Special Report: Analysis of the Israeli and Turkish Elections

Table of Contents

I. Israel

A. Barry Rubin, Israel's Election and the New Government Coalition

B. Cabinet make-up

C. Election results

D. Demographic breakdown of the election results

E. Parliamentary representation

F. Ehud Barak: A Biographical Profile

II. Turkey

A. Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Elections and New Government: An Analysis”

B. Results of Recent National Elections

SPECIAL REPORT:

ISRAEL'S ELECTION AND NEW GOVERNMENT COALITION

By Barry Rubin

Israel's May 1999 election was an important development for the country and potentially for regional and international issues as well. This brief analysis sets forth some of the main developments visible in the election and then discusses the dynamics of the new government coalition and cabinet.

A central question is whether this was a "critical election," that is whether it was a short-term variation in the parties' balance of power and the voters' behavior or whether it constitutes an important historic shift. Of course, critical elections can only be judged in hindsight, when later events and balloting show the staying power of trends.

In several ways, however, this appears to have been a critical election. It seems to have ended an era characterized by both the Likud party's hegemony and an almost even split among Israeli voters between the left and right. In turn, this situation, which began in 1977, was largely a response to a debate over Israel's policy in peacemaking and also with the orientations of certain communities within Israel.

On one hand, while sharp differences remain, the election seems to have marked a basic Israeli acceptance of the framework created by the Israel-Palestinian agreements since 1993. This now seems to mean a negotiated agreement involving territorial compromise and a Palestinian state. Barak's strong majority, the Likud's decline, and the failure of the National Union party, which rejected the Oslo agreements, and the National Religious Party (NRP), which took a hard line against them, indicates the reduction of forces demanding that Israel keep most of the territories and reject Palestinian sovereignty.

On the other hand, as Israel's first post-Arab-Israeli conflict election, issues of religion and secularism--as well as communal identity--came to the fore. Thus, a voter's position on the peace process was not as central in determining preferences as it had been before (though this issue should not be underestimated either) and other considerations emerged. This factor is reflected by the large vote for Shas and for the anti-religious Shinui party, as well as the campaign against Shas by the Soviet immigrant party, Yisrael b'Aliya.

One might identify three levels of decisionmaking by voters:

--The communal level. Many voters did not vote on a communal basis. Not all Arabs voted for Arab parties, or Sephardic Jews for Shas, or Soviet immigrants for the Yisrael b'Aliya or Yisrael Beiteinu parties, or modern Orthodox voters for the National Religious party, or secular Ashkenazic Israelis for Shinui or Meretz. Nevertheless, these communal lines were important markers which helped the rise of several small parties and the decline of the two largest parties, Labor and Likud.

--The peace process. In the race for prime minister, one's attitude toward the negotiations with the Palestinians was a key factor in choosing between Barak and Netanyahu. The basic stand of most parties was clear to their voters, and voters might choose among parties in the same camp on this issue. There were, however, two "wild cards" here, because both Shas and Yisrael b'Aliya have leaders who are more dovish on the peace process than many of their followers. Thus, for example, Shas supporters generally took a hard line--and many of them could have easily voted for Likud or the National Religious parties. Yet Shas wanted to be in Barak's coalition even if it made considerable concessions in negotiations.

--Antagonism to Netanyahu: Netanyahu's alienation of his own party colleagues and other leading figures reached unprecedented proportions. Among Likud leaders who left the party to oppose Netanyahu were: Yitzhak Mordechai, Benny Begin, Dan Meridor, and Roni Milo. Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir attacked Netanyahu and did not vote for the party to which he had belonged for 50 years. The Center Party was an association of ex-Likud leaders who hated Netanyahu and sought to bring him down. By sponsoring a second Soviet immigrant party--Yisrael Beiteinu--Netanyahu alienated Natan Sharansky and his Yisrael b'Aliya party. David Levy walked out of the government and into an alliance with Labor. By moving so close to the religious parties, Netanyahu angered some secular Israelis, especially among Soviet immigrants. Some rightists felt Netanyahu had become too centrist on the peace process. Ordinary voters were dismayed by a series of questionable decisions, and specific incidents implying incompetence.

Here are some of the election's main trends and outcomes:

1. Fragmentation. Israel's electoral reforms providing for a directly elected prime minister, which first took effect with the 1996 elections, allowed or encouraged voters to support small parties in the parliamentary race. Several smaller parties openly pointed out that voters could show their preference for a big party with their vote for prime minister, then indicate a sectoral interest with their parliamentary ballot. Small parties prospered in the ensuing fragmentation while Labor and Likud suffered. Thus, Labor's share of parliamentary seats declined from 44 in 1992, to 34 in 1996, and only 26 in 1999. The number of parties represented in the Knesset rose from 11 to 15.

