PUBLIC SECTOR PAY
The Prime Minister's Official Spokesman (PMOS)
<http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7166.asp>
IRAQ
In answer to questions relating to alleged plagiarism concerning the latest
Government
document on Iraq which had been published last weekend, the PMOS said that it
was
important to put this story into context. It was imperative for people to
understand what
the document was about. It was a Government briefing paper based - as stated on
its
front cover - on a number of sources, including intelligence material. Why had
we thought
it necessary to publish it? Because we wanted to show people not only the kind
of
regime we were dealing with, but also how Saddam Hussein had pursued a policy of
deliberate deception. Unfortunately, Saddam did not produce an equivalent of the
GICS
handbook, the Iraqi Year Book or Who's Who (if he did, he would probably have to
change it on a regular basis). We were trying to explain to people why the
inspectors
were experiencing such problems in finding material and also the lengths to
which
Saddam had gone to pursue his policy of deception. The first and third sections
of the
document were based largely on intelligence material. The first section
described the
extreme lengths to which Saddam had gone to hide his weapons and obstruct the
inspectors. The third section of the document described the impact of the regime
on the
Iraqi people. The second section, which was the part which had been highlighted
by the
media last night and today, described how the regime was structured. Some of
that had
been based on Dr Ibrahim al-Marashi's work which, in retrospect, we should have
acknowledged. The fact that we had used some of his work did not throw into
question
the accuracy of the document as a whole - as Dr Marashi himself had acknowledged
on
Newsnight last night where he had said that in his opinion the document,
overall, was
accurate. Nor did it take away from the core argument in the document,
particularly in
section one which was based on current intelligence, that: Saddam had mounted a
deliberate policy of deception; that the inspectors were outnumbered by a ratio
of 200:1;
that they were under constant surveillance; that there was a deliberate policy
of
intimidation of scientists and others; and that every effort had been made to
obstruct
rather than fully comply as 1441 said they should.
Asked repeatedly which Government Department had been responsible for drawing up
the document, the PMOS said that the information had been drawn together from a
variety of different sources. He had no intention of getting into some big
debate about
processology. That wasn't the issue here. The issue was the central argument
highlighted in the document - that there was a deliberate policy of deception.
No one,
from Dr Marashi down, had been able to question the accuracy of that central
argument.
Asked to confirm that the British intelligence services and FCO officials had
drawn up
the document, given at least of the names revealed in today's front page
Guardian report
appeared to match up with someone who worked for the Prime Minister's Director
of
Communications and Strategy, the PMOS said that he would decline attempt to draw
him into a discussion about processology for obvious reasons. That said, he
could
confirm that the relevant people had seen the document before it had been
published.
Asked if he would agree that the document was the result of a "cut's job by
kids in
Downing Street's spin-doctored department", the PMOS said that we had
wanted to set
out information relating to the membership of the Iraqi regime. Saddam Hussein
did not
produce a Who's Who or give interviews to Jeremy Paxman-type people (although
Channel 4 News might say otherwise). Consequently, we had no cuttings on which
to
base our knowledge. We did, however, have intelligence regarding Saddam's
deliberate
policy of deception. We had tried to give people an insight into that
intelligence in order
to inform their thinking. In our view, there was nothing for which we had to
apologise in
making that attempt. Questioned as to whether anyone in Downing Street would be
disciplined given plagiarism was a very serious offence, the PMOS repeated that
we
acknowledged that Dr Marashi's work should have been sourced, but he was not
going to
get drawn into a processological discussion about this matter.
Asked why we hadn't acknowledged Dr Marashi's work from the start, the PMOS
repeated that the information contained in the document had been pulled together
from a
variety of different sources. As he had said, in retrospect we should have
acknowledged
which parts had come from public sources and which had come from others to clear
up
any confusion. Ultimately, however, it was important to recognise that our
overall
objective had been to give as full a picture as we could, not only of the Iraqi
regime, but
also of its deliberate policy of deception - without in any way compromising the
intelligence sources on which the information was based. It was perhaps that
which lay
at the root of our failure to acknowledge a piece of work which, in retrospect,
we should
have done.
Put to him that the document was not 'based' on Dr Marashi's work but contained
'chunks' of it which had clearly been lifted from his research - some of which
was over a
decade old, the PMOS repeated that section one, which dealt with Saddam's policy
of
deception, was based largely on intelligence, including current intelligence.
Similarly with
section three, which dealt with the effect of the regime on the Iraqi people.
Section two
examined the structure of the regime, and it was only part of that which was
based on Dr
Marashi's work. It was therefore wrong to proclaim that the whole of the
document was
untrustworthy. It was not. As Dr Marashi had underlined in his Newsnight
interview last
night, there was no dispute over the accuracy of section two of the document.
