By Barry Rubin
American policy toward the Middle East shifted sharply in 1980-81 in an attempt to respond to developments in the region and to changing US perceptions. These changes were inspired by the Iranian revolution and the Shah's fall, the hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the increasing importance of the Persian Gulf as a petroleum, financial and strategic center, and the different views of the Administration of President Ronald Reagan, which took power in January 1981.
During its final months, the Carter Administration was preoccupied with the task of freeing the American diplomats held hostage in Iran, a task accomplished only in its last hours. Already, a reassessment of the American position in the ME had begun, prompted by the need for a new structure of Gulf security, an apparently increasing threat of Soviet involvement in the region, and the growing importance of US-Saudi ties.
The Reagan Administration's priorities, however, also contrasted with those of its predecessor, with emphasis on the Gulf, on military solutions to preserving American influence, and to the Soviet threat replacing earlier concerns over progress towards solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, diplomatic efforts, and prime consideration to the internal and regional causes of instability in the ME. Military sales, the search for base or facility rights, and the building up of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) were key elements in this transition.
CONFLICT WITH IRAN: THE HOSTAGE CRISIS
Events in the Autumn of 1980 marked the beginning of the end of the hostage crisis. Washington watched closely the convening of an Iranian Parliament capable of making a deal and the Iraqi invasion in September of Iran's Khuzistan province. The US declared neutrality in the conflict, not wanting to damage the chances of liberating the hostages, and fearing the conflict's threat to regional stability. Yet, by heightening Iran's isolation and increasing the effectiveness of American political and economic sanctions, the war had a positive effect on resolving US-Iran differences.
Secret American initiatives, including letters from the Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, and contacts between the Deputy-Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, and the Iranian representative in West Germany, Sadeq Tabataba'i, were also carried forward. The Iranians were told that some settlement could be reached on three of their demands: the return of their frozen assets abroad, an end to private US law-suits against Tehran, and an American pledge of future non-intervention in Iran's internal affairs. But they were told, a fourth issue-the return of the Shah's wealth-would be harder to resolve.
The White House preferred to settle the hostage conflict before the 4 November Presidential elections. Even though the hostage issue was rarely referred to directly by the candidates, it was very much on the minds of the American people. Reagan complained he did not "understand why 52 Americans have been held for almost a year now"; and his Vice-Presidential running mate, George Bush, accused Iran of using the hostages to "manipulate" the election and claimed that Tehran favored Carter.
While such accusations were unjust, the Administration's on-and-off optimism and hints of a quick solution fuelled popular discontent. Americans, used to action and success, were growing weary of Carter's apparent lack of success. and with their country's apparent impotence. It was easy to assume that a harder line, as represented by Reagan, would have brought faster results.
The Majlis began the debate over its conditions for releasing the hostages on 26 October. These reached a conclusion on 2 November, only hours before Americans went to the polls. They demanded the dropping of law-suits, the promise of future non-intervention, and the return of frozen assets as well as the Shah's
purported wealth in America.
While some Iranian leaders-particularly in President Abul-Hasan Bani-Sadr's camp-worried about a Reagan election victory, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni and his clerical supporters saw scarcely any difference between the two candidates. Indeed, Khomeyni himself had sworn that Carter would not be re-elected and had predicted his defeat. The Iranian leaders had a particular hatred for Carter, who they identified with opposition to the revolution, both before and after its victory and who they despised as the man who had admitted the Shah into the US.
While there was some vague hope of using the US elections to gain negotiating leverage, there was little effort to put this into practice. At any rate, the desire for revenge against Carter, Iranian misconceptions about American politics, and the disorganized state of the Tehran Government all prevented the Iranians from taking full advantage of the situation.
This was not, however, the way it appeared to many Americans at the time. The hostage issue's high visibility in the election campaign's closing days brought Carter's seeming inability to secure the hostages' freedom into sharp focus. At the same time it raised suspicions about some last-minute manipulations of negotiations for political purposes; thus, the Democrats had the worst from both sides of the issue. When the Majlis finally did make its last-minute offer on a settlement, the White House took the principled position of deferring consideration until after the election.
