Volume 4, No. 4 - December 2000
Volume 4, No. 4 - December 2000
By Gal Luft
Editor's
Summary: Violent confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli forces
raise the question of the effectiveness and role played by Palestinian
police/military forces. The article finds that these units have improved
training and weaponry. But their institutional conflicts inhibit their
performance. Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat keeps tight control over them and
is now playing off the Fatah militia as a new factor to portray the upheaval as
a struggle by the masses.
The violent upheaval by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza during
September-November 2000 raised many political issues. One of the most
interesting but least addressed is the role of Palestinian police and military
units during this second intifada. At various times, they tried to stop
violence, participated in it, or acted merely as onlookers. What does this tell
us about the capabilities, political function, and future character of these
all-important institutions?
Four years earlier, following the September 1996 opening of the Hasmonean
Tunnel in Jerusalem, Palestinian policemen and Israeli soldiers exchanged heavy
fire throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip leaving 85 Palestinians and 16
Israelis dead, and more than 1,200 Palestinians and 87 Israelis wounded. The
"September riots," as they were called, showed the Palestinian
security services (PSS) acting very differently than had been expected under the
Oslo agreements, which gave them the task of providing for peace and security in
the Palestinian Authority (PA) ruled territories.
While engaging in diplomatic negotiations with Israel, the Palestinians
have been planning and preparing for the scenario of a failed diplomatic option
and the possibility of a next round of violence. After the 1996 events, the
41,000-strong security forces improved their tactical sophistication, introduced
new training methods and obtained new weapons and equipment.
But after weeks of intensive fighting in September-November 2000 between
PSS troops and the Israel Defense Force (IDF) the PSS's poor performance is
puzzling.
Certainly, during those demonstrations, the Palestinian police failed to
fulfill all the duties and functions assigned to them by the Oslo agreements.
These include: the maintenance of internal security and public order; the
protection of property and places of special importance such as Jewish holy
places in Palestinian-controlled territories; the prevention of incitement to
violence and the fight against terrorism.
At the same time, though, PA Chairman Yasir Arafat and his lieutenants
not only refrained from using their armed forces as an instrument to impose
peace, they also did not--contrary to some analysts' predications--use their
troops as a tool of war either. Throughout the clashes Palestinian troops did
not demonstrate even a fraction of the capabilities they had developed. They
inflicted minimal casualties on the IDF, used virtually none of the special
weapons--such as anti-tank missiles--in their possession, and failed to initiate
and execute any significant military operation against Israeli targets.
Was the poor military performance a result of pure incompetence? Lack of
will? Or was it a result of Arafat's calculated strategy of incremental use of
force that leaves, for now, the Palestinian military units in their camps?
PALESTINIAN MILITARY BUILDUP SINCE SEPTEMBER 1996
Being more than a regular police force and short of being a fully matured
army, the 12 branches of the PSS have invested great efforts to learn the
lessons from the previous major clashes with the IDF. New weapons and tactics
have been introduced, and training has improved considerably.
Palestinian police officers go through a rigorous training program.
Junior officers are being trained in the Jericho police academy; more senior
company and battalion commanders received professional training in Egypt, Yemen,
Algeria, and Pakistan as commanders of combat units. (1) This training enabled
them to think and plan as field commanders rather than as police officers.
Since 1996, the PSS have increased the size of formations capable of
executing independent military operations from small-sized units such as
platoons and companies to full battalions. In the first half of 2000 alone, half
a dozen battalion-level exercises were held in the Gaza Strip. (2) Despite the
fact that live-fire training has been restricted to platoon level, the
battalions trained in rather complicated combat scenarios such as gaining
control of an area of land and mock attacks on IDF posts and Jewish settlements.
In an attempt to increase the number of Israeli casualties in case of a
war, the Palestinians recruited a large number of snipers equipped with
telescopic sights for their M-16 and AK-47 rifles. In addition, it has been
reported that some of the Palestinian security apparatuses obtained weapons
prohibited by the Oslo agreements such as light anti-armor weapons, rocket
propelled grenades, anti-tank missiles, light mortars, land mines and hand
grenades. Several reports indicated that the Palestinians also obtained
shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles and truck-mounted anti-aircraft guns.