2. Likud's decline: Going from 32 to only 19 seats was a catastrophe of huge proportions for Likud, leaving the party in ruins. Likud voters went largely to Shas, though also to other parties including the National Union and Center parties. By ignoring his party while in government, Netanyahu opened up deep rifts and antagonisms in its ranks. By ignoring his party in the election campaign, Netanyahu made even voters who supported him feel they could vote for other parties in the parliamentary race.

Yet Likud's recovery may not be so simple even after Netanyahu's resignation. As a party which depended on votes from poor Sephardic Jews (who now backed Shas) and on those skeptical about the peace process, it isn't entirely clear on what issues Likud can base its future appeal.

3. Shas' rise and the religious parties: Shas, a Sephardic (overwhelmingly ethnic Moroccan) religious party, was a big gainer in seats--but not necessarily influence--from the elections. It went from 4 seats in 1984, to 10 in 1996, and 17 in 1999. The party's appeal is based on a combination of factors. There is resentment by those in the Moroccan-origin community who feel alienated, left out, or poor. The conviction for bribery of party leader Arieh Deri sparked anger and accusation that the court was biased against him for ethnic reasons. There is also a large measure of gratitude for the social services (funded with government money) provided by Shas. While most of these voters are hawkish on the peace process--they have been strong Netanyahu and Likud supporters--the party leadership is relatively dovish. The party needs continued access to government membership to maintain its tax-funded institutions.

At the same time, the rise of Shas provoked a strong counter-reaction among those who believed the party was preaching superstition, hatred of national institutions, and divisiveness. The convictions for corruption of many party leaders was a big factor in Shas' poor image. This added to older secular grievances about the flow of money to religious institutions, the lack of army service by ultra-Orthodox men, and other issues.

But the election was not exactly a victory for the religious communities, which themselves are deeply divided into three rival parties struggling for patronage and government funding. The Ashkenazic ultra-Orthodox party, United Torah Judaism (UTJ), stayed at 5 seats, while the National Religious Party declined from 10 to 6 seats. The National Religious Party's almost exclusive focus on supporting Jewish settlement in the West Bank diminished its overall appeal among its Sephardic voters (who went to Shas) and the most militant opponents of the peace process (who went to the National Union). Thus, the number of representatives for religious parties in parliament rose only from 25 to 28 seats, still an all-time high.

4. The secular factor: As a reaction to the growth in the religious parties' power, a new single-issue secular party, Shinui, obtained 6 seats. The traditionally militant secular party, Meretz, stayed at 10 seats. Ironically, while Shas' main electoral appeal was not religion but ethnicity, the response to Shas focuses on the party's religious aspect. This was the first time in Israel's history where opposition to participation of religious parties in government--or at least the ultra-Orthodox parties--has become a powerful force in public opinion.

5. The Soviet immigrants: This group was widely viewed as the key constituency in the election. The central question was whether its votes would be determined by a hawkish perspective or by a readiness to exercise democratic rights to elect the opposition against a government which did not satisfy them. The second factor proved more important. Many immigrants voted against Netanyahu. But the election was not a victory for Yisrael b'Aliya, plagued by a split and by its inability to help its constituency while in government, it declined from 7 seats to 6. The new Yisrael Beiteinu party, with a shady leader and no program, received 4 seats. Half of its successful candidates were previously Knesset members from Yisrael b'Aliya. Still, this sector went from 7 to 10 seats overall.

6. The Arab sector: The number of Arab citizens voting for Zionist parties declined while remaining relatively high. Splits in the community also contributed to a poorer showing, though these parties increased representation from 9 to 10 seats. An interesting phenomenon was their desire to be independent of Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. The biggest winner was the Arab Democratic Party, running in cooperation with the Islamic Movement, which won 5 seats. The Arab sector voted overwhelmingly for Barak.

Forming a Coalition

Despite his overwhelming victory in the prime minister's race, Barak had a difficult choice in forming a coalition. He took his time and bargained toughly. The combination of One Israel, Meretz, the Center party, and Yisrael b'Aliya gave him a coalition of 48 seats of the 61 he needed.

How to get the remaining 13 seats in the coalition? Barak saw two alternatives: to invite either Shas or Likud to join the government. He wanted a broad coalition which would provide a strong basis for a peace agreement with the Palestinians (and possibly Syria and Lebanon). He also preferred to have at least religious parties in government, to bring along some of that sector.

The Arab parties--which included Communists, Islamic fundamentalists, and a top advisor to Yasir Arafat--were not deemed attractive coalition partners but were expected to support the coalition from outside. They were divided internally as well as in three rival parties. The same calculation applied to the Shinui Party, whose anti-religious rhetoric was also thought to be politically counterproductive.