Reagan's victory was due to a number of factors, including the state of the American economy. Still, the hostage crisis played an important role since it furthered the Carter Administration's reputation for indecisiveness and inept implementation of its policies. According to one poll, 23% of those who switched their votes late in the campaign.cited the hostage crisis, expressing the belief that Reagan could do more to solve it. Of those crucial "swing" voters, 20% saw the hostage crisis as Carter's greatest failure.
Once the election was over, the defeated Carter Administration could concentrate its attention on the negotiations for the two and a half months left of its term. On 10 November a US delegation led by Warren Christopher and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia Affairs, Harold Saunders, went to Algeria. For over two months they painstakingly worked out a deal, always operating through Algerian intermediaries and never holding direct talks. Success did not seem preordained. The Iranian negotiators seemed concerned that any step they took might be interpreted as contrary to their parliamentary mandate. The Americans had to worry about the limitations of US law. In mid-December, when Iran suddenly demanded $24 billion in guarantees for the return of the frozen funds of the Royal Family's wealth, it looked as if the talks would fail. Washington took a tough stand. If this was the final Iranian position, said the American team, an agreement was impossible. A deadline of 16 January was set as the last possible moment when the outgoing Carter Administration might implement any arrangement. President-elect Reagan's attacks on the Iranians were designed to show them that procrastination past 20 January would hardly secure them a better deal.
By January 1981 several short-range factors were helping the efforts for a settlement. The intensification of Iran's internal problems, the strain of war, the high rates of inflation and unemployment, and Iran's need to increase oil exports all pressed for attention. Tehran needed an end to the sanctions imposed by America and its allies, as well as the quickest possible return of the frozen assets.
The coming American transfer of power was also involved in this process. It was not that the Iranians feared Reagan, but rather that the change to a new Government would set back talks for months and possibly unravel what had already been achieved. Time was no longer on Iran's side, and the deadline forced a clear decision. Finally, on the morning of 20 January, the agreement was completed; the hostages' plane finally took off dramatically during the inauguration ceremony, only minutes after Carter had left office.
The arrangements involved the return of just under $8 billion of Iranian assets which had been frozen by the US Government. Of these, $5.5 billion were held in foreign branches of American banks, $1.4 billion had been deposited in the Federal Reserve Banks, $940 million was in Iranian gold held by the US, and $137 million was in deliverable Iranian assets. An additional $2.2 billion was deposited in domestic branches of American banks or in other types of assets which would take longer to liquidate.
Only $2.9 billion was immediately sent to Iran after the hostages' release. An additional $3.7 billion was used by Tehran to pay off American bank loans to the Shah's regime-a proposal made by the Iranians themselves in order to sever one more link with the US-while $1.4 billion was put into escrow to cover non-syndicated loans to the Iranian Government, quasi-government institutions or Iranian banks that had since been nationalized. The remaining $2.2 billion in Iranian funds still held by American banks were to be returned later, and $1 billion of this amount was to go into a "security account" to cover claims by American companies. These corporate claims, which totalled over $3 billion, were for broken contracts, nationalized assets and unpaid goods and services from business relationships under the Shah's regime. These companies had filed lawsuits in American courts to regain their losses. According to the agreement, these legal procedures were set aside. An attempt would first be made to settle the dispute directly between the companies and Iran. If this failed, the claim would go to an international commission with American, Iranian and neutral members which would be serviced by the special $1 billion fund. The agreement also barred the hostages and their families from suing Iran.
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY
During 1981 it became fashionable to say that the new Administration had no ME policy. This was generally untrue. The Administration's conservative ideology inclined it toward emphasis on Soviet threats to the region to be met through a build-up of US military forces-themes by no means absent in the later stages of the Carter Administration. Its business ties made the Reagan team especially conscious of the importance of continued supplies of petroleum and of enhancing American trade to the region-particularly Saudi Arabia-as a means of recycling dollars paid for oil imports.
