Volume 5, No. 3 - September 2001
Volume 5, No. 3 - September 2001
By A.W. Samii
Editor's
Summary: Despite
the election of President Muhammad Khatami, Iranian conservatives continue to
target the press there, using the institutions they control. Indeed, arrests,
persecutions, and harassment of the independent-minded and reformist media has
increased as the anti-Khatami faction struggles to hold onto power. Khatami has
been unwilling or unable to respond. This is a case study of how effectively
those opposing democracy and change can wield their assets.
Iranians
have won a great deal of recognition for their journalistic activities recently,
but it probably is not the kind of recognition they want. The U.S.-based
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) placed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei at the top of its annual "Enemies of the Press" list in May
2001, and he was the runner-up the previous year. Iranian publisher Shahla
Lahiji was awarded the 2001 PEN/Barbara Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award last
April as she faced a three-and-a-half year prison sentence for acting against
national security and another six months for describing the dangers faced by
Iranian writers. Iranian editor Mashallah Shamsolvaezin's first year in prison
was marked that same month and he was already in jail when he received the
International Press Freedom Award from the New York-based Committee to Protect
Journalists. There are at least 20 Iranian journalists in prison now, and about
50 Iranian publications have been closed by the government in the second half of
2000 and the first half of 2001.
Four
years ago it looked like things would turn out much differently.
The
election of Hojatoleslam Mohammad Khatami in May 1997 and his appointment of
Ataollah Mohajerani as Islamic Culture and Guidance Minister led to expectations
of a blossoming of the Iranian press. Indeed, in the first year of Khatami's
presidency, 226 publications received licenses. But at the same time, newspapers
were closed for violating vague and unevenly enforced regulations. As one editor
complained: "Every time the press in Iran is warned by officials, we are
told that we have crossed a red line, although no one has bothered to tell us
where that red line is."(1) Journalists were tried, incarcerated, and
sometimes prevented from practicing their profession. Others were murdered or
just vanished from the face of the earth.
Shortly
before its final session, the fifth parliament strengthened the press law and
defined the "red line" more clearly. The new law was used to close
some 13 publications in one week in April 2000, and at least 44 publications by
April 2001. And when the new, predominantly-reformist, sixth parliament tried to
change the press law in August 2000, Supreme Leader Khamenei blocked the debate.
The
state of the Iranian press over the last four years will be described in the
following pages. One sees that publications and journalists took on more and
more controversial subjects during that time. One also sees that there were
numerous press closures, especially in the last year. These two developments led
to the creation of what Iranian conservatives term the "serial
newspapers" and Iranian reformists could term the "serial
plaintiffs." The conclusion of this article predicts short-term
developments in Iranian politics and describes the possible impact of those
developments on the Iranian press.
HIGH
EXPECTATIONS
When
President Khatami was elected on May 23, 1997, there were expectations of
increased press freedom for several reasons. After all, Khatami himself had been
forced out of office in 1992 after almost ten years as Minister of Islamic
Culture and Guidance after accusations that he was too lax with the media and
had advocated relations with the United States. Then he selected Ataollah
Mohajerani as Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance, and there were early
predictions that Mohajerani would not win parliamentary approval.(2) One
parliamentarian criticized Mohajerani for being too "culturally tolerant
and politically weak vis-a-vis the West," another asked Mohajerani if he
would kill Salman Rushdie if he met him, and a third one said that "[a]ll
the shrewd and cunning foreign media are supporting Mohajerani's nomination. Let
us all disappoint them."(3) At that time Mohajerani displayed the resolve
that showed itself in his later encounters with the legislature: "I
disagree with almost all of the present practices in the culture ministry. We
have to protect artists and provide an atmosphere for creativity, tranquility,
and freedom." He added, "Everybody who has accepted the Islamic
Republic and its constitution must be subject to tolerance.…I condemn the
burning of bookshops, the beating of university lecturers and attacks on
magazine offices."(4)
During
his presidential campaign, furthermore, Khatami promised increased openness,
civil society, and governmental accountability and transparency. A free press is
essential if these conditions are to be met. A free press provides a voice for
the average citizen. Journalists keep an eye on the government, serving as the
proverbial watchdogs that can detect corruption and abuses of power. And in
Iran, many publications serve as party mouthpieces, especially when contrasted
with state broadcasting, which is heavily biased in favor of hardline political
tendencies.
