Volume 5, No. 3 - September 2001
Volume 5, No. 3 - September 2001
Editor's
Summary: The
author suggests that the very changes brought about by the 20-year-old Islamic
republic has so changed the country's people and structures as to undermine the
rule of conservative forces. A new generation yearns for a free, more normal
existence. The state's poor performance on a wide range of issues increases the
pressure for major alterations in the country's governance. Revolutionary
mobilization has given way to reformist mobilization. The author assesses the
numerous strong points of the current regime but concludes
that it can stop the pressure for change only, perhaps, by actions that would
also bring its own destruction.
By basing itself on mass-based
popular support, the Iranian revolution changed the nature of state-society
relations in Iran. Although the new political elite has tried to reduce the
people's role as the majority turned against it, the major transformations made
over the last 20 years
are not so easily reversed. It is my contention that this historical experience
along with current socioeconomic and political realities has brought Iran for
the first time in its long history to the verge of inaugurating a viable
democratic political system. The problem, of course, is crossing that threshold,
a process that should take a very long time. Still, the next few years could see
the emergence of a meaningful institutional democracy in Iran despite the
continuing struggle and the power of a faction that opposes such a
development.
The idea to establish an
"Islamic Republic" after the 1978-1979 Revolution gathered immediate
support among the revolutionaries and populace alike. The only short-lived
debate was over whether to include the word "democratic" in the
"Islamic Republic" to emphasize the democratic nature of the new
state. This matter was soon resolved in a rather undemocratic fashion when
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini decided the matter was closed to debate since Islam
had already embraced democratic values in its core. At any rate, the popular
image and belief that Islam is an all-encompassing panacea to all socioeconomic
and political ills of society was overwhelming and widespread. After all, how
could Allah and his messengers be undemocratic?
The problem of course was not
so much with the Will of Allah but with the quarrel among mortal followers over
interpreting Allah's words and intentions as presented in the Koran; the
tradition, Sunnah; and deeds and sayings, Hadith, of Prophet
Muhammad and the Shi’a religious authorities, the 'Ulema. While
Iranians through a national referendum gave their support to the creation of the
"Islamic Republic," they entrusted their faith with the 'ulema and
religious intellectuals to work out the details, all without a serious and open
national debate on what Islamic Republicanism would entail. The ideological
foundation of the new state was thus from the beginning bound to create rifts
both in the state leadership and in society.
Over twenty years later, in
March 2001 Iranians gathered to celebrate, as they have for centuries, the
beginning of Norouz, the ancient pre-Islamic tradition that marks the first day
of spring and the beginning of the new year. Millions across the country put on
their new clothes and visited relatives and elders to pay their respects and to
renew friendships and acquaintances. This past year's celebration also marked
Muhammad Khatami's first four years as president. President Khatami's plan for
establishing a democratic Islamic Republic, however, in light of the crackdowns by
conservative elements in the government in recent months, seemed all but
unraveled. The latest assault on reformists by conservatives(2) after their
severe loss in the 6th Majles (Parliament) elections, started in summer
2000 and accelerated by March 2001. It included the closure of pro-reform
publications, imprisonment of influential journalists, curtailing of the powers
of the reformist-dominated Majles, and the arrest of 16 prominent
Islamist-nationalist(3) personalities charged with "plotting against the
regime," followed by the detention of some students activists under the
same accusations.(4)
The Islamic revolution
tribunal of Tehran on April 8, 2001, arrested 40 members of the Iran Freedom
Movement (IFM) and personalities affiliated to the nationalist-religious
current. The judiciary officially banned activities of the IFM and the
nationalist-religious on the eve of Norouz when, in similar operation, 21
prominent personalities belonging to these movements
were detained during a night raid on the house of Mr. Muhammad Basteh-Negar, an
IFM activist."(5) In July 2001, Tehran's Revolutionary Court issued a
warrant for the arrest of IFM Secretary-General Ebrahim Yazdi, who had failed to
meet a court order issued in April to return to Iran by May 1. Dr. Yazdi has
been residing in the US, undergoing cancer treatments.
Continuing with harassing
their opponents, Iranian conservatives have also taken aim at the
reformist-dominated Majles (parliament). Mrs. Haqiqatjoo, an outspoken MM
(Member of the Majles) was detained in late March for six hours before
being released on bail. She had already been summoned by a court on charges of
inciting public opinion and insulting the judiciary after she openly criticized
the judiciary over the arrest of Mrs. Fariba Davoudi-Mohajer, a journalist
affiliated with the Islamist-nationalists. Mrs. Haqiqatjoo further had revealed
that "Mr. Ali Afshari, a student leader who was sentenced to a five-year
jail term for his participation at the now famous Berlin Conference of April
2000, has been made to confess under duress."(6) Mr. Ahmad Salamatian, an
independent political analyst based in Paris, contends that "by extending
the scope of its prerogatives to the entire nation, the Tehran Islamic
revolution tribunal has also replaced the Intelligence Ministry, the Interior
Ministry, the security services, the Law enforcement Forces and above all the
Supreme Council. It is acting as the army in times of martial law."(7)
In a March 20 Norouz address,
President Khatami himself suggested that "opponents of reform are
threatening the country's future: Those who do not understand the nation's
genuine and historical demands for freedom, independence, and progress, those
who sow the seeds of hatred and violence have chosen an ill-fated journey....
The Iranian nation will say no to them all."(8)
President Khatami's
overwhelming victory in the May presidential elections was, however, the
manifestation of continuing popular support for his campaign for the rule of
law, civil society and democracy. President Khatami won 21,659,053 out of
28,160,405 votes cast in the elections, breaking his own record of the May 1997
presidential elections. Khatami scored 77 per cent of the votes, up from 70 per
cent he got in the 1997 race. The huge turn out of some six million first-time
voters was a major factor explaining the incumbent president's huge victory
margin.(9)
Although at least one-third of
the 42 million in the electorate did not take part in the exercise, against a mere 5
million in the previous elections, Khatami has become the first Iranian
president to increase his votes from earlier elections, against both Ayatollah
Ali Khameneh'i and Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani who got much less
votes in winning a second term.(10) So, as Mr. Hamid Reza Jala'ipoor, publisher
of several influential and mass circulation reformists dailies, all banned by
the Islamic Judiciary, has commented: "If by voting for Khatami in the May
1997 elections, people wanted to reject the candidate of the conservatives and
by the same token, express their opposition to the present theocracy, in [May
2000's presidential] elections, they showed great maturity by insisting on the
continuation of reforms, notwithstanding the blows the conservatives dealt to
the process".(11)
Despite popular support for
Khatami's mandate, the conservatives have continued their assault on the media
and religious and nationalist reformists. A month after Khatami's victory, the
Paris-based international press watchdog Reporters Sans Frontieres (Reporters
Without Borders, RSF) warned that the situation of press freedom in Iran was
"getting worse." RSF reported that 27 journalists were behind bars,
with twenty-one of them in an unknown place. The organization also called on the
Islamic republic Judiciary Head Ayatollah Mahmood Hashemi-Shahroodi to order the
release of the detained journalists.(12)
The critics have argued that
despite the recent presidential victory and two more "historic"
successes in municipal and legislative elections, "Khatami's promises of
reform has proven unrealized. Not only the defeated conservatives, led by the
fundamentalist leader Ali Khameneh'i, continue to control all key positions,
including the Judiciary, Radio and Television, the Armed Forces, Security
services, but [they] have also dumped Mr. Khatami's reforms process all
together."(13)
Iran has so far oscillated
between democratic tendencies, autocratic control, and sporadic repression. But
the question remains: What is in store for the future of democracy in Iran given
the present power struggle among the state's political leadership and the
enduring socioeconomic problems that have haunted Iran's population since the
early days of the revolution? The skeptic might argue that the experiment to
blend Islam with republicanism was doomed to failure from the beginning since
Islam as a religion and as a way of life does not permit the separation of
church and state. This argument is that the
notion of an Islamic democracy is an oxymoron. So it has been observed:
"The dichotomy that Khatami faces is essentially the political dichotomy of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, enshrined in its Constitution. The contrast
between a government based on allegiance to God and a government legitimated
through political participation may prove to be an unbridgeable gap."(14)
On the other hand, it has been
argued that Islam and its tenets are basically misunderstood: textual Islam like Christianity and Judaism
embraces a mixture of divinely-ordained "democratic" and
"undemocratic" laws, values and principles. Our true understanding of
Islam must therefore go beyond reading the mere form of religion (e.g., rites
and rituals) but to understand the very content of religion. Religion
"encompasses precepts, rites, and canons...[yet] these precepts and canons
are important not in themselves but in their capacity to guide us to the
essential purpose of religion: the spiritual enrichment and moral elevation of
human beings through the worship of God."(15) So, a modern and dynamic
Islamic state can adopt democratic institutions, procedures, values and
principles without losing the "essence" of Islam.
