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FROM COLD PEACE TO COLD WAR?
THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF EGYPT'S
MILITARY BUILDUP
Jeffrey Azarva*
Since the 1978 Camp David Accords, the Egyptian government has undertaken extraordinary
efforts to modernize its military with Western arms and weapon
systems. By bolstering its armored corps, air force, and
naval fleet with an array of U.S. military
platforms, the Egyptian armed forces have emerged as one
the region's most formidable forces. But as the post-Husni
Mubarak era looms, questions abound. Who, precisely, is Egypt arming
against, and why? Has Egypt attained
operational parity with Israel? How will the military be affected by
a succession crisis? Could Cairo's
weapons arsenal fall into the hands of Islamists? This essay
will address these and other questions by analyzing the regime's
procurement of arms, its military doctrine, President Mubarak's
potential heirs, and the Islamist threat.
INTRODUCTION
In March 1999,
then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen embarked on a
nine-nation tour of the Middle East to finalize arms agreements worth over $5 billion with
regional governments. No state received more military hardware
than Egypt.
Totaling $3.2 billion, Egypt's
arms package consisted of 24 F-16D fighter planes, 200 M1A1
Abrams tanks, and 32 Patriot-3 missiles.[1] Five months later, Cairo inked
a $764 million deal for more sophisticated U.S. weaponry.
Few in Egypt and
the United States batted an eye.
For the government
of Husni Mubarak, exorbitant military expenditures have always
been the rule, not the exception. In the 29 years since the
Camp David Accords, successive U.S. administrations have provided Egypt with roughly
$60 billion in military and economic aid subsidies to reinforce
its adherence to peace.[2] Under U.S. auspices,
the Mubarak regime has utilized $1.3 billion in annual military
aid to transform its armed forces from an unwieldy Soviet-based
fighting force to a modernized, well-equipped, Western-style
military.
Outfitted with
some of the most sophisticated U.S. weapons
technology, Egypt's
arsenal has been significantly improved--qualitatively as well
as quantitatively--in nearly every military branch. While assimilating
state-of-the-art weaponry into its order of battle, the Egyptian
military has also decommissioned Soviet equipment or upgraded
outdated ordnance. This unprecedented military buildup, however,
extends beyond the mere procurement and renovation of Western
armaments; Egypt has
been the beneficiary of joint military exercises and training
programs with the United States dating back to 1983.
However, while
the Egyptian leadership has professed its desire for peace
and emphasized the deterrent nature of the buildup, its stockpiling
of arms should arouse some concern. Already the most advanced
army on the African continent, the Egyptian military faces
no appreciable threat on its Libyan or Sudanese borders. Thus,
some analysts believe it has been reconstituted with one purpose
in mind: to achieve military parity with its neighbor across
the demilitarized Sinai Peninsula--Israel.
Many Israeli policymakers,
though, see Egypt's
conventional military buildup in a different light. In their
analysis, Egypt's self-perception
as a regional power broker necessitates the creation of a potent
military. While Egypt remains
a hotbed of anti-Semitism nearly three decades after peace,
for them, such rhetoric is intended only for domestic consumption.
The mainstream Israeli defense establishment, by and large,
shares this assessment, citing the Egyptian military's doctrinal
flaws and questionable combat readiness as an impediment to
renewed conflict.
Yet while battle
plans are not being drawn up in Cairo, Egypt's muscle-flexing does raise an eyebrow
when other factors are considered. As the Husni Mubarak era
enters its twilight years, no real decision has been made concerning
his successor, though his son certainly appears the frontrunner.
While Egypt's Islamists are unlikely to usurp power
anytime soon, a drastic change in leadership could spawn greater
instability in the Egyptian-Israeli arena. Likewise, Egypt's
failure to curtail endemic weapons smuggling on the Egypt-Gaza
border--arms which are funneled to Palestinian terrorists--has
fueled speculation among Israeli hardliners that Cairo may
be girding for war.
The truth, of course,
likely lies somewhere between these divergent viewpoints.
ARMING TO THE
TEETH
In
a November 1995 speech, President Husni Mubarak encapsulated
the mission statement
of the Egyptian military, declaring, "...The level of our armed
forces is a source of pride for us all, and [they] are capable
of deterring any danger threatening our national security."[3] Senior officials and generals in the Egyptian
armed forces, such as Minister of Defense and War Production
Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, have echoed similar
sentiments that, while stressing the doctrine of deterrence,
have explicitly stressed the importance of offensive capabilities.
While not discounting the probability of armed conflict with Israel, Egyptian officials view such offensive-orientated
capabilities as a means of enhancing Egyptian diplomacy, allowing
it to operate from a position of strength. The Mubarak government
sees this posture as a prerequisite for regional stability,
inextricably linked to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
However, diplomatic
leverage alone cannot explain Egypt's
buildup. As the main bastion of regime support, the military's
strength serves Mubarak's interest in stability. Given the
paranoia that pervades much of the ruling elite in Egypt and
other Arab mukhabarat states, it is understandable that
the Egyptian leadership views a strong military as its greatest
asset. In this sense, Egypt's bloated
defense budget represents a quid pro quo of sorts. Mubarak
furnishes his military brass with weapons and pensions; in
return, they refrain from dabbling in politics and pledge to
safeguard his regime from external threats. Perhaps one can
also frame the buildup in terms of domestic prestige. Owen
L. Sirs writes that during the height of the 1960s, the government's
military parades "...served as a sort of symbolic dialogue
between the Egyptian regime and its people."[4] While today's demonstrations may lack the pomp
and grandeur reminiscent of the Nasser era, they still serve to showcase the country's modernization
and progress.
