Volume 8, No. 3 - September 2004
Volume 8, No. 3 - September 2004
While the threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program has been diminished in the wake of the war in Iraq in 2003, studying the motivations behind Saddam's acquisition of these weapons is necessary to understand how states in the Middle East may seek to acquire similar weapons in the future. This paper, based on captured documents from the Iraqi leadership and intelligence services that span the periods of the Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf War, analyzes Iraq's rationale for developing its WMD programs.
(This article was originally written for a project and conference on "Countering Threats in the Era of Mass Destruction: Accounts from the Middle East and Europe," co-sponsored by the GLORIA Center and The Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) of Italy.)
While it is clear that there is no longer any threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program in the wake of the war in Iraq in 2003, studying the motivations behind Saddam Hussein's acquisition of these weapons is necessary to understand why states in the Middle East may seek to acquire similar weapons in the future. Having had invested more in its WMD program than any other country in the developing world, Iraq had sought to develop this capability since the mid-1970s when Saddam became vice president of Iraq. Once assuming the leadership of Iraq in 1979, he intensified Iraq's drive to become a regional power. Saddam's WMD program grew as Iraq embarked on a disastrous war with its neighbor Iran. Saddam had to match Iran's larger army by developing WMD to stop its offensives into Iraqi territory. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq over its suspected WMD program in 2003, brought to the fore the question of the threat Iraq's WMD posed to the Middle East and to Europe.
This article will examine Iraq's rationale for developing weapons of mass destruction, gleaning clues by analyzing captured documents from the Iraqi leadership and intelligence services--documents which span the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and the 1991 Gulf War. These documents demonstrate that in the face of international and domestic threats, WMD was seen by Baghdad as a necessary means for guaranteeing the survival of not only the Iraqi nation, but more importantly, the regime of Saddam Hussein. By using these documents to ascertain the Iraqi mindset on WMD use, as well as its threat perceptions, one can postulate whether Iraq would have used nuclear weapons if, in fact, it had acquired them. While such a nuclear capability may not have threatened the security of Europe directly, it would have given Saddam the ability to threaten the much weaker Gulf States to his south. His ability to intimidate and influence these nations would have given him strategic leverage over the region's oil resources, on which Europe is heavily dependent.
After the 1991 Gulf War, hundreds of thousands of secret Iraqi state files were abandoned in Kuwait and the north of Iraq by retreating Iraqi forces. These documents are currently being classified by the Iraq Research and Documentation Project (IRDP), and the Iraqi state files can be accessed through their website.(1) A careful review of these documents provides an unprecedented insight into the operations, organizations, chains of command and control, and divisions of power of the extensive network of Saddam's state security apparatus.(2)
This article attempts to use these documents to explore possible implications regarding the critical subject of weapons of mass destruction. The problem remains, however, that the Iraqi documents do not make many specific references to Iraqi WMD. Still, the documents do give substantial evidence through indirect references about Iraqi development and use of WMD.
Despite the fall of Saddam's regime, the analysis still remains relevant for a variety of reasons. First, it provides a starting point with which to understand WMD issues in Iraq that can then be used as the basis for further research by other international agencies. Second, the insights gained here may be relevant to other countries of concern and can be used as one additional means by which to better understand their weapons programs and how they might be controlled.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Iraq ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1969; however, Iraq intended to use the benefits of the NPT to secretly obtain nuclear weapons. In 1976, Iraq purchased its Osiraq research reactor, which had the capability of irradiating uranium to produce significant quantities of plutonium. Iraq's plans to extract enough fissile material for a nuclear device were hindered on June 7, 1981, when Israel launched an air raid that destroyed the nuclear reactor.
