Volume 5, No. 1 - March 2001
Volume 5, No. 1 - March 2001
By Barry Rubin
Editor's
Summary: In recent decades, coup activity by Middle Eastern
militaries has fallen sharply. While armies remain important and powerful in
regional states, governments (often led by former officers) have learned how to
control their armed forces. To some extent, however, this has produced a
situation in which the effectiveness of Arab and Iranian military establishments
has declined due to the restrictions placed on them by governments. This article
analyzes the current role of Middle Eastern armies on these issues as well as
their role in maintaining domestic order and spreading the state's influence
abroad.
Our views of the military's role in Middle East politics have largely been formed by the history of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s in the region. Those years were the golden age of coups in the Arab world, a time when every Arab military officer could hope to become his country's ruler some day. The armed forces were highly politicized and rulers generally failed to control them. During this period, too, the armed forces were the most effective national institutions and, at times, the only effective one.
Officers
argued that politics were too important to be left to the politicians, who they
saw--by no means inaccurately--as incompetent and corrupt. The 1948 defeat,
failure to gain Arab unity, a perceived subservience to Western states, and the
slow pace of the development process were among the grievances that motivated
officers to seek political power.
At
the same time, coups by military officers often, in fact, represented revolts by
various ethnic, religious, class, and regional groups that were well-represented
in the officer corps while largely excluded from the political and economic
elite. Thus, these coups were actually social revolutions in the form of
military takeovers. At the time, many Western scholars saw Arab militaries as
the necessary instruments for creating governments capable of nation-building
and mass mobilization.
The
current era, beginning in the 1970s, was shaped by these military regimes and by
the remaining civilian rulers who had learned how to survive this threat. They
were determined to prevent military officers from staging any fresh coups.
Indeed, governments did have a great deal of success in preventing their armies
from intervening in politics. (1)
They have also built militaries that can successfully maintain internal order.
But the price of that accomplishment is severe damage to their ability to
function as armed forces actually fighting wars. (2)
Perhaps
the biggest asset of Middle East militaries is that they often have more
influence than their Western counterparts in obtaining the level of financial
support they seek. They need not worry about public criticism. At the same time,
though, few Middle Eastern armed forces can equal the professional qualities and
operational advantages enjoyed by counterparts in democratic states.
The
limits placed on the regular militaries as a tool for fighting external wars
have made it more necessary for states to develop other means of projecting
power, ranging from sponsorship of terrorism to obtaining Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Certainly, the high level of conflict in the Middle East has led to
periodic wars. Yet this history has also shown the risks involved in normal
warfare and the frequency of defeat for Arab and Iranian armies. The possession
of strong deterrence, especially by Israel, has also discouraged direct assault.
After
the 1980s, the decline of one superpower sponsor in the region, the Soviet
Union, and the relative strength and willingness to intervene by the sole
remaining superpower, the United States, accelerated this trend. Consequently,
such tools as the use of proxies, subversion, terrorism, and an attempt to
obtain Weapons of Mass Destruction have become important means of power
projection compared to the use of regular armed forces.
THE ARMED FORCES AND STATE POWER
The
first requirement for any government is to ensure its own survival. In the Arab
world, this has meant finding a way to prevent the armed forces from seizing
power in a coup. Simultaneously, governments have given the armed forces
privileges while also trying to weaken them in order to redirect their interests
away from politics. Ironically, though, the armed forces have been kept out of
politics only by measures that subordinate them to the government's policy
decisions, making the governments dependent on keeping the officers happy, and
making the actual use of the armed forces a dangerous strategy that is likely to
produce defeats.
Only
two of the fourteen main Arab countries--Egypt and Libya--today have rulers who
are in power because they were career military officers. (3) And even in these
two cases, the chief executives (Husni Mubarak and Muammar Qadhafi,
respectively) left active duty more than a quarter-century ago.
Two
more peripheral and less developed Arab states, Yemen and Sudan, have military
dictatorships more typical of the Middle East in the 1950s-1970s period. Sudan,
which in many ways is different from other members of the Arab League, had
military coups in
1958, 1969, 1985, and 1989. The current leader is Lieutenant General Omar Hasan
Ahmad al-Bashir and the government portrays itself as Islamist. Yemen had its
latest coup in 1979 and is led by Ali Abdallah Salah, who promoted himself to
field marshal. He is a Ba'thist with strong pro-Iraq sympathies. Both of these
countries have turbulent histories and a lack of alternative civilian political
institutions relative to other Arab states.
In
order to ensure that the military did not try to seize power, Arab governments
followed several policies. There were two general ways, by which politicians
sought to win the armed forces' backing: through material incentives for
individuals and for the collective military institution:
--Officers
are kept happy by high pay and special privileges. These benefits have included
many varieties. In Syria, they can be said to include the right to smuggling and
other illicit profits deriving from Damascus's control over Lebanon. Special
housing is another perquisite commonly seen.
