Volume 8, No. 3 - September 2004
Volume 8, No. 3 - September 2004
By Amin Tarzi
This article considers the Iranian weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, reviewing the calculations that have driven Iran to seek these weapons and their delivery systems, and the dangers to European countries should Iran succeed in its efforts. Lastly, it considers the effect of Iran achieving regional superpower status through the development of WMD on the EU's economic and overall policy in the Persian Gulf region.
(This article was originally written for a project and conference on "Countering Threats in the Era of Mass Destruction: Accounts from the Middle East and Europe," co-sponsored by the GLORIA Center and The Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) of Italy.)
"Regardless of the content of Iran's nuclear program, the EU should not address the Iranian nation in this tone. Maybe they don't know who they are talking to."(1)
--Editorial, Jomhuri-ye Islami, August 2004
Unlike the United States, the EU has never totally withdrawn its presence from Iran. Even at times of political problems, trade between the EU member states and Iran has continued. Two major difficulties in the first decade of revolutionary Iran tested the relations between Tehran and the Europeans.
The first instance was the fatwa (religious opinion) issued by the Islamic Republic's founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in February 1989 shortly before he died in June. Khomeini's fatwa called on all Muslims to kill the British novelist Salman Rushdie for writing The Satanic Verses, which ostensibly insulted the Muslim prophet Muhammad. Since Khomeini himself died a few months after issuing his death decree, the authorities in Iran have been unable to override the fatwa; as such an act would certainly be regarded as an insult to the founder of the Islamic Republic. The European governments came to understand this situation and have let the case lay dormant. Former Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, in an attempt to improve his country's image abroad, presented a blueprint guaranteeing that the Iranian government would not pay for, nor encourage the assassination of Rushdie. Though short of Britain's original demand that the fatwa be revoked, it nevertheless was an attempt to ease the situation.
The death sentence on Rushdie, while still technically in effect since the fatwa has not been officially revoked by the Iranian government, was removed as an impediment in Iran-EU relations when the reformist President Mohammad Khatami in 1998 said that the Rushdie Affair should be considered to be completely finished.(2)
The second diplomatic row began in April 1997, after a German court in Berlin found members of the Iranian government, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamene'i and other top officials, guilty for the 1992 assassination of four Kurdish dissidents shot in a restaurant. The authorities in Tehran were infuriated as they claimed that the evidence by former Iranian president Abu'l Hasan Bani-Sadr came from people opposed to the Iranian regime and was therefore unreliable. European reaction to the Berlin verdict was to recall all EU ambassadors to Tehran and stop the "critical dialogue" that had marked EU policy towards Iran.(3)
The "Mykonos Affair," as the Berlin assassination case came to be known (after the restaurant's name) was also resolved by Khatami's dismissal of intelligence chief Hojatoleslam 'Ali Fallahiyan, the person identified in the case for ordering the assassination. Amid some political face-saving stratagems, the Europeans decided to return their ambassadors to Tehran.
In January 1998, the EU lifted the ban on contacts with Iran imposed because of the Mykonos Affair, and six months later, European diplomats in Brussels decided to resume the policy of critical dialogue with Iran that had been the basis of EU relations with Iran since the Edinburgh Summit in December 1992.(4) Robert Litwak argues that under the rubric of "critical dialogue," the Europeans hoped to use trade as an incentive to alter Iranian behavior, notably vis-à-vis terrorism.(5)
Initially, not all EU member states followed the warming of relations with Tehran with the same enthusiasm. The United Kingdom in particular was more cautious in its approach and held back high-level contact with Iranian officials until a diplomatic framework was found to resolve the Rushdie Affair. This was of greater importance to London, Rushdie being a British citizen. In addition, the United Kingdom followed a policy slightly closer to that of the United States toward Iran than did the rest of EU. Likewise, even from the institutionalization of the "critical dialogue" policy, different member states conducted their policies toward Tehran according to their national priorities. For example, Denmark withdrew from the "critical dialogue" track in 1996 when Greece involved Iran in the political and economic affairs of the Balkans.(6)
From its inception in 1992, the policy of "critical dialogue" did not yield much change of behavior by Iran in regard to WMD, terrorism, and Tehran's objection--based on the stated policy favoring the destruction of the Jewish state--to any peace process between Israel and the Arabs. These issues are part of what Geoffrey Kemp has described as the "red button" issues that have kept Iran and the United States at odds.(7) Ironically, despite Europe's strategy and efforts, American companies, not those of any individual European country, carried out the most economic activity with Iran during the 1990s.(8)
In 1999, the EU moved from its policy of "critical dialogue" to a more conciliatory policy of "constructive dialogue." At this stage, the United Kingdom followed its European partners by sending then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook to Tehran in September.
The Rushdie and Mykonos cases are illustrative of the nature of Iranian relations with the EU in general. When political problems arise, diplomatic efforts and time have been utilized to keep the relations from deteriorating further. Trade, however, has always played a major factor. For example, in the case of the Mykonos Affair, at the time the Iranians indicated that what had allowed the European envoys' return was the September 1997 agreement between the National Iranian Oil Company and an international consortium led by the French oil giant Total SA to explore natural gas in Iran's offshore South Pars field--an agreement which received subsequent EU support.(9) With the new political climate in Iran, the EU stands to benefit greatly in terms of winning contracts in Iran's hydrocarbons industry and other economic sectors.
EU-Iranian relations reached a higher level with the launch of negotiations between the European Commission and Iran on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) in December 2001. The EU made sure to include a parallel track of negotiations with Iran on "political dialogue and counter-terrorism."(10) The draft of the TCA was prepared in November 2001, and according to the EU press release announcing the talks' launch, after the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, "There was general agreement not only to strengthen the political dialogue [with Iran], but also to include appropriate provisions on the fight against terrorism."(11) In June 2002, while adopting directives for a TCA with Iran, the EU reiterated its "concerns in the area of human rights, terrorism, the Middle East, and non-proliferation."(12) Before concluding the TCA, European diplomats gave assurances to American counterparts that the political agenda is a critical part of the overall deal with Iran.(13)
In general, the EU has been more interested in keeping Iranian markets open to European products and oil from Iran flowing to its members than pursuing policies aimed at altering Iran's WMD, terrorist-sponsoring, or human rights policies. Even with the political linkages the EU has attached to concluding a TCA with Iran, there may be economic pressure groups that will try to "minimize the linkage" to keep the Iranian market open to European goods and services.(14)
The EU is Iran's largest trading partner with bilateral exchanges exceeding €13 billion in 2001.(15) The amount of EU-Iran trade, while allowing the former to have a formidable influence over the latter, has become the engine driving Tehran-Brussels relations--sometimes at the cost of the EU neglecting to challenge Tehran on the question of WMD and other political points.
