![[Meria Journal Image]](../../images/meria.gif)
Issue 4/February 1998
Editor, Prof. Barry Rubin
Issue 4/February 1998
Editor, Prof. Barry Rubin
ARTICLE: Current Iraqi Military Capabilities: An Assessment
By Kenneth M. Pollack, courtesy of the Washington Institute
IMPORTANT NEWS: Note from the Editor; updated homepage, MERIA Journal 5
1. ANNOUNCEMENTS OF MEETINGS, CONFERENCES, LECTURES
2. RESEARCH QUERIES--PLEASE HELP
3. NEW PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST
5. FUNDING/SCHOLARSHIPS/FELLOWSHIPS
6. MERIA BOOKS: ORDER FOR FREE
7. DISCOUNTS FOR MERIA READERS:
Our discount list will now be carried on the homepage.
New items will be listed for several months.
With the Clinton Administration warning that its patience with Iraq is wearing thin and that military strikes could be just around the corner, it is useful to revisit the question of Iraq's current ability to respond militarily to a new round of conflict.
Barely a Paper Tiger.
The Iraqi armed forces today are a pale shadow of even their
1991 form. On paper, Iraq's army still looks formidable, with
400,000 men, 23 divisions (6 of them Republican Guard), 2,000
tanks, and 200-300 combat aircraft. However, most of Iraq's arms
are obsolete and it lost most of its advanced weaponry during the
Gulf War. In contrast, U.S. forces are considerably better armed
today than they were in 1991.
Iraq's armed forces suffer from other significant shortcomings. During the Gulf War, Iraqi forces were crippled by overcentralized command and control, poor tactical leadership, an inability to take full advantage of their weapons, inadequate attention to reconnaissance, and near total incompetence in battles of maneuver both on the ground and in the air. There is no indication Iraq has made any progress in remedying these problems. Iraqi forces were also plagued by poor and haphazard maintenance practices which greatly reduced their numbers of operable equipment; most Iraqi Army formations rarely had more than two-thirds of their vehicles operational at any time. As a result of the UN sanctions, Iraq has been unable to buy spare parts, tools, lubricants, and other supplies, with the result that its maintenance problems have worsened. Many Iraqi weapons have rusted beyond use, lack critical parts, or have been cannibalized to keep other equipment running. To compensate, Baghdad has been forced to demobilize numerous divisions and reduce the numbers of weapons assigned to those remaining.
Iraqi Air and Air Defense Forces.
Iraq's ground-based air defenses are the one part of its
military that could cause U.S. forces difficulty, although they
almost certainly can be overcome by a determined U.S. effort. The
Iraqis have been able to reconstruct most of their pre-war
integrated air defense system. However, they have not been able to
expand or improve its capabilities, which proved inadequate to the
task of defeating American air power in 1991. Indeed, the inability
of Iraqi air defenses to deter or defeat periodic raids by the
Iranian air force since the war suggests that the Iraqi air defense
net remains in worse shape now than it was then. The Iraqis have
been practicing some new tricks--such as distancing fire-control
radars from SAM launch units, which makes the crews less vulnerable
to the high-speed anti-radiation missiles that proved so
devastating during the war. But in the past, Iraqi forces have
shown an inability to execute the more sophisticated tactics they
have occasionally practiced. Iraqi SAMs are mostly obsolete and
lack the capability to shoot down advanced U.S. combat aircraft
without a lot of luck. Much of Iraq's vast array of anti-aircraft
guns is inoperable due to age or poor maintenance, and Baghdad
still has not found a solution to the U.S. tactic that proved so
successful during the Gulf War: flying above the 10,000 foot
ceiling of most Iraqi anti-aircraft guns.
The Iraqi Air Force is unlikely to prove more effective than it did during the Gulf War. Iraqi pilots were exceptionally poor--many could barely fly their planes, let alone dogfight--and were wholly dependent on directions from ground controllers, which were routinely jammed by Coalition forces. As a result of the shortages caused by the embargo and the restrictions of the two no-fly zones, Iraqi air force pilots have generally had even fewer flight hours to practice combat skills than in the past. Iraq has not found a solution to the problem of U.S. jamming of its communications, nor has it been able to train its pilots to fight without direction from their ground controllers. Maintenance problems have hit the Air Force hardest of all, while the war left Iraq with only a handful of advanced fighter aircraft (maybe a dozen operable MiG-29s and possibly twice that number of Mirage F-1s). If Saddam were to try to contest a new U.S. air campaign, he would probably leave most of the work to his ground-based air defenses for fear of having too many expensive aircraft shot down by American fighters.