There were both advantages and disadvantages to choosing either Shas or Likud. Shas would go along with Barak on the peace process but could cause significant social and political tensions. Its handicaps included a record of corruption, including the party's leader being condemned to a prison sentence. Meretz and other leaders said they would not serve in a government with Shas. Ironically, the very size of Shas constituted a problem since its success made Shas inclined to make big demands and opponents to fear it even more.

In contrast, Likud would pose fewer problems on economic, religious or social issues but could be expected to cause great difficulties over the peace process.

But at least four issues made Barak prefer Shas as a partner:

--His emphasis on moving the peace process quickly.

--The higher demands for ministries and influence over policy from Likud.

--The fact that a number of Likud leaders opposed entering Barak's coalition and it was unclear whether Sharon could really deliver the whole delegation. Moreover, this split also made it more likely that at least part of Likud would defect from the coalition over the peace process.

--Barak’s belief that he could handle Shas and the removal of Arieh Deri from the party’s leadership.

The New Cabinet

Barak's cabinet was based on the necessity of building a coalition so strong that it could make the tough decisions necessary for a peace agreement with the Palestinians and Syria. As in most parliamentary systems, the distribution of portfolios was designed more to balance parties (and personalities) than to put experts at the head of specific ministries.

While the cabinet composition was criticized on a number of grounds--lack of women, abundance of religious parties, specific appointments--Barak's decisions were based on the prior decisions of the voters and the parties. Each party chose its own candidates for ministrial positions and the proportions among the parties reflected the number of seats they have in parliament.

As a party agreement, the cabinet puts the top few leaders of each party into ministries. Since Labor has so few parliamentary seats relatively, it had to give up many ministries to other parties.

Jobs also had to be found for leading figures who might make trouble internally. And it was equally vital to keep certain people out of influential positions lest they cause damage by doing things against Barak's policy. Thus, for example, Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin had to be kept away from peace process areas where they might make mischief, while Shas ministers had to be kept away from controlling money as much as possible.

Barak was also careful to ensure that potential rivals--Ben-Ami, for instance, as well as Peres and Beilin, were not in control of posts where they had too much power regarding overall policy toward the peace process or other matters.

Several additional points should be made about this cabinet:

It is even stronger than it looks because has parties outside which support. Thus while the coalition parties have 75 seats (Labor, Shas, Meretz, UTJ, NRP, Yisrael b'Aliya), it can usually count on an additional 18 parliamentarians (Shinui, Arab Democratic Party, Hadash, Balad, One Nation). The real opposition is restricted to three parties--Likud, Yisrael Beiteinu, and the National Union--which only have 27 seats out of 120.

By the same token, if one or more parties want to walk out of the coalition government, they know that Barak can find replacements from other parties outside the government, as members or supporters of his policy. Shas also knows that it could be replaced by the Likud as a leading partner.

The rivalry among the three religious parties for patronage also inhibits walk-outs, since any defector knows that money for its school system, for example, would decline as a competitor staying in the coalition took a larger share.

With the exception of the NRP, whose defection would not really damage the coalition that much, all the parties will support Barak's negotiating policy with the Palestinians.

The most difficult area, of course, would be over whether Barak could make domestic changes which the religious parties do not want. It should be stressed, however, that Barak sees this phase as emphasizing the peace process. In a future phase, he could shift partners to obtain a majority oriented more toward domestic issues.

In general, Barak has kept control over the essential ministries involved in the peace process. He will be defense minister, with the very able Efraim Sneh as his deputy. David Levy may not be an activist at the foreign ministry but more importantly he will not subvert Barak's efforts, unlike the main alternative candidates.

The importance of Internal Security, headed by Shlomo Ben-Ami, should not be disregarded. The police and other such services will play an important role in handling the fight against terrorism and the structure of security provisions in any agreements with the Palestinians. Note, for example, the important role played by his predecessor in that post, Avigdor Kahalani.

Several ministers could do good jobs on domestic issues. While Yossi Beilin is the first non-lawyer ever to be minister of justice, this is an extremely challenging and important decision, given the assault on the courts by Shas. Moreover, the courts have assumed the role of reviewing parliamentary legislation which makes them an essential factor in social policy.

At education, Yossi Sarid will be dedicated to improving the system and will not be shy about focusing assets on the secular educational sector.

At finance, Avraham Shohat has ample experience from Rabin's government.