Indeed,
on the day that Khatami's victory was announced his spokesman said that "of
course Mr. Khatami will not continue the present restrictions on the press and
media. He will have an open policy toward them."(5) In his first extended
remarks after winning the election, Khatami said that it was time to insure more
democracy in Iran. Khatami said that the Islamic Republic was stable enough and
had recovered sufficiently from its war with Iraq to begin guaranteeing its
citizens full constitutional rights, including free thought, life, employment,
assembly and association. "We hope to gradually witness a more legal
society," he said, "with more clearly defined rights and duties for
citizens and the government."(6) And in his first address after taking
office, Khatami also called for the creation of an independent press.(7)
SOME
EXPECTATIONS MET
The
first year of the Khatami presidency saw the emergence of a reinvigorated
press.(8) Notable was the publication of Jameah, which was the first to
report the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) commander's closed-door speech
in which he threatened to "cut the necks and tongues" of political
opponents. The daily also ran interviews with Abbas Amir Entezam, who had served
15 years in prison as an American spy, in which he described torture in the
prison system and the need to separate religion from politics.(9) Publications
like this questioned the status quo, and they also served as vehicles for
reform-oriented political figures to express their views.
Simultaneously,
one saw trends that would gain momentum later. Student leader Heshmatollah
Tabarzadi was beaten up and his newspaper was closed in late 1997 after he said
that the supreme leader should be elected directly by the people for a limited
term, rather than by the Assembly of Experts, a directly-elected 86-member
clerical body. Jameah had its license suspended in June 1998, and the
next month it resumed publication with the same staff under the name Tus.
Editor Mashallah Shamsolvaezin opined that "We are a test case of how much
openness the government can tolerate."(10) The answer came in August, when
the judiciary ordered the closure of Tus for "publishing lies and
disrupting public order," and members of the hardline Ansar-i Hizbullah
vigilante group beat up Shamsolvaezin.(11) And the daily was permanently closed
in September for questioning Tehran's tough policy towards the Taliban, a rather
unwise move at a time when the regime to the east had just murdered a group of
Iranian officials (who were diplomats and intelligence officers).
Just
as press closures and violence against people in journalism took on a pattern,
so did the continued publication of a banned newspaper under a new name and
using an unused press license. After its closure, Jameah started coming
out as Tus, and after that license was revoked the newspaper came out as Neshat.
After its closure, Neshat took over the dormant license of Akhbar
and resumed publication as Akhbar-i Eqtesad, employing Neshat
staff. Other Neshat personnel were employed by Asr-i Azadigan,
which after its closure was succeeded by Gunagun weekly. Until its
closure, this weekly employed staff from Tus, Neshat, Asr-i
Azadigan, and other reformist publications. Other Jameah alumni
created Aftab-i Imruz. Hardline political commentators complained about
the "serial newspapers."(12)
Some
of the 1999 press closures clearly were factional and linked with the
publications' support for the reformists. Examples of this situation were the
cases of Salam, Neshat, and Khordad. Nevertheless, the
issue was not always purely one of hard-liners versus reformists, or
conservatives versus pro-Khatami moderates. The cases of Zan, Hoviat-i
Khish, and many others were not so clear-cut and demonstrate the complex
factors involved in silencing Iran's more outspoken media.
On
July 7, 1999, Salam was closed and its editor-in-chief, Abbas Abdi, was
arrested on the basis of a complaint from the Ministry of Intelligence and
Security (MOIS). The complaint stemmed from a July 6 Salam report about a
MOIS plan to restrict the press. The MOIS said that the Salam report was
false; the MOIS had no such plan and the letter cited by Salam was a
fake.(13) Even though the MOIS dropped the complaint against Abdi and he was
released, a July 8 student demonstration against the Salam closure and
the press bill, catalyzed by anger over the earlier arrest of students
protesting the detention of officials from a weekly magazine, Hoviat-i Khish,
escalated into some of the worst violence in the Islamic republic's history.
The
managing director of Salam, Hojatoleslam Mohammad Asqar Musavi-Khoeniha,
was tried by the Special Court for the Clergy in July 1999 on charges of
spreading fabrications, disturbing public opinion, and publishing classified
documents. Khoeniha was found guilty and sentenced to a three-and-a-half year
jail term and a flogging, but the sentence was suspended and Khoeniha was fined
instead. He was banned from publishing activities for three years, and Salam
was banned for five years.(14)
Actions
against Salam were politically driven. By restricting Khoeniha and Abdi's
media access, hard-liners eliminated some of the institutional support for the
pro-Khatami Second Khordad movement. Khoeniha is a co-founder of the pro-Khatami
student group called the Office for Strengthening Unity, which is a member of
the Second Khordad movement. Khoeniha also is a leader of the Student's
Following the Line of the Imam, the organization that occupied the U.S. Embassy
in 1979 and held the American hostages. Abdi is a member of the latter group,
and he is a founder of Khatami's Islamic Iran Participation Party. Leaders of
the Office for Strengthening Unity, such as Ebrahim Asgharzadeh, are also
one-time members of the Students Following the Line of the Imam.