Of
course, while such privileges inflate budgets, the wage rates (especially for
enlisted men) are relatively low. If economies were booming and a large middle
class being created, professionals and hi-tech employees would be earning more
than soldiers, creating problems of morale and retention. These problems exist
especially in Israel. (4)
Arab military systems are still largely geared to recruiting and retaining less-educated, poorer people from the sectors most loyal to the regime. In many Arab states, military careers are still relatively lucrative compared to the other options open to rural and poorer people who can qualify for such jobs. Yet already urban, college-educated young people are reluctant to enter the armed forces. As time goes on, Arab militaries will have a harder time in keeping up with the growing importance of hi-technology, advanced communications, and other new features of warfare requiring highly trained elite personnel as well as innovation and flexibility.
This
problem already exists in the Gulf Arab monarchies, where easier high-paying
jobs are available, but is solved by employing foreign mercenary soldiers to
protect them. These countries have also tried to manage their manpower shortages
by cooperating through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), though efforts to
develop a joint military force have had only limited success. (5)
--The armed services have been given high proportions of national
budgets, thus detracting from development and social spending, in order to
ensure the military's loyalty.
That
point, while obvious, may be often missed by Western observers who expect that
the prospect of obtaining an economic "peace dividend" is an incentive
for ending regional conflicts. Given their importance for maintaining domestic
stability, as well as the threats from neighbors faced by every state, military
budgets are unlikely to decline. A purely "rational" argument based on
economics will not appeal to leaders who know they need a strong and happy
military to survive.
Expensive
weapons' purchases are often undertaken based on the military commanders'
preference rather than on the nation's need for these specific arms or the armed
forces' ability to maintain them. Again, the demand for top-of-the-line weapons
is important for ruler's egos, national prestige, and the deterrence of regional
threats, yet these rationales, too, are often responses to the desires or
decisions of military commanders.(6) Turkey
has a similar situation since generals there can interfere in the budget process
to ensure their demands are met. (7)
Nevertheless,
as military budgets and the costs of specific weapons' systems climb higher,
governments are forced to apply the brakes on spending. This situation has
already been seen in such countries as Syria and Turkey. The need to obtain
financing for weapons' purchases can also affect foreign policy. For example,
Syria portrays itself as a frontline state battling Israel in order to seek
money from Gulf Arab monarchies. Iraq used a similar approach in defining itself
as the Arab world's defender against Iran.
In
the case of the Gulf Arab monarchies, another motive for huge arms purchases
from the United States is to create additional links to make certain that
country will play the role of a protector for the regimes. As a result of
seeking prestige and protection, however, civilian and military leaders often
waste huge amounts of money without creating a more effective military
establishment. For example, the United Arab Emirates, buys advanced planes for
which it does not have pilots or even, perhaps, suitable runways.
Governments
employ six other successful methods designed to weaken and divide the armed
forces' ability to threaten the government. These policies also, however, damage
the military's ability to fight external adversaries:
--Multiple
military branches and intelligence services are maintained to cancel each other
out in terms of power and influence. This also leads to wasted resources and
poor coordination among forces. It also corrupts the intelligence-gathering
process, since a premium is put on information that pleases rulers and
discredits rivals rather than on accurate data. A lot of the intelligence effort
goes to gather information on the military itself, including officers' attitudes
and any dissent that might exist in the ranks.
Asked why he needed so many security forces for his Palestinian Authority
(PA), Yasir Arafat replied: "The Syrians have 14, the Egyptians have 12. I
only have 6 to protect me." (8) Actually, he had as many as 12 different
military agencies. These forces sometimes feuded and even fought among
themselves.
For example, in 1998, Military Intelligence, led by Musa Arafat, a
relative of Yasir Arafat, raided an office of the Tanzim, Fatah's armed militia
headed by Marwan Barghuti, Fatah's leader in the West Bank. Barghuti then led a
march on the Military Intelligence's headquarters in Ramallah in which Musa
Arafat's men opened fire and killed one youth, nephew of a Palestinian Authority
cabinet minister. Barghuti's men then issued a leaflet stating: "Musa
Arafat and his dogs suck Palestinian blood by dealing with stolen cars,
whorehouses, and selling weapons. They prefer to be Israeli prostitutes, working
here as the Israeli intelligence arm to separate the Palestinian leadership and
the Palestinian people." (9)
During the fighting against Israel in the intifada that began in 2000,
different forces refused to share ammunition and supplies. (10) In doing so,
they were not flouting Arafat's instructions but fulfilling the divide-and-rule
structure that he had deliberately created to forestall future coup
possibilities even before a state was established. Of course, fully independent
states created more order and discipline among their various forces but the
basic principle of using multiple forces to enhance control remained the same.
In
Arab countries, these units have overlapping responsibilities, spy on each
other, and have no ability to coordinate among themselves. They are, then,
deliberately put into competition with each other. While Arafat plays off
different forces as more or less equal, in Arab states and Iran they form a
hierarchy ranging from more apolitical and multi-ethnic regular units to elite
forces more tied to the regime through communal and ethnic interests. To ensure
this support, the elite groups are more dosed with ideology, as well as favored
with more privileges. The concept is to make sure the special units and their
officers feel their fate is closely linked to the regime's survival.
In
Iran, aside from the regular military, there is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps and the Basij militia, both ideologically reliable and loyal to the
regime, or at least the hardline faction. Given internal Iranian conflicts,
these latter two forces are also in a sense a party militia that could be used
in a factional civil war. (11)
Saudi
Arabia has both its regular forces and the tribal-based "White Army."
