In order to understand the role played by Salafism in the process of radicalization of Muslim communities and how this process operates in Europe, one must first examine its characteristics as a movement in the Arab world. In contrast to other formal organizations, Salafism lacks hierarchical structures. The Salafi network structure is decentralized and segmented. The different groups are led by sheikhs or scholars with varying degrees of knowledge of the science of the hadiths, but not necessarily having ties with each other. There is also some element of competition between the sheikhs, each defending his interpretation of the Salaf, or true path, as the correct one. The most important scholars enjoy considerable support among students, who often recommend them to others on account of their vast knowledge of religious issues. There exists only an informal hierarchy based on the reputation of the different sheikhs recognized by the Salafi community. The proliferation of sheikhs means that there is no elite or clearly-defined leadership. This decentralized and cellular structure, in which anyone with religious knowledge can claim leadership of a group, explains how easy it has been in Europe to create groups or autonomous cells willing to blow themselves up without the need for direct orders from a higher authority.

Salafi activism operates through informal networks, the very same networks that have ensured the transmission of Islamic knowledge down the centuries and have proven extremely effective in creating a common Muslim identity. They mobilize in social networks created out of personal relationships and shared beliefs. Surveys of Jordanian Salafis reveal that friends played a crucial role in their conversion to Salafism.[14]  The recruitment process is carried out directly during discussions on Islam. Devout Muslims socialize in circles of friends for whom Islam plays an important role in their lives. Religion is a recurring theme in such circles. Through daily interaction, Salafis explain their theology to their friends until the latter are convinced of the truth of their perspective. In many cases, entire groups of friends convert to Salafism, given that all of them are exposed to the same lessons, speeches, and ideas. The blend of friendship and religious networks creates a high degree of group solidarity, which is still one of the main features of Salafi groups in Europe, enabling the network to survive close scrutiny by intelligence and security services in western countries.

Most of the new recruits and followers in the Arab world come from other Islamist movements. These movements interact in mosques, lessons, and religious meetings. As a result of such contacts and their own religiousness, they are favorably disposed to Salafi thinking, a situation that does not arise outside Islamist movements. Two groups form the basis for recruitment. The first is the Jama’at al-Tabligh, a missionary movement founded by Muhammad Ilyas in India in 1927 to “re-islamicize” the Muslim community. Although the group tends to stay out of politics or social issues, its most socially committed members are potential recruits for the Salafi movement. The second group is the Muslim Brotherhood. It is not difficult to find Salafi scholars who have previously been members of the Brotherhood. Similarly, militants close to Salafism tend to be the most conservative, and at times most radical, sectors of the Muslim Brotherhood.[15] This trend is seen in Europe as well, although experience shows that Salafism also attracts people who have no religious background whatsoever.

The movement uses a range of mechanisms typical of informal networks—personal interaction, activities in mosques, seminars, and lectures—in order to spread Salafi beliefs. Mobilization used to be achieved primarily through religious classes delivered in mosques. Tighter police controls and repression have resulted in classes being moved to private homes, where surveillance is much more difficult. Publications also play an important role in spreading Salafi ideas. Scholars are prolific publishers, and their writings are distributed widely in the Muslim world. Tape recordings and internet facilitate the reproduction of classes and sermons by Salafi scholars, connecting audiences in time and space, thus leading the community to a greater sense of unity. The fact that a European Salafi can listen to a sermon by Sheikh Abu Qutada live on the internet creates a strong sense of an imagined community, transcending national borders and uniting Salafis through a shared religious discourse.

The emergence of Salafism in European Islam is a relatively new phenomenon. During the 1980s, the functions of socialization and ultra-rigorous adherence to Islam were exercised by the Tabligh movement. This organization preached a highly demanding form of orthodoxy, including disengagement from unholy society and visits by followers to poor neighborhoods to recuperate a population that had strayed from the true path. The Tabligh’s glory days in Europe were from the mid-1970s until the early 1990s, during which it targeted disaffected sectors (immigrant workers with no cultural access to European societies). However, it failed to adapt to the coming of age of young Muslims who had been educated in Europe and sought a more intellectual approach, which the movement was unable to provide. Consequently, it no longer occupies a central role on the European Muslim scenario, although it still survives as a minority movement, and one of its branches is a member of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM).[16]

The Salafis’ arrival in Europe, particularly France—where they have established themselves more solidly than elsewhere—coincided with the emergence of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria. In France, where it proved impossible to turn FIS Salafism into political action, the trend adopted an essentially religious approach characterized by disengagement from the habits and customs of French society. Its influence spread throughout Europe thanks to the Algerian diaspora. On account of its focus on the Holy Scriptures and strict interpretations of these, it proved more successful in meeting the demands of a young generation brought up in the deliberately uncultured propaganda of the Tabligh.