The Shah's fall had already undermined the Nixon Doctrine of dependence on local powers to maintain order. The new policy makers took the view that if America wanted something done, it would have to do it itself. Thus although this was not generally understood, the goal was not to find reliable allies or even surrogates-be they Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia or others-but to enhance the US's own ability to respond to crises. This unilateralist policy had serious weaknesses, mainly because it aimed at responding to worst-case military scenarios rather than striving to prevent them through diplomatic and economic policies, and because it threatened to alienate the local actors.
Certainly, on the question of the Arab-Israeli conflict the Administration had no special solution in mind and generally downplayed the urgency of progress toward some settlements position contrasting with that of the Carter years. Reagan preferred peace and quiet on that front, the better to convince the Arab States to concentrate on the "real" problems of Soviet expansion and subversion. This was the uphill battle for the idea of a "strategic consensus" to line up ME States in an anti-Moscow alignment-even though most of them were more concerned with internal problems and regional battles.
Nevertheless, the Administration wished to preserve the gains of the Camp David accords in order to preserve good relations between two of America's friends. While Reagan himself was on record as a strong supporter of Israel, his Administration could not accept Begin's definition of autonomy because this would undermine US interests in the Arab World. For the same reason, any open admission that the negotiations had failed, or that the US was indifferent to their pace and progress, was unacceptable. A Jordanian solution for the occupied territories' future was foreclosed by Amman's disavowal of any such role. American negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were out of the question, not only for a range of traditional reasons, but also because of the Administration's strong stand against terrorism and its perception of the PLO as a Soviet ally. There was, then, no attractive solution in sight for American policymakers.
While the Government was united over Gulf policy, there were important internal differences on its stand toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, took less seriously Arab demands for the Palestinian question to be settled and for Washington to distance itself from Jerusalem as a precondition for their co-operation. The Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, in charge of lining up Arab States for the anti-USSR strategic consensus, saw a greater need to propitiate Saudi Arabia and other Arab States.
The greater Defense Department role was dictated, in part, by the larger role played by military factors in Administration policy and, in part, by the decline of the National Security Council as a power center, having been relegated to more technical-logistical tasks. The State Department's Bureau of Near East and South Asia Affairs headed by Assistant-Secretary Nicholas Veliotes, was largely cut out of influence during the first months of the new Administration. More important in setting ME strategy was the State Department's Counsellor Robert McFarlane and, in the early months, the Policy Planning Staff. Particularly powerful were President Reagan's own White House advisers, who tended to side with Weinberger against Haig.
There was general consensus in letting the autonomy talks take their own course. No special ambassador was appointed as US representative to replace Ambassador Sol Linowitz who had been appointed by the Carter Administration. Nevertheless, the Administration stood strongly against the European initiative on the ME and constantly reiterated its support for the Camp David agreements. The US was also successful in negotiating for European participation in the multinational force organized to patrol the Sinai.
THE STATE OF US-ISRAELI RELATIONS
A series of events throughout 1981 tended to bring Arab-Israeli conflict issues to center-stage and provoked a great deal of tension in US-Israel relations. These included the PLO's rocket offensive along the Lebanon-included the Syrian Missile crisis, the PLO's rocket offensive along the Lebanese-Israeli border, the 7 June Israeli raid destroying the Iraqi nuclear reactor outside of Baghdad, the 17 July bombing of Beirut buildings Israel, the AWACS controversy, and the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights in December.
Although much of the Administration expected Menahem Begin to be defeated in Israel's June 1981 elections, early signals from the White House nonetheless seemed to favor Begin's views: the implication that the US did not see settlements in the occupied territories as illegal; the attacks on Syria as a Soviet client state; and the emphasis on terrorism as a major international threat.
However, when Syria's placement of missiles in Lebanon was met by Israeli threats to destroy them, Washington was horrified and Philip Habib, a veteran diplomat, was sent on a shuttle diplomacy mission to help ease the situation and to try to relax the conflict in Lebanon. While Habib was not able to convince Damascus to remove the rockets, he did succeed in defusing potential conflict for the time being. American belief that Saudi Arabia had aided Habib's efforts strengthened Washington's hope that the Kingdom could be an important force for stability and peace in the region.