(3)
The PA succeeded in amassing stocks of weapons and ammunition through
smuggling and theft from Israeli military bases and private homes. Cross-border
smuggling, mainly from Jordan and Egypt, also enriched the PA's arsenal. In this
way, Palestinians were able to triple the number of light weapons originally
entrusted to them by the Oslo agreements and, hence, to arm civilian militias
such as the Tanzim and veterans of the Fatah Hawks militia.
The September 28, 1995 Oslo II agreement permitted
the PA 15,000 light weapons and 240 machine guns of 0.3" or 0.5"
caliber.
Preparing for a long, protracted military confrontation with Israel also
required the build-up of a strong logistical base to supply Arafat's forces with
food, water, medications, weapons and ammunition. Throughout the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, the PA established warehouses where war material--mainly light
ammunition, hand grenades and first aid equipment--was prepared and stored. Since no IDF operations are allowed in Area A, the Palestinians
store most of their weapons and ammunition in the towns, where there is no risk
of IDF raids. Prior to the eruption
of the al-Aqsa intifada, the PA imported large amounts of food supplies, stored
large amounts of water and oil and prepared an alternative power source by
deploying large generators in various locations in the PA. Most of the purchases
are legal imports, some of the equipment was bought in Israel.
ASSESSMENT OF PSS PERFORMANCE DURING THE RIOTS
The massive wave of violent demonstrations that broke out in late
September, following Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon's visit to the
Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, was met with a weak response by the Palestinian
police. In September 1996 Palestinian policemen formed, in many cases, human
chains to prevent demonstrators from advancing on Israeli settlements and
military outposts. During the current crisis, they did not interfere with
Palestinians demonstrating against Israel in such areas as the Neztarim Junction in
Gaza or outside the West Bank towns of Nablus, Ramallah, Tulkarm, Qalqilia
Bethlehem, and in Hebron.
Two incidents in October--the destruction of the Jewish holy site
Joseph's Tomb in Nablus and the attack on the Palestinian police station in
Ramallah that murdered two Israeli soldiers held by the police--showed the
Palestinian police's lack of resolve in dealing with a rioting mob. In many
cases, Palestinian policemen took off their uniforms, joined the demonstrators
and opened fire on IDF troops.
There were several reasons for this conduct. First, the PSS have had
relatively little training in crowd control. They also lack necessary equipment
such as shields, helmets, flak jackets, clubs, radio equipment, armored
vehicles, tear gas and other non-lethal weapons to contain massive
demonstrations.
Second, the policemen themselves are strong nationalists who support the
demonstrators' cause and methods. As one Western diplomat put it: "they
don't have their hearts in it because they'd probably prefer to be throwing
stones at the Israelis themselves." (4)
The Palestinian police showed in the past that it could put down violent
riots aimed against the PA itself. On Friday, November 18, 1994, the PSS
clashing with thousands of Hamas demonstrators outside the Filastin Mosque in
Gaza killed 13 and wounded about 200 demonstrators. This kind of resolution
could not be demonstrated when demonstrators attack IDF troops. PSS personnel do
not want to be seen as Israeli lackeys and would not even contemplate opening
fire at their own people.
Third, the PSS is responsive to Arafat's orders. This explains the
difference between its performance during the earlier part of the 1996 violence
and the role it played during the 2000 violence.
Nevertheless, the PSS also seemed to show less military ability in 2000
compared to the part it played in the rioting of 1996. Despite the heavy volume
of fire exchanged between Palestinian policemen and the IDF--and despite the
long training undergone--Palestinian policemen didn't reach a high level of
marksmanship and proficiency with their weapons. Unlike the September 1996 riots
in which PSS officers succeeded in killing 14 Israeli soldiers including some
senior officers, in the al-Aqsa intifada not one Israeli soldier was killed in
combat with Palestinian police officers for the first seven weeks of the
confrontation, until a Palestinian police captain infiltrated Kfar Darom on
November 18 and killed a sentry before being killed himself.
