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SAUDI-U.S.
ALIGNMENT AFTER THE SIX DAY WAR
By
John D. Ciorciari
This
paper examines the effect of the Six-Day War on the U.S.-Saudi
relationship, an alliance that has long contributed to the
political, economic, and military shape of the Middle East.[1]
It also considers why these ties did not suffer more
dramatically following a bitter conflict in which Washington and Riyadh backed opposite sides. From an American
standpoint, why did the alliance remain largely intact despite
Riyadh's considerable opposition to U.S. policy and
participation in the 1967 oil embargo? For the Saudis, why did
the intense indignation--at both public and elite levels--at
U.S. support for Israel not prompt a break in relations? The
answers to these questions are not only of historical interest.
Understanding the basic dynamics that drive international
alignment is as important today as it was during the height of
the Cold War.
Unsurprisingly,
the Six-Day War brought a great deal of strain upon the
Saudi-U.S. alliance. As conflict approached in early June,
anti-American sentiment rose to dangerous levels in the Kingdom.
On June 2, three bombs exploded near the U.S. Embassy and the
U.S. Military Training Mission in Riyadh. The influential Saudi
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Ahmad Zaki Yamani,
also warned officials of the Arabian-American Oil Company
(ARAMCO) that American support for Israel could have grave
consequences for U.S. oil business in Saudi Arabia.[2]
When the war began, public resentment of the United States
continued to grow. Anti-Israeli and anti-American demonstrations
took place in Ras Tannura and Dhahran, while demonstrators in
Dhahran attacked the U.S. consulate and ransacked facilities at
ARAMCO.
The
Saudi government kept dissent in close check. Several hundred
people were arrested, and there were rumors that some were
killed in custody. Hundreds of Palestinians were also expelled
from the country,[3]
reflecting the Saudi government's fear that the war could bring
unwanted political and economic shocks at home. However, the
kingdom's reaction to the protests and sluggish support for
Egypt led radical Arabs to denounce the House of Saud as an
American puppet. In part to avert attacks on his regime, on June
6, when the war began, King Faisal called Saudis to jihad,
proclaiming, "We consider any state or country supporting
or aiding Zionist-Israeli aggression against the Arabs in any
way as aggression against us."[4]
With Egyptian forces in retreat toward the Suez Canal, and
Jerusalem near capture, the call to arms must be interpreted
primarily as a political and rhetorical gesture. Only a single
brigade of Saudi soldiers supported the Egyptian-led effort by
traveling to Jordan. They did not arrive until after the war had
ended.[5]
Like Faisal's public pronouncements, the Saudi military
contribution can best be interpreted as a means to defuse
potential domestic and Arab criticism, without unduly
jeopardizing the Saudi economy and Riyadh's security ties to the
United States.[6]
Fears
of a Break
Nevertheless,
it is important to stress that the strains in Saudi-U.S.
relations were more than simple rhetorical posturing; they
reflected genuine and serious disagreements over the nature of
the conflict and the proper diplomatic resolution of the impasse
between Israel and its neighbors.[7]
Faisal, like other Arab leaders, clearly perceived Israel as the
aggressor in the Six-Day War and resented the American
reluctance to criticize Tel Aviv more forcefully in the United
Nations. According to Walt Rostow, special assistant to
President Lyndon Johnson:
At
the root of Faisal's reaction are 20 years of frustration
beginning with the UN resolution creating Israel, which he
believes came about only as a result of U.S. pressure. He was at
the UN himself in 1948 and speaks from deep personal conviction.
Ever since, with the exception of 1956-57, he believes we have
leaned toward Israel. He just doesn't believe--no matter how
many times we say it--that we can't influence Israel.[8]
During
and immediately following the war, there existed real
concern--particularly in Washington--that the conflict could
lead to a rupture in Saudi-U.S. relations. On June 8, President
Johnson sent a personal message to King Faisal expressing his
"firm determination that events in the present crisis not
be permitted to affect the long-standing interest of the United
States Government in the closest possible relations with Saudi
Arabia."[9]
Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed the embassy that "we
are making a major effort through as many channels as possible
to convince King Faisal of U.S. hope [to] maintain good
relations with him and to prevent possible break in relations
between us."[10]
Several days later, the U.S. ambassador in Jeddah, Hermann
Frederick Eilts, reiterated the concerns and wrote to the State
Department:
Thus
far [the Saudi government] has stood up admirably to Arab
pressures [to] sever relations with [the] US. We have had
private (but official level) assurances that the King does not
intend to do so. But we should not take [the] Saudi position for
granted… In Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, our prestige and
influence have suffered as a result of recent hostilities and
[the] belief is widespread that [the] stunning Israeli victory
[is] somehow attributable to [the] US.[11]
Politically,
both sides were under pressure to reduce the alignment or to
sever relations altogether. The Saudi regime faced vilification
from radical Arabs at home and abroad for its pro-American
alignment,[12]
while Israel and pro-Israeli groups in the United States were
also lobbying to prevent the buildup of Arab armies after the
war.
A
Step Back in Bilateral Relations
Saudi-U.S.
relations did ultimately suffer.On June 5, the oil ministers of
Arab countries convened in Baghdad and issued a communique pursuant to which they would, "stop all shipments of oil to
any nation assisting Israel in its aggression against Arab
countries."[13]
That day, Nasser publicly declared--without factual basis or
confirmation from Russian intelligence--that U.S. aircraft from
the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet and British fighters from Cyprus
had participated in the attacks on Egyptian airfields.[14]
Although some of the oil ministers present wished to confirm the
report, Arabs widely believed that U.S. and British planes had
at least given air cover to the IDF.[15]
On June 7, King Faisal announced that Saudi Arabia and its Arab
neighbors would cut off oil supplies to "anyone who aided
Israel," including the United States and United Kingdom.
Oil Minister Yamani informed ARAMCO that shipments to those
countries would be prohibited.[16]
The
United States also took action, suspending arms transfers to
Saudi Arabia and other regional actors between June and October.
This ended a period of relative Anglo-American exclusivity in
supplying weaponry to the kingdom, forcing Riyadh to diversify
its sources of military supplies and turn to France for much of
its armor.[17]
Saudi confidence in the reliability of future U.S. arms supplies
waned slightly, as both sides faced pressure to scale back
defense ties.[18]
According to an October State Department memorandum:
[Saudi
Deputy Foreign Minister Sayyid Omar Saqqaf] noted that each time
there is a serious problem in the Near East, there seems to be
an attempt to influence policy through arms procurement matters.
The Saudis were coming to feel that there was nothing on which
they could depend.[19]
Moreover,
the arms embargo "had caused deep feeling among the
officers of the Saudi Army."[20]
However, given the political pressures on both sides to break
relations--and in the particular the widespread
Arab outrage toward Riyadh for not doing more--the
changes in the Saudi-U.S. security relationship were quite
minor. Riyadh did not take serious moves toward non-alignment,
and Washington did not threaten a severe reduction in military
support.
Privately,
both governments discussed their differences in the context of
repeated assurances of long-term cooperation. Their
communication after the war reflected their closeness. A few
weeks after the cease-fire, Faisal told Eilts that the U.S.
failure to condemn Israel made it difficult for him to support
Washington. He said that American policy planners did not
understand the "mob psychology" of the Arab world.
