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Unity Through
Opposition:
Islam as an Instrument of Radical Political Change
By
Thomas Butko
In wake of the September 11 attacks, there has been a heightened
focus on political Islam (or Islamism) as a global area of research.
Yet, in spite of the view that political Islam is essentially
internationally oriented in its outlook, the primary focus of
Islamist groups is actually at the domestic level, as Islam is
utilized as a political instrument to initiate radical political
change within Middle Eastern states. These movements have arisen in
reaction to attempts at rapid development and modernization which
have not fulfilled the expectations of a majority of their
populations. Urbanization, higher education, and the perception of
relative material deprivation have led to feelings of alienation,
frustration, and hence, a growing sense of powerlessness. Most
individuals and groups disenchanted with the economic mismanagement
and authoritarian political structures of Middle Eastern states have
rallied around the Islamists. With an indigenous ideology, strong
organization, and long-term strategy, the Islamists present
themselves as the only credible alternative to the region's tired,
inefficient, and repressive regimes.
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the majority of
research on political Islam (also referred to as Islamism) has
predominately focused on the movement's ideology and strategy on the
international level. However, Islamists' primary target remains the
domestic regimes of individual Muslim countries. Consequently, this
paper will examine the various factors that account for the increase
in support accorded the Islamists since the 1967 Six-Day War.
Specifically, this article claims that their success is rooted in
their appropriation of religious symbols, discourse, and language to
express socio-economic grievances, utilizing them as instruments to
enact radical internal political change. This has been achieved
through a linking of interests and ideas both inside Islamic
societies and at the individual level as well.
This article begins with a brief survey of
contemporary Muslim societies. At the macro or systemic level, these
societies exhibit certain common characteristics associated with the
phenomenon of rapid development and modernization. Some important
consequences of attempts at advanced modernization have included
greater urbanization (or conversely a massive rural exodus), wider
attainment of higher levels of education, and an increase in
perceived material deprivation. Second, this has impacted the
micro-level in terms of an individual's subjective perceptions and
evaluations towards the system as a whole, leading to increased
feelings of alienation, frustration, and a general sense of
powerlessness. As a result, there are specific socio-economic groups
within contemporary Muslim societies who have been more
detrimentally affected by these recent developments. This article
argues that what ultimately unites these sometimes very divergent
individuals into a common cause that supports the Islamists is their
shared animosity towards a ruling elite they believe to be solely
responsible for their grievances. Since the regime dominates all
aspects of the political, economic, and social process, and forbids
any opposition to and criticism of its rule, the state then becomes
the exclusive target of those dissatisfied groups frustrated with
what they perceive as corrupt, incompetent, and oppressive regimes.
In fact, throughout its history, Islam has been seized upon by those
groups seeking to radically restructure the existing socio-political
order as an ideology of protest and an instrument of revolt.
FACTORS BEHIND SUPPORT
Islamist organizations should be viewed primarily as modern social
movements whose success is rooted in their ability to mobilize the
population towards a concrete goal.[1]
Therefore, while the Islamists may espouse and articulate their
message within a religious or moral framework, their support is
predicated upon the particular socio-economic context of that
society.[2]
The individuals who support these groups do so not necessarily for
religious reasons, but because they desire a radical restructuring
of the current order, a change they believe can only be provided by
contemporary Islamist movements. A case in point is the one state
where an Islamist revolution triumphed. In Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini
succeeded precisely because he created a flexible political
organization which identified with individual socio-economic
grievances, and not because he embarked upon a religious crusade
obsessed with theological dogma.[3]
Therefore, while Khomeini's message was viewed in the West as
essentially that of a religious demagogue, he was, in fact, more
interested in expressing the socio-economic concerns and aspirations
of his followers.[4]
At the macro, or systemic level, there are a number of common
features shared by the principal Muslim states that have contributed
to the growth of political Islam. In its most rudimentary sense,
these difficulties can be linked to the process of modernization or
the attempts, not always successful, at
rapid economic development.
Therefore, many people who favor the Islamists' calls for a radical
restructuring or overthrow of the contemporary political, economic,
and social structure are stimulated in part by the side-effects of
economic development, such as increased migration to urban centers
and the acquisition of higher education. As a by-product of both
industrialization and urbanization, they have become increasingly
frustrated by what they perceive as the constrained nature of
economic modernization within their own specific countries. In their
view, economic development and modernization have not only led to
greater social and cultural dislocation,[5]
but also have failed to fulfill the promise of increased employment
and status. In her overall analysis of contemporary Muslim
societies, Nazih Ayubi states, "
One
of the characteristics of late, uneven, and dependent capitalist
development is that the rates of growth in urbanization, education,
and bureaucratization are never matched by similar rates of growth
in industrialization."[6]
As rapid economic
development and modernization have universally demonstrated, the
side effects of concentrated industrialization can be catastrophic
and "provoke violent reactions and regressions."[7]
One of the most important consequences of rapid economic development
has been the accelerated urbanization and a corresponding rural
exodus that has occurred since the 1970s. As populations throughout
the Muslim world increased exponentially and the land available to
sustain rural populations continued to shrink, more and more people
moved to the city in search of employment and the promise of a
better future. Oliver Roy estimates that the entrance of millions of
peasants into the city led to a threefold increase in the population
of the great Muslim metropolises from 1970-1990.[8]
Consequently, these new cramped conditions have led to severe
overcrowding and massive housing shortages, and in these growing
megacities and shantytowns increasingly even the most basic of
services--water, sewers, transportation--are either lacking or non-existent.[9]
Not surprisingly, this has led many people to become progressively
more disenchanted with a system which does not seem to properly
attend to their growing needs.
