Volume 4, No. 4 - December 2000
Volume 4, No. 4 - December 2000
By Amatzia
Baram*
Editor's
Summary: Iraq has continued to
survive international sanctions and attempts to isolate itself in the decade
following the war over Kuwait. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has used Islam and
tribalism to maintain power at home, while playing off other countries and
seeking humanitarian sympathy to weaken the opposition to his regime from
abroad. The article surveys the current state of Iraq's domestic and foreign
policies.
In the year 2000 the domestic and international position of Iraq's ruler,
Saddam Husayn, was the most secure and promising since the 1991 Gulf War.
At home, more than three years had passed since any meaningful coup
d'etat was exposed--and probably even hatched--against him. Serious Shi'i
protests and a wave of guerrilla operations against his forces in the south, but
also in Baghdad, had begun to decline. On the economic level, while the
stagnation and even slow deterioration of Iraq's economy continued unabated,
there were no serious food shortages nor signs of famine and key elements of the
country's infrastructure were slowly being reconstructed.
In the inter-Arab arena, Iraq has developed commercial ties and some
improvement of diplomatic contacts with a number of Arab countries, including
some Gulf emirates, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. Since December 1998, there had
been no weapons' inspections carried out by the UN Special Committee (UNSCOM).
Despite periodic confrontations between Iraqi air defenses and U.S. planes above
the Southern and Northern No-Fly Zones, Iraq continued to challenge the
overflights.
Furthermore, the United States and Britain came under the greatest
international pressure to lift--or at least greatly relax--the international
economic embargo against Baghdad. The anti-embargo campaign brought together
those upset by the alleged suffering of Iraq's people and those countries and
companies that hoped for huge profits from Iraq's oil industry and
reconstruction once sanctions ended.
What is Saddam Husayn's secret? How has he survived a devastating defeat
in the Gulf War and almost ten years of a crippling embargo? Why is the U.S.
containment policy that was so successful in the early and mid-1990s slowly
collapsing?
SADDAM HUSAYN'S POWER BASE AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS
When the Ba'th party came to power in Iraq in July 1968 it was committed
to the ideal of unifying the Arab states into one super-state. Very soon,
however, it became clear that the only candidates for accepting immediate
unification--Syria and Egypt, both governed by regimes not unlike the new regime
in Baghdad--posed a grave danger to the fledgling Ba'th rule. Both Gamal Abd
al-Nasir and Hafiz al-Asad, the rulers of Egypt and Syria during this period,
enjoyed much greater prestige in the Arab world and even inside Iraq. In
contrast, the Baghdad leadership was inexperienced and had already lost power
once in 1963.
Thus, rather than striving toward unification, the new Iraqi regime
turned against Syria and Egypt, accusing them of betraying the most cherished
Arab values by failing to defeat Israel in 1967 and of sabotaging Arab unity in
a variety of other ways. With very small fluctuations--mainly in 1978-1979--this
pattern of accusations remained Saddam Husayn's policy since he became
vice-president of Iraq in 1969 and president in 1979.
Eventually, under Saddam Husayn, Iraq developed a new, Iraqi-centered and
imperial brand of pan-Arabism. Its main message was that, due to its heroic and
rich history, starting with ancient Sumer and Babylon and ending with Saddam,
Iraq is the natural leader of the Arabs. As a result, everything that benefits
Iraq will eventually benefit all the Arabs. This message sought to legitimize
political maneuvers that clearly contradicted Arab solidarity or seemed to
detach Iraq from the struggle against Israel. The invasions of Iran and of
Kuwait are two examples of such maneuvers.(1) It is quite possible that this
ideological argumentation made it easier for Ba'th party members to stomach the
regime's policies, which deviated from traditional pan-Arab values.
Another ideal professed by the new regime was secularism, or the
separation of mosque and state.(2) Until the ascendancy of Ayatollah Ruhallah
Khomeini in Tehran Iran in February 1979, this ideal was essentially adhered to
in Iraq, even though the Ba'th regime did make changes over time toward
involving Islam in politics more than one would expect from a secular
nationalistic regime. Baghdad's policy went through a quantum leap when the
Ba'thi rulers were pushed by the Islamic regime across the border to demonstrate
that they were not, as Tehran claimed, anti-Islamic atheists.
After the government "Islamized" much of its rhetoric during
the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran War, President Saddam Husayn led the Ba'th party in
introducing some Islamic principles into the Iraqi legal system. This started a
short while before the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, when Saddam made clear that
whenever laws clashed with the divine Shari'a, the former must always give way.
One day before the Allied bombing began the fighting in January 1991, Saddam
Husayn added the slogan, "Allahu Akbar" (God is Great) to the Iraqi
national flag.(3)
During the war, Saddam's rhetoric was fully Islamized in a way
unparalleled by any other Arab secular leader. By implication he presented
himself as the modern-day champion of Islam (mujaddid al-din). He promised his
warriors that when the battle commenced, God would give them victory as had
happened in the seventh-century battle of Badr, when a tiny Muslim army defeated
a multitude of Meccan idol worshippers. The president also invoked the memory of
a pre-Islamic battle between the Arabs and an Ethiopian invading army that had
marched on Mecca with war elephants. The invaders, he promised, would be
defeated in the same way that the Ethiopians had been, through a miraculous,
divine intervention.(4)
It is not clear how useful these promises and analogies were in raising
the troops' morale. From interviews with Iraqi soldiers who served in the war,
it emerged that at least some believed these mythological references were a
symbolic way to refer to secret Iraqi electronic devices and weapons that could
neutralize the American technological advantage. Of course, they were no such
weapons.