Application of the law in this case clearly showed political-factional
motivations. Hardline publications--the weekly Javan and the dailies Kayhan
and Jomhuri-yi Islami--printed copies of a letter from 24 Islamic
Revolution Guards Corps commanders to Khatami in which they threatened to take
the law into their own hands if the president did not act against the
demonstrators.(15) The publications received warnings from the Islamic Culture
and Guidance Ministry for publishing a classified document,(16) but nothing else
happened.
The
September 1999 closure of Neshat was politically motivated, too, although
the charges brought against it did not indicate this clearly. The paper was
closed on the orders of Press Court Judge Hojatoleslam Said Mortazavi after a
complaint from the public prosecutor. The charges against the daily stemmed from
its publication of an open letter urging Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
to distance himself from hard-liners, as well as two articles criticizing
capital punishment.
Neshat
seemed destined for a bad end from the outset. Its staff consisted of personnel
from the previously banned Tus and Jameah newspapers. In April,
just three months after getting its license, managing director Latif Safari had
to appear before the Tehran Revolutionary Court on charges of questioning the
Islamic Revolution and supporting the monarchy.(17)
In
August, complaints were filed against Neshat by the Law Enforcement
Forces, state broadcasting, the state prosecutor, Qom's Special Court for the
Clergy, the Islamic Open University, and some parliamentary deputies. Neshat's
managing director had to appear in court, as did Neshat columnist Ebrahim
Nabavi.(18) When Neshat was banned in September, the Tehran Justice
Department pointed out that "repeated summons and bails [sic] have proved
ineffective in preventing the daily from repeating its offense."(19)
And
once again, the law was unevenly applied. Neshat officials apologized for
any offense their articles might have caused,(20) but they were not forgiven.
When Qods was charged with offending two Shia sources of emulation,
however, it published an apology and the Press Supervisory Board only issued a
written warning.(21)
Hearings
before the Special Court for the Clergy in the case of Khordad managing
editor Hojatoleslam Abdullah Nuri got underway in October 1999. This case, more
so than that of Salam and Musavi-Khoeniha, was based on the pro-Khatami
leanings of both Nuri and the publication. Nuri served as Khatami's Interior
Minister until his June 1998 interpellation. He was elected to Tehran municipal
council in February 1999, and after announcing his intention to run for the
legislature he was seen as a possible speaker of the parliament.
Nuri
faced charges of publishing reports that insulted officials and institutions of
the system, reporting lies and waging a propaganda war against the system,
insulting Father of the Revolution Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his views,
publishing reports contrary to religious principles, and insulting religious
sanctities. Other charges included backing ties with America, promoting
dissident cleric Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri's political views, and urging
recognition of Israel.(22) The contents of Khordad, the Special Court for
the Clergy's special prosecutor said, "smack of conspiracy and
hostility."
Nuri's
defense undermined many long-standing hardline values with clear logic, and the
Tehran media covered the case extensively. This may have earned him popular
support, but it did not help Nuri's case. The prosecutor in the case said that
the more Nuri talks, "We realize that our opinion about him was right and
his guilt becomes more certain."(23) The jury found Nuri guilty on 15 of
the infractions and recommended against any leniency in sentencing. He was
sentenced to five years in prison and barred from journalistic activities for
five years after that.
The
Salam, Neshat, and Khordad cases were obvious attempts to
eliminate reformist newspapers and to limit the influence of reformist political
figures. Reasons for the closures of Zan and Hoviat-i Khish were
factionally related, too. Their closures were not, however, related to their
relationships with Khatami or their reformist tendencies.
The
Judiciary closed Tehran's Zan daily in April 1999. It was punished for
publishing a letter from the ex-empress of Iran and for publishing a cartoon
ridiculing the current Iranian interpretation of the principle of "blood
money." (In Iran, the compensation one must pay to a murdered woman's
family is less than that which must be paid to a murdered man's family.)
The
case against Zan was not so much an attack on a Second Khordad
publication, although Faezeh Hashemi herself is a Khatami supporter. There was
resentment over her apparent personal ambition. It was also an attempt to lessen
the influence of Hashemi's father, Expediency Council chairman Ayatollah
Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. He is identified as the leader (in loose terms) of
the Executives of Construction Party that is connected with Khatami's successful
election campaign. In addition, there is a great deal of resentment over the
cronyism, nepotism, and corruption associated with his family.
In
June 1999, the Revolutionary Court detained Hoviat-i Khish weekly's
editor-in-chief, Heshmatollah Tabarzadi, and director, Hussein Kashani.