A special feature of the elite units is that they are more likely to be used in
quelling internal unrest since they can be considered reliable against
anti-regime rebels who may come from a different religious, ethnic, and
geographical background.
Within
Iraq, this multi-force system is developed to its peak of complexity and
specialization. Kurds are not drafted into the regular army--though there are
pro-regime Kurdish militias. In the regular armed forces, there is a large
proportion of Shia Muslims, who can even attain the rank of general. Beyond
this, however, is a complex hierarchy. As Amatzia Baram has written:
"In
the army, as opposed to the Republican Guard (RG), support for the president is
far less staunch. Thus, the RG is placed between all army units and the capital
city, and the Special Republican Guard (SRG) is stationed inside of Baghdad, and
thus between the RG and the inner rings guarding the president. As long as the
regime looks stable, the RG, the SRG, Special Security (SS), and the Palace
Guard (or Presidential Guard,
Himayat al-Ra'is) will remain essentially loyal to [President] Saddam Husayn. If
he is removed they have too much to lose: power and prestige, higher salaries
than those of their army counterparts, and other privileges that increase in
relation to a soldier's proximity to the president." (12)
--Promotions
and assignments are based more on political loyalty than ability. This approach
can make a distinction between professionally able and politically correct
officers. Those who devote more time to proving their pro-regime credentials can
advance more quickly, and this priority can mean sacrificing military
effectiveness for meeting the regime's preferences and expectations. Such
organizational politics exist in all the world's armies, of course, but the
question is how important such considerations are in the overall mix of
decisionmaking.
At
the top, key positions may also be given to those with special connections to
the regime through family--as happens with many Saudi princes and several Iraqi
commanders--or ethnic, geographical, or tribal connections.
To
put a premium on political loyalty makes eminent political sense, of course,
since the regime's first priority is to stay in power but it also lowers the
military's quality. In the real world, less competent officers are often more
eager to portray, or pretend, ideological zeal precisely in order to ensure
their successful careers since they lack other assets for doing so. The point is
whether apolitical officers--as opposed to ones antagonistic to the
regime--suffer.
--Higher-ranking
officers are frequently rotated to avoid letting them establish strong ties of
loyalty with their troops or subordinate officers. Periodic transfers are also
common in armies throughout the world, but other armed forces want to build good
links within the officer corps and between officers and enlisted personnel. The
issue here is to what extent such relationships might be deliberately curtailed
as a matter of policy.
--Initiative
among individual officers is discouraged, a doctrine that has high costs during
battles and military campaigns. Indeed, mistrust can be encouraged, making
officers reluctant to share information. Coordination among units can be
inhibited and combined operations can be made very difficult or even impossible.
These problems are increased by cultural tendencies but may be worsened by
deliberate regime policies.
--Special
formations based on ethnic and sectarian religious membership are used as elite
forces and deployed in sensitive places, especially close to the rulers and
capital.
As
already noted above, Iraq's elite units are overwhelmingly Sunni in composition
and are recruited from tribes and areas close to President Saddam Husayn's home.
In Syria, the same practice is followed but with Alawites from the community of
the ruling Asad family.
Jordan,
in apparent contrast to other countries, has always relied on a highly
professional military without competing alternative units. But since the regular
armed forces are overwhelmingly comprised of "east bank Jordanians,"
with only very limited numbers of Palestinians permitted, it does constitute an
ethnic-communal force in its own right. Israel only drafts Jewish citizens as
well as Druze and Circassian minorities into its army. Although Muslim and
Christian Arabs are accepted as volunteers, it is perceived that the level of
loyalty and reliability that can be expected is unsatisfactory.
Certainly,
there are exceptions to such practices, notably Egypt, where religion does not
seem to be a major criterion in assignments and promotions.
Especially interesting are two other cases. Lebanon, where the country's
communal-democratic system makes a nominally multi-ethnic army a necessity, has
the least effective armed forces in the entire region. Since it is so
representative, the military is hard to use reliably against any given group.
As
a result of this problem, as well as many other factors of course, the central
government has remained weak. Ethnic militias sprang up, controlled most of the
country's territory, and fought a long civil war. Even after the fighting ended,
Hizballah, a Shia Islamist militia, continues to operate independently and even
to wage its own war against neighboring Israel.
The
other interesting exception is Turkey, a country based on a strong unitary
nationalism with a very large army based on a universal draft. Denying the
existence of a separate Kurdish national group, Turkey never made any
distinction among citizens even during the height of fighting against Kurdish
separatists.
--Officers
suspected of other political loyalties, or even excessive ambitions, are
periodically purged. All the region's armies, except Iran of course, try to keep
Islamists out of the officer corps. A failure to do so can be costly, as shown
by the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat by a small group
of soldiers at a military parade. Turkey's armed forces are so powerful and
adamant on this point that it even forced Prime Minister Erbakan, leader of the
Islamist party, to endorse the expulsion of his own supporters from the
military.
