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Boycotts, Coalitions and the Threat of Violence:
The Run-Up to the January 2005, Iraqi Elections
By
Ibrahim al-Marashi
The January 30, 2005, Iraqi
parliamentary election is one of the most important events in that
country's modern history. This event has required a whole new
political mechanism, the formation of political parties, and dealing
with difficult security problems. The success or failure of the
election will have a tremendous impact on U.S. policy and Arab
politics. This article analyzes the organization of the election,
the campaign, and the emerging political forces in Iraq.
The January 30, 2005 election in Iraq brought about the organization
of political forces there for the post-Saddam era. While Iraqis
generally looked forward to a transition from an interim
administration to a nationally elected regime, there were many
obstacles to successful elections including a lack of internal
security and insufficient guarantees of the protection of the polls;
the Arab Sunni boycott; shortcomings in voter education; and the
limited party options available without sectarian or ethnic
platforms.
Yet the stakes were high not only for Iraq on a regional and even
global level. After the conclusion of the 2003 Iraq war, President
George Bush declared that the United States would ensure Iraq serve
as an example of a successful democracy in the heart of the Arab
Middle East. Arab states and their peoples also watched the
election not only to see the direction of Iraq itself but also as a
potential model, or threat, to their own countries' structure.
In the months leading up to the
election, the nation witnessed the mobilization of Iraq's Shi'a,
Kurds and Sunnis, as well as a few other parties advocating
non-sectarian and non-ethnic platforms. The interim government,
dominated by Arab Shi'as and Kurds, tried to balance cooperation
with the United States with demonstrating it can govern
independently without American interference. The Arab Sunnis for
the most part failed to engage in the post-Saddam administration
after losing control of a state they had dominated for decades.
While the Shi'a and Kurds wanted to take part in the
elections--knowing they would more likely emerge with power and then
use it to end the U.S. occupation--Sunnis declared a boycott.
Elections are not an entirely new
concept in Iraq. The Hashemite monarchy, which ruled Iraq from 1921
until 1958, adopted a parliamentary system based on that of its
colonial rulers, the British.[1]
Opposition political parties existed and political debates were
tolerated in the parliament. Prior to the monarchy's overthrow,
there was a relatively free press with close to 23 independent
newspapers in Iraq's major cities.[2]
However, the monarchy was perceived as too pliant to British
"imperialist demands" and what emerged afterwards was a series of
"revolving-door dictatorships" which Iraq experienced in the 1950s
and 1960s.[3]
When Saddam Hussein came to power as vice-president through a
military coup in 1968, he worked behind the scenes to eliminate all
political opposition to his Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. After
assuming presidential power in 1979, he held elections but only with
himself as the sole candidate.
OVERVIEW OF THE IRAQI ELECTION PROCESS
On June 8, 2004, UN
Security Council Resolution 1546 gave a unanimous endorsement to
transferring sovereignty to the new Iraqi government and endorsing
the January election for a Transitional National Assembly. The
interim Iraqi constitution, known as the Transitional Administration
Law, adopted in March 2004, was designed to serve as a temporary
constitution when the interim government took power on June 28,
2004.
Registration
The timetable for
the election began in early November 2004 with voter registration.
Political campaigning began in December 2004.[4]
After the January 30, 2005 vote, the "Iraqi Interim Government"
which assumed authority on June 30, 2004 was to be replaced by an
elected "Iraqi Transitional Government."
Every Iraqi who
holds Iraqi citizenship, provided he or she was born before January
1 1987, is eligible to vote. Voters are registered based on the UN
"Oil for Food" rations lists. This system was adopted as there was
insufficient time to conduct a population census. Iraqis obtain
their registration forms from their ration card agents.[5]
Iraqis also have the option of updating or correcting the
information within this system if needed.[6]
The Independent
Electoral Commission (IEC)
UN
Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511 stressed "the rights of
the Iraqi People to choose in full freedom its political future."[7]
A UN-appointed,
eight-member Independent Electoral Commission made up of Iraqi
citizens and one additional international expert was tasked with
drawing up the election procedures and supervising its proceedings.
The duties of the commission are stated as follows:
1.
Determine, establish,
develop, certify, subdivide, and maintain the voter roll.
2.
Help build societal
support for and confidence in the electoral process throughout
Iraq.
3.
Regulate and conduct
the registration and certification of political parties.
4.
Regulate and conduct
the registration and certification of candidates for office.
5.
Accredit election
observers and other officers engaged in monitoring and / or
observing elections in Iraq.
6.
Manage the polling
and ballot tabulation activities.
7.
Adjudicate electoral
grievances and disputes.
8.
Certify election
results.[8]
Any political
organization or party must be approved as a "political entity" by
the Commission before it can nominate candidates for an election.
They can present a list of anywhere from a 12 names to 275
candidates for all the seats in the National Assembly.
Constituencies
and the List System
Iraq constitutes a single
constitutiency for the election of the Transitional Assembly
because election organizers hoped this would provide for
representation of far more different interest groups.[9]
Thus, every voter in the country will have the same list of
candidates to choose from rather than different ballots for each
district.[10]
The advantage of
such a single constituency system was stated in the Iraqi Communist
Party newspaper, "Proportional representation and Iraq being a
single constituency mean that there is no specific high percentage
to win and enter parliament other than obtaining the necessary votes
for one seat. By dividing the number of votes by 275, we get the
number of votes necessary to get one seat."[11]
In other words, rather than being based on the "winner-takes-all"
system, the election is designed to ensure that any political
faction or independent candidate can be elected to the Assembly if
he or she gets a required number of votes.
The election
commission also pointed out that the system also permits "groups and
communities" as well as political parties to submit lists while also
making it easier for independent candidates to run.[12]
Each list is required to have at least one-quarter female
candidates. No candidate can have been a high-ranking Ba'ath party
official or have ties to any Iraqi insurgent groups. Ba'athists who
did not commit any offensive acts against the Iraqi people, however,
can run.
The National
Assembly
The Iraqi
candidates on these lists are to be elected to a 275-member
transitional National Assembly. In the north, a separate election
will occur simultaneously for candidates running for the local
Kurdistan National Assembly. It is this Transitional Assembly that
will later select the prime minister, president, two deputy
presidents and other ministers.
[13]
The tasks of the
new National Assembly include drafting a permanent Iraqi
constitution that will then be put to a public referendum for
approval. The constitution will be ratified if approved by the
majority of voters in Iraq in October 2005.[14]
If the Iraqi public votes for the constitution, new elections will
be held two months later. However, if the draft document fails to
get the necessary votes, the Transitional National Assembly
will be dissolved and a new
Assembly will be elected to produce another constitution. Such a
scenario could occur if two-thirds' of the population of three
provinces object to the contents of the draft constitution. The
Kurds who are dominant in the three northern provinces of Dohuk,
Sulaymaniyya and Irbil could veto the constitution if their demands
for autonomy or federalism are not met.[15]
A two-thirds' majority in
the National Assembly will elect a president of the state and
two vice-presidents to form a Presidential Council. The
Presidential Council will then name the prime minister who in turn
selects the members of his cabinet. This Assembly will have the
power to approve the military actions of the Iraqi defense forces,
as well as endorsing the budget and drafting laws.[16]
MOBILIZATION AND
BOYCOTTS
The current
thinking on the nature of Iraqi society is that it consists of three
communities, the Arab Shi'as, Arab Sunnis and ethnic Kurds.