The religious parties focused on patronage ministries. While the National Infrastructure post (Eli Suissa, Shas) may prove maningless. this is not so for others. Labor and Social Affairs (Eli Yishai, Shas) has control over Shabbat closings; Health (Shlomo Benizri, Shas) over medical funds; Religious Affairs (Yitzhak Cohen, Shas) regarding appointments to hundreds of local posts; and Construction and Housing (Yitzhak Levy, NRP) over what communities get apartments built where they want them. Local government patronage is controlled by Interior (Deputy Minister Nissim Dahan, Shas), while Education supervises support for school systems (Shaul Yahalom, NRP).

Everyone will be watching these ministries for signs of corruption and favoritism. The reappearance of such misbehavior--especially by Shas--would damage the government's image and could lead to a crisis.

Finally, Yisrael b'Aliya achieved its goals by controlling the Interior and Absorption ministries, which deal with current and recent immigrants.

Consequently, despite the complexity of its arrangements, this coalition has a good chance for long-term survival. The most likely internal crises would arise from:

--Efforts by Peres and Beilin to pull the government to the left and to voice their own policy on the peace process and other issues.

--Corruption scandals involving Shas or other religious parties.

--Conflicts over enacting social legislation opposed by the religious parties.

--Threats of a walk-out by the NRP over concessions made in the peace process.

Note should also be taken of possible conflicts between Barak and his own Labor party, and the need to make David Levy and Yitzhak Mordechai feel that each of them receives proper personal respect.

Except for implementing the Wye agreement and some specific issues like safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, the peace process will focus on final status negotiations. These talks will be complex and difficult but it is worth noting that the lack of interim agreements will reduce any new concessions Israel must make and implement immediately. In other words, the government will not be constantly faced by compromises that could bring internal divisions.

The focus, rather, will be on deals to be made with the Palestinians or Syrians that will be implemented only when a full arrangement is reached. Barak has promised there will be a national referendum over such agreements. If agreements are reached in less than four years, such a referendum--perhaps combined with the next national elections--would be the big test of whether Israel has entered a new political era.

B. THE CABINET

Prime Minister - Ehud Barak, Labor*

Defense - Ehud Barak, Labor*

Foreign - David Levy, Gesher*

Regional Cooperation - Shimon Peres, Labor*

Internal Security - Shlomo Ben-Ami, Labor*

Min. without Portfolio - Haim Ramon, Labor*

Justice - Yossi Beilin, Labor*

Finance - Avraham Shohat, Labor*

Communications - Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, Labor*

Environment - Dalia Itzik, Labor*

Transportation - Yitzhak Mordechai, Center

Interior - Natan Sharansky, Yisrael b'Aliya

Education - Yossi Sarid, Meretz

Industry and Trade - Ran Cohen, Meretz

National Infrastructure - Eli Suissa, Shas

Labor and Social Affairs - Eli Yishai, Shas

Health - Shlomo Benizri, Shas

Religious Affairs - Yitzhak Cohen, Shas

Construction and Housing - Yitzhak Levy, NRP

Tourism - Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Center

Culture, Science and Sport - Matan Vilna'i, Labor* 

Diaspora Affairs - Michael Melchior, Meimad*

Acting Agricultural Min. Ehud Barak Labor*

Deputy Ministers:

Defense Efraim Sneh Labor*

Immigration & Absorption Yuli Edelstein, Yisrael b'Aliya

Interior Nissim Dahan, Shas

Education Shaul Yahalom, NRP

Finance - Haim Oron, Meretz

*Members of Barak's One Israel coalition party

___________

Barry Rubin is Deputy Director of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies and Editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs. His books include Revolution Until Victory?: The Politics and History of the PLO and The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building (Harvard University Press, 1994 and 1999).

C. OFFICIAL ISRAELI ELECTION RESULTS

From the Central Elections Committee:

 C. The Demographic Breakdown of the Election Results

(Before soldiers, diplomats, hospitalized and handicapped votes are counted)

 D. Parliamentary representation (Members of the 15th Knesset)

One Israel (Labor, Gesher & Meimad): 26 Seats

1. Ehud Barak

2. Shimon Peres

3. David Levy (Leader of Gesher)

4. Shlomo Ben-Ami

5. Yossi Beilin

6. Matan Vilna'i

7. Avraham Burg

8. Ra'anan Cohen

9. Uzi Baram

10. Dalia Itzik

11. Binyamin Ben-Eliezer

12. Haim Ramon

13. Eli Goldschmidt

14. Avraham Shohat

15. Yael Dayan

16. Ofer Pines

17. Michael Melchior (Leader of Meimad)

18. Maxim Levy

19. Ephraim Sneh

20. Nawaf Masalha

21. Avi Yehezkel

22. Sofa Landver

23. Sallah Tarif

24. Shalom Simhon

25. Yossi Katz

26. Shiri Weizman

Labor Website: http://www.avoda.org.il;