Other
motives drive Egypt's strategic objectives as well. Ostracized
by its neighbors in the 1980s for blazing
a trail to peace, Egyptian leadership found vindication in
the peace process of the 1990s. Yet with this historic opportunity
came two distinct choices. As Robert Satloff notes, Egypt could
either "...expand the circle of peace via widening Arab normalization
with Israel or [choose] to follow a different path, one that
views Israel as a fundamental challenge to Egypt's self-perception
as a regional power... and makes anti-normalization a fixture
of Egyptian policy."[5] Perhaps
threatened by the Jewish state's regional assimilation and
military prowess, Egypt has opted
for the latter. Thus, it has embarked on a sustained campaign
to contain Israel and
alter the Middle East's balance of power.
Flush with billions
in U.S. military aid since the
1980s, the Egyptian government has significantly revamped its
conventional forces, paying particular heed to its armored
corps, air, and naval forces. Today, Egypt,
no longer a beneficiary of its erstwhile Soviet patron, can
boast of a Western-style fighting force--comprised of 450,000
regular servicemen--that approaches the quantitative and qualitative
levels of the Israeli military in certain sectors. Israel is,
of course, more concerned with preserving its edge in the latter.
That is, given the sheer size of Israel's
Arab neighbors, it is imperative that the Jewish state compensate
for its inevitable quantitative weakness by maintaining its
advantage in weapons systems, training, and technological know-how.
Still, the qualitative
gap has shrunk as Egypt catapulted
itself into the upper echelon of Middle Eastern arms importers
during the past decade. From 2001 to 2004 alone, Egypt paid
$6.5 billion in arms transfer agreements, $5.7 billion of which
was used to purchase U.S. weaponry.[6] During this period, Egypt supplanted Saudi
Arabia as the primary recipient of U.S.-manufactured
arms in the Middle East.[7]
Among
Egypt's most noteworthy acquisitions has been its procurement
of American-made M1A1 Abrams battle tanks,
whose components are partly assembled on Egyptian production
lines. When the U.S. Department of Defense first licensed production
of the M1A1 tank (commensurate with the Israeli Merkava tank)
in Egypt in 1988, the decision raised alarm in some U.S. and
Israeli policy circles, given the sensitive transfer of technology
involved, the method of co-production, and the fiscal constraints
it would place on an already burdened Egyptian economy. Yezid
Sayigh notes that this industrial strategy of in-country assemblage,
prevalent in the Middle East, enables the arms importer to "...acquire
the necessary production skills and military technology gradually,
with the eventual
aim of producing indigenous systems."[8] Israeli analysts believe that by the time the
current contract is completed in 2008, Egypt's
armored corps will have amassed 880 M1A1s.[9]
In 1999, Israeli
defense officials became concerned when Egypt acquired
10,800 rounds of 120mm KEW-A1 ammunition for its Abrams battle
tanks.[10] Composed of depleted uranium, this armor-piercing
ammunition--long possessed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)--was
used by U.S. Abrams crews to decimate 4,000 Iraqi tanks and
armored vehicles during Operation Desert Storm and is said
to be able to neutralize any armor system in existence.[11] None of this is to mention Egypt's
835 upgraded and U.S.-made M-60A3 tanks that also saw action
in the 1991 Gulf crisis.[12]
The influx of sophisticated,
Western weapons into Egypt is
not limited to the renovation of its armored corps. This buildup
also extends to the Egyptian Air Force (EAF), which now sports
roughly 220 F-16 fighter planes, in comparison with the approximately
240 F-16s in the Israeli arsenal.[13] Israeli
strategic analysts, such as Ret. Brigadier General Shlomo Brom,
are quick to point that while this margin
has narrowed substantially since the 1980s, the status of the
Israeli Air Force's qualitative edge should not be confused
with quantitative parity in military platforms. "We say they
aren't the same planes. The level of the pilots and the quality
of the weapons systems are not identical," Brom stated.[14] There are also reports that Israel will
be the first Middle Eastern state equipped with the F-22 and
F-35, the F-16's successors.
Still, other IDF
officials disagree with Brom's assessment and believe that
the EAF's growth has forced Israel to alter its air combat
techniques. Those critics point to the EAF's recent integration
of 36 AH-64A Apache attack helicopters, each capable of carrying
16 laser-guided, anti-tank, Hellfire missiles.[15] It is worth noting, though, that while permitted
to upgrade the Apaches to their more advanced prototype (the
AH-64D), Egypt has been prevented from acquiring the helicopter's
most coveted feature--the Longbow radar--which has first-rate
target identification capabilities.[16] Nonetheless, the Israeli Air Force maintains
only a handful more of Apaches than its Egyptian counterpart.