The
question was whether we should have acknowledged his work which, in retrospect,
we
admit we should have done.
Asked if the fact that we were using Dr Marashi's work was proof that we didn't
have our
own sources to investigate the structure of the Iraqi regime, the PMOS said no.
We had
our own sources. However, in drawing up the document, we had to balance the need
to
try to explain to people the reality of the situation on the ground in Iraq with
the need not
to compromise intelligence sources. Was there any doubt that there was a policy
of
deception in Iraq? No. Was there any doubt that the purpose of the structure of
the Iraqi
Government was to deceive the international community about Saddam's intentions?
No.
Dr Marashi wasn't disputing the accuracy of the document as a whole. His
complaint
was that we hadn't acknowledged his work which, we had said, in retrospect we
should
have done. Asked if the acknowledgement would go up on the Downing Street
website,
the PMOS said that we would of course look at the document on the website.
However,
it was important for people to understand that Dr Marashi had not questioned the
accuracy of the report as a whole.
Put to him that this incident had 'shattered' the Prime Minister's argument in
his
Newsnight interview yesterday that trust was vital if we were going to go to
war, the
PMOS said that people's trust would be shattered if the information contained in
the
document was found to be inaccurate. No one had said that it was - including Dr
Marashi. Equally, the fact that some of it had been sourced while Dr Marashi's
work
hadn't been did not call into question any part of the document. The document
was solid
and accurate and we stood by it. Asked if we had asked Dr Marashi whether he
would
allow us to use his research, the PMOS said no and pointed out that his work was
publicly available.
Asked for a reaction to Dan Plesch of the Royal United Services Institute who
had said
that the Government had been trying to deceive people by attempting to give the
impression that the information contained in the document was based on British
intelligence and was up to date, the PMOS repeated that the first section of the
document was based largely on current intelligence. Parts of section two,
however, were
based on Dr Marashi's work. The fact that we had not acknowledged his research
did not
in any way call into question the accuracy of the overall document. Asked if we
had
pointed out in the document that some of the information which had been used was
twelve years old, the PMOS said that while some of the information might have
come
from an earlier period, it did not call into question the accuracy of the
document as a
whole. Asked for a reaction to Glenda Jackson's comment this morning that the
Government had misled Parliament, the PMOS said that he would reject the
suggestion
completely.
Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister and Downing Street were embarrassed
by
what had happened, the PMOS said that if he was being asked whether we should
have
acknowledged Dr Marashi's work, the answer, in retrospect, was yes. Did that in
any
way invalidate the core argument of the document? No it did not. Pressed as to
whether
we were embarrassed by the revelations, the PMOS said that we all had lessons to
learn
as we went through life. Asked if he would accept that the episode could have an
impact
on the credibility of any past or future documents we might produce, the PMOS
said no.
Asked if we had received any reaction from the US given Colin Powell's high
praise for
the document on Wednesday, the PMOS said no. He reminded journalists that Mr
Powell had praised the compelling proof that Saddam was involved in deception.
Questioned further, the PMOS queried whether journalists were more interested in
focussing on processology or substance. In Iraq they knew the information in the
document was true. A failure to acknowledge someone's research did not
invalidate an
entire piece of work. Nor did it disprove the fact that Saddam was deliberately
trying to
deceive the international community. Those who tried to suggest otherwise should
realise that they were deluding themselves - and recognise that this delusion
was more
about dogma than reality.
Asked for a reaction to the apparent concessions announced by Iraq overnight,
the
PMOS said that this was the really serious business of the weekend. The key
question
was not whether Saddam might make a few gestures or concessions - as we expected
he would - aimed at continuing the game of catch as catch can. Rather, the issue
was
whether there was a fundamental change in his attitude. As Mohammed ElBaradei
had
said last Thursday, it was not enough for Saddam to comply 90% or even 99%. He
had
to comply 100%. The test for this weekend was contained in Resolution 1441. Was
he
going to comply with the unanimous wish of the UN Security Council that he
co-operated
"immediately, unconditionally and actively" with the goal of allowing
the inspectors "to
remove, destroy and render harmless all prohibited weapons"? It was
important for
people to remember that this was the man who had had the bare-faced cheek to
tell
Tony Benn that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. After Dr Blix's first
report to
the Security Council last week and Colin Powell's presentation on Wednesday,
surely no
one seriously believe him.
Questioned as to whether there was a timetable for getting a second UN
Resolution, the
PMOS said that the next step in the UN process was Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei's
report
to the Security Council on 14 February. People should exercise a little patience
and not
get too ahead of themselves.