On August 9, 1981, Iraq's Military Intelligence Agency issued a report to the commander of Iraq's Air Defense Corps, entitled, "A Study and Analysis of the Zionist strike on the Tammuz (Osiraq) Nuclear Plant." The document is critical of Iraqi failures to secure the site: "The Zionist enemy took advantage of the weak points, which are the vulnerability of our nuclear plant to aerial bombardment, and the unfinished dirt walls that were supposed to be erected to guard against such an event." The document concludes with assurances that such shortcomings have been remedied: "We have taken positive procedures to reduce the likelihood and success of a future Zionist air strike on any of our vital military targets in Iraq."(3) It is significant that this document stresses learning from past shortcomings and the need to rectify them in the future. Still, the tone employed in this report is what is most important: Iraq will remain undeterred from Israel's raid and will protect its nuclear program from further such attacks, rather than end it altogether.
In fact, Israel's strike on the reactor did not end Saddam Hussein's nuclear ambition, rather, he expanded his efforts to develop a nuclear device. The Iraqi defector and former nuclear scientist, Khadir Hamza said, "Israel made a mistake. The bombing ended the plutonium effort but began a new program to produce highly-enriched uranium. At the beginning we had approximately five hundred people working, which increased to seven thousand working after the Israeli bombing. The secret program became a much larger and ambitious program." (4)
By 1989, U.S. intelligence determined that Iraq was attempting to obtain a nuclear explosive device, based on Iraqi patterns of acquiring nuclear-related equipment and materials that lacked applications for a peaceful civilian program. Iraq acquired these components by establishing front companies abroad for nuclear-related procurement. However, by 1990, intelligence estimates determined that Iraq was not yet in possession of weapons-grade fission material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium), nor of uranium-enrichment installations, plutonium producing reactors, or reprocessing equipment necessary for its production.
Before 1990, there were few indications of an Iraqi military nuclear program or that nuclear weapon-related technology had been transferred to Iraq. Yet, there was evidence of Iraqi attempts at uranium enrichment, necessary for such a program. Iraqi intentions were most likely to build a secret uranium enrichment plant based on gas-centrifuge technology. At this time, Iraq did not have any civilian nuclear energy plants, and as such, there was no peaceful need for a uranium-enrichment plant. Thus, it was concluded that Iraq was trying to produce weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium.
By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq approached companies in the UK, West Germany, the Netherlands, and France for the necessary components for gas-centrifuge enrichment. These efforts had been only partially successful. It seems that the Iraqis had success in obtaining certain centrifuge types and made attempts to recruit experts on the development and construction of gas centrifuges in Iraq from Germany.
The Iraqi armaments firm al-Qa'qa' State Establishment, responsible for developing explosives and high-velocity measurement techniques, assisted in producing the non-nuclear components of a nuclear weapon. Another Iraqi firm, Nasr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries in Taji near Baghdad, was responsible for the development and production of gas centrifuges.
After the Gulf War, the extent of Iraq's nuclear program was slowly uncovered. The extensive program, unhampered by Iraqi budgetary constraints, was closer to yielding a nuclear weapon than U.S. intelligence analysts realized before Desert Storm. While they were aware of two nuclear facilities, UN weapons inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) discovered more than twenty sites involved in the Iraqi nuclear program.
Such activities demonstrated that Iraq was determined to acquire a nuclear device during the 1980s, despite the financial costs of the Iran-Iraq War. Even while Iraq was suffering from dire economic conditions in the aftermath of the eight-year war, such nuclear related activities of procurement and development continued, demonstrating Saddam's determination to obtain a nuclear weapon. While Saddam claimed this was meant be an "Arab bomb" for the benefit of the entire Arab world, his unchecked determination shows that actually Saddam realized that possessing this ultimate weapon would be the key to obtaining all his future objectives.
IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM
Having begun production in earnest in the early 1980s, Iraq had the most extensive chemical weapons program in the Middle East, if not in the developing world. Iraq declared to UN inspectors that it had produced over 200,000 chemical weapons munitions, exhausting half of them against the Iranian military and Iraqi Kurds during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War.
