Volume 6, No. 1 - March 2002

Twins or Enemies: Comparing Nationalist and Islamist Traditions in Turkish Politics

By Birol Akgun

In the last decade, fragile Turkish democracy has witnessed the rise of the two dynamic movements: Right-wing nationalism and religious revivalism. In a comparative perspective, this paper analyzes and explores underlying causes of increasing electoral support given to the Islamist Refah Party or RP (later succeeded by Fazilet or FP) and the right-wing nationalist Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP). First origins, historical evolutions, and ideological roots of both Islamist and Nationalist traditions in Turkey are introduced. Then, the evidence associated with the rise of these parties is presented drawing on public opinion regarding significant political issues, socio-demographic characteristics, and information on geographical bases of these parties. Finally, an assessment is made regarding the future of right-wing parties and democratic consolidation in Turkey.

In recent decades, Turkey’s fragile democracy has witnessed the gradual and steady rise of two right-wing parties: The Islamist Refah or Welfare Party (RP), later succeeded by the Fazilet Party or Virtue Party (FP), and the right-wing nationalist Milliyetci Hareket Partisi or Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Although these two parties existed in the pre-1980 era and even took part in various coalition governments, they were then marginal and parochial political forces.

Scholars suggest that extremist parties become politically relevant when they influence the building of coalitions and majorities in the decision-making system.(1) It is hard, however, to find comparative studies on the political sociology of these parties in Turkish political literature.(2) This article’s objective is to document the emergence of Turkey’s two right-wing parties, the nationalist MHP and Islamist RP/FP, drawing on public opinion regarding significant political issues, aggregate data, socio-demographic characteristics, and the geographical bases of the radical vote.

Four basic questions will be addressed:

• Where are these parties located? (i.e., the electoral geography of the parties)
• Why are they so located? (i.e., the aggregate characteristics of the geographical locations)
• Who are the likely supporters of these parties, and why? (i.e., the social characteristics and issue positions of supporters)
• Finally, from whom do these parties receive support? (i.e., the political origins of voters)

In the 1987 parliamentary elections, RP and MHP garnered only 7.2 and 4.3 percent of the vote, respectively. The two parties formed an electoral alliance in the 1991 election to surmount the ten percent national electoral threshold. This "holy alliance," as some named it, gathered 17 percent of the popular vote and sent 62 MPs to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (which has a total of 550 seats).

In the 1994 local election, Refah registered a dramatic victory by winning elections in 28 major municipalities including Istanbul and Ankara, the capital. The following year, RP’s vote surged to 21.4 percent making it the largest party in the Turkish National Assembly. Although MHP was left out of the Assembly due to the 10 percent electoral barrier in 1995, its vote doubled to 8.7 percent. In the election of April 18, 1999, the nationalist MHP made a surprise showing by more than doubling its share of the vote (18 percent) and entered parliament as the second-largest party, only six members less than the largest one, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). The new Fazilet, successor of the ex-Refah (which was banned in January 16^th 1998 by the Constitutional Court), lost some votes in 1999 elections. Nonetheless this party still commanded 15 percent of the vote and fared even better in the municipal elections (18 percent). Thus the combined support of the MHP and FP reached 34 percent of the total vote and 44 percent of MPs in the Turkish parliament.

At the outset, it must be made clear that scholars who study right-wing parties point to the lack of a generally accepted definition of "right-wing extremism," even though the term is used by a large number of people.(3) Hartmann uses the term for all "progress-hostile forces."(4) Some qualities and interests often associated with right-wing parties include nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and a strong state. Falter and Schuman define ten features of right-wing extremist thinking: extreme nationalism, anti-communism, ethnocentrism, anti-parliamentarism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law-and-order thinking, a demand for a strong leader and/or executive, anti-Americanism, and cultural pessimism.(5)

Not all right-wing parties express or share all the core features listed above. Many of them, however, display hostility toward modernity, a hatred of political divisions and a search for social harmony, an exaltation of natural community and hostility towards foreigners, and a faith in hierarchical structures.(6) Sartori refers to such parties as "anti-system parties," because they do not share the values of the political order within which they operate.(7) In this study, we accept a broader definition of far-right parties: any party that openly displays anti-pluralist political attitudes and beliefs, or is viewed so by the scholars and the public at large, can be seen as a member of the extreme right party family. In Turkish politics the National Action party and the ex-Refah (Virtue) party are placed within this category.