Following the Iraqi defeat in the war, there was no sign of a return to
rational, secular rhetoric. Indeed, in 1994, when the economic embargo resulted
in serious inflating and unprecedented suffering among the vast majority of
Iraqis, Saddam Husayn went further by introducing punishments such as severing
the right hand for theft and the death penalty for prostitution, defining these
penalties as Islamic. The Iraqi president also initiated laws forbidding the
public consumption of alcohol and introduced enhanced compulsory study of the
Qur'an at all educational levels, including in Ba'th party branches. The most
amazing step in the same direction was the declaration, in 1989, that before his
death the Christian Michel 'Aflaq, founder and chief ideologue of the Ba'th
party had converted to Islam. None of the deceased founder's friends or family
ever heard about such a momentous decision but this did not prevent the Ba'th
secular regime from making this astounding post-mortem announcement.(5)
It is impossible to gauge the extent to which the
"Islamization" steps helped the Iraqi president and his ruling elite
stay in power by more effectively legitimizing them. It would seem, however,
that such a far-reaching decision had to be based on a rational calculation that
more emphasis on Islam would strengthen the regime's popularity
A similar and perhaps more effective strategy, was the selective return
to tribal values and, most importantly, to tribal affinities. While the process
of Islamization started in earnest only after the Iraq-Iran War, the regime's
neo-tribal policies were introduced a few months after it took over in 1968.
Contrary to its ideological commitment to socialism, modernity, and
anti-tribalism as part of its European-style integrated nationalism (whether
Iraqi or pan-Arab), the new regime adopted clear-cut tribal policies.
In a sense, Saddam Husayn's own rise was linked to that factor. In
November 1969 little-known, young Saddam Husayn was chosen as vice-president of
Iraq, deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)-the state's
supreme, executive, judicial and legislative body-and deputy secretary-general
of the all-Iraqi leadership of the Ba'th party. Saddam was already in control of
internal security. As reported by a senior Ba'thi official who was then a member
of the small Iraqi Regional Leadership of the Ba'th party (RL), Saddam's growing
role gained from the relationshp between President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and his
childhood friend and distant relative, Khayr Allah Talfah, who was also Saddam
Husayn's maternal uncle, and in whose home Saddam was raised.
Talfah pointed out to Bakr that the party had once lost power (in
November 1963) because it relied too heavily on party loyalty, rather than on
family and tribal ties. For a socialist, revolutionary nationalist this was
shocking heresy, but Bakr agreed. Saddam was from the same tribe as Bakr. Talfah
suggested his young nephew, and Bakr's fellow tribesman, as Iraq's number-two
and assured Bakr that with Saddam Husayn behind him he would never need to look
over his shoulder with concern for his life and position.
Since the early 1970s, Saddam Husayn has fortified his position by
recruiting young men from his hometown, Tikrit, as his bodyguards. Within the
Tikriti population, the innermost circle from which recruits were picked was Al
Bu Nasir, the tribe to which both Saddam Husayn and President Bakr belonged. The
next phase was to introduce some of these young men into key positions in most
of Iraq's internal security bodies. The most important amongst them was Jihaz
Hanin (the Apparatus of Yearnings), later to become al-Mukhabarat al-'Amma
(General Intelligence), the Ba'th party's intelligence organ that terrorized all
of its opponents, as well as most party members.
Later on, members of Saddam's tribe were also injected into al-Amn
al-'Amm (General Security), the old, powerful internal security body established
by the Iraqi state under the monarchy. When new security bodies were created by
the Ba'th regime it was ensured that they would be effectively penetrated and
controlled by key officers hailing from Saddam Husayn's tribe. This has been
particularly the case with al-Amn al-Khass (Special Security) and al-Haras
al-Jumhuri al-Khass (the Special Guard).
During the Iraq-Iran War, al-Bu Nasir men were injected into the army and
the elite Republican Guard (RG). Indeed, following Iraq's military defeat by
Iran at al-Faw in February 1986, the president decided to "tribalize"
many elite units and the mid-level command of much of the army. He did so in the
belief that tribal men were both braver in battle and, being purely Arab,
unmixed with Iranian elements more reliable in a war against Iran. When he
realized that his own tribe was far too small for such a massive assignment, he
started recruiting young men from neighboring and friendly tribes, mostly Sunni
Arab ones but also some from southern Shi'i tribes. He recruited tens of
thousands of young men from tribes like al-Hadithiyyun, al-Shaya'isha, al-Bu
Khishman and al-Bu Bazun, all residing in and around Tikrit, but also from
al-Jubbur, and other tribes who live mostly north and west of Baghdad. For these
young men, coming from a very modest rural background and with relatively little
education, a military career was an excellent avenue for upward social
mobility(6) and there is little wonder that most of them remain loyal to the
president and regime.
Even
though there were a few cases when Republican Guard troops and even Special
Republican Guard officers were involved in coup attempts, they were clearly the
exception. Tribal loyalty is far from 100 percent, but when combined with
meaningful social and economic benefits, it creates a strong bond. It is very
likely that even this bond would melt away once these officers were certain or
near certain of Saddam's impending demise, but fortunately for him, this has
never happened.
In the army, as opposed to the RG, support for the president is far
less staunch. Thus, the RG is placed between all army units and the capital
city, and the Special Republican Guard (SRG) is stationed inside of Baghdad, and
thus between the RG and the inner rings guarding the president. As long as the
regime looks reasonably stable, the RG, the SRG, Special Security (SS), and the
Palace Guard (or Presidential Guard, Himayat al-Ra'is) will remain essentially
loyal to Saddam Husayn. If he is removed they have too much to lose: power and
prestige, higher salaries than those of their army counter-parts, and other
privileges that increase in direct relation to a soldier's proximity to the
president.
Surprisingly, the weakest link in this tribal military chain is the
president's extended family. Family troubles started for Saddam Husayn in 1988,
when his elder son, 'Udayy, murdered his beloved bodyguard and valet, Hanna
Jojo. It is possible that this was the result of Saddam's 1986 decision to marry
his mistress, Samira Shahbandar, when she was about to give birth to his baby.