The division between reformists and “fighting” Salafis has also been replicated in Europe. Reformist Salafism has found favor among the unemployed youth in the suburbs of major cities. This is thanks largely to the proselytizing work carried out in certain European mosques by Salafi Imams who have enjoyed, and still enjoy, considerable backing from Saudi Arabia. The number of followers continues to grow, thanks partly to the scholarships awarded every year by Saudi Arabia to enable young Europeans to study at the Umm al-Qura University in Medina. Furthermore, Islamic centers run by the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-'Aalam al-Islami) tend to be in the hands of clerics who preach a very strict form of Islam, very close to Salafism. Although opposed to violence, they preach a form of Islam that calls for a complete cultural break with unholy Europe. They have flooded the internet with websites purporting to be strictly apolitical and featuring frequent consultations with renowned Saudi Salafi sheikhs on a range of social issues. In addition to France, sizeable communities that follow the tenets of Salafism are found in Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. Although in principle they do not pose security problems, their principles and references to the scriptures coincide with those of fighting Salafism, and hence the passage of militants from one faction to the other is not difficult.

Fighting Salafism emerged in Europe in the mid-1990s through the armed Algerian groups. The fact that most of these were infiltrated by al-Qa’ida illustrates the gradual convergence between global jihadism and this form of Salafism. The nearest precursor is Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (GIA), whose European wing—under Khaled Kelkal—carried out several attacks in France in 1995 and 1996. The editor-in-chief of its mouthpiece in Europe, the weekly publication al-Ansar, was Abu Qutada, later to become one of the leading ideologists of fighting Salafism. When the group’s infrastructure came under pressure in France, its cells were divided up among Belgium, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, and Spain.[17]

The demise of GIA leader Jamal Zitouni in 1996 caused a split within the group, apparently at the behest of Usama bin Ladin, who was opposed to the campaign of brutal attacks against civilians in Algeria carried out by the GIA under Zitouni. The al-Qa’ida leader gave his support to the creation of the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), establishing direct ties with its head Hasan Hattab, who until then was the leader of the GIA network in Europe. In August 1998, Hattab’s followers joined the GSPC, making it not only the main Algerian terrorist group, but also the main group in Europe with al-Qa’ida links, having inherited the GIA networks there.[18]

Nineteen ninety-eight was also an important year in terms of the formation of a series of groups with radical Salafi leanings in the Maghreb countries. The European cells of these groups have become one of the main threats to Europe’s security. Also sponsored by the al-Qa’ida network, which lays down the strategies to be followed, organizations such as the Moroccan Islamic Combatants Group (GICM), the Tunisian Combatant Group, and the Libyan Islamic Combatant Group were set up to provide logistical support to al-Qa’ida. The groups grew up around Salafi preachers, and their militants are drawn from run-down districts outside the big cities, not from the popular medinas or industrial zones, the traditional breeding grounds for Islamist movements. This new generation of Islamists is totally excluded from society and lacks any sense of national belonging. They are the product of the rift between the non-integrated population of the suburbs and the rest of society. They are organized in separate independent groups, lacking a unified leadership, and drift into banditry and crime under the jihad banner.[19]

The new Salafi groups in the Maghreb countries share a number of common features: They have dropped the term jihad in their names, using instead the word “combat” (qital); they maintain close ties with their counterparts in other Maghreb countries—which explains the presence of various Maghrebi nationals in the cells formed in Europe; and they use former combatants from Afghanistan to extend their influence among Muslim communities in Europe. Although originally set up to provide logistical support to al-Qa’ida, the September 11 attacks and the growing repression in the Maghreb countries led these groups to redefine their priorities and become independent players on the international jihad scene. This is the backdrop to the attacks in Casablanca and Madrid.[20]