Organizationally, the EU had been reluctant to challenge Iran on reports that the country had a clandestine nuclear weapons program or was in violation of its safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As late as May 2003 --with the promises of political linkages related to the TCA still intact--the EU failed to discuss officially the case of Iran in international forums on nuclear weapons proliferation despite information about undeclared sites in Iran being allegedly used for nuclear activities.(16) For example, in the statement by the EU representative delivered at the Second Preparatory Committee of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference held in Geneva in April-May 2003, Iran is never mentioned. In comparison, the U.S. representative in the same conference devoted a significant portion of his statement to Iran, stating, "Iran provides perhaps the most fundamental challenge ever faced by the NPT."(17)
However, the European attitude did shift dramatically by June 2003, with the issuance of the IAEA report on Iranian nuclear activities, confirming allegations that the country was involved in illicit nuclear activities. Director General of IAEA, Muhammad al-Baradai, in his report to the IAEA Board of Governors on June 6, 2003, stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had failed "to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the respect of reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed."(18)
This European change of policy was first hinted at the G8 Summit held in Evian in early June, prior to (but with knowledge of) the contents of al-Baradai's report. The final declaration of the G8 stated that members of the group "will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program," and stressed that Iran should comply with its obligations as a signatory of the NPT.(19)
The EU General Affairs and External Relations Council followed suit with a strong statement on June 16 voicing its concern with the report by the IAEA director general, stating that "some aspects of Iran's [nuclear] programme raise serious concern, in particular as regards the closing of the nuclear fuel cycle, especially the uranium centrifuge."(20) The EU Council called upon Tehran to "implement urgently and unconditionally an Additional Protocol" with the IAEA and linked the continuation of TCA with the nuclear issue, calling the two issues "interdependent, essential and mutually reinforcing elements of EU-Iran relations."(21)
The decision by the Europeans to link directly trade and other bilateral relations with Tehran to the WMD program of Iran marked the first time since the inception of the "critical dialogue" policy in 1992 that the EU as a whole took a firm and decisive stance on the issue of WMD with Iran. Arguments have been made that since its inception, the policy of "critical dialogue" had failed to change Iran's behavior in key areas of concern, including Tehran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles.(22)
Following the issuance of the IAEA report in June and a show of strong international, including European, concern regarding Iran's nuclear intentions, Tehran took some steps to rectify some safeguard questions addressed by the IAEA. Adversely, and typical of its attempts to gain more bargaining chips and time in its dealing with the IAEA, Iran introduced nuclear material into its Natanz plant.(23)
In October, the foreign ministers of three EU member states--France, Germany and the United Kingdom--traveled to Tehran and convinced the Iranian authorities to accept signing the Additional Protocol, and more importantly, to "voluntarily" suspend "all uranium enrichment and processing activities as defined by the IAEA."(24) Iran's declaration prompted Russian President Vladimir Putin to declare that he sees "no obstacles to nuclear cooperation with Iran."(25) In a victory for the policy led by the three European states, in December Iran decided to sign the Additional Protocol, allowing the IAEA more access to its declared nuclear sites.(26)
The Additional Protocol represents the final stage of the IAEA's attempt to strengthen its safeguards system known as "Program 93+2," while granting inspectors access to a wider list of sites and the authority to collect environmental sampling from wider areas. It is by no means a guarantee against states which want to cheat the system. However the Additional Protocol, if used intrusively by the IAEA, can create more difficulties for a state intending to have a clandestine nuclear weapons program.(27)
Regardless of the effectiveness of the Additional Protocol, the political victory of the European powers began to lose its luster. First, Iran made operational a new uranium conversion plant in Isfahan in March 2004, forcing the European trio to criticize the action.(28) Second, the IAEA accused the regime in Tehran of systematically trying to delay meetings scheduled with the Agency. In addition, the Iranian Parliament did not move to ratify the country's acceptance of the Additional Protocol. Moreover, Iranian authorities refused to provide full disclosures of its nuclear-related activities as requested by the Agency, especially related to sources for the discovery of highly enriched uranium contamination and the "extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the P-2 advanced centrifuge design."(29)
In June 2004, the Board of Governors of the IAEA in a strongly worded resolution deplored the fact that "Iran's cooperation [with the Agency] has not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have been."(30)
After the issuance of the IAEA resolution, reports emerged that Iran had or was intending to resume building centrifuges and begin enriching uranium. In response, the three European states that in October had received a pledge from Iran not to begin enriching uranium met with Iranian officials in Paris. The outcome of these secret talks were inconclusive, with France and the United Kingdom reportedly supporting a much tougher stance toward Tehran as favored by the United States and Germany not being far out of the mix.(31) Rebuking the three European states for not backing Iran's "cooperation" with the IAEA and allowing the June 2004 resolution to be issued, in early August Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi confirmed that his country had indeed "started building centrifuges," but that Iran had not decided to begin enriching uranium.(32)
According to a British Foreign Office spokesman this meant that Iran is "set on research into the development of the nuclear fuel cycle--for which read nuclear weapons--we are trying to stop them."(33) Tehran's refusal to abide by the agreement it had made with the European trio of foreign ministers prompted U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to hint to European partners that the Iranian regime "has to be isolated in its bad behavior, not 'engaged.'"(34)
Iran's Motives for Developing WMD
Iran's modern history and reestablishment as a strong central state free of foreign influence began in 1501, with the start of the Safavid rule that lasted until 1722. The Safavid policies and cultural legacies have remained part of the Iranian national character and the way that Iranians define themselves to the present day. The most enduring feature of the Safavid dynasty had been its conversion of most of the inhabitants of Iran to Shi'i Islam. From that period onward, Shi'ism has come to serve as the distinct national character and national religion of Iran, thus carving a unique identity for the country, although it is still part of the greater Islamic community. While historically it is unclear exactly why the first Safavid monarch, Shah Isma'il I (1501-24), decided to change the creed of the Iranians from Sunni to Shi'a, the constant struggles between Shi'i Safavids against Sunni Ottoman Turks in the west and the staunchly conservative Sunni Uzbeks, and later Afghans, in the east rendered Iran synonymous with Shi'ism.
Iranian history in the twentieth century has been dominated by two distinctly different regimes represented by the Pahlavis (1925-1979) and the Islamic Republic (1979-present). Reza Shah Pahlavi in his reign between 1925 and 1941 helped to bring Iran out of the prevalent anarchy where every powerful tribal leader was the ruler of his area without any regard to the central government. In its place, he created a centralized autocracy, eliminated tribal powers and laid the foundations of a modern state apparatus that included a national armed force and defined boundaries. To have energized Iran's national sentiments and have fostered a modern disposition, Reza Shah resurrected a new image of the country based on Iran's pre-Islamic history. He insisted that his country be called Iran (the ancient imperial name for the country)--and not Persia, as most Europeans referred to the country. The name Iran, which means "Land of the Aryans" racially separated the Iranians from Turks and Arabs, thus giving them a separate identity based on their imperial past.
Muhammad Reza Shah, who reigned from 1941 to 1979, continued on his father's track and furthered the process of Westernization. In the late 1960s, Iran became the foremost oil exporter in the Middle East, which not only brought petrodollars to the country, but also attracted Western--mostly American--interests to Iran. With limitless funds from the sale of Iranian oil and help from the United States, he established a strong military and an effective intelligence organization. Finally in 1971, in a pompous celebration, Muhammad Reza Shah officially claimed to be the inheritor of the Achaemenid Empire, whereby he changed the Islamic calendar to one based on the ancient Iranian dynastic rule.
Reza Shah's determination to elevate his country's position in the international order as a regional (if not global) power gained momentum after the withdrawal of Britain from the Persian Gulf in 1971. However, this glory did not belong to the majority of the Iranians who were alienated from a regime that no longer represented Iranian society. The two most powerful opposition groups representing popular grievances were the Islamists, led by Shi'i clerics, and the Left, led by secularist intellectuals. The two forces joined forces this does not sound correct – perhaps this could be changed to 'the two forces combined' against the Shah in 1978. Soon after the monarch's fall, however, the Left became the main target of its Islamist allies and was systematically eliminated.