In addition,
increased levels of education, without a corresponding expansion in
the number and quality of employment, is another factor leading to
the growth of political Islam throughout the Muslim world. Many
young Muslims attempting to find their way out of their current
state of poverty and underemployment have sought higher education as
a means to this end.
Despite their hard work and parents' financial sacrifices, recent
graduates have become increasingly frustrated by their inability to
find the types of jobs they expected their new educational skills
and status as graduates deserve.
This problem was
especially pronounced in Egypt because of Gamal Abdel Nasser's twin
policies of free higher education and guaranteed state employment.
As Carrie Rosefsky Wickham argues, such "paradoxical" polices led to
a tripling of university graduates in Egypt between 1975 and 1985,
making it difficult, if not impossible, for the state to absorb such
an increase.[10]
Consequently, many recent university graduates--not just those with
general arts degrees, but individuals with science degrees,
engineers, and doctors--along with their parents, have become very
receptive to the Islamists' promises of overthrowing the current
order and replacing it with what they perceive to be a more just and
fair system.
A third consequence of
rapid economic development and modernization is a general sense of
material deprivation experienced by an ever-expanding proportion of
the population. While attempts at widespread economic development
create noticeable financial benefits for a portion of the
population, modernization and the growth of urban centers have also
led to increased feelings of relative material deprivation and
disadvantage as many individuals have become more acutely aware of
the promises of consumptionism and their corresponding inability to
participate in the purchase of primarily western goods. This
realization that there is a growing consumer society in which they
cannot participate makes the West a primary target of their
animosity; something the Islamists willingly exploit. Emmanuel Sivan
has argued along these lines, writing that Islamic fundamentalism "is
a reaction against a modernity that does not deliver even on its
material promises. It creates a gap--or cognitive dissonance if you
will--between Western-style consumerist expectations and ‘Fourth
World' production and per capita income."[11]
Ayubi summarizes the
consequences of attempts at rapid economic development when she
argues that "these [Islamist] movements have emerged not really as
an expression of moral outrage against a modernization that was
going ‘too fast,' but rather as a reaction to a developmental
process that was not going fast enough."[12]In an examination of the micro or individual level, it is clear that
subjective feelings, perceptions, and evaluations towards the
existing political, economic, and social order help to determine a
person's own perspective regarding the legitimacy of such a system.
Most individuals who support the Islamists share general feelings of
alienation from and frustration towards the current socio-political
structure. A sense of alienation can arise from an unresponsive
government and a continuing lack of political participation[13],
while growing frustration can be rooted in several areas, such as
unemployment, a lack of adequate housing,[14]
cultural ambiguity or a loss of identity.[15]
These feelings of alienation and frustration lead the individual to
experience a general sense of marginalization at the hands of the
regime and deprivation in relation to the wealthier segments of
society. In other words, these feelings derive from individuals'
beliefs that they are increasingly powerless in contemporary
society, with little or no control over the daily affairs of their
own lives.[16]
In addition, systemic transformations occurring in contemporary
society--urbanization, increased education, and relative material
deprivation--have created rising, but unfulfilled expectations,
leading to the disenfranchisement of many individuals within Muslim
societies undergoing rapid change. A number of authors identify
rising expectations, and the subsequent frustrations created when
the promises offered through modernization remain unfulfilled, as an
important factor in contributing to the Islamists' success.[17]
Consequently, Islamist movements acquire a significant degree of
their support from individuals who subjectively perceive that they
form part of the "declining social stratum" of society.[18]
According to Ayubi, backing for the Islamists is directly related to
the growing frustrations caused by contemporary systemic changes in
the Muslim world: "In a nutshell it can be argued that while the middle
strata have been expanding in size and in proportion in most Arab
societies, their rising expectations (stimulated in part by the
acquisition of higher education and by the move to urban centers)
are being severely frustrated because of the constrained nature of
economic development in these societies."[19]
Gilles Kepel concurs with
Ayubi regarding the state of contemporary Muslim society, especially
in terms of an ever-increasing sense of powerlessness. The emphasis
for Kepel, however, is more strongly placed on the individual's
"loss of reference points" and "loss of identity" in a rapidly
changing world as being the primary factor in the increased support
for the Islamists.[20]
Saleem Qureshi also examines this question of powerlessness when he
writes, "The uprooted are often those psychologically least able to
cope with the unknown and the strange, and the dislocation often
results in alienation and loss of identity."[21]
Accordingly, it is not surprising that two groups who
particularly have been drawn to the message of political Islam are
the young and recent migrants to the city.[22]
In a difficult and sometimes solitary existence, it is the Islamists
who have assisted these individuals in their daily struggles. On the
one hand, the Islamists have provided significant support through
their establishment of a network of social services, which the state
either refuses or cannot afford to provide.[23]
On the other hand, the conservative-oriented social message of
political Islam and its focus on traditional values in a rapidly
changing world has been an important factor in providing comfort
and, hence, increasing the legitimacy of the Islamists in the eyes
of the masses. As John Esposito summarizes, "Many
swept along in a sea of alienation and marginalization found an
anchor in religion. Islam offered a sense of identity, fraternity,
and cultural values that offset the psychological dislocation and
cultural threat of their new environment."[24]
In the end, the common characteristic exhibited
by those individuals that tend to support the Islamists' platform is
the self-perception as victims or "losers" in the attempts at
modernization and economic development; the repercussions of which
are only accentuated in the current era of globalization. These
individuals are driven by crowded conditions and a sense of
anonymity, frustrations created by "wasted" educational
opportunities, individual alienation, frustration, powerlessness,
and their exclusion from the consumer society which they see just
out of reach. As a result, they are often drawn to the single
credible group that promises to deliver a fresh beginning and a new
and more just system.
