Volume 4, No. 4 - December 2000
Volume 4, No. 4 - December 2000
Since they gained independence a decade ago, the newly independent states
established within the ex-Soviet borders have been seeking their role in the
world and in the regions they inhabit. This is particularly true for the
Republic of Armenia, whose domestic development was crippled and international
activity completely suspended for the 70-year-period it was swallowed up by the
USSR.
Armenians view their country as linking the Middle Eastern and European
cultural areas – the two regions that dominate its international relations.
But the most critical, complicated regional interests are clearly dealing with
what is now being called the Greater Middle East, extended to include the new
northern rim of three ex-Soviet republics in the South Caucasus, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia
In its
local political environment, Armenia must maneuver to handle three stronger
powers–Russia, Iran and Turkey--which play a role in the area. Armenia's
geopolitical importance is largely derived from its potential role in developing
transit routes for delivering Russian and Caspian basin energy resources to
Europe, Turkey and Israel. It is also being perceived as a connecting link
between Russia and Iran.
Armenia supported the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh in their war
with Azerbaijan and has tried to find a way to resolve this conflict. This issue
has brought problems for Armenia with both Azerbaijan and Turkey. In contrast,
Armenia has good relations with Georgia. As a result of its geopolitical
situation, Armenia might be expected to have common interests with Syria, Iran,
Greece, and Cyprus. Its perceived close relations with Iran have brought more
friction with Turkey, Azerbaijan and, to a lesser extent, Israel.
A good way to consider Armenia's situation is to compare Armenia to
Georgia. After gaining independence in 1991, both Georgia and Armenia continued
to be in a zone of Russian influence--Armenia to a larger extent than Georgia.
Moscow still has economic, political and military leverages over both of them.
Despite its internal problems and efforts to escape Russian influence,
Georgia is in a relatively good strategic position. Georgia has no conflict with
any of the states in the region, which gives it a large freedom of maneuver
among the United States, Russia, Turkey, and other regional actors. Georgia also
has cultivated ties with Azerbaijan, with which it has common interests
regarding transport routes for Caspian oil. In addition, Georgia's problem of
trying to preserve territorial integrity of Abkhazia and Southern Ossia against
ethnic claims has made it support Azerbaijan, which faces a similar problem in
Nagorno-Karabakh.
In contrast, Armenia has a much more restricted freedom of action since
friction with Turkey reduces its options in being able to counter or being
potentially more dependent on Russian and Iranian influence. As a result, while
Armenia cooperates with NATO in the "Partnership for Peace" framework
it has not shown a desire to join that organization. Of course, Armenia does not
want to see either Russia or radical Islamist forces gain control over the
Southern Caucasus. Otherwise,
though, Armenia's interests are roughly parallel to those of Moscow and Tehran.
This problem can be more clearly seen by noting that Georgia and
Azerbaijan view Turkey as a way to counter-balance Moscow and also as an aid in
building their relations with the United States in order to escape permanently
from the Russian sphere of influence. In this context, Azerbaijan and Georgia
want Turkish participation in the creation of a regional security mechanism that
would include Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Azerbaijan
and Georgia also expect Turkey to help them achieve NATO membership and to
encourage greater U.S. involvement in the area. Turkey supports these efforts.
(1)
Despite their different strategic interests, Armenia and Georgia have been able to work together toward resolving sub-regional and mutual problems. This is partly true since both of their leaders are well aware that their country's weaknesses require cooperation. The most important document for this strategic partnership was signed by Georgian President Edward Shevarnadze and Armenian President Robert Kocharian on September 29, 1999 as the "Declaration of the Basic Principles of Cooperation on the New Level of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and Georgia." (2)
The South Caucasus, including Armenia, attract special attention in the
geopolitical plans of several powerful nations. Iran, Russia, and Turkey wish to
exercise influence there, while U.S. policymakers seek to limit the penetration
of Tehran and Moscow. The needs of the local states--Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia--for development assistance, technology, strategic support, and help in
their internal problems provide leverage for these more powerful nations as they
try to gain regional influence.
Until 1990-1991, this area, of course, was under complete Soviet control
and the United States was fully excluded. After independence, though, this
situation changed dramatically. U.S. National Security Advisor Samuel Berger, in
his 1997 report "On Priority Principles of the U.S. Foreign Policy,"
noted the importance of the South Caucasus countries for U.S. strategic and
economic interests. (3) In this effort, the United States also works with Turkey
and Israel.