"You are dealing with irrational people," he said,
referring repeatedly to the Arab public as "crazy
people." "Those of us who are trying to stand up for
you are being let down," he added, "Your actions at
the UN are intensifying pressures on me and other moderate Arab
leaders."[21]
The American leadership clearly understood Faisal's dilemma. As
early as June 13, Eilts wrote to the State Department that the
US should:
Avoid
placing King Faisal in position these next few days or weeks
where he [is] required to show excessive public identification
with [the] US. However, where possible, look for ways of showing
that his past policy of friendship toward [the] US pays off, not
only for Saudi Arabia but for other Arabs. It is distinctly in
our interest at the present time to push Faisal and other Arab
moderates' causes in [the] Arab community.[22]
THE
OIL EMBARGO
Of
course, the most pronounced expression of Saudi disapproval of
American support for Israel was its participation in the Arab
oil embargo against the United States and the United Kingdom.
This section describes the nature of the Saudi participation in
the embargo to illustrate that, even in the context of its most
defiant act against Washington, Riyadh continued to place a high
degree of priority on the alignment. Likewise, the United States
did not attempt to exact "punishment" for the embargo,
sending the implicit message that it understood the House of
Saud's predicament and shared Riyadh's evident desire to smooth
over the turbulent fall-out from the Six-Day War to solidify a
long-term alliance.
The
Onset of the Embargo
While
the stated reason for the embargo was to punish supporters of
Israel and deter them from future assistance to the Jewish
state, other motives were apparent as well. As the British
Cabinet concluded, Saudi oil production had "been stopped
through action by the mobs."[23]
The Arab oil producers, including Saudi Arabia, faced widespread
domestic criticism for their alleged dependence on the United
States and its Western allies.
Egypt also applied public pressure on the conservative
monarchies.[24]
The embargo was largely a means to show solidarity with the Arab
cause and thereby channel some of the public anger and
frustration away from the conservative Arab regimes. It would
also reduce the likelihood of Arab nationalist sabotage of oil
installations. Finally, the move relieved some of the political
pressure to nationalize the oil companies, which Saudi leaders
and others feared would have dangerously destabilizing effects
on their economic and political regimes.[25]
Viewed in this way,
Saudi participation in the oil embargo was as much a way to
preserve its ties to Washington as to assert independence from
the United States.
The
long-term economic interests of both the Saudi regime and the
United States clearly favored a quick resolution to the embargo
and a resumption of a friendly--if not too overt--trade
relationship. The United States also sought to preserve the
relationship to protect access to the oilfields that one
American official had called "the greatest single prize in
all history."[26]
Although the United States was not then dependent on large
imports of Saudi oil, consumption and production trends showed
that the kingdom would occupy an ever-greater place in the U.S.
economy. This was particularly important to the United States in
the context of the mounting demands of the war effort in
Vietnam. Large revenues through corporations like ARAMCO and
associated development projects also represented considerable
economic benefits of the trade.
Saudi
Arabia's government and economy relied even more on its
relationship with the American oil industry. By 1967, the
kingdom received roughly 80 percent of its total national income
from the oil industry and was largely dependent on American and
European technicians for the management of public utilities and
development projects.[27]
When the embargo began, Saudi leaders feared both the short-term
effects of lost revenue and the potential sacrifice of long-term
markets if Saudi supplies came to be viewed as unreliable.[28]
The increased sales by rival oil exporters, including Iran and
Venezuela, during the summer of 1967 added to the Saudi concern
of being squeezed out of future contracts.[29]
Given Saudi Arabia's vast reserves, the kingdom has always
tended to promote economic policies that will guarantee
long-term access to lucrative markets, even at the expense of
possible short-term price hikes.
Bringing
and End to the Embargo
Faisal
attempted to scale back the embargo as soon as political
circumstances permitted. On June 18, Riyadh helped to block a
proposal by Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Algeria for total stoppage
of production. On July 29, Yamani publicly questioned the impact
of the embargo and the "serious impact" it would have
on Arab economies,[30]
and on July 6, Faisal declared on Radio Jeddah that the Arabs
should use oil to build up their economic strength. He warned
that the embargo was having the opposite effect and that Saudis
"should not be misled by ideas that communist friendship
has imbued in some people's minds."[31]
The following day, the Saudi government called for an end to the
embargo, "now that it has been established that there was
no evidence of British and American aircraft helping Israel in
last month's war."[32]
Vehement
Arab opposition to the statement compelled Riyadh to step back
from that position for nearly two months, but the Saudi
government continued to push for the resumption of oil supplies
diplomatically, and gradually secured other states' support at
the Khartoum Conference in August. Meanwhile, the United States
and its allies suffered little from the embargo, as at that time
domestic production and imports from other regions could
comfortably compensate for the loss of Arab oil.[33]
As Saudi officials had warned since late June, the embargo was a
relative failure in punishing the West.[34]
On September 2, Saudi Arabia became the first Arab country to
put a complete end to its embargo, and others soon followed.[35]
Throughout the embargo, Saudi behavior conveyed the same
essential message with respect to the United States. The kingdom
would make a show of disapproval strong enough to satisfy local
and Arab audiences, but not strong enough to jeopardize its
long-term U.S. alignment.
Survival
of the Alliance
The
relationship bent, but it certainly did not break. What
documents in the British and American archives suggest is that
both the Saudi and American leadership took modest steps back
during the summer of 1967 in an effort to preserve long-term
relations in the face of public pressure, above all from the
Saudi population and radical Arab states. The overriding Saudi
interest in regime security, the American focus on Cold War
containment, and shared economic incentives served to sustain
the alignment with minimal damage.
EXPLAINING
THE RELATIVE CONTINUITY OF THE ALLIANCE
How
can one best explain why the 1967 War did not bring about a more
pronounced rift in Saudi-U.S. relations? As the preceding
discussion of the oil embargo suggests, one answer is clearly
economic. The bilateral relationship between Saudi Arabia and
the United States has often been characterized as a
"marriage of convenience" based largely on the two
countries' common economic interest in oil production.[36]
Indeed, the revenue generated through Saudi rental of oilfields to the ARAMCO provided an important pillar in
the relationship during its formative years, providing
much-needed fiscal revenue and foreign exchange to the House of
Saud as it consolidated its political position and built a
modern state apparatus.[37]
Throughout the relationship, American trade and military support
helped the House of Saud to construct what many analysts
describe as a "rentier state," benefiting and
protecting the governing elite through the creation of patronage
networks and a loyal military and civil service.[38]
Comparable
to oil, an important pillar of the relationship was the common
Saudi and American fear of communism and radical Arab
nationalism.[39]
That concern drove Washington and Riyadh to develop close
security ties, and by the late 1950s, the United States was the
dominant source of Saudi arms, military
training, and external strategic support.[40]
For the Saudi regime, the merits of alignment were largely
regional and related to intra-Arab rivalry. For the United
States, Saudi Arabia was a linchpin in the effort to prevent the
Soviet Union from securing massive additional oil reserves and,
just as importantly, a major warm-water strategic foothold in or
near the Persian Gulf. Rostow made American strategic
priorities clear in the run-up to the war, relaying the results
of a discussion within the National Security Council (NSC):
The
main issue in the Middle East today is whether Nasser, the
radical states and their Soviet backers are going to dominate
the area. A related issue is whether the United States is going
to stand up for its friends, the moderates, or back down as a
major power in the Middle East.[41]
The
Six-Day War represented a major local victory for Israel and
helped Saudi Arabia establish a stronger role in Arab affairs,
but the overall balance of power in the Middle East between
radical and conservative (or pro-Soviet and pro-American) forces
did not change radically.[42]
More accurately, the overall "correlation of forces"
between conservative and radical forces did not shift
tremendously after the war, despite Nasser's humiliating defeat.[43]
If anything, both the United States and House of Saud faced a
more challenging matrix of regional security threats after the
war. Consequently, the same basic economic and security
interests that had helped the two nations construct their
bilateral relationship for several decades continued to hold the
alignment together after June 1967.