Apparently, Saddam's first wife, Sajidah, and 'Udayy were incensed. Hanna Jojo
served as the messenger between the president and Samira, and this is believed
by many to have been at least part of the reason for 'Udayy's hostility. As a
result of the murder, 'Udayy was briefly imprisoned and then released and sent
to Geneva to stay with his uncle, Barzan Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti. He later
returned to Baghdad and was reinstated in all his duties. 'Udayy also developed
a deep hatred for Saddam Husayn's second cousin once removed, General Husayn
Kamil. Finally, 'Udayy also came into conflict with his uncle, Watban Ibrahim
Hasan, the Minister of the Interior.
In August 1995, 'Udayy threatened to expose Husayn Kamil's corruption,
and as a result, Kamil, with his brother Saddam Kamil, and their wives (Saddam's
two daughters) and other family members defected to Jordan, dealing a tremendous
blow to the regime's efforts to conceal its remaining non-conventional weapons.
General Kamil was one of the most central figures in these efforts. In the same
month 'Udayy also attempted to kill and seriously wounded his uncle Watban. The
president again demoted his flamboyant son and the regime entered a deep crisis.
A few months later, the Kamil brothers and their wives returned. They were
forced to divorce the president's daughters and were later murdered along with
their father and a few other family members. Their children-Saddam's
grandchildren-were spared.(7)
This was the beginning of Saddam Husayn's recovery. Since then no
meaningful family confrontations have been reported. The president also relied directly on his sons.
'Udayy was eventually reinstated as the czar of the Iraqi media and
youth, and given back the command of a militia force, Fida'iyyi Saddam. His
younger brother, Qusayy, has been put in charge of internal security. Today he
is the chief supervisor of the RG, SRG, and SS. No army unit can move without
his personal authorization. He is greatly aided by his older colleague, Saddam
Husayn's chief bodyguard, 'Abd Ihmid Hmud, a Tikriti from Saddam Husayn's tribe.
There is little doubt that there is deep suspicion and resentment between
'Udayy and Qusayy, but the system seems to be stable all the same. The
president's half-brothers were effectively neutralized after they were ousted
from all their state positions, including Barazan's job
as Iraq's ambassador to the UN in Geneva (Barazan returned to Baghdad in
1999.) Even though there may be much resentment within Saddam's paternal
cousins' family, the Majids, following the brutal murder of the Kamil branch,
there has been no sign that any of them is trying to avenge their relatives.
In short, it would seem that at the outset of the new millennium, the
Iraqi president managed to put his house back in order in a reasonable fashion
and thus is free to dedicate his undivided attention to other affairs of state.
The opposition abroad is divided and the United States and Britain give it only
very limited help. The Shi'i opposition at home is capable of unpleasant
pinpricks but unable to jeopardize the regime's stability. The Kurds are
unwilling to engage once again in meaningful anti-regime activities. As a
result, the main danger to leader and regime lies now in the unknown: a palace
coup d'etat. All the indications are that this is where the Iraqi president is
looking for trouble.
IRAQ'
By 1999, Iraq's relations with a number of neighboring states showed
clear signs of improvement. By far the most important change occurred in
Iraqi-Syrian relations. Traditional mutual suspicions notwithstanding, once Iraq
was allowed to resume selling its oil under UN supervision (see below), it
finally possessed something that Syria wanted. With a portion of its oil
revenues, Iraq has been purchasing Syrian agricultural products and other goods
since 1996. For Syria, this became a very important source of hard currency.
At the same time, Syria reversed itself and began to call for an end to
the international sanctions.(8) On the diplomatic level, Baghdad and Damascus
agreed to exchange interest offices (though this has not yet been implemented.
Iraq even went so far as to announce that even if Syria signed a peace agreement
with Israel, mutual relations would proceed, even though Baghdad would never
follow suit.(9)
Trade centers were also opened in the two capitals. In June 1997, two
border crossings were opened for the first time since 1982.
State officials but also a few tourists have been allowed to cross in
both directions, and businessmen are encouraged to conduct mutual visits.
Advanced negotiations have been conducted on reopening the Iraqi-Syrian oil
pipeline from Kirkuk and Haditha to the Mediterranean. The full capacity of the
pipeline is 1.4 million barrels a day (bpd), but at present, it can deliver no
more than 300,000 bpd.(10) All this is short of full diplomatic relations and
truly open borders. But for Iraq, which is still besieged in many ways, it is a
major breakthrough.
Relations with Egypt are the smoothest they have been since 1990.
Egyptian businessmen and officials show up regularly in Baghdad, and Iraq buys
various goods in Egypt as part of the Oil-for-Food program. Much like Damascus,
Cairo is careful not to upgrade diplomatic relations completely,(11) and
occasionally Egyptian spokesmen and newspapers are critical of the Iraqi
regime.(12) But on occasion one can hear much more agreeable remarks coming from
Cairo's government spokesmen or media. By the end of 1999, the demand to end the
embargo was sounded both by Damascus and Cairo.(13) Maybe they can afford to
make such a demand because they know that the United States and Britain are
certain to prevent such a development, and in the process, both regimes can take
up a cause that they believe is popular with many Arabs.
Jordan, whose economy has been heavily dependent on trade with Iraq,
cannot afford to criticize Baghdad, even in the limited fashion that the
Egyptian press does. Between 1995 and 1998, King Husayn was occasionally
critical of the Iraqi regime's meddling in Jordanian domestic affairs and Iraq's
general policy of confronting the UN. The King even offered support to the Kamil
brothers upon their defection. However, in the last year of his life, the
Jordanian monarch refrained from confronting Iraq and settled for a practical
co-existence.