However, dividing Iraq into
these three distinct units is rather simplistic. There is a certain
degree of cohesiveness, a sense of "Iraqiness," that persists until
today among the country's various ethnic and confessional groups.
Nevertheless, for the sake
of organization, the following sections of this analysis will
examine the various political parties in Iraq along ethnic and
religious lines and how they have mobilized for the election.
The Shi'a
The Shi'a parties
have been the strongest advocates that the elections be held on
schedule. Since the creation of the Iraqi state, the Shi'a have
been excluded from the higher echelons of power despite being the
majority in the country. The elections represent their first
opportunity to seize the helm of Iraq's politics.
The Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq
(SCIRI)
[17] is an Iranian-backed organization founded in
1982 as an umbrella group for anti-Saddam Shi'a groups. Its armed
wing, known as the Badr Corps, was the largest and most organized
Shi'a militia with a numerical strength estimated at 10,000 to
20,000 men. It was led by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim who was
killed in Najaf by a car bomb after delivering his Friday sermon in
August 2003. Upon his death, his brother, 'Abdul-'Aziz al-Hakim
took over leadership of the party.
SCIRI has encourage the
Shi'a public to vote by using religious injunctions. For example,
its newspaper featured a front page quote from Grand Ayatollah
Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayyad that called on-time elections "the first
step in the right direction."[18]
Another front-page article
showcased a statement issued by Ayatollah al-Sayyid Kazim al-Ha'iri
that urged Iraqis to participate in the upcoming elections "in order
to foil the enemies' plans."[19]
Perhaps most importantly,
comments from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have appeared
frequently; notable among them was his exhortation, "that even old
people who need the support of others to walk must take part in the
upcoming elections."[20]
The Hizballah Movement in
Iraq, an offshoot of SCIRI, has also played an active role in
mobilizing the Shi'a to the polls, emphasizing that elections will
accelerate the departure of the occupation forces.[21]
Muqtada Sadr, a
30-year-old cleric, inherited his father's credentials as a high-
ranking Shi'a cleric opposing the Saddam Hussein government. His
father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq Sadr and two of his sons were
murdered in 1999, allegedly by the Iraqi government. After a few
years of hiding, Muqtada reappeared in Najaf when the American
military captured the city in April 2003. He has not formed a
cohesive political party per se,
but he has emerged as a
political force to be reckoned with, especially after mobilizing the
militia knowan as the Mahdi Army to challenge U.S. forces in Najaf
and the neighborhood of Sadr City in Baghdad.
His popularity rose
considerably after confronting the US in April 2004. When
asked, "Which National Leader do you Trust the Most?" only 1.5
percent of the respondents in a poll mentioned Sadr's name in
February 2004. By June 2004 that figured jumped to 7.4 percent.
While this number may not seem high, it represents the highest jump
in popularity for any Iraqi political figure. Capitalizing on this
trend, Sadr agreed to halt his armed campaign and take part in the
political process. In October 2004, the Political Bureau of the Al-Sadr
movement began negotiations with other political forces to prepare
for the election.[22]
It stated the intention to mobilize followers but insisted that
Sadr himself would not be a candidate.[23]
His faction accuses the United States of arresting his followers
to subvert its political participation.[24]
The Iraqi National Congress
was initially formed as an umbrella organization of diverse
opposition groups, including Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni opponents of
the Saddam regime. Its leader, Ahmad Chalabi, had called for a
secular, democratic, and pluralistic Iraq while still preserving its
territorial integrity. While once popular with officials in the
U.S. Department of Defense, he was not favored by other U.S.
government agencies and then was accused in Washington of having
provided intelligence to Iran. Chalabi has used his Shi'a
background to gain support among Iraq's majority, trying to
capitalize on the popularity of the Al-Sadr movement by forming a
joint organization in July 2004 known as the Shia Political Council.[25]
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani,
the highly revered Shi'a cleric, has emerged as a decisive factor in
the election. He has abstained from declaring membership in any
Iraqi political faction or from taking an active part in the
political process because he insists that clerics should not take a
direct part in politics. Nevertheless, he has used his religious
authority to bestow legitimacy on the Iraqi electoral process. His
fatwas (Islamic religious rulings) have emphasized that he wants the
elections to be held on time.[26]
He has called upon all Iraqis, not just the Shi'a, to vote even
calling for non-Muslims, such as the Iraqi Christians, as well as
women to take an active part in the process.[27]
"All eligible male and female voters should cast their votes and
check that their names are correctly recorded in the voter
registry. Voting is considered a religious duty similar to prayers
and fasting, and your abstention constitutes disobedience of God
Almighty.[28]
The Sistani faction has also stressed that successful elections will
be the only way to "expel the occupation."[29]
One of Sistani's representatives made the alleged statement that
anyone refusing "to participate in the elections is a traitor and
will go to hell."[30]
However, this particular remark was criticized widely.[31]
According to a
September 2004 poll, religious sanction of the elections is crucial.
When asked, "Please indicate how each of the following authorities'
or figures' endorsement of a candidate or list of candidates would
make you more or less inclined to support that list?" 40 percent of
respondents said that a cleric's endorsement would make them more
inclined to support a list.[32]
Shi'a factions have made veiled threats that if the elections were
not held, they would take violent action. Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi
al-Mudarissi said: "If the elections are delayed, there will be a
real disaster and sedition, in which the American people bear
responsibility for the tragedy that will happen to the Iraqi
people." He went on to warn that, "the areas which are safe at
present, will burn with fire if the elections are postponed."[33]
Husayn al-Shahrastani, a former nuclear scientist with close
connections to Sistani, said that if elections were postponed, "The
peaceful Shi'a would have resorted to other options."[34]
While it seems that the "other options" he alludes to refer to
violence, it is also possible that he was intimating that the Shi'a
might seek autonomy for the south where they predominate.[35]
Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya
(The Islamic Call Party), popularly known as al-Da'wa, is a Shi'a
Islamist party established in the 1960s with the support of the
prominent Iraqi Shi'a cleric Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al-Sadr, who
was executed by the Saddam government in 1980. It has also actively
called for the Shi'a to take part in the elections. According to its
newspaper:
"It behooves our oppressed people to take part in these elections.
They must not fail, repeat past mistakes, and let nationalist,
communal, and agent elements control the destiny of Iraq and its
people anew in the name of democracy this time….We must do all we
can to guarantee a prosperous future for our children so that they
will not suffer as we have suffered due to the slackness of our
fathers in the last century.[36]
The "slackness of our
fathers" refers to the period in Iraq's history when the Shi'a
protested the British occupation in the 1920s by boycotting any
political process. According to some Iraqis, these actions led to a
cycle of Shi'a exclusion from Iraq' politics that continued up until
the fall of the Saddam's government.