In November 1983, Iran approached the United Nations with evidence that Iraq was deploying chemical weapons in the war against them. From 1983-1988, Iraq continued to use both mustard and nerve agents in battles against Iranian troops without any international sanction. Iraq used these weapons because they were seen simply as force multipliers, since it gave the heavily outnumbered Iraqis an advantage on the battlefield. For example, between February and March 1984, the Iraqis reportedly killed 40,000 Iranians and lost 9,000 of their own men in conventional fighting. Still, this was deemed an unacceptable ratio for achieving victory; so in that period, the Iraqi command ordered the use of chemical weapons.
In March 1985, Iranian forces reached fifteen miles from the strategic Baghdad-Basra highway. Had the Iranians succeeded in taking this highway, it would have cut off the Iraqi capital from the Gulf, constituting a threat to the regime itself. As a result, Iraq again unleashed chemical weapons against the Iranians.
Iraq also used chemical weapons against Kurdish insurgents in a series of attacks dubbed by the Iraqi government as the Anfal ("war spoils") campaign. The campaign culminated in an attack on February 16, 1988, when Iraqi aircraft attacked the Kurdish city of Halabja in northern Iraq with mustard and nerve agents, resulting in 5,000 casualties, the majority of which were non-combatants. The Anfal campaign was launched as a response to the perceived alliance of Kurdish elements with the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War. The following document reveals the Iraqi attitude towards the Anfal campaign, demonstrating both the pride taken and justification for such actions:
As a result of the heroic Anfal campaign, which was crowned with the defeat and destruction of the bands of terror, we have noticed that members of these bands have been lately conducting acts of sabotage in the cities, targeting beauty salons and sewing factories. In order to stop these traitors and wipe them out, you are instructed to pay attention to such acts since terrorism has shifted from the mountain to the city. It is necessary that you mobilize your apparatuses in the city to handle immediately any emergency. Please be informed and take necessary action and inform us.(5)
This document reveals the difficulty Iraq's military had in controlling the Kurdish rebellion during the Iran-Iraq War. One of Iraq's inherent weaknesses was its inability to send large armored troop formations into the mountains where the Kurdish rebels were based. Instead, the Iraqi military could only send infantry into the rugged countryside, where they were at a disadvantage against the Kurds, who were often more familiar with the terrain. Thus, chemical weapons delivered by Iraqi aircraft offered a "solution" to this problem.
However, documents referring to the Anfal campaign did not always make explicit mention of specific actions, such as chemical weapons attacks. The documents do not say directly that chemical weapons were used; rather, the Iraqis used a code name "al-'itaad al-khas," meaning "special munitions," rather than "al-islah al-kimawiyya," which is the literal translation for "chemical weapons." Although there are many references to chemical attacks, Iraqi bureaucrats most often refer to them either indirectly, by reporting that Kurdish sources have accused the Iraqi government of having carried out a chemical attack, or euphemistically, by referring to Iraqi "special attacks" ("hujum al-khas") or attacks with "special munitions." Beginning in December 1991, Middle East Watch carried out extensive field research, and in conjunction with Physicians for Human Rights, exhumed mass graves in the area over a period of almost two years in order to investigate Kurdish claims of chemical weapons use by the regime during the Anfal campaign, and thus were able to check the forensic evidence against the captured documents.(6)
Some of the documents themselves establish the link between "special attacks" and the use of chemical agents. In one taped meeting in 1987, Ali Hassan al-Majid used the terms "chemical attacks" and "special munitions" interchangeably.(7) Moreover, Iraq's use of chemical weapons coincided with the multiple references in the documents to the Kurdish rebels obtaining protective devices. For example, one document refers to the KDP obtaining 500 gas masks as a precaution against "special attacks," and another says that in the spring of 1987, the PUK and KDP acquired gas masks and ampules with chemical antidotes. There are references to Iraqi "air strikes" that, according to the documents, caused people to lose their eyesight--probably from the deployment of chemical agents. For example, the following document confirms Iraq's use of chemical weapons in its air attacks on Kurdish villages, which resulted in the blindness and death of many people:
On May 27, 1987, our planes struck the villages of Malkan, Talitan, Kandour, Yali al-Ulya (Upper Yali) and Yali al-Sufla (Lower Yali) of Khlefan subdistrict, where the saboteurs were to be found. As a result of the airstrikes, Omar Abdallah, the brother of the criminal Mustafa Abdallah, the advisor of National Defense Battalions 88, who recently joined the side of saboteurs, was blinded. In addition, as a result of the air strikes, a number of saboteurs were killed and approximately 30 persons lost their eyesight, including the family of the criminal Kamal Haji Khudr Agha, who was in charge of Teep 12 Suran [PUK military unit]. Agha lost his eyesight as well. All the casualties were sent to hospitals in Iran.