His son, King Abdullah, has continued this policy, but has also
introduced two innovations. First,
he greatly improved Jordan's relations with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Upon his
visit to Kuwait, he announced Jordan's support for Kuwait's efforts "to
bring a positive end" to the issue of its war prisoners in Iraq.(14) The
other change was to strengthen Jordan's ties with Damascus through personal and
government-to-government contacts.
In January 2000, Jordan and Iraq signed a new trade agreement which,
while far less beneficial to Jordan than expected, was still extremely important
for Jordan's economic well-being. As in previous years, Iraq would provide for
half of its oil consumption, at a value of $300 million, free of charge. This
was defined as Saddam Husayn's personal gift to the Jordanian people. The other
half was to be sold to Jordan at a price lower than the international rate.
Jordan demanded that it pay only $14 per barrel. Eventually the price agreed
upon, to Jordan's chagrin, was $19 per barrel. This is still three or four
dollars below the market price of this brand of oil, but for Jordan this is a
high rate all the same. To compensate, the two countries decided to increase
their trade volume from $200 million in 1999 to $300 million. The total value of
the contracts signed between Jordanian companies and the Iraqi government since
the beginning of the Oil-For-Food program in 1996 grew to
$842 million.(15)
Since 1991, Iraq's relations with Iran have undergone fairly extreme
fluctuations. Even though, theoretically, the main bone of contention should
have been the permanent border issue on the Shatt-al-Arab and a few small border
zones further north (mainly Qasr Shirin and Sayf Sa'd), it seems that both Iraq
and Iran are interested in far more pressing issues. The most painful one is
that of prisoners of war. Even though on a few occasions the two countries have
exchanged them (16), Iraq claims that Iran still holds around 14,000 Iraqi
prisoners.
t is not clear whether these people are alive or dead, and, if they are
alive, whether or not they would like to go back to Iraq. Certainly some
prisoners joined the Iraqi anti-government forces fighting alongside the Iranian
troops under the command of Ayat Allah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim and the Da'wa
Party.
A second problem poisoning relations is that of the 148 Iraqi civilian
airplanes and jet fighters that crossed into Iran just before and during the
Gulf War to escape the allied bombings. When Iraq demanded them back, Iran
reported that it had sought the UN's advice and was told (very conveniently)
that, as a result of the embargo, it was not allowed to return them. Naturally,
Iraq was furious and denied that Iran had even approached the UN. Whatever the
case, the airplanes are still in Iran.
Last but not least, Iraq is accusing Iran of providing support to Shi'i
revolutionaries in the south. While the degree of Iranian support for such
operations is unclear there is no doubt that armed revolutionaries are attacking
Iraqi units in the south, mainly from makeshift bases in the marshes. Iraq also
regards Iran as responsible for occasional bombing operations in Baghdad.(17)
Iran, for its part, points to official Iraqi support of the Mujahidin
Khalq anti-Tehran movement, which has military bases on the border east of
Baghdad. The last Mujahidin operation to date was a mortar attack on government
buildings in downtown Tehran in February 2000.(18) At the same time, however,
both Iranian and Iraqi spokesmen express the wish that bilateral relations be
improved. In practice, too, trade relations are slowly being cemented, and
Iranian pilgrims are allowed to visit Karbala.(19)
Iraqi barges smuggling illegal oil products to the United Arab Emirates
through Iranian territorial waters probably could not do so without Iranian
permission. This ambivalent pattern of bilateral relations, baffling as it is,
shows real, if uneven, improvement. It would seem that in Iran the absence of a
central decisionmaking authority is making it impossible for the Iranian
leadership to act decisively one way or another. Stopping all support for the
Shi'i revolutionaries in the south is very difficult for ideological reasons, as
well as because of the accumulated influence of some half a million Iraqi exiles
in Iran. Recently the Iranian government took some steps to encourage these
Iraqi expatriates to leave, but the results of this campaign are far from
clear.(20)
Seen from the Iraqi side, giving up help to the Mujahidin Khalq is such a
major concession that Iraq may want to settle all unresolved issues first. Iran,
it seems, is satisfied with a weakened regime in Baghdad. It can do business
with it and, at the same time, has no immediate reason to worry about its
military machine. While providing limited support to the Shi'i opposition in the
south, Tehran shows no interest in Iraq's disintegration, since such a
development could plunge Iran into conflict with the Arab world. A weak Saddam
prevents disintegration, guarantees a large degree of Iraqi isolation, and
prevents pro-American forces from taking over in Baghdad.
While Iraq's relations with the UAE have improved since the
mid-1990s,(21) those with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia remain extremely tense. The
Saudis rejected all U.S. requests to use their territory as a base for launching
bombing attacks against Iraq but did
agree to allow their air space to be used by American forces. American AWACS
were also allowed to take off from Saudi territory.(22) In addition, American
jet fighters patrolling the southern No Fly Zone are using bases in Saudi
Arabia. Iraq accuses Saudi Arabia of collaborating with U.S. military attacks,
including the December 1998 air raids,(23) and even though Iraqi spokesmen
occasionally express a readiness to reconcile both with Saudi Arabia and with
Kuwait, vicious media attacks against the Saudi and Kuwaiti regimes are
frequent.(24)
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait retaliate in kind, provoking further Iraqi
diatribes.(25) It is quite clear that, while most Arab countries (including
those in North Africa and also Yemen) are gradually inching toward more normal
relations with Iraq, Kuwait, victim of the 1990 occupation, and Saudi Arabia,
which felt directly threatened, disagree. These two countries are both still
adamant in demanding Iraqi compliance with the most important UN resolutions:
total relinquishment of its WMDs and the return of the Kuwaiti prisoners and
property.