Effects
of the War on the Regional Balance of Power
To
understand why the Saudi-U.S. alliance survived the June war, it
is important to consider the continuing uncertainties in the
regional balance of power after the conflict. While the Six-Day
War was a seismic event in the politics of the Middle East,
diminishing the power and prestige of Egyptian and Syrian
forces, the overall change in the balance of power was much more
nuanced than a simple victory for the United States and its
allies. The war had implications in a number of areas. It
affected not only the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also the "Arab
Cold War" that had been waged throughout the decade between
Arab nationalist forces and conservative monarchical regimes.
It also had an impact on the level of Soviet and American
involvement in the region. The changing character of the
distribution of power in the Middle East would be vital to
sustaining the Saudi-U.S. alignment.
The
"Arab Cold War"
Between
1962 and early 1967, the dominant theme of Arab politics had
been the struggle for ascendancy between republican
nationalists, led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and
conservative monarchies, increasingly led by King Faisal.[44]
That dispute played itself out partly through a complex series
of republican Ba'thist coups in Syria and Iraq, but primarily
through the fierce civil war in Yemen. With a smaller landmass
but considerably larger population than Saudi Arabia at the
time, Yemen became the source of the overriding security
concerns of the Saudi regime throughout the years preceding the
Six-Day War.[45]
Since late 1962, Cairo and Riyadh had been providing financial
and military support to
the warring factions in a civil war, and by early 1963,
Egypt had stationed approximately 15,000 troops there. The
Soviet Union also supported the republican forces with economic
aid, roughly 1,000 technical advisors, and indirect military aid
through Cairo.[46]
In February 1963, the war nearly spilled into Saudi Arabia when
Egyptian planes bombed the Saudi border town of Najran while trying to hit royalist
forces. Only U.S. President John F. Kennedy's
intervention prevented escalation, as Washington pledged to use
its air power to protect the kingdom.[47]
In
1965, with the war near its peak, Nasser and Faisal signed the
Jeddah Agreement, which included a disengagement plan and a
plebiscite for the Yemenis by November 1966. However, the
agreement remained a dead letter as protracted negotiations with
and between Yemeni republicans and royalists failed to make
progress and the war continued unabated[48]
The "Arab Cold War" intensified as members of the
Nasserist Union of Peoples of the Arabia Peninsula infiltrated
into Saudi Arabia and conducted a series of bombings in Riyadh
and Dammam in late 1996 and early 1967.[49]
In early 1967, Saudi officials also captured a number of
pro-Egyptian Yemeni infiltrators who had entered the kingdom
during the hajj and
were planning assassination attempts against Faisal and Prince
Fahd. During the same period, Nasser supported the deposed Saudi
king, Sa'ud, who flew to Sana'a and donated US$1 million to the
YAR. Sallal named Sa'ud the "legal King of Saudi
Arabia," and he remained an aggravating thorn in Faisal's
side.[50]
The struggle for primacy on the southern Arabian Peninsula
remained deadlocked.
The
Six-Day War and the Khartoum Conference
Only
with the Six-Day War did the balance of power on the Arabian
Peninsula shift decisively in Riyadh's favor. In less than a
week, the IDF brought about what years of Saudi and royalist
resistance to Yemeni republicans had failed to achieve. Egypt's
crushing defeat in early June led to the effective reactivation
of the 1965 Jeddah Agreement as financial and military weakness
forced Nasser to withdraw Egyptian forces from the Yemen.
Even before the war began, Nasser had started to pull some of
his troops out of the YAR to reinforce defenses in Sinai and, by
June 12, Egypt began a larger withdrawal of its forces, pulling
15,000 combatants, 150 tanks, and all of its heavy artillery out
of Yemen.[51]
This represented the beginning of the end of the role that Egypt
had played on the Arabian Peninsula since the 1962 coup against
Imam al-Badr.[52]
Less
than three months later, on August 31, 1967, Nasser and Faisal
signed an agreement in Khartoum on a peaceful resolution of the
Yemen conflict. The agreement provided for a complete withdrawal
of Egyptian forces by late November and the cessation of
Nasser's support for former Saudi King Sa'ud, in exchange for
Riyadh's agreement to cease support for Yemeni royalists. At the
Khartoum conference, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya also agreed
to provide Egypt and Jordan with 135 million British pounds
of annual aid, of which Egypt would get 95 million. Saudi Arabia
would give 50 million
of this amount but said it would only pay out to Egypt once
troops were out of Yemen.[53]
The
Khartoum settlement reflected two very important facts about the
immediate post-war political environment in the Arab world.
First, in an atmosphere of intense anti-Israeli sentiment,
Riyadh and other royalist states had to show solidarity with
Egypt or risk losing international prestige and domestic
stability. Secondly, the agreement reflected the decided
advantage of Riyadh over Cairo as the latter came, cap in hand,
in need of financial support and willing in turn to effectively
renounce its claims on the Arabian Peninsula. By October 10,
Nasser declared that almost all of its troops were out of Sana'a
and that the last contingent would leave from Hodeida in early
December.[54]
Although a republican regime remained in power in Yemen, the
balance of power in the southern Arabian Peninsula had clearly
tilted away from Cairo and toward Riyadh.
Stronger
ties between Moscow and the Arab Republics
On
a broader strategic level, the Six-Day War represented an
apparent triumph for the United States and Great Britain in
their struggle for regional influence against the Soviet Union.
Two of America's closest regional allies--Israel and Saudi
Arabia--had gained considerable influence, while two Soviet
allies--Egypt and Syria--had suffered catastrophic military and
territorial losses.[55]
In addition, as Bernard Lewis observed shortly after the
conflict, "Soviet prestige--the reputation of Soviet arms
and guidance, the credibility of Soviet warnings--had received a
damaging blow."[56]
The departure of Egyptian forces from Yemen also limited
Moscow's strategic options on the Arabian Peninsula.
Furthermore, the closure of the Suez Canal dramatically
curtailed Soviet capacity to project naval influence into the
Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Western Indian Ocean. This lack of
naval access posed a significant obstacle to Soviet political
and military influence in the area.[57]
Some observers went as far as to characterize the Middle East as
"Russia's Vietnam," sucking Moscow into a losing
conflict involving high risk, tremendous costs and dubious
promise for strategic gain.[58]
Although
the Israeli victory brought clear immediate gains to the United
States and its allies and suggested a Western triumph, the
changing character of the regional balance of power was more
complex. While the war had arguably shown the superiority of
American weaponry, defeat also drove Cairo and Damascus closer
to Moscow in need of military and economic support. Moscow soon
launched a massive supply effort to restore the battered
militaries of both states and to provide military training and
technical advice. Both Cairo and Damascus opened their port
facilities to the USSR, raising its ability to challenge the
U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.[59]
Thus, as Lewis notes:
During
the months that followed the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, the
view gradually gained ground in the West that the Arab defeat
represented a considerable Russian victory. Some more
imaginative observers argued that the Russians had deliberately
engineered both the war and the defeat in order to achieve this
result; others, without going as far as to ascribe conscious
purpose, nevertheless agreed that, by increasing the hostility
of the Arabs to the West and their dependence on the Soviet
Union, the crisis, the war and their aftermath had greatly
strengthened the Soviet political and strategic position in the
Middle East and correspondingly weakened that of the Middle
East.[60]
The
truth was more complex, as Lewis argues. It was clear that the
USSR had gained influence through the
larger dependency of radical Arab regimes in Cairo and
Damascus. This increased its naval access and power in the
Eastern Mediterranean and its ability to threaten Turkey and
Iran from the south as well as the north. However, these gains
were accompanied by serious strategic losses in the southern
half of the region due to the closure of the Suez Canal and
diminished Soviet influence in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
Conservative regimes in the Gulf rallied, while the USSR lost
the confidence of Somali leaders and the help of Egyptian forces
in Yemen. Finally, as the British departed from southern Arabia,
"The ripe plum of Aden fell to the ground and was not
picked."[61]
Overall, the balance of power between East and West did not
change dramatically in the region after the Six-Day War.
