claimed that Qadhafi had dispatched a "hit squad" to kill President Reagan and other high-ranking officials. Conclusive evidence of such a plot was never brought to light, though Libyan agents did intimidate and, in one case, attempted to kill dissident Libyans in the US. During 1982, American citizens were told by Washington to leave Libya, although US oil companies continued to operate there.
Iranian military successes against Iraq and Tehran's counter-invasion of that country in the Summer of 1982 kept alive American fears about Gulf stability (see essay on Iraqi-Iranian war). Washington continued its overtly neutral position, but gave some signals of an interest in improving relations with Baghdad. These signals included the removal of Iraq from a list of countries considered as supporters of international terrorism, and the clearance of some equipment sales and food credits for Iraq. Iraq also responded relatively favorably toward US regional initiatives.
The Administration also continued to strengthen ties with Pakistan and Turkey, which both received large amounts of military assistance. Egypt's share of American aid funds climbed higher during this period, although the attempts at political co-ordination-so visible during Sadat's rule-were largely absent under his successor, President Husni Mubarak.
American economic ties with the ME and North Africa also continued to grow. According to US Department of Commerce figures, exports to Arab countries were up 6% in 1982 over 1981, totalling $20.6 billion. Sales to Saudi Arabia were up 23% to $9 billion, and those in Egypt rose 26% to $2.9 billion. Other major customers were: Israel, $2.3 billion; the United Arab Emirates (UAE), $1.1 billion; Kuwait, $941 million; Algeria, $939 million; Iraq, $846 million; Jordan $620 million; Morocco, $397 million; and Libya, $301 million.
By contrast, imports from the ME were cut in half between 1981 and 1982 to a total of $15.6 billion. This was due to reductions in oil purchases and to declining petroleum prices. The largest ME and North African exporters to the US were: Saudi Arabia, $7.4 billion; Algeria, $2.7 billion; the UAE, $2 billion; Israel, $1.2 billion; and Iran, $600,000. The US achieved its first trade surplus with the region since oil prices rose steeply a decade earlier. American oil purchases from the Arabs fell from $15.6 billion in the first half of 1981 to $8.1 billion in the first half of 1982. New discoveries and the pricing structure made oil from Mexico and other non-Arab suppliers more attractive. US trade with Libya suffered a particular decline because of official discouragement of commerce with that country.
Meanwhile, Arab investments in the US (not including direct corporate investments) reached $71.3 billion by mid-1982 according to Treasury Department figures. Of this amount, $43.3 billion were in US government securities, $6.3 billion were in corporate bonds, and $9.5 billion in corporate stock, while $7.7 billion was on deposit in US banks. However, predictions that these investments and other elements of economic leverage would increase Arab pressures and influence over US policy and influence over US policy remained unfulfilled. In one area-a fall in overall American oil imports and a diversification of sources to other parts of the world-this linkage actually declined.
While the Administration could claim little to show for its own policies, the American position in the ME was strengthened by local events. The continuing pressure and concern placed on Arab Gulf countries by the Iraqi-Iranian war, and the particular worries this brought for Amman and Baghdad, seemed to indicate that the US was the power best able to protect Gulf stability. The defeats of Soviet-allied Syria and the PLO in Lebanon-and Moscow's poor performance in that conflict-also reinforced the idea that the US held the best cards in mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict.
It was difficult, though, to take advantage of such seeming opportunities. The dangers of pushing Iran into Soviet arms and of a regional backlash against American involvement in the region's conflicts pointed to the need to maintain US neutrality in the conflict. Still, the majority of the region's governments maintained their important American connections through behind-the-scenes contacts, large-scale arms sales and either direct or indirect interest in the RDF.
The problem for the US on the Arab-Israeli front was that it could not easily alter the positions of either side to make possible a negotiating breakthrough. The Reagan Plan provided a credible American effort in that direction, but hopes of a major change in Jordanian or PLO positions were, at least for the short run, disappointed.
Frustrations were bound to affect American-Israeli relations, given their very different conceptions of the ME political situation. Washington considered Israeli actions to be disruptive of delicate regional arrangements and threatening to US interests since it would be blamed by the Arabs for Israeli actions or for failing to get Israel to change its positions. The Begin Government believed that the US wanted to take the advantages arising from Israeli actions-e.g. defusing Iraqi nuclear potential, defeating the Syrians and PLO in Lebanon-while foisting the political costs on to them. Hints of pressure on Jerusalem were taken as a substitute for American ability to moderate Arab positions.
Given the fact that bilateral ties were subjected to the greatest strain in many years, the US-Israel relationship survived to a surprising extent. US relations also remained strong with Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia-although it proved equally difficult to employ such connections for Washington's diplomatic purposes.
In many ways, these were classic problems for America's ME policies; but the dramatic events of 1981-82 revived them in an accentuated manner. For while the overall interests and broad outlines of policy for the US in the ME seemed relatively stable, no clear policy had yet emerged to cope with them.
This chapter originally appeared in Colin Legum et al, Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1981-82, Vol. 6 (NY, 1983). Reprinted with the permission of the Dayan Center.