Given Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait's combined importance in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the
organization has continued a tough line against Iraq. The Gulf states have been
demanding repeatedly that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions toward its
neighbors and admit that its invasion of Kuwait was a violation of Arab and
international legitimacy as well as the Arab League's charter. The Gulf states
also distinguished between the Iraqi people and its rulers, saying they
"sincerely shared the suffering of the fraternal country of Iraq the
consequence of the policies and obstinacy of its government." The fact that
they stressed the need to "safeguard Iraq's independence and territorial
integrity" did not make the pill less bitter to the Iraqi regime.(26)
Although relations with Turkey have been characterized by extreme
contradictions, they have been remarkably stable all the same. Since 1991,
Turkey has allowed an Anglo-American (at first also the French) air force to use
its Incerlik airbase to monitor the northern No Fly Zone, and occasionally even
to attack Iraqi targets outside the No Fly Zone. Also, Turkish forces have
invaded autonomous Iraqi Kurdish regions in mop-up operations against
anti-Turkish Kurdish rebels. The Iraqi regime strongly protested both
activities. Turkey also refused repeated Iraqi appeals to break the embargo by
opening its pipelines to the free flow of Iraqi crude. Yet Turkey has allowed
the flow of oil products in trucks through the common border and, like Iraq,
greatly benefited from its cheap price. Those benefiting most were the Kurds of
southeastern Turkey, which helped soothe ethnic discontent there. Since the
beginning of the Oil-for-Food program Turkey also obtains a fee for Iraqi oil
sent through the Iraqi-Turkish pipelines going from Kirkuk to Dortyol. In
exchange for oil, Turkey sells Iraq a variety of products.
Not surprisingly, the positions of Turkish politicians vis-à-vis the
Iraqi regime are full of contradictions. Most of them no longer regard Saddam as
dangerous. Because they fear the emergence of a Kurdish state, they prefer to
see him back in the autonomous Kurdish zone, and because they need Iraqi
business, they prefer that the embargo be lifted. However, the need for close
military and political cooperation with the United States dictates caution, and
thus most Turkish politicians prefer not to rock the boat. And because they do
not fully trust the Anglo-American commitment that a fully-fledged Kurdish state
will not emerge in northern Iraq, their best option is to carefully watch all
parties concerned, and do what they can to prevent such an eventuality from
materializing.(27)
IRAQ AND THE UN
With the end of Mikhail Gorbachev's rule, the Soviet Union--and later
Russia-- started to distance itself from American policies over Iraq. Even
during the Gulf War, the USSR was careful not to send any troops to join the
coalition. By the mid-1990s, France also started to differ with the
Anglo-American position, and China never supported the military action against
Iraq. In the second half of the 1990s, these three permanent Security Council
members opposed any military action against Iraq, even when it meant abandoning
the UN inspection system.
In terms of its rhetoric, France has always been closer to Anglo-American
policies and far more committed than Russia and China to Iraq's disarmament, but
in practice the differences between France and its two partners in the Security
Council were small. While since 1998 the Russians supported the immediate
lifting of the embargo,(28) claiming that Iraq has fulfilled all its obligations
under UNSC Resolution 687 to disarm, France suggested an early end to the
embargo once the UNSCOM inspectors affirmed that Iraq had relinquished most of
its Weapons of Mass Destruction.
The French formula held that the UN should not expect Iraq to comply with
its resolutions to the letter. This was in marked contrast to the Anglo-American
approach that Iraq had to satisfy 100 percent of UNSCOM's demands. Likewise,
while the United States and Britain sought UN approval for military operations
whenever Iraq seriously interrupted UNSCOM's military activities, Russia,
France, and China always objected. This led to the Anglo-American decision to
bomb Iraq in December 1998 without asking for UN Security Council approval.
Saddam Husayn's strategy of driving a wedge between the two camps in the
Security Council proved highly successful. By promising French and Russian
companies lucrative oil deals and other contracts in Iraq after the embargo was
lifted, he managed to secure their support. The result was that, in effect, Iraq
acquired a virtual veto right in the Security Council over important aspects of
weapons inspections. Between December 1998 and December 1999 UNSCOM stayed out
of Iraq, and there were no military operations, save almost daily small-scale
confrontations over the No Fly Zones, which the Iraqi regime decided to
challenge.
At the same time, however, there was no way Saddam's supporters in the
Security Council could legally lift the embargo because such a decision could
always be vetoed by the United States and Britain. To end this draw, the five
permanent members eventually agreed to UNSC Resolution 1284, which established a
new, somewhat less independent inspection body, the UN Monitoring Verification
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC.)(29) A few weeks later, after Iraq vetoed
one candidate, Dr. Hans Blix, another Swedish diplomat who had been for many
years the Chairman of the International Atomic Energy Agency, was nominated as
the new body's director. Iraq rejected the new resolution because it demanded
full cooperation with the new inspection body for around one year before the
embargo would be suspended and because suspension meant that it could be easily
re-imposed (the suspension was to last for six months only, and to renew, there
needed to be a consensus in the Security Council.)(30) No military measures were
taken against Iraq for rejecting the resolution. This created a new stalemate in
the Security Council.
CONCLUSION: WHAT NEXT?
What is Saddam Husayn's strategy for the next phase of his confrontation
with the West? In a number of speeches, the Iraqi president has made very clear
that he does not expect the embargo to be lifted all at once. Between 1991 and
1999, he managed to get rid of the weapons inspections and, except for four
nights of aerial attacks in December 1999, was not punished for it. If he is
successful in hiding his WMD production the United States will not bomb his
installations in the future either. This is no small achievement.
At present the unresolved issue is that of the economic embargo.
Regaining full control of his oil revenues is crucial for Saddam Husayn if he
wants to rebuild his armed forces, resuscitate Iraq's economy and turn Iraq into
a regional superpower once again. There is no easy way to reach that goal.