Essentially,
all of the above policies worked in preventing successful coups and even in
avoiding serious attempts at takeovers. There has not been a coup or serious
attempt to seize power by soldiers in Egypt since 1952, Syria since 1970, or
Iraq since 1968. Syria had about 8 coups during 22 years (1949-1971), while Iraq
had 3 within 10 years (1958-1968). As of the year 2000, neither had had such an
event for 30 years. It is easy to
forget that the last coup during which soldiers seized power for themselves in a
major Arab state (outside of Yemen and Sudan) were those of Asad in 1970 and
Muammar Qadhafi's coup in Libya in 1969.
The
reasons for this dramatic transformation are not hard to find. In the earlier
period, the state system had not yet stabilized and institutionalized itself.
The military was the one institution that had the cohesiveness and tools to take
power. Thereafter, the officers who took power finally learned how to keep it or
civilians discovered the same lesson. The new system made officers less eager
and able to try to seize power while also defeating any plots more effectively
before they could be well-organized.
As
a result, the armed forces found a new role as the incumbent regime's guardian
rather than as its principal challenger. Of course, this is the proper role of
the military, though in this function its political behavior may exceed that
considered appropriate in the West. In Turkey, the armed forces have staged
several coups to implement their interpretation of preserving the country's
unity and democratic system. Preserving the secular republic against Islamist
rule motivated the generals to force Prime Minister Erbakan's resignation.
A
parallel situation took place in Algeria. When it appeared certain that
Islamists would come to power through elections, the military seized power and
canceled the balloting. This action set off a bloody civil war, though the armed
forces preferred to hand control back to civilian politicians.
Of
course, a key element in successful coup avoidance is an Arab leader's personal
connection to the armed forces. Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and Syrian
President Hafiz al-Asad were commanders of their countries' air forces. King
Husayn of Jordan was a graduate of the British military academy and devoted
great personal attention to the army. Even some civilian leaders, like Saddam
Husayn and Yasir Arafat, frequently appear in uniform.
As
for the next generation, King Abdallah was an officer who was given command of
Jordan's important special forces' units. If he had not become king at such a
young age he would have continued in his military career. An interesting
contrast that illustrates the same point is Syrian ruler Bashar al-Asad. An eye
doctor with no military background, he was quickly made an officer and rapidly
promoted after it became clear that he would succeed his father. (13)
Gulf
Arab monarchies have developed a number of control mechanisms to ensure that the
armed forces remain servants of the state. One key measure is to have members of
the ruling family hold high military ranks and control key units. (14)
Of course, many Arab leaders are civilian politicians. In the Gulf Arab
monarchies, except for Saudi Arabia, the governments depoliticize the militaries
by hiring foreign mercenaries. While this raises a theoretical problem of their
loyalty and willingness to fight, in practice the officers stay out of local
politics. An excellent example is the fact that Gulf Arab monarchies preferred
the presence of non-Arab and even non-Muslim cadre to that of Egyptian and
Syrian units, even when encouraged to adopt such a solution after the 1991
Kuwait war. Having even allied Arab, Muslim forces on their soil was considered
far more dangerous in political terms than any advantage that might be gained
regarding external security.
Finally, there are some important, negative social and cultural factors
that damage the capability of Arab armies. These are hard to measure and
controversial to enumerate, as well as being intensified by some of the
political factors identified above. They might include excessively rigid
hierarchies, reluctance to take initiative.
An American army officer with extensive experience as an advisor to Arab
armies, Norvell De Atkine, has concluded:
"Until Arab politics begin to change at
fundamental levels, Arab armies, whatever the courage or proficiency of
individual officers and men, are unlikely to acquire the range of qualities
which modern fighting forces require for success on the battlefield. For these
qualities depend on inculcating respect, trust, and openness among the members
of the armed forces at all levels, and this is the marching music of modern
warfare that Arab armies, no matter how much they emulate the corresponding
steps, do not want to hear." (15)
THE ARMED FORCES AND
INTERNAL CONTROL
For
Middle East governments, the armed forces play an important role in maintaining
internal security. The requirements of this political objective have taken many
forms and varied strategies.
On
the political level, it should be noted that the armed forces' loyalties lie
with the regime more than with the general population, a democratic system, or
the nation as an abstraction. The main exceptions here are Turkey, where the
military sees itself as the guardian of the republic, and Israel. Of course, it
should be emphasized that the program of most Arab governments over decades was
designed precisely to break any such linkages. The only time that military
formations are wedded to ideology is when they have been formed by regimes for
precisely that purpose: for example, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps to support radical Islamic rule and the Iraqi Republican Guard to support
Ba'thist rule.
In
general, outside of Iran (and perhaps even in Iran's own regular army),
professional military formations do not seem sympathetic to radical Islamist
views. Does this indicate some inevitable orientation? To some extent, this may
be due to tradition. In the 1950s, of course, the revolutionary officers in
various countries were always tied to secularist views. Moreover, the armed
forces had more contact with foreign ideas and personnel than virtually any
other institution in Middle East countries. Perhaps the pragmatic and patriotic
ethos of the professional militaries discouraged traditional piety.
Unquestionably, too, Islamists and strong religious believers were attracted to
other professions, while frequent purges in many armies kept their numbers
limited.