The Arab Sunnis
Most of the
violence in Iraq today has been attributed to the Arab Sunnis'
reaction to their loss of their monopoly on power. Many of the
attacks directed against American forces and Iraqis working with the
interim government originated from the so-called "Arab Sunni
Triangle." Falluja has emerged as the focal point of this
insurgency. Arab Sunni forces have linked their attitude toward the
election to the fighting between U.S. forces and local militias
there, which reached a peak in
November 2004. The
Association of Muslim Scholars has emerged as a prominent group
representing the interests of the Arab Sunnis.[37]
A statement delivered at a
mosque in Baghdad, on behalf of 150 Sunni clerics representing the
Association, stated, "If the city continues to be stormed and
shelled with planes and artillery…we will…call for boycotting the
elections and considering their results null and void."[38]
The group has
stressed that it is not a political party and therefore cannot take
part in the elections process but in its role as a religious
authority for the Sunni Muslims, it will discourage constituents
from participating in the vote.[39]
A spokesman for the Association argued that while the Falluja attack
was supposed to make the area safe for the elections; it in fact
backfired. He projected that, "had the Al-Fallujah battle taken
place after holding the elections, such a call would not have
emerged.[40]
However,
the Association does not represent the view of all Sunni Muslims and
a debate has emerged within this community as to whether or not they
should participate in the process. A Sunni author
argues in one article that if the elections were to proceed with the
Sunni boycott in place, the government and any constitution or
parliament that emerged from it would lack legitimacy, being based
on "a sectarian identity."[41]
Even some Shi'a officials fear that an election without the Sunnis
would hurt the legitimacy of the new government. Muwafiq Al-Rubay'i,
a Shi'a and Iraq's national security advisor, said: "We hope,
aspire, and plan as an interim Iraqi Government that all the sons of
our people with all their political, religious, sectarian, racial,
and ethnic backgrounds in every area, city, and town will take part
in the elections because the credibility of this process and the
elections stems from the participation of all the Iraqi people….If
one group decides to boycott the elections, the credibility of the
elections and the future constitution to be drafted by the
transitional National Assembly would be undermined."[42]
Other Sunni parties have encouraged their constituents to take part
in the elections. The Iraqi Islamic Party is led by Muhsin 'Abd al-Hamid,
who had served on the interim Iraqi Governing Council. He announced
that his party would take part in this process but would encourage
delaying the elections until the security situation improves. One
spokesman from the party stated, "Religious and national
responsibility necessitates our participation in the upcoming
elections."[43]
The party recommended that the elections be delayed for at least six
months.
The National
Democratic Party, led by Nasir Chadirchi, is a non-sectarian party,
although the leader happens to be Sunni. In their newspaper, they
criticized the Association of Muslim Scholars' stance towards the
election, arguing if it proceeds on schedule, "The Sunnis will be
the big losers." The article also laments the fact that there are
divisions among the Sunnis because they do not have a religious
authority like Al-Sistani or Muqtada al-Sadr to unite them[44]
Another article
encouraged the Sunnis not to boycott the elections or otherwise they
would repeat the historic mistakes of the Shia: "In 1922, the
Shiites experienced almost the same situation in which the Sunnis
find themselves now." But even though they were a majority and the
British authorities were ready to let them participate, they closed
this door "with their own hands. Consequently they remained out of
the circle of power…for another 80 years.[45]
The Iraqi interim President, Ghazi Ajil al-Yawir, himself a Sunni,
made the same point to other Arab Sunnis "not to repeat the Shi'a's
mistake."[46]
Al-Yawir formed his own secular political party to take part in the
elections, called the Iraqis Grouping (tajammu' iraqiyyun).[47]
Other groups not
necessarily sectarian in nature, but led by Sunnis, decided to take
part in the elections. For example,
Iraq's
Constitutional Monarchy Movement, led by Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein,
himself a Sunni, seeks to restore the Iraqi monarchy. The
Independent Democrats Grouping, led by Adnan Pachachi, the former
Iraqi foreign minister in the 1960ss, also agreed to take part in
the elections, though he expressed doubts that the security
situation in Iraq is suitable for such a process.
The Kurds and
Turkmens
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was established in 1947 by
Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani, while a rival organization, The Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) formed in 1977 under the leadership of
Jalal Talabani. Kurdish candidates will participate in the elections
on three levels: the Kurdistan assembly elections, Iraqi assembly,
and governorate councils.[48]
The Turkmens (also seen as Turcomans) are Iraq's third largest
minority and reside in the north of Iraq as well as in the oil-rich
Kirkuk area. The Turkmens have been traditionally represented by
the Iraqi Turkmen Front, a coalition. The Turkmens and Kurds have
been engaged in a heated battle for the fate of Kirkuk. The Kurds
have declared that they would like to see Kirkuk as their regional
capital but the Turkmen have argued that they form the city's
majority and therefore it should remain free of Kurdish control.
The Kurdish position on
whether to hold or postpone the elections was mixed. Iraq's Deputy
Prime Minister, Barham Salih, a former official in Talabani's PUK,
has warned that postponing the Iraqi elections would have serious
repercussions for Iraq's political development.[49]
However, Falaq al-Din Kaka'i, editor of the newspaper representing
the views of the KDP supported delayed elections, since the Kirkuk
issue has not been satisfactorily resolved. Asked if the Kurdish
parties were attempting to use the Kirkuk issue as a way to pressure
the interim government to expedite a resolution of the issue of the
city to their benefit. Kaka'i argued this was not the case but then
answered the question with another question, "How will the rest of
Kurds act if the Kirkuk Kurds do not participate in the elections
for any reason?"
[50]
Other Kurdish figures lobbied to postpone the provincial elections
in Kirkuk until all Kurds displaced under the Saddam regime's
Arabization effort in the city are returned to Kirkuk, thus
bolstering Kurdish votes in the area. The most contentious issue is
the Turkmen declaration that Iraqi Kurds have resorted to a violent
campaign of intimidation in order to force them to leave Kirkuk. A
politician in the Turkmen Front argued that the two Kurdish parties
distributed 90,000 forged ration cards to Kurdish families that have
recently arrived in Kirkuk to bolster their numbers in the upcoming
elections.
[51]
The Iraqi Turkmen Front has argued that their people have been
marginalized in the Iraqi political process since the fall of the
Saddam government. They hope to change this situation by at least
securing 25 out of 275 parliamentary seats.[52]
Other Turkmen parties have forged alliances with Shi'a factions.
The Turkmen Islamic Union in Iraq praised al-Sistani's call to the
Iraqis "to participate effectively in the forthcoming elections and
register their names on the electorate list."[53]
The Formation of
the Lists
There were more
than 70 lists submitted by December 15, 2004, the deadline for the
registration period. Nine
of the lists were multiparty coalitions, while 66 were lists
presented by single Iraqi parties.[54]
Perhaps the most important of them is the "Unified Iraqi Coalition
List" which submitted 228 candidates for the 275-member National
Assembly. It represented 16 Iraqi political groups, among them the
dominant Shi'a factions in Iraq. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Hakim, leader of
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, held the top
position, followed by Ibrahim al-Ja'fari from the al-Da'wa Party.
Ahmad Chalabi held the tenth position on the list. The list also
included candidates from other communities as well as prominent
chiefs of some Iraq's Sunni and Shi'a tribes, such as the Shammar,
Jarba, Bani Asad and Bani Rijab.[55]
Due to Sistani's endorsement of the list and Hakim's and Ja'afari's
past ties to Iran, opponents of the list call it the Iranian list[56]
Both Kurdish
parties ran together on what has been termed the Kurdish list.[57]
Other multiparty coalitions lists include two lists, "The Iraqi
Independent Bloc" led by Dr Ghassan al-Attiya and the Arab
Democratic Front, which said they excluded anyone working for the
current Iraqi administration, implying such people cooperated with
the "occupation forces."