It was under Mohammad Reza Shah that plans for developing a nuclear and missile capability were laid down. With limited technical abilities, however, Iran initially concentrated on acquiring small foreign systems. The United States and other Western states were only too happy to oblige.
During the period of Reza Shah, Iran's quest for WMD--namely nuclear weapons and their delivery systems (i.e., missiles)--was mostly for glory and insuring that Iran was not far behind, or even ahead of, its neighbor Pakistan in developing such weapons. Because at the time Iran had close relations with the United States, nuclear weapons were then seen as a deterrent against the Soviet Union, with which Iran shared a long land and water border.
In February 1979, opposition groups headed by their exiled leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini toppled the Shah and proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Iran. The new regime quickly reversed Iran's dependency on the United States and the relationship between the former allies reached an abyss with an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the subsequent hostage crisis. The advent of the religious, Islamic revolution in Iran became the new regime's raison d'etre.
In September 1980, sensing the chaotic state of affairs in Iran, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq invaded Iran and began a devastating war that lasted until 1988. No formal peace treaty was ever signed. The Iran-Iraq war, in which most Arab countries supported Iraq, ruptured the early revolutionary rhetoric that echoed from Tehran, calling for Muslim unity and stronger ties with the Arab world. Although the vicious war with Iraq ended the pro-Arab sentiments in Iran, it did not shake that country's claimed position as the vanguard of Islamic values.
In Iran's threat perception, the war with Iraq, which Tehran viewed as being imposed on it, exposed the state's vulnerability. A country that perceived itself not only as the region's most powerful state, but also as a mini-superpower, was apparently unable to deal with a much smaller neighbor. Beyond the sense of vulnerability, the experience of war with Iraq illustrated to the revolutionary Iranian leaders a sense of helplessness. Whether totally correct or not, Tehran viewed itself alone and saw the regime in Baghdad being supported financially, militarily, and politically by an array of allies, including Western states.
This sense of abandonment and vulnerability not only threatened the Iranian sovereignty over parts of its territory that had been occupied by the Iraqi forces, but also was threatening the nascent revolutionary Islamic regime.
To address existing threats emanating from Iraq or possible future military action against Iran from other states in its neighborhood, the Khomeini regime in 1981 ordered research on uranium dioxide, generally used to generate electricity in nuclear power plants. By 1985, a uranium centrifuge enrichment program had begun operation.(35) According to Anthony Cordesman, in 1981, Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Beheshti ordered the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to develop a nuclear weapon.(36)
Whereas nuclear weapons were seen as the ultimate symbol of power, prestige and security, Iranian authorities also began a robust program to develop short- and long-range ballistic missiles during the war with Iraq. In the most intensive periods of strategic missile exchanges between Iran and Iraq, commonly known as the "War of the Cities," hundreds of ballistic missiles were fired on civilian targets by both sides. However, Iraq possessed far more missiles than Iran did and by barraging major Iranian cities had changed the tide of the war in its favor.(37)
While the damage to Iranian civilians and infrastructure was not immense relative to the huge number of casualties in that conflict, the missile attacks on civilian targets had a grave psychological effect, which many analysts believe forced Iran to accept UN Security Council Resolution 598 in 1988, paving the way for a ceasefire. It is estimated that the missile attacks by Iraq on Iranian cities killed around 2,000 people during the entire period of the war. In addition, as Aaron Karp has stated, these attacks "drove half of the people of Tehran out the city and damaged morale."(38) Whereas it is generally accepted by military experts that ballistic missiles are normally produced to carry WMD warheads, Iraq used them with conventional warheads as a strategic weapon against Iran in order to demoralize the country. Iraq also delivered chemical weapons by short-range missiles against Iranian troops, but the impact of the conventionally armed missiles made a pivotal impact on Tehran's decision to accept the ceasefire arrangement.
For Iran, missiles are not just strategic weapons; they are also used to alter their enemies' perceptions. Messages on Iranian missiles serve as important international billboards. During a 1998 military parade commemorating the Iranian victory in its war with Iraq, the Shihab-3, Iran's longest-range ballistic missile, was paraded through the streets of Tehran with the following messages: "Israel should be wiped off the map" and "USA cannot do anything." In the following year's parade, the Shihab-3 carried only one sign, quoting Khomeini: "We will trample upon the USA."(39)
An Iranian missile known as the Zelzal-1 was paraded in 1999 with placards stating: "Khamene'i is another Khomeini and his rule is the rule of Ali"--a reference to the infallible rule of the first Imam of the Shi'i Muslims. This message, unlike the one on the Shihab-3, was meant for domestic consumption. It was a warning to the reformers from the hardliners that they should not underestimate the military might in the rulers' hands.
Unlike other WMD programs that Iranian officials deny having, they actually tend to exaggerate their country's missile power. For example, in April 2001, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) launched an unknown number of unidentified surface-to-surface missiles or artillery rockets against bases of the Iraqi-based opposition group known as the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO).(40) According to MKO, Iran fired anywhere from 44 to 77 missiles, identified by most sources as being Scud-B, on its camps inside Iraqi territory, killing one of its members. Iran's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian, stated "These limited and appropriate operations were aimed at halting the attacks against Iran launched by the Munafeqin ['hypocrites,' a term used by Iran to describe the MKO] with Baghdad's support from inside Iraqi soil, but should not be interpreted as a measure against Iraq's territorial integrity."(41)
Iran had no logical reason to waste up to one third of its Scud B arsenal on targets that could be hit with shorter-range and less expensive artillery rockets. However, not only did Iran deny the reports of up to 77 Scud B's being used against the MKO, they actually transmitted these reports through their own media sources. The acceptance of exaggerated claims by the MKO allowed Tehran to showcase that it had the capability to launch more than 70 Scud missiles and as such should be considered a missile powerhouse.
It is also important to recognize the importance and power placed on image and perception. According to some Iranian officials, the messages are not written on missiles to be interpreted literally. These missiles have an important symbolic value for society, which is prestige and power projection. A prime example of the effectiveness of the Iranian approach is the prestige that world attention brought to India and Pakistan for their missile and nuclear developments.
How WMD AddressES Iran's Policies and Threat Perceptions
Prior to the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan following September 11, the prime motivation for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons was to deter Iraq. Other potential threats to Iran's threat perception were Israel, Turkey and Pakistan--either directly or through Islamabad's support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Nuclear weapons also would have allowed Iran to compensate for strategic isolation in face of increasing U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf region. In addition, nuclear weapons are viewed in Tehran as a substitute for its conventional military weakness, especially when compared to the air power of countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Beyond addressing threats and affording influence, nuclear weapons have domestic "benefits" for the regime, too. Following the examples of India and Pakistan, the leadership in Iran can showcase nuclear technology as a substitute for the lack of progress in most economic sectors.