But, what is perhaps even more
important is the degree to which democracy can contribute to the peaceful
resolution of inevitable disputes in society arising from competition over
resources. Democracy is not about religion per se, it is about the management of
competition over socioeconomic resources and political power
within agreed-upon normative principles and values and institutional
arrangements, whereby individual citizens through elections and other forms of
political participation determine their own future through elected
representatives.(16)
This article argues that
democracy is essentially about a power struggle over socioeconomic resources and
political power in the state-society relations, and given the structural changes
in the state-society relations in the past twenty years, Iran for the first time
in its long history is faced with real opportunities for inaugurating a viable
democratic political system. The evolution of the Iranian state-society
relations based on democratic principles and values will obviously take many
years to come and will have its own unique dynamics, but the next few years may
at least see the emergence of a more meaningful institutional democracy in Iran,
the indispensable requisite for the expansion of political and civil rights in
the long run.
DEMOCRACY
IS ABOUT EMPOWERMENT
The debate over democracy, its
definition and fundamentals, as well as its impact on governments' domestic and
foreign policies, has continued for centuries. Is democracy the best political
system for promoting political, civil, and economic rights? Can democracies
continue to keep the average citizen involved in politics? Are democracies
really more peaceful than non-democracies?(17) Above all, is democracy
appropriate or desirable as a political system for non-Western societies (e.g.,
Middle Eastern countries)? That is, can an essentially Western ideology be
applied to non-Western societies?
To answer these questions,
proponents of democracy have looked to socio-economic, political, cultural,
historical, and international factors that help mold forces responsible for the
structure of political systems in different countries. Although this article
does not address these important issues, the contention here is that democracy
is about empowerment of ordinary citizens and that prospects
for democracy in any given society is contingent upon the presence of certain
requisites.(18) Without these requisites in place, prospects for establishing
and maintaining democracy are dim and can lead to democratic breakdown.(19)
Furthermore, democracy as a
political system is attractive to many--if not most--people around the globe. It
can be said, "nobody likes to be imprisoned, tortured, or killed, and that
everybody tries to escape when confronted with harm." Citizens in Western
countries remain fundamentally free from arbitrary and random state repression,
enjoying rights not shared by people under authoritarian regimes that often do
not respect even fundamental human rights. These political and civil rights
should be understood not as Western or non-Western but rather as universal
rights entitling individuals, within their own particular historical and
cultural settings, to shape their own future and be protected from abusive
government.(20)
The development of democratic
ideals and principles, e.g., the expansion of widespread respect for political
and civil rights of the individual, occurs not overnight but over decades and
even centuries. The expansion of such rights in the West itself, where modern
democracy first emerged, has taken centuries to develop to where today political
democracy is equated with freedom. But more important to the process of
democratic development is that the expansion of political and civil rights has
been the result of struggle and competition among contending
groups in society (e.g., labor, women, minorities) over political power and
socioeconomic resources.
It is only through a power
struggle for the expansion of such rights that a polyarchy,(21) a system based
on multiple power centers, can eventually emerge. The struggle for democracy in
Iran must be understood within this broader context: the politics of
electioneering and establishing the fundamental institutional framework for
competitive politics (e.g., parliament, presidency), despite all its
shortcomings and even seemingly undemocratic features (e.g., the absence of real
political parties, the all-too-powerful office of the rahbar or velayat-i
faqih) can in the long run develop more democratic features. The politics of
electioneering on its own is educational and also has a mobilizational impact on
the populace in large. This is not to argue that elections on their own
represent democratic states or having elections means the beginning of a
successful journey toward a fully democratic state. But,
it is inconceivable to witness the emergence of a democracy without elections
and electoral processes in place.
Modernization theory proposes
that economic, social, and political mobilization lead to social mobilization,
economic development and political democracy.(22) But political democracy
results from such development only where social and economic, as well as
political power resources become more evenly distributed and that this cannot be
assumed to occur, at least not initially. The development
of civil society through organized and active groups, clubs, and associations
can also help the cause of democracy by challenging the hegemony of the state
over socioeconomic resources and political power. So, it is argued that civil
society is correlated to democracy. Historically, the term "civil
society" has been used to mean different things, but its current usage
clearly points to a particular type of relationship between the state and
society.(23) Specifically, civil society exists where "clubs, organizations
and groups act as a buffer between state power and the life of the
citizen."(24) In the absence of such groups and associations, the state
dominates socioeconomic and private affairs.
However, most developing
societies like Iran suffer from structural inadequacies: Social, economic, and
political settings are such that a widespread number of people, though in
varying degrees, remain relatively poor, uneducated, and in poor health. This,
coupled with underdeveloped and ineffective social organizations and the absence
of a civil society, has often meant the domination of society by the state,
which leaves the society vulnerable to the whims of elites in and out of
power.(25) The strong position of the state vis-à-vis a weak civil
society is responsible for the disproportionate share in power by the state in
less developed countries.
So, state control over vast
resources in many developing countries has made the state a formidable force in
the distribution of socioeconomic resources and political power, through its control over
mineral and natural resources, development projects, police and intelligence,
permission for the opposition to organize into political parties, labor unions,
and associational groups, etc. The ruling elite naturally resists expanding
political and civil rights, especially if such a move would threaten its
interests or its very survival and benefit opposition groups. A compromise
resolution can emerge only when the cost of oppression to the state supersedes
any potential benefits, and concessions offered to the opposition ultimately
results in a net gain.