While apprehensive
about the buildup of the Egyptian ground and air forces, some
Israeli officials, especially Knesset Member Yuval Steinitz
and former commander-in-chief of the Israeli Navy, Major General
Yedidia Ya'ari, consider the overhaul of the Egyptian navy
to be the most significant aspect of the military's modernization
program. The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies' 2003-2004 Middle East Strategic Balance report
notes that Egypt acquired
two Knox class frigates and four Oliver Hazard Perry frigates
from the United States in the 1990s.[17] Obtained
as excess defense articles from the Pentagon, the Perry-class
frigates are "capable of over-the-horizon combat and anti-submarine
warfare."[18]
However, it was
the November 2001 Bush Administration decision to sell Egypt
53 satellite-guided Harpoon Block II missiles, which can exploit
Israel's lack of strategic depth by evading its current air
defense systems, that has truly caused consternation in Jerusalem.[19] This purchase could signal a strategic shift
in Egypt's naval doctrine--one that would allow it to project
its open-sea capabilities even further in the eastern Mediterranean
Sea and place a stranglehold on Israel's most important maritime
lifelines. Though the U.S. State Department downplayed the
missiles' offensive nature, one must remember that Egypt's
geographic position gives its fleet--which maintains principal
naval bases at Ras al-Tin on the Mediterranean and at Safajeh
and Hurghada on the Red Sea--the capability to blockade both
of Israel's
sea links with the outside world.
The
United States will likely continue to refrain from selling
the Egyptian government advanced weapon systems
that would allow the EAF, or any other branch of the Egyptian
armed forces, to enjoy operational parity with their Israeli
counterparts. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen
said as much during his visit to the region in 1999, when he
reassured then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that
the United States remained committed to "...Israel's qualitative
edge and military capability to protect its own people."[20]
In the past, though,
the United States has demonstrated a willingness to
export some of its most sensitive military technologies to
regional governments, as evidenced by the Clinton Administration's
sale of the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range-Air-to-Air-Missile
(AMRAAM) to the United Arab Emirates in 1998.[21] Prior to this transfer, only Israel had
been cleared to purchase the AMRAAM among Middle Eastern states.[22] However, contracts were soon inked in Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain,
and Egypt, with the United States selling Cairo
a lesser ground-launched version of the missile in 2000 only
because of vociferous Israeli objections.[23] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's blasé reaction
to these and other related developments belied Israel's
true concern. In 2004, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz
and Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom vehemently opposed--and
ultimately won restrictions on--a U.S.-AMRAAM sale to Jordan
based
on fears that the technology would eventually be sold to Egypt.[24] Though purchasing the AMRAAM system had once
been the sole prerogative of NATO member states (and Israel),
the flurry of U.S. sales
to non-NATO Arab governments, including Egypt,
signaled that U.S. arms
transfer sales could indeed trump strategic promises.
WESTERN WEAPONS, SOVIET DOCTRINE?
While detractors
of the gloom-and-doom scenario in the Israeli defense establishment
will not dispute the Egyptian military's modernization, their
sanguine assessments assume that it will be mired in its antiquated
Soviet-style military doctrine for the foreseeable future.
Undoubtedly, Egypt's military ranks are still characterized
by a rigid command structure; one that strategic analysts say
precludes the implementation of the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA)--a military concept espousing the use of precision-guided
weaponry, information technology, and integrated command and
control systems with real-time capabilities.
That
the Egyptian armed forces have failed to fully adopt the
RMA paradigm thus
far is true. Even with continued American aid at current levels,
the Egyptian armed forces would encounter a serious economic
crunch in financing such an initiative. Yet that is not to
say they do not possess some of the requisite skills. The military
has been the beneficiary of numerous joint initiatives and
training exercises with Western forces dating back to the large-scale "Operation
Bright Star" maneuvers kicked off in 1983.[25] Held biennially in the Egyptian desert, "Bright
Star" stresses interoperability and has exposed thousands of
Egyptian military personnel to U.S. advanced training techniques
and expertise in tactical ground, air, naval, and special operations.[26] Mubarak's deployment of 30,000 troops, including
commando and paratrooper units paired alongside U.S. forces,
into the Kuwaiti theater during Operation Desert Storm in 1991
illustrated Egypt's
ability to apply RMA techniques in actual combat.[27]
U.S. programs such as Peace Vector and the International
Military Education and Training initiative (IMET) have provided
additional know-how to the Egyptian military in tactical training
and weapons maintenance. Under the third installment of the
Peace Vector program (PV III), which began in August 1991,
Egyptian Air Force pilots have logged thousands of flight hours
with their American counterparts in tactical operations.[28] Other projects in the PV III program have included
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' construction of a self-sufficient
F-16 air base located in Ismailiyya, Egypt (adjacent to the
Suez Canal and demilitarized Sinai), which can accommodate
a population of up to 20,000 personnel.[29] Under IMET, 6,600 Egyptian soldiers have participated
in U.S. military education courses since 1995 in an effort to instill U.S. values,
doctrines, and procedures.[30]
Despite such assistance,
logistical support, and extensive coordination, the mainstream
Israeli defense establishment continues to perpetuate the belief
that the Egyptian military's mere knowledge of the RMA doctrine
does not necessarily imply its implementation. The Badr-96
and Jabal Pharon-98 exercises debunk this myth. In September
1996, the Egyptian armed forces staged a ten day maneuver near
the Suez Canal, the largest operation of its kind since the late 1970s.
The target of the exercise was explicit: Israel. Badr-96--the same code-name used for Egypt's
crossing of the Suez Canal in the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Badr-73)--simulated
a large-scale amphibious landing on the Sinai
Peninsula coast by a mechanized infantry battalion.[31] Designed first to repel an Israeli attack, the
battalion--coupled with border guards, paratroopers, and special
forces--would then engage in a counteroffensive to seize control
of the entire Sinai and penetrate Israeli territory.[32]
Hailed by the Egyptian
media as a stern warning to Prime Minister Netanyahu, Badr-96
evoked stirring nationalistic sentiments from the 1973 war.