Some families of the bands of saboteurs turned to the side of the Iranian regime. Compounds were created for them in the Iranian cities of Bakhtaran and Sanandaj.(8)
This document reveals how chemical weapons were used indiscriminately against villages thought to be sympathetic to the PUK. Thus, not only were chemical weapons a military tool, but also a means of terror used by the Iraqi regime. While the Reagan administration publicly condemned Iraq's use of these weapons, U.S. defense officials were assisting Iraq at the time and did not oppose their use against Iran, indicating to Saddam that these weapons could be deployed with little international opposition.
THE 1991 GULF WAR
Had Saddam Hussein waited until he acquired a nuclear device in the early 1990s, his invasion of Kuwait might have had an entirely different outcome. By examining the Iraqi military assessments of the 1991 Gulf War, one can gain an insight into the strategic mindset of the Saddam regime, and better understand how this mindset would have differed if Iraq had possessed a nuclear capability.
According to some accounts of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein believed that the U.S. deployment in Saudi Arabia was a bluff and that the U.S. lacked the resolve to attack. For example, one source wrote, "Hussein apparently believed that when push came to shove, neither the American people nor the coalition would stomach an actual war."(9) Similarly, another source claimed that Hussein felt confident the U.S. would not engage in a war to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait since it suffered from a "Vietnam complex" and could not stomach the casualties of a sustained conflict.(10) In this case a distinction needs to be made; Hussein believed that the U.S. did not have the capability to stomach casualties in a conflict,(11) nevertheless such military intelligence documents indicated that an attack would be launched regardless.
Iraqi military assessments believed an attack would indeed occur, even as early as August 1990, the first month of the invasion. As the U.S. announced on August 8, 1990, that military forces would be dispatched to Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi Air Defense Command had responded with directives regarding the "hostile threats" that warned: "The volume of the hostile sorties are of high density. It is unlikely that we will have a single wave of attacks. The enemy will extensively utilize electronic jamming of different kinds and types." However, it offered little tactical advice for defending against this threat, merely recommending, "to counter the hostile threat with calm and self-control and measured behavior. To acquire the hostile target and neutralize it while in range and to avoid over usage of equipment."(12) This was the first indication that the impending war would differ from the Iran-Iraq War, where ammunition was plentiful. Another report issued that same day ordered solders to "[hide] the airplanes inside bunkers and airports."(13) This was one of the first indications that the Iraqis were preparing to fight a defensive war against an overwhelming superior military force.
Military Intelligence also issued a report on the American naval and land forces, including the movements of the USS Independence aircraft carrier:
Their land forces have arrived in Saudi Arabia in the vicinity of Dhahran. The U.S. 82nd Airborne will arrive on the 9th and the 101st Green Beret on the 10th. It is recommended that a special rapid precaution force be deployed to the Kuwaiti coast, moving our planes out of Kuwait, and concentrating air defenses around petrol, military industry and electric stations. (14)
In this instance, more indications were provided that the Iraqi military had begun preparing for a defensive war. It also suspected that the "Zionist air force" would be involved in a potential attack.(15) A third report went on to state, "The size of the enemy ensures that they can deliver an air strike on any place in the region at any time they decide," indicating Military Intelligence's awareness of the inherent vulnerabilities of the Iraqi forces.