Judging by numerous expositions of Iraqi spokesmen, Iraq's intention is to
convince, first of all, the Arab and Islamic states (foremost among them, Jordan
and Turkey), but also Russia, France, China and other powers, to break the
embargo by conducting normal dealings with Iraq. When Russian and French oil
companies refused to move in, the Iraqi authorities threatened to cancel the
contracts that they had signed with them.(31)
To date, all Iraq's overtures to overturn the embargo unilaterally have
failed, except for relatively small-scale oil smuggling through Iranian
territorial waters to the UAE, into Syria, and into southeastern Turkey. The
Iraqi hope is clearly that these breaches of the embargo will become a flood. To
encourage its neighbors and some outside powers to move along this trajectory,
Iraq has been offering lucrative deals.
It seems that Russia is the first power ready to risk a confrontation
with the United States over Iraqi oil smuggling: in February 2000 a few Russian
vessels smuggling Iraqi heavy fuel were intercepted by the U.S. Navy, and the
Russian foreign minister admonished the United States in bellicose tones,
arguing that the oil was, in fact, loaded in Iran. The Iraqis poured oil on the
diplomatic fire when they defined the incident as "sheer [US] piracy and
[Russian] humiliation."(32)
What are Saddam Husayn's options and strategic choices? Theoretically,
Saddam can stop the Oil-for-Food program, and thus create such suffering in Iraq
that the U.S.- based humanitarian community will apply more pressure on
Washington to lift the embargo. The dangers are, however, that the humanitarian
community will blame him, and not the U.S. administration, for the suffering.
More realistically, when people in Iraq feel that their daily sustenance is in
immediate danger, they might get desperate and revolt despite the fear of fierce
repression, and this time the United States may come through with strategic
help. The regime has become the prisoner of its own policy in this respect: the
Oil-for-Food program has become its opium. Alternatively, the Iraqi president
may declare that, if the embargo is not lifted, he would use his remaining
weapons of mass destruction against
Israel, or Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia or all.
In practice, however such a scenario is not likely unless his political
survival is clearly threatened. But this is far from being the case. In 2000,
Iraq's international relations are developing in a promising fashion as more and
more countries are keen to establish some presence in Baghdad, the United States
and Britain are on the defensive in the UN, and the domestic American arena
seems to be changing.
Since 1991, a very central component of Saddam Husayn's strategy
has been exploiting the suffering of the Iraqi people to influence public
opinion in the West to end the embargo. At first the American public paid little
attention to humanitarian arguments. Since the late 1990s, however, the Iraqi
claim (though largely inflated)(33) that 5,000 children were dying every month
as a result of the embargo started to change the public mood. Saddam Husayn,
Tariq 'Aziz, and other Ba'thi luminaries cynically but successfully used the
suffering of the children of Iraq, and mainly that of Iraq's Shi'i children
whose parents revolted against the regime in 1991.
Humanitarian delegations reported regularly of the very real plight of
the children in "Saddam's City" (a 2 million-person Shi'i quarter of
Baghdad) and in Shi'i towns such as 'Amara and Karbala. That the Ba'th regime
was responsible for the suffering did not detract from the tragedy. By late
1999, the "Oil-For-Food" program, introduced in 1996, greatly
ameliorated the malnutrition problem: on average every person in Iraq was
receiving by then the equivalent of 2200 Kilo-Calories for free.
(Twenty-five-hundred KCal are usually regarded as sufficient for an adult.) The
program also provided Iraq with very large quantities of medicines and medical
equipment, but malnutrition has been slow to disappear, and distributing the
medical supplies takes time. Generally speaking, the Iraqi public health system
suffered so heavily during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988), the Gulf War and the
mass revolts against the regime (1991), and the embargo, that to resuscitate it
would require a few years.
In the meantime the Iraqi regime can convincingly show that in certain
parts of the country the suffering is still great. To date, the humanitarian
reports from Saddam's City and the Shi'i south are Saddam Husayn's most potent
weapon against the embargo. The result is UNSC Resolution 1284 of December 7,
1999. The
resolution retained financial control over most of Iraq's oil revenues, but
relaxed the embargo in some important areas. Most significantly, Iraq was given
permission to sell unlimited quantities of oil (before it was limited to selling
at the value of around $5.2 billion every 180 days.)
In February 2000, Iraq was producing only a little more than 2,000,000
barrels per day, and even though prices are high-more than $25 per barrel-it
could not take advantage of the new regulation. Still, by 2001, Iraq will very
likely exceed its quota as set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, and the permission to sell unlimited quantities will become extremely
important.
The resolution also allowed Iraqi producers, for the first time, to sell
their products to their government through the Oil-for Food program. This should
have been allowed from the very outset, because it has a potential of greatly
encouraging them to increase production since they would be receiving world
market prices. Also, the resolution accepted the Iraqi request to substantially
increase the amount of money allocated to the purchase of spare parts and
technology for the oil sector. This will enable Iraq to overcome some very
serious problems and to significantly expand its oil production. Finally, all
contracts relating to food and medicines were to be automatically approved by
the sanctions committee so as to expedite the processes.
None of the aforementioned concessions seriously jeopardizes the embargo,
because its main tool, namely UN control of Iraq's oil revenues and supervision
over Iraq's contracts, remains in place. However, humanitarian concerns among
the American public opinion are growing substantially and becoming a major
threat to the U.S. administration's strategy of hemming Saddam in by denying him
control of Iraq's oil revenues.
In mid-February 2000, 70 U.S. members of Congress signed a petition
addressed to President Clinton demanding an end to the embargo. At the same
time, two leading UN officials concerned with the humanitarian operations in
Iraq resigned in protest against the embargo.(34) One of them, Hans Von Sponeck,
the UN humanitarian representative, demanded to "de-link" the
military-political aspects of the embargo from the economic-humanitarian ones.