The state-controlled newspaper al-Ahram was one of several
media outlets to engage in saber-rattling. An editorial published
by the paper's managing editor read "...The lessons of Badr-73
and Badr-96 take us back to the starting point... that the
end of war does not necessarily mean the achievement of peace,
and vice-versa."[33]
Similarly, the
Jabal Pharon exercise on April 22, 1998 sought to create a
scenario whereby the Egyptian Third Army, in conjunction with
naval and air force personnel, conducted operations in the
rugged terrain of the Sinai.[34] Once more, the target was the Israeli Defense
Forces. On August 12, 2001, in the midst of the al-Aqsa Intifada and
three days after a Hamas suicide bombing rocked Jerusalem, London's Sunday
Times reported that a senior Egyptian official allegedly
threatened to deploy the Egyptian Third Army into Sinai--at
the late Yasir Arafat's behest--if Israel moved into the occupied territories to
thwart Palestinian terrorism.[35] That another Badr-like exercise ensued the following
month[36] at Ismailiyya should be sufficient evidence to
suggest that the Egyptian military--which enjoys a symbiotic
relationship with Mubarak and the state--feels constrained by
the security measures imposed on it by the 1979 treaty. As
a result, some Israeli officials see these exercises as an
inherent Egyptian desire to remilitarize the Sinai. Whether
that ambition translates into capability is contested, given
the assertion of military experts that any successful military
operation in the Sinai Peninsula requires
RMA-style warfare.
It is here, precisely,
where Egypt's acquisition of the
M1A1 Abrams tank and the AH-64A helicopter could have dire
consequences. As the tank battles of the 1967 and 1973 wars
have illustrated, the peninsula is an ideal battleground for
armored, mobile warfare. Theoretically, an Egyptian foray into
Sinai, in which M1A1s are given aerial cover by AH-64A Apaches
and F-16s, would enable mechanized forces to seize the strategic
Mitla and Giddi passes in central Sinai before an Israeli counterattack.
By controlling these access routes, vital for east-west movement,
the Egyptian armored corps could then traverse the entire peninsula
in a relatively short period of time.
This
scenario, though, is not universally accepted. While the
M1A1's superior
long-range capabilities were put on display in the Iraqi desert
in 1991 and 2003, Stephen A. Cook believes that the "...Egyptians
are able to employ them [M1A1s] only as set battlefield pieces.
This is a function of the fact that Egypt's land forces...
cannot refuel and re-supply its forces beyond a limited range."[37] Other Israeli analysts counter that the Suez
Canal zone's weak logistical infrastructure, which includes
bridges (some of which are pontoons), ferries, and the Ahmad
Hamdi tunnel, renders the movement of Egypt's M1A1s highly
susceptible to an Israeli air attack with precision weapons.
THE DAY AFTER MUBARAK
Most
Israeli policymakers, though anxious about the buildup on
the Nile, portray Egypt as something of a paper tiger; one
that
derives too many rewards from peace to foolishly self-inflict
death and destruction on its own people. Their conventional
wisdom holds that President Mubarak's quarter-century of authoritarian
rule has actually acted as a bulwark against not only those
extremist elements in Egyptian society who wish death upon
Israel, but against the military's adventurism as well. Even
if that
assumption were true, Egypt faces
a looming presidential succession that could completely invalidate
this strategic assessment. In 2003, Shaul Mofaz voiced his
uncertainty over the matter, stating, "Within a few years Egypt's
leadership might be replaced and the new regime might have
a different attitude toward Israel."[38]
While
President Mubarak at age 78 is in reputedly "good health," his
fainting during a televised parliament session in 2003 and
his sudden
two-week absence for medical treatment abroad in 2004 paint
a different picture of stability.[39] Mubarak has also eschewed pressure over the years
to appoint a vice president, most recently during an April
9, 2006 interview with al-Arabiyya TV. Mubarak stated: "The
constitution gives me the right of appointing a vice-president.
The vice-president has no work except as he performs only directives
of the president. This is the point and I'm not ready to appoint
a vice-president..."[40]
Despite a constitutional
provision specifying the temporary transfer of power to the
speaker of parliament following the president's permanent incapacitation,[41] vice presidents have, in practice, assumed the
mantle of leadership before. Thus, Mubarak's gambit in maintaining
this vacancy has not only clouded the issue of succession,
but has generated much unease in Egypt and elsewhere as well. In recent years,
this decision appears to have cleared the path for heir apparent
Gamal Mubarak, Husni's son and one of three deputy secretary-generals
in his father's ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).[42] The liberal-minded Gamal continues
to burnish his image at home and abroad. During the fourth
annual NDP
conference in September 2006, he proposed an Egyptian nuclear
program and openly defied Washington's vision of a "new Middle East," stating: "We
will not accept initiatives made abroad."[43] Still,
his "inheritance" of the presidency is
not a foregone conclusion.
In
a January 1, 2004 press conference, the elder Mubarak reassured
Egyptians
that he would not emulate the "Syria model," which
witnessed Bashar al-Asad's rise to power after his father's
death in 2000. "We are not a monarchy. We are the Republic
of Egypt... we are not Syria and Gamal Mubarak will not be the next president
of Egypt," Mubarak
declared.[44] Gamal
echoed similar sentiments during 2005's "Cairo Spring," when
his father introduced political reforms authorizing Egypt's first multi-candidate presidential election.