On August 20, the fourth Military Intelligence report monitored the movements of the American aircraft carrier Kennedy, and Egyptian and Pakistani forces in Saudi Arabia.(16) It described a possible scenario of an American attack:
The air forces will be used to strike in the rear areas of Kuwait to cut off transportation in the nation Then the land forces will attack our army in Kuwait, after the military air strikes have succeeded in paralyzing our military and have produced heavy losses for the Iraqis.[sic]
The report admitted that Iraq could be attacked at Safwan and Zubayr in the south of Iraq, as well as on the road connecting Nasiriyya and Basra, cutting off all avenues of retreat from Kuwait. The assessment went on to note, "Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt will participate at this point. The enemy will use electronic warfare to affect our wire communications and paralyze our defenses."(17)
Such reports indicate that the Iraqis expected the U.S. to attack, even though they do not specify when such an attack would occur. According to Heikal, when Saddam Hussein heard of the American aircraft carrier deployments, he believed an American attack was inevitable.(18) Nevertheless, despite the overwhelming superior military forces arrayed against him, Hussein would defend Kuwait at all costs, rather than retreat and risk humiliation in the Arab world and a possible coup.
Most of the Gulf War literature described the Coalition fears of an Iraqi WMD attack.(19) However, such accounts fail to understand that such a fear was prevalent on the Iraqi side as well. Thus, one aspect of the defense of Kuwait was preparations for a conflict involving weapons of mass destruction. On August 23, U.S. intelligence reported that Iraqi tanks carrying decontamination materials were moved to the front, a possible indication that they may have been preparing for the launch of a chemical attack.(20) This assessment was proved mistaken upon examination of the captured Iraqi documents. In fact, the Iraqis had placed such tanks on the frontlines in anticipation of an American attack using WMD. An Iraqi WMD training manual on how to defend the nation from "Hostile forces in the area of the Corps, who are preparing to unleash blindsiding hostilities on our dear country,"(21) bore the following warning, "The Istikhbarat [Military Intelligence] reports have indicated the possession of the American Zionist union of chemical weapons, and their ill intention to use them against our country to increase our losses in persons, equipments, weapons and preparations."(22)
On October 29, the Iraqi Army Chief of Staff sent orders to all military branches about the threat of nuclear weapons deployment by the Allied forces, ordering several precautions to be taken. It issued rather simple commands to all military forces to destroy all enemy planes and nuclear missiles that entered Iraqi air space. It recommended that supply stations should not be concentrated in one area to avoid massive losses as well as the preparation of alternative routes and roads to be utilized in case of nuclear attack. It even gave commands to unit officers to use mechanical hand watches as opposed to electronic digital hand watches, as well as the obvious, such as remaining at least one kilometer away from ground zero.(23) Another communiqué asked for a report to investigate the effects of electromagnetic radiation on wireless communication devises and electronic equipment.(24) On November 14, commands were sent to Iraqi Air Force battalions warning, "We received information that the mentioned American strike on our nation on November 15, 1990, this night is to be called the "black night." The Americans will use weapons that are detonated at an elevation of ten kilometers and generate electro-magnetic waves that disable radars and radios. We ask that you take the highest levels of precaution and care."(25)
On October 3, Saddam Hussein convened a meeting with military commanders where he reportedly said:
…any weapon, regardless of advancement, has faults and weaknesses that can be utilized. The Americans rely on their technological advantage. To overcome this technical hurdle, we need to submerge underground (weapons, equipments, bunkers) and to be resilient and have self-control. To reduce losses, we need to study the characteristics of the weapons and counter them with simplicity (like using smoke or dust). Take care of the fighters because the basis of victory is to build a human brotherly relationship among yourselves.(26)
On October 17, an Iraqi general circulated another set of military directives from the president entitled "How Fighting the Americans differs from Fighting the Iranians." The argument was that fighting the "American enemy is different… due to the quality of their weapons. They will be selective in their target selection, because they want to use the oil after the end of hostilities." The general was ordered to warn the fighters about the abilities of the American weapons, but to avoid exaggerations in order not to scare the fighters, but to reassure them instead: "Tell them that our enemy has no real cause or previous war experience. Their view of war is to have as few casualties as possible, and that benefits the Iraqi soldier. The Americans believe that after they start their aerial campaign there will be no one left. But they will find out that many will be left to resist them."(27)
Finally, on November 29, "The President Leader ordered the following: ‘In spite of the Security Council's deadline of January 15, 1991, as the last date for carrying out its resolutions, the enemy may still initiate aggression before this deadline assuming that Iraq is off guard. For that everybody should be on full alert effective immediately.'"(28)
THE PROSPECT 0F A NUCLEAR IRAQ
From these few documents, several conclusions can be made about the Iraqi security mindset during the occupation of Kuwait up to the initiation of hostilities. The first is that the Iraqis expected an attack at any moment from the U.S., and as early as August 1990. If the Iraqis believed the U.S. was as bold as to launch such an attack at this juncture, perhaps Iraq realized its arsenal of chemical and biological weapons was not a successful deterrent. If Iraq had a nuclear weapon capability at this point, perhaps such reports would have given more confident assessments of the Iraqi military's ability to respond to an American attack.