Even
Israel's army was traditionally dominated by secularists. Observant Jews are now
becoming a more important factor than ever before but are still quite limited in
number in the higher ranks. Turkey's armed forces are explicitly secular,
viewing that as one of the Turkish republic's most important values. Israel and
Turkey are also relatively unique in explicitly stressing the military's role in
national integration: bringing people from different areas, backgrounds, and
social levels together to forge them into a single nation. These two countries
have a very broad draft policy to put a relatively large proportion of their
citizens through some experience of military service.
Armed
forces may also play an important socio-economic role. They absorb excess labor,
which might otherwise be unemployed and thus politically disruptive. Egypt seems
to fit this situation. As noted above, though, as economies develop the armed
forces can be a drain on the workforce, removing people from potentially
productive labor. The armed forces can also be used for development projects,
and Egypt also furnishes a good example in this respect. (16)
To
some extent, the military can be said to have lost its internal control function
to security forces. At the same time, however, regular militaries often prefer
such a division of labor, preferring not to be involved in conflicts which, they
argue, detract from their prime function of protecting against external enemies.
Such internal security problems, officers argue, require operations for which
they are neither equipped nor trained. Among
other reasons that military forces don't like to engage in such activities, is
the danger of creating friction between the armed forces and the citizens,
opening up divisions in their own ranks, and detracting from training.
While
each situation is quite different, the highest-level internal conflicts in which
Middle Eastern militaries have participated include the following:
Algeria:
a bloody, full-scale civil war against Islamists has been fought since 1992,
after the army intervened to cancel the second round of elections that would
have been won by that opposition group. The armed forces were easily able to
prevent the rebels from taking power and apparently made some progress in battle
against them. But the military also seemed to lack any strategy for achieving
victory. During this period, the army had strong influence over the civilian
leaders though it did not always determine their policies.
Egypt:
A low-level military force, used mostly for guard duty, revolted in 1986 over
pay and conditions but was put down by the armed forces within a few days.
Iran:
The regular army crumbled during the 1978-1979 revolution due to soldiers'
refusal to fire on civilian revolutionaries, some dissension in its lower ranks,
demoralization at the shah's uncertain strategy, and key officers' conclusions
that the Islamist opposition was going to win.
This outcome--though certainly by no means attributable only to the
military's behavior--was the greatest failure of any Middle Eastern military to
maintain internal security in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Iraq:
The army fought wars against Kurdish separatists in their mountain strongholds
during the 1960s and 1970s which resulted in enough of a stalemate to provide
the government with a victory. Following the 1991 defeat in Kuwait, the armed
forces put down Shia and Kurdish rebellions with great bloodshed, though
international intervention prevented them from occupying the Kurdish-populated
areas of northern Iraq. (17)
Israel:
Most of the "internal" activities of Israel's army were conducted not
within the country's own borders (where police units have jurisdiction) but in
the areas captured during the 1967 war--the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The army
has been used to counter specific terrorist operations within Israel, for
example hostage-taking incidents, from the late 1960s onward and especially
during the 1970s. It was used extensively during the first (1987-1990) and
second (2000- ) Palestinian intifadas. These activities involved tactics and
restraints quite different from conventional war. The army also governed the
West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1967 to 1994, and the areas retained by Israel,
which were gradually reduced during the post-Oslo agreement peace process. (18)
Jordan:
In 1970-1971, the Jordanian army fought and defeated PLO forces after some
elements in the Palestinian organization became increasingly involved in a bid
to overthrow King Hussein. The armed forces performed very effectively and won a
total victory.
Lebanon:
The most notable point about Lebanon's army is its lack of involvement in
internal security matters. It was not involved in the civil war of the 1970s and
1980s, fought by ethnic-communal militias, and the government even refused to
deploy it up to the border after Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in the
year 2000. The army did play a role, however, in policing the post-civil war
situation, though its ability to act was always minimized by the more powerful
Syrian military presence and the remaining militias.
Sudan:
Since the 1970s, and especially since 1983, the army has been periodically
involved in fighting secessionist rebels in the south led by a former officer,
John Garang, a member of the Dinka tribe and leader of the Sudanese People's
Liberation Army (SPLA). The army has never been able to defeat the rebellion and
there has been a complex mix of fighting and truces during this period.
Syria: After the army ceased
seeking direct state power, following Asad's coup of 1970-1971, its place in
maintaining internal security was largely taken by Ba'th party and Alawi ethnic
forces especially loyal to the regime. The most significant internal security
operations included the war against Islamist rebels in the 1970s which
culminated in the massive killings in the city of Hama in 1982 that crushed any
armed opposition.
Turkey:
The longest continuous and largest-scale internal security operations by regular
armed forces was the Turkish struggle with Kurdish separatists of the Kurdish
Workers Party (PKK) during the 1980s and 1990s. The fighting involved the
country's southeast provinces, terrorist operations in Turkish cities, and
Turkish military incursions into northern Iraq. While fought originally by the
gendarmerie, the army became increasingly involved over time in using
counter-guerrilla warfare techniques. Aided by the capture of the PKK's leader
and his own call--under threat of a death sentence--to end the rebellion,
Turkish forces had achieved victory by 2000.