SOCIAL BASES OF SUPPORT
Since their re-emergence in the 1970s, Islamist movements have
tended to receive the majority of their backing from four principal
socio-economic groups. These four main bases of support are the
state-employed petit bourgeoisie (i.e., civil servants), the
under-employed intelligentsia, large numbers of young people,
especially students, and finally, recent rural migrants to the city.
In other words, the Islamist movements acquire the bulk of their
support from members of the ever-expanding middle and lower-middle
urban classes.[25]
It may be surprising that one of the core supporters of contemporary
Islamist movements in their battle to dismantle the regime are civil
servants, since this group derives its very living from wages
received from the state. Yet, for many of the most educated,
frustrated by their seeming inability to make sufficient advancement
or income, the civil service may be the only option for employment.
The active support of civil servants was a prominent feature of the
Islamist movement throughout the twentieth century. The civil
service performed an instrumental role in the initial success
achieved by Hasan al-Banna and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in
the late 1920s and early 1930s. This was especially true during its
period of rapid growth from 1932-1945.[26]
The civil service still remains a fertile area of recruitment for
the Islamist groups, forming one of their core constituents.[27]
The second segment of Muslim society that is especially
overrepresented regarding its support of and membership in
contemporary Islamist movements, is the under-employed, and
perceived as under-paid, intelligentsia.[28]
This group includes specific professions such as university
professors and teachers, in addition to those under the more general
designation of intellectuals, poets, and artists. As with civil
servants, the intelligentsia have long supported the Islamist
movements, constituting both a key component of the organizations'
base and even actively assisting the early Brotherhood in
disseminating their message to the masses.[29]
Intellectuals, professionals, and teachers have continued to
constitute a principal component of the Islamists' following over
the past two decades.[30]
More specifically, in his analysis of the Iranian revolution, Ervand
Abrahamian shows how Khomeini deliberately sought the support of the
intellectuals in legitimizing his movement to the masses. In fact,
teachers and intellectuals, along with students, were among the
first groups to actively protest against the Shah's regime.[31]
The third group that has remained deeply supportive of the Islamists
consists of the younger members of Muslim society (i.e., those under
25).[32]
Many tend to be students, as demonstrated in the case of Iran in
1979, and therefore have acquired some level of higher education. As
with both state employees/civil servants and intellectuals, students
formed a key component of the Egyptian Brotherhood's support base
prior to the 1952 Revolution.[33]
This remains the case as certain scholars argue that the twin
variables of youth and education determine to a great extent the
likelihood that a specific individual will support an Islamist
movement.[34]
It is probably not surprising that support among the younger
segments of the population is high, since younger people in general
tend to be more radical and seem more willing to take extremist
positions than their elders.[35]
Consequently, they have demonstrated a greater willingness to
support the type of radical Islamist movement that has developed
throughout the Middle East, especially in Egypt, in the post-1967
era. For Ismael and Ismael, an examination of the Islamic Liberation
Organization (Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islami) confirms this
fact.[36]
Established in Egypt in the wake of the 1967 War by leader Dr. Salih
Siriyya, most members were young, with a median age of 22, and were
students or recent graduates (professionals).[37]
The final socio-economic group is the recent rural migrants who have
left the countryside to live and work in the city.[38]
As previously mentioned, this group, which tends to be underemployed
and estranged in its new surroundings, has been especially receptive
to the Islamist message of equality, justice and brotherhood being
preached in the slums of many Arab cities. Both the Islamists'
traditional message, which resonates with their religious
upbringing, and the sense of intimacy and belonging such
organizations provide, has been important in drawing this group to
the Islamists' cause. Michael Fischer argues that recent migrants to
Iranian cities were especially crucial in the formation of the
social bloc that supported Khomeini in his eventual overthrow of the
Shah.[39]
UNITY THROUGH OPPOSITION
TO THE GOVERNING REGIME
It is critical to understand that the individuals and groups that
tend to favor the Islamists do so less because of what the Islamists
propose--the installation of a state ruled according to Islamic law
(Shari'a)--and more based on what the Islamists actually
oppose: the current ruling elites and their perceived domination
over all facets of contemporary society.[40]
It is this "unity through opposition" that allows all those
disenchanted with the current regime to coalesce around the
Islamists. Consequently, the Islamists have capitalized on the fact
that they have been able to portray themselves as the only credible
alternative to corrupt, inefficient, and sometimes repressive
regimes.[41]
According to Ayubi:
A wide variety of groups are attracted to the Islamist
thesis because... [it] imparts a certain sense of intimacy and
assurance, and because they also share with the militants a certain
degree of antagonism towards the existing social order and the state
that keeps it in place. The Islamic language therefore most
fundamentally represents a broad alternative system of meaning
and power to the hegemonic system represented by the existing
social-political order which inevitably marginalizes and/or
alienates certain individuals and certain social groups. To an
extent, the details of the Islamic thesis become less important than
the fact that it is a very different thesis from that advocated by
the State.[42]
As Ayubi concludes, "[Thus] their sole objective [is] the defeating
of the state and the dismantling of the current social order on
which it is premised."[43]
In contemporary Muslim
states, a principal reason why many authoritarian regimes have
become the primary target of frustration for the middle and
lower-middle classes is their monopolization over all actual and
potential power bases through their complete domination of the state
apparatus and civil society. In turn, this creates the impression
that the current regime, either through corruption, mismanagement,
or incompetence, is solely responsible for all the contemporary
problems inflicted on these disaffected groups. Since the Islamist
opposition is better organized, more efficient at providing
alternative services, and represents an indigenous belief system,
the Islamists are usually able to outperform the secular opposition
by presenting themselves as the only legitimate alternative to the
current ruling elite.[44]
The fact that Islam represents a native ideological approach is
especially important since the ability to "frame"[45]
contemporary grievances through religious discourse and language has
allowed the Islamists to eclipse the ability of other potential
critics of the regime (i.e., Marxists, socialists, Nasserists,
liberals, and others).