Eager to shed the label of heir apparent, Gamal stated: "I
am absolutely clear in my mind and the president's mind that
this story of father and son has nothing to do with reality."[45]
Of
course, actions speak louder than words in the Middle
East. The recent consolidation of key policy positions by Gamal
and his associates within the NDP belies such statements. However,
in a country where the Free Officers Movement's 1952 coup d'état
still resonates--every president since has been drawn from the
military's ranks--Gamal's non-military background could present
a problem. Edward S. Walker Jr., a former U.S. ambassador to
both Israel and Egypt, warns that if Gamal is truly bent on
economic reform, "...the entire military and security structure
could easily lose its privileges, its special treatment, its
informal retirement benefits..."[46] Such a development, in which the Egyptian military
loses its patronage, could loosen the government's reins on
the armed forces and unnerve Israeli leadership. At the very
least, the armed forces would be hard-pressed to accept such
a monarchical-style transition.
Other
potential successors do not elicit much Israeli confidence
either where
the military is concerned. One is current Defense Minister
Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, who believes that only the "endless
development of military systems and the arms race" will guarantee
Egyptian national security.[47] Egyptian security sources revealed that had
the 1995 plot to assassinate Mubarak in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia succeeded, Tantawi, a Mubarak confidant
for many years, would have become president "without a doubt."[48] Tantawi's advanced age and failing health, though,
likely decrease his prospects of succeeding Mubarak.
General Omar Sulayman,
the head of Egyptian intelligence, remains another candidate
in the offing. Arguably the second most powerful man in Egypt,
Sulayman, aged 70, raised his public profile considerably after
he was handed the Palestinian dossier following the intifada's outbreak
in 2000.[49] A career military officer and Mubarak's right-hand
man, Sulayman was also responsible for quelling the Islamist
insurgency in Egypt during the 1990s. Some Israeli policymakers
suggest Sulayman's role as an interlocutor between the Palestinians
and Israelis and between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority,
particularly during the 2003 hudna (cease-fire) negotiations,
juxtaposes his tough anti-Islamist terror stance.
Sulayman has often
met with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror chiefs
in Cairo, Gaza, Ramallah, and Damascus--gestures which have
not only conferred legitimacy upon such groups, but have also
served to undercut a weakened and once-secular Palestinian
Authority.[50] While
he publicly sought to broker an unconditional cease-fire between
Palestinian terror factions and Israel in
2003, as required by the Quartet's road map for peace, Sulayman
privately demanded that the former only halt its attacks within
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and 1949 armistice
lines for a period of six months.[51]
Though Sulayman
did in fact engineer an official, albeit brief, cessation of
violence on June 29, 2003,[52] his
intervention came under close Israeli scrutiny. Oded Granot,
an Israeli journalist, suggested that Sulayman's
efforts were perhaps motivated more by an urge to "quiet" the
Egyptian street during the Iraq War's infancy, lest anti-government protests
break out, than by a genuine desire for peace. Israeli officials
reserved harsher criticism for Sulayman. Foreign Minister Silvan
Shalom believed that the general's efforts would implicitly
endanger the Jewish state by creating a "ticking time bomb;" a
respite that would allow Gaza's terrorist infrastructure to
regroup and replenish via the Philadelphia Corridor and Sinai.
TUNNEL WARS
Seven weeks later,
the hudna began unraveling. On August
19, 2003, a Hamas operative blew himself up while riding a Jerusalem bus.[53] At the same time, IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon
reported that after the Israeli army discovered and destroyed
several smuggling tunnels in Gaza, smoke billowed from their opposite end--in some cases from inside
Egyptian military posts.[54]
No picture of Egypt's de facto strategy toward Israel can be considered complete without examining
the Gaza tunnel phenomenon.
While in past years the IDF and Israeli intelligence have monitored
Egypt's conventional arms buildup with unease, their attention
has often been diverted to another front where Cairo's true
intentions have increasingly been called into question--the
Egypt-Gaza Strip border.
On August 22, 2005,
the Israeli government completed its disengagement from the
Gaza Strip after 38 years of occupation. Israel's
Disengagement Plan had called for the evacuation of all Jewish
settlements and military installations in Gaza,
with one exception. The plan stated that the IDF would not
redeploy in the Philadelphia Corridor, an eight-mile border
zone between Gaza and Egypt notorious
for its arms-smuggling tunnels.
As
disengagement approached, the decision to retain control
of the corridor
became untenable, despite the concerns of Israeli policymakers
that withdrawing troops from the area, including the Rafah
border crossing with Egypt,
would result in the militarization of Gaza
as a terror base. Israeli leaders determined that maintaining
an Israeli presence in the border strip would be a lasting
source of Palestinian and Arab antagonism and would undercut
their government's claims of complete withdrawal. The Israeli
government looked toward Cairo as the most
viable alternative to patrol the border and stem the flow of
contraband into Gaza.
Though some Israeli officials remained skeptical of Egypt's
commitment, the two governments signed the "Agreed Arrangements Regarding the Deployment of a Designated
Force of Border Guards along the Border in the Rafah Area" on
September 1, 2005.[55]
Pursuant to the
agreement,[56] Egypt dispatched a border
guard force to the corridor (comprised of 750 armed personnel)
to replace the Egyptian police force mandated by the 1979 peace
treaty. Permitted weaponry included assault rifles, rocket-propelled
grenades, and machine guns.[57] Though
subject to the treaty, which stipulates the Sinai Peninsula's
demilitarization, the Agreed Arrangements raised fears in Israel over the Egyptian force's objectives in
the Sinai and the overall stability of the peace agreement.