Conventional Retaliation.
If Saddam cannot actually stop a U.S. air campaign, he may try
to retaliate. Here as well, his military options are limited. The
destruction of Iraq's logistical assets during the Gulf War--plus
its maintenance problems-- effectively preclude long-distance
armored offensives such as would be needed to threaten key
objectives in Saudi Arabia (such as Jubayl or Riyadh) or Jordan
(such as Amman or Mafraq). U.S. air interdiction along the limited
road networks from Iraq to Saudi Arabia and Jordan would probably
make it impossible for Iraq to attack even less important, but
closer, objectives such as Hafr al-Batin in Saudi Arabia or
Jordan's H-4 air base. In the absence of U.S. forces, Iraq probably
could once again overrun Kuwait; but today, a U.S. brigade
task-force is based north of Kuwait City backed by formidable air
power in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and on two U.S. carriers in the
Gulf. Moreover, the forces Baghdad currently has in place in
southern Iraq lack the combat skills and mobility to be entrusted
with such a mission. Consequently, as in 1990 and 1994, Saddam
would undoubtedly rely on the Republican Guard for an invasion of
Kuwait. At present, all of the Guard's armored divisions remain in
their garrisons around Baghdad. In October 1994, the United States
demonstrated that in the time it would take for Iraq to move these
units to the Kuwaiti border, Washington could deploy far more
military force to the region than could Iraq. In addition, the U.S.
currently has more powerful military forces in Kuwait than it did
in 1994, and would therefore need even less time to prepare for
battle, while Iraq probably will be reluctant to concentrate the
Guard for an offensive out of fear that it would then be vulnerable
to U.S. airstrikes.
Nor does Saddam have much of an airstrike option. First, the Iraqis flew most of their advanced strike aircraft to Iran during the Gulf War. All of Baghdad's Su-24 Fencers are now in Iranian hands, as are most, if not all, of Iraq's Mirage F-1EQ5/6s--the strike variant of the Mirage F-1. Second, Iraq's remaining inventory of attack aircraft consists of older Soviet planes which carry less sophisticated munitions, have shorter ranges, poorer avionics, and less ability to penetrate enemy air defenses. These planes realistically could only attack targets in Kuwait, eastern Jordan, northern Saudi Arabia, or southeastern Turkey, where they would likely face U.S. fighters and Patriot missile batteries that would make short work of any Iraqi attackers.
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
In the worst case, Saddam might consider employing his hidden
arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to retaliate. The UN
inspectors believe Saddam may still have as many as several dozen
Scud-type missiles, along with warheads and bombs filled with
chemical and biological agents. If Saddam believed that he were
about to be overthrown, he might lash out with WMDs in a desperate
effort to stave off his downfall. However, short of such dire
circumstances, the risk that Baghdad would retaliate for U.S.
military action with WMDs is slight. In the past, Saddam has only
used WMDs when his adversary could not respond in kind, and has
been careful not to use them when his adversary could. Thus, he
scrupulously refrained from firing WMD-filled Scuds at Israel or
Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War for fear that the U.S. or Israel
would retaliate with nuclear weapons. Indeed, Saddam would probably
think very carefully about attempting to employ WMD even
clandestinely; he will no doubt consider that-- as with his
attempted assassination of George Bush--the United States would
discover Baghdad's hand behind any mysterious outbreaks of anthrax
or terrorist attack with nerve gas and retaliate against Iraq.
Because of Saddam's inherent conservatism when it comes to taking
risks that could threaten his regime, he will probably weigh very
carefully any action that could provoke a massive U.S. or Israeli
attack on Iraq.
Kenneth M. Pollack is a research fellow at The Washington Institute.
Posting
1. Analysis:
Tony Allan, "Why Middle East Powers Aren't Warring Over Water"
Rami G. Khouri, "Algeria's terrifying but unsurprising agony"
Kemal Kirisci and Bulent Aras, Roundtable on Recent Developments
in Turkey
2. Habib C. Malik, "Is There Still a Lebanon?"
[Courtesy of Middle East Quarterly]
3. Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinian Public Opinion, The Peace Process, and Political Violence"
4. Barry Rubin, "After Arafat: Succession and Stability in Palestinian Politics"
5. Ofra Bengio, "Crossing the Rubicon?: Iraq and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process"
6. Seth Carus, "Iranian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons: Implications and Responses"
Note from the Editor:
We are very pleased that MERIA has
passed 2,500 subscribers and with the many positive letters we've
received. Thanks to everyone who has written, submitted material,
and sent articles. Especially positive was a message from London
that organizers of an event announced in MERIA not only received
several phone calls inquiring about attending from people in
England, but also requests for more information or transcripts from
a number of other countries. We hope our services and material are
useful and please remember that we depend on your cooperation.