With the destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 and the demise of Iran's archenemy, Iraq in 2003, an argument can be made that some of Iran's incentives to acquire nuclear weapons have been eliminated. However, Iran's other arch-enemy, the United States, has military forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq. A joke making the rounds in Tehran is "that there are just two countries in the world that have only the United States as their neighbor: the other one is Canada."(42)
Even before the demise of Saddam Hussein's regime, IRGC commander Brigadier General Yahya Rahim Safavi said in 2002, "The nature, extent and direction of the threats [against the Islamic Republic] have currently changed and the people must prepare for defense and confrontation in proportion to these threats... We regard America as a serious threat and this attitude is based on the official stance of the Islamic system, which has been approved by the Supreme National Security Council as the official body to decide on state security."(43)
It is true that the United States is now flanking Iran from three sides--including its presence in the Persian Gulf to Iran's south. Yet from a purely military perspective, as illustrated during the campaign in Iraq, the United States has the ability to launch a military strike on Iran without having access to Iraq or Afghanistan. Then what is the reason for the rush by the authorities in Tehran to risk-it-all to obtain nuclear weapons to confront the threat described by Safavi?
The answer can be found not in the fact that the United States is a neighbor of Iran to its east and west, but how the United States got there and how it compromised with Iran's only nuclear power neighbor--Pakistan.
Nuclear Weapons and Regime Security
When U.S. President George W. Bush announced in his State of the Union address in 2002 that Iran, Iraq and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) were posing a "grave and growing danger," he was responding to possible threats against the United States emanating from countries which were developing WMD and supporting terrorism.(44) These three states President Bush claimed, "could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred," and thus made up an "axis of evil" along with their terrorist allies.(45) In the post-September 11 environment, the Bush administration calculated that a combination of states developing WMD and sponsoring terrorism was an unacceptable threat to the United States and its allies.
It is true the three states named by President Bush did not share the same record in supporting terrorism, nor did they share similar history in developing and using WMD. Moreover, there were other states much more active in supporting terrorism while pursuing WMD programs, than, for example, North Korea. A good example is Syria. Iraq on the other hand, while less obvious in its support of terrorism, had the worst track record in the WMD sphere, using chemical weapons against its neighbor Iran and against its own people, while trying to develop nuclear weapons in total breach of its obligations under the NPT.
The argument can be made that the scenario that the Bush administration dreaded the most was a rogue state--one that has had a record of breaking its obligations under international agreements--that also had a pattern of supporting terrorism as a foreign policy tool, combined with a drive to produce nuclear weapons. As potentially devastating as chemical and biological weapons could be, it seems that nuclear weapons in the hand hands of rouge states and/or their client terrorist organizations was the main factor in the selection of Iran, Iraq and North Korea into the "axis of evil" club.
Of the three, the Bush Administration chose to threaten and eventually use force against Iraq. But the forceful removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power in April 2003 has had, at least in the short-term, an adverse affect on stopping the nuclearization of the other two members of the "axis of evil."
The fact that Iraqi WMD programs have not been discovered following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime has given the critics of the Bush Administration and of British Prime Minister Tony Blair a chance to declare that the war in Iraq was fought for pretexts other that than that country's pursuit of WMD. This in turn may have given some countries the moral ground to challenge the United States or Britain in future cases where a country's undeclared WMD program can be used as justification for military action or even political and economic pressures.
North Korea announced on January 10, 2003, that it has withdrawn from the NPT, effective immediately.(46) In April, the official North Korean news agency, issued a statement from the country's foreign ministry stating, "As we have already declared, we are successfully going forward to reprocess work of more than 8,000 spent fuel rods at the final phase as we sent interim information to the United States and other countries concerned early in March after resuming our nuclear activities from December last year [2002]."(47)
In July 2003, North Korean diplomats told American counterparts in New York that Pyongyang has produced sufficient plutonium to make six nuclear bombs, to which U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher replied that "North Korea has made a variety of claims," some of which had been false.(48) Comparing North Korea's overt and perhaps exaggerated claims of achievements in the nuclear weapons development to the Iraqi case, an American official said that North Korea represents, "The mirror image of the Iraq problem," adding, "we spent a year looking for evidence Iraq was lying when it said it didn't have a nuclear program. Now North Korea says it's about to go nuclear, and everyone is trying to figure our whether they've finally done it, or if it's the big lie."(49)
There is no doubt that both the Iranian and the North Korean nuclear programs started well before the ouster of the Iraqi regime from power. However, the situation in Iraq may have given a fresh impetus for Iran's drive to go nuclear, and as such, elevated the value of nuclear weapons to such a level that the clerical regime in Iran is willing to gamble its very existence to acquire them.
The "value" of possessing nuclear weapons in altering the attitude of Washington vis-à-vis a potential target country, at least in the view of important circles in Iran, can be evaluated from U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In the case of Afghanistan, after the most devastating attack on its soil since 1941, the United States not only had the right, but had no choice than to respond with force against the terrorists who carried out the attacks and against a state that harbored and supported them. One of those states was Pakistan, the main and perhaps only force behind the Taliban regime which hosted the al-Qa'ida terrorist network.(50) As early as 1987, when groups such as al-Qa'ida were in their formative stages, of 777 terrorist incidents recorded globally, 90 percent occurred in Pakistan.(51) General Pervez Musharraf had in 1999 terminated a democratic--albeit not perfect--process in Pakistan on his way to becoming the leader of his country.(52) Pakistan's record in human rights was very dismal, too.
But despite all of this, Washington chose to ally itself with Islamabad. The reasons for this action are numerous and fall outside the scope of this article, but it is suffice to say that U.S. dealings with the Musharraf regime further enhanced the notion that Washington respects nuclear weapons. In the Pakistani case, an illegitimate regime--coming to power in a military putsch--which has supported terrorism in Afghanistan and Kashmir, was tolerated, and indeed befriended by the United States partly because it had nuclear weapons that had the potentiality of falling in the hands of Islamic radical parties in Pakistan. An unstable, nuclear-armed Pakistan could also trigger a potentially devastating unconventional war with India.
Even after the establishment of a UN-mandated Transitional Administration of Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime, Islamabad continued to support radical militants that opposed the new Afghan system. As late as April 2004, Washington's ambassador to Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad expressed his country's frustration with the lack of cooperation from Islamabad in curtailing the activities of militants along the Afghan-Pakistani border. "A major continuing challenge is the problem of enemy sanctuaries in Pakistan," and "the Taliban and other terrorist organizations continue to be able to base, train and operate from Pakistani territories," Khalilzad stated.(53) Despite his ambassador's comments, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell recommended to Bush that the United States, "Recognize Pakistan as a 'Major Non-NATO Ally' in recognition of its close and continuing cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism."(54) The U.S. president accepted this recommendation. Prior to placing Pakistan into a category of allies that includes countries such as Japan, Washington allowed Islamabad the freedom to deal as it wished with Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who had been involved in international black market transfers of nuclear arms materials. In what IAEA Director General al-Baradai has referred to as the "Wal-Mart" of nuclear trafficking, the operation led by Khan also supplied Iran with nuclear technology.(55)
In Iraq's case, it was clear that in 2003, the regime of Saddam Hussein did not possess nuclear weapons. Thus, in Iranian calculations, Iraq, as a member of the "axis of evil" became the first military target because it did not have nuclear weapons. Husayn Shari'atmadari, the influential editor of Tehran's conservative daily Kayhan, suggested that Iran should withdraw from the NPT. When asked why, he replied that when in 1991 the United States and its allies were at the gates of Baghdad following the liberation of Kuwait, they did not "choose to attack Iraq… because at that time, Iraq had a great arms power and America didn't want to defeat Iraq by suffering heavy casualties." Thus, they chose to eliminate Iraq's WMD through UN sanctions before invading the country in 2003.(56)
The regime in Iran believes that the United States will, sooner or later, directly or indirectly, put an end to its very existence. Of course, changes in the U.S. administration in elections or the problems facing the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere, may delay or speed up such an eventuality. The Iranian regime, however, wants to prevent this from happening whatever the timing. The only assured way they can see is going nuclear, and fast. By talking tough, the Iranian regime seeks to hide its sense of weakness and buy enough time to produce its desired deterrent.