The popularity of Islam as a
religion and as a panacea to all social ills poses a serious challenge to
political and religious leadership of the 'ulema in the Islamic world. The
'ulema have always claimed that Islam is not merely a religion but a way of
life, and, as such, Islamic values, laws and moral codes should guide Muslims
and their political leadership throughout ages. The 'ulema must then play a
central, if not dominant, role in the daily affaires of the state, since there
is no separation of religion from politics in Islam. But, the modern state in
Muslim countries, as elsewhere in the developing world, has established itself
as a dominant entity, adhering to "modern" secular values, and
representing for the most part the powerful elites with entrenched interests and
resistant to societal pressure for power sharing.
On the other hand, the
religious leadership, as well as religious groups and intellectuals in Iran and
elsewhere in Muslim countries, has found itself in the midst of a power struggle
between the state and society over socioeconomic resources and political power.
The 'ulema have enjoyed overall religious legitimacy over the past centuries,
and have proven themselves capable of mobilizing the population at large in
either opposition to (e.g., during the Iranian Revolution) or in support of
(e.g., Iran under the shah, Saudi Arabia) the state. However, they have yet to truly prove themselves
as successful statesmen and political leaders. In Iran, the experimentation with
an "Islamic" Republic has proven very challenging, to say the least.
Questions over the extent of political and religious authority of the state and
the political and civil rights of the citizens have been daunting the state
authorities since the early days of the revolution.(26)
THE
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
The new ruling
elites'--consisting of 'ulema, religious and
secular intellectuals and, at least initially, democrats and liberal
nationalists--solution to mass popular participation and support for fundamental
change in the state-society relations after decades of being marginalized by the
Pahlavi regime was the creation of an Islamic Republic. In doing so, soon after
the revolution the institutional foundation of a representative government was
laid out, including a new constitution, a legislative body, Majles, and
an independent judiciary.
Iran today has a complex
cleric-dominated but popularly driven political system. The institutional
framework designed for the Shi’a Islamic Republic embraces both popular
participation and a balance of power within the ruling elite circle. The supreme
authority is the guide (rahbar) of the revolution, currently Ayatollah Ali
Khameneh'i, who was appointed by the popularly elected 83-member Assembly of
Experts (majles-i khubregan) which has constitutional rights to dismiss
him if it decides he abuses his authority. The guide is not expected to interfere with the daily
affairs of the government, although he is commander-in-chief of the armed forces
and has the power to dismiss the president and to appoint the heads of the
judiciary, the revolutionary guards, the media, and the military. The Council of
Guardians (shura'-i negahban), comprised of religious lawyers appointed
by the guide and of lay lawyers elected by the parliament ensures that all
legislation conforms to Islamic law.
Since 1988, the Expediency Council (shura-i
maslahat-i nezam) has been in charge of resolving disagreements that often
arise between the Council of Guardians and the popularly elected parliament. The
reshaping of the Expediency Council in the weeks prior to former president
Hashimi Rafsanjani's departure from office resulted in an increase in the power
and prestige of the Council, which Rafsanjani now heads.(27) In contrast to all
these appointed bodies, members of the parliament and the president are
popularly elected.
The creation of an Islamic
republic was beset with difficulties from the start. Ayatollah Khomeini aimed to
replace a tyrannical leader with a just, popular rule under the tenets of Islam.
The challenge to the Islamic republic has been to establish popular sovereignty
under clerical rule and preserve a government with a divine mission whose real
secular task was to run a modern state in a Western-dominated capitalist
world.(28) However, with the exception of the government-controlled Islamic
Party, no provisions were made for independent political parties. And soon after
the fall of the provisional government of Bazargan, all opposition was
suppressed, including the liberal National Front and the leftist Mojahideen-i
Khalq, which accused the ruling 'ulema of monopolizing power and eventually
declared an armed struggle against the government. The new religious leadership
ignored that "institutional approach to democracy necessarily implies that
no group in civil society--including religious groups--can a priori be prohibited from
forming a political party." And that, "Constraints on political
parties may only be imposed after a party, by its actions, violates democratic
principles," and "the judgment as to whether or not a party has
violated democratic principles should be decided not by parties in the
government but by the courts."(29)
The Majles itself, in
light of the absence of true political party opposition to the state, has been a
battleground for factionalism, broadly divided into conservative and reformist
camps: Elite factionalism among clerics began almost immediately after the
revolution. The ideological and political fragmentation in the fifth, and now in
the sixth parliament, remains along three lines. The Association of the
Hizballah consists of conservative-minded individuals and blocs of
parliamentarians who reject President Khatami's agenda for the supremacy of the
rule of law, the expansion of civil society and individual freedoms, within a
yet-fully-developed Islamic framework. The Hizballah Members of the
Parliament stand in opposition to Khatami and his supporters in the parliament.
They are generally suspicious of the direction of domestic reforms and closer
relations with the West that they see leading toward the erosion of the supreme
leader's authority, and ultimately the secularization and subordination of
Iranian society to "external powers" at the expense of Islam. They
perceive the notion of individual rights in opposition to the Shi’a
principle of guided leadership by a faqih (leader).
The central issue is over
whether the guide should be popularly elected or not, given that his leadership
is ordained by the Shi’a belief in the infallibility of Imams and by
implication, the leader (i.e., the guide, not the president).(30) The
Independent Hizballah Members are parliamentarians who supposedly remain
independent in their political and ideological orientations and whose votes in
the legislator is not either in support of or in opposition to President Khatami
but can swing between the other factions.
Overall, the debates over the ideological and practical application of clerical
rule among and between clerics have intensified in the past 20 years.
The ideological and political
division within the Shi’a clergy-dominated ruling government is the
natural outcome of the struggle for power and resources, including ideological
hegemony, within the state and between the state and society at large. That is,
the behavior of the state in Iran can convincingly be explained based on the
clergy's efforts to sustain itself and in doing so to dominate society. The
debate over the place of Islam in the "Islamic Republic" is not merely
a matter of theological interest but reflecting a long historical struggle over
the "proper" role the 'ulema should play in Islam and the Islamic
community, the Umma'.
The historical view has been
that Islam without the leadership of the velayat-i faqih (Guardianship of
the Jurists) is not possible. Indeed, without the leadership of the Guardians
Islam, like Christianity in the West, may even be destined over time to lose its
hold in society and be overshadowed by forces of secularism and capitalism. This
will not only undermine Islam and Islamic tenets, it will severely undermine or
even destroy the "rightful and legitimate" clerical leadership of the
'ulema as the guardians of Islam. After all, the presumption is that the
survival of Islam in the past fourteen centuries without the leadership of the
'ulema would not have been possible.
The experiences of the Islamic
Republic since the revolution, however, has demonstrated that religious leaders
once in power are not immune to the corrupting influences of politics.
Regardless of the ideological foundation of the state, modern politics is about
the management of conflict over the distribution of socioeconomic resources and
political power. The management of the state-society relations, however, without
the benefit of effective institutions is not possible. It is through the clashes
of ideas and interests, managed and organized in political, economic and social
institutions that peaceful resolutions to conflicting interests can be tested
and implemented. In the political arena, opposition political parties, religious
or not, and different associations and clubs like labor unions are instrumental
in the process of democratization.