[58] Iraq's interim prime minister and president
each submitted their own lists of candidates. Prime Minister Iyad
Allawi and his party, the Iraqi National Accord have submitted a
240-candidate coalition, and Iraqi President Ghazi Ajil al-Yawir ran
on an 80-person slate representing the Iraqi Grouping.[59]
Other single party
lists include those presented by The Constitutional Monarchy
Movement, The Iraqi Communist Party, and the Iraqi Turkmen Front.
The Iraqi Islamic Party presented a list ticket with 275 candidates
while still proposing that the election should "be delayed for at
least six months."[60]
OBSTACLES TO THE
ELECTIONS
Lack of Security
The
worsening security situation in Iraq remains the greatest obstacle
in holding nationwide elections in Iraq. This situation was
graphically demonstrated in November when Iraqi elections officials
were dragged out of their car in broad daylight and killed by Iraqi
insurgents on a busy Baghdad street.[61]
Election officials say they have received many threats from those
alleging that the elections are perpetuating the
"colonization and occupation" of Iraq,
and attributing them to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian
leader of Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Al-Qa'ida of
Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers).[62]
In terms
of logistics, there are question of how the Iraqi security forces
can guarantee the safety of the polling stations, if these same
forces can barely defend themselves. Lines of voters waiting to
cast their ballot could be prime targets for Iraqi insurgents
attempting to disrupt this process.
Groups
linked to Zarqawi, like the Ansar al-Sunna Army,
threatened to strike the polling centers and potential candidates
running in the elections.[63]
On November 18, 2004, they declared it would strike all election
centers, considered "centers of blasphemy," and participants. It
justified such attacks by declaring that:
"Islam is only God's dominion and does not belong to the majority
nor to the party...whoever is chosen for these positions becomes an
infidel, because he should know that he will rule according to
infidel's rules….Muslims who participate…will become infidels as
well, because they well know that the one they elect will govern
them with man made laws.[64]
Threats have also
emerged from other factions in Iraq. In the restive city of Mosul,
hundreds of boxes of voter registration forms were torched.[65]
Fakhri al-Qaisy, head of the conservative Sunni Consultative Council
on Fatwas and Islamic Orientation, said that there is no possibility
for the Sunnis to take part in the elections and threatened violence
if this boycott was breached, "We met to decide not to participate
in these elections. If any party goes back on its decision, the
resistance will fire its rockets at it."[66]
There are doubts
that there are enough Iraqi security forces to maintain security
during the election, as well as sufficient international monitors to
review the process. Allawi stated that 400,000 police officers would
be needed to provide security for the 9,000 electoral centers
throughout Iraq.[67]
The number of Iraq's security forces fall well below that number.
Foreign Minister Hoshiar Zebari expressed "anxiety over the
insufficient number of UN employees who will supervise the elections
scheduled to be held at the beginning of next year."[68]
Nevertheless,
restive areas such as Mosul and Falluja will not be excluded from
taking part in the elections. This was justified by Farid Ayyar
when he said, "Iraq is a single electoral district and it would be
impossible to exclude one area. This is the law that binds us.
Therefore, the elections must be held on all of Iraqi soil without
any exception so that all the Iraqis can benefit from this new and
unique democratic process."[69]
Despite the threat
of violence, other Iraqis insisted the elections proceed on
schedule. Shi'a proponents of the elections argued that while it
may be marred by violence, the process in the long term could end
terrorism in Iraq. The head of the al-Fadilah Islamic Party stated,
"If they take place as scheduled, the Iraqis would have won this
war. If postponed, terrorists would win and achieve their goals.
Then, you can say goodbye to Iraq, God forbid. Postponing the
elections is out of the question."[70]
Muwafiq al-Rubay'i, Iraq's national security advisor said, "We
cannot postpone the elections even for one day because this would
mean terrorism, the saboteurs, and the enemies of democracy and Iraq
have won. This would break the morale of the Iraqi people, which we
would never allow to happen under any circumstances." He stressed
that a newly elected government would have the authority to end the
presence of U.S. troops on Iraqi soil, thus eliminating the
justifications for violence carried out by insurgents opposed to the
occupation.[71]
The Al-Da'wa party also wrote that holding elections on schedule
will help eliminate terrorism in the country.[72]
SCIRI officials declared that postponing the elections would cause
more insecurity and grant a victory to Iraqi insurgents: "Postponing
the elections will serve their interests and objectives, and would
encourage them to continue their war against Iraq, against the
democratic transition, and against the elections."[73]
When two deadly attacks
occurred in the predominantly Shi'a cities of Najaf and Karbala to
discourage people from participating in the elections, SCIRI
described them as the "tax for adhering to the principle of
elections." While they expect more attacks to be carried out, they
insist that the elections be held as scheduled.[74]
Statements made
during a poll conducted by the al-Ahali newspaper revealed
the strength of some
citizens' commitment to the elections. One interviewee said,
"Through the elections, the Iraqi people will achieve its will
through triumphing over the forces of darkness, killing, and
abduction." One novelist even declared that: "I will go to polling
stations even if the terrorists turn all ballot boxes into mines
that tear up our bodies, because the elections are the only way to
set up a democratic, prosperous Iraq; unify its sons, in all their
sects, ethnicities, and political shades; and restore to the Iraqi
people--which was marginalized throughout the time of the hateful
dictatorship--its identity and citizenship."[75]
Other polls taken
in October 2004 indicated that the majority of Iraqis
favored holding the
elections on schedule, with estimates ranging from 60 to 85
percent.[76]
The Failure to
Form National Parties
Another
obstacle to holding elections is that there are virtually no Iraqi
political parties that have developed a strong grass roots' base or
that transcend ethnic or sectarian differences. The parties in Iraq
are either remnants of the opposition groups exiled during the
Saddam era or based only on sectarian or ethnic affiliation.
Perhaps the only exception to this trend is the Iraqi
Communist Party (al-Hizb al-Shuyyu'i al-'Iraqi) founded in 1934.
While it not based on any ethnic or sectarian ideology, it does not
have a wide following in Iraq.