According to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, his country is a model for Islamic countries and thus is opposed by the United States. As such, rapprochement with the United States is tantamount to treason for Iran.(57) However, Khamene'i qualified his statement by adding that when economic, cultural, scientific and military bases of Iran are solidified and the country becomes strong, then perhaps the United States would lessens lessen its enmity toward Iran and the two countries may begin talking to each other. The message of Khamene'i is that unless Iran is strong--i.e., with nuclear weapons--it cannot be friendly with the United States and as such is a target for Washington.
Iran's WMD Posture
Officially, the Islamic Republic of Iran denies that it has any biological, chemical or nuclear weapons in its arsenal, or that it has plans to acquire such weapons. Iran does not regard ballistic missiles as being prohibited by any international agreement that it has signed and therefore does not deny possessing and building such weapons, which it claims are for defensive purposes. However, Iranian officials have on several occasions hinted at the need for their country to possess WMD. For example, Rafsanjani declared in 1988, "Chemical and biological weapons are a poor man's atomic bomb and can easily be produced. We should at least consider them for our defense. Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the [Iran-Iraq] war taught us that international laws are only scraps of paper."(58)
The year before, Rafsanjani made a similar statement, suggesting:
With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was made very something missing here 'clear' perhaps during the war that these weapons are very decisive. It was also made clear that the moral teachings of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage and the world does not respect its own resolutions and closes its eyes to the violations and the aggressions which are committed on the battlefield. We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on you should make use of the opportunity and perform the task.(59)
Given the experience of Tehran's stalling games it has played with the IAEA since 2003, it can be deduced that the truth regarding Iran's arsenal of chemical and biological weapons likely contradicts Tehran's official stance on these weapons.
Nuclear Weapons
Iran first acquired nuclear technology under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, when the United States provided a five-megawatt research reactor in 1967 at the Amirabad Nuclear Research Center. In the early 1970s, the Shah had planned to develop over twenty nuclear power reactors around the country, all under the AEOI.(60) Among the more significant deals the Shah's government concluded was an agreement with a French-Belgian-Spanish-Italian consortium granting full access to its enrichment technology and a supply of enriched uranium.
As early as the mid-1970s, the United States suspected that Iran had, despite its commitments to the NPT, begun some research into nuclear weapons at the Amirabad location. Among the Shah's more suspicious activities were his on-going efforts toward enrichment capabilities, including illegal efforts to obtain laser isotope separation technology from the United States. Iran had also been researching weapons design as well as exploring other means of obtaining plutonium and enriched uranium. By the time of the Islamic Revolution and the Shah's collapse, Iran had negotiated a secret deal with South Africa to purchase up to 1,000 metric tons of yellowcake (processed uranium ore used in centrifuges for the enrichment process) per year.
While initially hesitating to pursue WMD--reportedly due to Khomeini's view that WMD contradicted Islamic morals--the Islamic Republic restarted the country's nuclear program in earnest no later than 1985 during the Iran-Iraq War.
In its June 2003 report, the usually timid IAEA clarified some of the suspicions regarding Iran nuclear activities, while stopping short of declaring that the country was intending to build nuclear weapons. IAEA Director General al-Baradai concluded what most observers of the Iranian nuclear program had suspected. The IAEA reports contains a detailed list of activities that "Iran was obliged to have reported."(61) The most incriminating of these activities are Iran's importing of natural uranium (from China though the report does not name the country of origin), and its building of new facilities for processing and storage of the uranium. Many open questions remain in the IAEA report, such as why Iran converted some of its imported natural uranium to uranium metal, "since neither its light water reactors [under construction in Bushehr] nor its planned heavy water reactors [planned to be constructed in Arak and Isfahan] require uranium metal for fuel."(62)
In a follow-up report in November, al-Baradai highlighted the fact that Iran has been developing a uranium centrifuge enrichment program for the past 18 years and a laser enrichment program for the last 12 years.(63) According to the IAEA, while the breaches by Iran "to date have involved limited quantities of nuclear material, they have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing." However, somehow, the IAEA report concludes, "To date, there is no evidence" that Iran's illicit nuclear activities "were related to a nuclear weapons program."(64)
Currently, few serious observers believe that Iran's nuclear-related activities are solely for the purpose of building and maintaining nuclear power plants for civilian uses. What is debated is the best way to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state and how much time is left before Iran reaches the point of no return--i.e., when the country no longer needs foreign assistance or material to build a nuclear bomb.
According to retired Israeli Brigadier General Ephraim Sneh, Iran has already reached the point of no return and it is only a matter of how fast the regime in Tehran can work before it produces a nuclear warhead.(65) According to reported estimates made by the British and French governments, Iran could have nuclear weapon capability by 2007.(66) An assessment by the Israeli intelligence chiefs in July 2004 also predicts a nuclear weapons capable Iran by 2007.(67)
Chemical Weapons
There is very limited, reliable open-source information available about the possible existence and nature of Iranian chemical weapons programs. Numerous allegations, made primarily by Iranian opposition groups and the U.S. government, have not been corroborated or supported by other sources or any public physical evidence.
According to U.S. sources, Iran made use of captured Iraqi chemical mortars as early as 1984 and by 1986-87 the country developed the capability to produce its own lethal chemical agents sufficient to be weaponized.(68) While some sources claim that Iran in fact used chemical weapons in the later stages of its war with Iraq, lack of evidence puts the credibility of such reports into doubt. However, Rafsanjani's quotations above clearly suggests that Iran's intentions have been to produce chemical weapons for both offensive and defensive purposes.(69)
Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November 1997 and despite assertions by Washington that Iran may be in breach of its obligations with the CWC, on December 8, 2000, the Director General of the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), José Maurício Bustani released an official statement in which he said, "The Secretariat wishes to reiterate that it has no reason whatsoever to question Iran's full compliance with the CWC, and that the application of verification measures in Iran is strictly in accordance with the Convention. There are no grounds for any concern or ambiguity in this regard."(70)
For Iran, chemical weapons do not have the value that nuclear weapons or long-range missiles afford it. As the "poor man's atomic bomb," chemical weapons can stop an advancing enemy or be used as a deterrent against potential use of such weapons by an adversary. When Iraq used chemical weapon against its enemy from 1982 until 1988, Iran was incapable of responding in kind other than possibly using unexploded or captured Iraqi shells.(71)
Until it develops better long-range missiles, chemical weapons in Iranian hands cannot be regarded as a direct threat to Europe, though it is possible that in case of elevated hostilities between an EU member state and Iran, Tehran-backed terrorist groups could use chemical weapons.
European countries, in general, have not accused Iran of possessing chemical weapons and have not publicly called on Tehran to take any measures to alleviate the questions regarding its possible possession of chemical weapons.
