Volume 5, No. 2 - June 2001
Volume 5, No. 2 - June 2001
AN
ESSAY ON ARAB LESSONS FROM THE 1991 KUWAIT CRISIS AND WAR
By Barry Rubin
Editor's
Summary: For a long time after the 1991
war over Kuwait, that event seemed to mark a turning point in the region, along
with such contemporary developments as the Soviet Union's collapse, the Cold
War's end, and the Madrid conference's commencement of direct Arab-Israeli peace
negotiations. A decade after the fighting, however, the changes seem to have
been more limited or perhaps relatively temporary ones. This article tries to
assess what has and has not changed in the Middle East during the decade since
the Kuwait crisis.
How
did the 1990-1991 Kuwait crisis and the ensuing war affect Arab politics and
polities during the decade that followed?
Addressing
this question during the years between 1991 and 2000 might well have produced an
analysis seeing that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and subsequent defeat--along with
several other contemporaneous events--as a turning point in Middle Eastern
history. Those additional developments included the Soviet Union's collapse, the
Cold War's end, and the emergence of the United States as the world's sole
superpower.
By
seizing and annexing Kuwait, Iraq had shown a disregard for its neighbors'
sovereignty so great that it provoked the near-unanimous condemnation of Arab
states to the point that they backed a war to expel its presence.
Moreover, they allied with the non-Arab (and often harshly criticized)
United States in this conflict. Egypt and Syria sent troops, and the Arab world
endorsed tough sanctions against the Iraqi regime. Each of these steps was
unprecedented.
Clearly,
such steps were provoked by powerful motives. In the case of Kuwait and the
other Gulf monarchies, there was a clear and rational fear that Iraq might well
extinguish their independence altogether and loot their assets. For other Arab
states, notably Egypt, Iraq posed a threat to seize the leadership of the Arab
world and to involve it in new and ultimately disastrous adventures. A few
countries--like Jordan and Yemen, as well as the PLO--supported Iraq, and Saddam
Hussein's case had some real appeal for the Arab masses. But Saddam's popularity
seemed threatening to other Arab leaders. Indeed, it appeared to endanger their
survival just as much as did his aggressive behavior.(1)
In
response to these trends and events, it seemed as if an era of pragmatism and
moderation was developing in the region. Features of this shift appeared to
include:
--A
decline in Pan-Arab nationalism.
--Increasing
political differences among Arab countries and their legitimacy as individual
nation-states, including willingness to take steps in their own interests even
if it broke with the previous Arab consensus and ideology.
--An
increasing willingness of moderate Arab (especially Gulf Arab) states to work
closely with Washington,
--Some
discernible progress toward more open societies, stronger civil societies, and
democratization.
--The
weakening of radical regimes and their isolation from each other as well as
within the region as a whole.
--The
hope that Syria would join the moderate camp.
--The
expectation that Iraq's regime would remain isolated and weak, perhaps even
falling from power.
--A
successfully advancing Arab-Israeli peace process.
--The
failure of radical Islamist movements to seize power or expand the revolutionary
threats they posed to Arab governments.(2)
--A
relevant, if non-Arab, factor was the growth of a reform movement in Iran which
enjoyed support from an overwhelming majority of the population there. This
possibility of a triumph for moderation in Iran would undercut the strength of
Islamist, radical, anti-American, and anti-peace process forces in the Arab
world as well.
--The
need to take into account the military lessons of the 1991 war. On the one hand,
this meant the relative obsolescence of the Arab armies which did not have
high-technology arms, and on the other hand an increasing interest (though not
necessarily success) in obtaining Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), especially
missiles.(3)
In
this context, then, the Kuwait crisis created--or at least played an important
part in--a major transition for the region.
By the
year 2001, however, these hopes were thrown into question or even refuted. The
most obvious of these problems was the collapse of the Israel-Palestinian and
Israel-Syrian peace processes. While the details of these events can be debated
and analyzed in many ways, the fundamental problem was the difficulty for Syria
or the Palestinians in making peace with Israel even in the context of major and
extensive Israeli concessions.
As
important as this breakdown was, however, it was not an isolated occurrence. A
number of other developments were increasingly clear during the period
coinciding roughly with the tenth anniversary of the Gulf war in January 2001:
--The
Arab-Israeli conflict was not fading from the scene as much as had been hoped.
Especially important was the fact that moderate states were not ready to put
pressure or even strong encouragement on Syria and the Palestinians to make a
compromise agreement, even one based on meeting roughly 95 percent of their
demands.
--The
prospects for serious economic or political reform in Syria seemed to fade as
new President Bashar al-Asad decided to follow many of the policies of his
father and predecessor. He limited change and cracked down on dissent.(4)
--Individual
nation-states were still wary of Pan-Arab nationalism's appeal, limiting their
own autonomy.
--Leaders
took the safer, easier path of accepting and even intensifying public opinion on
key issues, including Arab-Israeli relations. They made little attempt to change
the views of the masses, which continued to accept many of the ideas that had
held sway before 1990. It should be noted that public opinion is not an
unchangeable force of nature but a also construct. With their sweeping control
over public debate through the media, educational system, repression, and other
means, Arab leaders have more control over this sector than do their
counterparts in other countries.