Ehud Barak Website: http://www.ehudbarak.co.il;

Meimad Website: http://www.meimad.org.il

Likud: 19 Seats

1. Binyamin Netanyahu (resigned)

2. Silvan Shalom

3. Moshe Katsav

4. Limor Livnat

5. Meir Sheetrit

6. Gideon Ezra

7. Naomi Blumenthal

8. Ariel Sharon

9. Uzi Landau

10. Reuven Rivlin

11. Dan Naveh

12. Tzahi Hanegbi

13. Yisrael Katz

14. Michael Eitan

15. Yehoshua Matza

16. Moshe Arens

17. Avraham Herschson

18. Tzippi Livni

19. Ayoub Kara

(Netanyahu’s resignation made the number 20 candidate on the list a Knesset member) Yuval Steinetz

Website: http://www.likud.org.il

Shas: 17 Seats

1. Aryeh Deri (resigned from Knesset)

2. Aryeh Gamliel

3. Eliyahu Suissa

4. Eliyahu Yishai

5. Shlomo Benizri

6. Yitzhak Cohen

7. Amnon Cohen

8. Nissim Dahan

9. David Azoulai

10. David Tal

11. Yitzhak Vaknin

12. Rahamim Malul

13. Meshulam Nahari

14. Yizhak Tsaban

15. Nissim Ze'ev

16. Yair Peretz

17. Ofer Hogi

Yitzhak Gagula (number 18) replaced Deri)

Meretz: 10 Seats

1. Yossi Sarid

2. Ran Cohen

3. Haim Oron

4. Amnon Rubinstein

5. Anat Maor

6. Zehava Gal-On

7. Avshalom Vilan

8. Ilan Gilon

9. Naomi Chazan

10. Husseina Jabara

Website: http://www.meretz.org.il

Yisrael B'Aliyah: 6 Seats

1. Natan Sharansky

2. Yuli Edelstein

3. Roman Bronfman*

4. Marina Solodkin

5. Gennady Rigeur

6. Alexander Tsinker*

(*Resigned to form new faction)

The Center Party: 6 Seats

1. Yitzhak Mordechai

2. Amnon-Lipkin Shahak

3. Dan Meridor

4. Ronni Milo

5. Uri Savir

6. Dalia Rabin-Pelossof

Website: http://www.hamercaz.org.il

Shinui: 6 Seats

1. Yosef (Tommy) Lapid

2. Avraham Poraz

3. Yehudit Naot

4. Yosef Paritzky

5. Eliezer Zandberg

6. Victor Brailovsky

Website: http://www.shinui.org.il

Arab Democratic Party (including Islamic Movement): 5 Seats

1. Abdulmalik Dehamshe

2. Taleb Al-Sana

3. Hashem Mahmeed

4. Tawfik Khatib

5. Muhammad Kena'an

United Torah Judaism: 5 Seats

1. Meir Porush

2. Avraham Ravitz

3. Ya'akov Litzman

4. Moshe Gafni

5. Shmuel Halpert

National Religious Party: 5 Seats

1. Yitzhak Levy

2. Haim Druckman

3. Shaul Yahalom

4. Yigal Bibi

5. Zevulun Orlev

Yisrael Beiteinu: 4 Seats

1. Avigdor Lieberman

2. Yuri Stern

3. Michael Nudleman

4. Eliezer Cohen

Haichud Haleumi [National Union]: 4 Seats

Benny Begin resigned from the Knesset

1. Rehavam Ze'evi

2. *Hanan Porat

3. Michael Kleiner

4. Benny Elon

Website: http://www.haichudhaleumi.org.il

 *Eventually also resigned from the Knesset

Hadash (Communist party): 3 Seats

1. Mohammed Baraka

2. Issam Mahoul

3. Tamar Gozansky

Website: http://www.hadash.org.il

Balad: 2 Seats

1. Azmi Bishara

2. Ahmed Tibi

One Nation: 2 Seats

1. Amir Peretz

2. Haim Katz

E. Prime Minister Ehud Barak

Born in 1942 in Kibbutz Mishmar Hasharon. He joined the Israel Defense Forces in 1959, and served in special operations, armored, and staff posts, including being head of the Intelligence and Planning branches and of the Central Command. He fought in the 1967 and 1973 wars and was deputy commander of Israeli forces in Lebanon during the 1982 war. He was named deputy chief of staff in May 1987 and chief of staff in April 1991. In the latter job, he played an important role in the peace negotiations and the Israeli army's redeployment.