Although Russia has a wide range of problems limiting its power in this
region, some of Moscow's most critical interests involve the South Caucasus.
These include the need to protect its borders, a continuing military presence,
and potentially valuable oil and gas resources. Events in this region also
threaten Russian internal politics. For example, Russia accuses Azerbaijan of
supporting Chechen rebels. Azerbaijan responds by complaining about Russia's
allegedly pro-Armenian position regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But
this did not prevent the two countries from signing the Azerbaijani-Russian
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Security in June 1997. Russia also
has some problems with Georgia, related to the Abkhaz conflict, tensions over
the presence of Russian troops in the country, and Georgia's increasing Western
orientation. Russia started the partial withdrawal of its troops from Georgia in
summer 2000, but Russian peacekeeping forces are still staying in Abkhazia.
In contrast, Russia has stable friendly relations with Armenia, which it
considers a strategic partner. Armenia also provides an obstacle for Turkey's
penetration into Muslim and Turkic-speaking regions of the former Soviet Union
and is also a factor helping to preserve Russian influence in the South
Caucasus. On August 28, 1997, the two countries signed a Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Support after having ratified an agreement on
maintaining Russian military bases on Armenian territory. Russia uses Armenia to
pressure on Azerbaijan. At the same time, Russia is one of the most important
investors for Armenia and its main arms' supplier.
Iran's interests in the South Caucasus revolve around Caspian oil, its
concern that Azerbaijan might subvert the internal ethnic Azeri population (who
sometimes call the part of Iran they live in “Southern Azerbaijan”), and the
chance to use Armenia's and Azerbaijan's territory as energy transit routes.
Iran suggests that it can also act as a mediator in settling ethno-political
conflicts. But after Iran mediated a ceasefire of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
in May 1992, the Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe organized the
Minsk Group to find a solution to the issue without Iranian involvement. (4)
Iran's major regional conflict is with Azerbaijan over differences in the
ownership of Caspian oil and on projected oil and gas pipeline routes from the
Caspian basin to Western oil consumers. The cheapest pipeline route lies across
Iranian territory but, under U.S. pressure, preference has been given to the
Western "Baku-Cyhan" route through Turkey. These issues, though, have
not been finally decided.
The possibility of a Southern Azerbaijan issue becoming an international
problem should be taken very seriously. Iran's northwestern province bordering
on Azerbaijan is populated mostly by Azeri Turks identical to those across the
frontier. There have been semi-nationalist movements in the province during past
decades and some of the Iranian Azeris seek unification with Azerbaijan. Iran
and Azerbaijan have normal relations and are in continuous dialogue. The
Azerbaijani government discourages pan-Azeri nationalism. Still, a heightening
of this issue could cause considerable friction some day. (5)
As a result of Iran's interests and policies, Armenia sees Tehran as
another power that can counter-balance Turkey's activity in the region. There
are no territorial issues between Iran and Armenia, and religious questions play
no role in disrupting relations between the Islamic Republic and Christian
Armenia. For Iran, Armenia blocks Turkish influence along Iranian northern and
western borders and also in Central Asia.
In contrast, Turkish interests in the South Caucasus directly collide
with Russian and Iranian interests, a factor that also affects Turkey's
relations with each of the South Caucasian states. Turkey's relations with
Georgia and Azerbaijan may be defined as a strategic partnership, since they
have a common interest in limiting Russian and Iranian influence.
Turkey's friction with Armenia, whatever historical reasons can be cited
for it, has been closely related to the Turkish-Azerbaijan alliance. For Turkey,
Armenia is an obstacle for its cultural, economic and political involvement in
Muslim and Turkic-speaking regions of Russia and Central Asia. The war over
Nagorno-Karabakh sets Armenia at odds with Turkey's close ally, Azerbaijan.
Nagorno-Karabakh is an area mostly inhabited by Armenians that was
incorporated in Azerbaijan. Armenians there sought to join Armenia while
Azerbaijan rejected secession. The result was a war between Armenians of
Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan in 1992-1994 in which Turkey supported
Azerbaijan.