Polls conducted
inside Iraq support this assessment. One survey found that 63
percent agreed, "There is not yet a party in Iraqi that represents
my interests or views."[77]
Of those polled, 49 percent said, "I do not trust them at all," when
asked about political parties.[78]
When asked, "Whether or not you support a political party right now,
please tell me which of the following factors would be most
important to you in choosing a party to vote for in Iraq's first
elections?" The first priority was for the party to be able to
"maintain order and stability," while party ideology was ranked
third indicating that no political faction in Iraq has managed to
articulate a platform or agenda that has widespread appeal.[79]
According to a poll conducted between February and March 2004, by
the Gulf Research Center (GRC) based in Dubai, 75 percent of those
surveyed did not belong to a political party, and, of those, 87
percent said they refused to join one because they "do not trust the
parties.[80]
Some critics have
complained the Iraqi political landscape is dominated by the former
exiled parties.[81]
Others have claimed the United States gives financial support to
parties it favors, not allowing independent parties to emerge or
complying with true democracy.[82]
The National League for Iraqi Intellectuals and Academics criticized
political parties for trying to incorporate civil society
organizations "under their umbrellas" instead of bolstering their
role in the society.[83]
Failings in
Voter Education
Some have criticized the
electoral authorities for failing to educate Iraqis sufficiently
about the election process. For example, an Iraqi interviewed on a
local station stated that many Iraqis do not the meaning of words
such as "constituency," "political entity," or "unified list."[84]
Another person in a
newspaper survey stated that the average Iraqi thinks he is voting
for the president or prime minister and does not realize that he
will be voting for the assembly that will select these two.[85]
Even the Election Commission spokesperson Ayyar admitted that
according to a poll, "74 percent of Iraqis think these are
presidential elections because that is the way they are used to
things." He said the commission would work to make it clear to all
the Iraqis "that these are parliamentary elections to elect 275
members" of the interim assembly.[86]
The Voice of Mujahadin radio station declared that writers
and intellectuals "must shoulder their responsibility in
contributing toward election awareness, given that they are the
fourth estate in activating the society and steering it toward the
promising elections."[87]
Others have pointed
to the media's responsibility. The SCIRI paper al-'Adala
stated that Iraqis have no previous experience in democracy and thus
it is the responsibility of the media to express a "diversity of
opinion" on this subject to help "nurture the experience of
democracy in the country."[88]
The al-Sabah newspaper featured an article entitled, "The
Necessity of Elections Education," stating that the Iraqi media is
very weak in comparison with the other Arab media, and thus could
not, "Fulfill its national responsibilities of educating people for
the upcoming elections."[89]
One engineer said in an interview:
"Many Iraqis do not have the slightest idea about the method of
holding these elections. I am one of those people, and I did not
have a clear idea about the formula of presenting the lists of
candidates, the nature of possible constituencies, or the candidates
and their party or independent orientations. I am greatly prepared
to participate in the elections, which are considered a clean lung
from which Iraq will breathe freedom and democracy, but on the
condition that the government pay attention to the media aspect and
inform its citizens of all matters related to voting."[90]
These comments echo
the results of the IRI poll. When asked, "In your opinion, which of
the following would be the best way for a party to get you
attention?" more than 50 percent cited television advertisements,
the highest percentage.[91]
The Independent Elections' Commission attempted to mobilize the
Iraqis through a media education program. The commission produced a
45-minute publicity movie, more than a half a million posters, and
ten million brochures to be distributed to raise public awareness on
the elections.[92]
The commission issued a daily publication called "Your Vote Is the
Future" (Sawtuka al-Mustaqbal) which featured such headlines as,
"Your contribution to the election is an evidence of your love for
your country"
and "Vote for the sake of future; vote for the sake of Iraq."[93]
Other elements in
Iraq's society have done their part in terms of voter education and
promoting voter turn-out. The independent Iraqi satellite
television station, al-Sharqiyya was also instrumental in
encouraging the Iraqis to vote featuring both commercials and
interviews among average Iraqis that stress the importance of
voting, as well as features with prominent figures involved in the
elections.[94]
Sistani's offices have put up posters around Iraq featuring his
fatwa encouraging the Iraqis to vote.[95]
Governorates in Baghdad and Basra initiated cultural programs on
elections for youths of both sexes in the areas, while the al-'Amara
governorate established the Iraqi Society Towards Democracy, whose
goals were "spreading democratic concepts among people and preparing
them for the upcoming elections."[96]
Other civil society
organizations have played a role in this process, such as the Civil
Dialogue Organization which helped explain to the public the method
of conducting the elections and the need for active participation in
the process. The Human Rights Society in the province of Babil for
example held education programs on the elections."[97]
Other tribally based organizations, such as The Islamic Conference
for Iraqi Tribes have also held seminars on voter education.[98]
Political parties have maintained campaigns to mobilize the public
as well as to educate them about the electoral process. The al-Da'wa
party for example organized a mass meeting in the al-Sha'ab district
in Baghdad to discuss the election situation.[99]
According to the
interim Iraqi elections law the percentage of women's representation
in the National Assembly must not be less than 25 percent.
Therefore, the nomination lists have been made up accordingly, often
having as many as 33 percent women, to guarantee reaching this
proportion.[100]
Special attempts have been made to mobilize Iraqi women to vote in
the upcoming elections. Female politicians have conducted their own
effort to encourage women to vote by holding forums and conferences
as well as visits to the governorates in order to educate women.[101]
THE IRAQI
ELECTIONS AND THE UNITED STATES
After the
dismantlement of the Saddam Hussein government, many Iraqis
questioned whether the United States had a genuine interest in
fostering a democracy in Iraq. A common notion in Iraq is that the
United States did not genuinely support a democracy in a post-Saddam
government. The average Iraqi believes that it was part of U.S.
foreign policy during the Iran-Iraq war that kept Saddam Hussein in
power. Most Iraqis knew that the United States gave military and
intelligence support to their former tyrant to make sure Saddam
emerged victorious over Khomeini's Iran. This relationship was
inflated to the point in Iraq where many Iraqis themselves believed
that Saddam was a CIA agent. For example, one Iraqi newspaper,
refers to the former dictator as "the Americans' obedient servant,
Saddam, who offered them everything, but they refused to let him
stay."[102]
Another belief in Iraq is
that the United States will not support its democracy because the
majority of its people are Shi'a and its post-Saddam leader would
most likely be a Shi'a. In their opinion, the United States would
be wary of such a leader because he might possibly form an alliance
with Shi'a Iran and then dominate the Gulf. Ironically, it is from
the Shi'a clerics, that America feared would try to engineer
an Iranian-style theocracy in Iraq, that the most strident calls for
democracy have emerged. Sistani, the country's most influential
Shi'a leader, in March 2004 rejected a U.S. formula to transfer
power to the Iraqis via a provisional legislature selected by
eighteen regional caucuses.
Some Iraqis are
convinced that the United States is working behind the scenes to
manipulate the elections to its advantage. One writer in the
independent daily al-Furat stated that a Washington Post
article described how the U.S. Administration allocated millions of
dollars to support some Iraqi figures and parties in the coming
elections and that U.S. intelligence agencies will be involved
behind the scenes to guarantee a favorable outcome where Iraq would
emerged as an "American village controlled by the White House
without a reference ever being made to the Iraqi people."[103]
An article in the
SCIRI paper Al-'Adala stated that while the Iraqis are looking
forward to transparent elections free of corruption, many fear that:
"The United States dethroned Saddam and invaded Iraq for its own
benefit, not for the benefit of the Iraqi people. Therefore, the
United States is not ready to lose control over Iraq. Such is the
case when a group of people who would never fulfill its interests or
oppose it if they were to win the elections. This is why the United
States' call for elections may be no more than propaganda for its
own elections or slogans to be raised, not a fact to be reached."[104]
The writer emphasizes that U.S. interference in the elections is
likely because, "The United States and the West in general work
solely for their own interests, disregarding other peoples'
interests." He argues that the Bush administration will push ahead
the elections to prove the invasion of Iraq was a success.[105]
Another writer from the independent daily paper al-Ufuq
stated, "The Iraqi elections will give Bush the image of a man who
kept his word in achieving democracy in Iraq and turning the country
into a model for the Middle East. Therefore, it is apparent that the
U.S. administration is determined to hold the polls even if that
means certain areas will be exempted from participation."[106]
Muqtada al-Sadr has
also expressed his distrust of U.S. motives for supporting the
elections. He said in a speech, "Is there anyone who asks: 'If I
participate in the elections, will the occupiers leave my country?