Barak holds a Bachelors of Science in Physics and Mathematics from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem (1976), and a Masters of Science in Engineering-Economic Systems from Stanford University, California (1978).

After leaving the army, in July 1995, he became minister of the interior, and then minister of foreign Affairs from November 1995 until June 1996. From 1996 on, he was chairman of the Labor Party and a Knesset member.

II. Turkey

TURKEY’S ELECTION AND NEW GOVERNMENT: AN ANALYSIS

By Alan Makovsky

In making two strongly nationalist parties the top votegetters in the April 18 election, Turks showed the assertiveness of a nation that feels itself emerging as a regional power and the defensiveness of one still embittered by Western Europe's rejection. The secular establishment can take only slight solace in the decline of the Islamic vote, as the overall voting pattern shows increasing fragmentation; mainstream secular parties garnered little more than half the overall vote. Overall, the result guarantees another era of three-party, and probably unwieldy, government.

With 75 percent of the votes counted, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's pro-nationalist Democratic Left Party (DLP) has won a clear plurality of the popular vote and a slight lead in parliamentary seats over the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (NAP), which shocked most Turks by finishing second. Every other major party was embarrassed by its showing. Expected by many to win their second straight election, the Islamists finished a lackluster third. Two rival center-right parties, each led by scandal-tainted former prime ministers, finished fourth and fifth. A center-left party, led by former foreign minister Deniz Baykal, a bitter rival of Ecevit's, received less than 10 percent of the vote and thus will be unable to enter parliament. Pro-Kurdish rights HADEP, which many people believe is closely linked to the separatist Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), scored only 4 percent nationally but won several key mayoralties in the Kurdish-majority Southeast, thereby setting up a possible confrontation with authorities.

TWO BRANDS OF NATIONALISM

The NAP, and to some extent the DLP, rode a rising tide of nationalism in Turkey, fuelled not only by the struggle with the PKK and the arrest of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, but far more profoundly by a sense of rejection by Europe. At the same time, Turks feel that they have more foreign affairs options than at any time in years, Sensing their growing economy and military prowess, as well as close links with the United States and Israel, Turkey felt strong enough to initiate, and win, a confrontation with neighbor Syria last year. It is now more dismissive than ever of Western, particularly European, efforts to convince it to compromise on Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations. Moreover, growing ties with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkic Central Asia increase the sense of the possible. It is the mood--more assertive, more self-confident, more regionally connected, and yet unsettled by its isolation from Europe--upon which both Bahceli and Ecevit capitalized.

Ecevit is widely seen as a nationalist because of his positions on specific issues-in particular, support for Turkish Cyprus and strong opposition to the PKK and Kurdish nationalism-and a "Turkey first" approach to world affairs. The NAP's nationalism is more all-encompassing-romantic, ideological, and ethnically based, with emphasis on the wider "Turkish nation." This year, the NAP's foreign policy platform was relatively pragmatic, however, and it seems to have abandoned a longstanding call for a pan-Turkish empire comprising Turkey and the Turkic-speaking parts of the former Soviet Union. In cultural terms, Ecevit is Western-orientated, whereas the NAP looks to central Anatolia and eastward to other Turkic peoples for cultural influences; neither Ecevit nor the NAP exhibits much interest in European Union (EU) membership, however.

Although it is a secular party-and somewhat incongruously, given its glorification of myths about the pre-Islamic origins of the Turks--the NAP has long emphasized that Islam is a natural part of Turkish national identity. As a result, the party was able to run comfortably on a joint ticket with Necmettin Erbakan's pro-Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party (RP) in the 1991 elections. Were it not for the military's opposition, the NAP might now consider coalition with the Virtue Party, the de facto successor to the banned Refah Party. Its positive view of Islam and "Turk-Islam synthesis" no doubt boosted NAP's standing in the central Anatolian heartland and perhaps helped lure votes from Virtue.

ECEVIT'S SUCCESS...

Long regarded as washed up, 73-year-old Ecevit has won his first election since 1977. His achievement is the result of both design and luck: his incorruptibility at a time when corruption rumors engulf most of his competitors; his "fluke" election-time incumbency, a result of parliamentary maneuvers; his good fortune to be in office when Turkey captured PKK leader Ocalan; his relative moderation on economic and foreign policy issues since he became deputy prime minister in 1997, easing the concerns of many who liked his secularism and sincerity but otherwise feared his policies. By election day, Ecevit's success was expected, and he also benefited in the last weeks of the campaign from the perception that he was leading the secular pack; no doubt, many Turks wanting to maximize the value of their anti-Islamist vote decided to back the perceived secular front-runner.