Tabarzadi's real crime, it seems, was his role as a leader of the Islamic Union
of Students and Graduates, a more radical student group. The July 8 student
demonstrations were catalyzed by the arrest two days earlier of students who
gathered to protest Tabarzadi and Kashani's detentions. The Revolutionary Court
judge later said that members of the Islamic Union of Students and Graduates
were being prosecuted for their parts in the July demonstrations.(24)
In
1999, other publications and their personnel encountered "legal"
problems for reasons that were not political or factional. For example, the
director of the provincial publication Kosar Kavir Kerman claimed that
his offices were set ablaze in reaction to articles about the improper use of
nationalized property in Kerman Province.(25) The publisher of Sanandaj's
Kurdish-language Sirwan weekly was summoned "for publishing
falsehoods and slander against an adviser of the head of the judiciary,"
although it is more likely that the real issue was publication of an article
about financial mismanagement in the Kurdistan Province governorate.(26) The
situation in Gilan province seemed especially bad. Ali Sebati, director of the
provincial publication Payam-i Shomal was arrested by the Gilan province
headquarters of the MOIS.(27) Two months later, seven Gilan journalists were
imprisoned.(28)
THE
CLOSURES BEGIN...
Events
in the first two years of the Khatami presidency pale in comparison to what
happened in 2000 and 2001, when about 50 publications were closed in a
fifteen-month period. This trend started in March-April 2000, when Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave several sermons and speeches that criticized
advocates of reform generally and the reformist press specifically.
In
one sermon, Khamenei complained about unnamed promoters of "Americanized
reforms" and seemed to indicate that they were acceptable targets of
violence.(29) And in another, he said that the West first attacked Iran via its
radio stations, but now it is building a "stronghold" in Iran. He said
the press is creating anxiety, discord, and pessimism. "It seems as if 10
or 15 newspapers are being directed from the same center to publish articles
with similar headlines. They make mountains out of molehills...kill the hope
among the youth...weaken the people's trust...offend and insult." The
Supreme Leader added that President Mohammad Khatami is unhappy with the press
too. "We are trying to stop the enemy from realizing his propaganda
conspiracy."(30)
Such
statements inspired the IRGC to say that "if necessary, our enemies, be
they small or large, will feel the reverberating impact of the hammer of the
Islamic revolution on their skulls and the impact will be so strong that they
will never be able to engage in hatching plots or committing crimes."(31)
Then the new press law was passed.(32) In just one day, 12 publications were
closed. And it was quite clear that the closures related to the publications'
criticism of the hard-liners and support for reformist causes.
TABLE
1: THE ORIGINAL CLOSURES; 23 APRIL 2000
Dailies:
Guzarish-i Ruz, Bamdad-i No, Aftab-i Imruz, Payam-i Azadi, Fath, Arya, Asr-i
Azadigan, Manateq-i Azad
Weeklies:
Payam-i Hajar, Aban, Arzesh
Monthlies:
Iran-i Farda
After
the initial closures, an unnamed Judiciary official explained that a committee
formed to investigate the press concluded that "despite frequent warnings
given to them, they continued with their anti-Islamic and anti-revolutionary
activities," and "the tone of material in those papers had brought
smiles to the faces of the enemies of the Islamic Republic and hurt the feelings
of devout Muslims at home and even the leader of the Islamic revolution."
The Judiciary official warned, "We are also trying to detect the foreign
links of some of these newspapers."(33)
Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued his criticism of the media during a 26
July speech in northwestern Meshkinshahr.(34) He said that "a number of
journalists in Tehran wait for opportunities in order to make a mountain out of
a molehill in the political arena. They wish to keep the government, the
officials, and the people engaged with political and factional issues."
Khamenei accused them of treason and cooperating with foreign intelligence
services. "The journalists stop the officials from carrying out their
duties and this is an act of treason. Talking about matters that are desirable
by the CIA and Mossad; or writing about issues in order to please them [CIA and
Mossad]; or taking stances for their benefit, do not serve the people's
interests."
In
August, Khamenei put a stop to parliamentarians' debate on the press law.(35) He
warned that "should the enemies of Islam, the revolution and the Islamic
system take over or infiltrate the press, a great danger would threaten the
security, unity and the faith of the people and, therefore, I cannot allow
myself and other officials to keep quiet in respect of this crucial issue."
Khamenei went on to say that "The current [press] law, to a degree, has
been able to prevent the appearance of this great calamity, and [therefore], its
interpretation [amendment] and similar actions that have been anticipated by the
parliamentary committee are not legitimate and not in the interest of the
country and the system."
