Volume 4, No. 4 - December 2000
Volume 4, No. 4 - December 2000
By Alan Dowty
Editor's
Summary: Japan is dependent on
Middle East oil and is one of the world's strongest economies. Yet its political
involvement in the Middle East has been quite limited. There are signs though
that Japan is becoming more active in the region. This article traces the
history of Japan's economic and political role in the region, including the
effect of Japanese perceptions and the effects on this policy of the close
U.S.-Japan relationship.
There has been a vast
disparity between Japan's heavy dependence on the Middle East and the low level
of its involvement in that region. This situation has prevailed despite the fact
that, apart from its own East Asian neighborhood and arguably its ties with the
United States--no other region has such an obvious impact on the well-being,
prosperity, and even basic security of Japan. There are signs, though, that
Japan's historic policy toward the region is now changing.
As the world's single largest
oil importer, Japan is the "pivotal customer" in a Middle
East-dominated world oil market. Indeed, the shift to an oil-based economy is
credited by many as literally, fueling the Japanese economic miracle of the last
half-century.(1) In comparison to the United States and most other Western
countries, Japan "remains extraordinarily susceptible to serious
disruptions in supply or increase in the price of raw materials."(2)
Following the shock of the 1973 oil crisis, Japan managed by 1986 to reduce its
dependence on oil for primary energy from 77.4 percent to 56.6 percent. In the
period since then, however, its dependence has remained at the same level (for
example, at 56.1 percent in 1995).
Furthermore, the percentage of
this imported oil that comes from the volatile Middle East has hardly changed
since the first oil crisis: 77.5 percent in 1973 and 77.2 percent in 1994. The
bottom line is that while the United States depended on Middle Eastern oil for
only 4.7 percent of its primary energy needs in 1996, the figure for Japan was
41.4 percent.(3) As a result, the Middle East is the one area of the world with
which Japan runs a chronic and severe negative trade balance. In short,
"Japan has more to gain from peace and stability in the [Middle East]
region than any other industrial country."(4)
Yet the level of Japanese
involvement in the Middle East has not reflected this vulnerability. Of course
Japan's renunciation of military force or arms sales in its foreign policy poses
a serious constraint in an area of the world where the use of force has been all
too frequent and arms sales have been a primary instrument of influence. But
Japan has also been a marginal player in the political and diplomatic arenas.
Only in the 1990s, with the
development of multilateral channels linked to the Arab-Israeli peace process,
has Japan assumed a formal role in negotiations designed to ensure regional
stability. The record is so thin that in many accounts of Japanese diplomacy in
the Middle East the list of official visits back and forth provides much or most
of the content.(5) Even in economic statecraft, Japan's level of activity has
lagged well behind what might be predicted from a reading of its economic stake
in the area.
Foreign developmental
assistance has become Japan's primary instrument of statecraft. Yet foreign aid
to the Middle East, after peaking at 24.5 percent of Japan's total overseas
developmental assistance budget in 1977, declined to around 10 percent in the
1980s and to 6.8 percent in 1995--putting the Middle East behind Africa and
Latin America in Japan's foreign aid priorities.(6) To this must be added
Japan's low level of investment in the Middle East, relative to the objective
importance of the area and levels of investment elsewhere, despite a concerted
effort after the 1970s oil scares to increase the Japanese economic presence in
the area.(7)
Even the level of public and
scholarly interest falls short of what objective interests would seem to
dictate. While a Middle East Institute was founded by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in 1956, the Japanese Association of Middle East Studies and its
publication Annals appeared only in 1985. The first book on Japanese foreign
policy toward the Middle East, written by a Japanese-American political
scientist, was published only in 1984.(8)
What accounts for this glaring
disproportion between the importance of the Middle East to Japan and what
appears, at least at first glance, to be the modest attention accorded to the
area in both policy and scholarly interest? Obviously the lack of any background
of historic ties or interest in the Middle East in the pre-oil period is a
factor, though it has been pointed out that already in the 1930s Japan's
prominence in the Middle East textile market gave some expression to the reality
of objective interests that were beginning to emerge.(9) Also, there are in
Japan no domestic pressure groups like those in Western nations that serve to
intensify public debate on Middle East issues and raise their visibility.
