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Published by the GLORIA Center, |
Volume 9,
No. 3, Article 5 - September 2005 |
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TURKISH
PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES *By Nasuh Uslu, Metin Toprak, Ibrahim Dalmis, and Ertan Aydin Turkey is a traditional ally of the United States, however, certain events, notably Washington's 2003 military intervention in Iraq and the Turkish response to this, have soured Turkish-American relations. Based on opinion polls, this article analyzes and explains the Turkish people's perceptions of the United States during the period between December 2002 and September 2003. The Turkish were displeased by what they saw as an American attitude of pursuing unilateral policies aimed solely at protecting American interests. The Turkish people believed that the U.S. decision on Iraq was taken without regard for Turkey's national interests or bilateral relations. In their eyes, the American intervention, and Turkey's possible participation in it, would be harmful for Turkey, especially in the context of the Kurdish question. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Turkish nation opposed supporting the Americans in Iraq. After World War II, Turkey's main goal was to establish an alliance and to cooperate with the West, the United States in particular, in every regard. Until 1964, maintaining close relations with the United States was the central theme of Turkish foreign policy and was backed by public opinion. The Turkish people considered the United States the sole guarantor of Turkey's security and the sole source of the development of the Turkish economy. The clashes in Cyprus began at the end of 1963, and the United States took a neutral stance between Turkey and Greece. This demonstrated that pursuing policies based solely on the United States was insufficient to protect Turkey's interests. Consequently, the United States experienced suffered a major loss of prestige in the eyes of Turkish rulers, and anti-Americanism soared among the Turkish people. Problems such as Washington's use of Turkish military bases, Turkish opium exacerbating drug addiction among American youth, the 1974 Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, and the American arms embargo on Turkey cooled Turkish-American ties until 1980. While relations between the two countries were generally cordial during the 1980s, despite some significant problems, the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s once again forced Turkey to make a choice in its foreign relations. Turkish leaders decisively chose to stay in the Western camp and to act with the United States in world politics. In fact, in the new era, the Turkish ruling elite feared that Washington would leave Turkey due to the decrease in its strategic importance. Therefore, considerable efforts were made to prove Turkey's strategic value for the West and the United States. As part of the new Turkish attitude, Turkey lent full support to Washington's policies during the 1991 Iraq crisis, in order to use every opportunity to increase Turkey's value in the eyes of American leaders. Turkish leaders approached the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States in the same way, emphasizing Turkey's alliance with the United States in its war against new threats. However, the U.S. decision to intervene in Iraq militarily and the subsequent demand for Turkish assistance brought a new turning point in Turkish-American relations. Turkey's full support for Washington's 1991 war with Iraq did not further Turkish interests as was expected. In fact, as a result of the economic embargo on Iraq, Turkey lost a huge amount of revenue due to lost trade and investment opportunities. The new conflict with Iraq was seen the Turkish people and leaders as harmful to its vital national interests, especially with regards to the Kurdish question. Although the Turkish government felt compelled to support the American action and launched some initiatives in this direction, the Turkish nation was overwhelmingly opposed to lending any kind of support to the Americans. In this new atmosphere, the Turkish parliament rejected the proposal to allow U.S. forces to use Turkish territory for the war. This article analyzes and explains Turkish public opinion concerning the United States during the critical period of December 2002 through September 2003. These analyses are based on the opinion polls conducted by two Turkish public surveying companies: Anar and Pollmark. The Turkish nation's perception of the United States is an important factor in the future of Turkish-American relations. Moreover, the Turkish people's opinion of Washington's war against Iraq is an important indicator as to the perceived legitimacy of U.S. actions, a problem it has faced elsewhere in the world. THE
TURKISH PEOPLE'S OPINIONS ON AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ In addition, reports that the United States would provide Turkey with significant financial aid in return for its participation in the war might have been expected to mobilize public support. But this exchange was seen as an insult to Turkey's national honor, as if it were a puppet or mercenary of the world's superpower. Therefore, 59.2 percent of the Turks expressed negative opinions on the bilateral negotiations regarding Turkey's contribution to the war.[1] In December 2002, 86.7 percent of Turkish people opposed the intervention.[2] A month later this figure rose to more than 90 percent. This was an extremely high rate given the alliance relationship between the two countries.[3] It was also striking that 74.9 percent of the Turkish people thought Iraq to be right in the conflict, compared to only 7.2 percent who supported the U.S. side.[4] Turkish public opinion continued to oppose U.S. intervention after the war began. (80.6 percent opposed the intervention in May 2003).[5] The fact that the United States won the war easily did not change the Turkish people's negative view. In August 2003, the American intervention in Iraq was still at the top of the agenda for the Turkish nation because of the serious problems it incurred for Turkey.