But, democratic institutions
do not appear overnight and during the transitionary period from authoritarian
to democratic rule they often coexist with authoritarian institutions. So, in
Iran the democratically elected institutions, such as the president and
parliament, must share power with equally powerful, if not more powerful,
authoritarian and unelected elements of the government.(31) Therefore, the
question should not be whether Islam can function without the benefit of the
'ulema or the velayat-i Faqih. Instead, the question is what are the
appropriate institutional arrangements where religious and secular forces can
openly compete for political power without undermining the rules of democracy
and democratic bargaining. Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, the most prominent
critic of Ayatollah Khameneh'i with millions of supporters, for example, has
called for changes to the Iranian constitution so that the concentration of
powers in the hands of a single person does not occur. Montazeri also has
suggested that "either the post of president and spiritual leader should be
combined to create a powerful elected leader or the president should be given
more powers and the spiritual leader should just fill an advisory
role."(32)
SOCIAL
MOBILIZATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS
The aggressive effort by
conservatives to suppress the reformists in Iran raises the question of whether
the future of democracy in Iran is doomed. Can the limited democratic gains in
Iran, through fairly open and competitive local and national elections, be
rerouted by conservative forces who see democracy and popular sovereignty as
Western values and incompatible with Islam? In other words, can conservatives
through their control of central political institutions and the military erase
the Republic from the Islamic Republic of Iran? While it is impossible to
predict exactly what is in store for the future of democracy in Iran, my
contention is that the nature of the state society relations in Iran in the past
20 years has been altered drastically by domestic and international events,
making a return to authoritarian rule, under any ideological disguise, very
unlikely.
The Iranian society's
experiences in the post-revolution era have been intense, violent, and
widespread. The revolutionary upheaval, anti-government armed insurgencies by
opposition groups, the eight-year-long war with Iraq, the rapid population
growth and urbanization, the flood of Afghani and Iraqi refugees, the U.S.
economic sanctions and most of all the persistence of economic crisis have had
enduring impacts on the Iranian society. These events, along with the deliberate
state policy of "Islamization" and populist economic policies to give
priority to rural development and an overall a more balanced approach to
development, have reshaped the foundation of Iran's socioeconomic and political
structure. Despite all its shortcomings, Iranian society's outlook on the state
and its own self-image has fundamentally changed.
The power distribution in the
state-society relations in modern Iran until the 1978-1979 revolution had been
structured by a complex relationship among the monarchy and its supporters, the
'ulema and the religious establishment, and the traditional small merchants or
the Bazarris. The politically powerless middle and working classes did
not play central roles in setting the national agenda. Similarly, the
intellectuals' influence over masses in the national struggle for freedom--which
since the 1906 Constitutional Revolution had focused against anti-colonialism
and foreign domination, and not democracy per se--remained marginal for the most
part.(33) But today, intellectuals, professionals, the media, filmmakers, and
artists are among the forerunners in the national struggle for democracy and
freedom.
It is only in the past 20
years that we have witnessed the disappearance of the monarchy as a central
contender for power, and the weakening of 'ulema as the legitimate heir to
Allah's rule on earth in the absence of a Mahdi or the Messiah. The rise
of the 'ulema to political power, moreover, has exposed their vulnerabilities to
trappings of power, thereby raising doubt about their ability and sincerity to
act simultaneously as both political and religious leaders. The 'ulema, now
contenders for power, are no longer perceived as sincere men of God and immune
from corruption. The result, in the words of Naser Momayesi, is that, "the
clergy's direct involvement in state affairs has made it the main target of
blame for the ills of society and the state. The cleric's mismanagement of the
economy, totalitarian control over the country's cultural life, and above all,
abuse of power, have severely undermined their once untarnished moral
authority."(34)
Similarly, the
post-revolutionary period has mobilized the Iranian population, creating space
for young educated males and females from all socioeconomic backgrounds, and
helped energize the intellectuals and professionals who have been on the
forefront of the drive for democracy. Ironically, much of the changes in the
fabric of Iranian society, prompting the drive toward democracy, have been the
result of policies promoted by the central government itself. Even throughout
the war with Iraq, "The building of schools and roads between rural areas
and the towns (sometimes for strategic reasons), the electrification of the
villages, and the building of modern facilities (public bath, hospitals, houses,
etc.) was undertaken at a relatively fast pace."(35) In that sense, Islam
in Iran has played a central progressive role in the ongoing process of
development and empowerment of the traditionally poor and powerless.(36)
Despite positive developments
in Iran in uprooting the historical relations of power, the past 20 years has
also created new obstacles for democracy. The revolution brought an end to the
royal court and its powerful allies who had long controlled vast amount of
economic resources and political power. But, since the new state's institutions
have created new networks of interest articulation--that along with their allies
among bazarri merchants and social conservatives remain resistant to economic
restructuring--social reform, calls for accountability and democratic rule is
being fiercely resisted by some government institutions.
The creation of state-run
foundation-conglomerates following the revolution to help consolidate state
control of society has had long-term economic and political consequences. The
Revolutionary Guards, for example, was created to help the police and security
forces to combat anti-revolutionaries, but it has developed into a powerful
organization, with its own ground, naval, and air forces to defend and maintain order
throughout the country. The Dispossessed Foundation (Bunyad-i Mostazafin and
Janbazan) also employs hundreds of thousands of people, linking their
livelihood with the state. It controls thousands of workshops, factories, hotels
and other properties it inherited from their nationalization in the earlier
years of the revolution.
These para-statal foundations
enjoy extensive economic endowments and political backing, and have become a
source of wealth and political power for those in charge of these foundations.
Some of these foundations are exempt from taxation and have grown into
influential forces blocking any attempts for economic privatization and reforms.
Perhaps the most notable example is the Dispossessed Foundation, whose budget is
close to equaling 60 percent of the entire national expenditure on development.
The Dispossessed Foundation is under the authority of the spiritual guide and is
exempt from any parliamentary investigation,(37) although parliament has
increasingly called for bringing such organizations under its jurisdiction.
The transformation of the
state and society in Iran has been a function of sociopolitical and ideological
transformations within both the state and society, compounded with severe and
persistent economic crises. The state policy to propagate "Islamic
justice" mainly to the dispossessed has helped mobilize Iranian population
from the ground up. Through the expansion of access to clean water, electricity,
roads, education, and even political power through local elections, the
government has opened the gate to the flood of massive social mobilization. So,
"by homogenizing the people, the Iranian revolutionary regime indirectly
has contributed to the consciousness of the new society that demands
participation in political matters and refuses henceforth the transcendence of
the state over society."(38)
Despite the state's populist
policies in giving priority to the needy, the Mostazafin, the weight of
economic difficulties in Iran continues to be placed on the backs of the poor
that now also includes large segments of working and middle classes. An
over-bloated, inefficient public sector, dominated by narrow, monopolistic
special interests, high levels of unemployment and inflation and the devaluation
of Iran's currency in the international market have had devastating impacts on
the standard of living in Iran. The middle class has declined in size and wealth
and the working class is plagued with high levels of unemployment. The repeated
devaluation of the rial in the international market and persistent inflation and
unemployment have also hurt a wide majority of the people, while benefiting some
state organizations and black-marketers, and helping to spread corruption and
bribery in almost every sector of the economy. As a result, hard currencies such
as the dollar have replaced the rial as a medium of exchange in the open
market.(39)
Thus, the government, in light
of the gradual transformation of Iranian society, faces an increasing legitimacy problem. It can no
longer justify itself by insisting that it is bringing about the creation of an
ideal Islamic society that embraces equality, justice and freedom while it
cannot provide for socioeconomic needs and fundamental political freedoms of its
people. The resolution of ideological splits within the state can help sustain
the state and to legitimate its existence, but the long-term solution for the
survival of the "Islamic" republic rests with the extent of its
success in providing material benefits and fundamental freedoms to Iranians
through further redistribution of political power and socioeconomic resources.