It should be added that there is one further factor that allows the
Islamists, as opposed to the secular opposition, the greatest
opportunity in challenging the power of the existing regime. This
important difference is that Islamist groups throughout the Muslim
world have had the benefit of using the mosque as a staging ground
for organizing their movement and disseminating both their religious
and political message to their followers. Thus, the mosque offers a
unique opportunity to criticize the government and ruling regime,
while remaining effectively beyond the control of the state (i.e., a
type of sanctuary from governmental repression). The mosque has
demonstrated its effectiveness in this context, as an organizer of
anti-government dissent and protest, in countries throughout the
Middle East, such as Egypt, Iran, Algeria, and the Palestinian
Authority.[46]
When examining the specific policies pursued by various Middle
Eastern states, much of the hostility directed towards these regimes
is based on the perception of incompetence and mismanagement on the
part of the ruling elites and their failure to address the actual
problems affecting a majority of their populations. In this sense,
the dominant powers are seen as having created an atmosphere of
political stagnation, through their inability to fulfill the
expectations they themselves have created.[47]
In turn, this failure to deliver the political ‘goods' leads to the
impression that the regime and its representatives are corrupt,
distant, and inefficient. The fact that in many of these states the
same leaders and/or party have ruled uninterrupted for several
decades--the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, the
National Democratic Party (NDP) in Egypt, the Ba'th party in Syria,
or the royal families in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Gulf
states--reinforces the perception of the regime as overly
bureaucratized and bloated, where nepotism, not merit, is the
primary requirement for advancement.[48]
For many in the middle class, the regime is viewed as nothing more
than ineffectual centers of political patronage for party hacks and
members of their immediate family.
It is clear that a crucial reason for this common perception of
political stagnation and, consequently, the general radicalization
of politics, has been the unwillingness of many Middle Eastern
regimes to permit any type of legitimate opposition to its
monopolistic control over the political process.[49]
With "the omnipotent control of the authoritarian one-party
nation-state" the norm in the Middle East,[50]
all opposition to the ruling party has been coopted, dissuaded, and
often, severely repressed. Most Middle Eastern regimes have
demonstrated a reluctance to accept or tolerate even moderate
opposition to their rule. In certain cases, such as Egypt and
Algeria, where governments have actively and severely repressed
opposition movements, such groups often reply in kind. History has
quite clearly demonstrated that violence begets violence, and
repression leads to more extreme, radical, and violent responses on
the part of the opposition.[51]
Economic policy is a second area where ruling elites have failed to
adequately address the concerns of their citizens, leading to
accusations of blatant economic mismanagement.[52]
This is not to suggest that all parts of society have equally
suffered from the economic policies pursued by the region's
governments since the 1970s. The fact that many members of the upper
echelons of society have become quite wealthy, accentuating and
polarizing the gap between the haves and have-nots, only contributes
to the perception among the masses that the current system is
corrupt and therefore must be overthrown. As Qureshi argues: "The
industrialization and economic reforms that have been instituted...