This
outraged reformist deputies. Scuffles broke out in the chamber, and there was a
walkout. Speaker of Parliament Hojatoleslam Mehdi Mahdavi-Karrubi reacted by
reminding the protestors that the Supreme Leader's action was legally
permissible. As he later told state radio, "The constitution emphasizes the
Absolute Rule of the Jurisconsult [Vilayat-i Motlaq] and this is how it is. And,
you voted for it."(36)
At
least one hardline cleric approved of this development, saying that Khamenei
"issued a warning to these nonsense-babblers. As a result they retreated
one step. But if the people cooperate with us, the nonsense-babblers will be
banished to the desert where Arabs play flute."(37)
Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Persian Service asked reformist journalist Masud
Behnud why the press law had been made so strict in the first place. Behnud
explained: "When the hard-liners discovered that they were losers of the
last elections, they made a few major changes to the press law at the end of the
fifth parliament. These changes were based on one point only. They discovered
they lost the election solely due to the presence of the press. Therefore, press
has the power of making up the people's mind and they can be the determining
factor, and observed the effect of the press campaign and advertisement in the
past months. They changed the press law so that these things will not take
place."(38)
TABLE
2: TOTAL CLOSURES, APRIL 2000 - AUGUST 2001
Dailies:
Aftab-i Imruz, Ahrar, Arya, Asr-i Azadigan, Bahar, Bamdad-i No,
Bayan, Dowran-i Imruz, Fath, Gonbad-i Kabud, Guzarish-i Ruz, Hambastegi,
Ham-Mihan, Manateq-i Azad, Mellat (reopened July 2001), Mosharekat, Nosazi,
Payam-i Azadi, Ruzdara, Sobh-i Imruz, Talieh
Weeklies:
Aban, Amin-i Zanjan, Arzesh, Ava, Ava-yi Varzish, Bazar-i Ruz, Cheshmeh,
Farda-yi Roshan, Golbang-i Iran, Gunagun, Iran-Javan, Hadis-yi Qazvin, Harim,
Iran Javan, Jahan-i Pezeshki, Jameh-yi Madani, Jebheh, Khalij-i Fars, Mihan,
Milad, Mobin, Nakhl, Payam-i Hajar, Qeseh-yi Zendigi, Ruzdaran, Sepideh Zendegi,
Sobh-i Omid, Tavana
Monthlies:
Iran-i Farda, Javanan-i Qorveh, Kiyan, Payam-i Imruz
Note:
this list does not include student publications--such as Mowj, Kavir, and
Farda-yi Azadi--or publications that have closed due to financial problems, and
it may not include some provincial publications that have been shut down. Also,
the licenses of Ayadin, Danesh-i Hisabresi, and Nava were revoked by the Press
Supervisory Board, but they had not been published for a "long time," Jomhuri-yi
Islami reported on 3 October 2000.
...
AND SPREAD TO THE PROVINCES
Press
closures and persecution of journalists were most noticeable in Tehran, but
these phenomena existed in the provinces, too. Editors from Rasht, Shiraz, and
Tabriz described some of the problems they face in a roundtable organized by
RFE/RL's Persian Service.(39) The most pernicious problem is self-censorship.
After seeing what happened in Tehran and noting how long their colleagues have
been unemployed, provincial journalists have become very cautious. The
provincial publications have other problems, not least little money from sales,
advertising, or state subsidies. There is also a dearth of modern printing
facilities. This means that the provincial publications have a low circulation
and limited reach.
Provincial
journalists face legal problems, too. Reformist journalist Masud Kordpur, who
has been associated with Arya, Khordad, Fath, Neshat,
and Asr-i Azadigan, was in court in September 2000. Kordpur told RFE/RL's
Persian Service that he faced charges of spreading falsehoods because during a
recent speech he criticized the disproportionate presence of non-Kurds in Bukan,
Kurdistan Province. Kordpur pointed out that there were no Kurdish officials at
his hearing, and their absence was particularly painful given the high level of
unemployment in the province.(40)
Davud
Bayat, managing editor of Zanjan's Farda-yi Roshan weekly, appeared in
court to face charges of printing defamatory articles, publishing falsehoods to
divert public opinion, and vilifying institutions, and Tehran's Justice
Department and the public prosecutor were the plaintiffs.(41) (The court ordered
the weekly's closure almost a year later, in August 2001.) Meanwhile, Mohammad
Reza Nabaie, the managing editor of the weekly Andalib was summoned to
the court following a complaint from former Malayer parliamentarian Hassan
Zamani. Zamani claimed that an article in Andalib was defamatory,
insulted the people of Malayer, distorted his words, and contained lies.(42)
THE
SERIAL PLAINTIFFS
What
could be called the "serial plaintiffs" are another development in the
Iranian media's problems, and they are, effectively, the four horsemen of this
press apocalypse. The original four horsemen were pestilence, war, famine, and
death. The new ones are the IRGC, the MOIS, the counterintelligence unit of the
Law Enforcement Forces, and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB).