However, around the Arabian Peninsula, the West and its allies
made measured but significant gains.
The
Ongoing Struggle in Yemen & South Arabia
The
modest Western gains, particularly in the Red Sea, Indian Ocean,
and Persian Gulf, did not end the strategic challenge from the
Soviet Union and its allies, however. Despite the Egyptian
withdrawal from Yemen, the power struggle between republican and
royalist forces in that country continued. It was in this
theater that the clearest external threat to Saudi security
remained. In the fall of 1967, both Nasser and Faisal largely
adhered to their agreement at Khartoum, but other external
powers stepped into the breach. Faisal allowed the shah of Iran
to airlift weaponry to royalist forces through Najran, including
some heavy artillery that Riyadh had previously withheld from
its Yemeni allies.[62]
In the north of the country, near the Saudi border, the conflict
initially appeared to proceed in favor of Riyadh. However,
divisions within the royalist movement led to an awkward
royalist-republican coalition government when Yemeni President
abd Allah al-Sallal was overthrown in Sana'a during a trip to
Moscow in early November.
A
new "third force" took power in Sana'a under
republican leader Qadi Abdul Rahman Iryani, whose government
included both traditional tribal and religious leaders and
ardent Arab nationalists. In the first week of December, as the
last wave of Egyptian troops departed, royalist forces attacked
Sana'a, but the USSR airlifted arms and supplies to the capital
and provided pilots for YAR aircraft to save the republican-led
regime.[63]
That application of force, though modest by Soviet standards,
played a decisive role at a key point in the Yemeni conflict.[64]
This represented the first time that Moscow had become publicly
involved in combat.[65]
It also underscored the Soviets' conviction to ensure that the
YAR and its armed forces remained in republican hands.
At
the same time, the long-standing British strategic presence in
southern Arabia was drawing to a close. Despite protests from
the Federal Government of South Arabia in the spring of 1967,
which asserted that it was unprepared to assume responsibility
for the security of Aden until September 1968, the British
accelerated their withdrawal plans to January.[66]
In June, shortly after the war, British forces began their
withdrawal, even though the security situation continued to
deteriorate. The U.K. Defense Secretary acknowledged that
security in south Arabia had become much more difficult,
particularly due to "allegations of collusion by ourselves
and the United States with Israel."[67]
By September, the South Arabian Federal Supreme Council had
"virtually disintegrated," and London announced its
intention to negotiate with the nationalist forces. Cabinet
minutes reveal that Faisal was "not
unexpectedly…upset" at the U.K. decision.[68]
Egypt continued to use the closure of the Suez Canal to push
Britain toward a settlement, and by late October the United
Kingdom announced that it would speed its withdrawal further,
despite fury from Faisal, "who feared that [early U.K.
withdrawal] might have repercussions for the rulers of the
Persian Gulf states."
The
withdrawal was complete in late November. As U.K. troops pulled
out from the South Arabian Federation, the Marxist National
Liberation Front (NLF) behind Secretary-General Abdul Fattah
Ismail quickly took power, defeating the Egyptian-backed Front
for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen. The NLF established
the People's Republic of South Yemen and proclaimed its
intention to overthrow the House of Saud and other traditional
regimes on the peninsula. Faisal considered the U.K. withdrawal
a foolish or deliberately wicked gift from the British Labor
government to Communism.[69]
He decried it as an "abandonment of friends" and
"prejudice of his interests."[70]
Riyadh was now confronted with a radical Marxist Arab state
along much of its southern border, an uncertain
republican-leaning regime beside it, and the risk of war between
North and South Yemen, both of which depended to varying degrees
on the USSR.
Other
Regional Uncertainties
The
state-based balance of power changes above were accompanied by
less measurable, but equally important, changes in what the
Soviets more accurately described as the overall correlation of
forces in the region. One effect of the 1967 War was to
radicalize many Palestinians and catalyze the transformation of
the Palestinian movement into the more militant and politically
assertive Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The
significant growth of PLO operations in Jordan following the
Six-Day War created uncertainty about the stability of the
Hashemite regime under King Hussein in Amman. A possibility
existed that Jordan would be swept into a struggle between
radical and traditional forces. In addition, the PLO's expansion
radicalized large numbers of Palestinians in the Gulf.[71]
By late 1967, radical uprisings in the Dhofar region of Oman
also appeared imminent, and in the Horn of Africa the Somali
government and radical Eritrean Liberation Front turned to the
Soviet Union for military support in their struggles against
Addis Ababa.[72]
The
effect of the Six-Day War was thus much more complex than a
simple gain in the power of the West and its allies at the
expense of the USSR and associated Arab republican regimes. The
war did bring a relative victory to Riyadh and the Gulf States
in their Arab Cold War conflict with Egypt. The Israeli victory
also affected the short-term distribution of territory and
military power between the competing U.S. and Soviet-led
alliance networks. Conversely, however, the vulnerability of
Egypt, Syria, and the Yemeni republicans after Nasser's defeat
made them much more willing to embrace stronger strategic ties
with the Soviet Union. The demise of Egyptian power also
prompted Moscow, for the first time, to commit itself publicly
with military activity in Yemen, where local republican and
Marxist forces held the upper hand. Moreover, the Six-Day War
radicalized the Palestinian movement and other Arab nationalist
groups and created an increased risk of regime instability in
the traditional Arab states. Finally, the pullback of British
forces in the context of Soviet support to Yemen, Somalia,
Egypt, and the Eritrean resistance created added uncertainty
about the overall balance of power in the region.
Saudi
and American Security Concerns after the War
The
ambiguous changes in the regional correlation of forces helps to
explain why the Israeli victory did not diminish the shared
sense in Washington and Riyadh that Arab radicals and the Soviet
Union remained serious threats to conservative interests in the
Gulf. Overlapping local and strategic threats continued to drive
the United States and Saudi Arabia together. In the Saudi case, elite
beliefs in a grand Communist-Zionist conspiracy added to
the perception that Israel's victory would only serve to benefit
the USSR.
American
Strategic Considerations
From
an American standpoint, much of the logic of the alliance with
Saudi Arabia followed the standard "rational" or
"realist" line. The U.S. interest in preserving one of
its emerging "twin pillars" in the Gulf was clear, as
the USSR continued to extend its reach into the region. With
American forces increasingly bogged down in Vietnam, and with
the Soviet Union gaining relative strength and political
assertiveness, the fear of Soviet advances into the Middle East
was acute. The region's oil resources, warm-water ports, and
access to key trade routes were all prizes that the Johnson
Administration very much sought to keep out of Soviet hands. The
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff summarized U.S. concerns in May,
asserting that "the long-term Soviet goal in this area is
to supplant Western influence with Soviet influence, leading in
time to a Moscow-oriented communist political, economic, and
social system."[73]
Moreover, U.S. influence in the Arab world region was limited to
a few key conservative states, as Libya, Egypt, Syria, and
increasingly Iraq tilted toward the USSR.
The
gradual British departure from Arabia and the Gulf exacerbated
those fears, as withdrawal from Aden would expose southern
Arabia to the UAR and Moscow, and "British withdrawal from
the Persian Gulf would provide the USSR with some opportunities
to expand its influence there."[74]
An NSC memorandum in November expressed that concern, noting
that "the British Cabinet decided last week that, come what
may, British forces will pull out of South Arabia sometime
[between] November 22-30. No one--least of all the
Brits--pretends to
know what will follow."[75]
As one State Department paper had argued to the NSC several
months before:
The
current contest for South Arabia has meaning far beyond its size
or importance. For 20 years the US has managed to maintain in
the Near East its major interests of access to oil, freedom of
air and sea transit and prevention of the dominance of the area
by any one power. However, our significant political influence
in the Arab Near East is now confined to the Arabian Peninsula
and Jordan.[76]
Faisal
played on U.S. concerns, asserting after the war that Jordan and
Saudi Arabia were the sole barriers remaining in the Middle East
to communism and "should receive every support from Britain
and the United States."[77]
Moreover,
as the British Foreign Secretary noted, the 1967 War increased
the American need to promote constructive relations with
moderate regimes in the Arab world.[78]
U.S. support for Israel had the clear effect of undermining
America's image in the Arab world generally and fueling
anti-American rhetoric from the region's radical regimes and
movements. Finally, U.S. demand for Gulf oil continued to rise,
particularly to fuel the massive war effort in Vietnam.
Saudi
External Security
On
the Saudi side, some of Faisal's motives for continued alignment
focused on strategic threats from outside the kingdom. After the
Khartoum Conference, Faisal and the Saudi foreign policymaking
elite faced a considerably diminished threat from Egypt and the
Arab nationalist movement in general, but this did not create a
risk-free environment for Riyadh. Faisal remained deeply
suspicious of Nasser and believed that the Egyptian leader
"was trying to spin things out until [the UK] had withdrawn
from South Arabia." In August, he exclaimed to Morgan
Man, the U.K. Resident
in Saudi Arabia, "If Nasser can get 299,999 soldiers out of
Sinai in 24 hours there is no reason why he cannot get 25,999
troops out of Yemen in a week."[79]
Moreover,
the relative diffusion of threats of the House of Saud after
August 1967, made it more difficult to assess and counter them.[80]
After the Six-Day War, Nasser was no longer a threat to Saudi
Arabia, but Faisal remained deeply concerned about the increase
in Soviet advisers and weapons in Egypt.[81]
The increased Soviet presence in Yemen and the Horn of Africa
also concerned Riyadh, as did the continuing conflict in the
YAR, the budding rebellion in Oman, and the rising tide of PLO
activity in Jordan. Oman was a special area of concern. Faisal
did not hide his disdain for the Sultan of Oman, whom he called:
A
backward, miserly autocrat who does hardly anything for his
people, sits ogre-like and fearful in Salalah, is scared to go
even to Muscat…and enjoys so little popularity that even his
own bodyguard is not afraid to take a pot-shot at him.[82]
He
was deeply concerned that Oman would become communist or
Nasserist, especially after the Six-Day War, and even went so
far as to support radicals in Oman to keep them out of Nasser's
hands.[83]
In
the medium-term, Faisal feared the evident British intention to
reduce its strategic presence around the Arabian Peninsula, a
process that began with the withdrawal from Aden. In December,
the Saudi Ambassador to Britain privately "admitted that
the Saudis had a lurking fear of the British not having a plan
but being liable, as they did in Aden, suddenly to depart from
the Gulf."[84]
According to Man, by October, "Faisal's mind [was]
turning more and more to the shape of things to come in the
Gulf," and he was not optimistic about British support:
Faisal
is deeply pessimistic about the future of South Arabia as a
result of our withdrawal and the chaotic situation which, to his
mind, threatens to result. Faisal at present feels that we have
let him--and ourselves--down badly over South Arabia in the
context of the stability and security of the Arabian Peninsula.
Quite frankly, he does not trust us and suspects that we may one
day help to overthrow the established rulers and regimes of the
Gulf--as we did in South Arabia--and replace them by those with
whom we had much more sympathy, namely the
socialist-revolutionaries.[85]
With
the envisioned British withdrawal or "turning of
coat," Faisal foresaw the possibility of a power vacuum in
the Persian Gulf and Eastern Indian Ocean that the shah of Iran
could seek to fill. Although relations between Riyadh and Tehran
were good, the prospect of a much larger Iran asserting itself
in the Gulf, around most of the key Arabian oil installations
and vital sea-lanes, raised concerns.[86]
Finally, political instability in Sudan--coupled with the
conflicts in the Horn of Africa--added threats to Saudi Arabia's
long littoral
region beside the Red Sea. All of these uncertainties in the
regional balance of power provided incentives for Saudi leaders
to keep the United States and its armed forces deeply engaged in
the area.[87]
Saudi
Domestic Concerns
The
Saudi regime also had to consider the domestic repercussions of
its alignment with the United States. Saudi security policy has
never been based simply on "realist" considerations of
managing external threats to the kingdom's territorial integrity
and independence. Internal stability and regime protection have
been consistent factors as well.[88]
The relative newness of the state apparatus and its questionable
legitimacy[89]
in the eyes of Saudi citizens, and much of international society, make the House of Saud vulnerable to
internal revolt. This fact always plays a part in major foreign
policy decisions.[90]
In particular, Saudi leaders have borne a constant concern about
the local political effects of the state's external relations
and the regime's perceived legitimacy at home[91]
This factor, more than any other--and certainly more than a fear
of American or Israeli attack on Saudi interests--drove Riyadh's
decision to moderate the alignment slightly and diversify its
sources of weaponry.
Ironically,
the same domestic threats also constituted a continuing basis
for substantive ties with Washington. A number of Saudi
opposition groups had been active since the 1950s. Some were
reformist, like the Liberal Party and Reform party, calling for
a constitutional monarchy and neutralist foreign policy. Others
were more radical, such as the Saudi Arabian National Liberation
front (SANLF) which by 1962 was calling for overthrow of the
monarchy. The SANLF joined other radical groups in 1964 to form
the Federation of Democratic Forces of the Arabian Peninsula,
and although the USSR was careful not to claim credit for their
activities, Moscow's shadow was never far behind.[92]
American military support, technical assistance, and economic
exchange were major sources of the power that the House of Saud
could bring to bear on these domestic threats to his rule.
The
Perceived Communist-Zionist Connection
Added
to this mix of "rational" Saudi threat assessment from
inside and outside of the kingdom was an intriguing conspiracy
theory that added to Riyadh's willingness to align with
Washington after the 1967 War. Faisal believed that Zionism and
communism were inextricably linked as part of an international
Jewish conspiracy. The proof, he argued, lay in the Jewish
backgrounds of Karl Marx, Trotsky, and other leaders of the
Communist revolution. During his reign, prominent Saudi hotels
distributed bedside copies of the forged Protocols
of the Elders of Zion and other works linking Judaism to
Communism.[93]
Faisal typically began meetings with foreign ambassadors by
speaking at length about the link between Judaism and Communism.