The Iraqi precautions against an American/Israeli WMD attack depict a genuine fear of a chemical or nuclear attack amongst the regime and military. It can be questioned whether this fear would have been mitigated within the Iraqi military if the regime offered a similar weapon that could deter the "American-Zionist conspiracy." However, in 1990, the only advice the regime could provide in its communiqués was for the military to maintain its calm in the face of such a threat. The military was reminded repeatedly that the Coalition threat was different from that of their Iranian foes in the 1980s. The common theme in these documents is the Iraqi admittance that the U.S. and its allies are at a technological advantage over Iraq. While it is not stated directly, the Iraqis considered the Coalition's greatest technological advantage to be the American nuclear capability. This acknowledgement of Iraq's disadvantages in an impending conflict surely had a demoralizing effect on its military. If Iraq had a nuclear capability, at the very least, it could have lifted the morale of Iraq's military.
Saddam's only advantage in a war with the U.S. was his perception that the latter could not absorb large numbers of casualties, believing that it still suffered from a "Vietnam syndrome." In the documents, his commands usually offer not tactical military advice, but rather commanded Iraq's military to inflict as many casualties as possible. Had the regime possessed a nuclear weapon, its ability to cause casualties among U.S. forces would have increased dramatically. Thus, the implied insecurity and doubt over the strength of the Iraqi forces throughout the 1990-1991 period would have been drastically different if Iraq had a nuclear capability. Not only would such a capability have strengthened the resolve of the regime, but of the military itself.
However, the question that needs to be asked is whether a U.S.-sponsored coalition would even emerge under the threat of an Iraqi nuclear strike. The key variable in the deployment of U.S. and Coalition forces was the Saudi acquiescence in allowing a strike to be launched from its soil. Would Saudi Arabia have even granted such permission if it meant losing Riyadh in a retaliatory nuclear strike? Saudi Arabia had already feared that Iraq's declaration of jihad and Islamic rhetoric would destabilize the desert kingdom. A nuclear threat, however, would have been more tangible and direct. Other Arab coalition members, such as Syria, Morocco, and Egypt, may have also been reluctant to sending their forces against an Iraq armed with nuclear weapons.
This Saudi scenario raises the question of whether even the U.S. would have gone to war with a nuclear-armed Iraq. Assuming that one of the key U.S. interests in liberating Kuwait was protecting the Gulf's oil, would it have risked a confrontation that may have obliterated the resources it was trying to protect? If Iraq had a nuclear deterrent capability, perhaps a diplomatic solution would have resolved the crisis as opposed to a military one. On the other hand, a nuclear capability may have convinced the regime that it had the upper hand in any negotiations and thus would have forced the international community to accept Iraq's annexation of Kuwait as its nineteenth province. Had it succeeded in this endeavor, Iraq could have dictated to the other Gulf countries how much oil to produce, basically dictating the global price of oil and holding the fate of the global economy in his hands.