Drawing on the accumulating literature regarding Western European right-wing extremism, first we will attempt to draw a picture of the geographical appearance of the MHP and ex-Refah, then using aggregate level data, examine correlates of the two parties’ electoral support. In the second step, the individual level survey data gathered during the period of increasing electoral support for the far-right parties (i.e., in 1998) will be utilized. A profile of the individuals and groups more likely to be associated with the MHP and FP will be extracted.

The history of the MHP and Refah-Virtue movements dates back to the late 1960s. Although MHP’s roots can in fact be traced back to the old Republican Peasant Nation Party, (CKMP), founded by the former general chief of staff Marshal Fevzi Cakmak, it was only after Alparslan Turkes’s election to the leadership in 1965 that the CKMP embraced an ultra-nationalist ideological stance and gained mass support.(8) During most of the 1950s and 1960s, the CMKP remained a marginal party that drew only very limited support from inner-Anatolian towns for its conservative and populist platform. Turkes, a former army colonel who played an important role in the 1960 military coup, reorganized the CKMP and changed the party’s name to Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP), or the Nationalist Action Party, in the 1969 party convention. Turkes himself was declared Basbug (commander, leader) and a new party program was formulated reflecting the new leader’s ideology. The Dokuz Isik Doktrini (Nine Lights Doctrine), the essence of which was "communitarian nationalism," became the official party program.(9) The rejuvenated MHP with new leadership and ideology fared relatively well in the 1969 general elections with its 3 percent of support increasing slightly to 3.4 percent in the 1973, and 6.4 percent in the 1977 general elections.

In the late 1960s, however, another conservative right-wing movement based on religious mobilization against the communist threat and monopoly capitalism was also taking root among the Islamically conscious circles. Having failed to gain a nomination from the center-right Justice Party, Necmettin Erbakan, a professor of mechanical engineering from Istanbul Technical University, launched a political initiative to run for the Turkish Assembly together with his similar-minded friends before the 1969 election. The movement did better at the polls than MHP. The movement gathered 5.6 percent of the vote and gained 13 seats, effectively becoming the fourth group in the parliament. In the following year, under the leadership of Professor Erbakan, the Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP), or National Order Party, came into existence.

The context in which the two far-right parties emerged can be better understood if we know how social, economic and political conditions evolved in Turkey in the 1960s. After the transition to multiparty politics, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Turkish economy experienced a great expansion generating considerable wealth. As a result of intense industrialization and mechanization agriculture in rural areas, a new working class emerged in the urban centers by the late 1960s. Moreover, the 1961 constitution introduced a liberal political environment that expanded freedoms of speech and encouraged associational life. In this milieu, socialist ideas and movements began taking root in the society especially among Turkish intellectuals, academicians, journalists, school teachers, and university students. In 1965, an openly socialist party, Turkish Labor Party (TIP), participated in elections, and for the first time it gained 15 seats in the Turkish Assembly. In response to this militant socialism, the centrist Republican People’s Party (CHP) also moved to the left out of the electoral concerns, and defined itself on a social-democratic platform.

The center-right Justice Party (AP), which had been considered a representative body of the conservative majorities since the 1950s, failed to address effectively the growing concerns of the people in the face of a rising communist threat. In addition, the AP over time became closely associated with big business interests, which alienated some segments of its constituency. The traditional middle classes (artisans, craftsmen, small merchants, etc.) saw monopoly capitalism as a threat to their economic prospects and were concerned as well with the rapid socio-economic modernization and cultural westernization of the country.(10) Thus, the emergence of the nationalist MHP on the basis of anti-communism and Erbakan’s Islamic MNP (later MSP) on the basis of religious conscientiousness can be interpreted primarily as political responses of the conservative groups to the rising communist ideology as well as to the rapid socio-economic modernization taking place throughout the country.