...AND NAP's

Virtually nobody predicted the NAP's success. Most pre-election discussion of the NAP centered on whether it would poll the 10 percent to enter parliament; it had not done so since the 10 percent threshold was established in 1993. Its only previous success during this period was in 1991, when it ran on a combined slate with Refah. Jointly, the two parties won 16 percent of the vote, but Refah was given most of the credit for that performance. Since the 1995 election, when the NAP won just 8 percent, its legendary leader Alparslan Turkes had died, replaced two years ago by the uncharismatic Bahceli. Nobody expected that Bahceli's NAP could out-do the party's performance under Turkes.

But the NAP was a primary beneficiary of the collapse of the center-right and more than doubled its vote percentage over the past election. Unlike the scandal-plagued and ideologically fuzzy Ciller and Yilmaz, Bahceli is viewed as principled and of clear views; by simultaneously projecting an image of a more moderate NAP, he was well positioned to scoop up stray secular-nationalist right-wing voters. At the same time, many traditionalists disgruntled with the Islamists no doubt found the nationalist but Islamically tinged NAP an acceptable alternative to Virtue.

VIRTUE'S FAILURE

Virtue was expected to challenge Ecevit's party for the first place, given that Refah had won a 31 .4 percent plurality in 1995. This year's result ended a streak of five consecutive nationwide elections in which the Islamists increased their vote. As such, it eases some secularists' concern that the Islamists are an unstoppable juggernaut, while probably convincing the military that its policy of confrontation with the Islamists is working.

With Erbakan banned from politics, the untested Recai Kutan led Virtue. Kutan emphasized his party's moderation-pro-Western, pro-democracy, and pro-free market, in contrast to Refah--even while also propounding views in support of limited Islamist goals. Virtue was handicapped, however, by the perception that the military would not allow it to take power, no matter what its level of support; by the fact that the state is pursuing judicial action to ban it; by the meager accomplishments, even on Islamist-related issues, of the 1996-1997 Erbakan prime ministry; and perhaps by a plainly visible split in the party, with Erbakan often at odds with his hand-picked successor Kutan, depleting party morale.

The Islamists remain fully ensconced as a power on the Turkish political scene, however. They appear to have won the second-highest total of mayorships (after the NAP), including that of Turkey's largest city, Istanbul-a particularly strong statement since the previously elected mayor of Istanbul, Refah's Tayyip Erdogan, was convicted of "incitement to religious hatred" and thereby prevented from running again. The Islamists will also make noise in other ways: The unprecedented election of head-scarved women to parliament on Virtue's ticket sets the stage for another confrontation with the dress-code-sensitive secular establishment.

RPP's END

RPP's failure to make the threshold is ironic and, in the eyes of many, just deserts. Baykal, its leader, initiated the maneuvers that led to these early elections (originally scheduled for December 2000) that almost nobody else wanted; his loss, just a point or two under his 1995 showing, may partly reflect the voters' punishment. Though founded by Kemal Ataturk in the early 1920s, the RPP's aura as "Ataturk's own party" had long since become more slogan than reality. For years, most staunch Ataturkists have voted for other secular parties. The demise of RPP from parliament also brings down the popular parliamentary speaker and former foreign minister Hikme Cetin.

THE CENTRE COLLAPSES

The elections marked the latest step in the ongoing fractionalization of the Turkish system and the decline of the secular center-right, once considered the "natural party of government" in Turkey. For the second consecutive election, six parties have improbably scored between 8 and 22 percent of the vote. The four mainstream parties-the DLP and RPP on the center-left and Yilmaz's Motherland and Ciller's TPP on the center-right-appear to have polled a total of only 56 percent, suggesting that there may no longer be a "mainstream" in Turkish politics. This total is down from 88 percent in 1987 and 66 percent as recently as 1995. For the center-right, the combined vote of roughly 26 percent is its lowest ever. As the traditional parties decline, mainly the more ideological Islamists and nationalists garner their votes. Together, Virtue and the NAP captured more than one-third of the vote.

The 1999 election was a clear rejection of Ciller and Yilmaz, whose two parties dominated Turkish politics in the 1980s and early 1990s under different leaders. Yilmaz has led Motherland in three national elections; each time its vote has declined further. This disastrous result could convince the parties that they have no future unless they unite. Yet, given the mutual contempt Ciller and Yilmaz have shown for one another, and given their poor images with the voters, it is difficult to imagine that even a united party would prove very stable or attractive to voters, unless there is new leadership. Indeed, along with RPP, three mainstream parties have now seemingly been led to ruin by their leaders.

One clear lesson of Turkey's 1990s political experience: Without electoral reform that produces stronger majorities, Turkey is doomed endlessly to be led by multiparty, and usually weak, governments. Without such reform, over time Turkey is likely to see not only growing fragmentation and extremism, but also increased involvement of the military in decision making.