This outcome could be attributed to the great efforts the IDF made since
1996 to improve its troops' protection, but the main reason for the IDF's low
casualty rate lies in the fact that most Palestinian fire was sporadic and
inaccurate. The sniper units were not put into action.
GOOD COP, BAD COP
The main problem in the PSS's operations is lack of coordination among
the various security services and between members of the official security
services and the civilian militias. The PSS is comprised of no less than 12
different services, the most prominent of which are the Civil Police, National
Security Forces, Preventive Security Forces, General Intelligence, Civil
Defense, Military Police, Military Intelligence and the Presidential Security
Forces, better known as Force 17.
Most of the branches have two commanders, equal in rank: one in the West
Bank and the other in the Gaza Strip. Those regional commanders report directly
to Arafat rather than being subjected to an intermediate level of operational
command or a general staff-like body. Competition, suspicion and tense relations
exist between the security chiefs to the extent that in several cases armed
clashes occurred between members of competing services.
Palestinian security apparatuses invest great efforts undermining each
other and are encouraged by Arafat to spy on each other. Arafat, as a result, is
the only one who can arbitrate among the different forces and through him their
chiefs communicate with each other. This system of command ensures that none of
the security forces becomes powerful enough to pose a threat to Arafat's
leadership. But in time of war Arafat's style of command impairs coordination
and unity of effort between the security apparatuses.
Studies on military effectiveness of Arab armies conclude that lack of
coordination and lack of trust are among the main reasons for poor battlefield
performance. The conduct of Palestinian military affairs so far indicates that
the Palestinians are not likely to be the exception.
(5)
Heads of security apparatuses receive, mostly through unsecured phone
lines, contradictory orders from Arafat's office. Simultaneously, one service
may receive an order to tighten control over the crowd while the other receives
an order to loosen it.
Arafat's differing use of his security services can be seen in his
treatment of Hamas and Islamic Jihad members. One PSS unit may be ordered to
arrest opposition activists while another unit may be instructed to release
Hamas prisoners or allow them to "escape" from prison. IDF head of the
Southern Command Major General Yom-Tov Samia revealed that the senior PSS
officers who are in daily contact with the IDF are aware of the fact that Arafat
"speaks in a different language with each body in the PA's security
establishment." (6)
Consequently, PSS chiefs do not feel accountable to agreements Israel
entered with their colleagues. Israeli military officials complained that at
least three times during the first two weeks of the clashes they succeeded in
securing commitments by senior PSS military commanders--among them commander of
National Security Forces in Gaza General Abd al-Raziq Majaida and his West Bank
counterpart General Haj Ismail--to reduce the violence but to no avail.
The Palestinian commanders admitted that they could not exercise their
control over any security forces not under their direct command. In most
countries, all the branches of the military forces submit to the command of a
general staff headed by a chief of staff. By way of contrast, Arafat is the only
person who controls all the PA's military bodies. But for seven of the first
nine days of the crisis Arafat was away from the battle scene. Rather than
managing the crisis from his command post in Gaza, Arafat preferred to travel
between Jordan, Egypt, France and Spain. In his absence, the PSS became an even
more confused, chaotic organ that did not have much effect on events on the
ground.
The Palestinians' weak system of command and control may undermine their
capability to engage in a long, protracted war against Israel. The disunity
between the services and the absence of a general staff-type body prevents
effective control over essential elements of the war effort such as supplies,
manpower, weapons and ammunition.
Several times during the clashes, Palestinian fighters ran out of
ammunition and had to cease-fire. There were warehouses of weapons and
ammunition not far away but these belonged to another security force which would
not reduce its own supplies (and, hence, power) by giving equipment to another
group. There is little mutual logistical assistance among the forces and they do
not coordinate their operations.