In addition, the tendency to
frame foreign policy questions in terms of economic interests leads to
underestimatng the challenges of relations with the Middle East, an area where
critical economic issues cannot be separated so easily from deeper social,
political, and strategic questions. A former Japanese diplomat recounts that
during the Iran hostage crisis a Japanese businessman asked bitterly: "Why
is it that we who have had nothing to do with the causes of the Iranian
Revolution, nothing to do historically with the Arab-Israel conflict, and
nothing to do with American interests in Iran, have to suffer this?"
This tendency to abstract economic relations from their context was, the
diplomat notes, "quite natural for the Japanese of that time."(10)
One must also consider the
general features of Japan's approach to the world and the distinctively Japanese
style in foreign policy. Both Japanese and non-Japanese scholars comment often
on a certain insularity in Japanese culture and on the closed nature of Japanese
society; without attempting to probe this subject in depth here, it is still
possible to observe that the attention paid to most areas of the world, beyond
the immediate East Asian neighborhood, has been relatively sparse until recent
years.(11) The legacy of World War Two and an anti-military constitution further
encouraged a style of foreign policy that was reticent and reactive rather than
assertive, often being expressed in the lowest-common-denominator language of
simple opposition to the use of force and promotion of diplomatic solutions to
conflicts.(12) Also, as Yasumasa Kuroda points out, "Japanese approach the
world in a syncretic way," seeking conciliation rather than confrontation
with all parties and trying to avoid offense to any of them; it is therefore
instinctive to avoid taking sides in distant regional conflicts even when the
tactical advantages of an active diplomacy push in that direction.(13)
Most or all of these factors
may be relevant, but clearly no explanation of Japanese policy, in the Middle
East or elsewhere, is complete without reference to the central U.S.-Japanese
relationship. Ties with the United States appear to be the most important key to
understanding both past Japanese passivity in the Middle East and recent changes
in this stance. For Japan, the U.S. alliance imposes serious constraints on
independent action in the Middle East, but at the same time it provides Japan
with the luxury of foregoing such action.
The basic interests of Japan
and the United States in the Middle East are, for the most part, overlapping.
These common interests are, in the words of a former Japanese Ambassador to the
United States, "to ease the political volatility in the region, achieve
political stability, maintain oil supplies to Western countries, and promote
economic development in the region."(14) Apart from the general interest
that Japan has, therefore, in avoiding unnecessary disruptions in its overall
relationship with the United States, it also has limited grounds for differing
with the basic thrust of U.S. policy in the Middle East. The general closeness
of U.S.-Japanese coordination in the region is sometimes overlooked in the
occasional contretemps over minor differences. In December 1988, for example,
Japanese Foreign Minister Sohsuke Uno held his first official meeting with a
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) representative less than eight hours
after the United States had announced its decision to open a dialogue with the
PLO. It has also been noted that during the 1980s, when Japan was in theory
following a declaratory policy somewhat more sympathetic to the Arab side of
conflict than that of the United States, its voting record on Arab-Israeli
issues in the United Nations actually moved closer to the U.S.
position--apparently in order to offset some of the friction that arose during
this period over trade issues.(15)
Since the United States has
taken the lead in maintaining overall stability and security in the Middle East,
Japan is freer, than would otherwise be the case, to pursue more specific
interests of its own or to simply sit on the sidelines. As dependent as Japan
may be on a flow of oil from the region, it knows that the United States is
committed to the same goal and is willing, as in the Gulf War, to bring its
power to bear for that end. The "luxury" that Japan enjoys, therefore,
is one of incurring relatively low costs for the maintenance of Middle East
stability by letting the United States indulge its propensity to run the entire
show. This has, of course, led some observers to characterize Japan as a
"free rider" on Middle East security: a nation enjoying the benefits
of stability in the area while contributing relatively little to the costs.
There is sometimes a general feeling in the United States that "her allies
have parochial perspectives and are willing to take a security 'free ride' but
unwilling to associate with their major ally beyond their immediate
interests."(16)
As this indicates, there
remain real differences in the interests and perspectives of the two parties,
despite a general congruence. Japan's interest in the Middle East is much more
narrowly focused and Japan's ability to apply pressure or coercion is much more
limited. The United States, as a superpower, enjoys latitude to pursue a variety
of policies that may displease or antagonize regional actors, and can exert its
influence through a variety of instruments.(17) Consequently there will be a
natural tendency for Japan, at least during certain difficult passages, to seek
a measure of dissociation from U.S. policy and to pursue its own priorities
through separate bilateral arrangements with states willing to strike deals. The
constant dilemma of Japanese policy, therefore, is how to differentiate itself
from the United States in certain specific instances while still remaining
within, and contributing to, the overall security umbrella maintained
principally by the United States.