Won't they rig the elections, and by doing so deny power to the
pious?' All they care for is to empower a puppet who gives his
consent to the occupiers to stay in our country and gain the
legitimacy rejected by the United Nations and others."[107]
One of his representatives said, "We see no one benefiting from the
elections but the occupation, Bush, and his followers and
supporters. This is because the elections will be won by
personalities demanding the continuation of the occupation and
supported by the occupation. Had the United States been serious
about the success of the elections, it would have assured the Iraqi
people and announced a timetable for ending the occupation, by which
time a fairly-elected national government would be formed."[108]
Proponents of holding the elections on time repeated their assertion
that the vote will be Iraq's first step in ending the occupation. A
representative of the Iraqi Communist party said, "Let
them say what they want. The final word will be for the Iraqi
people. If we choose a legitimate government through democratic
elections and if we enable it to restore its national decision, it
will be able to ask the foreign forces to leave Iraq as quickly as
possible. It will thus be protected by international law and the
support of the whole world."[109]
THE IRAQI
ELECTIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Iraqis have
expressed opinions criticizing the authoritarian nature of Arab
regimes and have blamed them for undermining the Iraqi elections.
The paper al-Sabah al-Jadid, an independent daily, carried a
front-page editorial stating the Iraqi elections are unprecedented
in the Arab world where their "leaders get 99.99 percent of the
votes without any opposition."[110]
One newspaper stated while none of the countries in the region has
opposed or rejected holding elections in Iraq, some of them wish
that these elections would fail so that they will not feel the
pressure to liberalize their own political systems.[111]
Farid
Ayar, spokesman of the Iraqi Independent Elections
Committee was particularly critical of the Arab media which he
states incites terrorism in Iraq and thus undermines the elections:
"We are aware how some Arab satellite channels are…setting traps and
trying to impose their political agendas on the Iraqi people....The
Iraqi people will exercise their right to elections and will
definitely succeed in establishing a democratic and free regime on
Iraqi soil that would set an example for many countries that should
follow suit in the future."[112]
Indeed,
some of the media in the Arab world has encouraged the Iraqis to
resist the United States and not take part in the elections. For
example, a writer from Jordan, Yasir al-Za'atira,
stated:
"It is obvious that the option of boycotting the elections and
refusing to give legitimacy to the election process is the best
option not only to the Sunni Arabs but also to Iraq and all the
Iraqis as well as to the Umma (Muslim nation). Along with the
boycott, the resistance will proceed ahead until it ends the
occupation, wrests full independence and genuine sovereignty, and
restores the political presence of those that rejected and resisted
against the occupation rather than to those who collaborated with
the occupation and sought to uphold its interests."
[113]
Ahmed Chalabi
responded that the real fear among foreign Arab critics was that
Iraq's democracy will spread to their nations:
"The elections are the only solution for ending Iraq's predicament
and are a resounding slap in the face of the Bedouins [Arab Gulf
states] and the terrorists who do not want what is good for Iraq,
because…their peoples will ask them for democracy, sooner or later.
The winds of change are definitely coming to them, since they do not
want democracy to spread in Iraq, and they are yearning for the
return of their idol [Saddam Hussein] and his henchmen to power.
This will never happen in the new Iraq, whatever happens and no
matter what they do and how much they plot against us."[114]
The Shi'a parties,
as advocates for holding the elections, also criticized the Arab
world's attempts to obstruct the elections. The SCIRI newspaper
also claims that they "fear the infection" of democracy in their own
countries.[115]
One article criticized Arab leaders, such as Egyptian president
Husni Mubarak and the Jordanian king Abdullah for attempting to
obstruct the elections in Iraq, fearing the control of the Shiites
and Kurds over the country.[116]
Another article criticized foreign countries who sought to interfere
in the Iraqi elections, affirming that no one should interfere in a
purely Iraqi affair.[117]
The al-Da'wa party paper also lashed out at non-Iraqi media,
clerics, and intellectuals as trying "to kill the new-born offspring
in its cradle" and issuing "statements full of spite for Iraq and
the Iraqis. They supported and named terrorism 'honest resistance.'"[118]
The Iraqi Communists have taken a similar position.[119]
CONCLUSION
The dilemma of the
elections in domestic Iraqi terms was well summarized by one Al-Jazira
journalist as follows: "The Shi'a authorities emphasize that those
who will not participate in the elections will burn in hell but the
Sunni fatwas stress that participation in the upcoming elections is
a sin against God."[120]
If the Sunnis heed the religious injunctions against voting, or
simply fail to participate due to the security situation in their
areas, the legitimacy of the elected Iraqi government will
ultimately suffer.
The prospect of a
Sunni boycott does not bode well for Iraq's future. Sunnis who felt
they have been excluded from the political process in post-Saddam
Iraq have used violence to make their protests heard. If the 2005
elections isolate them again, they will most likely continue to use
violence to address their grievances. However, failure to hold the
elections also posed risks. A delay would inflame the Shi'a element
who may then take out their frustration against U.S. forces in Iraq.
The fact that Shi'a proponents of the elections are arguing that
this process will be the first step in ending the US occupation is
an indication of such trends. Additionally, delaying the elections
would have proven to the insurgents that their tactics have been
successful and will only embolden them to continue their campaign,
making the hope for an end to violence in Iraq even more remote.
NOTES
[1]
George Grassmuck, “The Electoral Process in Iraq 1952-1958,”
The Middle East Journal,
Vol. 14 (1960), pp., 397-415.
[3]
Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Democracy in Iraq?”,
The
Washington Quarterly,
Summer 2003, p. 123.
[4]
“Al-Bayan Article Explaining Election Procedures, Urging
Nationwide Participation,” Al-Bayan , Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, (FBIS) GMP20041025000262, October 25, 2004,
p. 3.
[5]
“Iraq: Communist Party Secretary Interviewed on Stance toward
Elections,” Tariq al-Sha'b , (FBIS) GMP2004102400000923,
October 24, 2004, p. 2.
[6]
“Al-Bayan Article Explaining Election Procedures, Urging
Nationwide Participation,” Al-Bayan , (FBIS)
GMP20041025000262, October 25, 2004, p. 3.
[8] Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq.
[9] Institute for War and
Peace Reporting, “Iraqi Elections Backgrounder,”
available at <www.iwpr.net>.
[10]
“Al-Bayan Article Explaining Election Procedures, Urging
Nationwide Participation,” Baghdad
Al-Bayan
, (FBIS) GMP20041025000262, October 25, 2004, p. 3.
[11]
“Iraq: Communist Party Secretary Interviewed on Stance Toward
Elections,” Tariq al-Sha'b , (FBIS)
GMP20041024000009,
October 23, 2004, p. 2.
[12] Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq.
[13]
“Iraq: Communist Party Secretary Interviewed on Stance
Toward Elections,” Tariq al-Sha'b , (FBIS)
GMP20041024000009,
October 23, 2004, p. 2.
[15] Institute for War and
Peace Reporting.
[16]
“Al-Bayan Article Explaining Election Procedures, Urging
Nationwide Participation,” Al-Bayan , (FBIS)
GMP20041025000262,
October 25, 2004, p. 3.
[17] Also seen as the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (SCIRI) or Supreme
Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI).
[18] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041012000225, October 12, 2004.
[19] “Roundup of Iraqi Press
Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041014000275,
October 14, 2004.