have tended to make the rich richer and the poor poorer, if not in
absolute terms then in relative terms."[53]
In the specific case of Egypt, one of the principal factors
accounting for the growth of radical Islamist movements has been an
increasing perception of relative deprivation among the masses. The
economic policies pursued by Anwar Sadat in the 1970s, including his
‘infitah' or open door policy to foreign investment, led to a
definite economic polarization of Egyptian society. While there was
an absolute growth in the wealth of society overall, there was a
segment of society--usually those close to the president--who did
much better in relation to the general population.[54]
More generally, throughout the Middle East, such economic problems,
and the corresponding accusations of mismanagement, were exacerbated
with the decline of oil revenues in the mid-1980s. Not only did this
lead to a retrenchment in government expenditures on social services
and other "necessities," but many individuals who had been working
in the oil-rich Gulf had to return to jobs with substantially lower
levels of pay, which led to declining standards of living. As a
consequence of all these factors, many of the ‘have nots' began to
consider more radical options (i.e., political Islam) in an attempt
to extract a more equitable distribution of wealth from the nation.[55]
The third area in which
Muslim regimes have been criticized may be the most important for
those Islamist groups that oppose the state. It is commonly held by
a large segment of each country's population that the regime is
directly responsible for the cultural and social deterioration
perceived to be plaguing contemporary Muslim society. In fact, it is
on the level of this cultural and social dislocation that certain
authors, such as Sidahmed and Ehteshami, believe the Islamists have
been most effective in advocating their more traditionally-oriented
message.[56]
In examining this alleged
deterioration of the cultural and social environment, the Islamists
perceive the source of the problem as based on two interrelated
causes. First, is the growing influence of western culture and the
belief that the Muslim world is being polluted and even threatened
by the materialistic, hedonistic, and secular ways of the West. This
cultural invasion of the region by western beliefs and values has
created an environment in which the Islamists have been able to
portray themselves as the only group willing and able to defend
traditional Muslim society from cultural annexation by the West.[57]
However, the Islamists assert that a second and more deadly assault
is being perpetrated upon traditional Muslim societies. This more
ominous threat is not waged by an external foe, but instead
originates from within, from the newly ‘westernized' elites ruling
contemporary Muslim states. According to the Islamists, these elites
have undergone a metamorphosis, blindly imitating the Western world
in both its material orientation and belief system.[58]
In areas such as life-style, dress, sexual mores, and the media,
Western customs and values are perceived as engaged in a continuous
onslaught upon a more traditionally-oriented Muslim way of life.[59]
Of course, Islamists do not simply oppose specific governmental
policies. Instead, they refute the regime's entire legitimacy and
question its overall credibility, leading to what Bassam Tibi refers
to as a general "crisis of legitimacy."[60]
In fact, most of the Islamists' success has been based on their
ability to de-legitimize both the various governments and their
leaders. Such criticisms have only been exacerbated by regimes that
appear incapable or unwilling to allow either limited political
participation or create policies that can lead to sustained economic
growth.
In some states, such as Egypt, attempts have been made to work
outside the political structure (i.e., within civil society), since
as Wickham makes clear, participation in politics can lead to "the
risk of harassment, imprisonment, or worse."[61]
In response, the ability of a regime to monopolize control over
certain coercive agents of the state, such as the military,
judiciary, and police forces, is sometimes less important than its
capacity to dominate what tend to be specifically "private" realms,
such as the content of education and the environment of intellectual
development. Hence, through its ability to coopt the means of
socialization and penetrate various associations, organizations, and
institutions within civil society, these regimes have been able to
integrate and control their populations, while maintaining at least
a degree of popular legitimacy.
One specific example is the capacity of various regimes in the
Middle East to assert their dominance over the religious
establishment, which has been one of the reasons the regimes still
retain some level of legitimacy and status within their societies.
In Egypt, the ulama, or religious scholars, are in essence
civil servants, with their wages provided by the state. In exchange
for a decent salary and greater influence on state radio and in the
media, the ulama have been willing to back the regime and
support the state's official line on religious matters.[62]
As a result, the ulama have been coopted by the regime,
assimilated, and turned into a pillar of the status quo powers.[63]
The last aspect to examine regarding the ruling elite and its
all-pervasive dominance of the state and civil society involves the
greater question of political ideology. In other words, have these
regimes provided their people with a larger ideological context or
meaning through which to live their lives? For example, in the West,
liberal democracies promote ideas of individual freedom and the
collective good as the fundamental principles necessary to mask
inequalities and specific cases of blatant political, economic, and
social injustice.
In the Muslim world, however, the biggest threat confronting the
current ruling elite may be their inability to espouse a larger
ideological meaning for the masses or, perhaps more accurately, the
fact that their ideologies have emerged as bankrupt, meaningless,
and essentially void. As a result, the ruling regimes have as much
failed as the Islamist movements have succeeded in providing a more
effective ideology by which to guide the lives of their followers.
It is in this political and ideological vacuum created by the
breakdown of current ideologies that the Islamists have been offered
their greatest opportunity. Thus, the Islamists have presented the
masses with the chance to believe in something beyond the mere
exertion of power; namely, a belief in the ideas of equality, social
justice, and brotherhood.