Compared to its possible chemical weapons arsenal and programs, there is even less information available publicly regarding the possibility of Iranian biological weapons programs. Iran acceded to the Geneva protocol in 1929 and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1973. Nevertheless, the United States charges that Iran began to pursue BW in the early to mid-1980s and continues to support an offensive BW program linked to its civilian biotech industry. The CIA believes that Iran holds "some stocks of biological agents and weapons..." and the country has "the infrastructure to support a significant biological weapons program with little foreign assistance."(72)
Similar to chemical weapons, Iran's possession of biological weapons does not constitute a direct threat to the European continent, unless Iran is able to extend the range of its missiles and obtain or develop warheads capable of transporting the very volatile agents. However, biological weapons may be useful in small- or large-scale Iranian sponsored terrorist attacks in Europe.
As a whole the EU has not accused Iran of possessing biological weapons and has not made the issue a public policy matter.
Ballistic Missiles and Other WMD Delivery Systems
Other than some rumored associations with Israel on the development of the Jericho missiles and either an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) or an advanced cruise missile, before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran obtained most of its modern weaponry, missiles, and rockets from the United States and Western European states. The use of missiles in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war left an indelible mark on the Iranian psyche. Missiles were used as strategic weapons in the war, targeting cities and civilian centers. The inaccuracy of the Iraqi Scud-B missiles, and later the Iraqi modified Scud-B al-Husayn missiles, did not detract from their psychological effectiveness.
Iran, emerging from the eight-year war as a country in dire economic and industrial straits, launched a significant military build-up in an effort to rebuild morale and to be better prepared to face its rival in the future. That build-up included a focus on the domestic production and development not only of more missiles, but more effective missiles.
Iran had to conclude that the most effective deterrent was an ability to respond in kind to any attack, with the potential for an increase in stakes during retaliation. This factor is most likely one of the reasons for the confusing and opaque nature of the Iranian missile program, which gives contrary information on the precise numbers of missiles, their type, and even the missiles' names themselves. These techniques are all indications that the Iranians are pursuing opacity to ensure that their enemies will never be quite confident in their assessment of Iran's military and missile capabilities.
Iran has focused on acquiring self-sufficiency in missile and weapons production. To this end, Iran has concentrated on two tactics. The first is to reverse-engineer missiles from foreign sources. Over the years, Iran has developed a considerable capacity in this field, having reverse-engineered Soviet, Chinese, North Korean, and American missile technology. The second tactic is to adapt these missiles for use by the IRGC, which coordinates missile use and production. Though the true extent of Iran's procurement network is unknown, it is not nearly as extensive or wide-ranging was that of its arch-enemy, Iraq, during the 1980s. Iran is noted as having past or ongoing technical and financial links with Syria, Libya, and North Korea.
Iranian Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ali Shamkhani declared in February 1999--and reiterated again in February 2001--that the Shihab-3 medium-range ballistic missile will be its last combat missile platform. As such, these missiles, no matter what warhead they carry, are not a direct threat to the European continent.(73)
However, U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources cite that Iran is seeking further combat missile capabilities with the development of the Shihab-4, Shihab-5, Shihab-6 long-range ballistic missiles, and the Kosar ICBM. Shamkhani has described the development of the Shihab-4, reportedly based on the North Korean Taepo Dong and/or a knock-off of the Soviet SS-4 Sandel missile, as a satellite launch vehicle platform for civilian use. This, of course, is the same type of statement heard from Iranian officials regarding their nuclear activities.
Consequences of an Iran Armed with Nuclear Weapons
In an article, James Noyes has asked: "Could any prudent regime in Iran not maintain and seek to improve an arsenal of WMD?"(74) The question ought to be put in reverse order. Can the international community, led by the EU, allow the Iranian regime to maintain and improve its arsenal of WMD, especially nuclear weapons?
Once Iran has managed to build at least two nuclear devices, even if these weapons are not deliverable using the existing ballistic missiles available to the country, leaders in Tehran could opt for one of several options.
Iran, following the examples of India and Pakistan, could test openly, thus informing the world that it is in fact a nuclear power regardless of the number of warheads at its disposal. In which case, Iran would withdraw from the NPT. In the second scenario, the regime in Tehran, emulating the Israeli example, denies it has nuclear weapons. In this case, Iran may choose to allow leaks regarding its nuclear arsenal or stay quiet when another state accuses that it has such weapons. The benefit of the second option is that Iran could still technically stay within the NPT, unless in a challenge inspection the IAEA demands to inspect suspected sites.(75)
Regardless of what options a nuclear weapons capable Iran chooses, the prospects of the current regime in Tehran having access to these weapons is devastating for Middle Eastern (and even global) peace and security. The long-term dangers of a nuclear Iran do not change even if a more moderate regime comes to power in that country, mainly because it will signal the beginning of a renewed regional arms race. Should additional countries in the ever-volatile Middle East more vigorously pursue their own WMD programs in order to create a balance of threat vis-à-vis a nuclear Iran, it cannot but increase the chance of a catastrophic conflict in Europe's backyard.(76)
Even if the Arab states of the Middle East do not immediately try to obtain their own nuclear weapons, "Iran's nuclear bomb may bring Arabs closer to Tehran to benefit from its grown strength," and as such it may not be seen as a negative factor by certain Arab countries.(77) If true, Arab rapprochement with an increasingly conservative-dominated Iranian regime could only bring to a halt the already slow steps being taken by some Arab states towards more openness and drive more of their citizens to the European shores.
More than the general threat that such a renewed arms race would create, for Europeans, an Iran armed with nuclear weapons and long-range missiles poses a direct threat. This threat is not limited to Iran threatening European countries with nuclear-tipped missiles, but also the potential scenario of Iran using terrorism as a means to threaten the specific European state or states into taking a less confrontational policy towards any of Tehran problematic policies.
As the commentary in Tehran daily Jomhuri-ye Islami cited above warns, when dealing with the Iranian regime, the Europeans may really not know with whom they are talking.
Active nonproliferation measures that may be adopted by other states, specially the United States or Israel, in order to stop or at least slow down Iran's quest to obtain nuclear weapons, may also entail unintended or planned adverse consequences for EU states. Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz last year warned, "Israel can in no way accept the presence of a nuclear weapon in Iranian hands."(78) However most Israeli analysts and politicians believe that unlike the 1981 operation in which Israeli destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor, in the case of Iran, Israel cannot take military action alone.(79) According to Yuval Steinitz, chairman of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons is a "world problem."(80) While Israel may not gain the global support Steinitz is hoping for to confront the Iranian nuclear threat, the United States is increasingly sounding evermore ready to use force in dealing with the problem. Condoleezza Rice recently warned that her country and its allies "cannot allow the Iranians to develop a nuclear weapon," adding that President Bush would "look at all tools available to him" to try to prevent such a scenario from happening.(81)
Should Israel undertake military action on its own or in concert with the United States against Iranian nuclear installations, Tehran will likely retaliate against the most convenient targets. Should Israel strike alone, this may very well mean using Hizballah and other terrorist organizations in the region against Israeli targets, possibly even against targets abroad as Iran did in the early 1990s. Should it be done in cooperation with the United States, the retribution may be against U.S. and coalition forces--many of which are European--in Afghanistan and Iraq.