From the outset, both parties met with harsh criticism from the Turkish establishment and were accused of being "fascist" (MHP) and "reactionary" (Islamist MSP). The ruling political class saw them as threats to their hegemony since they had not come from the established Kemalist elites who had been running the country since the early days. Intellectuals and the mainstream media always questioned these parties’ legitimacy in the political system in the pre-1980 era, an attitude that has not yet entirely changed. These parties have been seen as alternative power centers organized by rising new elites who do not share the Kemalist vision of the Republican elite. In response, both parties sought to prove that they are pro-system, loyal opposition parties, and that they support democracy and uphold the constitutional parliamentary government.

Despite their efforts, Erbakan’s first Islamic party (the National Order) was considered to be in conflict with the secular foundations of the Turkish state and was totally banned from political activity after the 1971 military intervention. The same Islamist circles, however, regrouped as the Milli Selamet Partisi (the National Salvation Party, MSP) in 1972, which became unexpectedly successful in the 1973 general elections (See Table 1). The MSP’s 11.8 percent popular support and its 48 seats made the party the third political force in the Assembly after the CHP and AP. Since neither of the latter parties could win the majority of seats in the parliament, the MSP played a key role in forming coalition governments. The Islamist MSP allied with the Social Democrat CHP in an unlikely coalition government in 1973, which provided much needed legitimacy for the Erbakan’s party, a development that then leader of the CHP, Bulent Ecevit, lamented as "a historical mistake." The MHP, meanwhile, benefited from the CHP-MSP government by continuing to enlist alienated voters.

Notes: (*): Local elections. MHP: Nationalist Action Party. MCP: Nationalist Worker Party. Ind. Mov.: Independents’ Movement of Erbakan. MSP: National Salvation Party. RP: Welfare Party. FP: Virtue Party. The RP and MCP entered the 1991 election in an electoral alliance under the RP label. Nineteen MPs out of 62 that the alliance won later returned to the MHP.

Source: Cakir (1994), and Bora and Can (1994).

Despite their leadership and ideological differences, electoral support for both MHP and MSP came from the same societal sources. Yet a trade-off existed between the two parties’ popular support from the very beginning. At the grass roots level, nationalist-conservative masses voted for the party that was stronger in their regions. In fact, the surge of the MHP’s vote in 1977, from 3 percent to 6.4 percent, was mainly accounted for by analysts as a massive shift from the MSP (whose support diminished to 8.6 from 12 percent) to MHP due to the former party’s collaboration with the leftists in coalition government.(11) Such voter volatility between closely-related parties is consistent with Western European party systems. As will be discussed later, the vote-swing from RP to MHP was instrumental in the unexpected electoral victory of the MHP in the 1999 election.

Looking back at their three decades of historical evolution in Turkish politics, a brief contrast and comparison can be made with regard to the Nationalists’ and Islamists’ ideological roots, priorities, and political orientations. At first glance, both traditions appear to converge on many issues; however, as one looks more closely, one discovers that there are fundamental disparities.

At the very heart of the divergence between the two traditions lie in their worldviews. While the Islamic ideology originates from what are held to be the sacred teachings of God (Vahy), and therefore from immutable truths, the worldview of the Nationalists emanates from human intellect and is based on an individual’s philosophical conviction that his nation is superior to others, a secular outlook in essence. The nationalists glorify the nation and commit themselves to the service of the Turkish state that must be unconditionally loved and obeyed. One of the slogans commonly used by the MHP in the 1990s reads "either love it, or leave it." In the last party convention (November 5, 2000) the MHP used the slogan, "We love this county unconditionally." As long as their religious beliefs are respected, Islamists, too, obey and sanctify the state, since the Koran states that believers should obey God, His Messenger, and their own rulers.(12) In practice, neither Islamists nor Nationalists display any contempt for the state. They blame incumbent authorities, not the state, if their rights are violated.