Yemen:
The country has a relatively "traditional" military regime ruled by a
career officer, Field Marshal Ali Abdallah Salah, since 1979. Other members of
the government are also officers and one of them, the minister of interior,
controls a 50,000-man security force. The Yemeni army seized control of South
Yemen in the 1990s--which could be viewed as power projection abroad or as the
reunification of the country--and has fought border skirmishes with Saudi Arabia
and Eritrea. Aside from the regular army, there are also tribal levies. (19)
Several
basic conclusions can be drawn from this inventory of diverse events and
operations:
Internal
security forces are increasingly important. In part, this is due to the
effort to depoliticize the army. But officers generally support their exclusion
from having to deal with such problems, preferring to focus on external threats
and more conventional military operations.
Regular
armies can fight with a large degree of success in situations of ethnic-national
(as in Iraq, Turkey and Israel) and Islamist (Algeria) rebellions, though
only political solutions can end these conflicts.
In
contrast to other regional states, the armed forces continue to play a full
political role in Sudan and Yemen. In Algeria and Turkey situations have
developed in which the military feels free to intervene temporarily as guardian
of the state (and especially secularism), though returning power to civilians as
quickly as possible.
The
two great internal security failures of regular militaries were in Iran and
Lebanon, though political constraints played an important factor in each case.
In
general, then, armed forces remain reliable instruments for maintaining internal
regime authority though they do not necessarily prefer this role. They also lack
the training and equipment to perform such tasks.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND POWER PROJECTION
While
the armed forces have important duties regarding the preservation of regime
stability and internal control, their main job is supposed to be the care of
national defense and power projection. Regarding this task, the failure of Arab
and Iranian armies is an important factor in the modern Middle East's history.
Most
obviously, Arab armies were unable to destroy Israel or even to inflict defeats
on that country during the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1969-70 (war of attrition),
1973, or 1982 (Lebanon). While the Egyptian army can be said to have contributed
to that state's regaining of the Sinai peninsula through its successes in the
early part of the 1973 war, this is about the sole gain that can be cited during
the five decades of Arab-Israeli conflict. In power projection terms, the Arab
states failed to eliminate, dominate, defeat, or force significant concessions
from Israel.
A
second area of general failure in Arab power projection was the efforts to use
military force to promote Pan-Arab nationalist objectives or, to put it another
way, to ensure one Arab state's regional hegemony and absorption of neighbors.
Among these cases can be listed Egypt's failed intervention in the Yemen civil
war and unsuccessful effort to stop Syria from seceding from the United Arab
Republic (1961); Syria's move (canceled due to Israeli threats) toward
intervening in Jordan during the Jordan-PLO war of 1970; and Iraq's wars against
Iran (1980-1988) and Kuwait (1990-1991). The story of the Iraqi army shows an
especially impressive contrast between a military that was highly successful in
preserving the regime and remarkably unsuccessful in expanding its power through
warfare. (20)
There
are three cases, however, where such efforts can be said to have succeeded:
Syria's domination of Lebanon from the mid-1970s on through a 30,000-soldier
expeditionary force; Morocco's successful expansion into the former Spanish
Sahara, defeating a local insurgency; and Yemen's annexation of South Yemen.
In
Iran's case, the armed forces were able to repel an Iraqi invasion but not to
defeat and destroy the Baghdad regime. Otherwise, though, the Iranian leaders
have preferred to rely on more indirect efforts--including propaganda,
terrorism, and development of surrogate client groups--to spread the influence
of their state and ideology. Such groups have included Hizballah, Hamas, Islamic
Jihad, various organizations in the Persian Gulf, and also the direct covert
operations of Iranian intelligence.
Israel
can certainly be considered the most successful country in using power
projection, though with two important reservations. First, Israeli objectives
were always limited--far more so than most Arabs perceived them--and
defense-oriented. These goals included: preserving the state's existence, trying
to prevent neighboring countries from letting their territory be used to launch
third-party attacks on Israel, damaging the infrastructure of
terrorist/guerrilla groups operating from other countries against Israel, and
pressuring neighboring states to make peace or at least deter them from engaging
in war. Another goal was to stop or slow down the development of nuclear weapons
by Iraq, achieved in the 1981 raid on the Osirak reactor.
Within
this context, Israel's failures must be seen as more modest. Perhaps the most
prominent would be the inability to defeat Hizballah through Israeli operations
and support for surrogate forces in south Lebanon. From the standpoint of
deterring and reducing attacks on Israeli territory during the 1982-2000 period,
though, Israel's military was able to achieve a far better result than had
existed during the 1971-1982 period.
One
possible lesson from all of these events is that if conventional war and direct
engagement by national militaries seems too costly or unproductive, governments
have turned to other means for projecting power. These instruments can include
subversion, support for surrogate forces, terrorism, diplomatic solutions, civil
insurrections (notably the two Palestinian intifadas), the development of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and seeking the help of external great powers
to deter or fight wars. These last two factors will be discussed separately
below.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
At
first glance, the efforts of various countries to obtain WMD equipment
(missiles, nuclear, chemical and biological arms) seem to enhance the strength
of Middle East regular armed forces. But it should be remembered that
governments control such weapons very closely and give them only to special
military formations deemed especially reliable and may view them as an
alternative to using their regular armed forces.