[20] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041016000208, October 16, 2004.
[21] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041026000248, October 26, 2004.
[22] “Roundup of Iraqi Press
Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041030000149,
October 30, 2004.
[23] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041103000222, November 30, 2004.
[25] “Iraq: Media Report Pre-Election
Maneuvering of Shia Parties, Al-Sadr Groups,” (FBIS)
GMF20040910000231, September 10, 2004.
[26]
“Talk Show on Iraqi Elections, Proportional Representation, Al-Sistani's
Fatwa,” Al-Arabiyah Television, (FBIS) GMP20041018000258,
0825 GMT, October 18, 2004.
[27] “Roundup of Iraqi Press
Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041030000149,
October 3, 2004.
[28]
“Al-Sistani Office Offers Voting Guidelines,” Al-Diyar
Television (FBIS) GMP20041030000206, 0603 GMT, October 30,
2004.
[29] “Roundup of Iraqi Press
Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041030000149,
October 30, 2004.
[30] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041023000216, October 23, 2004.
[31] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041031000181, October 31, 2004.
[32] “Survey of Iraqi Public
Opinion: September 24-October 4, 2004,” International Republican
Institute (IRI) available at <www.iri.org>.
[33]
“’Wanted’ Cleric Urges Boycott of Iraq Elections, Another Wants
Elections on Time,” Al-Manar al-Yawm, (FBIS)
GMP20041107000119, November 6, 2004, p. 1.
[34]
“Iraq Election Monitor: TV Brings Out the Vote; Delay
Criticized,” (FBIS) GMF20041204000001, December 3, 2004.
[36]
“Al-Bayan Article Explaining Election Procedures, Urging
Nationwide Participation,” Al-Bayan , (FBIS)
GMP20041025000262, 25 October 25, 2004, p. 3.
[37]
“Sunni Clerics Bartering Election Participation for Al-Fallujah
Shelling Halt,” Al-Mashriq, (FBIS) GMP20041024000016,
October 23, 2004, p. 2.
[38] “Iraq Election Monitor: Party
Maneuvering, Sunni Boycott, Expat Vote,” (FBIS)
GMF20041029000223 October 29, 2004.
[39]
“Iraqi Paper Interviews Government, Opposition Figures on Coming
Elections,” Al-Ufuq , (FBIS) GMP20041025000267,
October 25, 2004, p. 3.
[40]
“AMS Spokesman Cited on Plan, Conditions Set for Participation
in Iraqi Elections,”
Iraq For All News Network,
(FBIS) GMP20041204000088, December 4, 2004.
[41] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041026000248, October 26, 2004.
[42]
“Iraqi Security Adviser Interviewed on Elections, ‘Foreign
Presence,’ Al-Zarqawi,” Al-Fayha Television, (FBIS)
GMP20041029000016, 0952 GMT, October 26, 2004.
[43] “Roundup of Iraqi Press
Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041030000149,
October 30, 2004
[44] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041020000292, October 20, 2004.
[45]
“Iraqi Article Urges Sunnis Not To Boycott Elections,” Al-Shira,
(FBIS) GMP20041028000237, October 27, 2004, p. 2.
[46] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041109000257, November 9, 2004.
[47]
“Iraqi President Al-Yawir Forms ‘Secular’ Political Party to Run
in Elections,” Al-Diyar Television , (FBIS)
GMP20041123000268, 1700 GMT, November 23, 2004.
[48]
“Four Kurdish Parties Meet in Irbil, Issue Statement on
Elections,” Tariq al-Sha'b , (FBIS) GMP20041030000171,
October 30, 2004, p. 1.
[49]
“Barham Salih Says Postponing Elections to Have ‘Serious
Repercussions,’” Al-Arabiyah Television , (FBIS)
GMP20041128000148, 1415 GMT, November 28, 2004.
[50]
“Iraqi Figures Discuss Calls for Postponing Elections, Dialogue
with Opposition,” Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television
, (FBIS) GMP20041128000207, 1715 GMT, November 28, 2004.
[51] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041110000224, November 10, 2004.
[52]
“Turkoman Front Leader on Participation in Elections, Situation
in Kirkuk,” Al-Mustaqbal, (FBIS) GMP20041129000241,
November 29, 2004.
[53]
“Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections Iraq,” (FBIS)
GMP20041021000163, October 20, 2004.
[54]
“Election Official Says 70 Electoral Lists Received,” Al-Sharqiyah
Television , (FBIS) GMP20041213000095, 1100 GMT,
December 13, 2004.
[55]
“Unified Elections List Represents Various Iraqi Sectors, Ethnic
Backgrounds,” Al-Najaf News Network, (FBIS)
GMP20041215000084,
December 14, 2004.
[56]
“Iraq Al-Sha'lan Calls List Backed by Al-Najaf Religious
Authority ‘Iranian’ List” Al-Sharqiyah Television, (FBIS)
GMP20041215000090, 1100 GMT, December 15, 2004.
[57]
“Kurdish Parties Run for Legislative Elections with an
Independent List,” Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel
Television, (FBIS) GMP20041202000023, 0515 GMT, December 2,
2004.
[58]
“Al-Sharqiyah Further Reports on Electoral Lists of Iraqi
Political Entities,” Al-Sharqiyah Television, (FBIS)
GMP20041215000209, 1305 GMT, December 15, 2004.
[59]
“Iraq Election Monitor: Sunni Party on List, Obstacles to Expat,
Kurd Votes,” (FBIS) GMF20041218000002,
December 17, 2004.
[60] “Iraqi Paper Reports
Names Included in Independent , Coalition Tickets,”
Al-Mashriq , (FBIS) GMP20041214000271, December 13, 2004, p.
1.
[61]
“Three Iraqi Election Office Staff ‘Gunned Down’ in Baghdad,”
AFP, December 19, 2004.
[62]
“Letters to Iraqi Commission Demand Cancelling Elections,
Include Threats,” Al-Sharqiyah Television, (FBIS)
GMP20041031000104, 1100 GMT October 31, 2004.
[63]
“Iraqi Islamic Group Threatens To Target Polling Centers,”
Al-Arabiyah Television, (FBIS) GMP20041118000219, 0610 GMT,
November 18, 2004.
[64]
“Jihadist Websites: Ansar Al-Sunnah Army Threatens Iraqi
Elections; Tips on Ambushing US Helicopters,” (FBIS)
GMP20041118000268, November 18, 2004.
[65]
Sam Dagher, “Iraqi Voter Registration Forms Burned by Insurgents
in Mosul,” AFP, November 20, 2004.
[66]
“Iraqi Salafist Official Defends Margaret Hassan’s Murder,”
Liberation, (FBIS) EUP20041118000039, November 18, 2004.
[67] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041031000181, October 31, 2004.
[68]
“Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,” (FBIS)
GMP20041025000184, October 25, 2004.
[69]
“Al-Arabiyah TV Talk Show Discusses Iraqi Elections,” Al-Arabiyah
Television, (FBIS) GMP20041122000264, 1905 GMT, November 22,
2004.
[70]
“Iraqi Party Official Condemns Recruits’ ‘Senseless’ Deaths;
Discusses Elections, Al-Fayha Television, (FBIS)
GMP20041026000118, October 25, 2004.