The successful Israeli raid against lraq's nuclear reactor sparked a negative reaction in the US, where it was perceived as a move escalating the possibility of regional conflict. The attack was particularly embarrassing to the US because of the use of American-built planes provided to Israel for purposes of self-defense--a matter on which American and Israeli definitions differed.
The American attitude was demonstrated at the UN where Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick worked out a resolution with Iraq's concordance providing for condemnation of Israel but with no sanctions against it. The supply of American F-16s to Israel was also suspended. On 17 July, the day when the Administration was to announce renewal of shipments, Israeli planes attacked PLO offices in Beirut, and inflicted heavy civilian casualties, further antagonizing American. official and public opinion.
The US did, however, help organize a ceasefire along the Lebanon-Israel border, involving PLO agreement, to end the bombardment of northern Israel. In mid-August, Washington again began to supply Israel with advanced aircraft.
One result of this series of events was to raise the question of Israel's reliability and predictability among American policymakers. An aspect of this problem was the two countries' mutual misperceptions. Americans saw Israel as acting from a sense of over-confidence that it could force Washington to approve of anything it did, rely on high levels of US aid while, at the same time, ignoring America's own conceived interests in the ME. The Israelis, however, believed that insecurity over the future of US support required them to strengthen their own positions and repeatedly to demonstrate heir independence of Washington.
US-SAUDI RELATIONS: THE AWACS AGREEMENT
A demonstration of this paradox was the fierce battle over the sale of AWACS advance-warning radar planes to Saudi Arabia. After the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian war in September 1980, four planes complete with air crews and ground support personnel were sent to Saudi Arabia. In October the Saudis announced their interest in purchasing the planes.
Saudi desires to purchase the AWACS were accompanied by requests initiated earlier for Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, auxiliary fuel tanks, and bomb racks for US-built F-15s already purchased by Saudi Arabia. as well as orders for tanker planes able to extend the range of those fighter-bombers. The Carter Administration had promised Israel in 1978 that such equipment--which enhanced Saudi ability to fight or attack Israel--would not be sold, an assurance designed to win Israel's acceptance for the original sale of the F-15s. In November 1980, however, the Carter Administration made a preliminary decision to sell these items. After conducting its own assessment, the incoming Reagan Administration endorsed that decision.
Advocates of the $8.5 billion sale argued that it would enhance Saudi security, help protect the oilfields and the Persian Gulf area against aggression by Soviet or local radical forces, aid American military and intelligence-gathering efforts, and strengthen US-Saudi relations. Opponents saw this step as endangering America's most secret technology in a country whose security, stability and friendship was questionable; as threatening Israel's security; and as entangling US interests with a regime whose fall might be encouraged by excessive military transfers, leaving Washington in a situation similar to that which followed the Shah's overthrow. Failure to deliver the AWACS, the Administration rejoined, would severely undermine American credibility in the Gulf.
Since Congress could veto the proposed sale through a majority vote in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, these became the main salient in the struggle over the sale of the AWACS, though the Administration quickly focused its efforts on the former. During September and October of 1981, the question became virtually the main issue in the US, with lobbyists on both sides engaged in a fierce struggle. While the outlook for the White House seemed bleak at first particularly because of poor handling of the issue by the Executive branch-the authority and bargaining ability of the President gradually gained the upper hand. The assassination of Egypt's President Anwar at-Sadat on 6 October was generally taken to show the need for American gestures to support local allies and brought additional votes favoring the deal. Nevertheless, a Los Angeles Times poll published on 8 October showed 56% of Americans opposing and only 29% favoring the AWACS sale.
Since Israel and its supporters strongly opposed the sale, the Reagan Administration attempted to assuage them by promises of further aid to Israel and a strategic alliance agreement with Jerusalem. The continued conflict between the Administration and pro-Israel forces over AWACS, however, led to much bitterness and to Reagan's complaints that Israel was interfering in internal US politics.
The Administration argued that the sale of AWACS, by strengthening the US position in the region, building US-Saudi ties, and adding to regional stability, was also beneficial to Israel. This view was not accepted by Israelis who tended to see Washington as appeasing the Saudis, and who believed that any improvement in US-Saudi relations would come at the expense of US-Israel relations. For their part, the Saudis were reluctant to become openly involved in American military Planning for the Gulf, but were eager to strengthen their links with Washington.