They and similar bodies file most of the complaints that lead to press trials.
And if there is a Grim Reaper, it would be the Judiciary, which actually revokes
the press licenses and sentences people to prison.
When
the Ava weekly from Najafabad, Isfahan Province, was suspended in April
2000, it faced complaints from the MOIS, the Press Supervisory Board, the
Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance, the Special Court for the Clergy in
Qom, and the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps in Qom and Najafabad. Ava
editor Mustafa Izadi was sentenced in early-July. Attorney Mohammad Aghassi told
RFE/RL's Persian Service that Izadi's chief fault was the perception that he is
a supporter of Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri-Najafabadi.(43)
The
managing director of Tabriz's Ahrar weekly faced complaints from LEF
counterintelligence chief Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, the IRGC, and
the East Azerbaijan Basij of the Dispossessed.(44) Bayan Managing Editor
Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur was summoned by the Special Court for the
Clergy to face complaints from the counterintelligence unit of the LEF, IRIB,
the Tehran municipality, and hardline cleric Hojatoleslam Ruhollah
Husseinian.(45)
In
the hearing of Arya publisher Mohammad Reza Zohdi, the plaintiffs
included the MOIS and LEF counterintelligence. Omid-i Zanjan weekly was
accused of insulting the IRGC and its commander, General Yahya Rahim Safavi, by
writing in 1998 that the military organization was planning a coup, referring to
the IRGC headquarters in Zanjan as a "den of vampires," and accusing
the IRGC of involvement in the March 2000 attempt to kill reformist ideologue
Said Hajjarian.(46) Fereidun Verdinejad, chief of the official Islamic Republic
News Agency, appeared before the court in July to face complaints by the LEF,
Ansar-i Hizbullah, Basij Mobilization Forces, IRIB, and private individuals. And
in the trial for the banned daily Manateq-i Azad, the plaintiffs included
IRIB and the LEF. Qafur Garshasbi, editor of the banned reformist daily Asr-i
Azadigan, faced charges of spreading rumors and of publishing false and
defamatory reports that were filed by the prosecutor general; the LEF
intelligence unit, intelligence deputy, and legal department; the Judicial
Organization of the Armed Forces; the Guardians Council; the student Basij of
Imam Sadeq University; Ansar-i Hizbullah, and IRIB.(47)
Nor
did these four horsemen confine their actions to filing criminal complaints that
led to press closures. Some twenty journalists--at a very conservative
estimate--have been imprisoned in the last year, and Reporters Without Frontiers
refers to Iran as the biggest jail for journalists in the world.(48) And often
people disappear in a prison system that is run by a myriad of unaccountable
security agencies. Other journalists have been murdered (for example, Majid
Sharif, Mohammad Mokhtari, Mohammad Jafar Puyandeh) or have disappeared (for
example, Piruz Davani).
CONCLUSION
Khatami
won reelection in 2001 by another big margin but with a smaller overall turnout.
He once again has a mandate for reform, albeit a weakened one. His mandate and
his prestige were undercut further when he was temporarily blocked from taking
the oath of office until parliament approved the nomination of conservative
jurists to the Guardians Council in August 2001. Nevertheless, he has had other
mandates with which he has done nothing. On the one hand, he may see himself as
a lame duck who has nothing to lose by aggressively promoting freedom of the
press and defending the print media. He might, therefore, appoint a Minister of
Islamic Culture and Guidance who is as tough as Mohajerani. On the other hand,
he may continue his current policy, which on the surface amounts to little more
than subdued complaints about repression.
Irrespective
of Khatami's being president, the Judiciary, Revolutionary Courts, and the
Special Court for the Clergy will continue to target the press, journalists,
publishers, and reformist politicians. The IRGC, which has adopted a more
aggressive stance in the last year, will continue in this vein, too. Indeed, the
Judiciary's closure of the reformist Hambastegi daily on 8 August 2001,
the very day that Khatami took his oath of office, is a pretty clear indication
that this will be the case.
Moreover,
the use of the shabnameh (literally "night letter," a kind of
samizdat) will increase if the current press situation persists. So far, most of
these night letters have been produced by hard-liners and used to attack members
of the reformist movement. Among the night letters' producers are so-called
"research institutes" in Qom, the Qom Seminary Theological Lecturers
Association, and hard-line pressure groups, and the allegations that appear in
the night letters reappear in hardline publications like Kayhan, Siyasat,
and Yalisarat al-Hussein.
The
night letters rarely make direct attacks. They make allusions, or they describe
a malfeasance but ascribe it to "Mr. X" rather than naming him.