THE OIL SHOCKS
One can detect, therefore,
three layers in Japanese Middle Eastern policy: First, there is the
"lowest-common-denominator" positions favoring peace and neutrality
that accord with Japan's perception of itself in the world and its role as a
member of the United Nations. Second, Japan identifies with the U.S.-led effort
to maintain Middle East stability, in view of Japan's enormous dependence on an
uninterrupted flow of oil. Finally, there are occasional efforts to stake out an
independent Japanese role, at least in specific instances where an overly close
identification with U.S. policy seems to put Japanese interests at risk. This
third category of policy responses can be subdivided into short-term measures
designed to meet an immediate interest or need, or long-term policies in which
Japan makes its own, distinctive, contribution to Middle Eastern stability and
development.
The interplay of these three
threads can be seen in a quick review of the more difficult passages in Japanese
Middle Eastern policy and U.S.-Japanese relations over the Middle East. Prior to
1973 little thought was given anywhere to the likelihood of a disruption in
Middle Eastern oil supplies; consequently the production cutbacks announced by
Arab oil-producing states, together with the declared embargo on any oil sales
to the United States and the Netherlands, caught all consuming nations by
surprise. But the shock in Japan was perhaps greatest. As the nation most
dependent on Middle Eastern oil, Japan found itself singled out for special
pressure to take a more pro-Arab position in order to achieve classification as
a "friendly" nation entitled to an uninterrupted flow of oil. The
Japanese cabinet obliged by issuing a statement of Japan's already stated
"lowest-common-denominator" position: opposition to the acquisition of
territory by force, a consequent demand for withdrawal of Israeli forces from
all territories occupied in 1967, and support for the "legitimate
rights" of the Palestinians. When this failed to satisfy the boycotting
nations, a second statement issued on November 22 added a promise to contribute
to a peace based on these principles, deplored "Israel's continuing
occupation of Arab territories," and threatened to "reconsider its
policy toward Israel" in light of future developments.(18)
At the time Japan's move was
heralded as the first serious crack in the U.S.-Japanese alliance, leading some
Japanese observers to argue that this alliance applied only to East Asia. It is
doubtful that alliances can be so compartmentalized geographically, but in any
event the size and importance of the split can easily be exaggerated. Responding
to U.S. pressure, and perhaps also to the threat of a Jewish counter-boycott of
Japanese goods in the U.S. market, Japan declined to take further steps demanded
by Arab governments such as cutting diplomatic ties with Israel. In addition, as
has been repeatedly pointed out, the Japanese declaration was little more than a
stylistic verbal change in existing Japanese policy, and made little or no
difference on the ground.(19)
Moreover, in the end the
gesture brought little or no benefit to Japan. While the November 22 declaration
did lead to Japan's reclassification as a "friendly" nation in Arab
eyes, the impact of the oil crisis was not lessened. Since oil is a fungible
commodity, embargoes directed at specific states resulted only in shifts in
normal marketing and shipping patterns; those nations able to afford it could
still find oil. The real impact of the 1973 crisis was on the price of oil,
which was quadrupled by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), and not by Arab oil-producers alone, against the background of a
shortfall--or to be more accurate, a perceived shortfall--in overall world oil
production. The impact on different nations was a function of their dependence
on imported oil, and not of their declared sympathies in the Arab-Israel
conflict. Thus, Japan was still among those hit the hardest.(20)
This episode taught the lesson
that independent short-term Japanese policies, designed to curry favor with
oil-producing states, might well gain nothing while still exacting a cost in
relations with the United States. On the other hand, the fall of the shah of
Iran in early 1979 was a clear reminder that total reliance on U.S. policy might
not be the ticket either. Following the American lead, Japan had developed
extensive and intimate economic ties with the Shah's regime, culminating in
massive investment in a petrochemical complex at Bandar Shahpur (later renamed
Bandar Khomeini). The unexpected fall of the Iranian government left Japanese
investors in an awkward position; although the new regime wanted to complete the
complex, it soon became a target in the Iran-Iraq War, and in the end Japan was
forced to negotiate a costly withdrawal from its contractual obligations.