Other humanitarian activists simply demanded an end to the embargo. What the
proponents of lifting the embargo demand is that Iraq be free to order and
distribute any goods without any limits, but that border controls designed to
prevent Saddam from importing weapons be substantially strengthened.
his approach is fully supported by the Iraqi government. Baghdad knows
that the weapons' embargo will continue for a long time, and that it will not be
lifted as long as the present regime is in power. At the same time, Iraq's
leaders also seem to believe that once they have all of Iraq's oil revenues
again under their complete control, they can buy weapons' technology, from
machine tools and know-how to fissionable material, that will enable them to
turn Iraq into a regional superpower. The strategy is not to rebuild a one-
million man army but, rather, to develop weapons of mass destruction. According
to UNSCOM reports, Iraq still has a seed stock of such weapons and much of the
know-how necessary to develop them.
It is anybody's guess what Saddam Husayn's grand design might be once he
is again in possession of such weapons. During the Gulf War, despite threats to
the contrary, he carefully refrained from using such weapons against the Saudis,
the Allied forces, or Israel. However, he also demonstrated an unacceptable
degree of risk-taking. For a non-nuclear power to threaten Israel, whom Iraq
believes to be a medium size nuclear power, is taking a huge risk.
Saddam Husayn is also prone to doomsday thinking. According to interviews
with three senior UNSCOM officials, during the Gulf War he delegated authority
to the commanders of his missile force that could have unleashed an
unconventional war. The most dangerous order was to attack Israel with
non-conventional missiles if communications between the missile force and
Baghdad were severed and if the commanders believed that Baghdad was about to be
conquered by the Allied forces. By giving his missile officers the instructions
he did, the Iraqi president had to take into account the possibility of an
Israeli nuclear response. The logic behind it is that he preferred Baghdad be
annihilated rather than conquered by the Allied forces.
All the existing evidence points to one direction, namely that the Iraqi
president is a high-risk gambler not only when it comes to his conventional
army, but, also in terms of his non-conventional arsenal. Judging by his
speeches and actions in the 1989-1991 period, his first goal is to dictate oil
prices to the Arab Gulf States and to neutralize the Iranian influence in the
Gulf. His next goal is to become the generally recognized leader of the Arab
world, mainly through assuming a confrontational posture towards Israel and
making far-reaching promises to the Palestinians. (In April 1990, for example,
he promised Arafat to liberate Jerusalem with Iraqi missiles and air power
alone.)
In 1990-1991, Saddam Husayn also indicated that he saw himself as the
potential leader of the whole Islamic world and, more dubiously, of the Third
World. It is not clear how he hopes to achieve all of these ambitious goals even
when he becomes a nuclear power and the second richest oil producer after Saudi
Arabia. But there may be little doubt that he intends to try and achieve at
least the inner core of this grand scheme.
NOTES
1. For details see Amatzia
Baram, "Qawmiyya and Wataniyya in Ba'thi Iraq: the Search for a New
Balance," in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.19, No.2
(April 1983), pp.188-200.
2. See, for example, Michel
'Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'th (Beirut, Dar al-Tali'a) (1974), p.167; Saddam Husayn,
"A View of Religion and Heritage," in his On History, Heritage and
Religion (Baghdad, Translation and Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1981),
mainly pp. 24, 27-29. Also the internal party organ Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya,
(July 1980), pp. 13-18.
3. Al-Jumhuriyya, January 15,
1991.
4. al-Thawra, October10, 1990;
September 17, 1990.
5. Amatzia Baram,
"Re-Inventing Nationalism in Ba'thi Iraq," in Princeton Papers (Fall
1998), Vol. 5, pp. 39-42.
6. For more details see
Amatzia Baram, "Neo-Tribalism in Ba'thi Iraq," in IJMES 29, (1997),
pp.1-31.
7. For details see Amatzia
Baram, Building Toward Crisis: Saddam Husayn's Strategy for Survival
(Washington, D.C., The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), pp.
7-36.
8. A declaration by a Syrian
parliamentarian; al-Malaff al-Iraqi (London), No. 54, (June 1996), p.36. Reuters
from Baghdad, May 16, 1996.
9. For example, an interview
with Tariq 'Aziz, LBC Satellite TV in Arabic (Beirut), January 2, 2000, in
FBIS-NES-DR, January 4, 2000, X-Lotus-From Domain. See also report of Iraqi
officials leaving for Syria to open the interests section and information about
mutual participation in international affairs in the two capitals and the
opening of trade centers, al-Ittihad (Baghdad), December 28, 1999, p. 8, in
FBIS-NES-DR JN2912131099 December 29, 1999.
10. US Energy Information
Administration, Iraq, December 1999, p. 5, internet version www.eia.doe.gov.
11. See Egyptian denial of
Iraqi reports that diplomatic relations will resume soon, MENA in Arabic,
November 24, 1999, in FBIS-NES-DR NC2411190499, November 24, 1999.
12. See for example Mursi 'Ata
Allah in Al-Ahram, November 18, 1999 as reported by Mid-East Mirror November 18,
1999 saying Saddam Husayn was first in imposing his own sanctions on his people,
restricting their movements, speech and the way they think.
13. See for example Foreign
Minister 'Amr Musa, "This [lifting sanctions] is not only an Egyptian
demand but a general Arab demand." Very inaccurately he also said:
"there are no reservations, either from Saudi Arabia or Kuwait." Not
surprisingly, Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahaf congratulated Musa
on his position. See also Arab League Secretary General 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid
praising Saddam for his wish to engage in a "quiet and rational dialogue to
address past mistakes([and] open a new page I Iraqi-Arab relations,"
Reuters, September 13, 1999
14. Reported by David Nissman
in Iraq Report, Vol. 2, No. 34 (September 10, 1999).
15. Al-Arab al-Yawm, Amman,
January 24, 2000, p. 14; Baghdad Iraq TV Network in English, Jan. 24, 2000, in
FBIS-NES-DR, Jan. 25, 2000.