Finally, the House of Representatives vote of 301 to 111 against the sale but the Senate supported it by a narrow 52-to-48 margin. The Reagan Administration had won a major, if close, victory. This decision greatly pleased the Saudis, particularly when it was followed by some favorable US government comments towards Prince Fahd's peace plan. Later developments, including US-Israel differences over steps toward annexing the Golan Heights, continued the chain of friction-inducing incidents between Washington and Jerusalem. Yet any serious US efforts over the Arab-Israeli or Palestinian questions awaited the outcome of the autonomy talks and the return to Egypt of the eastern Sinai.
The growing US orientation toward Saudi Arabia was well illustrated by an important, if somewhat offhand, remark by President Reagan on 1 October 1981. "Saudi Arabia we will not permit to be an Iran," he told a press conference. The implication was that the US would not only intervene against any Soviet aggression in the Gulf-as provided for by the 1980 Carter Doctrine statement-but also against any internal upheaval in the Kingdom.
THE BUILD-UP OF THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE
Military strength, facilities and planning were necessary to fulfill these various pledges and warnings. The Carter Administration had begun this process, but it took time to build and equip a RDF and to obtain and modernize nearby airfields, harbors and storage facilities. The official estimate was that $10 billion would have to be spent over several years to give America the capacity of projecting a force quickly into the ME.
Bickering among the military services over control of the RDF-it was eventually designated an independent force-slowed efforts during 1981. Some of the units selected for the RDF were already earmarked as NATO reinforcements in case of a war in Europe, and this created potential conflicts in case of a wider crisis. Washington had little success in gaining European co-operation for Gulf security and most countries in the region-including those friendly to the US were reluctant to become deeply involved or to supply bases.
However, some progress was made in finding and upgrading facilities in Kenya, Somalia, Oman, Egypt and the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. In June 1980 the US signed an agreement with Kenya promising $50 million in economic and $27 million in military aid over the next two years in exchange for the use of Mombasa port and two airfields.
That same month, a US-Oman agreement gave Washington access to bases there, including the air force base on Masira island. The US sold Oman some tanks, anti-tank missiles and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and agreed to sell transport aircraft and other material in the future. In 1981, the US gave Oman $1.2 million in economic aid-mostly for irrigation and water resource development and $25.1 million for military aid.
An August 1980 accord with Somalia gained the use of facilities in Mogadishu and Berbera in exchange for $53 million in economic aid and $40 million for military sales credits over the following two years. These bases were much closer to the Gulf than those in Kenya but, like the other military installations, required a great deal of money and labor to make them usable within the context of the RDF strategy.
US RELATIONS WITH EGYPT
In Egypt, the US sought the use of Ra's Bands, 500 miles south-east of Cairo on the Red Sea, across from the Saudi port of Jidda. Initial estimates for necessary improvements ran to $250 million. While the Egyptians were willing to share facilities at Ra's Bands, they refused to cede it as a base. Joint training maneuvers were conducted and American military aid-continuing the close US-Egypt relationship forged since Camp David-was substantially increased.
The US sold Egypt $2.4 billion in arms in 1980 and gave over $1.5 billion in military assistance during 1980-81. Egypt also stood at the head of the list of US aid recipients, receiving $1.2 billion each year for both 1980 and 1981. Egyptian pilots were training on F-4s, while delivery of F-16s and a whole range of other aircraft, ships, tanks, and infantry equipment was promised.
Sadat's hopes-which had paralleled Begin's early optimistic assessments for US-Israel relations under Reagan-that Washington would make Cairo its favored ally in the region, were doomed to disappointment. Rather than seeking substitutes or surrogates, the Reagan Administration was more concerned with the possibilities and requirements of direct intervention.