Thus in the second oil crisis,
ignited by the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, Japan was again largely
an observer despite the obvious threat to Japanese well-being. But this time
there were some glimmers of an independent diplomatic role: as the only major
power able to talk to both sides, Japan was active in efforts to promote a
peaceful resolution to the conflict. In August 1983, Japanese Foreign Minister
Shintaroh Abe traveled to Teheran and Baghdad on a peace mission. In 1988, Japan
was active in UN negotiations that produced Resolution 598 ending the conflict.
At the same time, the war produced frictions with the United States over such
issues as continued Japanese economic relations with Iran and requests for help
from Japan in ensuring the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf during the
Iran-Iraq war--including attacks on tankers--of the mid-1980s. As the nation
most dependent on the tanker traffic being protected, Japan was expected by the
United States to play a more active role despite its non-military policy. In the
end, Japan supplied navigational radar equipment in the Gulf to aid in the
operation.
By the mid-1980s, Japan had
made progress in reducing its dependence on oil as a part of its overall energy
needs, as noted above. This, and other measures such as building an oil
stockpile, made the nation somewhat less vulnerable to interruptions in supply.
Then came the collapse of oil prices in 1985-1986, when Saudi Arabia tired of
its role as the "swing producer" who cut production in order to
maintain the price level. This was a great boon to all oil-consuming states; the
value of Japan's imports from the Middle East as a part of all imports fell from
28.6 percent in 1982 to 10.9 percent in 1989.(21) The value of imported oil
compared to Japan's Gross National Product fell from nearly 5 percent in 1980 to
about 1 percent a decade later.(22)
Japan's internal energy policy
was therefore a partial success. However, since the value of Japan's exports to
the Middle East also dropped, since the oil producers were buying less, the
overall trade deficit remained very negative.(23) More important was the failure
to diversify sources of oil supply; the Middle East remained as crucial as ever.
Also, after the mid-1980s Japan did not stem the growth in demand for oil, so
there was no further reduction in overall dependence.(24)
On the whole, though, Japan
was much better prepared for the challenge of the 1990-1991 Gulf War than it had
been for the earlier oil crises, and the impact was considerably milder. At the
same time, Japanese policy was much more engaged in the process of trying to
restore stability to the region. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was an abrupt
reminder of the continued volatility of the Middle East and of Japan's continued
vulnerability to events there.
Saddam Hussein's biggest
misjudgment was precisely in not understanding just how important the Gulf had
become to the world economy and thus how vociferous the reaction of the world
community was likely to be.(25) Japan was a prime example of this; in addition
to the threat to the flow of oil and to low oil prices (which rose sharply after
Iraq's action), there were Japanese citizens among the hostages that Iraq seized
in the first stage of the crisis. As one Japanese official put it, "no
matter how this crisis turns out, it is a major turning point for Japan. We are
going to be participants, not bystanders, from now on."(26) There was some
embarrassment about Japan's inability to become a full-fledged member of the
international coalition opposing Iraq: "The Persian Gulf Crisis of
1990-1991 invoked doubts about Japan's 'checkbook diplomacy' and 'one-country
pacifism'."(27) Following the war, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
obviously feeling the international pressure for a more meaningful Japanese role
in the Middle East, published a document listing in detail all the contributions
Japan had made or was planning to make.(28)
The "checkbook
diplomacy" of the Gulf Crisis was not trivial; Japan gave $2.5 billion to
the front-line nations of Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Syria, and $11 billion to
the coalition. The military action against Iraq brought about a rapid fall in
oil prices that had been inflated by the pre-war crisis, providing a strong
justification for Japan, as a major beneficiary of the price drop, to make a
substantial contribution. But Japan also provided transport aircraft and
minesweepers to the war effort, marking the first departure from tradition in
this area.(29)
During the same period Japan's
relations with Israel were undergoing a fundamental change. These relations have
always been a function of Japan's relationships with the Arab world and with the
United States. In order to maintain access to the Arab world, Japanese companies
had not challenged the boycott of Israel. The pro-Arab declarations during the
1973 oil crisis have already been detailed. On the other hand, Japan maintained
normal, if low-level, relations with Israel and generally followed the U.S. lead
on Arab-Israeli diplomacy. One exception being when PLO leader Yasir Arafat was
invited on an "unofficial" visit to Tokyo in 1981, when pressure from
the second oil crisis was still strong.