In one provocative media interview, he asserted that,
"Zionism is the mother of Communism. It helped to spread
Communism around the world."[94]
Faisal argued that no contradiction existed between his
perception of Zionist-Communist collusion and the apparent fact
that Israel and the USSR were fighting on opposite sides of the
Cold War, with the United States supplying arms to Israel and
the Soviets assisting Egypt and Syria. He argued:
It
is all part of a great plot, a great conspiracy. Communism…is
a Zionist creation designed to fulfill the aims of Zionism. They
are only pretending to work against each other.…The Zionists
are deceiving the United States…the Communists are cheating
the Arabs, making them believe they are on our side. But
actually they are in league with the Zionists.[95]
Faisal
reasoned that the creation of the State of Israel had
radicalized the Arab world, which in turn drove radical regimes
into the arms of the Soviet Union, causing them to become unduly
dependent on Moscow and atheistic Communism.[96]
Faisal invoked this conspiracy theory on many occasions during
his rule.[97]
Whether entirely sincere or partly instrumental, the theory
conveniently linked the principal perceived enemy of Faisal's
people (Israel) to the principal perceived enemy to his rule
(Arab nationalists).
During
his reign as king, Faisal dominated the foreign policymaking
process in Saudi Arabia.[98]
Consequently, his personal perceptions and attitudes cannot be
ignored as highly important influences on the country's external
relations. In any
case, he was not alone in these perceptions. Saudi leaders
generally saw the war as evidence that the Soviets were trying
to increase their power over the Arabs rather than leading them
to a favorable solution with Israel. Faisal noted that despite
Moscow's public support of the Arabs, Soviet military assistance
to the Jews had allowed Israel to survive in 1948. Moreover,
Faisal blamed the USSR for the Arab defeat in June 1967,
accusing Moscow of deliberately misleading Nasser to believe
that Israel would not attack.[99]
To Faisal and other Saudi leaders, the United States
therefore served paradoxically as the world's greatest material
defender of Zionism and its greatest protector from communism.[100]
The Saudi king resented American support for Israel but
continued to rely upon Washington to face the "other
evil." Leading one of the few countries in the developing
world that had never been colonized by a Western power, Faisal
also possessed somewhat less fear of American intrusion than did
many other U.S. allies. He also respected America's Christian
heritage and saw religion as a basis for mutual trust between
the two nations.[101]
Conclusion:
Balances of Power and Alignment Dynamics
Theorists
and practitioners of international relations have long perceived
that a relationship exists between alignments and "balances
of power." According to the mainstream "realist"
theoretical tradition, alignments are best viewed as a
state's effort to counter powerful or menacing external actors.
So-called "neorealist" theory posits that the nature
of the anarchic international order compels states to align
against the most powerful actor in the system.[102]
"Classical" and "neoclassical"
realists tend to treat alignments, instead, as responses to a
state's primary perceived threat, as identified by its power,
proximity, and perceived intentions.[103]
This balance-of-threat theory encompasses the view taken by
American leaders at the time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
predicted, for example, that "Saudi Arabia…would view
additional UAR or USSR military influence in South Arabia as an
increased threat [and] probably would request increased U.S. or
other Western military aid or security commitments."[104]
The relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States after
the Six-Day War broadly support this threat-balancing logic, as
the continuing perception of common communist and Arab
nationalist adversaries was sufficient to minimize the fallout
from the two countries' opposing political and military stances
during the war.
These
realist models by no means provide a complete picture of
Saudi-U.S. alignment dynamics during the period, however.
Domestic politics in both countries were important in
forcing certain limitations on the alignment, even when external
factors and broad strategic and economic considerations demanded
otherwise. Overall, this study therefore supports the
theoretical work of a number of scholars in the post-Cold War
period who have emphasized the importance of focusing on regime
security, not merely state security, in explaining and
understanding the alignment politics of the developing world.[105]
The Saudi government's behavior simply cannot be properly
understood without focusing on Riyadh's longstanding concerns
about internal political stability and regime legitimacy.
This
study also supports theorists who have emphasized the roles of
economic interests and ideational factors in shaping alignment
decisions.[106]
In the Saudi case, the centrality of the oil industry in the
management of Riyadh's "rentier
state" has clearly disposed the House of Saud to carefully
avoid unduly antagonizing its most critical long-term trading
partner and technical service provider. On an ideational
level, Faisal's fascination with an alleged
Communist-Zionist conspiracy appears to have contributed to his
willingness to downplay Washington's own ties to Israel. In
conclusion, therefore, this study helps to reinforce the fact
that the evolution of an alignment invariably results from a
complex web of historical facts that are always at least
somewhat peculiar to the parties and the time period in
question. General theoretical models can be helpful in
structuring or clarifying the analysis of an alignment, but
there is no substitute for detailed historical inquiry.
NOTES
[1]
An "alliance" or "alignment" is defined
here as significant politico-security cooperation
between two or more states. For similar definitions, see
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 1; Glenn H. Snyder,
"Alliances, Balance, and Stability," International
Organization 45:1 (winter 1991), pp. 123-24.
[2]
Josh Pollack, "Saudi Arabia and the United States,
1931-2002," Middle East Review of International
Affairs 6:3 (2002), p. 77.
[3]
Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia
(London: Saqi Books, 1998), p. 370 (citing Middle East
Record, vol. 5, p. 456).
[4]
David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud
(London & Sydney, Pan Books, 1981), p. 252 (citing BBC
Monitoring Report ME/2485/A/7, 1967).
[5]
Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for
Strategic Stability (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984),
p. 133.
[6]
For a similar conclusion on Saudi policy in the wake of the
war, see Fuad Jabber, "The Arab Regimes and the
Palestinian Revolution, 1967-71," Journal of
Palestine Studies 2:2 (1973), p. 81.
[7]
See, e.g., "Memorandum from the President's
Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson," 13
June 1967, in FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXI, p. 562.
[8]
"Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant to
President Johnson," 10 Oct. 1967, in FRUS 1964-68,
vol. XXI, pp. 582-83.
[9]
"Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy
in Saudi Arabia, 8 June 1967," in FRUS, 1964-1968,
vol. XXI, p. 557.
[10]
"Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy
in Saudi Arabia, 9 June 1967," in FRUS, 1964-1968,
vol. XXI, p. 560.
[11]
"Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the
Department of State, 13 June 1967," in FRUS,
1964-1968, vol. XXI, pp. 562-63.
[12]
Pressure on Riyadh lasted for some time. See "Telegram
from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of
State," 27 Aug. 1967, in FRUS, 1964-1968, vol.
XXI, pp. 574-78.
[13]
See Arab Ministers' Oil Communiqué, June 5,
1967. The oil ministers of Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Algeria,
Bahrain, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi also signed the communiqué,
along with representatives from Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria.
[14]
Robert W. Stookey, America and the Arab States: An Uneasy
Encounter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), pp.
208-09. It is worth noting that Faisal was one of the only
Arab not to pay lip service to these reports, again
underscoring the limits to his willingness to jeopardize
American ties.
[15]
M.S. Daoudi and M.S. Dajani, "The 1967 Oil Embargo
Revisited," Journal of Palestine Studies 13:2
(1984), p. 69.