At this point, it should be noted that the downfall of the dominant
ideologies of various Middle Eastern regimes did not suffer a long
and slow decline. Instead, one definitive and "cataclysmic" event
symbolized the bankrupt nature of the dominant ideas of nationalism,
socialism, and Pan-Arabism that had arose throughout the Middle East
in the two decades following the Second World War. Without question,
the 1967 Six-Day War, in which Israel was able to effectively crush
the combined armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, caused such
profound shock, disillusionment, and humiliation that large numbers
of people suddenly became less willing to follow the belief systems
these regimes were promoting.[64]
It has been the ability of Islamists to fill this ideological void
that has helped contribute to their growth in the post-1967
environment. On the one hand, from strictly a religious perspective,
in difficult times, when there is a questioning of faith, religion
is often used as a comfort against the harsh realities of the
external world. Of course, to many, the embracing of religion was
seen to represent not just a comfort for the present, but also "a
form of divine punishment" for the sins of the past.[65]
As Mortimer argues, "In
the eyes of many the defeat was a just punishment on the regime, and
indeed on the nation as a whole, for the hypocrisy, for the neglect
of the Shari'a, the whoring after false Gods and foreign
ideologies, which characterized the whole of the preceding period."[66]
As Israel entered the old city of Jerusalem in June 1967, there was
a widespread belief that the Jews had been successful because they
had been "truer to their religion than the Arabs had been to
theirs."[67]
On the other hand, with the ideology of the contemporary regime
discredited and the creation of a political and ideological vacuum,
Islam was now capable of becoming a political ideology, providing
much needed solutions to the problems and failures of the current
regimes.[68]
In the opinion of many
people in the Muslim world, the nearly 40 years since 1967 have only
more clearly demonstrated that the regimes throughout the region
remain ideologically bankrupt, certain of only one goal: their
desire to maintain power. Moreover, the unwillingness of these
regimes to permit even a moderate degree of political opposition or
limited public participation reinforces the view that a significant
ideological vacuum remains. Therefore, through its ability to unify
the very diverse groups that, above all else, seek the overthrow and
destruction of the existing political and social order, only the
Islamists appear capable of providing the ideological,
organizational, and administrative means necessary to bring about
such radical political change.[69]
ISLAMISM: AN IDEOLOGY OF PROTEST AND AN INSTRUMENT OF REVOLT
In its most basic sense, political Islam should be seen as an
ideology of protest. Thus, political Islam is the beacon around
which all those groups most detrimentally affected by the existing
order converge in their denunciation of the current regime. While
the Islamists may incorporate the symbolism, language and discourse
of Islam to legitimize their claims, their real-life grievances are
social, economic and, most importantly, political. In other words,
it is power and control that they desire most.[70]
As R. Hrair Dekmejian argues, "No less significant has been
the role of Islamic fundamentalism as an ideology of protest against
arbitrary rule and socioeconomic injustice. In the absence of other
institutional and ideological channels of opposition, fundamentalism
has provided a religiously sanctioned means for the articulation of
popular dissatisfaction."[71]
This contemporary view of Islam as a vehicle for political protest
is not new. Throughout its history, Islam has been utilized both by
leaders to legitimize their rule, and by revolutionaries to denounce
it.[72]
Islam's popularity, and the recurring themes of social justice,
equality, and the ending of oppressive structures and systems, has
given Islamism the opportunity to synthesize its role as both an
emancipatory ideology and a vehicle of political protest. One only
needs to examine the earliest history of the infant Muslim polity to
observe Islam being employed as an ideology aimed at restoring what
was believed to be the true doctrine of the faith, while at the same
time attempting to overthrow the existing political order. According
to Dekmejian, "[P]resent-day Islamist societies emulate the pattern
of early insurrectionary groups by using politicized Islam as an
ideology of protest against ruling elites who are charged with
deviating from the true faith. Indeed, beginning with the Kharijites
and the Shiites, fundamentalism became the ideology of opposition
against those in power."[73]
Theoretically, contemporary Islamists had a much more difficult time
discovering historical justification for their revolutionary
doctrine since Sunni political theory clearly assumed the position
that "even an unjust ruler was better than strife and the
dissolution of society."[74]
This is where the works of Ibn Tamiyya (1260-1327) were used to
justify the overthrow of a ruler based on his non-compliance with
the Shari'a.[75]
In other words, "a Sunni ruler becomes illegitimate if he does not
apply a substantial part of the Shari'a."[76]
It were these types of arguments that were seized upon by
contemporary Islamists, such as Abd al-Salam Faraj (leader of the
al-Jihad Group which assassinated Sadat) in their justification of a
Sunni-style revolutionary doctrine with its roots in Islamist
political thought.[77]
Contemporary Islamists now had the philosophical legitimacy they
sought in justifying the overthrow of current leaders who refuse to
rule in the shadow of the Shari'a. As an instrument of
revolt, they maintain that they are simply fighting the same
non-Islamist and foreign rulers who have consistently plagued the
history of an otherwise peaceful and just Islamist state.
CONCLUSION
By examining the principal factors accounting for the growth of
contemporary Islamist movements, the main argument is that while
utilizing religious symbols and Islamic discourse, the primary
objectives of the Islamists remain explicitly political. In
addition, in spite of the heightened focus in the West on the
international aspects of Islamist ideology and radical Islamist
groups, these movements remain primarily orientated towards their
domestic environments. In this sense, Islam is utilized principally
as a tool or instrument to initiate radical internal political
change through the overthrow of the current regime and the
destruction of its political, economic, and social power. Both the
specific policies conducted by contemporary governments and their
total domination over the state and civil society have contributed
in unifying those groups most detrimentally affected by the current
environment (i.e., the casualties or "victims" of modernization)
into supporting what they perceive as the only practical alternative
to this hegemonic control. Thus, it is this unity through opposition
that has thrust the Islamists to the forefront of the current
political struggle. With its historical roots as an ideology of
protest and instrument of revolt, Islam has an advantage over other
movements and ideologies which seek to radically transform the
existing political order. Only Islam is perceived as a legitimate
and indigenous option available to those disadvantaged segments that
link both their interests and ideas into a concrete agenda for
change and an alternative vision of a better and more just future.
NOTES
[2]
As Mahmud Faksh asserts, "Islamism is basically an indigenous
response to prevalent socioeconomic and political problems."