By the late 1980s, given the
glut of oil on the world market and the drop in exports to the Middle East,
Japan, without changing its basic position on Arab-Israel issues, moved to
normalize relations with Israel. The first visit of a Japanese foreign minister,
Sosuke Uno, to Israel took place in 1988, and the first visit of a Japanese
prime minister, Tomiichi Murayama, finally occurred in 1995. An important
turning point came in April 1991, following the Gulf War, when Prime Minister
Toshiki Kaifu denounced the Arab boycott as an impediment to free trade. Not
coincidentally, major Japanese companies began to enter the Israeli market
shortly thereafter. The process gathered momentum after the breakthrough in
Israeli-PLO relations in September 1993. Not only were political obstacles
removed, but it became clear that the Arab-Israeli peace process was a
development highly favorable to Japanese interests, since it promised to open up
a large new economic space with no barriers and many new opportunities. By this
time, also, Israel had become Japan's "emerging market" in the Middle
East, second only to Saudi Arabia, and a number of joint Israeli-Japanese
ventures were underway.(30)
During the 1990s Japan also
began to play a more tangible role in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. Following the
Madrid conference of 1991, Japan chaired the multilateral regional Environmental
Working Group, and participated in the Working Groups on Water Resources,
Regional Economic Development, and Refugees. Japan also sent 77 election
observers to help oversee the election of the new Palestinian National Council,
in January 1966 and the following month created another important new precedent
by dispatching a small contingent of 45 soldiers to serve in the United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights-the first Japanese
peacekeeping force outside of Asia.
FROM ECONOMICS TO SECURITY
As this brief history shows,
Japan's policy in the Middle East has moved from vague support of peace and
concern about specific economic interests, to a greater focus on long-term
stability, whether in coordination with the United States or independently.
There has been recognition that economic issues cannot be dealt with in
isolation from social and political factors, and that reliance on market forces
alone is not a viable policy.(31) In other words, Japan needs to view Middle
Eastern stability as a security issue; in the words of former Prime Minister
Takeo Miki, "peace in the Middle East . . . must be achieved . . . [for]
the region is more than an energy problem. It is a political, strategic, and
economic problem."(32) This is part of a larger process in which Japan has
been overcoming a narrow conception of "self-defense" made possible by
the American security umbrella.(33)
The emerging policy focuses on
the long term, recognizing that short-term policies, in which outside nations
each scramble for its own perceived immediate interests, have been ineffective
and even self-defeating. The problem for oil-consuming nations is their
dependence on an unstable region of the world, not whether they are perceived as
friendly or unfriendly toward particular nations. Consequently, efforts to earn
favor by pandering to these nations will not work. As one analyst observed, in
1973
Few people in Washington or
Tokyo really understood how the oil market worked. In fact, regardless of
orientation toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, all countries faced higher oil
prices. . . .A better understanding of the oil issue has led to the realization
that Middle East peace and stability are a good foundation for the smooth
working of the oil market in the region. The problem lies in how to promote that
stability.(34)
When Japan seems to be
concerned only with its own specific short-term interests, it may in fact be
inviting more pressure and attempts at manipulation. In 1973 Japan was pressured
much more than European states that were also highly dependent on Middle Eastern
oil. Following the 1973 crisis Japan alone, and not the European states, was
subjected to strong, continuing pressure to recognize the PLO.(35)
A policy for promoting
regional stability is clearly not the same as a policy of currying favor with
all, or most, of that region's states. There are many conflicts that divide
Middle Eastern states from each other, apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict.