Another tactic is to let the reader draw his own conclusions, with sentences
ending in ellipses because the material is too sensitive or possibly too
offensive to complete. The research institutes try to make their work seem
scholarly and thoroughly researched by using references and endnotes. When one
tries to look up the references, however, one discovers that the original source
does not exist, people were misquoted or they never actually made the statements
attributed to them.(49)
Although
they have fewer assets at their disposal, reformists also have resorted to night
letters to spread their message. One example is the 80-page night letter about
the serial murders, linking MOIS officials and top regime figures with murders
that preceded those of 1998.(50) Distribution of the videotaped confessions of
Amir Farshad Ebrahimi, a former IRGC and Ansar-i Hizbullah member, is another
example of reformists' use of night letters.(51) Without newspapers to convey
their views, it seems likely that they will resort to night letters more often.
Finally,
Iranians' interest in foreign media, via short-wave, satellite, or the internet
will only increase as they seek unbiased information about developments in their
own country. State radio and television already had a powerful role in
opinion-making because newspapers and print media have a limited circulation
outside the main cities. The closure of so many publications only increased this
advantage. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), however, is criticized
for being one-sided in its news reporting, which explains the popularity of
foreign radio services. "Considering the limitations of literacy and the
even greater limitation in their access to the press, people will turn to Voice
of America, the BBC, and Radio Free Europe, which can be heard in the most
remote villages with two-band radios," a Tehran journalist warned.(52) Even
the April-May 2000 mass closure of publications did not enhance IRIB's
popularity. At that time, shopkeepers said that the demand for short-wave
receivers in Iran increased after the press closures.(53)
To
counter this phenomenon before the February 2000 parliamentary election, Tehran
jammed Persian language broadcasts by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the Voice
of America, and the BBC. RFE/RL and VOA broadcasts were jammed before the June
2001 presidential election, too. This second round of jamming was justified by a
February 13, 2001, statement by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that
"the political and security organs which are against the Islamic Republic
political system in America and Europe all emphasize in their statements, and in
the broadcasts of the radio stations they fund, that their efforts are aimed at
countering our political system. The other day, I accidentally heard this
myself, while listening to one of these radio stations.…"
And
a final note of caution. The Iranian media, if left alone by the state, is not
likely to be perfectly objective and unbiased. Many publications serve as party
organs and voice the viewpoints of certain political factions and pressure
groups. Others are linked with factions within the government. Even the more
independent newspapers, like Salam and Khordad, reflected some of
the more populist and reactionary views in foreign policy.
NOTES
1.
Arzesh magazine managing editor Ali Nazari in an interview with Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Persian Service, cited in RFE/RL Iran Report, v. 2,
n. 15 (12 April 1999).
2.
Associated Press, 12 August 1997. "Iran's Moderate President Faces Dissent
Over Cabinet Choices," New York Times, 15 August 1997.
3.
Reuters, 20 August 1997.
4.
Reuters, 20 August 1997.
5.
Khatami spokesman Ahmad Burqani, cited in Stephen Kinzer, "Moderate leader
is elected in Iran by a wide margin," New York Times, 25 May 1997.
6.
Khatami also took the time to criticize the U.S., saying, "We are sorry to
see that the United States' policy has always been hostile to our
revolution," and adding that "the key to the problem is in their hands
and not ours;" Reuters, 27 May 1997.
7.
"Iran's Moderate President Faces Dissent Over Cabinet Choices," New
York Times, 15 August 1997.
8.
Some of the information in this article appeared previously in A.W. Samii,
"The Contemporary Iranian News Media, 1998-1999," Middle East Review
of International Affairs, v. 3, n. 4 (December 1999).
9.
Elaine Sciolino, "Iran's Alternative Voices Now Demand to Be Heard,"
New York Times, 19 July 1998.
10.
Elaine Sciolino, "Iran's Alternative Voices Now Demand to Be Heard,"
New York Times, 19 July 1998.
11.
AFP, 1 August 1998. A useful study on Ansar-i Hizbullah and similar groups is
Michael Rubin, Into The Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami's Iran Policy
Papers No. 56 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Washington, DC, 2001).
12.
See, for example, Seyyed Jalal Fayyazi, "Elections: Free or Secular," Qods,
14 December 1999; Amir Mohebbian, "The Executives of the System Must be
Brought Under the Sword of Criticism," Yalisarat al-Hussein, 6 December
2000; "Mohajerani's period of ministership, cultural triteness, or cultural
corruption?" Fayzieh, 3 January 2001; Mohammad Imani, "May God save us
from dishonest friends," Kayhan, 15 February 2001.
13.
Kayhan, July 7, 1999.
14.
IRNA, August 4, 1999.
15.
Jomhuri-yi Islami, July 19, 1999.
16.
IRNA, July 21, 1999.
17.
Qods, April 18, 1999.
18.
Sobh-i Imruz, August 24, 1999.