While
observers often perceive the corridor's smuggling as an exclusive
Palestinian
enterprise, Israeli concerns have been augmented by what Major
General Doron Almog, former head of the IDF's Southern Command,
calls "a parallel Egyptian mechanism for smuggling and infiltration"[58] extending
into Sinai and the mainland. Black market forces may often
serve as the impetus for this mechanism--smuggling is a very
profitable business--but in the end, it can only function with
what Almog refers to as the "official acquiescence" of the
Mubarak regime.
Several factors
suggest that Egypt's failure to curb the
influx of weapons at Rafah--a town physically straddling the
Egyptian-Gazan border--is a product of inaction, not inability.
First, an army general on active service presides over the
Sinai governorate that stretches 100 miles behind Rafah.[59] In an authoritarian country like Egypt, where the armed forces are the guarantor
of internal stability, the military is cognizant of all that
goes on under its nose. Second, there are only two access roads
in the Sinai; countering the movement of weaponry bound for
Rafah should be a relatively easy undertaking. Finally, while
the IDF's counter-smuggling operations in the corridor have
almost always met fierce opposition from local inhabitants,
Egyptian patrols encounter no such armed resistance in Egyptian
Rafah.
The Egyptian military
has proven capable of reducing the security threat in the past.
When the Israeli military outpost of Termit, located in Rafah,
came under attack in 2001, Egyptian Rafah was conspicuously
quiet.[60] That is, despite the presence of illegal arms
and Palestinians in that area of the city, Israeli soldiers
were only ambushed from within Gaza. The Egyptian army had restrained all violent activity on its
side of the border. In past years, it is also true that Egypt has
arrested smugglers and detonated tunnels, but only when it
has been politically expedient. Unfortunately, these instances
are few and far between.
Yuval
Diskin, head of the Shin Bet domestic security service, and
Avi Dichter,
minister of internal security, are two of the outspoken leaders
in Israel sounding the alarm. On August 29, 2006, Diskin referred
to the Sinai Peninsula and Rafah border area
as a veritable "Garden of Eden" for weapons smuggling. On September
27, 2006, he again spoke of the exponential increase in smuggling
since Israel's 2005 Gaza withdrawal, estimating that nineteen tons of weapons and explosives
were burrowed into the strip during the past year. Holding
Egyptian officials directly accountable, he said, "The Egyptians
know who the smugglers are and don't deal with them. They received
intelligence on this from us and didn't use it. We're talking
about an escalation that is endangering us."[61] Three
days after his remarks, four Egyptian policemen were caught
attempting to smuggle ammunitions and hand grenades to Palestinians
in the Gaza Strip.[62] Alluding
to this incident and other tunnel discoveries, Dichter urged
White House officials in October 2006 to ratchet
up pressure on Cairo, criticizing its government's failure
to employ the "considerable
capabilities" at its disposal.[63]
Whether
or not smuggling activities are officially sanctioned by
the Mubarak
government is irrelevant. What does matter is that the current
regime's see-no-evil policy at Philadelphia--what Almog refers
to as a "release valve for [Egyptian] public sympathy for the
Palestinian armed struggle"[64]--significantly raises the stakes for Israel's
national security by allowing arms and material to be pumped
into Gaza at a dizzying rate.
THE ISLAMIST THREAT
Some suggest that Egypt's radical Islamist movement, closely allied
with like-minded Palestinian groups, has been the prime beneficiary
of the government's Philadelphia
strategy. Not only has unimpeded smuggling at Rafah stoked
the flames of Egypt's Islamist
movement, it has permitted homegrown jihadists and those in
the Palestinian territories the opportunity to attack the Mubarak
government and Israelis simultaneously. The October 2004 suicide
bombings at Tab'a, a popular resort location for Israelis in Egypt,
were perpetrated by Sinai Bedouins and Hamas operatives.[65] A Palestinian group in Gaza,
Monotheism and Jihad, physically trained an Egyptian terror
cell in the use of explosives and firearms before carrying
out the April 2006 bombings at Sinai's Dahab resort.[66]
That the corridor
and its environs could become a personal fiefdom for Egyptian
extremists is one reason that Israeli prognosticators fear
an Islamist takeover in Cairo. Although considered improbable today, the specter of an Islamic
revolution following Husni Mubarak's rule should not be dismissed.
Coupled with the Egyptian military buildup, it would have grave
consequences for regional security.
To be sure, the
toppling of the secular Mubarak regime by Islamist extremists
would have far-reaching effects. The extensive American aid
and assistance programs would cease automatically. The Egyptian
military's already shoddy weapons maintenance would be exacerbated.
Jihadists would annul the 1979 treaty. Yet it would be wrong
to assume that Egypt would thus
become nothing more than a massive arms depot to which somebody
had thrown away the key. Despite government efforts to the
contrary, Islamists and the military have not always remained
mutually exclusive entities.
Islamists from
the Muslim Brotherhood's most violent offshoots--such as al-Jama'a
al-Islamiyya and Jama'at al-Jihad--have had past success
in infiltrating the military's ranks. Among the members of
Jama'at al-Jihad, the group that carried out Anwar Sadat's
1981 assassination, were an army colonel on active duty and
a reserve lieutenant colonel.[67] Other members were drawn from a broad swath of
Egyptian society, including state security forces and military
intelligence. In December 1986, a ring of four military officers and 29 Islamists
affiliated with the same group was arrested and charged with
waging jihad against the Mubarak regime.[68] By the end of the decade, the government's purge
had resulted in the detention of some 10,000 Islamists suspected
of infiltration.