There are many sources of instability in the region, few of which have simple
answers. For example, some observers believe that the threat now emerging as the
greatest challenge in the Middle East is the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and that this is an area in which the United States, Japan, and all
other outside powers should be cooperating closely and taking a much more active
initiative.(36) Others point out that the problems threatening Middle Eastern
stability--and by extension the flow of oil--are increasingly problems of
internal instability rather than interstate conflicts, and that this requires
concerted long-term policies centered around democratization and development
(areas in which Japan can make a larger contribution).(37)
In addition, shifting patterns
of oil supply make it even more inevitable that Japan's role in the Middle East
will expand. With the rise of East Asian economies, more Middle East oil is now
flowing eastward, while the United States is coming to depend more on Western
hemisphere sources. According to some projections, the proportion of Gulf oil
going to Asia will increase in the next few years from about 40 percent to 60
percent.(38) This must be added onto the already existing concerns about a
"third" world oil crisis--given current trends in production and
consumption--that would again return OPEC to a dominant position in the world
oil market. In such a situation the competition between Japan and other rising
Asian economies for Middle Eastern oil would be intense, given the likelihood
that both Indonesia and China will become net oil importers in the near
future.(39) By one projection, the dependence of Japan on Middle Eastern oil may
reach 92 percent in the near future.(40)
In this light, it may indeed
be true that "Japan's future role in the Middle East is as big as it
chooses to make it."(41) Clearly there will be increasing pressure for
"burden-sharing" from the United States and other Western nations, in
any event. Logically this should be accompanied by increased willingness to make
Japan a fuller participant in alliance decisionmaking that involves the Middle
East.
All of this accords, of
course, with the general expectation of a more active Japanese role globally as
Japan emerges as a candidate for a permanent seat in the Security Council. Such
candidacy will inevitably raise the issue of Japan's broader participation in UN
peacekeeping and enforcement missions; as one U.S. diplomatic observer says,
"Japan will not be taken seriously as a political power as long as it
continues to project the image of a nation that is invariably prepared to adjust
its position on issues of political principle in order to win narrow economic
benefits."(42)
In the context of a changing
relationship with the United States, this also implies a willingness to act
independently of U.S. policy in some cases. A more assertive policy, while still
serving the common interests of both nations, will inevitably lead to some
differences. Japan's Middle East policy can be, in the best case, both
independent and coordinated with other Western nations. In some cases, it may
even be closer to U.S. policy than it has been in the past; the Arab-Israeli
arena comes to mind, as the U.S. experience seems to indicate that a policy of
balance and mediation better serves the cause of stability than a policy of
choosing sides. To build peace in this tangled conflict, good relations with
both sides, including Israel, are necessary, and Japan has been moving in this
direction.
On the other hand, there are
problems in the Middle East toward which a more independent Japanese policy
would be natural and beneficial. The
U.S. relationship to Iran, for example, is freighted with baggage that makes an
objective approach to conflict resolution extremely difficult. There is, at the
least, room for doubt whether current U.S. policy toward that nation does, in
fact, serve the world community's best interests. In this case, and perhaps
others, Japan might be able to serve as a bridge between Middle East and West,
since it is free from the taint of imperialism and cultural penetration in the
area. There could be a "division of labor" between the United States
and Japan (and others), in which each nation would focus on contributions to
regional stability that best suited its own inclinations and capabilities.(43)
There are a number of
particular strengths that Japan can bring to this endeavor. Obviously economic
contributions come to mind first, especially as greater emphasis on development
emerges as one of the keys. But this role should be conceived as not only donor,
but also as mentor and model. Japan's involvement raises much less suspicion in
the area, and Japan's economic success has been an inspiration and prototype in
the Middle East as elsewhere. Since 1990 Japan has been the largest aid donor in
the world.
But involvement in Middle East
stability involves more than aid programs alone. There are also political,
diplomatic, and even security issues in which Japan can make a distinctive
contribution, and in some cases already is making one. In a study of possible
Japanese contributions to the Arab-Israeli peace process, Yasumasa Kuroda
emphasizes the unique Japanese experience in internal conflict resolution and in
building a communitarian society, arguing that such skills could be
constructively applied to the Middle East.(44) It is not clear how far such
cross-cultural transference can occur. More realistically, the Japanese practice
of maintaining good relations with all parties could stand it in good stead as
an honest broker in cases where the United States finds itself unable to act in
that role. This has in fact already happened during the war between Iran and
Iraq and in the United Nations deliberations to end that conflict.
As for contributions to
security, Kuroda proposes a "neo-pacifist" stance in which Japanese
military capabilities would be improved but would be deployed only under UN
auspices as peacekeeping troops.(45) This would be merely an extension--albeit a
very important one--to Japanese deployments already carried out in Cambodia and
the Golan Heights. It might involve, however, some far-reaching changes in the
structure and capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces.