[16]
See Cave Brown, Oil, God, and Gold: The Story of
Aramco and the Saudi Kings (Boston & New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), pp. 268-80.
[17]
Anthony H. Cordesman, Western Strategic Interests in
Saudi Arabia (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 26.
[18]
Cordesman, supra note 72, pp.
135-36.
[19]
"Memorandum of Conversation," 4 Oct. 1967, in FRUS,
1964-1968, vol. XXI, pp. 581-82.
[21]
"Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the
Department of State," 23 June 1967, in FRUS,
1964-1968, vol. XXI, pp. 567-68.
[22]
"Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the
Department of State," 13 June 1967, in FRUS,
1964-1968, vol. XXI, p. 564.
[23]
"UK Cabinet Conclusions, 13 June 1967," CAB 128/42
(Part 1), CC 38(67), min. 1.
[24]
The British Cabinet concluded: "although Arab
governments might themselves wish to resume oil supplies to
us, or to connive at our receiving them, popular pressure
stimulated by the United Arab Republic might make it
difficult to do this."UK
Cabinet Conclusions, 15 June 1967' CAB 128/42 (Part 1), CC
39(67), min. 3.
[25]
Daoudi & Dajani, supra note 15,
pp. 67-68. Daoudi and Dajani further argue that
"It was obvious that the Saudis engaged in the embargo
solely to avoid alienating themselves from the Arab world,
with all the implications that such a move would have had
for the stability of the Saudi regime." Ibid. p.
81.
[26]
Daniel Yergin, The Prize (New York & London:
Touchstone, 1993), p. 393, quoting an American official on a
1944 delegation.
[27]
Tom Dammann, "Saudi Arabia's Dilemma: An Interview with
King Faisal," Interplay, Sept. 1970, pp. 16-19.
It is also worth noting that 87 percent of Saudi government
revenues came from the industry.
[28]
Daoudi & Dajani, supra note 15,
p. 70 (noting Riyadh's awareness that Iran had lost key
contracts after its cessation of production during the
nationalization dispute in 1951).
[29]
Leonard Mosley, Power Play: Oil in the Middle East (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, 19740, p. 345.
[30]
"Saudi Minister Urges Arabs to Reconsider Oil
Boycott," Financial Times, July 1, 1967.
[31]
Holden & Johns, supra note 4,
p. 253.
[32]
"Saudi Call to Resume Oil Supplies," The Times,
July 8, 1967.
[33]
Thomas Barger, Arab States of the Persian Gulf (Newark,
DE: Center for the Study of Marine Policy, 1975), p. 40.
[34]
This is a conclusion widely shared by analysts of the
episode. See, e.g., Walter Lacquer, The Struggle
for the Middle East (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1969), p. 127; Hanss Maull, "Oil and Influence: The Oil
Weapon Examined," Adelphi Paper 118 (London:
IISS, 1975), p. 2; and James A. Boorman III, "Economic
Coercion in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and the
Ensuing Juridical Issues," Journal of Law &
Economics (1974), pp. 207-08.
[35]
For a more complete account of the process of negotiation
leading to the end of the oil embargo, see Daoudi &
Dajani, supra note 15,
pp. 72-80.
[36]
Pollack, supra note 2, p. 81.
[37]
For a detailed discussion of the early years of the Saudi-US
relationship, see Parker T. Hart, Saudi Arabia and the
United States, Birth of a Security Partnership
(Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1998).
[38]
Saudi Arabia has often been described as the epitome of a
"rentier" state, deriving power and a sort of
legitimacy through control and dispersal or externally
received funds. See Giacomo Luciani, "Allocation
vs. Productive States: A Theoretical Framework," in
Hazen Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, eds., The Arab State
(London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 65-84.
[39]
See Adeed Dawisha, "Saudi Arabia's Search for
Security," Adelphi Paper 158 (London: IISS,
1980).
[40]
For a good account of the evolution of Saudi-US security
relations in the 1950s and 1960s, with a particular focus on
military cooperation, see Cordesman, supra note 5,
pp. 98-132.
[41]
"Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant to
President Johnson," 23 May 1967, in FRUS,
1964-1968, vol. XXI, pp. 210-11.
[42]
The term "balance of power" is notoriously vague
in international relations and historical scholarship. In
this paper, the "balance of power" refers to the
distribution of economic, military, and political power
among major state actors in the Middle East, including the
United States and the Soviet Union. For a classic discussion
of alternative definitions of the "balance of
power," see Martin Wight, Power Politics
(Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1979), chapter 16.
[43]
The term "correlation of forces" was used by
Marxist-Leninists to describe the total state and non-state
forces supporting each side of the ideological struggle
between the capitalist and communist sides of the Cold War.
In some cases, it is a more useful concept than the
state-centric notion of a "balance of power,"
because it contemplates the distribution of forces within
countries as well as among them.
[44]
Reinhard Schulze, A Modern History of the Islamic World
(New York: New York University Press, 2002), p. 181.
[45]
For a detailed narrative of the conflict, see Saeed M.
Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen,
1962-1970.
[46]
Aryeh Y. Yodfat, The Soviet Union and the Arabian
Peninsula (London & Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), pp.
2-3.
[47]
For a brief discussion of the episode, see Hermann Frederick
Eilts, "Book Review: Saudi Arabia and the United
States, Birth of a Security Partnership," Middle
East Policy Council Journal 6:4 (June 1999).
[48]
A.R. Kelidar, "The Arabian Peninsula in Arab and Power
Politics," in Derek Hopwood, ed., The Arabian
Peninsula (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), p.
158.
[49]
Mark N. Katz, Russia & Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy
toward the Arabian Peninsula (Baltimore and London:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 141; Holden &
Johns, supra note 4,
p. 250.
[50]
Holden & Johns, supra note 4,
pp. 250-51.
[51]
Vassiliev, supra note 3,
p. 22271.
[52]
Kelidar, supra note 48,
p. 158.
[53]
See Resolutions of the Khartoum Conference, Sept. 1,
1967, reprinted in T.G. Fraser, the Middle East 1914-1979
(London: Edward Arnold, 1980), pp. 115-16.
[54]
Vassiliev, supra note 3, p. 377
(citing Keesing Contemporary Archives, p. 22547).
[55]
The British Foreign Office initially took this view,
asserting that "the post-war position of Nasser in the
Arab World is weaker instead of stronger. The same may prove
to be true of the Russian position." See "Arab
Attitudes and British Economic Interests in the Middle East:
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 7
June 1967," CAB 129 (132), C(67)123, 5(b).
[56]
Bernard Lewis, "The Consequences of Defeat," Foreign
Affairs 46:2 (1968), p. 325.
[57]
Kelidar, supra note 48, p. 159.
[58]
Bernard Lewis, "The Great Powers, the Arabs and the
Israelis," Foreign Affairs 27:4 (1969), p. 644.
[59]
Glenn E. Perry, The Middle East: Fourteen Islamic
Centuries (3rd edn., New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1997), p. 265.
[60]
Lewis, "The Great Powers," p. 642. Interestingly,
the British Cabinet discussed the likelihood of this
development in a meeting on May 30, shortly before the
outbreak of war. See "UK Cabinet Conclusions, 30
May 1967" CAB 128/42 (Part 1), CC 33(67), min. 1.
[62]
Holden & Johns, supra note 4,
pp. 272-73.
[63]
Katz, supra note 49, p. 135.
[64]
Walter Lacqueur, "Russia Enters the Middle East," Foreign
Affairs 47:2 (1969), p. 303.