Government formation. The new government formed by Ecevit, and approved by parliament in early June, consists of his own DSP, Bahceli's MHP, and Yilmaz's ANAP. That grouping was widely seen as virtually the only plausible coalition possibility, given Ecevit's known desire to work with Yilmaz, Yilmaz's objection to working with Ciller, and FP's unacceptability to the military. Holding 63% of the seats in parliament, the coalition is Turkey's strongest since Turgut Ozal's second term as prime minister in 1987, when ANAP alone governed with 64% of the seats (in a smaller parliament).

A relatively smooth process of government formation was disrupted only briefly when Rahsan Ecevit, the prime minister's wife and secretary-general of his party, expressed dismay that her party would have to coalesce with a party (MHP) that shed blood in the 1970s. Her speech seemed calculated mainly to re-assure the party base that the leadership understood and shared its sensitivities about MHP, but Bahcheli took offense and temporarily suspended coalition negotiations pending an apology from Mr. Ecevit. He contented himself with a half-apology, however, and negotiations went forward. Yilmaz, who was close to MHP as a youth and remains a strong nationalist, did an effective and probably crucial job mediating between the two largest parties. During the entire government formation process, Ecevit and Bahcheli reportedly met only twice. 

DSP holds 13 cabinet seats (including the prime ministry), MHP 12, and ANAP 10. Each of the parties received a ministry that will give it representation on the National Security Council, the powerful body consisting of civilian and military leaders that effectively decides most issues of national security importance. DSP's Ismail Cem remains foreign minister, a post he has held since mid-1997. MHP, the dark-horse of the April elections, continued to surprise the public and to allay fears during the government-formation process. 

Bahceli consistently emphasized his willingness to compromise, despite the party's reputation for inflexibilty. As much as anything, MHP's moderate approach may have reflected the strength of its desire to return to government after a 21-year absense. But it had the effect, along with Bahceli's low-key speaking style, of projecting an image of statesmanship and national unity that impressed and reassured a Turkish public still trying to figure out what sort of role MHP would play in national life. In fact, MHP seemed to give up far more than the other two parties in the process of hammering out a government program. Most notably, the final document did not reflect MHP's campaign pledges to protect the rights of the religious and traditional women who cover their heads with scarves, who are are now barred from attending universities or holding government jobs and whose families make up a sizable portion of MHP voters. Several newspapers described the government program as an MHP "surrender." 

Although the three coalition partners are believed to share a strongly nationalist bent, the government program suggested far more continuity than change in foreign policy. Noteworthy, however, is the program's insistence that opposition to "separatist terrorism" will be "the principal condition we seek" in relations with foreign nations. The Turkic-speaking states of the former Soviet Union, long an object of passionate interest from MHP, earned only one sentence in the program: that the government "will follow an active and stable policy seeking to develop economic, social, cultural, and political cooperation". The word "political" undoubtedly caught Moscow's eye, however. Somewhat oddly, the government promises to "preserve" Turkey's "important and traditionally special relations with the Arab countries" and to develop relations with "Islamic countries," while not mentioning Israel at all. What makes this odd is that Turkey has famously enjoyed a growing security and economic relationship with Israel for more than three years, while its relations with the Arab world have been generally stagnant and strained. Government leaders privately say that relations with Israel will continue to develop. The formulation in the government program, and the omission of Israel, probably reflects no more than the government's desire to stabilize its relations with a region that – as widely perceived -- has been unsettled by Turkish-Israeli ties.

Government durability probably will depend on whether MHP continues its willingness to compromise or whether it ultimately will decide it must take a stand in support of the religion-related demands of its core constituency. Initial indications are that the government is functioning effectively and that it is putting its huge majority to good use. One of its first actions was to pass a constitutional amendment, with the support of the opposition, removing the military judge from the three-judge panel in state security courts, bringing those courts somewhat more (though not completely) into line with courtroom procedures elsewhere in the Western world. It has also passed a much-needed banking law and pledged to move forward with a constitutional amendment that would allow foreign investors to appeal disputes to international arbitration. The government is still enjoying a honeymoon period; for now, however, it is not far-fetched to imagine that it may be one of Turkey's strongest, most productive, and longest-lasting governments of recent decades. 

*Alan Makovsky is a senior Research Fellow at the Washington Institute and director of the Institute's Turkish research program.

RESULTS OF RECENT NATIONAL ELECTIONS 

* From Hurriyet, April 19 1999, with 73.6% of the vote counted

** Welfare ran in 1995 but was banned in 1998; Virtue, its de facto successor party, ran in 1999.

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