In
part, too, obtaining these weapons are attempts to overcome a perceived deadlock
in the balance of power that reduces the power projection and deterrence of Arab
and Iranian militaries. Clearly, WMD armaments add a new dimension to the
doctrine and strategy of Middle East armed forces. These weapons have already
been used in the Iran-Iraq war--with both sides firing missiles at the others'
cities and using, especially in Iraq's case, chemical weapons with great
effectiveness in battlefield situations. Iraq also fired missiles at Saudi
Arabia and Israel during the 1991 Kuwait war. Iran is developing missiles and
nuclear warheads under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
forces. Israel has long had missile and nuclear capability but these weapons
have had little effect on its doctrine and military structure.
It
should be emphasized, of course, that even the presence of WMD in the Middle
East would not supplant or render irrelevant the existing regular armies. On the
contrary, if such armaments break the existing deterrence deadlock they could
make the armed forces a more important tool for power projection. (21)
EXTRA-REGIONAL SOURCES OF TRAINING AND SUPPLY
Since
no Middle Eastern military can supply all the arms and equipment it needs,
finding a source for weapons and materiel is an important defining factor which
has major political implications. In 1955, when Nasser's Egypt turned to Soviet
supplies, this was a major turning point in the region's history, as was Egypt's
break with the USSR in the early 1970s and its move to the American camp in the
late 1970s. The same can be said for Israel's loss of French supplies in 1967
and its switch to U.S. equipment in the 1970s, or with Iran's break with U.S.
weapons necessitated by the 1979 Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis.
In
addition to the weaponry used by the armed forces, the outside supplier has
influence regarding training, doctrine, and the actual use of military force.
Europe tried to pressure Turkey regarding Kurdish issues by denying it certain
types of equipment imports. The U.S. boycott of Iran and, even more
significantly, the international sanctions against Iraq following the 1991
Kuwait war, have profound effects on the relevant armed forces' competence and
style.
By
the 1970s, the United States and the USSR were the only two powers able to
supply all of a Middle Eastern military's import needs. By 1990, the Soviet
Union had largely dropped out of the picture, though Russia, its successor
state, has returned to some extent. The end of the Cold War with the United
States victorious penalized countries like Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, that
depended on Soviet weaponry.(22) The technological gap between the two main
suppliers could also be expected to grow over time, with American equipment
becoming increasingly superior to Russian armaments. There are important
implications for an armed force's political stand in this situation, since the
officer corps is likely to favor maintaining good relations with the country
that is its chief arms' supplier.
To
cite some examples of this factor, a U.S.-supplied Middle Eastern military today
is less likely to stage a coup against a pro-U.S. government. Moreover, such an
army would be less likely to attack Israel, since this would lead to the loss of
U.S. spare parts. The loss of Soviet equipment and Russia's unwillingness to
provide arms on credit has crippled the capacity of the Syrian military. More
broadly, the loss of Soviet aid, low prices, and reliable supplies greatly
weakened the armed forces--and hence the power projection capabilities--of
Syria, Libya, and Iraq.
The
exception to the U.S. monopoly is most glaring in the area of WMD supply.
Countries like Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria can turn to alternative sources of
arms and technology, notably China, North Korea and Russia. This situation also
creates new policy dynamics for the armed forces of those Middle Eastern states.
Since this WMD equipment is obtained without any political restraints, such arms
might be more likely used, if not as weapons at least as strategic leverage for
power projection. (23)
CONCLUSIONS
The
decline in the Middle East armed forces' tendency to seize power is not
irreversible but is likely to remain the predominant trend. No rule can ignore,
however, the views of his generals and the institutional interests of the armed
forces. The militaries of various countries have a major role in terms of
advising the government, setting budget priorities, and maintaining internal
order.
Another
strong but not inevitable tendency is the current deadlock among states in terms
of deterrence and the lack of an extra-regional sponsor encouraging the use of
force in international disputes. Given the ineffectiveness of conventional armed
forces for power projection, alternative military means (surrogates, terrorism,
WMD, subversion, etc.) remain attractive.
Certain
structural flaws in regional--especially Arab--military establishments are also
important factors in limiting their political role and utility. The growing
importance of high technology, rapid communications, and flexibility in military
strategy tend to play up the weaknesses of Arab and Iranian armed forces.
Politicization
usually undermines professionalism. But government efforts to depoliticize the
armed forces--often by bringing politicization into their ranks--can have the
same effect. This is the paradox of Middle East states historically, and its
legacy today. At the same time, governments can choose to accept the military's
internal autonomy--as long as it does not impinge on political matters--as a
solution to this problem.
This
chapter's analysis is not meant to imply that the Middle East armed forces are
unimportant factors in the region's politics. On the contrary, in that part of
the world where war and conflict is most likely--and most often
evidenced--military power is relatively more important than anywhere else in the
world. But in a place where, to cite the Chinese revolutionary leader Mao
Zedong, political power once directly grew out of the barrel of a gun, today the
region's countries embody a situation in which politics are definitely in
command.