[65]
Yodfat, supra note 46, p. 3.
Syria and Algeria also began to provide money, arms, and
technical support for the new pro-Moscow YAR leadership.
Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for
Security (Ithaca, NY & London: Cornell University
Press, 1988), p. 123.
[66]
"UK Cabinet Conclusions, 11 May 1967," CAB 128/42
(Part 1), CC 30(67), min. 3.
[67]
"UK Cabinet Conclusions, 22 June 1967," CAB 128/42
(Part 1), CC 41(67), min. 3. For a more detailed account of
the British withdrawal from Aden, see J.B. Kelly, Arabia,
the Gulf, and the West: A Critical View of the Arabs and
their Oil Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1980).
[68]
"UK Cabinet Conclusions, 7 September 1967," CAB
128/42 (Part 1), CC 54(67), min. 2.
[69]
Holden & Johns, supra note 4,
p. 272.
[70]
"South Arabia: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, 26 October 1967," CAB 129 (133 part
2), C(67)169, 4.
[71]
Cordesman, supra note 5,
p. 135; Safran, supra note 65,
p. 124.
[72]
Cordesman, supra note 5, p. 135.
[73]
See "Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 18 May 1967,"
JCSM-281-67, in FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XXI, pp.
203-06.
[74]
See "National Intelligence Estimate, 18 May
1967," NIE 30-1-67, in FRUS, 1964-1968, vol.
XXI, pp. 206-08.
[75]
"Memorandum from John W. Foster and Harold H. Saunders
of the National security council staff to the President's
Special Assistant," 7 Nov. 1967, in FRUS, 1964-1968,
vol. XXI, pp. 235-36.
[76]
"Future of South Arabia," Paper prepared in the
Department of State for the NSC meeting of 24 May 1967, in FRUS,
1964-1968, vol. XXI, pp. 211-15.
[77]
Conversation between King Faisal and UK Ambassador Morgan
Man, "telegram no. 566 of 28 August 1967, FCO 17/241,
3(i).
[78]
See "Arab Attitudes and British Economic
Interests in the Middle East: Memorandum by the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, 7 June 1967," CAB 129 (132),
C(67)123, c 6.
[79]
"Jedda to Foreign Office, telegram no. 567 of 28 August
1967," FCO 17/241.
[80]
Safran, supra note 65, p.
122-23; Cordesman, supra note 5,
p. 135.
[81]
Katz, supra note 49, p. 135.
[82]
"King Faisal's Relations with the Sultan, 4 April 1967,
from the British residency in Bahrain" FCO 8/585, 3.
[84]
"Conversation with the Saudi Ambassador, 7 December
1967," FCO 8/45, 8.
[85]
"Saudi Arabia and the Future of the Gulf, Ambassador
Morgan Man to Frank Brenchley, Foreign Office, 25 October
1967," FCO 8/45, 2. US officials were aware of Man's
conversations with Faisal, which Ambassador Eilts summarized
in a memorandum of 28 October. See "Telegram
from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of
State,"28 Oct. 1967, in FRUS, 1964-1968, vol.
XXI, pp. 230-31.
[87]
Kelidar, supra note 48, p. 159.
[88]
Safran, supra note 65,
p. 3; James Piscatori, "Islamic Values versus National
Interest: the Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia," in Adeed
Dawisha, ed., Islam in Foreign Policy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 51-52.
[89]
"Legitimacy" is defined here as general public
conviction that the governing regime is rightfully entitled
to the control and exercise of state power. David Easton, A
Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John
Wiley, 1965), p. 278. For another seminal discussion of
"legitimacy," see Max Weber, The Theory of
Social and Economic Organization (Toronto: Free Press,
1964).
[90]
F. Gregory Gause III, "Attempts to Understand Saudi
Foreign Policies from Theoretical Prospects," in Proceedings
of the Conference at the Center for Contemporary Arab
Studies (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Apr. 28,
1999), pp. 21-22.
[91]
F. Gregory Gause, III, "The Foreign Policy of Saudi
Arabia," in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan
Ehteshami, eds., The Foreign Policies of Middle East
States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002),
pp. 196-99.
[92]
Katz, supra note 49, pp.
141-42.
[93]
Robert Lacey, The Kingdom (London: Hutchinson, 1981),
p. 385; David E. Long, "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,"
in David E. Long and Bernard Reich, eds., The Government
and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), p. 105; David T. Dumke,
"A Snapshot of the Saudi-US Political
Relationship," Essay Series No. 4 (Saudi-American
Forum, January 2003); Daniel Pipes, "The Politics of
Muslim Anti-Semitism," Commentary (August 1981),
available at www.danielpipes.org.
[94]
Newsweek, Dec. 21, 1970, p. 11.
[96]
Lacey, supra note 93, pp.
386-87.
[97]
See, e.g., Tunis Domestic Service in Arabic, April 12, 1974,
in FBIS ME, April 12, 1974, p. C1.
[98]
Gause, supra note 91, p. 204.
Gause also notes that there is a relative scholarly
consensus that Saudi foreign policymaking has been highly
centralized in the hands of the most powerful members of the
House of Saud throughout its modern history. See Safran,
supra note 65, pp.
217-20; and William Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 76-89.
[99]
Katz, supra note 49,
p. 149.
[100]
Long, supra note 93, p. 105.
The United States provided the vast majority of Israeli arms
imports in the era leading up to and following the Six-Day
War. See Anne Hessing Cahn, "United States Arms
to the Middle East 1967-76: A Critical Examination," in
Milton Leitenberg and Gabriel Sheffer, Great Power
Intervention in the Middle East (New York: Pergamon
Press, 1979), pp. 101-33.
[101]
Lacey, supra note 93, p. 390.
[102]
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory
of International Politics (Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), ch. 6
[103]
See, e.g., Walt, supra note, ch. 1; George
Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), ch. 1; and Hans J.
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 6th edn. 1985), chapter 12.
[104]
"Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary
of Defense McNamara, 18 May 1967," JCSM-281-67, in FRUS,
1964-1968, vol. XXI, p. 205.
[105]
See, e.g., Steven R. David, "Explaining Third
World Alignment," World Politics 43:1 (1991),
pp. 233-56; Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy,
"Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: the Case
of Egypt," International Organization 45:3
(summer 1991), pp. 369-95; Richard J. Harknett and Jeffrey
A. Van Den Berg, "Alignment Theory and Interrelated
Threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf Crisis," Security
Studies 6;3 (spring 1997), pp. 115-128; and F. Gregory
Gause, III, "Balancing What? Threat Perception and
Alliance Choice in the Gulf," unpublished manuscript,
Univ. of Vermont, 1999.
[106]
See, e.g., Laurie A. Brand, "Economics and
Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq,
1975-1981," International Journal of Middle East
Studies 26 (summer 1994), pp. 393-413; Michael Barnett,
"Alliances and Identity in the Middle East," in
Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security:
Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996).
John
D. Ciorciari
(Harvard A.B., J.D.; Oxford M.Phil.) is a doctoral candidate in
International Relations at St. Antony's College, Oxford, where
he was the Wai Seng Senior Research Scholar from 2002-2004. He
has taught Cold War history, Middle East politics, international
relations, and U.S. foreign policy at Oxford and has researched the
dynamics of alliances as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute
of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore. He currently serves
as a Senior Advisor for International Affairs at the U.S. Department
of the Treasury.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the U.S.
Department of State's conference "The United States, the
Middle East, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War," held on
January 12 and 13, 2005.
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