Our homepage now includes sections on answers to common
queries regarding Middle East research; a large database on U.S.
Middle East policy; additional links; updated table of contents for
MERIA's free books; and all previous publications. Visit it at:
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria.html
Newly Listed Upcoming Events:
February 27. Tel Aviv, Israel. BESA Center for Strategic
Studies. "Technology and War: A Survey of the Future" (Hebrew)
Yitzhak Ben-Yisrael, Yitzhak Gat, Ran Goren; Dan Hlotz; Shmuel
Gordon; Yhzkel Dror. Elisheva Brown browne@ashur.cc.biu.ac.il
March 2-4. Tel Aviv, Israel. Yitzhak Rabin Center for Israel Studies, "National Identity of New States" (mostly about the Middle East).
March 6. Oxford, England, St. Antony's Middle East Centre, 5pm. Dr. Fouzia Rhissassi, Rabat U, "Moroccan Women in Higher Education."
March 13. Oxford, England, St. Antony's Middle East Centre, 5pm. Dr. Nabid Osairan, "Bahraini Womcn: The Psycho-Social Construction of gender roles."
Seeking speakers May 11. Herzog Center, Ben-Gurion U, Beersheva, Israel. "Media and Diplomacy in the Middle East." Call: 07-6472538, 6472553 or fax 07-6472922.
Deadlines of Interest:
February 17: Proposal deadline for December 3-6. Chicago, MESA
Conference. mesa@ccit.arizona.edu or
http://www.mesa.arizona.edu
(no proposals accepted by email or fax). (includes meeting
of Society for Gulf Arab Studies)
February 23: deadline for abstract to May 8-9. Chicago, Illinois, 13th Annual Middle East History and Theory Conference U Chicago Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Michael Provence, prov@cicero.uchicago.edu
March 31 is deadline for a 1-page summary to propose a paper to the German/English-language conference on current research on Oman, June 20, Bonn, Germany. http://www.oman.org/bonn.htm or Joachim Duester jduester@pobox.com. Register via: Oman-Tagung, c/o Beta Publishing, attn. Mrs. Walter, Celsiusstr. 43, D-53125 Bonn, Germany, Fax (0049-228) 25 28 511.
Recent events of interest:
Water Issues Group, U London SOAS: January 17, Yemen's water
problems; January 27, Nile development Contact: ta1@soas.ac.uk
http://www.soas.ac.uk/geography/waterissues/
January 30, Washington DC, Georgetown U Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, "The Algerian Crisis: International Implications and Reactions. Dr. Azzedine Layachi, St. John's U; Dr. John Entelis, Fordham U; Mona Yacoubian, Consultant; Eric Goldstein, Human Rights Watch.
February 3, Tel Aviv, Israel. Tami Steinmetz Center, Sa'eb Erakat, Minister of Local Government, Palestinian Authority, "The Peace Process, Where To?"
February 5, Houston, Texas. James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice U, Dialogue on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Problems and Prospects. Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Maher el Sayed and Israel's UN Ambassador Dore Gold, 6PM, Baker Hall.
Regarding query 1998/2 of Michael Barnett on public opinion and the peace process: The Leonard Davis Institute has recently come out with a publication on The Israeli Public and the Peace Process. To order, write: msdavis@pluto.mscc.huji.ac.il
Avraham Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, SUNY Press, 350 pp., $24.95 paperback. The best short history of recent inter-Arab politics, strong on both factual content and original analysis.
The Spring 1998 issue of Survival, the respected journal of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (available February 13), includes several articles of special interest on the Middle East: "Rethinking Dual Containment" by Gary Sick; "The Continuing Logic of Dual Containment" by Patrick Clawson; "Israel's Revolution in Security Affairs" by Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt and Andrew J. Bacevich; and "Israel's Military Transfers to China and Taiwan" by Yitzhak Shichor. Summaries of these articles can be seen at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/iiss. For information on subscriptions or purchasing individual issues, write Petra Green: green@iiss.org.uk.