19.
IRNA, September 5, 1999.
20.
Neshat, September 2, 1999.
21.
IRNA, August 9, 1999.
22.
Hamshahri, October 12, 1999.
23.
Hojatoleslam Mohammad Ebrahim Niknam, cited in Sobh-i Imruz, November 11, 1999.
24.
Islamic Revolutionary Court Judge Gholamhussein Rahbarpur, cited in Jomhuri-yi
Islami, September 12, 1999.
25.
Kar va Kargar, January 31, 1999.
26.
Hamshahri, April 14, 1999.
27.
Khordad, February 3, 1999.
28.
Neshat, April 17, 1999.
29.
Friday prayer sermon at Tehran University, Voice of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Radio 1, April 14, 2000.
30.
Live speech by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to a group of young people in Tehran,
Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Radio 1, April 20, 2000.
31.
Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, April 16, 2000.
32.
A revision of the press law was proposed in the parliament in October-November
1998, and the parliament approved the draft bill on 7 July 1999. The law said
that a complaint against a publication could be filed for an unlimited period.
In other words, there is no statute of limitations. Part of the bill called for
a reporter to be held responsible for what he or she wrote, whereas final
responsibility rested with the publication's director or chief editor. Granting
of press accreditation was made more restrictive. The bill said that a Qom
seminarian and the head of the Islamic Propagation Organization would serve on
the Press Supervisory Board. Also, the bill said Revolutionary Courts are
qualified to hear press offenses, whereas Article 168 of the constitution only
permits press courts to do so.
This
law was almost identical to an October 1998 proposal for revising the press laws
by Deputy Minister of Intelligence and Security Said Emami. Emami complained
that journalists' activities would "cause security problems for the Islamic
Republic of Iran." Whereas the current press law only held license-holders
and managing directors responsible for what appeared in publications, Emami
wrote, the writers themselves must be confronted "individually, using the
law, in order to ban them from writing or publishing." Emami proposed the
drafting of a bill that would "lend legality to the security
measures." He wrote: "The bill must include the professional nature of
the work and eligibility for it." This meant that writers and translators
would require licenses. Emami proposed a special disciplinary court to judge
press offenses. Emami wrote, "In this way, associations that are acceptable
to us can be strengthened and hostile elements driven away." (Salam,
6 July 1999.) In January 1999, Emami was arrested for his part in the late-1998
murders of writers and dissident political figures. Little was known about
Emami's letter until after his death in June, when he allegedly committed
suicide while in custody.
News
about Emami's proposed press law was one of the sparks that led to the
disturbances of July 1999. Parliament, therefore, postponed acting on it,
leading to speculation that the new parliament could overturn it. But in late
April 2000, a little more than a month before the new parliament was
inaugurated, a new, tough press law was passed. The new law permits
Revolutionary Courts to prosecute press cases and prohibits the reappearance of
banned publications coming out under a new name. The new law prohibits criticism
of the constitution and it makes journalists, as well as publications'
directors, liable for what appears in the press. Kayhan, 29 April 2000.
33.
Tehran Times, April 25, 2000.
34.
Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Radio 1, 26 July 2000.
35.
IRNA, 6 August 2000.
36.
Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Radio 1, 6 August 2000.
37.
Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi at a meeting in Qom's Abshar Mosque, Iran,
3 October 2000.
38.
RFE/RL Iran Report, v. 3, n. 31 (14 August 2000).
39.
Roundtable with Farid Yasamin, editor of Shiraz's Nim-Negah daily, Seyyed
Hussein Ziavari, publisher of Rasht's Hatef weekly, and Hamed Iman, publisher of
Tabriz's Sham-i Tabrizi weekly, cited in RFE/RL Iran Report, v. 3, n. 36 (18
September 2000).
40.
RFE/RL Iran Report, v. 3, n. 36 (18 September 2000).
41.
IRNA, 6 September 2000.
42.
IRNA, 3 September 2000.
43.
RFE/RL Iran Report, v. 3, n. 29 (31 July 2000).
44.
Hayat-i No, 18 June 2000.
45.
Iran, 28 June 2000.
46.
Entekhab, 13 August 2000.
47.
Kayhan, 10 October 2000.
48.
Reporters Without Frontiers press release, 17 April 2001,
<http://www.rsf.fr/uk/home.html>.
49.
Bahar, 27 July 2000.
50.
RFE/RL Iran Report, v. 3, n. 45 (27 November 2000).
51.
RFE/RL Iran Report, v. 3, n. 38 (9 October 2000).
52.
Suleiman Kiai, Sobh-i Imruz, March 29, 2000.
53.
Kar va Kargar, cited by Iran Daily, May 2, 2000.
*A.W. Samii is a regional specialist with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc.