Volume 5, No. 1 - March 2001
By Sharon Sadeh
Editor's
Summary: The
Israeli defense industry was formed to meet urgent security needs but ceased to
be the main supplier for the Israeli armed forces. It became the world's
fifth-largest arms' exporter, competing successfully against leading Western
companies, but at the same time is on the verge of collapse. A highly capable
industry, which has been regarded as a model of Israeli technological
achievements and self-reliance, it is also a sector riven with structural
discrepancies and conflict of interests. This article explores the industry's
current situation including the considerations that guided its growth and its
likely future course.
The Israeli defense industry
is a mass of contradictions: it was formed in order to meet urgent security
needs but ceased to be the main supplier for the Israeli armed forces. It became
the world's fifth-largest arms' exporter, competing successfully against leading
Western companies, but at the same time is on the verge of collapse. A highly
capable industry, which has been regarded as a model of Israeli technological
achievements and self-reliance, it is also a sector riven with structural
discrepancies and conflict of interests.
This article explores the
industry's current situation starting with the security considerations that
guided its growth, continues with the build-up of the industrial complex and
finishes by assessing the industry's resilience and its impact on Israel's arms
exports and future warfare capabilities.
MOTIVES
AND DYNAMICS FOR THE GROWTH OF THE ISRAELI DEFENSE INDUSTRY
The circumstances that led to
Israel's establishment, its constant struggle for survival and disappointments
with foreign suppliers dictated the development of Israeli domestic arms'
manufacturing capabilities. During the pre-state years and after, Israeli
leaders were acutely aware of the inherent imbalance between Israel and its Arab
neighbors, resulting from its small territory and population, as well as a lack
of natural resources. The constant threat to national survival forced Israel to
seek external sources of weapons and military technology.
Initial attempts to buy
weapons and warfare-related equipment met with difficulties, as arms suppliers
were reluctant to develop a steady relationship. Consequently, a constant
uncertainty with regard to external sources of weapons and technology prevailed,
and there was a growing fear that the needs of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
could not be met if Israel remained totally dependent on imported weapons only.
In many cases, though, dealing
with arms exports showed Israel that such sales are largely a continuation of
diplomacy by other means. Western governments, especially those with a global or
regional agenda like the United States, Britain and France, all attempted to use
arms supplies to gain diplomatic and political concessions. That reality imposed
many limitations on Israel, especially in the 1960s and the 1970s. It also
sometimes trapped Israel in bitter feuds between rival ministries of the same
foreign governments over arms' procurement choices.(1)
Frequent rejections of
Israel's requests for both weapons and technologies, recurrent arms sanctions
and the intensified rearmament of Arab nations during the 1960s convinced the
Israeli leadership to embark upon the development of a broadly based indigenous
arms production capability. This, in fact, temporarily settled an ongoing debate
within the Defense Ministry in the 1950s and 1960s. One camp, headed by then
director-general of the Defense Ministry Shimon Peres and former chief of staff
Zvi Zur, stressed the importance of self-sufficiency and insisted that all
necessary equipment, including platforms and battle systems, be produced
indigenously.(2) The other group, led by General Yitzhak Rabin, preferred buying
foreign equipment that was already available. Israel, he said, cannot and will
not be able to produce everything, therefore it is far more sensible to minimize
as much as possible the costly risks of research and development (R&D)
programs and foster strong relations with a reliable supplier, preferably the
United States. The industry, he maintained, should be confined to maintenance
and improving subsystems.(3)
Over the years, Israel
developed a dual-policy approach towards defense procurement. While the country
continued to exhaust any opportunity to buy weapons abroad, it also invested
heavily in establishing a sophisticated defense industry.(4) This system would
provide a domestic industry as a logistical back-up for the IDF in war and
handle its operational requirements more quickly. In addition, the defense
industry would have the ability to tailor weapons and develop new ones not
available elsewhere by creating advanced, defense-oriented research and
development facilities. Such an industry (see
table 1) would also become a source for employment, development in certain parts
of the country, and export income. Most importantly, by averting future arms'
embargoes, Israel would be able to hold a bigger army with an increased
diplomatic and political leeway.(5)
Table 1: Areas of Military
Research that facilitated civilian applications in Israel (6)
| Field | Subject | Contribution / End product |
| Aeronautics |
Structure
and aerodynamics |
R&D of Business Jets |
| Electronics | Radar | Air traffic control radar |
| Communication | Encoding | Cellular phones and networks |
| Electro-optics | Image processing | Image processing for printers |
| Control | Gimbals control | Medical scanners |
| Micro-electronics | Sensors & signal processing | Medical equipment |
| Computing | Software | Internet software |
| Agricultural engineering | Rapid entrenchment | Mechanized digger |
The criteria for developing
and manufacturing locally made weapons was guided by four key principles:(7)
* The refusal of foreign
powers to sell critical weapons.
* The achievements of Israeli
developers that allowed the IDF to acquire a decisive advantage on the
conventional battlefield (i.e., electronic warfare and intelligence equipment).
* The lower cost of domestic
production in Israel compared to imports.
* The production only of
weapons' systems that were needed to facilitate a regional deterrence posture
and were unattainable from other sources.
Independent research,
development, and manufacturing were thus a substitute that could free Israel of
its total dependency on foreign supply sources for the IDF. Consequently, the
Israeli government have allocated many resources, most of them at the expense of
other pressing requirements like housing and infrastructure, in order to
establish an independent military industrial base.(8) A comprehensive knowledge
base was set up in universities and governmental laboratories through global
networking and by applying practices such as reverse engineering, industrial
espionage and smuggling of specialists and equipment in covert operations.(9)
The Kfir fighter plane, for
example, was based on plans of the French Mirage III acquired clandestinely
through a Swiss source in the 1960s.(10) In another operation which took place
in the 1960s, the Ministry of Defense brought to Israel an expert in firearms
and explosives, a Pole of Jewish origin, who helped to design new types of
weapons in Israel Military Industries (IMI).(11)
The operational success of
many indigenous products, the quest for additional income, in light of the
industry's growth in the 1970s and 1980s, and the rising costs of new
developments, have motivated the export endeavors of the Israeli defense
establishment.
A liberal export policy
combined with vast operational experience secured Israel's defense industry
position in the world markets. Israel was quick to offer operational solutions
thanks to a considerably faster development process. Among the factors involved
in Israel's success and speed were the high national priority placed on defense
efforts, the quality of the minds involved in this industry, and the fact that
the end user was often part of the design and production team bringing to bear
practical experience and specific requirements. This has given Israel an
important commercial edge over its competitors around the world. In many cases,
foreign armies found these advantages to provide good reasons for them to
participate in new Israeli weapons programs.
A rapid rise of export
revenues in the 1980s assisted to subsidize the cost of the research and
development of new weapons, and this has compensated for a sharp cut in the
domestic R&D budget.(12) Advanced generations of air-to-air missiles were
funded through revenues from arms sales to China(13) while Singapore and Chile
paid for most of the development of the Barak, a naval missile.(14) South Africa
funded the development of Israel's first reconnaissance satellite and advanced
generations of ballistic missiles.(15)
Arms exports not only played a
crucial role in offsetting Israel's trade imbalance but also performed a pivotal
role in furthering its clandestine diplomacy efforts. The sale of arms and
technology has become one of the most effective techniques to furthering Israeli
goals overseas, including as a bribe to rescue some endangered Jewish
communities.(16) The discreet ties with China and India and the more salient
alliance with Turkey in the 1980s and the 1990s are good examples of strong
links based on such cooperation.
Some countries, such as
Indonesia and Sudan, have no formal relations with Israel, but supplying them
with military systems has maintained a level of dialogue and is sometimes the
only way to achieve this goal.(17) Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) alone has
recently reported that its client-base now reaches over 80 countries, while
Israel Military Industries (IMI), in its prime, supplied more than 60 foreign
armies.(18) The export products included not only used weaponry that was being
phased out of IDF service, but also consisted of new, sophisticated arms, such
as missiles, battleships and combat aircraft and included co-production in
weapons' development and technology transfers.(19)
In many instances, the defense
industries came up with innovative designs and creative conceptual solutions,
neither foreseen nor suggested by the armed forces. The Lebanon War of 1982
furnished some examples of this innovative development, such as surveillance by
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and the Python-3, high maneuverability air-to-air
missile, which brought down about 90 Syrian fighter aircraft.(20) Later examples
are the IAI's Arrow anti-ballistic missile defense system and the light-weight
military reconnaissance satellite Ofeq, Elbit's display and sight helmet DASH
for fighter pilots, and Rafael's anti-tank missile, Gomed.(21)
Availability of foreign
weapons was also affected by Israel's own technological and industrial
capabilities. The more advanced and self-reliant they became, the less
restrictions on arms transfer were imposed, especially by the United States,
Israel's chief supplier since the mid-1970s. Paradoxically, the mere fact that
Israel has developed the capability to produce similar weapon systems was enough
to lift export objections. Previously refused systems, like advanced air-to-air
missiles (AMRAAM), thermal imagery systems and electronic warfare kits were
offered to Israel. This can be explained by the desire of American producers to
remove Israeli rival design from the global market, which becomes easier once
the Israeli manufacturer loses its traditional end user, the IDF.(22)
Although Israel has gained
wider access to the American arsenal as time went by, it was also subjected to
occasional arms embargoes and technology transfer objections, especially in the
1980s. After the Israeli air strike against Iraq's nuclear reactor in
1981--justified by Israel as an act of self-defense--Washington suspended a
pending shipment of F-16s aircraft.(23)
To this very day, there are
still many restrictions in place. For instance, Israel is prohibited by the
United States from using the MLRS rocket system in Lebanon,(24) and encountered
many obstacles on requests for technology transfer on commercial or political
grounds. A possible breach of international conventions, such as the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty (NPT) or the missile technology control regime (MTCR),
was also sometimes cited as a reason for an American refusal.
More disturbing from the
Israeli point of view was the practice of using arms supplies in an attempt to
extort concessions from Israel or dictate restrictive demands on it. During the
1991 Gulf War, for example, Israel was asked to guarantee that it would not
attack Iraq, in return for access to U.S. spy satellites photos of Iraqi Scud
missiles sites. Israel refused.(25) In July 2000 Israel was forced to scrap the
sale of a sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft to China, despite her
contractual commitments, following a direct American threat to cut Israel's
military aid and downgrade strategic relations with her. The United States also
demanded a right to veto Israel's arms export to certain countries--China,
Russia and India, among others--a request that is seen as a major threat to the
Israeli industry.(26)
THE
EVOLUTION OF ISRAEL'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY
A mixture of imported
technology and Israeli innovation boosted the growth of the defense industry.
The industry evolved through several stages, starting with small arms production
and maintenance of more complex weapons, followed by licensed production and
joint ventures, adoption and upgrading of licensed systems, and local production
and design of components. The French arms embargo of 1967 and the aftermath of
the 1973 war served as a catalyst for the next phase, namely independent design
and the production of major weapons systems and platforms. This rapid progress
backfired during the 1990s, as the industry shrank and focused on the production
of niche expertise systems and components due to a sharp fall in domestic and
foreign sales.(27)
The origin of the Israeli
defense industries can be traced back to the pre-state years, when the Jewish
community in mandate Palestine of the 1930s had some clandestine arms production
units that produced and repaired rudimentary weapons.(28) The secret industry
was established to support the underground paramilitary organizations opposing
British rule in Palestine.(29)
The first stage of local
production, from the late 1940s until the mid-1950s, focused largely on the
manufacture of small arms and ammunition and the refurbishing of old
weapons--World War II surplus--for use by the IDF. An aircraft maintenance
facility, Bedek, was founded as a department in the Ministry of Defense,
specializing in maintaining and repairing military aircraft.(30) By that time,
the workforce in defense facilities had reached 5,000.(31)
Table 2: Israel's Progress in
Weapons and Military Technologies (32)
|
Decade |
Product |
|
1940s |
Hand grenades, submachine
guns, mortars, armoured cars |
|
1950s |
Uzi submachine gun, small arms
and ammunition |
|
1960s |
Fouga Magister jet trainer
(licensed production); Gabriel anti-ship missile, Jericho
intermediate-range ballistic missiles; first generation non-conventional
capabilities |
|
1970s |
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles;
Laser range-finders and designators; Galil assault rifle; Reshef missile
boat family; Kfir fighter; Merkava tank; Barak surface-to-air missile;
Popeye air-to-ground missile; |
|
1980s |
Electronic-warfare suits,
ELINT and COMINT systems; Thermal imaging and electro-optical systems;
Ofeq reconnaissance satellite; Jericho ballistic missile mark 2; Harpy
attack UAV; Lavi fighter (cancelled); secured communication systems;
deciphers and encoders; Python-4 all aspect air-to-air missile; Directed
energy weapons; advanced armor techniques and anti-armor weapons; energy
weapons. |
|
1990s |
Attack multi-purpose UAVs;
complex composite structures; cyber-warfare; Arrow anti-ballistic
missile; simulators; Electronic Warfare systems; communication systems;
remote sensing; anti-tank guided missiles; cruise missiles; upgrade
programs; Merkava tank Mk. 4; |
The second phase, involving
licensed production, lasted between 1955 and 1967. A combination of political
and military interests led to close cooperation between Israel and France.
During this period, France sold advanced aircraft, armored vehicles, naval craft
and other weapons. In addition, the French provided the Dimona nuclear reactor
and the technological knowledge for the Israeli ballistic missile program. The
French also agreed to provide Israel with technological assistance for the
licensed production of combat fighters and trainers, and all this, in turn,
brought a major transition in the development of local arms capabilities.
The Sinai war of 1956 brought
a rapid inflow of tanks, jet fighters, helicopters and new communication systems
that led to a swift growth of the maintenance facilities. The responsibility for
research and development was transferred in 1958 from the Research and Planning
Branch of the Ministry of Defense and transformed into a separate unit, Rafael,
but still as part of the Defense Ministry.(33) As a national laboratory, Rafael
was required to address the critical demands of the IDF, including top secret
projects, such as the development of weapons of mass destruction.(34)
At the same time, Israel
Military Industries, once a small manufacturer of relatively simple components
and light arms, entered into new upgrading projects for artillery platforms,
such as battle tanks and self-propelled guns.(35) IAI-Bedek turned from an
aircraft maintenance and repair workshop into a full-scale system house,
specializing in avionics and missiles, with assembly capabilities for French jet
trainers. The expansion of the defense industry was also reflected in the
increased number of employees, which by 1967 had reached 14,000 workers.(36)
Following the French arms
embargo of 1967, Israel initiated programs for the indigenous production of
advanced aircraft, tanks, naval craft, as well as tactical and strategic
missiles, electronics and other subsystems.(37) While a policy of
self-sufficiency was questionable economically, it was a sound
political-military strategy. Israel's search for qualitative superiority over
its neighbors underlined the need for technologically advanced systems. This led
to bigger resources becoming available for the defense industries, which became
a major component of the Israeli economy. The result, in terms of industrial
endeavor was recognized immediately. The industry's workforce soared from 14,000
in 1966 to 34,000 in 1972.
The defense industry continued
its expansion right after the War of 1973, alongside the IDF's accelerated
process of weapons acquisition and personnel expansion. During this period,
total employment (including sub-contractors) doubled to 63,000, most of them
organized in strong unions within the state-owned sector(38). This amounted to
more than 4 percent of the total workforce and 20 percent of the industrial
labor force.(39) At the same time, arms export sales increased 25 times over--
from $40-70 million in the early 1970s, to $1.52 billion dollars in 1997 (in
current values)(40) making Israel the world's fifth-largest arms exporter.(41)
Industrial readjustment in the
1980s and the 1990s
Major events in the second
half of the 1980s--an economic crisis in Israel and the end of the Cold War--
had a long-lasting impact on the defense industry.
Local defense expenditure was
reduced as the government tried to rein in hyperinflation through a series of
deep cuts in domestic expenditure, thus affecting the IDF's spending power. The
armed forces bought far less from the local industry,(42) while increasingly
channeling orders to the U.S. market.
Controversial arms
exports--mainly to Iran, Chile, South Africa and China-- were sanctioned in
order to maintain employment in the industry and to compensate for a sharp fall
in the domestic R&D budget.(43) This was a short-lived hope as new arms
orders plummeted after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the arms industry
struggled with redundant capacity. In contrast to the aspirations of the 1960s
and the 1970s, it became clear that Israel was unable to sustain a large and
diverse indigenous defense production capability. The self-sufficiency strategy
was well beyond Israel's limited means.
The Shift in Procurement
Preferences
Following the peace accord
with Egypt in 1979, the relationship with the United States stabilized and the
level of insecurity with respect to weapons' imports decreased significantly.
Reliance on imports from the United States--financed by American
grants--increased sharply. The American pledge to back Israel militarily and
diplomatically during the peace negotiations in the Middle East(44) convinced
Israel's decision-makers that a repetition of the 1967 scenario--when France
placed a sudden arms embargo on Israel--was highly unlikely. The IDF and the
Ministry of Finance have become so habituated to the American grants, including
the stipulation that Israel buy American products, that they begun to perceive
it as indispensable part of the Israeli defense budget.(45)
Notes: The United States is
paying Israel's repayments for loans taken from her in the 1970s through the
Economic Aid. In addition to an annual military grant of $1.8 billion, Israel
received additional military aid, including pre-positioning of war reserve
stores in Israel, one-time post-Gulf War aid worth $2.3 billion, funding for
programs like the anti-ballistic missile project, Arrow, and commitments of
American aircraft suppliers to make indirect offset deals with Israeli firms.
The availability of American
funding, which somewhat cushioned the cut in the local ingredient of the defense
budget, exposed deep anomalies in the relationship between the IDF, the Ministry
of Defense and the defense industry. In the 1950s and the 1960s, the Ministry of
Defense was engaged in central planning of military industrialization and this
sometimes influenced certain acquisition decisions of the IDF.(46) In the 1980s,
the IDF started exercising a principle known to economists as "consumer
sovereignty" (or consumer preference), after a 1979 Defense Ministry
decision that gave the IDF full control over the defense budget, including
long-term weapons' development and acquisition. This meant that the IDF was able
to determine not only its needs but also how much it would spend and from which
source. Consequently, the IDF's needs took precedence over the interests of the
domestic industrial base.(47)
In some Western countries, the
responsibility for "preparation," a long-term process of augmenting
future capabilities usually guided outside the armed forces but in consultation
with them, and "preparedness," the immediate readiness to wage war,
are placed at separate hands. In Israel, they were both at the hands of the IDF.
The military has always
favored off-the-shelf equipment and objected to vast investment in costly and
risky indigenous programs funded through the defense budget, thus imposing
severe limitations on its latitude. Gradually, the IDF allocated less and less
to R&D projects, and much more for salaries and pension payments, in order
to ensure its competitiveness as a prospective employer.(48)
The Lavi fighter aircraft--the
flagship project of IAI and the pride and joy of the entire defense
industry--was the most salient casualty of the American aid. The IDF/Air Force
preferred the U.S. F-16 aircraft, though senior officials in the Ministry of
Defense supported the more expensive Lavi to boost the country's defense
industrial base.(49) Soon it was obvious that Israel could not meet the aircraft
development costs without substantial financial support from the United States,
which clearly had no intentions of doing so for commercial reasons. Another
incentive for the cancellation came when the United States allowed Israel to
convert one-quarter of the annual military grant to Israeli currency and to
allow for the purchasing of Israeli-made systems with that money. Despite
forceful opposition of IAI workers, the Lavi program was cancelled in 1987 under
strong pressure from the Israeli Air Force and the American administration.(50)
The cancellation of the Lavi
project was a result of a gradual shift of priorities, resulting from the
availability of American arms, and marked a watershed in the state's perception
as to the purpose of the local defense industry. Its traditional role as the
chief weapons' developer and supplier to the IDF was over. The role of the local
industry was scaled down in line with that shift, as it now was merely required
to guarantee the IDF's qualitative edge. This was to be achieved by upgrading
Israeli-made systems, and supplying "power multiplier"
systems--weapons that would guarantee superiority in the battlefield and are not
available from other sources.(51)
The industries resented this
approach. They said they needed a steady stream of orders from the IDF across
the board in order to retain the necessary workforce for future developments.
But their protests were to no avail.(52)
As of 1999, the IDF has been
diverting an increasing portion of the purchasing from locally made goods to
those made in the United States because they were paid for by the American
military aid. Israel buys low-tech products like shoes, uniforms and food from
American manufacturers that were previously purchased from Israeli
suppliers.(53) Recent report concluded that this gradual shift would force
Israeli suppliers of the Ministry of Defense to dismiss at least 17,000 workers
until 2008 and could inflict a cumulative loss of $2 billion in export
revenues.(54) One factor for this high estimate is that foreign clients hesitate
to buy Israeli military products if they are not in use by the IDF.(55)
The Crisis in the State-Owned
Defense Industry
The drop in foreign orders,
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of contracts with foreign
customers, coupled with the growing shift of the IDF toward the American
suppliers, affected both the state-owned and private defense industries.
While the private sector
handled its problems internally, the state-owned sector sought the help of the
government. In 1994, IAI reported a deficit of $450 million for the previous
year and IMI presented losses of $70 million in 1994 and $85 million in 1995.
Prime Minister Rabin commented on the crisis in IMI that "there is no
escape other than restructuring and adjustment in the defense industry. It is
cheaper to maintain IMI's workers in Hilton hotels than in the factory
itself."(56) Rafael--funded by the defense budget--reported a loss of 855
million shekels between 1989 and 1993 (roughly $315 million).(57)
The Finance Ministry convinced
the government that the state-owned defense industry had become bloated and
that--thanks to government bailout and subsidies--it was characterized by waste,
inefficiency and duplication.(58) In part, the restrictions imposed on the
state-owned firms--which are required by law to be profit-driven
entities--simply prevented them from addressing their problems promptly. Their
rigid labor structure meant that they were unable to diversify or lay-off
redundant employees as freely as privately owned companies. Their pay structure
was linked to that of the public sector, irrespective of their actual financial
condition.
At the same time, they could
not offer special wage advantages to some employees or hire short-term contract
workers without the consent of the unions. They also lacked managerial
flexibility, as they needed authorization from the bureaucracy and the political
echelon for almost every step, from arms sales to joint ventures. This meant a
slow process that led to a loss of business opportunities. In extreme cases, as
was so evident in the case of IMI, the company's financial condition
deteriorated because the government hesitated or declined, for political
reasons, to approve large-scale dismissals.(59)
Israel's state-owned defense
industries were forced to undertake massive layoffs--from 43,700 in 1985 to
about 23,000 in 1997 --a phase that was protracted and confrontational.(60)
Their research and production interests shifted from major platforms to
technologically advanced systems and components for the military and the
civilian markets.(61)
The contraction process was
paid directly by the state's treasury at a cost of almost $3 billion.(62) The
Ministry of Defense played a minor part in the discussions with the industries,
as it did not want to contribute for the downsizing from its own dwindling
budget.(63)
At the same time, the
privately owned defense and civilian companies in the electronics and software
sector gained prominence and spearheaded the local industry, thriving on the
advances seeded by government research laboratories. The technology boom and the
lure of the private sector and its many start-up companies attracted the most
skilled and talented employees who opted for better financial rewards, less
security restrictions and state-of-the-art research. The average age of
scientists in the state-owned industry reached 47, and the attrition rate of
young scientists continued to escalate.(64) The influence of the defense
industry in Israel's economy has slowly declined.
The diminishing position of
state-owned companies has been further undermined by the fact that privately
owned defense companies have developed competing expertise, gradually attracting
a larger portion of Defense Ministry orders. This was facilitated by the
introduction of the Compulsory Tender Law that required the Ministry of Defense
(and all other governmental branches) to introduce competition into the bidding
process of services and products. This has effectively ended the Ministry of
Defense's preferential disposition toward state-owned firms, while posing it
with serious conflict of interests (as proprietor, client and regulator at the
same time).
Privately-owned companies
stepped into the state-owned industry's traditional territory of expertise, such
as UAV, upgrade packages and Electronic Warfare systems, and demonstrated that
their leaner and more efficient structure pose a real challenge to the
state-owned sector.(65) Soon a disturbing phenomenon emerged: Israeli companies
started slandering and accusing each other in front of the client, while
competing on the same order. The Ministry of Defense was unable to prevent this
behavior, which led in many cases to a decision to award the contract to a
supplier from another country. Rarely and only after a direct appeal by the
Ministry of Defense did the industries agree to join forces abroad.(66)
The private industry, which
accounts for only 30% of the defense industrial base, also started a process of
mergers and acquisitions. Elbit Systems and El-Op Electro-Optics merged in July
2000(67), while the Koor Group consolidated its defense businesses, which
include Tadiran Electronic Systems, Tadiran Spectralink and BVR, under the
umbrella of Elisra Electronic Systems.
In sharp contrast to this
development, the government has not been furthering any concrete plan for a
far-reaching merger or privatization in the state-owned sector.(68) The plan to
transform weapons maker Rafael, which is part of the Ministry of Defense, into
an autonomous government-owned company started in 1994 but the government is
still negotiating with the unions, unable to reach a conclusive agreement. The
privatization plans of IAI and IMI were never seriously considered, due to
prohibitive demands of the workers' unions and the reluctance of the management.
The potential ramifications of clashes with the bureaucracy and the strong
unions had deterred politicians from both sides, despite a proclaimed policy of
privatizing the state-owned sector.(69)
Another obstacle was the
refusal of the Ministry of Defense to relinquish its control over these
industries until a law is in place that safeguards the nation's interests by
establishing procedures regarding foreign ownership, control and influence.(70)
For this and other reasons, the Ministry of Defense blocked the sale of IMI's
heavy ammunition division to the American firm Lockheed-Martin in 1996.
CONCLUSIONS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The growth of the Israeli
defense industry was a combination of policy and circumstances. The realization
that, despite the traumatic experience of the Holocaust, the Jewish state was
still subjected to existential threats by the Muslim world, have led to the
psychological as well as material institutionalization of the Centrality of
Security concept. This perception has been strengthened by various arms
embargoes and broken agreements inflicted by foreign suppliers.
Consequently, Israel's
policymakers allowed a rapid expansion of the state-owned arms industries and
their involvement in the production of indigenous state-of-the-art weapon
systems. The industries became the largest manufacturing and technological
sector in Israel, employing tens of thousands, most of them organized in strong
unions, and contributing enormously to the Israeli military qualitative edge,
the nation's diplomatic efforts and its economy.
The shift in the IDF's
procurement policy, following the 1979 Camp David peace treaty with Egypt,
effectively ended the industry's raison d'être. The growing dependence on
American weaponry deprived the Israeli companies of their most important client
and sales promoter, and forced them to rely on foreign customers to ensure
sufficient revenues. This exposed them to the cyclical nature of the arms
exports market and to fluctuations in the official rate of exchange.
The simultaneous drop in
domestic and foreign orders in the late 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s
revealed the industries' vulnerability. Their inherent weaknesses threatened
their very existence and contributed to their financial downfall. The government
stabilized their financial condition but refrained from addressing their basic
structural and labor deficiencies due to a combination of political cost
calculations, incoherent policies and a chronic problem of agenda congestion.
Restructuring, consolidation and privatization of the state-owned sector have
been kept firmly off the agenda despite their commercial and financial benefits.
Policymaking toward this sector was (and still is) crisis-driven and responsive
rather than pro-active.
Following the government's
massive handout, the state-owned industries showed signs of recovery in the
second half of the 1990s, but there are major question marks as to their
long-term viability. Privately owned industries emerged as strong and viable
competitors, both domestically and internationally, while the IDF continued to
reduce its local purchasing considerably across the entire industry.
The substantial cut in
Israel's defense R&D budget and the decline in research partnerships with
foreign clients will restrict the industry's capacity to develop successful--and
export worthy--weapons systems. The arms exports restrictions imposed by the
United States, Israel's patron and main benefactor, will deter foreign
consumers, while the Israeli industries, both private and state-owned, would
have to face as competitors the giant firms now existing in Europe and the
United States. Israeli companies are not permitted to join or merge with
multinational alliances in the defense sector, and this position is unlikely to
change in the near future.
In light of the above, the
long-term viability of the Israeli defense industry remains questionable. Unless
the government would devise and implement a plan for the restructuring and
preservation of the state-owned industries, which seems improbable under the
prevailing circumstances, their demise--especially in the case of the
technology-starved IMI--is likely.
NOTES
1. Two famous cases were the
cancelled sale of British Chieftain tanks in 1969 and the selling of American
Hawk anti aircraft missile in 1960.
2. Declassified American
intelligence reports and interviews with former Defense and Foreign Minister
Moshe Arens, 24.6.1998 and former Prime Minister Shimon Peres, 2.12.1997.
3. Y. Greenberg, Defense
Budget and Military Power, (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense publishing, 1987) p.
98-99; Interviews with former Chief of Staff (1961-1963) Zvi Zur, 21 December
1999 and Shimon Peres, 2 December 1997.
4. Y. Lifshitz, Defense
Economics - The General Theory and the Israeli Case (Tel Aviv: The Jerusalem
Institute for Israel Studies and Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 2000), p.
359
5. Interview with Peres, 2
December 1997; Z. Bonen, The Israeli Defense Industry - Past and Future,
(Technion, Yad Neeman, 16 February 1994), Lecture transcript, p. 35.
6. Z. Tadmor, Lecture
transcript, Neeman Institute, Technion, September 1997
7. Israel Tal, National
Security - The Few against the Many (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Dvir, 1996), p. 72. Maj.
Gen. (res.) Israel Tal, formerly deputy Chief of Staff, has served as a senior
assistant to the defense minister (1975-2000). Efraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel's
National Security, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 79.
8. Interviews with Israel Tal,
14 January 1998 and with Michael Shor (IMI's Director-General 1972-1990), 30
June 1998.
9.
Report by Defense Investigations Service (DIS), the field security branch
of the American Department of Defense, quoted in Ha'aretz, 31 January 1996. The
Bureau of Scientific Relation (Lakam) in the Ministry of Defense was responsible
for collecting scientific and technical intelligence abroad from both open and
covert sources. Lakam was disbanded in 1986 after it was identified as the
agency responsible for recruiting and running an American naval intelligence
employee, Jonathan Pollard. See also 'Israel - a country study', Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress, December 1988, Internet edition <http://leweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/iltoc.html>.
10. Interviews with Israel Tal
and Michael Shor. See also on the Mirage 3 affair in CRS Report; A. Oren,
Ha'aretz 9 May 1997 and 2 March 1998 and S. Reiser, The Israeli Arms Industry
(New York: Holmes and Meyer, 1989), p 104.
11. See: Interview with Tal,
14 January 1998.
12. See interviews with David
Ivry, 7 October 1997 and 28 June 1998. Major General (res.) Ivry, formerly Air
Force Commander, deputy Chief of Staff, Chairman of IAI and Director General of
MoD (1987-1996), head of the National Security Council and currently (2000)
serving as the Israeli Ambassador to Washington.
13. Ha'aretz, 5 February 1999.
14. Ha'aretz, 19 October 2000
15. See: Ha'aretz, 17 July
1994.
16. A. Kleiman, Israel's
Global Reach, p. 35; Israel bribed Sudan and Ethiopian leaders with arms to
enable rescue operations of Ethiopian Jews in the 1990s.
17. It has been repeatedly
reported that IAI has sold aircraft fuel tanks to Saudi Arabia, and maintained
links in Indonesia and Morocco.
18. 1998/1999 IAI's official
calendar; Interview with Michael Shor, IMI Director-General 1972-1990, 30 June
1998
19. Among the most prominent
countries: China, co-developing its future combat fighter, based on the Lavi,
see: Defense News, 2 September 1996, p.6; South Africa, under the apartheid
regime, was a major client that financed advanced projects, such as
reconnaissance satellite, ballistic missiles. It also bought redundant Kfir
aircraft, which were phased out of the Israeli Air Force service. Some of the
projects resulted in heavy losses, for example the development of Early Warning
aircraft inflicted a loss of $120 million upon IAI. See: Ha'aretz, 1 April 1997
and 25 April 2000.
20. See: interview with Col.
(res.) Dr. A. Sela, former head of Air Force operations, 5 July 1998.
21. Interviews with Moshe
Arens, 24 June 1998 and with Dr. A. Sela, 5 July 1998.
22. Interviews with Israel Tal
(Assistant to the Defense Minister) 14 January 1998; David Ivry, 7 October 1997
and 28 June 1998; and Amos Horev (Chairman of Rafael), 30 June 1999.
23. 'Israel - a country study', Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, December 1988, internet edition <http://leweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/iltoc.html>.
24. Ha'aretz, 11 February
2000.
25. Full account of this
episode appears in the memoirs of Israel's defense minister: Moshe Arens, Broken
Covenant (Milkhama Ve Shalom Bamizrah Hatikhon, 1988-1992), (Tel Aviv: Yedioth
Ahronoth, 1995), pp. 179-180.
26. Ha'aretz, 13 July 2000.
27. D. J. Louscher and A. N.
Schwartz, 'Patterns of Third World Military Technology Acquisition', in K. Baek,
R. D. McLaurin and C. Moon (eds.), The Dilemma of Third World Defense
Industries: Supplier Control or Recipient Autonomy? (Boulder: Westview, 1989),
p. 51; Interview with M. Shor, 30 June 1998; Interview with S. Peres, Interview
with A. Sela, 5 July 1998, Interview with David Ivry 7 October 1997; Congress
Research Service report on Israel's Defense Industry.
28. J. Evron, Shield and Spear
(Tel-Aviv: The Ministry of Defense publishers, 1992), p. 19.
29. S. Sadeh, Israeli Defense
Procurement (London: SMI Publishing, 1999) p. 85.
30. Y. Evron, Defense Industry
in Israel, (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1980), p. 407.
31. A. Yaniv, Politics and
Strategy of Israel (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Poalim, 1994), p. 145.
32. The list is based on
declassified American intelligence reports and other open sources, such as
Aviation Week and the Israeli press.
33. State Comptroller Annual
Report No. 45, pp. 842.
34. Jane's Intelligence Review
analysed Rafael roles, and asserted that it assembles nuclear warheads in a
certain facility in northern Israel. See: Ha'aretz, 13-14 November 1994; Rafael
was involved already in the 1950s in secret unconventional project. See: M.
Mardor, Rafael (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1981) pp. 120-129, and A. Benn,
'The project before the nuclear option', Ha'aretz, 2 March 1995, p. B3.
35. A. Yaniv, Politics and
Strategy of Israel, p. 145.
36. Ibid. p. 146.
37. A. Yaniv, Politics and
Strategy of Israel, p. 217.
38. In 1987, IAI had 20,000
workers, IMI - 14,000 and Rafael - 6,000. The rest were in Tadiran with 12,000
employees, Elbit, El-Op and other companies.
39. A. Kleiman, Israel's
Global Reach: Arms as Diplomacy (Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), p.73;
Eliot Cohen et al, Knives, Tanks and Missiles, (Washington: The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), p. 45; Bank of Israel Report for 1997, p.
294.
40. A. Yaniv, Politics and
Strategy of Israel, p. 288; Interview with Zvi Zur, former Chief of Staff and
Assistant to Defense Minister, 21 December 1999; Ministry of Defense figures;
Ha'aretz 19 March 1999 and 18 November 1999. The term 'arms exports' refers to
products and services - mainly of military nature - approved by the MoD. See
State of Israel, Official Statutes, no. 5410, 31.12.1991, 'Regulating Order for
Commodities and Services (Export of Defense Equipment and Defense Knowledge) -
1991', pp. 609-611
41. International Institute
for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1997/98 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997), p. 265.
42. IMI's sales to MoD fell by
45% from an average of $ 200 million a year between 1982-1984, to $109 million a
year between 1985-1988. See State Comptroller Special Report, June 1994, p.17.
During the same period, IAI sales to the MoD dropped by 22% from $641 million a
year to $500 million. See State Comptroller Report 45, p. 868.
43. Interviews with Yitzhak
Shamir, (Israel's Prime Minister 1983-1984, 1986-1992), 30 June 1998 and with
David Ivry, 7 October 1997, 28 June 1998. The military R&D budget was
reduced by 43% between 1986-1994. See State Comptroller Report no. 44, p. 1028.
44. See testimony of the
Director of the Defense Security assistance Agency before the House of
Representatives' Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations: 'Defense
Department Testimony on US Aid to the Middle East', United States Information
Service, 6 May 1994, p.1.
45. State Budget Proposal for
1994, Ministry of Finance, p. 63; This basic assumption is the basis of every
long-term work plan of the IDF and the Ministry of Finance. See interview with
Ilan Flato, chief economic advisor to Prime Minister Rabin, 21 June 1999.
46. The Air Force was forced
to buy the Israeli-made Kfir fighter aircraft despite its resistance. Interview
with MK Dan Meridor, member of foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the
Knesset, 1 July 1998.
47. Interview with Prof.
Pinhas Zussman, 6 July 1998. Prof. Zussman, an economist who served as the MoD
Director-General between 1975-1979, decided to implement this principle on
economic grounds. In retrospect, he regretted this move, as it lacked from the
outset some necessary checks and balances.
48. 2.3 billion shekel were
allocated for IDF's pension payments in 1998, compared to 0.9 billion shekel in
1986 (in 2000 prices) - a rise of 255%. During the same period, the portion
allocated for salary in the defense budget grew from 35% of the defense budget
to 45%, while the portion for services and acquisition fell from 50% to 40%
between 1987 and 1997. See: Ministry of Finance, Budget 2000 and Budget 1998
proposals.
49. Interview with Lt. General
Dan Shomron in Le Figaro, 28 October 1988.
50. For a detailed account
see: D. Zekheim, Flight of the Lavi: Inside a US-Israeli crisis (Washington:
Brassey's, 1996); 'The Decision Making Process of the Lavi', State Comptroller
Annual Report no. 37 (Jerusalem: Office of the State Comptroller, 1987),
pp.1291-1325.
51. State Comptroller Report
no. 45, p. 910; Y. Lifshitz, Defense Economics - The General Theory and the
Israeli Case, p. 362.
52. Interview with Dr. Gabi
Komisar, (IMI Managing Director, 1991-1995), 11 June 1998
53. Ha'aretz, 28 January 2000.
54. According to companies'
reports, 80% of IAI's revenues derive from exports, IMI has 50% exports revenues
and Rafael around 30%.
55. El-Op, a defense
electro-optics firm, has cut its asking price for laser designator, in order to
secure a contract for a European army. The move came following a claim by the
customer that El-Op's product was inferior because the IDF did not buy it as
well. See Ha'aretz, 31 August 2000, 12 September 2000.
56. Quoted in Ha'aretz, 24
December 1992.
57. State Comptroller Annual
Report 45, p. 842.
58. Israel has two companies,
which upgrade jet fighters, three companies that produce UAVs, three companies
that produce missile and rocket engines, and four avionics and electronic
warfare systems companies. In Britain, there is only one missile manufacturer,
which is part of a joint venture with a French company. Aviation Week, 10 April
2000; interview with Lord Peter Levene, 21 November 1997. Lord Levene was Chief
of Defense Procurement, UK Ministry of Defense, 1985-1991, and former consultant
to the Israeli government.
59. See: IMI - Current State
of Affairs (internal document), IMI Planning and Control Department, January
1995, p.3.
60. IAI workforce dropped from
22000 in 1985 to 13000 today; IMI cut its labour force from 14600 in 1985 to
4500 today and Rafael reduced its workforce from 7000 in the mid 1980s to 4800
today. Arens et al, The Israeli Military Industries, BESA Centre for Strategic
Studies - Bar-Ilan university, Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy (Hebrew),
No.9, August 1995, p. 25.
61. See interviews with Imri
Tov, MoD's chief economist, 8 October 1997; Haim Adar, MoD's Procurement
director, 18 January 1998 and 25 June 1998. IAI is heavily involved in research
and production for the civilian market. IAI reported that 39% of its revenues in
1999 were from the civilian sector while Rafael's and IMI's had only 2% and 5%
respectively. See: Haaretz, 6 April 2000, and Defense News, 9 August 1999.
62. Ministry of Finance, Budget proposal for 2000, Internet Edition <http://www.mof.gov.il>
63. See interviews with
Abraham Shokhat MK, Finance Minister (1992-1996, 1999-present), 26 June 1999,
and David Ivry, 28 June 1998.
64. Interviews with Dr. Gabi
Komisar (IMI Managing Director, 1991-1995), 11 June 199, Yossi Snir (former IMI
deputy managing director), 8 October 1997, Igal Sarbero (Rafael Vice President
for Strategic Planning), 18 January 1998.
65. Interview with Aviem Sela,
5 July 1998.
66. Interview with David Ivry,
7 October 1997.
67. The merged company, which
became the second largest defense group in Israel, employs 4000 workers with an
annual turnover of US$750 million. Ha'aretz, 3 October 2000.
68. Doron Cohen, Director of
Governmental Companies Authority, resigned in February 2000, protesting against
the government's indifference towards the privatization plans in the
state-controlled sector. Ha'aretz, 3 February 2000.
69. Ministry of Finance,
Budget proposal for 2000, Internet Edition; 'A proposal for an official policy
in the Defense Industry sector', a statement published by the Director-Generals
of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Finance, 9 May 1993; Interview with
David Ivry (the then MoD's director-general and signatory to the document), 7
October 1997.
70. Interview with Zvia Gross,
legal advisor to the Ministry of Defense, 15 March 1998; Ha'aretz, 23 September
1999 and 2 February 2001.
*
Sharon Sadeh is a doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics and the
Chief UK correspondent of the Ha'aretz newspaper. This article is partly based
on his interviews with more than 100 officials and experts.