NOTES
1. For an analysis of the social and institutional management techniques
of such regimes, see Barry Rubin, Modern Dictators: Third World Coupmakers,
Strongmen, and Populist Tyrants (NY, 1987).
2. For a discussion of the region's overall issues,
conflicts, and balance of forces, see Barry Rubin, "The
Geopolitics of Middle East Conflict and Crisis"
Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal,
Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1998).
3. Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and Jordan. King
Abdallah of Jordan was a career military officer but rules, of course, as heir
of his father.
4. See Stuart Cohen, "Portrait of the New
Israeli Soldier," Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)
Journal, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1997). To view this and other MERIA Journal
articles listed below, see <http://meria.biu.ac.il>.
See
also Stuart Cohen, "The Israel Defense Force (IDF): Continuity and
Change," Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney, Armed Forces in the Middle East
(London, 2001).
5. Turki al-Hamad, "Will
Gulf Monarchies Work together?"
Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal,
Vol. 1 No. 2 (May 1997).
6. These were factors, for example, in the military
overspending of the Shah's regime that was one factor contributing to its fall.
See Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions (NY, 1980).
7. Gencer Ozcan, "The Turkish Foreign
Policymaking Process and the Influence of the Military," in Barry Rubin and
Kemal Kirisci, Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multi-Regional Power
(Boulder, Co., 2001).
8. Shiham Bahatia, "Arafat's Torturer's Shock
Palestinians" Guardian Weekly, September 24, 1995.
9. Palestine Report, October 30, 1998; Ha'aretz,
December 22, 1998.
10. Gal Luft, The Palestinian Armed Forces,"
MERIA Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, (June 1999); "Palestinian Military
Performance and the 2000," in MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December
2000) and his chapter in Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney, Armed Forces in the
Middle East (London, 2001).
11. Darius Bazargan, "Iran: Politics, The
Military and Gulf Security," MERIA Journal, Vol. 1 No. 3 (September
1997).
12. Amatzia Baram, "Saddam Husayn Between His
Power Base and the Community," in Middle East Review of International
Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 2000).
13. Eyal Zisser, "Decisionmaking
in Asad's Syria" Middle East Review of International
Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 1998).
14. Daniel L. Byman and Jerrold D. Green, "The
Enigma of Political Stability in the Persian Gulf Monarchies," Middle East Review of International Affairs
(MERIA) Journal, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1999), and Sean Foley,
"The UAE: Political Issues and Security Dilemmas,"
Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal,
Vol. 3, No 1 (February 1999).
15. Norvell de Atkine, "Why Arabs
Lose Wars," Middle
East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal,
Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) and Middle East Quarterly, December
1999.
16. See Hillel Frisch's chapter in Barry Rubin and
Thomas Keaney, Armed Forces in the Middle East (London, 2001).
17. The best account of the Iraqi military's role in
putting down the 1991 revolts is in Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War,
Tyranny, and Uprising in the Arab World (NY, 1994).
18. It could be easily argued that the Israeli
military's involvement in the West Bank and Gaza fit better under the power
projection category. The discussion of these issues under the section on
internal security is not meant to make any political point but seems more
logical since the armed forces had already captured these territories and they
were under Israeli administration for a protracted period of time.
19. Thanks to Eric Watkins for help on these points.
20. For an evaluation of the contemporary Iraqi
armed forces, see Kenneth M. Pollack, "Current
Iraqi Military Capabilities"
Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) News
1998 No. 4 (February 1998).
21. George Tenet, "Weapons
of Mass Destruction: A New Dimension in U.S. Middle East Policy"
Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal,
Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 2000).
22. For a discussion of U.S. military capabilities
in the region, see Michael Eisenstadt, "U.S. Military Capabilities in the
Post-Cold War Era: Implications for Middle East Allies," Middle East
Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December
1998).
23. See, for example, Bates Gill, "Chinese Arms
Exports to Iran," Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)
Journal, Vol. 2 No. 2 (May 1998); Barry Rubin, North Korea's Threat to
the Middle East and the Middle East's Threat to Asia, BESA Center for
Strategic Studies monograph, (Tel Aviv, 1997); Barry Rubin, "China's Middle
East Strategy," Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)
Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 1999); Robert O. Freedman, "Russia and
the Middle East: The Primakov Era," Middle East Review of International
Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 1998); Robert O. Freedman,
"Russian-Iranian Relations in the 1990s," Middle East Review of
International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 2000).
*Barry
Rubin is deputy director of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies and editor of
the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His recent
books include The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to
State-Building, (Cambridge, Ma., 1999); Revolution Until Victory: The
Politics and History of the PLO, (Cambridge, Ma., 1994); Turkey in World
Politics: An Emerging Multi-Regional Power (Boulder, Co., 2001); and America
and Its Allies (London, 2000).
This article is based on a
presentation made at the conference "Armed Forces in the Middle East:
Politics and Strategy," held on November 15-16, 2000. The conference was
sponsored by the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International
Studies (SAIS) Foreign Policy Institute, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic
Studies, and the Bar-Ilan University Department of Political Studies. This
article will also appear as a chapter in an upcoming book Barry Rubin and Tom
Keaney (eds.) Armed Forces in the Middle East (Frank Cass, upcoming).