The transition from Salafism to terrorist militancy is easy given the radicalization that accompanies integration in the Salafi community. Support for or justification of terrorism, rejection of integration in host societies, and the creation of an Islamic State in Europe are all ideas shared by those who adopt Salafism as their system of values and behavioral model. The transition to more extremist positions is explained by a series of factors unrelated to religion but nonetheless skillfully exploited by terrorist networks. These factors include the perception of double standards in Western foreign policy, which preaches democracy yet tolerates oppression of the umma. Extremist propaganda exploits the regional conflicts in Palestine, Chechnya, and Iraq as examples of the global campaign against Muslims.

Similarly, the feeling of powerlessness with respect to the situation of Muslims in the world and the lack of outlets for such frustrations become arguments to switch to terrorism. Other contributing factors include the perception of widespread Islamophobia in European society and Europe’s media following the attacks of September 11 and the impression that anti-terrorism laws are applied abusively against Muslims. The radicalization process begins with the emergence of anti-integration tendencies and the desire to disengage from the host society. It continues with hostility towards the host society, rejection of the principles and institutions of liberal democracy, and the growing acquisition of violent attitudes, all of which make individuals a potential target for recruiters.

The final stage of the radicalization process is recruitment: the gradual process of manipulation and monitoring, during which the recruit is encouraged to join the jihad. The process concludes in a military training camp where the recruits receive military and ideological instruction to enable them to become mujahidin. No-one disputes today that in recent years many mujahidins living in Europe have taken part in the so-called “peripheral jihad”: Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and now Iraq.

Almost all of the recruiters have military experience in peripheral jihad conflicts. They have undergone strict military and religious-ideological training, in Afghanistan for the most part. They are therefore linked in some respect to the al-Qa’ida network. They are persons capable of inspiring admiration, respect, and a sense of leadership. They also tend to have some experience in the field of religious doctrine. To help them in their role, recruiters are aided by “spotters” who often provide the senior mujahidin recruiters with information on people they consider are ready to make the step up to terrorist militancy. Recruits tend to have little knowledge of the Koran, and thus it is easy for the recruiter to mask with religious content their core message: namely, that Islam is under threat from enemy action, particularly by the United States, Israel, and, generally, the corrupt West.

Recruiters target three risk groups in particular. First-generation Muslims: This group accounts for the bulk of activists in European countries where immigration is a recent phenomenon. As the investigations into the Madrid attacks have shown, this group includes immigrants who have integrated with their host society, as well as others who have not and who have turned to crime for a living, thus evidencing the close ties between Islamist networks of Maghrebi origin in Europe and common crime perpetrated by Maghrebi immigrants. Conversion of common criminals to radical Islamism helps activate both networks jointly. The recruitment process need not necessarily take place in mosques. Prisons, refugee centers, and shelters for needy immigrants are also venues for activities designed to convert young Muslims into terrorist militants.

Second or third-generation immigrants: This group constitutes the bulk of recruits in European countries where Muslim immigration has existed for several decades. Identity problems lead these young people to the path of jihad, where they find respect, brotherhood, and a new identity offered by Islamist fighters who guide them through the recruitment process. They feel part of a battle between good and evil. The recruiter guides them in the right direction while also addressing their existential concerns. The identity crisis suffered by these generations is compounded by the perception that they are ostracized by the rest of society, which views them as a “foreign body” that has failed to integrate properly. In these cases, mosques controlled by Salafi preachers (al-Quods in Hamburg, Finsbury Park in London, Chatenay-Malabry in Paris, or al-Tawfik in Brussels) become the main recruitment posts, attracting young persons on the edges of society. Recruitment of students and young professionals is also being carried out increasingly in universities.