--In
general, the tone of government propaganda and rhetoric, as well as a media
highly influenced by the state, remained largely unchanged.
--Progress
toward democracy or just the creation of a strong civil society remained
extremely limited. Even Egypt cracked down on nonpartisan human rights groups
and research centers that made mild criticisms of government policy.
--Weapons
of Mass Destruction, especially missiles, proliferated in the region. Iraq and
Iran were on the verge of obtaining nuclear weapons. In part, the choice of such
arms was a response to the high cost of conventional weapons, as well as their
being seen as a powerful means of projecting influence onto neighbors.
--While
Moscow's role remained far more limited than that of the historic Soviet Union,
it began to return as a factor countering U.S. influence. This channel became
particularly significant in the proliferation of weaponry and opposition to
American sanctions on Iran and Iraq. In contrast to the Cold War era, Russia was
usually more interested in profits than in political influence. By the same
token, its military supply relationship with Syria was held up by that country's
inability to pay past debts.(5)
--The
1990-1991 anti-Iraq coalition was steadily weakened, with Russia, France, and
China all opposing the sanctions on Iraq and some other U.S.-led efforts. On the
Arab side, only low-level delegations were sent to the tenth anniversary
celebration of Kuwait's liberation and the event was not celebrated outside of
Kuwait itself.(6)
--As
sanctions weakened, Iraq reemerged both on the Arab political scene and in terms
of successfully circumventing the sanctions. Thus, by the tenth anniversary of
the war, President Saddam Hussein remained relatively unscathed and on the verge
of a comeback.
--Within
non-Arab Iran, too, hopes for reform largely failed. President Muhammad Khatami,
though elected by a large margin and given a big parliamentary majority, proved
unwilling or incapable of leading a domestic movement for actual change. And
Iran's foreign policy remained as it had been before, supporting subversive and
armed movements, as well as building long-range missiles and nuclear weapons.(7)
Thus,
moderate regimes did not become more moderate; radical regimes remained hardline
and grew in relative strength. Reform efforts failed, the Arab-Israeli peace
process fell apart. The United States was unable to use its sole superpower
status to win any longer-term gains, though the restriction of Iranian and Iraqi
power during the 1990s was a real achievement.
Of
course, the achievements of the postwar decade should not be neglected. Kuwait
gained real peace and sovereignty. The U.S. role in the Middle East in general,
and the Gulf in particular, was strengthened. Gulf stability was put on a
stronger footing. Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty and the Arab-Israeli
peace process was given its best chance in history, moving further from
international conflict if not actually arriving at a negotiated solution.
Nevertheless,
it could be said that much of the progress and change that had apparently
followed the allied victory in 1991 had dissipated during the decade that
followed.
Whether
this was inevitable or not, and how this setback might have been avoided, is of
course a matter for debate. It should be clear, though, that to attribute all
these factors and more largely or solely to the failure to complete a final
Israel-Palestinian peace agreement is highly erroneous, blocking any serious
attempt to understand the region.
As a
case study on these issues, let us first consider the issue of Gulf security,
the situation closest to the Kuwait war's experience and lessons. The Gulf
strategic situation is a triangle in which two stronger sides--Iran and
Iraq--confront a weaker and richer third grouping, the Arab monarchies. These
states, all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), include: Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.
Historically, the United States played a secondary and outside, but increasingly
vital, balancing role.(8)
British
protection of the Gulf monarchies ended with that country's withdrawal in 1971.
During the 1970s, these kingdoms sought to preserve their security by appeasing
radical Iraq. Iran's Islamic revolution came to power in February 1979, ushering
in a new stage in which Iran was now the threat and the GCC saw Iraq as its
protector. Iraq invaded Iran in 1979, seeing that state as both a threat eager
to spread Islamist revolution and as a weak enemy that could be easily defeated.
To protect themselves from Iran, the GCC states also asked the United States to
convoy their oil tankers. They also bought huge amounts of weaponry from the
United States, though their forces were still nowhere near able to protect
themselves solely by their own efforts.
The
war ended with a nominal Iraqi victory in 1988. But Iraq had suffered huge
economic losses during the fighting. Both as compensation and reward, Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein sought Arab leadership and loot from the GCC states. In
1990, he occupied Kuwait. The GCC states had to turn to the United States to
save them, which it did as the head of a coalition during the 1991 war.
Looking
over this history from the vantage point of 1991, the GCC states could draw some
important lessons from their experience:
1.
Despite the rhetoric of Arab brotherhood and anti-Americanism, the GCC states
knew that other Arab countries were more likely to subvert than to protect them.
Consequently, they showed little interest in schemes for Egyptian and Syrian
forces to be present to ensure their security. Their proper goal was to promote
their own sovereignty, national identity, individual interests, and economic
progress.
2.
Having spent many years appeasing Iran and Iraq at various times, only to see
the guard dog turn into a wolf threatening to blow their houses down, the GCC
states seemed to prefer that both countries be deterred. In short, they wanted
both Iran and Iraq to be kept isolated and militarily weak. On the U.S. policy
side, this strategy came to be called "dual containment."
3. In contrast to their long practice of keeping the United
States at arms' length, the GCC states now viewed it as their protector, giving
it unprecedented military access to the Gulf and to their own territory.(9)
These
lessons from the Kuwait crisis and war largely governed GCC practices in the
1990s but eroded--at least points two and three--as the decade continued. It
should be noted that the overwhelming majority of this decline took place during
the period (1993-2000) when Arab-Israeli negotiations were generally progressing
and hopes of an agreement were high.
The
basis of this change, then, lay in local Gulf developments. Saddam Hussein still
governed Iraq and defiantly rejected efforts to disarm or moderate him.(10) At
the same time, the United States was unable to remove him or force him to change
his policies. The international coalition that had defeated Iraq broke up, with
Russia, France, and China taking the lead in rejecting tough action and urging a
reduction in sanctions.
In this context, the bottom line was that the GCC states knew that
Saddam Hussein would survive and continue to threaten them. Meanwhile, they did
not want to rely completely on U.S. backing, since this proved ineffective in
ousting Saddam and--they worried--might not continue forever. Their poor
understanding of American interests and motives, as well as the way its policies
were formulated, enhanced their suspicion.
Overriding
any apparent contradiction to this point, however, they also knew that the
United States would continue to help them no matter what they did. In other
words, the amount of U.S. protection they could expect would remain unchanged
even if the GCC states provided no help in advancing the Arab-Israeli peace
process, refused to support tough action against Iraq, and moved toward
appeasement of Iraq or Iran. In general, this proved to be a correct assessment.
At the
same time, in contrast to U.S. policy, several GCC states, especially Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, saw Iran as a potential ally against Iraq. They also expected
that easing relations with Tehran would reduce that country's threat to their
security. Thus, the Saudis led in a successful campaign to improve GCC-Iran
relations.(11)
In
addition, fearing Saddam Hussein, the GCC states were unwilling to take stronger
measures against him. With the partial exception of Kuwait, they accepted his
reintegration into the Arab world. While public opinion played some role here,
the main consideration was strategic. After all, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
remained most reluctant to remove sanctions on Iraq--facing the same basic
structure of public opinion as the other GCC states--because their situation
made them more vulnerable to his threat.
Still,
the GCC states knew they would have to deal with Saddam Hussein's regime in the
future and often saw no point in making it any angrier with them. They could
enjoy the fruits of sanctions that weakened Iraq and U.S. protection while also
trying to reduce Iraqi antagonism.
In a
sense, then, the GCC response to the United States strategy of dual containment
was increasingly what might be called "triple insurance," maximizing
their potential backing (or reducing threats) from Iran, Iraq, and the United
States whenever possible. Its three principles are:
--Improving
relations with Iran so that it could balance Iraq.
--Appeasing
or not antagonizing Iraq to reduce the likelihood that it would become an
immediate threat.
--Seeking
U.S. protection to keep both Iran and Iraq weak, while also deterring them from
intimidating or attacking.(12)
Thus,
a decade after the Gulf war, the old strategic triangle had reappeared. The GCC
states relied on U.S. protection in addition to--rather than instead of--a
policy including appeasement of both Iran and Iraq, while trying to use Iran to
counterweigh Iraq. Rather than irreversibly changing the nature of Gulf
strategic relations, the Kuwait crisis and war had opened another transient era
within that framework. It had a temporary impact in most respects, though it
also had a long-range effect in increasing both GCC mistrust of Iraq and
dependence on U.S. help.
This
basic model fits other aspects of the region as well. The events of 1990-1991
had a real effect on the area but did not bring about as much change as might
have been expected earlier. Traditional models, though modified, reasserted
themselves.
Each
issue, of course, has a different history and interpretation. Following is a
brief discussion of potential patterns and lessons emerging from the Kuwait
crisis and their fate during the ensuing decade.
PAN-ARAB
ALLEGIANCES VERSUS LEGITIMACY FOR INDIVIDUAL NATION-STATES
It
could be argued that the 1990-1991 crisis demonstrated the dangers of Pan-Arab
nationalism to Arab rulers. After all, this ideology was used by Saddam to
legitimate his seizure of Kuwait as well as his broader ambition to subvert or
subordinate all other Arab states. Millions of people throughout the Arab world
accepted Saddam's claims to regional leadership and supported his seizure of
Kuwait. This attitude was understandable. After all, if Arab
countries should be cooperate as closely as possible and even be united into one
state--an idea that achieved near official status, at least in public,
throughout the Arab world--Iraq's action was a proper and patriotic (in Pan-Arab
terms) step.
In
short, it became apparent that pan-Arab nationalism furnished a popular
ideological cover for nation-state imperialism. By accepting and promoting such
concepts, other Arab states and leaders were undermining their own freedom of
action and even sovereignty. History had shown this political framework to be a
formula for instability, mutual subversion, intervention, and conflict. At the
same time, it had inhibited the development of democracy as well as economic or
social development.
Consequently,
during the 1990s it seemed as if Arab governments were acting more
individualistically than ever before: forming alliances with the United States,
moving toward peace with Israel, and pursuing other policies as it suited their
interests. The fact that the moderate states no longer feared their radical
neighbors also widened their freedom of actions.
By the
turn of the millennium, however, the situation was returning to a status closer
to its historic patterns. The return of Iraq to the Arab fold, the lack of
criticism for Syria's continued occupation of Lebanon, Arab willingness to
subordinate their strategy to the decisions of Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat,
and other such moves showed the enduring appeal of Arab solidarity.
It
should be emphasized that this process remained more verbal than practical.
There was some increased wariness of Arab states toward their
"brothers" and a far greater reluctance to take risks on their behalf
than in earlier decades. For example, solidarity with the Palestinians evoked no
specific governmental activities, not even financial contributions to their
cause. Similarly, the GCC countries were not going to abandon their stronger
connections with the United States. In Egypt and Jordan, peace with Israel as a
policy--though not as an acceptable norm for the public and media--were
accepted.
Still,
the ideological constraints on individual states remained roughly--though
arguably somewhat less--strong than they had been in the pre-1990 years. While
this could be attributed to public opinion, or the Arab "street," the
fact was that this was a useful tool for governmental control and national
solidarity. A country could be filled with impoverished people, plagued by
corruption and government inefficiency, mired in undemocratic practices, and so
on, but all these issues would disappear in an orchestrated passion on the
Palestinian question. This is not to say that the emotional factor was not
there, but it was no accident that this was the only issue where government
"felt" itself required to "yield" to public sentiment. And
that same sentiment was constantly fostered by the state-controlled media,
educational system, officials' statements, etc., to a fever pitch. Indeed, it is
no exaggeration to say that this is virtually the sole issue on which the public
or media is permitted to speak at all.
Implicitly,
despite this persistent focal point, there was a long-term trend toward
nation-state patriotism. By the year 2000, almost all the Arab states had around
a half-century history of independence. They had built up their own economic and
political patterns though culture--given the shared Arabic language--tended to
flow more easily across borders. Each state, too, had its own geopolitical
situation, allies, and enemies. Still, the differentiation among them remained
more implicit than explicit, at least in terms of constraints on their foreign
policy behavior.
Of
course, nation-state self-interest had also been a major factor in Iraq's
seizure of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein's goal was, after all, to strengthen Iraq,
unite the country's communities--the Kurds and Shia--which were less
enthusiastic about his rule and to provide its citizens with additional
resources. Kuwait's resistance also drew from a sense of national self-assertion
against an invader and brutal occupier. Still, in the Arab world a decade after
the Kuwait war, nation-state patriotism was the political sentiment that dare
not speak its name.
DOMESTIC
POLITICS: MODERATION, DEVELOPMENTALISM, DEMOCRACY
Did
the Kuwait crisis and war suggest the need for domestic changes in Arab states?
Cumulatively, the half-century culminating in the 1991 debacle had been a very
bad era for Arab peoples and polities. A mere list of the problems and failures
during these years would require several pages. The Arab countries had lagged
behind many others in the pace of their economic development and social
progress. They were, as a group, less democratic and more repressive. Few, if
any, of their basic foreign policy goals had been achieved.
Consequently,
a key question in evaluating this process is on whom to place the blame for all
these shortcomings. Externalizing the Arab world's problems--to attribute them
to American (or Western) imperialism, Zionism, and local traitors serving these
enemies--prevented the kind of reappraisal necessary to fix the internal factors
at the root of the problems and catastrophes. Lacking such a real shift--and
despite the fact that the political systems and ideologies had failed--meant
that the domestic and international situations would not be solved or resolved.
The
great majority of leaders, scholars, and journalists in both the West and the
Middle East expressed real hope that such a process might happen in the
aftermath of the Kuwait crisis. Perhaps an alternative model of thought and
policy was possible. If the Soviet bloc had once provided a political and
economic example for some Arab states, these mentors had now clearly failed on
their own terms. Aside from the factor of massive oil income, progress or
success was visibly lacking for the Arab world. It had not defeated or destroyed
enemies, who seemed to grow stronger over time.
How
would the Kuwaitis and Gulf Arabs generally maintain their support for an Arab
nationalism which had almost destroyed their independence? Why would countries
cling to systems that had failed so badly to redeem their promises except for
their ability to keep incumbent governments in power? When much of the rest of
the world was moving to democracy would the Arab world remain bogged down in
dictatorships that were repressive at home and waged ruinous wars or continued
confrontations abroad? Would anti-Americanism remain so deep and bitter when the
United States had saved the Arab world from Iraq? Could the Palestinians sustain
a half-century-long struggle in which they had derived no state for themselves
and had failed to destroy Israel?
Yet
ten years after the Kuwait war's end, it was hard to see any major changes in
how a single Arab state was being governed compared to the situation in 1990 or
even in 1980, 1970, or 1960. There was no significant advance toward democracy
anywhere, despite some small gains in the Gulf Arab states. Civil society
remained extremely weak, with governments continuing to control or repress
independent voices. Even the public debate over these issues was still quite
staid compared to everywhere else in the world.
This
is a remarkable outcome, even though it is generally taken for granted.
Political systems that don't work very well or fail to achieve their goals may
be expected to be subject to change or at least to serious challenge. Policy
premises that do not accord with external realities, thus producing real
international failures, might be corrected or at least carefully reexamined.
Of
course, the explanation is partly that the systems do function adequately in
terms of keeping rulers in power and to maintain internal order.
Not a single coup or real regime change took place in the Arab world
between 1990 and 2000 or, indeed, from 1980 either, with the exception of the
peripheral states of Yemen and Sudan.(13) Moreover, the basic political concepts
shaping Arab politics remain fundamentally popular, though this might in part be
attributed to their reinforcement in state-controlled media and educational
systems.
The
picture, then, of a repugnant and repressive Iraqi dictatorship failing to meet
its people's needs, launching invasions of neighbors and generally disrupting
the regional system--a view held in the West--has not become an effective
political factor in promoting change in the Middle East.
The same result holds for democratic and economic reforms prevailing in
many areas elsewhere in the world. Some, but surprisingly little, debate of this
kind emerged in the aftermath of the Kuwait crisis and war.
FOREIGN
POLICY STRATEGY
In
thinking about foreign policy within the region, there are several issues put
into a different light by the Kuwait crisis. One of these questions, Gulf
security, has already been discussed as a case study, above. Other critical
points affected by this event include the attitude of states toward Iraq; Israel
and the Arab-Israeli peace process; and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
Attitude
toward Iraq
Why
did the sense of threat from Iraq among many Arab states--though far less so for
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait--fade over time despite the fact that the same
leadership holding the same ambitions continued to rule there?
There are many different reasons for this trend.
To
some extent, of course, such a process is natural and inevitable. Yesterday's
enemy may have strategic uses at a different time. New issues and problems crowd
out older concerns or at least reduce them to a lower priority. Sustaining the
same policy for even a decade can itself be seen as an impressive consistency.
The foregoing of economic advantage to maintain the sanctions, the increased
granting of basing facilities to the United States, and Jordan's decision to
receive leading Iraqi defectors--despite threats from Saddam Hussein--are all
examples of Arab steadfastness in continuing to support the anti-Iraq coalition.
Other
factors include the fact that Iraq's defeat and continued military weakness made
it seem far less threatening. At the same time, if Iraq were to be too
hard-pressed and collapsed this outcome would have certain geostrategic
disadvantages for some Arab states as well as furnishing a dangerous precedent
for their own survival as regimes and as countries.
Moreover,
since they understood that the United States would stand guard over them against
any Iraqi threat and do the unpleasant work of containing Baghdad regardless of
their own behavior, Arab governments knew they would lose nothing by giving
rhetorical comfort to that regime. Moves by Gulf Arab monarchies toward detente
with Iran were also steps toward trying to find an ally that would help preserve
their sovereignty and deter any Iraqi aggression.
Equally,
since the United States could not overthrow Iraq's ruler and conceivably might
fail to protect them from him in the future, Arab leaders also wanted to avoid
antagonizing Saddam too much lest he take revenge on them some day. The Iraqi
leadership carefully promoted this fear in order to encourage a return to past
appeasement policies by Gulf Arab states, Jordan, and others.
In
addition, several countries--notably Jordan and Syria--gained economically to an
enormous extent by bypassing the sanctions. Iraq was determined to make such
behavior worthwhile for them in terms of commercial benefits and low-cost oil.
While
domestic public opinion also affected Arab governments, it was only in the
framework of reinforcing all the points listed above. Factors here included
feelings of Arab brotherhood, sympathy for the suffering of the Iraqi people
(and not necessarily support for the regime), reassertion of familiar attitudes,
anger at outsiders seen as victimizing Arabs.
The
idea that Iraq might be helpful in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict was
only one point among many in setting this trend. And even with all these
factors, the movement toward rapprochement between the Arab world and Iraq was
still slow and limited. It still took almost a decade to readmit Iraq to the top
level of Arab League activity during the year 2000. And it was China, France,
and Russia--and not Arab states--which took the lead in the anti-sanctions
campaign.
At the
same time, and despite the fact that Egypt, Jordan, and Syria took a friendlier
attitude toward Iraq's demands for an end to all sanctions, not all Arab states
were ready to forgive Iraq for its past behavior. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
continued to insist that Baghdad must fulfill all UN resolutions before
sanctions should be lifted. Indeed, this factor remained powerful. At the March
2001 Arab summit, for example, the Kuwaitis stood firm. The sanctions should
end, they argued with support from the Saudis, only if Iraq promised not to
threaten Kuwait again and if it adhered to UN resolutions rectifying its
behavior.
In
short, the lesson that Iraq was a major threat receded somewhat into the
background but was by no means forgotten by other Arab states, especially those
that faced the greatest risk from Baghdad's future behavior.
Attitude
toward Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
The
Kuwait crisis and war also prompted, albeit along the lines of preexisting
trends, some Arab rethinking about Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. With
Iraq (as well as radical Islamist movements and Iran) as such a clear and
present danger to the survival of Arab regimes, it was harder to claim that
Israel was the principal threat.
Moreover,
the conflict with Israel seemed more and more like a situation that created a
dangerous permanent atmosphere of crisis; could draw Arab countries into costly,
losing wars; provided a rationale for dictatorship; justified counterproductive
economic or social policies; and inhibited necessary cooperation with the United
States. Thus, rather than serving the interests of Arab countries (or in some
cases, regimes), continuing this unwinnable battle was endangering their
survival as well as progress.
Aside
from the Palestinians, and especially after 1973, few Arab rulers were eager to
fight Israel and they were not required to do so.
While this policy of no war/no peace helped Arab politicians survive, it
also inhibited progress and opened the region to enormous dangers. If extremism in the pursuit of Arab rights was no vice and
moderation in the face of an allegedly evil Israel was no virtue, the resulting
atmosphere fostered revolutionary Islamic movements, expensive arms races,
catastrophic civil wars, and an Iraqi dictator invading your country.
Nonetheless,
a series of events slowly and consistently chipped away at the Arab political
and ideological system, making it seemingly hard to sustain a belief in pan-Arab
nationalism or even the likelihood of Arab unity, the destruction of Israel, and
a triumph over the West. The 1967
and 1973 military defeats by Israel were followed by Lebanon's vicious
twenty-year civil war, starting in 1974, Egypt's defection from the anti-Israel
camp in the late 1970s, Iran's 1979 revolution, and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.
The
year 1982 alone saw a triple disaster. The
Syrian army massacred thousands of civilians in Hama, showing the hollowness of
the radical regimes' populist, progressive rhetoric.
Iranian troops crossed into Iraq for the first time, pointing up the
genuine threat of Persian power and radical fundamentalism to Arab regimes.
Israel's army went into Lebanon and defeated the PLO and Syrian forces,
thereby showing Israel's continued military superiority, the Soviet and Arab
states' unwillingness or inability to respond, and the readiness of some Arabs
to ally themselves with Israel.
The
1980s brought much more bad news about Arab failures, defeats, and divisions.
Israel not only remained strong but huge numbers of immigrants from the
Soviet Union and expanding settlements on the West Bank seemed to show that time
was not on the Arabs' side. In
contrast, Moscow's power continued to decline and collapsed completely in 1991.
Radical Arab regimes, even those possessing huge oil reserves, were unable to
show economic progress. The reality of individual Arab nation-states--each with
its own interests, which had once seemed much less real than the pan-Arab
aspiration--had become undeniable.
Nevertheless,
so great was the old system's staying power that Saddam Hussein, the newest
incarnation of the old order, was still the 1990 Arab summit's hero.
But not only did he fail to deliver on his promise of Arab victory and
resurgence, he also graphically showed that the price of alleged glory would be
more wars, defeats, and perhaps political suicide for other Arabs. His adventure
showed once more--perhaps, but not definitively, for the last time--that the
most dangerous of men to the Arabs was he who actually believed and tried to
implement their slogans.
There
were many in the Arab world, then, who argued that the conflict with Israel was
obsolete and that a compromise negotiated peace was preferable. This atmosphere
was sustained to a greater or lesser degree through the 1991 Madrid conference,
through the 1993 Oslo agreement and for a seven-year peace process.
At the critical moment when agreement was closest, however, the decision
of Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat not to make peace with Israel in 2000 and his
launching of a new uprising instead, set off a new era which appeared to move
the region back into the pre-1990 era. Old attitudes and rhetoric quickly
reappeared. And if Arab states talked far more toughly than they acted, this too
had usually been true from the mid-1970s onward.
In
sharp contrast, it had seemed in the aftermath of the 1991 war that the old ways
could no longer continue for the Arab system amidst a growing sense of the
conflict's futility and wastefulness. Individual
Arab states showed increasing readiness to seek their own interests.
At the least, Arab states were walking away from the conflict.
At most, they were ready to make peace and try to turn it to their
advantage. The Madrid conference of 1991, itself a product of the Kuwait crisis,
was the beginning of the most promising peace process in a half-century of the
Arab-Israeli conflict, including a Jordan-Israel peace treaty.
Some
of these same criteria had seemed to apply to the Palestinians.
In 1991 they were at the low point of their fortunes. Their own intifada
had petered out and their hero, Saddam Hussein, had been defeated. Their ally,
the USSR and its Soviet bloc, had collapsed. Arab states were less interested in
helping them. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, angry at the PLO's support for Saddam
Hussein, cut off aid, producing a financial crisis as well as the expulsion of
about 300,000 Palestinians from Kuwait.
Around
350,000 Palestinian refugees had fled Iraq or been forced out of Kuwait. The
United States, which the PLO had usually viewed as its arch-enemy, was the
world's sole superpower. Israel
appeared stronger than ever. If ever there was a time for the Palestinians to
make a compromise peace, recognizing that they could not achieve their maximal
goals, the 1990s offered that opportunity.
The
history of the ensuing Syria-Israel and Palestinian-Israel peace processes is
very complex. Jordan did make full peace with Israel and several other Arab
states took steps in that direction. But from the standpoint of a decade after
the Kuwait war, the two main Arab protagonists were unable to reach an agreement
with Israel, even after Israel offered to meet virtually all their demands.
Arguably, this failure on the Arab side was due to weak leadership, afraid to
make tough decisions and unable or incapable of altering public opinion; an
inability to break with the past, overwhelming suspicion of Israel; and a range
of other factors.
The
bottom line was that the Palestinians and Syrians proved unable to meet the
challenge of achieving a compromise peace with Israel--albeit on good terms for
themselves--and the Arab world would not shake lose from their veto power in
ending the conflict. At the same time, though, the Kuwait crisis marked a
turning point after which Arab state support for the Palestinians--aside from
the purely verbal level--reached an all-time low.
The
Kuwait crisis had provided an opportunity to end the conflict--by strengthening
the United States, weakening the radical Arab forces, and showing that the
traditional Arab policy led to very dangerous results for the Arabs themselves.
The crisis probably did diminish the conflict considerably but the final
breakthrough remained beyond reach.
Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD)
During
the Kuwait war, Iraq fired missiles at both Israel and Saudi Arabia. The threat
of Iraq's potential use of WMD--along with its drives to obtain nuclear bombs,
chemical and biological capabilities--made the Arab world more aware than ever
of these new weapons. If the Gulf Arab states perceived a heightened threat,
they would have to consider new ways of defending themselves. The war also
brought to the fore the question of missile defense.
Nevertheless,
different Arab states had a variety of responses to this new strategic
environment. Gulf Arab monarchies purchased state-of-the-art air forces, Egypt
pursued a more traditional arms build-up, while Syria failed to find funding for
major arms purchases. In general, though, there was no progress on missile
defense, though the Saudis and Kuwaitis continued to field Patriot systems.
Regarding WMD, Iraq was stymied by international sanctions and inspections,
though it sought to continue such programs whenever possible. Other Arab states
decided not to launch crash programs to obtain nuclear weapons. Most money,
though Syria did have impressive missile forces, went into conventional
weapons.(14)
In
general, there was no "peace dividend" from the Kuwait crisis. On the
contrary, the war showed the heightened need for military forces. In this sense,
the Kuwait conflict had the opposite impact on the Arab world (and the Middle
East in general) that the simultaneous Cold War's end had for the West.
VIEWS
OF THE UNITED STATES
America's
role and influence as the world's sole superpower was recognized and further
consolidated in the Kuwait crisis.(15) Thereafter, moderate Arab states
continued efforts to maintain good relations with the United States and to use
it as a protector, no matter how their public posture differed from that image.
Even Syria tried to give the impression that it was showing cooperation with
U.S. efforts to further the Arab-Israeli peace process. The PLO, at least in its
form as the Palestinian Authority (PA) governing the West Bank and Gaza, became
a virtual American client. And after a long struggle involving U.S. sanctions,
Libya surrendered two intelligence agents for trial in the bombing of a U.S.
airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.
Only
Iraq remained openly defiant of the United States. Yet while sanctions remained,
Baghdad did not suffer greatly for that response. Sanctions remained but were
steadily weakened. The Gulf war coalition broke up, with France, Russia, and
China leading the way in opposing the tough U.S. strategy on Iraq. The United
States launched limited bombing raids, maintained no-fly zones, and preserved
the Kurdish autonomous area in the north.
What
was most noticeable and notable were the limits on U.S. power and influence,
which could be attributed either to mistaken U.S. policies or the nature of the
regimes, its problems, and its regimes. The United States was unable to press
the PA or Syria into signing peace agreements with Israel, despite that
country's many offers of concessions on almost all the key points. Equally, it
could not keep some countries from breaking the sanctions on Iraq or the
U.S.-imposed sanctions on Iran. The United States had very little success in
persuading other Arab states to move closer to peace with Israel, especially
Saudi Arabia and Iran, which it had saved during the 1991 crisis.
While
there are frequent complaints from the Arab world that the United States is a
bully, the prevailing attitude seems to ensure that such a splendid bully is on
one's own side. Moreover, there is ample reason to argue that American failures
came about not because it was perceived as a bully but because it did not use
its influence powerfully and effectively.
Why
should various Arabs show gratitude to the United States as their protector and
liberator when they didn't have to do so in order to obtain the benefits?
Indeed, there were interesting countervailing factors on this point. To indicate
dependency and appreciation for American help would bring U.S. demands for
reciprocal behavior. Moreover, in the context of their world view, Arab leaders
feared that the United States might seek to control the Gulf, or the Middle East
in general, subordinating them in an imperial manner.
In
short, while U.S. power was predominant and Gulf Arab states were ready to grant
Washington a more important role than ever in protecting Gulf security, the
gains made during the decade fell far short of earlier expectations. The
apparent lesson in the Arab world from the Kuwait crisis was that the United
States could be more helpful but they could avoid paying much of a price for
that assistance.
At the
same time, Arab states in the Gulf were less afraid of U.S. involvement and
intervention than they had ever been before. They were very much aware that the
United States was their source of arms and protector, which often exercised
influence on their behalf.
It
might seem, then, that the lessons from the Kuwait crisis remain more limited
than they appeared to be in earlier years. The rhetoric of the largely
state-controlled media as well as of the general public seems relatively close
to the pre-crisis norms. One could argue that the experience's memory and
impact--like others in life and politics--have worn down or worn out over time.
Yet at the same time, lessons and opportunities available from the experience of
1990-1991 have been neglected, making it possible that such events might be
repeated in future.
Another,
not uncomplimentary, perspective, is that Arab leaders have learned more than
they like to say. One key lesson of Middle Eastern politics for them had long
been not to talk explicitly about their conclusions. There continues to be a
distinction between the principles by which they live and act, and public
expression. The danger, of course, is that public expression can once again
become dominant in the creation of new crises.
NOTES
1.
These issues are discussed at greater length in Barry Rubin, Cauldron of
Turmoil: America in the Middle East, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1992 and in
the author's "The Kuwait Crisis, 1990," in Ami Ayalon, Middle East
Contemporary Survey, 1990, Volume 14, (NY, 1991). It is interesting to note that
this fear of another state's militancy winning internal support was also a key
factor in Iraq's own decision to invade Iran a decade earlier.
2.
Barry Rubin, Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East (SUNY Press,
2001). Turkish Edition: (Avrasya, Ankara, 2001); and Barry Rubin, Islamic
Radicalism in the Middle East: A Survey and Balance Sheet," Middle East
Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 2 No. 2 (May 1998); and
Emmanuel Sivan, "Why Radical Muslims Aren't Taking Over Governments,"
MERIA Journal, Vol. 2 No. 2 (May 1998); Joseph Kostiner, "State, Islam and
Opposition in Saudi Arabia," MERIA Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May 1997).
3. See
Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney, The Armed Forces in the Contemporary Middle East
(Frank Cass, 2001) and Barry Rubin, "The Military in Contemporary Middle
Eastern Politics," MERIA Journal, Vol. 5, Number 1 (March 2001).
4.
Yosef Ben-Aharon, "Negotiating With Syria: A First-Hand Account, MERIA
Journal, Vol. 4 No. 2 (June 2000); Barry Rubin, "Understanding Syrian
Policy: An Analysis of Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara's Explanation,"
MERIA Journal, Vol. 4 No. 2 (June 2000); Eyal Zisser, "Decisionmaking in
Asad's Syria," MERIA Journal, Vol. 2. No. 2 (May 1998).
5.
Robert O. Freedman, "Russia and the Middle East: The Primakov Era,"
MERIA Journal, Vol. 2 No. 2 (May 1998); Robert O. Freedman,
"Russian-Iranian Relations in the 1990s," MERIA Journal, Vol. 4 No. 2
(June 2000); Oksana Antonenko, "Russia's Military Involvement in the Middle
East" MERIA Journal Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 2001).
6.
Barry Rubin, The Region at the Center of the World: Crises and Quandaries in the
Contemporary Persian Gulf, (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
7.
A.W. Samii, "The Contemporary Iranian News Media, 1998-1999," MERIA
Journal, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1999); A.W. Samii. "Iran's 2000
Election," MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000)
8.
Barry Rubin, "The Persian Gulf After the Cold War: Old Pattern, New
Era," MERIA Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 1999)
9. On
GCC security policy and relations with the United States, see Jon B. Alterman,
"The Gulf States and the American Umbrella," MERIA Journal Vol. 4, No.
4 (December 2000); Joseph Kostiner, "The United States and the Gulf States:
Alliance in Need," MERIA Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1998); Joshua
Teitelbaum, "The Gulf States and Dual Containment," MERIA Journal,
Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1998); Sean Foley, "The UAE: Political Issues and
Security Dilemmas," MERIA Journal, Vol. 3, No 1 (February 1999); Turki
al-Hamad, "Will Gulf Monarchies Work Together?" MERIA Journal, Vol. 1,
No. 2 (May 1997).
10.
Amatzia Baram, "Saddam Husayn: Between his Power Base and the International
Community," MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 2000); Laurie Mylroie,
"Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 1997 Gulf Crisis," MERIA
Journal, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1997); Kenneth M. Pollack, "Current Iraqi
Military Capabilities," Meria News, 1998/No. 4 (February 1998).
11.
Teitelbaum, op. cit.
12.
For assessments of Iran's power and politics, see Michael Eisenstadt, "The
Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment," MERIA
Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 2001); Seth Carus, "Iran and Weapons of Mass
Destruction," MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 2000).
13.
On stability in the GCC states, see Daniel L. Byman and Jerrold D. Green,
"The Enigma of Political Stability in the Persian Gulf Monarchies,"
MERIA Journal, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1999); Daryl Champion, "The Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia: Elements of Instability with Stability," MERIA Journal,
Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1999).
14.
For an evaluation of the threat from WMD, see George Tenet, "Weapons of
Mass Destruction: A New Dimension in U.S. Middle East Policy," MERIA
Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 2000).
15. On
U.S. policy during this period, see Jon B. Alterman, "The Gulf States and
the American Umbrella," MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 2000);
Michael Eisenstadt, "U.S. Military Capabilities in the Post-Cold War Era:
Implications for Middle East Allies," MERIA Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4
(December 1998); Robert O. Freedman, "U.S. Middle East Policy in the Second
Clinton Administration," MERIA Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 1999);
Robert J. Lieber, "U.S. Middle East Policy in The Clinton Second
Term," MERIA Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 1997); Barry Rubin, "U.S.
Foreign Policy and Rogue States," MERIA Journal, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September
1999); Amin Tarzi, "Contradictions of U.S. Policy on Iraq and its
Consequences," MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000).
*Barry Rubin is Deputy Director of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA). His books include Cauldron of Turmoil; Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran; Armed Forces of the Middle East; Revolutionaries and Reformers: Islamist Movements in the Middle East; The Region at the Center of the World: The Contemporary Persian Gulf; Iraq's Road to War, and The Israel-Arab Reader.