Iranian society under the shah
for the most part "was undemocratic in its institutions, in the
distribution of power and in the material outlook of its elites and the majority
of its citizens."(40) But, the populist revolutionary approach to education
and rural development, broader minority autonomy, internal migration because of
the eight-year-long war with Iraq and continued rapid urbanization have promoted
the cause of cultural homogeneity in Iran. After two decades, the society is
"culturally more homogeneous than ever before: even in remote areas, young
boys and girls speak and write in Persian, including ethnic regions like
Azerbaijan, Baluchistan, Kurdistan, and the predominantly Arab area of
southeastern Khuzistan."(41) As one author observed in 1997:
The new generation is better educated on the whole, at least in the case
of popular groups from the lower and lower middle class and particularly in
rural areas. It is much more politically aware than the one that took part in
the Revolution because it is devoid of a utopian turn of mind and has
experienced the harsh facts of life resulting from two decades of economic
difficulties (the decline in oil prices, the flight of the capital outside Iran,
the eight years of war and its heavy toll in terms of destruction and brain
drain, etc.)(42)
Civil society in Iran, despite
fundamental structural changes in the fabric of the Iranian society and the
social mobilization of women, students, and intellectuals, remains relatively
weak. Civil society is basically used to label any group or movement outside the
state apparatus and control, regardless of its purpose or character. But the
relations among groups and movements and between them and the state are also
assumed to be at least minimally cordial and not totally conflictual. This view
has led the concept of civil society's becoming so general that it is sometimes indistinguishable
from the general term, "society." However, the pressure for change
toward civil society and democracy in Iran emanates not so much from agents of
civil society--which remains relatively few in numbers, organizationally weak
and mostly ineffective in influencing public policy--but from the overall
mobilized population across all sectors of society.
Post-revolution Iran witnessed
a revamping of the education system both in the content of the curriculum and in
the opportunity of access to lower and higher education. First, the new agenda
for national education was to include priorities for incorporating Islamic
values and culture into the curriculum. Second, the lower strata of the Iranian
population that included the lower and lower middle classes, were given
priorities of access in the national education scheme. The new regime felt
compelled to respond to its mainstream constituency, the dispossessed, for
ideological and political support during the crucial years of consolidating
power. Thus, the expansion of new schools and universities to villages and small
towns became a natural policy option. New quotas were accorded by the state to
the families of martyrs (those killed during the revolution, in the service of
the mobilized "vanguard" revolutionary guards, or in the eight-year
war with Iraq) to compensate them for their sacrifices and continued support of
the regime. In higher education, particularly, "martyrs' siblings and
children were allocated special quotas, a form of "positive
discrimination." Sometimes almost half the university places were reserved
for them, easing the accession of the popular classes to higher education, with
the middle classes grudgingly accepting the situation."(43)
In the years following the
Cultural Revolution of 1980-1982 and the reopening of universities, "The
lower class students were instrumentalized by the [Hizballah] to put down any
student or faculty opposition. They were mobilized in demonstrations and muzzled
protests by intimidating students and by helping the [Hizballah] scrutinize
their 'Islamic mores.' Many joined the Bureau for the reinforcement of Unity (daftar-e
tahkim-e vahdat), a student association under the aegis of the
[Hizballah]."(44) However, with the new generation of students entering
universities, a gradual shift of the lower class students from a Hizballah
ideology toward a new perception of politics was evident. As Farhad
Khosrokhavar, a professor at Ecole des Hautes en Sciences Sociales in
Paris has observed:
By the second half of the 1990s, the shift was clear, as evident in the
massive attendance at Soroush's(45) classes and the sporadic protest movements
against the poor quality of dormitories and cafeterias. The [Hizballah] had lost
its popular support among students, even among those who owed their studies to
the quotas of the regime and its financial contributions, mainly through the
Revolutionary Foundations, which were controlled by the [Hizballah].
Progressively, the Bureau for the Reinforcement of the Unity shifted from a
[Hizballah] ideology to an open and reformist one."(46)
Women have also experienced a
great transformation in their status and self-image in society. Before and
during the revolution, "Women had thought of each other either as archaic
and non-intelligent (the arrogant attitude of Westernized middle class women
toward the popular ones) or as selfish, immodest and dehumanized (the attitude
of women in the lower classes in popular districts of Tehran toward those living
in the Westernized residential neighborhoods in the northern parts of the
city)."(47)
The initial imposition of
strict Islamic dress code, the repeal of family planning laws and other
restrictive family and individual laws, affecting women for the most part, have
either been loosened or reversed. The status of Iranian women, entrapped in
chauvinistic and patriarchal rules and norms of behavior, still has a long way
to go. It can also be argued that Iranian women along with other sectors of
society have suffered from severe economic hardships and an overall decline in
the standard of living and severe limitations on their freedom of statement and
other civil liberties. The general population including women, however, has been
mobilized by the revolutionary upheaval and has gained a greater sense of
awareness and social consciousness.(48)
The ideological foundation of
the state itself has been instrumental in the mobilization of women and the
population in general. Despite the wide range of interpretations on the role of
women in Islam, most religious and political leaders have not objected to women
participation in politics, in the market and in social activities. After all,
the popular image of women in Islam often reverts back to Prophet Muhammad's
wife, Khadijah, and his daughter, Fatima, both symbolizing strength,
independence, comradeship with their husbands in life and successful individuals
in their own rights.
The wider access to education
for women and the intermingling of women from different socioeconomic
stratum and cultural groups, because of the eight-year war and internal
migration and rapid urbanization, have helped the mobilization of women in
society. Thus, "Women are much better educated than before, and they are by
far more conscious of their unjust situation.... In comparison to the Shah's
times when they were accorded a partial juridical equality with men, they are
now more mature in terms of human agency. Before the Revolution, the great
majority of women had no clear consciousness of their rights;
now, they are much more aware of the necessity to engage in social action to
convince public opinion (particularly men) to change the laws in the name of
social justice."(49)
The achievements by women in
creating a social space for themselves have not been due solely to opportunities
granted to them by men in power. Women, when possible, have proved themselves
very apt to mobilization and statement of their views. They poured their support
behind presidential candidate Muhammad Khatami in 1997 and
again in 2001 and have been among his strongest supporters.
The leadership of the women's
movement itself is divided between secular women like Mehrangiz Kar, Shirin
Ebadi and Islamist ones like Faezeh Hashemi and Shahla Sherkat, among others.
But both groups have in common their dedication to the cause of women in Iran.
Women have learned:
To respect each other in spite of their differences and not to demonize
each other for their divergent views on religion.... The Islamist feminists, for
example, defend women's rights in the name of the complementarity of men and
women in Islam; they ask for separate swimming pools, duplication of the
facilities for women whenever possible, defense of women in the name of Islamic
justice, and interpretations of religious law in a way that is favorable to
women. Secular feminists try to show the equality of men and women in modern
institutions and international treaties to which Iranian government adhered long
ago.(50)
HOW
ABOUT THE MILITARY AND ARMED FORCES?
What role do the military and
armed forces play in the struggle for political power and democracy? Although
the armed forces have been instrumental in the survival of the regime thus far,
the probability of a direct military intervention to gain control of the state
remains unlikely.
The Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Forces (IRGC) and the corps of volunteers, the Basij, have remained
central in maintaining security and political stability. They were instrumental
during the eight years of war with Iraq in keeping the regular armed forces
checked and preventing possible plots for military coups. The Iranian leadership
even during the war years remained suspicious of the regular army.(51) The IRGC,
in light of its experience during the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars, has developed
itself into a more structured and professional body with new uniforms, rank
structures, naval and air forces, all under the direct command of the leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khameneh'i. The regular army remains under the command of the
chief of staff of the armed forces and is loyal to the leader.
Both IRGC and the Basij
forces, along with the law enforcement forces, have also been active in helping
police and security forces in maintaining civil order in cities and villages
across the country. These often young and ideologically dedicated militia
volunteers are known to obey orders without questions, whether in putting down
demonstrations in cities as in Tehran, Isfahan, and Arak, or fighting the
Iraqi-supported armed Mujahiden-i Khalq opposition in the Western frontier, or
engaging armed drug smugglers in the eastern frontiers bordering Pakistan and
Afghanistan. The Basij remains a dedicated force supporting the government,
especially in controlling unrest, as in the 1994 Qazvin unrest or the July 1999
student demonstrations.
During the summer 1999 student
demonstrations the heads of the IRGC boldly threatened the possibility of the
guards' intervention if things were to "get out of hand." A letter was
signed by (24) commanding officers warning President Khatami for failing to
recognize the threat to Iran's national security because of students'
demonstrations and the possibility for the guards' armed intervention should
Khameneh'i deem it necessary. While the armed forces have begun to recover from
the eight-year war with Iraq, it remains qualitatively poor, financially
strapped, and faces even more potential adversaries today than ever before in
its modern history. Iran today is surrounded by potential adversaries in all its
borders; whether Iraq or Turkey to the West, Afghanistan and Pakistan to the
East, Turkish-Israeli-American influence to the north or the American forces
stationed in the Gulf in the south. Added to all this is the thriving network of
drug trafficking, originating in Afghanistan and through Iran and Turkey,
eventually finding its market in Europe.
Iran's efforts to rebuild its
military after the eight-year war with Iraq initially faced severe financial
constraints since the economy was in no shape to support major expenditures. So,
the projected $2 billion annual military budget was cut drastically. By the
second half of the 1990s, however, with the turning around of oil prices and a
more disciplined approach to economic management, Iran's military expenditures
began to rise again and also involved major arms purchases from Russia and
China.(52)
However, despite recent
increases in its defense budget, the quality of Iran's armed forces remains low
and its offensive capabilities
marginal. The armed forces also remain structurally weak and organizationally
divided.(53) The division of the armed forces into regular military and
revolutionary guards has created a dual military structure that has made command
control more difficult. The status of IRGC and whether it is totally dedicated
to the conservatives' vision and mission of the Islamic Republic has also come
to be questioned in recent years.(54)
The status of the armed forces
in Iran, particularly with respect to the revolutionary guards, is linked to the
future of democratic rule. The politicization of IRGC, the
"Islamization" of the command and control of the regular army, and the
overall low quality of the status of armed forces have made the Iranian military
less of an enduring threat to civilian rule. Contrary to its neighbor's
militaries in Pakistan and Turkey, who have a virtual carte blanche to
intervene in civilian rule, when deemed necessary, civil-military relations in
Iran has not been so favorably institutionalized on
behalf of the military.
This is not to argue that
military in Iran and particularly the IRGC may never attempt to gain control of
civilian rule especially if the current regime faces an imminent threat of being
overthrown, but given the historical absence of military rule in Iran and the
present civil-military relations, prospects for a direct military intervention
remains unlikely. This, of course, can help the cause of democracy in Iran.(55)
CONCLUSION
The Iranian revolution marked a
new beginning in the state-society relations in that country. The new elite in
charge of the state from the beginning attempted to separate itself from the old
structure of power that relied mainly on support from powerful wealthy families,
the military, technocrats, the affluent upper middle class and foreign powers.
The clergy-based government instead has relied fundamentally on mass-based
popular support to deliver its populist agenda for the country. Both the state
and society in the past 20 years, however, have experienced major
transformations, altering forever the nature of the state-society relations in
Iran. The revolution, eight years of war with Iraq, post-war reconstruction
experiences, and the ideological split within the state have marked the
transformation of state-society relations. The mobilization of the
post-revolution generation in general and students and women in particular, led
by intellectuals and professionals, has drastically changed the fabric of
society. The state itself can no longer
persuasively blame monarchists, counter-revolutionaries and foreign plots for
its own shortcomings. Given the ideological split within its ranks and
leadership, the conservatives must either bend to popular will or formulate
mechanisms to share political power with the opposition.
The implications for Iran's
experimentation with republicanism and democracy are more profound than a simple
formulation of a developing country's struggle to achieve political democracy.
Democracy, understood as empowerment of the citizenry, has a very strong appeal
in Iran today. It has taken a revolution, a bloody eight-year war with its
neighbor, and isolation in the international community to demonstrate to
Iranians themselves and the outside world that the country has indeed embarked
upon a new path to political assertiveness and self-reliance. Iran has indeed
been more independent in formulating its domestic and foreign policies than ever
before in its recent history. One can of course disagree with the extent of
Iran's successes and failures in political, socioeconomic and diplomatic arenas.
But the current debate on the rule of law, civil society and democracy and the
"reevaluation" of the regime's past 20 years' performance are due to
Iranians' genuine experiences with trials and errors in creating an
"Islamic" republic. Iranians are learning that the price of freedom
most often is high and the road to accountable governance and responsible
citizenship requires continuous struggle.
The clampdowns on
reformist-oriented individuals and the media and the imprisonment of reformists
under bizarre interpretations of "Islamic" tenets only indicate the
state's vulnerability in responding to rapid changes in Iran, ironically
promoted by the state itself in the past two decades.(56) Whatever one's view on
the debate on Islam and democracy, it is my contention that the final verdict
will largely depend on the successes and failures of the ruling elite in
delivering tangible economic, social, and political benefits to
Iranians in general and to their immediate constituencies in particular. That
is, the notion of an Islamic democracy is far easier to instill where the
general population benefits from the state's public policies that help
legitimate and consolidate the elites' position in society at large.
The new generation of Iranian
electorate "has not seen the shah's regime, did not take part in the
revolution, and yearns for a non-heroic, non-puritanical and pluralist social
life. This generation does not think any
more in revolutionary terms but rather in reformist ones. This change is due not
only to external factors (the collapse of the Soviet Union, the aspiration for
democracy in many parts of the world, etc.) but also to internal reasons within
Iranian society."(57) However, the resolution of what role the top
religious leadership, rahbar, must play in the overall distribution of political
power is the most immediate challenge facing the regime.
Khatami's first four years
were not a total failure. Despite serious setbacks to Khatami's reform agenda,
the population in general and the post-revolution generation in particular has
become energized and mobilized, demanding structural and enduring change.
Khatami' limited success has been due not so much because of his incompetence,
lack of vision, or leadership but due to persistent acts of sabotage of his
reform ideas by the conservatives. Khatami has insisted throughout on primacy of
the rule of law and civil society, Jama'ah Madani, as requisites to
socioeconomic and political development.
On November 26, 2000 Khatami
gave a major speech confessing he has no power to implement the Constitution and
his own duties as president. Nevertheless, in the May 2001 presidential
election, Iranians continued their support for reform. Khatami's failure would
be the failure of the Islamic Republic, and given the socially mobilized Iranian
population one wonders how long the conservatives can continue to rule with an
iron-fist before either giving into reformist Islamists-nationalists reform
agenda or further lose their religious/political legitimacy and perhaps succumb
to yet another revolutionary upheaval.
The view presented here is
that the changes in Iran have been structural and there are no real prospects
for a return to the authoritarian ruling style of the past. It is possible that
the conservatives will triumph, perhaps using some form of military intervention
against the reformists. Another scenario would be for the regime--possibly based on a broader
consensus--trying to follow the Chinese model of blending economic growth with
political stagnation. Yet the outcome lies not only with personalities or
factional struggle but also with some of the deeper shifts and developments
visible in Iranian society over the last two decades. This factor, along with
the strong popular base of support for the reform movement, offers hope for the
future.
NOTES
1. Portions of this article have previously been published in either my
book or article on Islam, state-society relations and democracy, see Ali R.
Abootalebi, Islam and Democracy: State-Society Relations in Developing
Countries: 1980-1994 (New York and London: Garland, 2000); "The
Struggle for Democracy in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Middle East
Review of International Affairs, MERIA, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 2000):
43-56.
2. Reformists in Iran refer to intellectuals, nationalists, and Islamists
(those Islamic leaders whose vision of Islam is more in tune with democratic
rule and compatibility of Islam with modernity) and other groups and
personalities; those who reject the more restrictive and traditional view of the
conservative religious leaders on Islam and its role in society,
economy and polity.
3. Reformists are also referred to as Islamist-nationalist, a coalition
of Islamists and nationalist personalities who share their opposition to
traditional religious readers' orthodox view of Islam and modernity.
4. As reported by Iran Press Service, April 4, 2001, on the Internet at
http://www.Iran-Press-Service.com.
5. Iran Press Service, April 4, 2001.
6. Iran Press Service, March 28th, 2001.
7. Iran Press Service, April 8, 2001.
8. As reported in the Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Iran Report, Vol. 4, No. 12, 26 March 2001.
9. Iran Press Service, June 10, 2001.
10. Iran Press Service, June 11, 2001.
11. Iran Press Service, June 10, 2001.
12.
Iran Press Service, June 14, 2001.
13. See comments by Iran Press Service's Editor, Safa Haeri, May 24,
2001.
14. A. Reza Sheikholeslami,
"The Transformation of Iran's Political Culture," Critique, No.
17 (Fall 2000): 105-133. Quotation is from p. 133.
15. See the short essay in Persian
that appeared in now-closed newspaper Asr-e Azadegan on January 2000,
"on Form and Content in Democracy and Elections" by Hasan
Youssefi-Eshkevari, who was arrested in August 2000 for attending an April 2000
conference in Berlin on democracy and reform in Iran. For translated version and
quotation used here, see Mahmoud Fazeli Birjandi, "Playing with the
People's Choice," published under "Voices from Within: Selections from
the Iranian Press," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (October
2000): 139-46; 140.
16. See, Abootalebi, Islam and
Democracy.
17. On this topic see, for
example, William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Management of Conflict,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37, 1(March 1993): 42-68.
18. The literature on democracy
and its requisites is rich. For a brief discussion of qualitative and
quantitative approaches to democracy and its requisites, see Rueschemeyer,
Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development
and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). See, also, Ali R.
Abootalebi, "Democratization in Developing Countries: 1980-1989," Journal
of Developing Areas 29 (July 1995): 507-30. A more comprehensive list
includes:
Seymour
Martin Lipset, Political Man (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1981); Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Arend
Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the
Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Dankwart A.
Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward A Dynamic Model,"
Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970), pp. 337-63; Robert Dahl, Polyarchy:
Participation and Opposition (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1971); Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1976). On Democracy and dependency, see Edward N. Muller,
"Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States, and
Democratic Breakdown in the Third World," International Studies
Quarterly 29 (1985): 445-69; Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and
Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley
Institute of International Studies: University of California, 1973); Andre
Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical
Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); Fernando H.
Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1979); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern
World System (New York: Academic Press, 1974);
Immanuel Wallerstein, The World Capitalist System (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1980). On Culture and Democracy, see Joseph Schumpeter,
Capitalism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1942); Lerner, The Passing
of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Free Press,
1958); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1963); Gerhard Lenski and Jean Lenski, Human Societies (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1974); Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae On Kim, Participation and
Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison (London: Cambridge University
Press,1978); Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase, et al., Political Action: Mass
Participation in Five Western Democracies (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979);
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston,
MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1980); Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman,
"Political Democracy and the Size
Distribution of Income," American Sociological Review 50 (August 1985):
438-57; Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Edward N. Muller and Mitchell
A. Seligson, "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal
Relationships," American Political Science Review 88 (September
1994): 635-52.
19. Democratic breakdown in
developing countries are caused by a number of sources, including foreign
intervention, dependency, and military intervention in politics. See, for
example, Edward Ned Muller, "Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence
on the United States, and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World,"
International Studies Quarterly 29, 1985: 445-69.
20. Giovanni Sartori, "How
Far Can Free Government Travel?" Journal of Democracy 6, no. 3 (July 1995):
101-11, p. 103.
21. The term Polyarchy was first
coined by Robert Dahl and it refers to a political system where both the
opportunity for participation and contestation for political power among elites
are widely open. See, Robert Dahl, Polyarchy.
22. A great deal of the literature
on modernization during the 1950s and 1960s was dedicated to social
mobilization. See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, A Social Mobilization and
Political Development, American Political Science Review 55 (September 1961):
493-514; David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1965); Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society:
Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958).
23. See Ernest Gellner,
"Civil Society in Historical Context," International Social Science
Journal, August 1991: 495-510. For more recent discussion on the civil society
debate, see the two volumes (1994, 1996) produced by the New York University
Civil Society in the Middle East Project, edited by Augustus R. Norton and
Farhad Kazemi, Civil Society in the Middle East (New York: New York University
Press).
24. Muhammad Muslih and Augustus
Richard Norton, Political Tides in the Arab World, Foreign Policy Association, no. 296,
Summer 1991, p. 11.
25. There is, noticeably, in LDCs
a lack of local and national groups and associations that can bring people
together with common interests. This is, however, not surprising, given that the
existence of and participation in such interest groups is highly related to the
amount of free time and resources that people have. In societies where most
people are relatively poor, and are mainly concerned with the essentials of life like food, clothing,
and shelter, organized group participation becomes something of a luxury that
most cannot afford.
26. See Ali R. Abootalebi, Islam
and Democracy.