Finally, the third group targeted by the recruiters is the converts:  Although fewer in number, their ranks are growing faster in terms of their importance in Muslim communities. Some—usually the leaders—are from middle-class backgrounds and convert to Islam because Muslims are “the only ones who fight the system.” In the 1980s, they would have signed up to radical left-wing movements. Today, however, conversion to Islam is one of the options for European rebels to find a cause. The cases of John Walker Lindt, the American of Christian origin who was arrested in Afghanistan during the U.S. offensive against the Talibans; Richard Reid, the Briton arrested with a bomb in his shoes on a flight to the United States in December 2001; or José Padilla, who was arrested in the Chicago airport in May 2002 and charged with passing information to al-Qa’ida to help them build a radioactive bomb, are good illustrations of how converts can radicalize.[21]

Recruitment is supplemented by two important events. Firstly, the recruit offers up his testimony for posterity as a devout Muslim, manifesting his wish to die in combat as a martyr in the war against the enemy. Secondly, he begins a course of military and ideological training to prepare him for jihad. Prior to 2001, such training was conducted in Afghanistan or Pakistan,[22] but since then it has been organized more selectively in Europe and lately, also in Iraq, which has become today a powerful magnet for dozens of young European Muslims. The fall of the Taliban regime had major consequences for the recruitment process. As the Madrid and London attacks showed, the profile of activists has changed. Without a transition or a period in Afghanistan, immigrants who led ordinary lives (some of them fully integrated with society) turned from being butchers, switchboard-operators, or estate agents into the activists who perpetrated a terrorist massacre.

Mosques are losing their importance in the radicalization process that leads Salafis to become terrorists, whereas religious courses in private homes, visits by itinerant radical recruiters, and Internet are all gaining importance in the radicalization and recruitment process. This situation should make us reflect on the true nature of the threat we currently face. There is no doubt that barring radical ideologists from entering Europe or arresting them is not enough to prevent the violent actions that ensue when young and not necessarily disenfranchised people come into contact with the jihadi ideology.

CONCLUSIONS

Salafism is first and foremost a method for the search of the religious truth; a desire to practice Islam exactly as it was revealed by the Prophet. It is a religious method whose influence has spread throughout the Arab world and also in Europe, thanks to the support received from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which have helped expand this peculiar vision of Islam that is very close to Wahhabism. Its influence is on the rise and it has successfully impregnated several Islamist movements, including some sectors of the Muslim Brotherhoods. In Europe, it has become a powerful magnet for generations of young Muslims who suffer identity problems, reject European citizenship, and use their cultural alienation to justify the adoption of a form of universal Islam stripped of its heritage of traditions and adaptable to all societies. Although in principle Salafism is apolitical and opposes violence, it preaches an Islam that calls for cultural rupture with Europe. Moreover, its principles and textual references coincide with those of fighting Salafism and its followers have therefore become the preferred targets of jihadi recruiters.

The fighting version of Salafism has also become the core ideology of the global jihadism sponsored by al-Qa’ida and the radical utopia of Abdallah Azzam. This ideology, aided by the proselytizing work of radical clerics, has led to the emergence in Europe of small groups with the capability to carry out independent terrorist strikes. Europe is no longer a mere logistics base for international jihadism, but a scenario for terrorist action. In the past, Islamist networks operating in Europe restricted their activities to providing logistical support for the cells that planned attacks in other parts of the world. The destruction of its operations base in Afghanistan has caused a transformation of the al-Qa’ida network, which is no longer an organized structure but a trademark or label conferring even greater impact on actions undertaken by local groups. Europe is facing a long term threat that will require not only measures to ensure appropriate integration of its Muslim communities, but also decisive action to confront an ideology that has declared a global war against the West.

*Juan José Escobar Stemmann is a Diplomat. He is currently the Deputy Head of Mission in the Spanish Embassy in Jordan. He has previously served in Bulgaria, Nicaragua, and Morocco. He also was Head of Unit for Euro-Mediterranean Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Madrid. He was a lecturer on Islamic movements in North Africa in the Instituto Gutierrez Mellado for Defence Studies in Madrid. His publications include “Islamic Movements in the Muslim world” in Perspectivas Exteriores (2003), edited by FRIDE, Política Exterior, and Instituto Elcano. He is a frequent collaborator of the magazine Política Exterior, where he has written many articles about political Islam and the process of democratization in different Arab countries. He has also published several articles about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in different publications such as Diálogo Mediterráneo. His main research interests are Islamism, democratization in the Arab world, and terrorism. He has participated in several seminars organized by the Center of Defence Studies in the Spanish Ministry of Defence and in different working groups in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He intends to publish a book next year on political Islam in the Arab world.