Yet for different reasons, the attitude of unquestioned submission to the state seems to have changed on both sides. When the armed forces intervened in politics in 1980, the military government did not differentiate between the leftist militants and the nationalist "idealist" groups, who believed that they were fighting on the state’s side against communism. However, "the state" put them in the same prison cells with the communists and prosecuted them regardless of their ideological beliefs or goals. As Bora and Can have argued, as a result in the 1980s the "Idealist Community" questioned their pre-1980 strategies and re-thought their position vis-à-vis the state.(13) Islamists, too, had to contend with state authorities in the 1980s due to the headscarf ban at universities and public offices. It seems that both Islamist and Nationalist attitudes toward the state have been evolving from an unquestioned deference to a more liberal understanding of state-society relations.

In both traditions, organic understanding of society and the nation is commonly accepted. As with corporatism, the nation is seen as a body and the individuals as its cells. National unity, integrity, and solidarity always come before the rights and freedoms of individual citizens. In the party organizations too, a top-to-bottom hierarchy has been maintained and free debate within the parties is discouraged. Party leaders assume a greater role than what can be assumed in a democratic party. They are considered as chiefs, heroes, saviors, or commanders rather than just party chairmen elected by the party delegates.(14)

In the MHP, it has been long held axiom that "leader, organization and doctrine" should not be questioned. As a result, Alparslan Turkes, the legendary leader of the MHP, had been given a free hand in the decision-making process because of his status as the Basbug of the Idealist Community (Ulkucu Camia) until his death in 1997. Similarly, in the MSP-Refah tradition Erbakan or Hoca (imam, leader, wise man) has remained an unchallenged chief of the Islamist movement since the 1970s. In party meetings his followers would often chant "here the army, here the commander."(15) Neither Erbakan nor Turkes’s leadership was ever challenged in party conventions, and their charismatic authority has only deepened over time among their followers. Only very recently have leadership changes taken place in both parties, due to Turkes’s sudden death in 1997 and Erbakan’s involuntary retirement from the active politics by a constitutional court decision in late 1997.(16)

On key policy issues, the MHP and the FP’s views both disagree and converge. The MHP has never openly accepted the existence of a distinct ethnic Kurdish population in Turkey, let alone a Kurdish problem. Their official view is that they (Kurds) are Turks as much as we (Turks) are Kurds. The issue is raised by foreign powers in order to divide and weaken our national unity. Therefore, the party strongly opposes discussion of the issue and any compromise with the Kurdish movement. Unlike nationalists, however, Islamists accept the notion that the Kurdish people constitute a distinct ethnic entity and thus they should be able to use their language freely in the public, including in education and radio-TV broadcasting. Any partition, or political autonomy, however, is opposed strongly by the Islamists too. They believe that Islamic brotherhood between Turks and Kurds will provide a common ground for both to live within the Turkish Republic as a single nation.

A key point of divergence is secularism--separation of state affairs from religious beliefs and doctrine. The Refah-FP tradition has always argued that secularism in Turkey is often misinterpreted, that public authorities must be more tolerant to the religious beliefs, and that religion-based claims could be the basis for political demands from public authorities. The state must provide compulsory religious education in the schools, and the wearing of headscarf must be allowed both for students and civil servants. The MHP, too, defends headscarf for students at schools but not for civil servants. The party, however, primarily sees religion as a private issue and while it supports religious education in the schools, it opposes the politicization of religious beliefs.

Regarding the use of violence, the pre-1980 MHP had a legacy of extensive violent acts. Paramilitary groups affiliated with the party have been involved in street fighting for the sake of the protection of the Turkish state from communist attacks.(17) Idealist groups have occasionally been involved in confrontations with leftist groups on university campuses, and against pro-Kurdish activists across the nation. Islamists, too, engaged in violent confrontations, although rarely, with leftist groups before the 1980 military coup. Some Islamic groups including the Virtue supporters have been heavily involved in demonstrations against the headscarf ban at schools and universities.