[6] According to polls, the Turkish people did not believe the reasons for launching a war against Iraq that were put forth by the American administration were the true motives behind the war. The Turkish population did not believe in the sincerity of the Americans, even though they were their political allies.[7] In their opinion, American leaders had other, evil intentions for military intervention in Iraq. Ironically, though, 45.6 percent believed that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons. However, this seemed to cause people to oppose the war since they worried Turkey might suffer if such weapons were used in an armed conflict. [8] According to the majority of the people (74.4 percent), the real purpose of the United States was to gain control over oil resources in order to remain a superpower and to strengthen its hegemony over the world. Few thought the United States' was simply flaunting its power by the operation (6.9 percent) or seeking colonies to exploit (only 5.1 percent). Remarkably, only 2.3 percent of Turks believed that overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime was the real reason for the attack, and just 0.6 percent believed the war was in retaliation for the September 11, 2001, attacks. On the other hand, only 5 percent thought that the United States was seeking to conquer the entire Middle East. In short, the main view was that America sought control of the oil rather than territorial conquest, to fight terrorism, or to eliminate a dangerous regime. Given the fact that Iraq was among the major enemies of Israel and that blaming the war on Zionism was a major theme in the Arab world, one might have thought that the Turkish people would embrace that theme. But just 3.6 percent held that view. It was also striking that only 0.8 percent of the Turkish people saw the U.S.-Iraq war as one of religion. REASONS FOR THE TURKISH
PEOPLE'S NEGATIVE APPROACH TO THE AMERICAN INTERVENTION The Turkish people also opposed U.S. intervention in Iraq because of its possible negative ramifications for the Kurdish question. Over half (53.6 percent) believed that a U.S. intervention without a Turkish military occupation of northern Iraq would result in the establishment of a Kurdish state.[10] To make matters worse, the majority of the Turkish people (60.5 percent) believed that the United States favored the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq.[11] In fact, one of the most important reasons for the Turkish nation's opposition to the U.S. intervention was this belief. The close relations between the United States and Kurdish groups, including U.S. protection for a northern Iraq enclave outside Iraq's central authority, were taken as evidence of such a goal. In contrast, 33.1 percent did not believe the United States would establish a Kurdish state. [12]And very few (0.08 percent) thought that creating such a state was the primary reason for the U.S. intervention. Still, some of those rejecting the idea of an American-backed Kurdish state might also have viewed the American presence in Iraq as encouraging Kurdish problems for neighboring countries, including Turkey.[13] The perceived high likelihood of American intervention resulting in the establishment of a Kurdish state caused the Turkish people to adopt extremely anti-American views. Another reason for Turkish attitudes was certain reverberations from Turkey's own history. For example, 74.3 percent of those polled opposed the appointment of an American general as the highest authority of the new Iraqi rule.[14] The situation was too reminiscent of the occupation of Turkey under a military governor after World War I, which eventually sparked a nationwide resistance under Kemal Ataturk. Also in this context, 73.3 percent were disappointed by Iraq's quick surrender without more fighting.[15] Such memories also gave rise to the concern by 83.7 percent that the United States would have too much power in the region by permanently stationing its armed forces there.[16] Another issue, which worried the majority (69.5 percent) of the Turkish nation, was the possibility that the American administration might not limit its intervention to Iraq and might intervene in other regional countries. [17] In
addition to factors cited for this tendency to reject any connection
with the Iraq war, was the fear of losing international prestige,
since other countries opposed the operation; the fear that Turkish
participation in the Iraq war would be a violation of the Turkish
principle to avoid conflict with neighboring states; and the lack of
perceived gain for Turkish interests. This view was held despite the
fact that Turks thought their country's refusal to cooperate would
not stop the war. Only 5.4 percent believed that their parliament's
refusal to cooperate would persuade the Americans not to launch a
war. However, the great majority of the Turkish people (77.8 percent) were of the opinion that Turkey should be opposed to the war and not help the United States in any way, including by offering its military forces and allowing the use of its military bases.[18] The Turkish people's opposition could have been more easily understood if there had not been potential benefits from the war. However, U.S. policymakers thought Turkey would gain a great deal by participating, and lose much-- including having a say in post-war arrangements-- if it did not participate. Turks may have also been expected to think they would lose more influence over the future of Iraq's Kurds and in bilateral relations with the United States if they did not participate. But the Turkish people viewed the situation differently. Only a small portion (7.7 percent) were ready to let the U.S. forces use the country's land and air space for the war, even without the participation of the Turkish armed forces. Those who supported this view believed that important gains could be obtained without any serious cost. However, more people did not take this stance because the Turkish people remembered the unfulfilled promises from the 1991 Gulf war and the great losses the country suffered as a result of that conflict. Only a very small number (2.6 percent) supported full involvement alongside the United States, which would include the use of Turkish military forces.[19] Fear of losing U.S. support for Turkey or suffering some punishment at the hands of the United States simply had no effect on public opinion. An overwhelming majority (77.9 percent) of the Turkish people opposed the deployment of American military armed forces on Turkish territory.[20] By March 2003, the majority of the Turks (61.3 percent) wanted parliament to reject the government proposal to cooperate in the war.[21] The rate of those who opposed the use of Turkish territory as a second front in Northern Iraq also increased to 75 percent.[22] In March 2003, 69.7 percent of the Turkish people even opposed opening Turkish airspace to American warplanes, a low level of cooperation, but one which might have been seen by Washington as a sufficient level of cooperation to merit reward.[23] Nor were Turks deterred by concern that, as 24 percent thought, Turkish-American relations would be negatively affected by a refusal to cooperate. Given Turkey's heavy military and economic dependence on Washington, this would be a grave cost from the Turkish point of view. A substantial number of the people, 20.7 percent, believed that a Kurdish state would be more likely to be established in Northern Iraq if Turkey did not cooperate with the United States.[24] In spite of these factors, Washington could not persuade the Turkish people to support the war effort. Indeed, despite Turkey's economic hardships at the time, 72.3 percent opposed allowing the American forces to open a second front by using Turkish territory, even if that would result in significant amounts of financial aid.[25] Some 34.7 percent of the Turkish people believed that the Turkish economy would be negatively affected if their government refused to cooperate in the war, resulting in greater inflation and higher taxes.[26] In March 2003, 58.2 percent thought that there was a connection between the introduction of new taxes and the Turkish parliament's refusal to allow American troops to use Turkish territory for the war. [27] By April 2003, the percentage of Turks who supported the decision not to extend help to the Americans during the Iraq crisis had decreased to 57.8 percent, although it remained a majority.[28] However, a month later, the number who believed that Turkey acted correctly during the Iraq war by not supporting the American war effort climbed back up to 71.7 percent.[29] Almost half, 46.8 percent, of the Turkish people even opposed the use of the Turkish ports and airports by the Americans for humanitarian purposes in June 2003. In contrast, 42.3 percent supported this restricted type of activity.[30] So intense was the overall opposition to the war, that the Turkish people criticized their own government, led by an Islamic-oriented party, as being too soft on the issue. The majority of the Turks (55.9 percent) did not approve of government policies, because they viewed them as hesitant or ambiguous rather than just firmly rejecting the American demands from the beginning.[31] The level of approval for the AKP government's policies on the Iraq crisis decreased further with the course of time (33.1 percent in March and 25.9 percent in July 2003).[32] In August 2003, the mark the government obtained even from its supporters was considerably low. (64 percent). [33] Reactions
toward U.S. Actions Another emotional issue was an incident in which Turkish soldiers were detained in northern Iraq by the U.S. forces. The United States suggested that they were engaged in activities which might subvert the status quo in the Kurdish-populated areas, but Turks saw this as mistreatment that amounted to an insult. There was also concern that the United States might use Kurdish groups to punish Turkey for its decision not to support the war. A huge majority of Turks, 88.3 percent, did not accept U.S. explanations for the incident.[35] Almost the same amount of criticism (79.9 percent) was leveled against the findings of a U.S.-Turkish joint commission that investigated what had happened.[36] Again, 70.2 percent felt that their own government-- which was acting cautiously so as not to worsen further bilateral relations--had not taken a tough enough stand on the incident.[37] Still, this was a temporary problem. Only 0.8 percent of the Turks saw the detainment as the most important incident of August 2003.[38] Providing
Military Forces for the Iraqi Mission It seemed that the Turkish people were confused on this issue. They favored the presence of the Turkish forces in the region in order to affect developments, but they also believed that intervention in northern Iraq, in the chaotic atmosphere created by the American operation, could not bring expected benefits. In September 2003, the percentage of Turkish people who suggested that Turkey should have sent military forces to Iraq before the war started decreased to 32.9 percent. On the other hand, the rate of those, who believed that Turkey had acted correctly by not sending military forces to Iraq, became 61.2 percent.[41] The opinion that the Turkish presence in Iraq would be risky seemed to gain more credibility. In July 2003, a considerable number of Turkish people (68 percent) were opposed to the deployment of military forces in Iraq.[42] In September 2003, 64 percent were opposed to sending military forces to Iraq, while 31.1 percent were in favor.[43] Thus, people did not approve of a proposal which could normalize relations with the United States, compensate for the damages caused by the act of not supporting the American war effort, and ensure the reinstatement of American sympathy. The
Turkish political and military elite favored sending military forces
to Iraq. However, at the same time, the general population
complained about the lack of Turkish influence in Iraq, while
opposing the sending of forces. This was partially because this was
considered the sacrifice Turkish soldiers to save American soldiers.
Turkey also did not want to be isolated internationally and
antagonize such countries as France and Germany at a time when it
was seeking full membership in the European Union.[44] Yet despite the Turks' deep antagonism toward U.S. policy to attack Iraq, opinions began to change in the summer of 2003. The United States had won the war and Saddam Hussein's overthrow was an established fact. If Turkey were going to have influence in the new Iraq, prevent the creation of a Kurdish state, prevent Iraq from becoming a base for the anti-Turkish PKK Kurdish group, and preserve good relations with the United States, a new approach was needed. Thus, in July 2003, an increased number of Turks, 41.5 percent, supported the idea of cooperating with Washington in Iraq, though 45.9 percent were still against it.[49] There was also an increasing interest in the idea of Turkey benefiting from Iraqi reconstruction. Some 42 percent thought Turkish businessmen could play an active role in the reconstruction of Iraq, whereas 45.8 percent held the opposite view.[50] Those doubting Iraq provided an economic opportunity thought the Americans would not welcome a Turkish role, though this seemed rather unlikely. PERCEPTION
OF THE OTHER ACTORS Nevertheless, there was a great deal of sympathy for what Turks perceived as the Iraqi people. Thus, 74.2 percent of Turks thought the Iraqi cause-- which they interpreted as contradicting an American attack-- was right, as compared to only 7.2 percent who believed the Americans were right.[55] This meant most Turks rejected the policy of the United States, their ally since 1947, who had provided them with substantial aid in the past. On the other hand, they held more positive views regarding Iraq, with whom Turkey did not have normal relations and with whom they even had major problems in the recent period. There were a number of factors involved here, including the identification of Iraqis as Muslims, the relative loyalty of Iraqis during the period Ottoman Empire, the view of the United States as an alien force in the region, and the idea that Iraqis were the underdogs. Perhaps most important of all, Turks preferred neutrality, the country's historic policy as in World War II and in the 1991 Gulf war. The fact that the United States was trying to push Turkey into a war brought about this preference for neutrality and encouraged opposition to American policy. Iran When Iranian students demonstrated against the regime, however, Turkish public opinion was not overwhelmingly supportive. While 39.3 percent had favorable views of the demonstrations, 32.1 percent did not, and 28.7 percent had no opinion.[56] Perhaps a relatively large number of people did not approve of the demonstrations, because they were concerned these might lead to regional instability. In addition, 49.6 percent of Turks disapproved of the American support for the demonstrations, while only 23.2 percent approved.[57] Moreover, 80.2 percent of the Turkish people were opposed to an American military intervention in Iran on the grounds that the country supported terrorism.[58] Regarding a possible Iran-America confrontation, 55 percent of Turks preferred neutrality, while 23.8 percent favored siding with Iran, compared to just 16.85 percent who wanted to be on the U.S. side.[59] This is remarkable given the long alliance between Turkey and the United States, on the one hand, and the Turkish authorities' perception of Iran as a threat since the Islamist revolution there in 1979 on the other. These attitudes could be related to public opinion on Iraq, including the concern regarding American power and the concern that this could serve as a precedent for foreign intervention which in turn could lead to later intervention against Turkey. Other
Regional Countries European
Union DIRECT PERCEPTIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES Certainly, the extent of this attitude is surprising. In the first place, there could have been more acceptance of the U.S. claims that it was combating a dangerous dictatorship as well as for the other reasons it gave to explain its actions. Second, the two countries had long been allies and Turks had seen U.S. aid and support as an important asset. Moreover, at the time the opinion polls were conducted, there was no serious crisis between Turkey and the United States. The two countries were still trying to work together on the Iraq issue. In addition, the Turkish government was publicly favoring cooperation and did not attempt to incite anti-American attitudes. The main problem, then, was the perception of the United States and its behavior. On the one hand, there was no country or institution in the world which could compete with, or restrain, U.S. power. On the other hand, the United States was seen as acting in its own interests, without consideration for other states. Thus, both the situation of a war next door and of an all-powerful United States seemed dangerous to many Turks. Some 69.5 percent of Turks believed that the United States, like other states which had world hegemony in the past, did not hesitate to intervene in the affairs of weaker countries because it knew that no one could stop it from doing so.[66] Two-thirds of those polled in February 2003 also felt that the United States would intervene militarily in Iraq regardless of whether Turkey opposed this action.[67] This conception was a recipe for considering U.S. policy to be against Turkish interests on several levels. In holding this view, public opinion rejected Turkish government policy that the country should cooperate to some extent in order to reduce any damage from the U.S. action. To a large extent, Turkish public opinion viewed the friction in bilateral relations to be a short-term problem, though 49.5 percent in the March 2003 poll were still pessimistic about the long-term future of the relationship.[68] In holding this view, they were aware that the refusal to help the U.S. war by helping the Americans open up a "second front" in northern Iraq was an act that could harm relations. Still, 37 percent were optimistic about the future of the relationship as well. By May 2003, concerns had eased somewhat, with more people saying relations would improve. Only 21 percent thought they would deteriorate further.[69] Turks were thus not pleased with the existing situation, but thought that the problems were only temporary ones related to the Iraq crisis. *Nasuh Uslu is associate professor of international relations at the Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences of the University of Kırıkkale. Turkey. His books include: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları. 2000); Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları. 2000); Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period (New York: Nova Publishers. 2004). The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: the History of a Distinctive Alliance (New York: Nova Publishers. 2003). The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish American Relations 1959-2003 (New York: Nova Publishers. 2003). *Metin Toprak is vice president of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency of Turkey. His books include: Türk Ekonomisinde Yapısal Dönüşümler (Structural Transformations in Turkish Economy): 1980-1985 (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi. 1996); İktisatta Yeni Yaklaşımlar (New Approaches in Economics) (Kırıkkale: Savaş Ofset. 1996); Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi (The Economy of the Turkish Republic): 75 Yıl Armağanı (Ankara: Kara Harp Okulu Yayınları. 1999;. Türkiye Ekonomisinde Reel ve Finansal Etkileşim (Ankara: Kara Harp Okulu Yayınları. 1999). Yeni İktisat (New Economics). (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık. 1997); Küreselleşme ve Kriz: Türkiye ve Dünya Deneyimi (Globalisation and Crisis: the Experience of Turkey and the World) (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi. 2001). *Ertan Aydın teaches at Çankaya University in Ankara. Turkey. From 2000-2001. he was a research affiliate at Harvard University. Center for Middle Eastern Studies. He was also a visiting fellow at The Ohio State University in the spring semester of 2002. In the fall semester. 2002-2003. he was a research fellow at Dartmouth College. His articles include. "The Peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology in the 1930s: The Ülkü Version of Kemalism. 1933-1936." published in Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 40. No. 5 (September. 2004) and "Dilemmas of Turkish Democracy: The Encounter Between Kemalist Secularism and Islamism in the 1990s" in Democracy and Religion. Free Exercise and Diverse Visions. ed. by David W. Odell-Scott. (Kent: Kent State University Press. 2004). *İbrahim Dalmış holds a Ph.D. in social psychology from the Middle East Technical University in Turkey. His research focuses on social identity and inter-group relations. He is a research assistant at Kırıkkale University in Turkey. Dr. Dalmış has written seven articles related to the social and political behaviors of the Turkish. TABLES ABBREVIATIONS
Appendix I: The Attitudes of Turkish People on the Reasons and Legitimacy of the Iraq WarTable 1 (D1, December 2002). What do you think about the U.S. military intervention in Iraq?
Table 2 (D1, January 2003). What do you think about the U.S. military intervention in Iraq?
Table 3 (C7, March 2003). Do you think that there are chemical and biological weapons in Iraq?
Table 4 (C8, March 2003). Do you think that Iraq under the leadership of Saddam generates a threat for its neighboring countries?
Table 5 (C5, March 2003). Do you think that U.N. becomes ineffective in practice after the U.S. intervention without the approval of the U.N. Security Council?
Table 6 (D1, February 2003). Do you think that anti-war demonstrations in Turkey and around the world will prevent the Iraq war?
Table 7 (D7, February 2003). Do you think that the U.S. will strike Iraq even without the consent of Turkey?
Table 8 (C6, March 2003). Which side is right in this conflict according to you?
Table 9 (B1, May 2003), Do you approve of the U.S. intervention in Iraq when considering the current circumstances?
Appendix II: Attitudes toward U.S.Table 10 (D13, February 2003). What is your general opinion about U.S. President George W. Bush?
Table 11 (C2, March 2003). What is your general opinion about U.S. President George W. Bush?
Table 12 (C1, March 2003). What is your general opinion about the U.S.A.?
Table 13 (C9, March 2003). Have the justifications for the U.S. intervention convinced you?
(Attention! The next question will be asked to the subjects who responded "no" to the above question) Table 14 (C9.a., March 2003). What is the real rationale behind the U.S. military intervention in Iraq?
Table 15 (C10, March 2003). Do you think the U.S. will leave or stay in the region after overthrowing the Ba'th regime?
Table 16 (C11, March 2003). Do you think the U.S. will also intervene in other countries in the region?
Table 17 (B5, April 2003). What do you think about the appointment by the U.S. of a military general as the governor of Iraq?
Table 18 (J4, May 2003). How would you react if the U.S. attacked Iran with the reason that it supports terrorism?
Table 19 (H2, June 2003). What is your general opinion about the student demonstrations in Iran?
Table 20 (H3, June 2003). What do you think about the support of the U.S. government for student demonstrations in Iran?
Table 21 (A8, July 2003). Are you satisfied with the explanations of the U.S. officials about the reasons for the arrest of some Turkish soldiers in Iraq?
Table 22 (A13, July 2003). Do you think the U.S. will be able to form a stable order in Iraq?
Appendix III: Attitudes toward IraqTable 23 (D11, February 2003). What do you think about Saddam Hussein's policies as they relate to the quarrel between Iraq and the U.S.?
Table 24 (D12, February 2003). What is your general opinion about Iraqi president Saddam Hussein?
Table 25 (C4, March 2003). What is your general opinion about Iraqi president Saddam Hussein?
Table 26 (J1, May 2003). What do you think about Paul Wolfowitz's explanation regarding Turkey?
Table 27 (B1, April 2003). The government of Saddam Hussein did not do enough to defend Baghdad as was expected. What do you think about this statement?
Appendix IV: Attitudes toward Policies of Turkish Government on the Iraq warTable 28 (D2, January 2003). If the U.S. intervenes in Iraq, what policy should Turkey follow in this situation?
Table 29 (D3, January 2003). What do you think about the diplomatic visits of Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul to the countries of the region to find a peaceful solution for the Iraqi problem?
Table 30 (D4, January 2003). Do you think that the Istanbul summit of foreign ministers of the countries of the region will be effective in solving the Iraqi problem?
Table 31 (D2, February 2003). What do you think about the policies of AKP government regarding the Iraq problem?
Table 32 (D1, March 2003). What do you think about the policies of the AKP government regarding the Iraq problem?
Table 33 (A5, July 2003). Do you think that the AKP government's policy regarding the Iraq problem is successful?
Table 34 (A11, July 2003). Are you satisfied with the U.S.-Turkish Commission's explanation for the arrest of Turkish soldiers by the U.S. soldiers in Iraq?
Table 35 (D6, February 2003). What do you think about the permission issued by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) for the U.S. military settlement in Turkey?
Table 36 (D8, February 2003). Do you think it would be beneficial for Turkey to send its troops to Northern Iraq in the case of U.S. military intervention in Iraq?
Table 37 (D2, March 2003). When you reconsider it today, what do you think about the TGNA's rejection of AKP government's decision to send Turkish troops to Iraq?
Table 38 (FM1, February/March 2003). What do you think about the TGNA's rejection of the AKP government's decision to send Turkish troops to Iraq and the settlement of the U.S. troops in Turkey?
Table 39 (FM2, February/March 2003). What would be the possible result of this rejection?
Table 40 (D3, March 2003). What do you think about the Turkish government's decision to open the Turkish air space to the U.S. air force?
Table 41 (E1, March 2003). Do you think that the TGNA's rejection of the Turkish government's decision about the settlement of the U.S. troops in Turkey would damage Turkish-U.S. relations in the long term?
Table 42 (E2, March 2003). Do you think that Turkey should have given permission to the U.S. troops to settle in Turkey in order to get financial support from U.S.?
Table 43 (E3, March 2003). If the U.S. wants to settle its troops in Turkey again should Turkey accept this demand?
Table 44 (E4, March 2003). In recent days Turkish troops have entered Iraq by crossing the border. What do you think about this?
Table 45 (F1, March 2003). Do you think that AKP government's negotiation with the U.S. government was successful in the process of issuing the permission of sending Turkish troops to Iraq?
Table 46 (F3, March 2003). Do you see any relation between the failure of AKP government's proposal to get permission from TGNA and the newly issued taxes?
Table 47 (B2, April 2003). When you reconsider it today, what do you think about the relatively low support of Turkey to the U.S. at the beginning of the Iraq war?
Table 48 (B6, April 2003). Do you think that Turkish businessmen will take an active role in the reconstruction of Iraq?
Table 49 (B7, April 2003). What do you think of Turkey, Syria, and Iran's common policy regarding Iraq?
Table 50 (J2, May 2003). Do you think that Turkey should have given more support to the U.S. in the beginning of the Iraq war?
Table 51 (J3, May 2003). Which direction do you expect Turkish-U.S. relations to take in the near future?
Table 52 (B2, May 2003). When you reconsider it today, what do you think about the policy on Iraq pursued by the Turkish government at the beginning of the war?
Table 53 (H1, June 2003). Which side should Turkey take in the tension between the U.S.A. and Iran?
Table 54 (C1, June 2003). What do you think about the decision of the Turkish government to open its seaports and airports to the U.S.A. for humanitarian purposes?
Table 55 (A6, July 2003). Should Turkey increase its cooperation with the U.S.A. on the Iraq issue?
Table 56 (A7, July 2003). Should Turkey send troops to Iraq?
Table 57 (A9, July 2003). Do you find the policy pursued by the Turkish government in regards to the arrest of the Turkish soldiers in Iraq successful?
Appendix V: The Impact of Iraqi Ethnic Structure on the Attitudes of Turkish people Table 58 (D9, February 2003). If the U.S. intervened in Iraq with military forces and Turkish troops did not enter Iraq, do you think Iraq would be divided ethnically?
Table 59 (C12, March 2003). If Iraq after Saddam becomes a federation consisting of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens, what would be your reaction?
Table 60 (B3, April 2003). If Iraq after Saddam were to become a federation consisting of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens, what would be your reaction?
Table 61 (B4. April 2003). Do you think that the U.S.A. wants a Kurdish state in Iraq?
Table 62 (A12. July 2003). What do you think about the newly established Iraqi Administration Council?
Table 63 (C6. May 2003). If the Turkish Government were to issue a law to pardon terrorist prisoners. how would you react?
NOTES [1]Table 45 (F1, March 2003).
[2] Turkey's new right, traditional left, and radical right (Turkish nationalists) were opposed to the intervention of the American armed forces in Iraq at similar high rates. The traditional right was, to some extent, left behind in this regard (its rate of opposition to the intervention was 76.3 percent. Table 1 (D1, December 2002)). [3] Table 2 (D1, January 2003). [4] Table 13 (C6, March 2003). [5] Table 9 (B1, May 2003). The Turkish nationalists opposed the U.S. military intervention in Iraq at a lower rate (64.8 percent) compared with the others. They may have feared that not acting with the U.S.A. would harm vital national interests. The group which opposed the intervention at the highest rate (89.4 percent), was the Kurdish nationalists. They should have been felt positively about the operation since it would bring more benefits for the Iraqi Kurds. The Turkish Kurds might have been affected by previous American support for Turkey on the Kurdish question. [6] Pollmark, Türkiye Gündemi, August 2003, p. 22. [7] Table 14 (C9a, March 2003). The traditional left and the Kurdish nationalists were more convinced than others by the explainations given by the Americans (94.8 percent and 93.5 percent). But the rates of the others polled were also high. The group whose rate was lowest on this issue was the traditional right (88.1 percent). The Kurdish nationalists had the lowest rate (66.3 percent) of belief that the competition for oil resources was the real cause of the American war against Iraq. They put more of an emphasis on obtaining colonies and establishing control over the Middle East as the motives behind the war. It seemed that the others believed gaining control over oil reserves was the only motive for the war. [8] Table 3 (C7, March 2003). [9] Table 5 (C5, March 2003). The Turkish left had a stronger feeling that the U.N. would become non-functional (80.5 percent believed this). The left put more of an emphasis on the question of legitimacy. [10] Table 58 (D9, February 2003). The Turkish nationalists feared the possibility of the division of Iraq at a higher rate (65.9 percent) than the others did. The Kurdish nationalists least believed (34.4 percent) that Iraq would be disintegrated. It was interesting that the Turkish left was anxious about this issue at a rate similar to that of the Turkish nationalists. They, too, were concerned about the integrity of the Turkish territory. [11] Table 61 (B4, April 2003). The Turkish left had the highest rate (66.1 percent) of belief that the United States would establish a Kurdish state. The group that least believed such an occurrence was possible (38.9 percent) was the Kurdish nationalists. According to them, the United States would not hold an anti-Turkish stance on this issue. The traditional right least believed that the United States wanted to establish a Kurdish state. [12] Table 61 (B4, April 2003). [13] Table 14 (C9a, March 2003). [14] Table 17 (B5, April 2003). The traditional right approved the appointment of an American general as the highest authority in Iraq at a higher rate (25.0 percent). It was interesting that the Kurdish and Turkish nationalists disapproved of this most (80.9 percent and 80.5 percent). Nationalistic feelings led them to oppose the action, as they considered it to be belittling the nation. [15] Table 27 (B1, April 2003). [16] Table 15 (C10, March 2003). The Turkish left and the Kurdish nationalists believed at the highest rate (about 89 percent) that the United States would establish its presence in the region and would be in the pursuit of hegemony over the region. The new right, which was in the power, believed at the highest rate (12.4 percent) that the U.S.A. would leave the region. [17] Table 16 (C11, March 2003). The Kurdish nationalists, who did not want to see the United States in the region as a colonial power, believed at the highest rate (81.3 percent) that Washington would launch attacks against the other regional countries. The new right, which was affected by being in the power and which did not want to have to face any difficulties, believed at the lowest rate (62.7 percent) that the United States would intervene in other states. [18] Table 28 (D2, January 2003). [19] Table 28 (D2, January 2003). The group which was most opposed to taking a side in the war (90.6 percent) was the Kurdish nationalists. They may have beleived that their situation would be negatively affected by the Turkish-American cooperation. The lowest rate (71.1 percent) on this issue was that of the traditional Turkish right which was more pro-American. It was interesting that the anti-American Turkish left showed the highest rate (13 percent) of support for the use of the Turkish airspace and land by the Americans. On the other hand, the left least believed that Turkey should be on the side of the United States in the war (1.7 percent). [20] Table 35 (D6, February 2003). All of these groups had a negative view of the government decree. The leading group in this regard was the Kurdish nationalists, who were against Turkey's intervention in Iraq because they did not want Turkey's influential presence in the Kurdish region. It was interesting that the traditional Turkish right was more opposed to the decree than was new right. The Turkish nationalists approved of the decree at a higher rate than the followers of the governmental party did. They