16. The last exchange occurred
in April 1998, when Iran returned 5592 and Iraq 380 prisoners, see New York
Times, April 7, 1998.
17. See for example an
interview with Tariq 'Aziz, LBC Satellite TV in Arabic (Beirut), January 2,
2000, in FBIS-NES-DR, January 4, 2000, X-Lotus-FromDomain.
18. See warning to Iraq by the
Chief of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, news agencies from Tehran, February 9,
2000, from kurdishmedia@hotmail.com.
19. See for example, President
Khatami inviting Saddam Husayn for a visit and Iranian parliamentarians calling
for improved relations. Mid-East Mirror, September 10, 1999. For an agreement to
allow 3,000 Iranian pilgrims to visit Karbala every week, see IRNA in Persian,
November 12, 1999, in FBIS-NES-DR LD1211192799, November 12, 1999. For three
agreements on economic and trade cooperation, see BBC, Nov. 11, 1999, in
Washington Kurdish Institute, November 15, 1999, internet version, WKI@kurd.org.
20. See for example,
al-Ittihad (Baghdad), September 7, 1999, p. 1, in FBIS-NES-DR MS0809131399,
September 8, 1999; Mid-East Mirror, September 10, 1999.
21. See for example confirmed
reports that Russian companies are selling companies in the UAE spares for T-72
tanks and Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters for which the UAE has no use. These spares
find their way to a desperate customer, Iraq Defense Week, January 3, 2000, p.
3. Also, see Shaykh Zayd Bin Bultan Aal Nahyan, President of the UAE, calling
for the lifting of the embargo, Amatzia Baram, Building Toward Crisis: Saddam
Husayn's Strategy for Survival (Washington, D.C., The Washington Institute,
1998), p.144. And Shaykh Muhammad Bin Rashid Aal Maktum, the UAE Minister of
Defense calling upon Kuwait to give Iraq territory to build a harbor, as quoted
by Kuwait's al-Watan, in Iraq Report Vol. 3, No. 6, (February 11, 2000).
22. Interviews with American
officials, Washington, D.C., December 1998.
23. See for example, Saddam
Husayn's address to commanders Iraq Satellite Channel TV in Arabic, September 2,
1999, in FBIS-NES-DR , September 2, 1999.
24. See for example, Al-'Iraq,
September 7, 1999 as reported by AFP, ibid. pointing out that Iraqis could
"at a single stroke throw the al-Sabah monarchy into the waters of the
Gulf." The Kuwaiti criticism of Iraq "betrays their hallucinations and
aide the US-Zionist plot to divide the Arab and Islamic nation." An
official of the Ministry of Culture and Information on Baghdad Radio on
September 7, accusing Kuwait of "using all their wicked methods to destroy
any form of Arab solidarity" and calling the Kuwaiti regime "the lowly
ones," quoted by David Nissman Iraq Report, Vol. 2, No. 34 (September 10,
1999). See an attack against both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia that if they did not
end their collaboration with the US they "will sustain further losses
whether in terms of (relations with the Americans, the way the Arab and Muslim
masses look at you, the things history will write about you", Sami Mahdi in
al-Thawra, October 17, 1999, p. 1.
25. See for example King
Fahd's speech in the GCC twentieth Round of Foreign Ministers Summit: "In
our Gulf area the Iraqi regime still insists on its old stands and is still
incapable of learning a single lesson of the painful past." The Iraqi side
replied by accusing Fahd of adopting "the approach of treachery and
forfeiting national and pan-Arab rights," as reported in Baghdad Iraqi TV
Network in Arabic, November 29, 1999, in FBIS-NES-DR JN2911205099, November 29,
1999.
26. AFP, from Cairo, September
13, 1999
27. For more details see
Baram, Building Toward Crisis, pp.109-122.
28. For example, the Russian
Ambassador to Baghdad, Alexander Chevin, to al-Jumhuriyya, November 27, 1999,
p.3.
29. UNSC S/RES/1284 (1999),
adopted by the SC at its 4084 meeting, December 17, 1999, internet version.
30. See for example Tariq
'Aziz, interview to Baghdad Radio of Iraq Network, February 2, 2000, in
FBIS-NES-DR JN0202201800, February 2, 2000. Taha Yasin Ramadan, arguing that no
inspection at all would be tolerated any more because it serves as cover for
espionage, Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio, February 10, 2000, in FBIS-NES-DR ,
February 10, 2000; but Deputy Foreign Minister Nizar Hamdun saying Iraq might
agree if major changes are introduced into the Resolution, Iraq Report, (Vol. 3,
No. 6), February 11, 2000.
31. For overtures to Syria,
Jordan, and Turkey to bust the embargo see Baram, Building Toward Crisis,
pp.87-96, 109-136.
32. For Russian ships involved
see Steven Lee Myers, New York Times, February 1, 2000. For the foreign
minister's demand that a Russian ship be immediately released and Iraqi meddling
Segodnya (Moscow), Feb.4, 00, in FBIS-NES-DR MS0402140900, Feb.4, 2000.
33. For a solid statistical
analysis of child mortality in Iraq see Richard Garfield, Morbidity and
Mortality among Iraqi Children From 1990 to 1998: Assessing the Impact of
Economic Sanctions (Goshen, Indiana, Institute for International Peace Studies,
University of Notre Dame and the Fourth Freedom Forum, March 1999).
34. Ha-Aretz (Tel Aviv),
February 17, 2000. For more details see "The Political Scene" in MEES
Website (www.mees.com), (Vol. 43, No. 8), February 21, 2000.
Amatzia Baram is head of the Jewish-Arab Center and the Gustav Von Heinemann Middle East Institute, Haifa University. His books include Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968-1989 and Building Toward Crisis: Saddam Husayn's Strategy for Survival. He is co-editor of Iraq's Road to War.