During his fateful last visit to Washington, President Anwar al-Sadat asked Reagan to negotiate with the PLO. While this idea met with no positive response, the two Presidents did agree on the importance of continuing the close bilateral relationship established earlier. Sadat's assassination shocked Washington, and gave rise to some concern about the need to reassess American policy. But after Sadat's successor, Husni Mubarak, established his control in Cairo, there seemed no wish for any immediate change in US policy toward Egypt.
Ever since the Iranian revolution, the White House, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency had given careful consideration to the need for improving their assessment of developments in key ME countries. The shortcomings of policy makers and media in understanding regional politics and such phenomena as the upsurge in radical Islamic activity were often discussed, but there were no apparent improvements in procedures.
Washington reacted immediately to Sadat's assassination by deciding to accelerate arms deliveries to Egypt. AWACS were dispatched-as they had been on one previous occasion, to guard against any attempt by Libya to take advantage of the confusion within Egypt. A purported Libyan threat to Sudan also heightened American commitments to Khartoum, including a major increase of US assistance to President Ja'far Numayri.
American antagonism to Libya had been an early and constant characteristic of the Reagan Administration's ME policy. Given Col Mu'ammar Qadhafi's links to international terrorism, his tightening alliance with Moscow, and his destabilizing actions in Chad, Uganda and other African countries, Washington's Orientation toward Libya was not surprising.
There is serious evidence that in the Spring of 1981 the US Government decided, or came very close to deciding, on a campaign to overthrow the Libyan leader. This involved aid to dissident forces within the country, Libyan emigres, and Cairo as well as more direct pressures. The Administration let it be known that it would not block any Egyptian actions against Libya, a reversal of Carter's policy, and tried to convince the American oil companies operating in that country to withdraw. Yet the corporations refused, and Libya remained the third largest supplier of American petroleum imports, producing 10% of these for an annual income of $9 billion a year.
In May the Libyan diplomatic representation in Washington, which had been transformed from an embassy into a "people's bureau," was expelled. The following month the Libyans, nervous over the increasing seriousness of American hostility, dispatched an envoy to Washington to discuss the two countries' differences. But nothing came of these overtures and Washington, concerned about the Presence of 2,000 Americans in Libya as potential hostages in any conflict, continued to urge American oil companies to withdraw their personnel, but without much success.
The Carter Administration had decided not to hold maneuvers in the Gulf of Sirte to avoid any confrontation with Libya, which claimed this whole area as lying within its territorial limits. For the Reagan Administration, however, the reassertion of American strength was primary, and it was considered a mistake to avoid such tests of will, even if they led to showdowns. On 19 August, during naval exercises, American carrier planes were engaged by Libyan interceptor aircraft, two of which were shot down 60 miles off the Libyan coast. The serious deterioration of relations between the US and Libya continued in the following months and helped produce a suspicious climate in which the US Administration announced that a Libyan hit squad, under Qadhafi's orders, was stalking President Reagan and other high officials.
RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN
American links to Pakistan were strengthened during 1981. While this was a traditional US alliance, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the operations of Afghan guerrillas from Pakistan's territory, made it a front-line state in the struggle to secure the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Pakistan's leader, Ziya al-Haqq, had rejected the original Carter Administration offer of aid as "peanuts," and was gratified by the considerable expansion in the amounts and quality of weapons offered by the Reagan Administration. He was emboldened to request 40 F-16s.
The Undersecretary of State, James Buckley, went to Pakistan in June 1981 to discuss the arms sales. American military aid to Pakistan had been cut off in 1979 because of its nuclear arms program. Now the White House argued that because of the importance of Pakistani help, both on its own borders and in the Gulf, it was necessary to waive the ban on military aid-a position finally supported by Congress.
While the overt American position toward Afghanistan remained the same criticizing the Soviet invasions and occupation but offering no concrete aid to the guerrillas-there were important changes behind the scenes. Sadat had revealed that he was sending arms to the anti-Soviet guerrillas.
SUMMING UP
Essentially, then, US policy toward the ME as it evolved through 1981 was focused on the possibility of continued Soviet gains in the region and on the need to build a new security system in the aftermath of the changes in Iran and Afghanistan. Alliances were built or strengthened with a range of countries including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Oman, Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Kenya, Somalia and Morocco. The need to show a reliable commitment to such allies was rated highly.