feared the decree could negatively affect Turkey's national interests. [21] Table 37 (D2, March 2003). The Kurdish nationalists approved of the rejection of the governmental decree at the highest rate. The left lagged behind on this issue. The traditional right and the Turkish nationalists disapproved of the rejection at the highest rate. [22] Table 43 (E3, March 2003). [23] Table 40 (D3, March 2003). The traditional right had a much higher rate of approval of the opening of the airspace than did the others. They wanted to normalize relations with the United States, as the United States was annoyed by Turkey's actions. [24] Table 39 (FM2, February/March 2003). [25] Table 42 (E2, March 2003). [26] Table 39 (FM2, February/March 2003). [27] Table 46 (F3, March 2003). [28] Table 47 (B2, April 2003). [29] Table 50 (J2, May 2003). [30] Table 54 (C1, June 2003). [31] Table 31 (D2, February 2003). [32] Table 32 (D1, March 2003); Table 33 (A5, July 2003). [33] Pollmark, Türkiye Gündemi, August 2003, p. 14. [34] Table 26 (J1, May 2003). [35] Table 21 (A8, July 2003). [36] Table 34 (A11, July 2003). [37] Table 57 (A9, July 2003). [38] Pollmark, Türkiye Gündemi, August 2003, p. 22. [39] Table 36 (D8, February 2003). [40] Table 44 (E4, March 2003). The Turkish nationalists favored the deployment of Turkish military forces in Northern Iraq at the highest rate, which exceeded the rate of the others considerably. Their major concern was the possibility that the Kurdish issue could get out of control. The Kurdish nationalists were decisively opposed to the deployment of Turkish forces in the region. They believed the presence of Turkish forces would be harmful to their interests. [41] Pollmark, Türkiye Gündemi, September 2003, p. 52. [42] Table 56 (A7, July 2003). [43] Pollmark, Türkiye Gündemi, September 2003, p. 53. Governmental party (AKP) supporters approved the deployment of military forces at the highest rate (41.2 percent), which was twice as high as the rate of the others. The government seemed to be determined to protect Turkey's interests. [44] Pollmark, Türkiye Gündemi, August 2003, p. 22. [45] Table 22 (A13, July 2003). [46] Table 62 (A12, July 2003). [47] Table 59 (C12, March 2003). [48] Table 60 (B3, April 2003). [49] Table 55 (A6, July 2003). [50] Table 48 (B6, April 2003). [51] Table 28 (D2, January 2003). [52] Table 23 (D11, February 2003). The Turkish nationalists were ahead of the others in approving the policies pursued by Saddam Hussein. The possibility of the establishment of a Kurdish state, as a result of Saddam's overthrow by the Americans, affected the opinions of the nationalists on this issue. The traditional right, friends of the United States, showed the highest rate of disapproval of Saddam Hussein's policies. [53] Table 4 (C8, March 2003). [54] Table 24 (D12, February 2003). [55] Table 8 (C6, March 2003). The new Turkish right (followers of the governmental party) felt the Iraqis to be right at the highest rate (80.1 percent). They had more sympathy toward the Iraqis because of their shared Islamic backgrounds. The traditional right and left found the Iraqis to be right at lower rates. Their opinion was influenced by their traditional hostility toward the Arabs. [56] Table 19 (H2, June 2003). The groups which approved of the student demonstrations in Iran at the highest rate were the Kurdish nationalists (61.1 percent) and the Turkish left (50.4 percent), who did not like the Iranian regime at all. The new right showed the highest rate (31.6 percent) of disapproval of the demonstrations. This could be explained by their fear of the destabilization of Iran, which could be harmful to Turkish interests. [57] Table 20 (H3, June 2003). [58] Table 18 (J4, May 2003). A possible American attack against Iran was supported at the highest rate (18.4 percent) by the Turkish left, who did not like the Iranian regime. Those who were most opposed to the American intervention (86.2 percent) were the Kurdish nationalists, who feared that the American intervention would be harmful to their situation. [59] Table 53 (H1, June 2003). [60] Table 29 (D3, January 2003). [61] Pollmark, Türkiye Gündemi, August 2003, p. 31. The followers of the governmental party and the opposition party in the Parliament favored E.U. membership at higher rates (about 80 percent) in comparison to other opposition parties, which were not represented in the Parliament (their rate was 60 percent). [62] Pollmark, Türkiye Gündemi, September 2003, p. 50. [63] Table 12 (C1, March 2003). [64] Table 11 (C2, March 2003); Table 10 (D13, February 2003). [65] Pollmark, Türkiye Gündemi, August 2003, p. 33. [66] Table 16 (C11, March 2003). [67] Table 7 (D7, February 2003). [68] Table 41 (E1, March 2003). Leftists and Turkish nationalists believed at higher rates that Turkish-American relations would be soured. Followers of the governmental party also believed that relations would be negatively affected. The traditional right was more optimistic as to the future of the relations. [69] Table 51 (J3, May 2003). The groups had not made up their minds regarding the future of Turkish-American relations. The followers of the governmental party were more optimistic, believing there would be an improvement of relations. The same group showed the lowest rate of a belief that the relations would deteriorate. Publisher and Editor: Prof. Barry
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