In the foreign policy area, MHP accepts Turkey’s traditional foreign policy outlook with some reservations. It aims to improve relations with Turkish-speaking nations of Central Asia. The Islamists, on the other hand, only reluctantly support existing relations with the West but accept the NATO security arrangement. The party gives a higher priority to integration with Islamic nations (under Turkey’s leadership), and defends a common market and an "Islamic-NATO" among Muslim states. The new virtue however, revised some of its foreign policy priorities and openly supported Turkey’s bid for a full EU membership. Whether this new policy stance represents a genuine ideological transformation of the Islamists or simply a pragmatic response to the growing pressure from Turkish establishment remains to be seen.

Both the Islamist tradition and Nationalist movement have a fairly long electoral history in Turkish politics. With some interruptions during the early 1980s, MHP and Refah Party participated in almost every general and local election without restrictions. As shown in Table 1, they were represented in the Turkish Assembly before the 1980 era, and both Erbakan and Turkes had an opportunity to serve in coalition governments in the 1970s. Professor Erbakan’s MSP was supported by some 1,265,771 voters (12 percent) in the 1973 election and four years later its vote increased by only 4,000. But due to high electoral turnout and an increase in registered voters, the party’s overall proportion of support declined to 8.6 percent, and its parliament group decreased by half from 48 to 24.(18) In the case of the MHP, the strongest support came in the 1977 elections during the time of intense ideological and political conflict between the left and right wing groups. The party’s electoral base expanded from 3.4 percent to 6.4 percent between 1973 and 1977, mostly at the expense of the Islamist MSP, and it won 16 seats in the Assembly.

The backbone of the electoral support of the two right-wing parties in the early period (1970s) came from relatively less developed Anatolian provinces where traditionally conservative Sunni Turks lived side by side with Alevi (a more liberal Islamic sect whose followers always identified with the left wing parties) population. Thus both parties’ electoral constituencies were concentrated in Central and Eastern Anatolia, and in the northeastern part of the country. In addition, from the outset the Islamist MSP found a fertile ground in the religiously conservative southeastern Turkey Kurdish populated region. Neither party, however, could generate sizable support in the economically developed western provinces where the center right (AP) and the social democrat (CHP) parties dominated elections.

Due to the 10 percent electoral barrier introduced by the military council in order to prevent small-extremist parties from entering the Assembly, the newly-created MCP (successor to the MHP) and Refah were shut out of the parliament in the post-1980 period. After the 1991 election, however, voter support for these radical parties increased. The evolution of both parties from parochial and marginal status to nationwide political movements in the 1990s should be examined within both domestic and international contexts.

Comparing both parties’ support across the provinces during the 1970s and 1990s reveals enormous stability in their electoral bases. Where the Islamist MSP fared well in its first appearance as a political party (in 1973), its successor Refah received its highest vote after two decades in the 1995 election. The core of support is to be found in the central region (Konya, Corum, Kayseri, Sivas), the eastern provinces (Erzurum, Elazig, Malatya), and the southeast (Diyarbakir, S. Urfa, Adiyaman, Bitlis, Siirt, Mardin). These provinces constitute the traditionally conservative and economically stagnant parts of the country, at least until very recently. Over time Islamist Refah also made some inroads into the industrialized centers in the northwest (Izmit, Sakarya, and Kutahya), as well as in the two largest metropolitan areas (Istanbul and Ankara). It appears that the party built up a coalition among the three distinct groups.(19)

The backbone of the party is the middle-level Anatolian merchants, small business owners (esnaf ve tuccar), mid-and-lower level bureaucrats and professional elites (engineers, doctors, lawyers, etc.). Some scholars particularly emphasize the role of the "rising" counter-elite as carriers of Islamist ideology.(20)

The second group consists of those conservative elements that may not have an Islamist political vision, yet they support cultural conservatism (family values, education, TV broadcasting, etc.).