Turkey has closed its border with Armenia and tries to impose a boycott
against that country. There are no diplomatic relations between Armenia and
Turkey. Turkey states that the normalization of relations with Armenia and a
reopening of the border requires an altered Armenian stance on settling the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and a willingness to stop the campaign for
international recognition of the genocide of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey in
1915.
At the same time, though, Turkey wants to limit the friction. It calls
for establishing a sub-regional security system hat would include all South
Caucasian states. There have also been efforts by both states' leaders are
trying to reduce their mutual conflict, although without any success. (6) Any
progress on this front worries Azerbaijan.
For its part, the United States seeks good relations with all three South
Caucasian nations. It is allied with Turkey but tries to persuade Turkey and
Armenia to improve relations. While the United States wants to limit Iranian and
Russian influence in the area, it has tried to do so through building stronger
ties with Armenia and reducing existing conflicts rather than pressure.
Although the United States wants to reduce Moscow's influence in the
South Caucasus as a whole and backs anti-Russian trends in Georgia and
Azerbaijan, it recognizes the Russian interests in this region. Still, U.S.
mediation efforts in the local ethno-political conflicts, including
Nagorno-Karabakh, conflict shows "creeping" U.S. intervention into an
area of Russian "vital interests." By developing influence through
mediating activities, the U.S.'s South Caucasian policy uses the same mechanism
as in its approach to the Middle East. Therefore, given existing
contradictions--between Russia and Turkey, Turkey and Iran, Iran and Azerbaijan,
Russia and Azerbaijan--the United States is gradually becoming the only real
"third force" in the area.
Russia, too, has its assets. Its military presence in Armenia and Georgia
creates opportunities for Russia to manipulate processes related to the
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhaz conflicts. However, it should be
noted, that its chances in the South Caucasus are limited by the apparent
pro-Western moods of the leaderships of Georgia and Azerbaijan, which blame
Russia for "double standards" and follow its actions and initiatives
in the sub-region with suspicion.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a decisive factor in Armenia's foreign
policy and one of the most destabilizing factors in the fragile South Caucasian
area. Armenia considers the conflict one of giving self-determination to the
Armenian people of Nagorno-Karabakh, while Azerbaijan defines the conflict as a
problem of territorial integrity.
Both sides need a resolution to this complicated, emotional issue.
Azerbaijan's development is being held up by the dispute, which also threatens
its internal political stability. Armenia finds its other policies and
international posture being held hostage by the conflict.
Although Turkey, which is a member of the OSCE Minsk Group, directly
supports Azerbaijan, at the same time it welcomes the beginning of direct
dialogue between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Another promising
development has been U.S.-Russian cooperation through the Minsk Group in trying
to mediate a solution. (7)
The internationalization of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict started in 1992
with parallel mediation efforts by Russia and Iran. On May 12, 1994, with
Russian help, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the "Bishkek Protocol" as
the basis for a ceasefire which has continued to the present day. Thereafter,
the OSCE summit established the Minsk Group. In 1997, the co-chairmanship was
given to the United States, Russia, and France, which tried shuttle diplomacy to
bridge the differences between the contending parties.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict also plays some role in Arab-Armenian
relations. Azerbaijani diplomacy tries to convince Arab states that this
conflict is a territorial dispute between Christian Armenia and Muslim
Azerbaijan, exploiting the religious factor in an attempt to gain support of the
Muslim world. However, some Arab states admit that the territory of Nagorno
Karabakh is historically Armenian, and most prefer that the dispute be settled
peacefully.
In general, Armenian-Arab relations may be characterized as stable and
friendly, lacking any bilateral problems. This situation is assisted by the
presence of successful Armenian communities in several countries. Relations are
especially good with Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, though relations with Iraq were
suspended until May 2000.
Israel generally supports U.S. policies, opposes the extension of Iranian
influence, is uncomfortable with any expansion of Russian influence, and
cooperates closely with Turkey. Yet Israel has no bilateral problems with any of
the South Caucasian republics. Azerbaijani-Israeli and Georgian-Israeli
relations are developing intensively and have been somewhat helped by the
existing Jewish communities there or former Jewish residents who have moved to
Israel. There are numerous declarations of common political and economic
interests, and readiness to cooperate in the field of security. In addition,
Israel is a potential consumer of the Caspian energy resources.