As to what other contributions Japan can make in the security realm, this
will surely be one of the questions that will dominate Japanese foreign policy
debates in the years to come.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Kaoru
Sugihara, "Japan, the Middle East and the World Economy: A Note on the Oil
Triangle," in Kaoru Sugihara and J. A. Allan, eds., Japan in the
Contemporary Middle East (Routledge, 1993), pp. 1-13.
2. Douglas R. Ostrom,
"Trends in Japanese Trade with the Middle East," in Edward J. Lincoln,
ed., Japan and the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1990),
p. 18.
3. Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, Energy Production, Supply Demand Statistical
Year Book; Long Term Energy Supply Outlook, June, 1994; BP Statistical Review of
World Energy, 1996; IEA Statistics on Oil, Gas, Coal, and Electricity, Quarterly
Statistics, Third Quarter, 1996; all cited by Yoshiki Hatanaka, "OPEC and
Global Energy Supplies," in John Calabrese, ed., The United States, Japan,
and the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1997), pp.17,
19, 24.
4. Yasumasa Kuroda,
"Japan, the Arab World and Israel," American-Arab Affairs, No. 28
(Spring, 1989): 19.
5. See, for example, the
prominence given to diplomatic visitors in the official presentation of Japanese
Middle Eastern policy on the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site,
http://www.mofa.go.jp.
6. Japan's Economic
Cooperation in the Middle East," Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site
(http://www.mofa.go.jp).
7. Discussion of this issue
can be traced in the special issue of Middle East Economic Digest that focuses
on Japan's economic relations with the region, published annually in December.
See, for example, "Middle East Gets a Raw Deal," Middle East Economic
Digest, 37 (Dec. 17, 1993): 12-13); "Trying Ever Harder to Turn the
Tide," Middle East Economic Digest, 39 (Dec. 15, 1995): 35-36.
8. Yasumasa Kuroda and Nobuo
Asai, "West Asian Studies in Japan," in Tareq Y. Ismael, ed., Middle
East Studies: International Perspectives on the State of the Art (Praeger,
1990), p. 185. The book was Michael M. Yoshitsu, Caught in the Middle East
(Lexington Books, 1984).
9. Hiroshi Shimizu, "The
Japanese Trade Contact with the Middle East: Lessons from the Pre-Oil
Period," in Sugihara and Allan, op. cit., pp. 27-53.
10. Kazuo Chiba, "Japan
and the Middle East in the 1970s and early 1980s: A Japanese Diplomat's
View," in Sugihara and Allan, op. cit., pp. 152-153.
11. Kuroda and Asai (op. cit.,
pp. 184-185)) note that until fairly recently Japanese national universities did
not hire foreign professors as tenured faculty, a situation that handicapped all
area studies centers that would normally depend on indigenous scholars skilled
in the regional languages and cultures.
12. In the case of the
Arab-Israel conflict, for example, this translated into a preferred reading of
UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November, 1967--the resolution that
furnishes an agreed though ambiguous framework for a negotiated settlement of
the conflict--that emphasized, well before the first oil crisis, the clause on
the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and was thus
"pro-Arab" in the political context of the time. This accorded, in the
words of Prime Minister Takeo Miki, with "a basic part of our way of
thinking . . . that the expansion of territories by force could never be
permitted . . . . (personal interview with Michael Yoshitsu, in Yoshitsu, op.
cit., p. 15.
13. Yasumasa Kuroda,
"Japan and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," in Lincoln, op. cit.,
pp. 45-46.
14. Ryohei Murata,
"Keynote Address," in Lincoln, op. cit., p. 6.
15. Kuroda, "Japan, Arab
World and Israel," p. 11.
16. Shahram Chubin, "The
Middle East in Alliance Politics," in Ronald A. Morse, ed., Japan and the
Middle East in Alliance Politics (The Wilson Center, 1986), p. 20.
17. Michael Sterner, "The
Middle East Factor in U.S.-Japanese Relations," in Morse, op. cit., p. 74.
18. Shuzo Kimura,
"Japanese Middle East Policy--Impact of the Oil Crisis," American-Arab
Affairs, No. 17 (Summer, 1986): 68-69.
19. Roy Licklider, "Arab
Oil and Japanese Foreign Policy," Middle East Review, 18 (Fall, 1985):
23-29; Akifumi Ikeda, "Japan's Relations with Israel," in Sugihara and
Allan, op. cit., pp. 158-159.