For example, while the US had been neutral in the Western Sahara war between Morocco and the Polisario guerrillas and continued to be so on a political level-US military aid to Morocco increased. One of the main decisions to send arms to the Moroccans, whose adversaries were being supported by Algeria, came in the Administration's first days, only hours after Algeria had helped negotiate the release of the US hostages.
Regional issues, unless they seemed to fit into this framework, or seemed likely to lead to serious and immediate conflict, were treated as secondary. For instance, the autonomy negotiations and Arab-Israeli problems were generally allowed to run their own course. The US stepped in only to prevent any deterioration leading to war and to shore up its influence in the Arab World.
Despite many instances of friction, the US-Israel relationship remained strong, though the conflicts might have set up serious strains for the future. US aid to Israel continued at record levels and Washington seemed eager to patch up troubles but only after they had occurred. This was due, in part, to Israel's domestic political leverage in the US-which seemed to have eroded somewhat but also to the Administration's conviction that Israel was a useful ally in the new strategic picture.
While there seemed some initial US interest in the Habib mission of trying to help settle the Lebanese civil war, this aspiration quickly faded. There had also been some talk of trying to divert some regional Soviet allies, most notably Iraq but also Syria; yet relatively little was done on that front. American neutrality on the Iraqi-Iranian war was maintained.
Countries defined as enemies in the Reagan Administration's more bi-polar view of the ME-Syria, Libya, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Iran-were, except for the last-mentioned, considered to be Soviet allies. All of them were deemed supporters of international terrorism. As for the USSR itself, its policies were seen as increasingly successful in either frightening Third World countries into joining its side, or of actually taking them over. The possibility of a Soviet invasion of the Gulf-most likely through Iran-was seen as a serious contingency and as the highest priority for planning and for the build-up of military counter-forces.
As with many new Administrations, the Reagan team went through a "learning process" in which lines of authority and decision-making had to be reworked, and in which preconceptions were changed. The depth and complexity-which means the intractability-of problems were discovered anew. A key issue in this context was the attempt to persuade Arab and.other countries in the region to line up against the perceived Soviet menace and to convince all concerned that, "objectively," Arab-Israeli and other local issues must take second place in view of the far larger danger represented by "Russian expansionism."
These plans were frustrated on two scores. First, for a variety of reasons, most States were not willing to stand up and be counted in a US-organized strategic alignment. This involved doubts about US credibility and reliability; but there were also stronger interests in other issues, e.g. the Palestinian question. In some ways, the US pressure proved to be counter-productive. The Arab Gulf countries' strong preference for a local deterrent and regional collective defence was not really understood in Washington; far less was there any comprehension of their worry that the RDF or American forces in general might be used against them.
As happened elsewhere in the world, it proved difficult for Washington to coordinate regional policy with its European and Japanese allies, who were far more dependent on ME oil than was America. When accords could be reached with Particular Governments, the latter attempted to turn them to their own advantage. Thus, it was clear that while the US Administration was not ready to change its general view of events, many adjustments would be necessary.
On the economic scene, the objective importance of the ME for the US continued to grow. According to Department of Commerce figures, the US exported 15.3 billion worth of goods to the region and imported $31.5 billion from it in 1980. The ImPorts were largely in the form of oil. While changes to other fuels and greater conservation and efficiency led to some reduction in the amount of US dependence on ME petroleum supplies, they remained a considerable factor in American calculations. Meanwhile, American investments in the region reached $7.7 billion, of which $5.3 billion were in Saudi Arabia alone.
By 1981 the ME had become more important for the US position in the world than anyone would have conceived possible a decade earlier. For preserving peace, security, and economic well-being in the US, the ME had become perhaps the single most important part of the world. Yet, despite this centrality, it was not clear that American knowledge and policymaking had yet caught up with this new reality.
This chapter appeared in Colin Legum et al, Middle East Contemporary Survey 1980-1981, Vol. 5 (NY, 1982). Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked, Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. 9, 1984-1985, (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1987). Reprinted with permission of the Dayan Center.