As for the diplomatic alternative to the use of force, U.S. plans to bring the Iranian nuclear weapons issue before the United Nations Security Council have so far received resistance from major EU member states, such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom.(82)
What Can the EU Do to Prevent the Iranian Threat?
The EU has a chance, if not a responsibility, to act decisively and, if necessary, forcefully when addressing Tehran's quest to acquire nuclear weapons. The EU has more political and economic clout with Iran than the United States, and it stands to lose more than Washington does if Iran joined the "nuclear club."
Thus far, while the EU, or certain member states, have recently shown better resolve, there still seems to be reluctance on the part of the Europeans to deal decisively with Iran. It should use its leverage to insist on better behavior and more international cooperation when it comes to that country's pursuit of WMD, its support for terrorism and, related to that, its opposition to any peace initiative between the Arabs and Israel.
Practical steps, which the EU can take immediately to address Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, should include direct linkage between its trade agreements with Tehran, including the TCA, and the total dismantlement of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle and heavy water production projects.
A month after the agreement between Iran and the European trio, EU's foreign policy chief Javier Solana claimed the Iranians "have been honest," but qualified his statement by adding: "Let's see if they continue all the way to the end."(83) Since early 2004, it has become crystal clear that Iranian authorities have not been honest and are simply playing for time.
While it is true that after the Iraqi situation, much more evidence will be needed for there to be international action taken to prevent nuclear proliferation by a particular state, but still the EU can and should be firmer with Tehran--not only within the context of the IAEA, but also on a bilateral basis. EU member states should express openly that a nuclear-armed Iran would not be tolerated at any cost. Furthermore, the EU should work with Moscow and actively discourage Russia from supporting Iran's nuclear weapons ambition, directly or indirectly.
As suggested by Ephraim Asculai, the EU also could work closely with the United States, and form a coalition of countries that include Japan, Russia, and a number of Non-Aligned Movement member states to pressure Iran in abandoning its nuclear ambitions.(84)
In order to satisfy Tehran's desire to have access to nuclear energy, the EU could guarantee that it would supply Iran, at a reduced cost if necessary, fuel for its IAEA-supervised nuclear power plants. The core of Iran's current argument for its nuclear activities is that it needs to produce fuel for its power plant under construction at Bushehr. An official pledge by the EU that Iran would be supplied with fuel should satisfy Tehran--unless, of course, if Iran's true intention is not to produce nuclear energy, but a nuclear bomb.
Steven Everts wrote in 2003 that with "luck, Europe's best and brightest will come up with an effective strategy for dealing with the Iranian [nuclear] question."(85) Let's hope that luck is on the side of the Europeans and in the near future they don't have to use the best and brightest to find ways to save the continent from a "nightmare" nuclear race emanating from its southeast.(86)
NOTES
1. Editorial appearing in the conservative Iranian daily Jomhuri-ye Islami in response to the meeting between Iranian officials in Paris in August 2004 with their British, French, and German counterparts to discuss Tehran's nuclear activities, quoted in Guy Dinmore and Gareth Smyth, "Support grows for UN Showdown with Iran Over Nuclear Programme," The Financial Times, August 5, 2004. <http://www.ft.com>
2. See Shahram Chubin, "Whither Iran?" Adelphi Paper, No. 342 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 32.
3. In April 1997, the EU decided that while ambassadors of individual member states can return to Tehran, only through unanimity can the EU resume its policy of critical dialogue with Iran. According to a Reuters report of April 29, 1997, an unidentified EU official said that the court ruling in Berlin was "the death-knell for the critical dialogue policy."
4. The first official contact between the EU and Iran was made in July 1998 when a delegation led by Albert Rohan, the deptuy foreign minister of Austria visited Tehran.
5. Robert S. Litwak, Rouge States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), p. 167.
6. When Rushdie won a literary prize in Denmark in 1996, Copenhagen initially refused to allow the British author permission to enter the country, citing security concerns, however later the Danish government apologized to Rushdie and promised to have him in the country during 1996. Iranian government said that the Danish apology "increased the disgust of Moslems whose religious beliefs had been insulted." In contrast, in February 1997, Greece played host to Iranian Vice President Hassan Habibi making him the highest ranking Iranian visitor to a EU member state since the Islamic Revolution. Geoffrey Kemp, America and Iran: Road Maps and Realism (The Nixon Center, 1998), p. 11; AP, November 1, 1996; Reuters, quoting IRNA, November 6, 1996; and Reuters, February 18, 1997.
7. Kemp, America and Iran, p. 37. Kemp's "red button" issues also includes the legacy of the past relations between the U.S. and Iran; the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf; and "economic disputes including sanctions, energy policy and the disposition of Iranian financial assets frozen by the U.S."
8. Litwak, Rouge States, p. 169. During a press conference in February 1995 with U.S. President Bill Clinton, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl pointed out that it was "American oil companies, not German oil companies," that "export [Iranian oil] into other countries."
9. Iran initially did not allow ambassadors from Denmark and German to return, prompting the EU to agree that unless Tehran allowed all 15 ambassadors, none would return to Iran.
10. "EU-Iran: launch of negotiations on new agreements with Iran," IP/02/1862, December 11, 2002, EU official website <http://europa.eu.int> (accessed on December 18, 2003).
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Geoffrey Kemp. "How to Stop the Iranian Bomb," The National Interest, Summer 2003, accessed through Gulf 2000 Project.
14. Ibid.
15. "EU-Iran: launch of negotiations on new agreements with Iran," IP/02/1862, December 11, 2002, EU official website <http://europa.eu.int> (accessed on December 18, 2003).
16. The most elaborate report regarding Iran's illicit nuclear activities were presented in August 2002 by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, showing satellite photographs of sites near Nataz and Arak, see Sharon Squassoni, "Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments," CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report for Congress, August 15, 2003, p. 2.
17. U.S. statement was delivered on April 28, 2002, by Assistant Secretary of State John S. Wolf.
18. "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report of the Director of the IAEA to the Board of Governors (GOV/2003/40), June 6, 2003, p. 7.
19. 2003 G8 Summit Documents, "Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A G8 Declaration," <http://www.g8.fr/evian/> (accessed July 6, 2003).
20. "The EU's relations with Iran," June 16, 2003, EU official website <http://europa.eu.int> (accessed on July 6, 2003).
21. Ibid.
22. See Daniel Bayman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Jarrold Green, Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. RAND, 2001, p. 86.
23. Squassoni, "Iran's Nuclear Program," p. 6.
24. "Tehran's Declaration on Nuclear Program," transcript of the delclaration as reported by Reuters in The New York Times, October 21, 2003.
25. "Russia Ready to Help Iran With Nuclear Plant," The New York Times, November 11, 2003.
26. "Iran Signs NPT Additional Protocol," IRNA, December 18, 2003.
27. For a study of the Additional Protocol and Iran's nuclear policy, see Chen Zak, "Iran's Nuclear Policy and the IAEA: An Evaluation of Program 93+2," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Military Research Papers, No. 3, 2002.
28. Richard Bernstein, "Europeans Criticize Iran's Plan to Start Up Enrichment Plant," The New York Times, April 1, 2004.
29. "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Resolution adopted by the Borad [of Governors of IAEA] on June 18, 2004 (GOV/2004/49), pp. 1-2. P-2 centrifuge is a design that A Q Khan of Pakistan copied from European designs for use in Pakistani nuclear weapons program and which he exported to countries such as Iran and Libya.
30. Ibid. p. 2.
31. Dinmore and Smyth, "Support grows for UN Showdown with Iran Over Nuclear Programme."
32. "Iran Building Centrifuges, Defying Nuclear Watchgod," Reuters, August 1, 2004.
33. "Hope of Saving Iranian Nuclear Deal is Fading," The Guardian, July 20, 2004.
34. "Support grows for UN Showdown with Iran Over Nuclear Programme," The Financial Times, August 5, 2004.
35. "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran." Director General's Report to the IAEA Borad of Governors, November 10, 2003, GOV/2003/75, pp. 3, 9.
36. Anthony Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Backgroud Paper for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 7, 2000, p. 6.
37. For an assessment of the missile war between Iran and Iraq, see Anoushirvan Ehteshami, "Iran's 'War of the Cities' Experience," in Ben Sheppard, Ed. Ballistic Missile Proliferation, Jane's Information Group, March 2000.
38. Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Techniques (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 45.
39. See Amin Tarzi, "Iran's Missile Test Sends Mixes Messages," Center for Nonproliferation Studies Reports, August 15, 2000 <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/shehab.htm> (accessed August 4, 2004).
40. For a detailed account of the attack on the MKO camps, see, Amin Tarzi and Darby Parliament, "Missile Messages: Iran Strikes MKO Bases in Iraq," in Nonproliferatoin Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 125-133.
41. "Iran informs UN that measures against MKO were defensive," IRNA (Tehran), April 19, 2001
<http://www.irna.com>.
42. See Steven Everts, "Iran: The Next Big Crisis," Prospect, December 2003, p. 47.
43. "Iran Prepares for U.S. Attack," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 177, May 13, 2002.
44. The State of the Union Address by U.S. President George W. Bush, January 29, 2002 <http://www.whitehouse.gov>.
45. Ibid.
46. Letter, dated January 10, 2003, by the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the French Presidency of the United Nations Security Council and the States Parties of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
47. "Factsheet on North Korean Nuclear Reprocessing Statement" April 23, 2003, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies <http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/repro.htm> (accessed July 19, 2003).
48. "North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel for Atom Bombs," The New York Times, July 15, 2003.
49. Ibid.
50. For an account of how Pakistan in fact created the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 1994 and continued to sustain them militarily and politically despite numerous requests by the United States and the United Nations, see Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (London: Yale University Press, 2000). On the WMD front, Pakistan has been identified by the C.I.A. as both a supplier of nuclear technology to North Korea and a purchaser of North Korean missiles; see "U.S. Says Russia Helped Iran in Nuclear Arms Effort," The New York Times, December 16, 2002.
51. Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), p. 8.
52. For more detailed analysis for why the United States chose to ignore Pakistan's record with the Taliban and democracy, see Amin Tarzi, "Proliferation Assessments: Iran's Strategic Environment After 9/11" in Michael Barletta (ed.), "After 9/11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional Paper No. 8, May 2002, pp. 31-37.
53. Transcript of Zalmay Khalilzad's speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2004, <www.csis.org> (accessed April 7, 2004).
54. Daily Press Breifing, April 1, 2004, U.S. State Department <http://www.state.gov>.
55. "U.N. Official Sees a 'Wal-Mart' in Nuclear Trafficking," The New York Times, January 23, 2004.
56. Husyan Shari'atmadari, "What Have They Dreamt for Us?," Kayhan, July 12, 2003.
57. Khamene'i quoted in Kayhan, July 27, 2000.
58. Paula A. DeSutter, Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring Iranian Use of NBC Weapons (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), p. 44, quoting Rafsanjani on Teheran radio October 6, 1988.
59. Quoted in Kori N. Schake and Judith S. Yaphe, "The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran," McNair Paper 64, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 2001, p. 3.
60. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein and Day, 1980), p. 177. According to Pahlavi, four nuclear power plants were planned to be operational by 1984. He does not indicate when the other 14 plants would have been built. According to more recent reports, the Shah of Iran was intending to built 23 nuclear power plants, see Squassoni, "Iran's Nuclear Program," p. 5.
61. "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report of the Director of the IAEA to the Board of Governors (GOV/2003/40), June 6, 2003, p. 4.
62. Ibid. p. 5.
63. "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Director General's Report to the IAEA Borad of Governors (GOV/2003/75) November 10, 2003, p. 9.
64. Ibid., 10.
65. Riad Kahwaji, "Nuclear Iran Unsettles Friends, Foes," Defense News, January 12, 2004. <www://http://DefenseNews.com> Sneh is the chairman of the subcommittee on defense planning and policy in the Israeli Knesset (Parliament).
66. Everts, "Iran: The Next Big Crisis," p. 47.
67. Ed Blanche, "Danger Zone: Iran Nears Point of Nuclear No Return," The Daily Star, July 31, 2004.
68. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran's Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999), pp. 233-34.
69. Cordesman , for example, claims that Iran made "sporadic" use of blister and blood agents, and possibly phosgene and chlorine gases in 1987 and 1988, see ibid, p. 234.
70. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Office of the Director General, Statement by Director General of the OPCW, Mr. José Maurício Bustani, December 8, 2000.
71. For a list of Iraq against Iran using chemical weapons, see, Cordesman, Iran' Military Forces, pp. 338-39.
72. Cordesman, Iran's Military Forces, p. 355.
73. See Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Country Overviews: Iran--Missile Capabilities" <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile> (accessed on August 9, 2004).
74. James H. Noyes, "Fallacies, Smoke and Pipe Dreams: Forcing Change in Iran and Iraq," Middle East Policy, Vol. 7, No. 3 (June 2000), p. 29.
75. For discsusion of other scenarios, see Kori and Yaphe, "The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran," pp. 13-14.
76. See Amin Tarzi, "The Prospects of a Nuclear Iran," August 2003, accessible at Middle East Newtwork Library <http://128.97.229.117>
77. Retired Major General Kard Said, head of the military unit of the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic and Policial Studies in Cairo quoted in Riad Kahwaji, "Nuclear Iran Unsettles Friends, Foes."
78. Ha'aretz, November 18, 2003.
79. Ed Blanche, "Danger Zone."
80. Ibid.
81. David E. Sanger, "Rice Says Iran Must Not Be Allowed to Develop Nuclear Arms," The New York Times, August 9, 2004.
82. Steven R. Weisman, "Allies Resist U.S. Efforts to Pressure Iran on Arms," The New York Times, September 9, 2004.
83. Thomas Fuller, "Wider Split Between U.S. and Europe Over Iran," The New York Times, November 18, 2003.
84. Ephraim Asculai, "Iran, The IAEA and the Legend of the Smoking Gun," in Tel Aviv Notes, Mark A. Heller (ed.), Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, No. 110, September 2004, p. 4.
85. Everts, "Iran: The Next Big Crisis," p. 49.
86. This phrasing was used by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in his recent comments. See "German FM: Iranian nuclear arms buildup--'nightmare,'" AP, August 29, 2004.
Amin Tarzi is an analyst at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). Previously, Tarzi worked as a senior researcher on Iran at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey Institute for International Studies in California. The views expressed here are those of the author and not of RFE/RL.