During his visit to Azerbaijan in September 1997, for example, Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said it is a unique situation when the Jewish
state establishes close, friendly relations with a Muslim state. The sides also
discussed possible Israeli-Azerbaijani-Turkish cooperation in fighting Islamic
fundamentalism. In March 1999, Netanyahu visited Georgia and called the
relationship one of strategic partnership. The parties signed a military
cooperation agreement, building on an earlier, January 1998 bilateral agreement.
(8)
Given this context, though, Armenia has less in common with Israel,
though both sides often cite the parallel historical experiences of their
peoples. There are developments regarding economic and cultural cooperation. The
official visit of the President of Armenia Robert Kocharian to Israel in January
2000 could be a sign of warming relations and led to the signing of an agreement
to encourage investments. Israel also views Armenia as a potential ally in
opposing Islamist extremism. Armenia hopes Israel will support its case on the
genocide against Armenians, despite Israel's warm relations with Turkey. (9)
For its part, Iran does not hide its negative attitude to the
establishment of working relations between Armenia and Israel. The Armenian
president responded to Iranian criticisms by saying, "We are taking steps
based on our national interests....There is no need to search for enemies, but,
rather [to find] friends." (10)
Armenia, long in a Russian sphere of influence, must maneuver among all
these interests and rivalries in order to preserve its independence. For
Armenia, the most urgent tasks are:
--To increase and develop the partnership with Georgia and closer
relations with Israel, as potential allies who are not seeking sub-regional
hegemony.
--To resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict peacefully.
--To build normal relations with Turkey.
--To intensify cooperation with Russia, Iran, and the United States
without being too dependent or influenced by any one of them.
One leading potential danger for Armenia is to lose its options by its
gradual, forced drift toward an emerging axis of Russia and Iran, which sees
itself competing with a U.S.-Turkey-Israeli bloc. Such an outcome would also
damage Armenian relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Still, Armenia's chances in pursuing its independent policy,
despite certain limitations, are actually increasing. In international terms,
the South Caucasian sub-region has been far more stable over recent years than
might have been expected. Armenia's management of its foreign policy has been a
key factor in that sub-regional balance.
NOTES
(1)
See especially the results of the visit of the President of Azerbaijan Heydar
Aliev to Turkey, and of the former President of Turkey Suleiman Demirel to
Georgia in January 2000.
(2)
Respublika Armenia, October 2, 1999.
(3)
The Washington Post, March 27, 1997.
(4)
This group is now called the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE).
(5)
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan Vilayat Guliev has urged improved
relations: "Azerbaijan has to revise its attitude towards Iran. We need to
build warmer relations with this state". He pointed out that the Iranian
side is also ready to get closer with Azerbaijan. Zerkalo (The Mirror, Daily),
Baku, January 24, 2000.
(6)
See the message of Turkish President Suleiman Demirel to the President of
Armenia Robert Kocharian, Azg (The Nation), January 24, 2000 (in Armenian). See
also the speech by the Armenian President Robert Kocharian at the OSCE Summit in
Istanbul on November 18, 1999.
(7)
See also "The Transcaucasus Today: Prospects For Regional
Integration", Edited Conference Report, Yerevan, 23-25 June 1997.
(8)
Voice of Israel, September 2, 1997 (in Russian).
(9)
The Jerusalem Post, April 22, 1999. There was a crisis in Turkish-Israeli
relations in April-May, 2000, after the decision of Israeli Education Minister
Yossi Sarid to include Armenian genocide in a new curriculum, under which
students would learn about "national genocide." See: Ha'aretz, April
25, 2000, The Times, London, April 25, 2000; Turkish Daily News, April 28, May
11, 2000; The New York Times, May 10, 2000.
(10)
Respublika Armenia, No. 9, 21 January 2000. See also, Gayane Novikova,
Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership and its impact on the political situation
in the South Caucasus and Middle East, Yerevan, ACNIS, 1999
*Dr. Gayane Novikova is an Analyst on Middle East Affairs of The Armenian Center for National and International Studies. Her monographs include "The Palestinian Problem: Origins. Transformation. Solutions?" (1996); "Militant Islam: Theory and Practice (1997); "The United States and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Chronology. Dynamics. Tendencies" (1998); "Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership and its impact on the political situation in the South Caucasus and Middle East" (1999). This article is written with the support of The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.