The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations has published: Nissim Rejwan, "Elie Kedourie and His Work: An Interim Appraisal," A Dowty, I. Peleg and others, "The Role of Domestic Politics in Israeli Peacemaking, and also (in Hebrew) Reuven Erlich and others, "New Threat to The Security Zone in Lebanon." Write: msdavis@pluto.mscc.huji.ac.il.
Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature is edited by Julie Scott Meisami, The Oriental Institute, U Oxford, UK and Paul Starkey, U Durham, UK and will be published by Routledge in two volumes. It contains 1300 entries and will be available in April 1998, 896pp, Hb: 0-415-06808-8. 175 British pounds; $290US; $406Canadian. write: Darell Carey dcarey@routledge.co.uk.
Lawrence Potter, deputy director of the Gulf/2000 project, "The Persian Gulf in Transition," Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association (No. 315), 66 pages for general readers and classroom use but with many useful facts and figures. $5.95. Discounts up to 30% available for larger orders: Foreign Policy Association, Sales and Circulation, 470 Park Avenue South, NY, NY 10016-6819.
Lise Garon, Universite Laval, Quebec, Canada, Le silence tunisien. Les alliances dangereuses au Maghreb, L'Harmattan, Montreal et Paris, 297pp, covers civil liberties in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, including media, democracy, public opinion.
The Muslim Student Association (MSA) of the US has updated its services including its archive of reprinted articles http://msanews.mynet.net/MSANEWS/; links http://msanews.mynet.net/Launchpad/; and writings listed by author: http://msanews.mynet.net/Scholars/.
Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS)(Yerevan, Armenia) http://www.acnis.am has a well-done site with several publications and articles on contemporary Armenia.
The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew U new site: http://atar.mscc.huji.ac.il/~davis
Lebanon's Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform: http://www.omsar.gov.lb
Special London Calendar:
February 15, "Reflections on Teaching about Islamic History in
American and British Schools," Ross Dunn, San Diego State U,
Director of World History Projects for the National Center of
History in the Schools, UCLA. 4:30PM, Room L67, SOAS, Thornhaugh
Street, Russell Square, London WC1H OXG
February 15, Algeria and Britain: perspectives for a developing understanding (lecture), Society for Algerian Studies, CNMES, SOAS. Ahmed Benyamina, Algerian Ambassador to the UK, Room to be confirmed, Contact: 0171-323 6239
February 16, Water Issues Group, U London SOAS, 5.00 pm, "Hydropolitics: Water Security for Whom?" Jeroen Warner, Center for Environmental Security, U Groningen. Information: ta1@soas.ac.uk or http://www.soas.ac.uk/geography/waterissues/
February 19, CNMES. "Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban," William Maley and Anthony Hyman, Room G50, SOAS, 5.30pm, Contact: CNMES tel: 0171-323 6239.
February 20, "The Alevis in Turkey," Dr David Shankland, U Wales, Room 116, SOAS, 12.00, Contact: 0171-323 6262.
February 21, "Death by Heroine" a play by Mehrdad Seyf on Anglo-Iranian relations, Riverside Studios, Studio 2, London. Contact: 0181-237 1111
February 23, "Security Council Resolution 986: winners and losers," Barbara Stapleton, 5.30, Lecture Theatre, SOAS, Contact: 0171-323 6239 (CNMES).
February 25, "Islam as a Political force," Salah el-Ghobashi, U Westminster, Brunei Gallery B102, SOAS, 1pm, Prof Abdel Halim, tel: 0171-323 6297.
February 25, Poetry Reading in Farsi, by Hooshang Ebtehaj (Sayeh). Lecture Theatre, SOAS, 6pm, contact: 0171-323 6239
February 25-March 4, "The Condition of Jerusalem," photography exhibit, Khalid Al Zagari (Palestinian journalist), Kufa Gallery, 26 Westbourne Grove, London W2 5RH, 6.30-8.30pm. Open 11am to 5pm except Sundays and Mondays. contact: 0171-229 1928
February 26, "The Politics of Football in Iran, H. Chehabi, Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Washington DC. Room G59, SOAS, 6pm, Contact: CNMES, 0171-323 6239
The British Museum has two series of events in February: Traditional World of Islam": 0171-636 1555; and "Spinning Tales: Costumes and Stories from the Middle East": 0171-323 8690.
MERIA offers you discounts on books and publications. We welcome special arrangements for our readers. To propose articles, items for publication, give others free subscriptions, or other correspondence, write:besa@popeye.cc.biu.ac.il