Mahmud A. Faksh, The Future of Islam in the
Middle
East: Fundamentalism in Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia
(Westport: Praeger, 1997), p. xii. Also see Emmanuel Sivan,
Radical Islam: Medieval Methodology and Modern Politics (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 125.
[3]
Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 3.
[6]
Ayubi, Political Islam, p. 171.
[7]
Daryush Shayegan, Cultural Schizophrenia: Islamic Societies
Confronting the West (London: Saqi, 1992), p. 84.
[9]
Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social
Movement Theory," in
Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, p. 7.
[10]
Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, p. 38.
[11]
Sivan, Radical Islam,
p. 11.
Roy makes a similar point, suggesting Islamic movements are a
response of "the oppressed of all countries… [who] dream of
access to the world of development and consumption from which
they feel excluded." Roy, The Failure of Political Islam,
p. 52.
[12]
Ayubi, Political Islam, pp. 176-77.
[15]
Qureshi, "Political
Implications of Fundamentalist Islam," p. 77.
[16]
Conversely, part of the Islamists' success is their ability to
create a sense of "empowerment" among its supporters, or what
Wickham calls "physical empowerment."
See Carrie Rosefsky Wickham,
"Interests, Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt," in
Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, p. 244; and Wickham,
Mobilizing Islam, pp. 153, 170.
[18]
Youssef Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism (Boston: Twayne
Publishers, 1990), p. 1
[19]
Ayubi, Political Islam,
pp. 159-60. Emmanuel Sivan makes a similar point in examining
the role played by "rising expectations," especially among the
educated youth. According to Sivan, "The greater the
expectations, the deeper the fall to the abyss of despair when
the hopes failed to materialize." Sivan, Radical Islam,
p. 125.
[20]
Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in
Egypt:
The Prophet and the Pharaoh
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 217. Also
see Wiktorowicz, "Introduction," pp. 11-12.
[24]
Esposito, The Islamic Threat, p. 16.
[26]
Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, pp. 12-13.
Also see Christina P. Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in
Egypt (The Hague/London/Paris: Hoover Institute on War,
Revolution, and Peace, 1964), p. 158; and Dilip Hiro, War
Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and the Global
Response (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 61.
[27]
Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 12. Also see
Malise
Ruthven, A Fury For God: The Islamist Attack On America
(London: Granta Publications, 2002), p. 115; and
Ayubi, Political Islam, p. 161.
[28]
In Egypt, Wickham claims that the Islamist groups, especially
the Muslim Brotherhood, have garnered most of their success from
what she terms the "lumpen intelligentsia." Wickham,
Mobilizing Islam, p. 37.
[29]
Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers, pp. 283-84.
[31]
Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p. 53. It should not be
surprising that in Iran, where Islamists control the government
but have faired no better in providing for their urban citizens,
it is again the students and intellectuals that have been among
the most prominent opponents to the regime.
[32]
Unquestionably, all those theorists who have examined in depth
the main socio-economic bases of the Islamists' support focus on
the "young" as the primary demographic group. Kepel's views have
already been addressed regarding the "young urban poor." Kepel,
Jihad, especially see pp. 6, 107, 127, 152, 159, and 168.
[34]
Kepel argues that education--even higher education--is more, not
less likely to lead an individual into supporting radical
Islamic movements. Kepel, Muslim Extremism in
Egypt,
p. 217. For some other examples see Choueiri, Islamic
Fundamentalism, p. 12; Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power:
The Politics of Islam (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), pp.
403-04; and Ayubi, Political Islam, p. 161. These points
were also examined in some detail in the previous section.
[35]
From a macro or systemic level, certain authors argue that one
common feature in those countries that have exhibited higher
rates of support for the Islamists' cause, especially greater
degrees of Islamic radicalism, are countries with a larger
percentage of young people. According to Kepel, 50 percent of
Palestinians are under 15, while 70 percent are under 30, Kepel,
Jihad, p. 152; while Mark Juergensmeyer's argues that
Algeria's radicalized political environment is at least
partially the result of the fact that 70 percent of the
population is under the age of 25. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror
in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 191.
[37]
Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, Government and
Politics in Islam (London: Pinter, 1985), p. 114.
[39]
Michael M. J. Fischer, "Imam Khomeini: Four Levels of
Understanding," in John L. Esposito (ed.), Voices of
Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983),
p. 162. Kepel argues that "young immigrants from the
countryside" remained a key cornerstone of the Islamists' core
constituency up to and during the Iranian revolution. See Kepel,
Jihad, p. 108.
[40]
Esposito, The Islamic Threat, p. 189.
[41
41. John L. Esposito, "Introduction," in Esposito (ed.),
Political Islam, p. 3.
[42]
Ayubi, Political Islam, p. 175 (emphasis added).
[44]
Anderson, "Fulfilling Prophecies," p. 24.
[45]
Wiktorowicz examines the importance of this issue of "framing"
in terms of the Islamists' discourse. His main argument is that
the Islamists have been the most successful in utilizing the
symbols and language of Islam to construct shared "meanings" and
"identities" as the "basis of collective action." Wiktorowicz,
"Introduction," pp. 2, 3, and 16.
[46]
Gilles Kepel provides a good example of how the mosque has been
utilized in the Islamists' struggle in Egypt. See Kepel,
Muslim Extremism in
Egypt,
Chapter 6: The Sermons of Sheikh Kishk. Others authors also
examine this issue including: Wiktorowicz, "Introduction," pp. 1
and 10; Robinson, "Hamas as a Social Movement," p. 126; and
Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, pp. 131-33.