The third group has nothing to do with Islamist ideology but represents those groups who are frustrated with the established parties and who want to express their discontent. They support them to voice their demands for jobs, health care, education, social welfare, and a more equal distribution of the wealth. Moreover, as Yavuz pointed out, the pragmatic policy of the Islamists in addressing local grievances provides the party with an opportunity to project different images in different regions.(21) Islamist politicians present a pro-Kurdish image in the southeast; they become conservative-nationalists in the Central Anatolia to appeal Sunni Turks; and take a Muslim social democrat stance in the big cities to attract working class voters. The glue among these social categories is a search for "justice and equality" for everybody and opposition to the corrupt socio-political system.

The Refah party’s experience with power sharing in a coalition government after the 1995 election, however, seemed to have alienated some of its constituencies. Drawing on this frustration, the MHP attracted many of the ex-Refah party supporters in the 1999 election. Voters, who were dissatisfied with Refah’s performance and its confrontation with the army, switched their votes from the Islamists to the Nationalist MHP, particularly in the Central and Eastern regions. As one observer aptly stated "the conservative masses who cherish nationalist views and support moral values have now found themselves a new address."(22)

As a result, in the late 1990s, electoral geography of both parties largely converged outside the Kurdish-populated southeast region where the MHP has the weakest support. Traditionally, the core of MHP support was found in the Central and Eastern provinces. Surprisingly, the party made strong gains along the Mediterranean coast (Icel, Adana, K. Maras, Antalya) and moderate gains in the Aegean region. The party is still weak, however, in the largest cities of the northwest region, particularly in Istanbul.

Notes: (*): p<. 05. (**): p<. 001. The data collected by the author from official Turkish Statistic Institute (DIE) publications. All entries are Pearson Correlation. Infant mortality: Death per thousand. Kurdish population: Measured as a ratio of Kurdish and Zaza speaking people to overall population (taken from 1965 census). Education: Percentage of High School graduates in provinces. The GDP in provinces is composed of basically industrial, agricultural and commercial activities. Source: State Institute of Statistics, The Yearbook of Turkey, (1970, 1996 and 1997 editions).

Some province-level indicators correlate with right-wing party support. As presented in Table 3, Islamist Refah-FP support appears to be correlated with socio-economic developmental indicators (infant mortality, educational level, and per capita income). The MHP vote in both 1995 and 1999, however, does not correlate significantly with the developmental indicators, but shows a strong negative correlation with the Kurdish population and HADEP support (a pro-Kurdish party).

The correlation between population increase (reflecting mostly internal migration from rural to urban areas) and MHP support is an interesting finding. One interpretation is that the intense Kurdish migration from the terror-ridden southeast to the coastal towns and major urban centers in Mediterranean and Aegean provinces might have generated an awareness of national identity and feeling of insecurity among the city dwellers. As Husbands pointed out in the French electoral context, the increasing visibility of foreign immigrants in their neighborhoods has created "contact racism."(23) The growing Kurdish population in the western cities might have generated similar feelings among ethnic Turks.

The moderate correlation between the MHP and FP vote (.24 in 1999, and .28 in 1995) suggests that both parties drew their support from the same areas. The left-wing parties’ support (tapping the left-right ideological cleavage) does not correlate with the MHP vote, but is strongly associated with the Refah-FP vote. Given the lack of correlation with the developmental level indicators and ideological variables, it can be said that the MHP’s electoral base displays more diversity than the FP. It might also imply that the latter party is leaning toward lower class constituencies.

The single most important factor that seems to contribute to the MHP’s success is rising nationalistic feelings against the Kurdish separatist movement (anti-Kurdish sentiment). Thus, perhaps the MHP can be described as a "single issue" movement.(24) While it was the rising communist wave that gave rise to this party in the late 1970s, now it has been replaced by a new-found enemy, Kurdish separatism. The Kurdish separatist movement has generated fear and insecurity that is shared by many ordinary citizens in relation to Turkey’s national identity and territorial integrity. The examination of individual level data below will shed more light on the sociological bases of right-wing parties and sources of protest voting in Turkey.

The lack of systematically collected and reliable survey data on the sociological bases of Turkish parties in the 1970s prevents us from comparing today’s extremist party supporters with those of the earlier period. Therefore, in this section we will present the findings of a nationwide representative survey data that was conducted by the VERI research group in March-April 1998 by following a systematic sampling method including 1800 subjects from the electoral age population (i.e., 18 year and older) in Turkey. The sub-samples of MHP (N=178, 9.9 percent) and FP (N=259, 14 percent) voters will be compared with the entire Turkish electorate in terms of their sociological characteristics, issue positions, ideological orientations and political origins.

Notes: Entries are percentage point differences from the full sample (N=1800). (*): No percentage point difference (lower than 1 point). The figures are calculated by the author from the raw data.

Source: Veri Research Group, 1998.

The sociological profile of the MHP and FP supporters notably differs, in some aspects, from that of the entire population as well as from the each other. As has been reported by the students of the extreme right in Europe,(25) males are disproportionately represented in both the MHP and FP electorate. The gender bias is much more noticeable in the ranks of the MHP electorate (25 percentage points) than the Islamist FP (7.4 points). Age is another factor, which distinguishes the far-right electorate in Turkey: the younger age cohorts are more likely to support the Nationalist MHP. The FP also appears to be supported by the lower age cohorts, especially those between 25-to-39 years. Conversely, the MHP is markedly under-represented among the older age groups (55 plus) while the FP is less likely to be supported by the 40-to-54 age category.

These age differences can be explained with socialization theory. While older voters experienced the pre-1980 years that marked with intense left-right ideological conflicts, younger age groups who came to voting-age in the 1980s were exposed to different sets of values and ideologies. Some scholars suggested that nationalistic propaganda and introduction of compulsory religious classes in the elementary and high schools have socialized the younger generations to the authoritarian values.(26) Moreover, the reemerging parties in the post-1980 era failed to serve as socializing agents to align the new voters. Finally the crises of political party system in the center (personal rivalry, corruption) created new opportunities for the energetic right-wing parties. Thus, with their well-defined ideology, discipline and emphasis on group solidarity, far-right nationalist and religious parties attracted many of the new voters.

The educational and occupational status variables are of major interest due to their implications for the class composition of support for these parties. The MHP appears to draw from all educational categories, but finds stronger support among those with only a primary school diploma (15.2 points). FP supporters also happen to be less educated than the entire sample, and only marginally represented in well-educated groups. This finding supports the aggregate level results reported in Table 3. In terms of occupation, MHP voters display considerable similarity with their Western European counterparts. A significant number of working class (blue collar) voters (a 9 point bias), and self employed small businessmen groups (11.8 point difference) consisting of merchants, shopkeepers and artisans (Esnaf ve Zanaatkar) disproportionately support this party as well as the FP. In contrast, however, the housewives and white-collar voters tend to be less supportive of right-wing extremism at the ballot box.

Finally, small farmers seem to associate themselves mostly with the Islamist FP, rather than secular nationalist MHP in the elections. This does not change the fact, however, that the MHP draws its majority of support from the rural settlements (9.2 point). As the electoral geography of the MHP suggests, the nationalist MHP fared well in the small to medium size Anatolian towns in the 1970s as well as in the 1990s. Similar tendencies have been observed with the FP supporters with less marked differences (1.5 point), a finding that might be compared with this party’s significant presence in some big cities. The social-class composition of the MHP and FP is consistent with the findings of West European research on far-right party support and suggests that the support given to these parties might be a reaction of the discontented traditional middle-classes voters and lower educated blue-collar workers.