[71]
“Iraqi Security Adviser Interviewed on Elections, ‘Foreign
Presence’, Al-Zarqawi,” Al-Fayha Television, (FBIS)
GMP20041029000016, 0952 GMT, October 26, 2004.
[72] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005
Elections , (FBIS) GMP20041012000225, October 12, 2004.
[73]
“SCIRI Official Issues Statement Rejecting Calls To Postpone
Iraq Elections,” (Internet) Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, (FBIS) GMP20041123000227, November 23, 2004.
[74]
“SCIRI Official Says Al-Najaf, Karbala Attacks Seek To Obstruct
Iraq Elections,” Al-Manar Television , (FBIS)
GMP20041219000216, 1840 GMT, December 19, 2004.
[75]
“Al-Ahali Interviews Iraqi Citizens on Significance of
Elections,” (FBIS) Al-Ahali,
GMP2004102000023, October 20, 2004, p. 8.
[76] “Roundup of Iraqi Press
Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041022000107,
October 22, 2004; “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005
Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041021000163, October 20, 2004;
International Republican Institute Survey.
[77] International Republican
Institute Survey.
[80] “Iraq…..Where To? Results
of the Opinion Poll Conducted by the Gulf Research Council (GRC)
in Iraq, February-March 2004,” Gulf Research Council, available
at <www.grc.ae>.
[81] “Roundup of Iraqi Press
Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,” (FBIS)
GMP20041012000225, October 12, 2004.
[82] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041016000208, October 16, 2004.
[83] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041012000225, October 12, 2004.
[84]
“Iraqi TV Al-Fayha Program Reports Care Aid Chief Abduction,
Discusses Elections,” Al-Fayha Television, (FBIS)
GMP20041020000234, 0900 GMT, October 20, 2004.
[85]
“Al-Ahali Interviews Iraqi Citizens on Significance of
Elections,” Al-Ahali, (FBIS) GMP20041020000233,
October 20, 2004, p. 8.
[86]
“Al-Arabiyah TV Talk Show Discusses Iraqi Elections,” Al-Arabiyah
Television, (FBIS) GMP20041122000264, 1905 GMT, November 22,
2004.
[87]
“Mujahidin Radio Blames Election Commission for ‘Slow’ Work,
Calls for Active Media,” Voice of the Mujahidin, (FBIS)
GMP20041103000056, 0620 GMT, November 2, 2004.
[88] “Roundup of Iraqi Press
Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,” (FBIS)
GMP20041107000235, November 7, 2004.
[89] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041109000257, November 9, 2004.
[90]
“Al-Ahali Interviews Iraqi Citizens on Significance of
Elections,”
Al-Ahali,
(FBIS) GMP20041020000233, October 20, 2004, p. 8.
[91] International Republican
Institute Survey.
[92] “Roundup of Iraqi Press
Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections ,” (FBIS) GMP20041012000225,
October 12, 2004.
[93]
“Iraq Election Monitor: Iraq’s Independent Electoral Commission
Publishes Daily on Election Affairs,” (FBIS) GMP20041209000085,
December 5, 2004.
[94]
“Iraq Election Monitor: TV Brings Out the Vote; Delay
Criticized,” (FBIS) GMF20041204000001, December 3, 2004.
[95]
“Iraq Election Monitor: Al-Sistani's Fatwa, Posters Urge
Iraqis to Participate in Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041211000033,
December 11, 2004.
[96] “Iraq Election Monitor: Start of Election
Activity, Debate over Delay,” (FBIS) GMF20041021000290,
October 21, 2004.
[97]
“Iraqi Paper Reports on Conference on Elections in Babil
Governorate,” Al-Mada, (FBIS) GMP20041024000194,
October 24, 2004, p. 6.
[98]
“Roundup of Iraqi Press of 26 October Reporting on Jan 2005
Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041028000168, October 28, 2004.
[99] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041012000225, October 12, 2004.
[100] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041103000222, November 3, 2004.
[101]
“Iraqi National Assembly Member: Women’s Rights ‘Mere
Propaganda’”, Al-Mada, (FBIS) GMP20041025000244, October
25, 2004, p. 6.
[102]
“Iraq: ‘Those Who Pant for American Carrot,’ ‘Patience of the
Hopeful’ Mocked,” Al-Hawzah, (FBIS) GMP20041125000220,
November 4, 2004.
[103]
“Writer Sees 'Intervention' by 'US Intelligence' in Iraqi
Elections,” Al-Furat, (FBIS) GMP20041024000095,
October 24, 2004, p. 3.
[104]
“Iraqi Commentary Says United States Serious About Holding
Elections,” Al-Adalah, (FBIS) GMP20041031000010, October
27, 2004, p. 12.
[106]
“Iraqi Writer Says Polls a Dilemma for All, Whether Held on Time
or Delayed,” Al-Ufuq, (FBIS) GMP20041105000184, November
2, 2004, p. 4.
[107]
“Muqtada al-Sadr Message Urges Troops to Quit Iraq ‘Straight
Away’ After Election,” Al-Hawzah, (FBIS)
GMP20041125000239, November 11, 2004, p. 1.
[108]
“Al-Sadr Urges SCIRI, Al-Da’wah Party to Reconsider December
Decision to Run for Elections,” Al-Jazirah Satellite
Channel Television, (FBIS) GMP20041202000181, 1324 GMT, December
2, 2004.
[109]
“Iraqi Communist Party Leader Views Electoral Program, Obstacles
to Elections,” Al-Sharqiyah Television, (FBIS)
GMP20041219000187, 1605 GMT, December 19, 2004.
[110]
“Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections” (FBIS)
GMP20041024000144, October 24, 2004.
[111]
“Iraqi Writer Discusses Two ‘Wagers’ on Iraqi Elections,” Al-Bayan,
(FBIS) GMP20041024000007, October 23, 2004, p. 3.
[112]
“Iraqi TV Al-Fayha Program Reports Care Aid Chief Abduction,
Discusses Elections,” Al-Fayha Television, (FBIS)
GMP20041020000234, 0900 GMT, October 20, 2004.
[113]
“Arab Writer Argues in Support of Sunni Arab Boycott of
Elections in Iraq,” Al-Hayah, (FBIS) GMP20041109000305,
November 1, 2004, p. 9.
[114]
“INC Head Chalabi on Debt To Gulf States, Security Situation,
Other Issues,” Al-Bayyinah, (FBIS) GMP20041128000160,
November 27, 2004, p. 14.
[115] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041025000275, October 25, 2004.
[116] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections,” (FBIS) GMP20041103000222, November 3, 2004.
[117]
“Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan 2005 Elections,” (FBIS)
GMP20041024000144, October 24, 2004.
[118]
“Baghdad Paper Explores Benefits of Political Process, Assails
Saudi Fatwa,” Al-Bayan, (FBIS) GMP20041123000204,
November 22, 2004, p. 3.
[119] “Roundup of Iraqi Press Reporting on Jan
2005 Elections ,” (FBIS) GMP20041026000248 Iraq, October 26,
2004.
[120]
“Iraq Elections Monitor: Iraqi Sunni Figures Discuss
Iraqi Election Prospects; Sharm al-Shaykh Conference,” (FBIS)
GMP20041025000217, , October 24, 2004.
Ibrahim Al-Marashi (Ph.D. Oxford
University) is a post-doctoral fellow at Sabanci University. He was
a consultant to the Iraq Analysis Center in New York and a lecturer
at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, as well as a research
associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
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