27. The decision by Ayatollah
Khamene'i to reshape the expediency council has led to thirteen more members and
has taken voting privileges concerning questions unrelated to constitutional
matters away from the six religious lawyers of the council of guardians who are
also members of the expediency council.
28. It should be clear to Muslims that in the Quran and
Shari'a, Allah is the ultimate sovereign, and everything on earth and heaven is
under His command. Yet, there is nothing in either source to deny Muslims'
freedom of action to improve their individual and communal lives, nor does
Shari'a promote subservience to the state as a proof of proper Muslim behavior.
On the contrary, individuals are regarded as responsible for the salvation and
well being of themselves, their families, and their communities. See, The Quran,
Surah (chapter) 10, Aya (verse) 108 (NJ. Dawood, trans., New York: Penguin,
1993). The writings of Hasan Turabi, Mehdi Bazargan, Abd al-Karim Soroush, as
well as the late Ayatollah Taleqani, also discuss the sovereignty issue. Mehdi
Bazargan, for example, in response to Samuel Huntington's assertion of "the
clash of civilizations," commented, before his death, on the positive
relationship between Islam and individual rights, peaceful coexistence with
non-Muslims, economic development, freedom of action, and democracy. See Mehdi Bazargan, "Is
Islam a Global Threat?" (Aya Islam yek khatar-i Jahani Ast?), Rahavard no.
36 (Tir 1373 [1994]): 48-57. For a recent discussion of various Islamic concepts
with implications for democracy (e.g., tawhid, shurah, khilafah, etc.) see, John
Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996).
29. Alfred Stepan, Religion,
Democracy, and the "Twin Tolerations," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11,
no. 4 (October 2000): 37-57, p. 40.
30. See also, Shaul Bakhash,
"Iran's Remarkable Election," Journal of Democracy, Volume 9, No. 1
(January 1998): 80-94, 83, 84.
31. Naser Momayesi, "Iran's
Struggle for Democracy," International Journal on World Peace, Vol. XVII, 4
(December 2000): 41-70, p. 66.
32. See Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Iran Report, Vol. 4, No. 27 (23 July 2001).
33. On a history of intellectual
participation in the democratic struggle in Iran, see Merhzad Boroujerdi,
Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism (Syracuse:
Syracuse University
Press,
1996).
34. Naser Momayesi, p. 53.
35. Jahad-e Sazandegi (Crusade for
Construction) was heavily involved during and after the war in rebuilding Iran,
see Eric Hooglund, "Jehad-e Sazandeghi and Rural Change," in
Proceedings of the 100th Birth Anniversary of Imam Khomeini Conference in Tehran
(Tehran: Majmeh'e Jahani Islam Ganjineh m'aruf Quran, 2000). Cited in
Khosrokhavar, p 7.
36. Islam and Islamic leaders play
different roles in different countries, depending on the underlying
socioeconomic and political structure prevalent in any particular country and
whether Islam is in power, as in Iran and Sudan, or it is a contending force
competing for power, as in most Muslim countries. I have elsewhere discussed
this point in more detail. See, Ali R. Abootalebi, Islam and Democracy.
37. Akhbar-e Iqtisad, Vol. 2,
April 24, 2000, p. 2.
38. Farhad Khosrokhavar,
"Toward an Anthropology of Democratization in Iran," Critique, no. 16
(Spring 2000): 3-29, p.10.
39. For Iran's post-revolution
economy, see, for example, Hooshang Amirahmadi, Revolution and Economic
Transition: The Iranian Experience (N.Y.: State University of New York Press,
1990); Jahangir Amuzegar, Iran's economy under the Islamic Republic (London:
I.B. Tauris, 1993); Massoud Karshenas and M. Hashem Pesaran, "Economic
Reform and the Reconstruction of the Iranian Economy," Middle East
Journal Vol. 49, No. 1, (Winter 1995): 89-111; Jahangir Amuzegar,
"Iran's Post-Revolution Planning: The Second Try," Middle East Policy, Vol. VIII, 1 (March 2001):
25-42.
40. Khosrokhavar, p. 4.
41. Khosrokhavar, p. 9.
42. See Eric Hooglund,
"Letter from an Iranian Village," Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no.
1 (Autumn 1997): 76-84, as cited in Khosrokhavar, p. 9.
43. Khosrokhavar, p. 19.
44. Khosrokhavar, pp. 19-20.
45. Abdalkarim Soroush is perhaps
the leading Islamist intellectual in Iran. Soroush published works are numerous
and there is an Internet site dedicated to his works, at
http://www.seraj.org/seraj.htm. He is currently a visiting fellow at Harvard.
46. Khosrokhavar, p. 20
47. Khosrokhavar, p. 22.
48. My comments about women,
students and the youth and the overall transformation of society in Iran also
reflect my own personal observations during my last two visits to Iran in summer
1997 and 2000. I spent several weeks in Tehran and visited the western provinces
of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and the eastern province of Khurasan , as well as
the Caspian region, and held personal formal and informal interviews with a
number of people.
49. Khosrokhavar, p. 23.
50. Khosrokhavar, p. 22.
51. For more on civil-military relations in Iran, see Sepehr Zabih, The
Iranian Military in Revolution and War (London: Routledge, 1988); Nader
Entessar, "The Military and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran,"
in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin, eds., Post-Revolutionary Iran
(Boulder, CO: westview Press, 1988); Michael Eisenstadt, "The Armed Forces
of the Islamic Republic of Iran."
52. Iran expenditures on arms imports, according to its Central Bank
figures stood at $1.625 billion in 1989-90; $1.6 billion in 1990-91; $1.678
billion in 1991-92; $808 billion in 1992-93; and $850 million in 1994-94.
Figures cited in Michael Eisenstadt, "The Armed Forces of the Islamic
Republic of Iran: An Assessment," MERIA, March 2001, endnote 1. By March
2001 after a large Iranian delegate visit to Russia, that included high military
officials including Admiral Ali Shamkhani the head of the regular military and
IRGC, it was all but certain that major arm purchases from Russia was
forthcoming.
53. For a recent account of the status of Iran's armed forces, see
Michael Eisenstadt, March 2001.
54. The support of IRGC personnel for Khatami in 1997 Presidential
elections and the refusal of their commander units in opening fire on
demonstrators during the 1994 Qazvin demonstrations has raised some questions
about IRGC's outlook of the power structure in the Islamic Republic. See,
Michael Eisenstadt, "The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran."
55. For a discussion on democracy, military, and politics in Turkey and
Pakistan, see Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000 issue. See, Eric Rouleau,
"Turkey's Dream of Democracy," pp. 100-14 and Jessica Stern,
"Pakistan's Jihad Culture, pp. 115-26.
56. The number of arrests, imprisonment, newspaper closure, and an
overall crackdown on reformists in Iran dramatically increased since summer 2000
(1379 in Iranian calendar). Among victims have been secular reformists,
religious-nationalists), religious personalities and politicians, and a series
of newspapers and other publications.
57. Khosrokhavar, p. 8.
*Ali R.
Abootalebi has taught at the University of Arizona and Union College. He is currently
associate professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Eau
Claire. He is author of Islam and Democracy: State Society Relations in
Developing Countries, 1980-1994 (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 2000).