CONCLUSIONS
This raises several issues for neighboring countries. In a post-Saddam Middle East, will Syria try to develop nuclear weapons in order to lead the Arab world in strategic parity with Israel? Will Syria or Iran continue developing WMD in order to crush potential internal uprisings within their borders? Will having seen its neighbor overrun within a month convince Iran that the pursuit of nuclear weapons is absolutely essential to deterring a similar American invasion? Would nuclear weapons serve as the only Iranian deterrent against perceived U.S. ambitions in the region? The demise of the Iraqi regime as the U.S.-led war in Iraq came to a close in April 2003 sent signals to many other countries in the Middle East regarding the inability of their armies to stand up to American forces. Looking at Iraq's fate, many may have decided that only a nuclear option could guarantee the survival of their regimes.
While the question of Iraqi WMD may seem a mute point, there are still issues that will affect the security of Europe and the United States. The question remains whether all of Iraq's WMD materials have been accounted for, and if not, do the few remaining Saddam loyalists control them? If, in fact, they do hold such materials, there is always the possibility that they could end up in the hands of terrorists who would have no qualms about using them in Europe or the United States.
NOTES
1. These documents can be viewed on the Iraq Research and Documentation (IRDP) website <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~irdp>, run by the Iraq Foundation, in Washington, D.C. For other works using these archives in MERIA Journal, see Robert Rabil, "Operation Termination of Traitors: Iraq's Anti-Kurdish Campaign," Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 2002) and Robert G. Rabil, "The Iraqi Opposition's Evolution: From Conflict to Unity?" Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002).
2. For an extensive discussion of this subject, see Ibrahim al-Marashi, "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis," MERIA Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 2002).
3. Kuwait Data Set (KDS) Folder CD 10 File 108-10-039, p. 1-19.
4. Hamza's comments can be found at the Federation of American Scientist's website, Iraq section <http://www.fas.org>.
5. IRDP, Northern Iraq Data Set (NIDS)-657500.
6. See Eric Stover, Unquiet Graves: The Search for the Disappeared in Iraqi Kurdistan (Physicians for Human Rights: Middle East Watch, 1992).
7. For a partial transcript of his speech, see: Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 349.
8. IRDP-NIDS-856513.
9. M.J. Mazarr, D.M. Snider, and J. A. Blackwell, Jr. (eds.), Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 77.
10. Bishara A. Bahbah, "The Crisis in the Gulf: Why Iraq Invaded Kuwait," in Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck (eds.), Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991), p. 54.
11. Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), p. 175.
12. KDS Folder CD 10 File 108-10-001, p. 50.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 68.
15. Ibid., p. 72.
16. KDS Folder 90809 File 124-6-009, p. 84.
17. Ibid., p. 86.
18. M. Heikal, Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War (London: HarperCollins, 1992), p. 224.
19. See, for example, Mazarr, et. al, p. 124, who wrote, " Many coalition ground officers also feared that Hussein would use chemical weapons during the decisive ground battles to come."
20. Kevin Don Hutchinson, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Chronology and Fact Book, (Westport and London: Greenwood, 1995), p. 20.
21. KDS Folder CD 9 File 104-6-015, p. 6.
22. Ibid.
23. KDS Folder CD 07 File 096-4-008a, p. 12.
24. Ibid., p. 13.
25. KDS Folder CD 06 File 096-14-003, p. 19.
26. KDS Folder CD 10 File 111-9-005, p.4-6.
27. KDS Folder 90809 File 500-1-15, p. 2.
28. KDS Folder CD 19 File 135-4-004, p. 32.
Ibrahim Al-Marashi (Ph.D. Oxford University) is a post-doctoral fellow at Sabanci University. He worked with the Harvard University Center for Middle Eastern Studies' project on captured Iraqi state documents and was a researcher on Iran-Iraq affairs at the U.S. State Department, Congressional Research Service, and National Defense University. He was a lecturer at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, as well as a research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.