[47]
Wickham's examination of the "paradox" between the Nasser
policies of free higher education and guaranteed state
employment, and the resulting frustrations, has already been
examined. See Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, p. 38.
[48]
Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, p. 52. In Wickham's
interviews, a common complaint of Egyptian graduates, and a
prime reason that they felt growing disillusionment with the
regime, was their perception that nepotism and not merit was the
only way one could hope to achieve decent paying government
employment. The term she uses is "wasta" (i.e., right
connections). See Wickham, "Interests, Ideas, and Islamist
Outreach in Egypt," pp. 237-38; and Wickham, Mobilizing Islam,
p. 62.
[50]
Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon
Answers (Boulder: Westview, 1994), p. 114.
[51]
In both Hafez, "From Marginalization to Massacres," and Mohammed
M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the
Egyptian Islamic Movement," in Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic
Activism, the main thesis is that the prime variable
determining if an Islamist movement will utilize violence in
their attempts to attain political power is whether the regime
embarks on a strategy that is "reactive and indiscriminate" as
opposed to "preemptive and selective."
[52]
Abdulwahab Saleh Babeair, "Intellectual Currents in Contemporary
Islam," The Muslim World, Vol.81, No.3 (1991), p. 234.
[53]
Qureshi, "The Political Implications of Fundamentalist Islam,"
p. 77.
[54]
For an example see Kepel, Jihad, p. 83.
[55]
See Ismael and Ismael, Government and Politics in Islam,
pp. 105-07. In many ways, this parallels the attraction
socialism and communism held in the region during the mid-20th
century.
[56]
Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Introduction,"
in Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.),
Islamic Fundamentalism (Boulder: Westview, 1996), p. 7.
[57]
See Mary-Jane Deeb, "Militant
Islam and the Politics of Redemption," The Annals of the
American Academy,
Vol. 524 (November 1992), pp. 55-55.
[59]
Esposito, The Islamic Threat, p. 138.
[60]
Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam
and the
New
World Disorder
2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 8.
Also see Najib Ghadbian, "Political Islam: Inclusion or
Violence?" in Kenton Worcester, Sally Avery Bermanzohn, and Mark
Ungar (eds.), Violence and Politics: Globalization's Paradox
(New York and London: Routledge, 2002), p. 101.
[63]
See Abu-Rabi M. Ibrahim, "Discourse, Power, and Ideology in
Modern Islamic Revivalist Thought: Sayyid Qutb: A Review
Article," The Muslim World, Vol. 81, No. 3 (July-October
1991), p. 294.
[64]
Sivan, Radical Islam, pp. 47 and 131. See also Fouad
Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and
Practice Since 1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981).
[65]
Kepel, Jihad, p. 63.
[66]
Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power, p. 285.
[69]
As Kepel argues, in Iran, the Islamists succeeded primarily
because of their ability to attract and "unite everyone with an
axe to grind [who wanted to] bring down the established power."
Kepel, Jihad, p. 118.
Or, as he argues elsewhere, Islam has become the "weapon" or
"vehicle" for all who desire an overthrow of the state and a
destruction of the existing order. Ibid., p. 63.
[70]
Faksh, The Future of Islam in the Middle East, p. 23.
[71]
R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in
the Arab World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985),
p. 176.
[72]
See Sivan, Radical Islam, p. 165; and Ayubi, Political
Islam, p. 62.
[73]
Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, p. 38. The Kharijites
were the first major sect to break from mainstream Islam. This
occurred during the period of the Caliph Ali (657-661).
Primarily consisting of economically alienated and marginalized
segments of the population, they argued that those who did not
follow the literal word of God as expressed in the Koran should
be excommunicated from the community. Several authors draw
parallels between the Kharijites and the contemporary Islamists.
For some examples see Ayubi, Political Islam, pp. 4 and
125; Mortimer, Faith and Power, p. 62; Kepel,
Muslim Extremism in Egypt, p. 58; and Fouad Ajami, "In the
Pharaoh's Shadow: Religion and Authority in Egypt," in James P.
Piscatori (ed.), Islam in the Political Process
(Cambridge; New York: Royal Institute Of International Affairs,
1983), p. 27.
[76]
Sivan, Radical Islam, p. 99.
[77]
Kepel, Muslim Extremism in
Egypt,
pp. 193-94; and Sivan, Radical Islam, pp. 104 and 190.
Admittedly, while Faraj may have gone further than his
predecessors within the "radical" Islamist movement, he was
really just following in the footsteps of other 20th century
Islamists, such as Abu A'la Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb.
Thomas Butko teaches
Political Studies at Augustana Faculty, University of Alberta, in
Camrose, Alberta, Canada. His research focuses most specifically on
Islamist, anti-globalization, and other counter-hegemonic movements.
His publications include "Political Islam and the Middle East Peace
Process: A Veiled Threat," in Tami Jacoby and Brent Sasley (eds.),
Redefining
Security in the Middle East (London and New York: Manchester
University Press, 2002), "Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian
Approach to the Rise of Political Islam," British Journal of
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (May 2004) and "Islam as
Political Ideology," in Don Carmichael (ed.), From Philosophy to
Politics: Essays in Memory of Dimitrios S. Panopolis (Edmonton:
University of Alberta, 2004).
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