That
the regime has grown wary should not come as a surprise.
In prosecuting
its own "war on terror" against radical Islamists in the 1980s
and 1990s, the state began implementing policies to counteract
the threat. Yet rarely has the military entered into this calculus.
Fearing its exposure to fundamentalist ideologies, the government
has rarely summoned the armed forces into action.[69] Instead, counterterrorism operations have often
been delegated to state security services, but even they have
not been immune from this phenomenon. Thus, the regime has
left no stone unturned in stemming the tide of infiltration.
In addition to restricting the military's rules of engagement,
it has begun constructing a host of military cities in remote
locations, such as Mubarak Military City in the Nile Delta region, to
ward off Islamist influence.
The regime's precautionary
steps have often been supplemented by stern counterterrorism
measures--measures which not only broke the Islamist insurgency's
back in the 1990s but have also allowed relative quiet to prevail
since. While the threat posed by al-Jihad and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya
has not evaporated--even with the latter's renunciation of violence--the
radical Islamist leadership in Egypt remains fractured and marginalized. Mubarak's
cooption of the movement's mainstream and less militant elements,
coupled with the recent release of 950 al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya members
in April 2006,[70] has
further moderated their ranks.
Despite episodic
violence, Mubarak's balancing act has thus far allowed him
to secure the allegiance of the military--the regime's most
significant pillar of strength--while thwarting the Islamists' attempt
at regime change. Still, the latter's quest for power in Egypt lies
within the realm of possibility, given Mubarak's border policies
at Rafah and his failure to appoint a vice president and surefire
successor.
CONCLUSION
As the Egyptian
armed forces continue to upgrade the quantity and quality of
their military platforms to unparalleled heights--levels rivaling
those of Israel--they have positioned themselves to be
a major player on the Middle Eastern block. The path charted
by Egypt during
the coming years, though, will go a long way toward determining
the significance of its meteoric rise from an archaic, Soviet-styled
military to a Western-armed, twenty-first century juggernaut.
While justifiably
concerned about the neighborhood in which they operate, the
Egyptian military's unrelenting buildup appears to have already
met its stated objectives of deterrence. The continued integration
of Western weaponry into Egypt's armored corps, air force, and naval fleet
has thus raised the question: To what end? Egyptian defense
officials will riposte that a strong military is essential
for enhancing regional security, protecting strategic maritime
routes, and strengthening U.S.-Egyptian coordination.
Though the Egyptian
armed forces do serve these and other interests, one cannot
neglect the fact that rearmament is also geared toward changing
the military status quo vis-à-vis Israel. Of course, this is
not to suggest that Egypt is
on the warpath, moving toward a confrontation with Israel tomorrow or the day after. Full-blown
hostilities, reminiscent of past Arab-Israeli wars, that would
reap wholesale death and destruction are not, one would think,
in Cairo's best interests. Yet in an explosive region such as this, policymaking
is not often equated with best interests.
Viewed
in the context of Egypt's regional ambitions, limited rapprochement
with Israel,
and potential succession crisis--with all its implications
for
the peace treaty and an Islamist resurgence--the military's
buildup resembles a powder keg forming on Israel's doorstep.
Three decades of peace notwithstanding, the Egyptian-Israeli
front remains a tinderbox, one in which a cold peace may just
become a cold war.
*Jeffrey Azarva
is a research assistant at the American Enterprise
Institute in Washington, DC.
NOTES
[1] David Honig, "A Mighty Arsenal: Egypt's Military
Buildup: 1979-1999," Policy Watch, No. 447,(The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, March 21, 2000).
[2] United States Government Accountability Office,
Report to the U.S. House Committee on International Relations, "State
and DoD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing
Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security
Goals," April 2006, GAO-06-437.
[3] Hillel Frisch, "Arab Armies: Religious, Economic,
and Structural Dimensions," Mideast Security
and Policy Studies, No. 54 (June 2003), p. 95.
[4] Owen L. Sirs, Nasser and the Missile Age in
the Middle East (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 98.
[5] Robert Satloff, Testimony before the U.S. House Committee
on International Relations, April 10, 1997.
[6] Richard F. Grimmett, "Conventional Arms Transfers
to Developing Nations, 1997-2004," Congressional
Research Service (RL33051), August 29, 2005, p. 28.
[8] Yezid Sayigh, Arab Military Industry: Capability,
Performance, and Impact (London: Brassey's, 1992),
p. 63.
[9] Though granted a license by the Pentagon to produce
the M1A1 model in 1988, the Egyptian government first began
assembling the Abrams tank after the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
The first assembly contract lasted from 1991 until 1998 and
resulted in the production of 555 combat tanks.
[10] Arieh O'Sullivan, "Egypt--The New Enemy?" The Jerusalem Post, August 25, 1999.
[12] Yiftah S. Shapir (ed.), "The Middle East Military
Balance," The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel
Aviv University, February 20, 2006.
[13] Amnon Barzilai, "Should We Be Up in Arms Over
Egypt's Buildup?" Ha'aretz, January
18, 2005.
[15] Honig, "A Mighty Arsenal: Egypt's Military Buildup:
1979-1999."
[16] Shlomo Brom and Yiftah S. Shapir, The Middle
East Strategic Balance: The Egyptian Armed Forces (Sussex Academic
Press, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, 2004), p. 97.
[18] Honig, "A Mighty Arsenal."
[19] Federation of American Scientists, "Harpoon Missile
Sale to Egypt Launches Debate," Arms Sales Monitor, No. 47 (January 2002),
p. 3.
[20] Wade Boese, "U.S. Announces
New Arms Sales to Middle East Worth
Billions," Arms Control Today, March 1999.
[21] Frisch, "Arab Armies," p.100.
[22] Boese, "U.S. Announces
New Arms Sales to Middle East Worth
Billions."
[23] Frisch, "Arab Armies," p. 100.
[24] "Report: Israel trying
to block US sale
of missile system to Jordan," Agence
France Presse, August 1, 2004.
[25] Frisch, "Arab Armies," p. 101.
[26] Clyde R. Mark, "Egypt-United
States Relations," Congressional Research Service (IB93087), August
20, 2003, p. 9.
[27] David A. Silverstein, "Keeping an Eye on the
Allies," Backgrounder
Update, No. 154 (The Heritage Foundation, February
4, 1991).
[28] Remarks by U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Francis J. Ricciardone at Abu Suwaye Air
Base, June
21, 2006.
[30] Michael Coulter, "Review of U.S. Policy and Assistance Programs to Egypt," Testimony
to the U.S. House Committee on International Relations,
May 17, 2006.
[31] Yossef Bodanksy and Vaughn S. Forrest, "Approaching
the New Cycle of Arab-Israeli Fighting," Task Force on
Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, U.S. House
of Representatives, December 10, 1996.
[32] Frisch, "Arab Armies," p. 102-03.
[33] Satloff, Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on International Relations.
[34] Frisch, "Arab Armies," p. 103.
[35] Uzi Mahnaimi, "Egypt Threatens
Show of Armed Force to Aid Arafat," Sunday Times (London), August 12, 2001.
[37] Stephen A. Cook, "Egypt--Still America's Partner?" Middle
East Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2, (June 2000).
[38] Reuven Pedatzurr, "A New Threat Pops Up--Egypt," Ha'aretz, October
22, 2003.
[39] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Mubarak the Pharaoh," The
Wall Street Journal, July
15, 2004.
[42] Gamal Essam El-Din, "Reintroducing Gamal Mubarak," al-Ahram
Weekly, March 30-April 5, 2006.
[43] Michael Slackman and Mona el-Naggar, "Mubarak's
Son Proposes Nuclear Program," New York Times, September 20, 2006.
[44] El Pais (Madrid), March 28, 2000.
[45] Anton LaGuardia, "Mubarak's Heir Apparent Hails
'Cairo Spring'" The Daily Telegraph, June 14, 2005.
[46] "The Future of Egypt," The Middle
East Review of International Affairs (MERIA),
Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 2006).
[47] Frisch, "Arab Armies," p. 96.
[48] Daniel Sobelman, "Gamal Mubarak, President of
Egypt?" Middle
East Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 2001).
[49] Hossam Hamalawy, "Powerful Egyptian Spy Chief
No Longer Behind the Scenes," Los
Angeles Times, February 8, 2005.
[50] Yuval Steinitz, "The Growing Threat to Israel's
Qualitative Military Edge," Jerusalem
Issue Brief, Vol. 3, No. 10 (Jerusalem Center
for Public Affairs, December
11, 2003).
[52] Eli Kazhdan and David Keyes, "The Inevitable
Disintegration of the Hudna," Jerusalem Issue
Brief, Vol. 3, No. 5 (August
26, 2003).
[53] Molly Moore, "In Jerusalem,
A Scene 'Like a Horror Movie,'" The Washington
Post, August 20, 2003.
[54] Mark Lavie, "Israel: Peace Plan in Deep Freeze
Until Palestinians Crack Down on Militants," Associated Press, August 11, 2003.
[55] Michael Herzog, "A New Reality on the Egypt-Gaza
Border (Part II): Analysis of the New Israel-Egypt Agreement," Peace
Watch, No. 520 (The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, September 21, 2005).
[56] During the 18-month-long negotiations, Sulayman
and Tantawi sought to package the agreement as the first
phase in the deployment of thousands of Egyptian troops to
the Israel-Egypt border. Israel rejected this proposal, citing Annex I,
Article II in the1979 treaty. This annex, which delineated
four security zones in the Sinai, prohibits Egypt from stationing any armed personnel, except
civil police, in the zone closest to the Israeli border.
[57] Brooke Neuman, "A New Reality on the Egypt-Gaza
Border (Part I): Analysis of the New Israel-Egypt Agreement," Peace
Watch, No. 518 (The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, September 19, 2005).
[58] Doron Almog, "Tunnel-Vision in Gaza," Middle
East Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer 2004).
[59] Hillel Frisch, "Eye of the Sphinx: Egypt's Military
Doctrine," The Journal of
International Security Affairs, No. 2 (Winter 2002),
p. 13.
[61] "Shin Bet Chief Accuses Egypt of
Allowing Weapons Smuggling into Gaza
Strip," Ha'aretz, September
27, 2006.
[64] Almog, "Tunnel-Vision in Gaza."
[66] Daniel Williams, "Cairo Links
Sinai Attacks to Palestinians: Gaza Extremists
Said to Train Egyptians," Washington Post,
May 24, 2006.
[67] John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth
or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),
p. 146.
[69] Jonathan Spyer, "Failure and Longevity: The Dominant
Political Order in the Middle East," MERIA,
Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 2006).
[70] Challiss McDonough, "Egypt Frees
950 Gamaa Islamiya Prisoners," Voice of America News, April 12, 2006.
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