20. For a more complete
analysis of the impact of the oil crises of the 1970s and 1980s, see Alan Dowty,
"Oil Power in the 1980s," Jerusalem Journal of International
Relations, 6 (No. 3, 1982-1983): 71-91; see also Robert Lieber, "Japan and
the Middle East: Implications of the European Experience," in Morse, op.
cit., p. 66; and Kuroda, "Japan and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,"
pp. 43-44.
21. Ostrom, op. cit., p. 19.
22. Peter Kemp, "Crisis
Forces Policy Rethink," Middle East Business Weekly, 34 (Oct. 19, 1990):
15.
23. Exports to the Middle East
were 12.2 percent of all exports in 1982, and only 3.1 percent in 1989. Ostrom,
op. cit., p. 19.
24. Peter Kemp, "Oil
Sector Sucks in the Imports," Middle East Economic Digest, 36 (Dec. 18,
1992): 19.
25. J. A. Allan, "Japan
and the Middle East: Trade, International Assistance, and International
Relations," in Sugihara and Allan, op. cit., p. 25.
26. Michael Berger,
"Japan Debates a New Role: Facing the Mideast Crisis," The New Leader,
73 (Sept. 17, 1990): 5.
27. Mike M. Mochizuki,
"Japanese Security Policy," Council on Foreign Relations, Jan., 1997,
Working Papers, Columbia University Affairs Online
(https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dic/ciao/wps/grm02/grm02.html). See also Peter
Kemp, "Will Money Make More Friends?," Middle East Economic Digest, 39
(Dec. 15, 1995): 28.
28. Japan, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Japan's Post Gulf International Initiatives (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, August, 1991).
29. Kunio Katakura and Motoko
Katakura, Japan and the Middle East (The Middle East Institute of Japan, 1991),
p. 106.
30. "Middle East Gets a
Raw Deal," Middle East Economic Digest, 37 (December 17, 1993): 12.
31. On this point see Anthony
H. Cordesman, "The United States, Japan, and the Gulf: Meeting External
Challenges," in Morse, op. cit., p. 45.
32. Interview with Miki, July
29, 1981, in Yoshitsu, op. cit., p. 13.
33. Richard L. Armitage,
"U.S.-Japan Relations in the Middle East," in Calabrese, op. cit., p.
7
34. William B. Quandt,
"The United States, Japan and the Peace Process," in Calabrese, op.
cit., p. 68.
35. Kimura, op. cit., p. 78;
Michael Sterner, "The Middle East Factor in U.S.-Japanese Relations,"
in Morse, op. cit., p. 77.
36. Cordesman, op. cit., p.
48; Richard W. Murphy, "Japan, the United States, and the Gulf," in
Lincoln, op. cit., pp. 68-69.
37. See, for example,
Cordesman, op. cit., pp. 40-45.
38. James A. Placke,
"Changing Oil Demand Patterns: Implications for the United States-Persian
Gulf-Japan Triangle," in Calabrese, op. cit., pp. 27-29; Cordesman, op.
cit., p. 38.
39. Michael May, "Energy
and Security in East Asia," Asia/Pacific Research Center, Working Papers,
Columbia University Affairs Online
(https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec-cgi-bin/ciao/dataplug.pl); Hatanaka, op. cit.,
p. 21; Ronald A. Morse, "Japan and OPEC in the Global Energy Market,"
in Lincoln, op. cit., p. 14.
40. Yoshio Hatano, "Japan
and the Middle East: Building a Partnership," in Calabrese, op. cit., p.
14.
41. Allan, op, cit., p. 21
42. Sterner, op. cit., p. 78.
43. On Japan as a bridge, see
Mohammad Mahallati, "The United States, Japan, and Iran," in John
Calabrese, ed., The United States, Japan, and the Middle East (Washington, D.C.:
The Middle East Institute, 1998), p. 13; on the division of labor, see Murphy,
op. cit., p. 68.
44. Kuroda, Japan in a New
World Order, passim.
45. Ibid., p. 24.
Alan Dowty is Professor of Government and International Studies, and Fellow of the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, at the University of Notre Dame. He is the author of six books or monographs and over one hundred articles on the Middle East, Israeli politics, and general international relations.