THE PROBLEM OF TANZIM
Another problem the PSS face is the growing power of the Tanzim, the
armed wing of Fatah, the largest faction of the Palestine Liberation
Organization. Tanzim led the rioting and confrontation with the IDF in September
1996 and the Nakba riots of May 2000. It has about 20,000 members, some of whom
are armed with automatic weapons and trained by the PSS. The turning over of
arms to the Tanzim contradicts the Oslo agreements.
The Tanzim's primary duty is to control opposition to Arafat in the PA.
For this purpose, Arafat has been funding and grooming the organization. At the
same time, though, Arafat has distrusted and tried to undercut the power of the
Tanzim's chief, Marwan Barghuti, leader of Fatah in the West Bank. For his part,
Barghuti has often criticized Arafat indirectly and battled the PA's official
security organs, which he accuses of corruption.
Barghuti also blamed the PSS for not having done their job to protect the
Palestinians from Israeli attacks.
(7) The organization,
however, has grown in power and prestige, at the expense of the PA's military
apparatus.
Armed Tanzim activists often brush off the uniformed policemen and
disobey their instructions. Palestinian policemen are reluctant to confront the
militia which has grown to become the most visible and active armed body of the
PA. Arafat prefers to yield leading role of his armed intifada to the popular,
plainclothes Tanzim activists since this lets him present the Palestinian
struggle as an authentic popular uprising.
Several times during the first weeks of the clashes, Arafat instructed
the Tanzim to escalate the violence, while at the same time giving his uniformed
security chiefs opposite instructions. As a result, Palestinian policemen find
themselves confronted by an uncontrolled armed force backed by Arafat. Hence,
they are prevented from exercising the power and authority granted to them by
both the Oslo agreement and the PA itself.
Another problem is that many members of Tanzim, especially in the Gaza
Strip, are in fact PSS employees. During
the day, these people work as intelligence agents and police officers enforcing
the law. Off-duty, they participate in the same activities they are being paid
to thwart.
One incident demonstrates the complex relations between Tanzim
and the PSS. When a critically wounded IDF soldier was trapped on October 1 in
Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, the IDF requested that two PSS commanders in the West
Bank, Preventive Security chief Jibril Rajub and Palestinian Police chief Haj
Ismail facilitate his evacuation. But the tomb compound was surrounded by Tanzim
activists. For two hours, the Tanzim prevented the PSS chiefs from entering the
compound. The soldier died of his wounds before medical assistance was allowed
to arrive while the helpless PSS chiefs stood by powerless to act.
Since the beginning of the clashes, many speculated on the extent in
which Arafat controls the Tanzim. The dominant assessment is that the Tanzim is
tightly controlled by Arafat and will continue to submit to his authority,
whatever personal or political frictions take place between Arafat and Barghuti.
(8)
Yet this situation also creates a new problem for Arafat in regulating
the relations between the official security forces and the unofficial forces of
the Tanzim. Failure to do so would continue to erode the PSS's power, let the
Tanzim claim credit for waging the struggle, and lead more Palestinian policemen
to give their loyalty to the Tanzim and not their own commanders. As a result,
Arafat could face resentment from the security forces and a challenge from the
Tanzim itself. (9)
CONCLUSIONS
At first sight, the PSS's performance during the recent clashes in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip may raise doubts about the Palestinians' military
effectiveness and the PSS's ability to pose a serious challenge to the IDF. But
the apparent weakness of the Palestinian police is more likely due to a
calculated decision by Arafat to spare, at least for the moment, his uniformed
armed forces from the fray.
Arafat seems to have chosen to keep the lion share of his security forces
disengaged from the fighting and put them into action only if and when an
all-out war with Israel broke out. Seeking international sympathy and wary of
the IDF's military superiority, Arafat did not want to escalate the battle too
much. To do so would have destroyed any chance of using a diplomatic option.
Thus, the PSS as such did not launch concerted attacks or use certain weapons in
its possession, while Arafat portrayed the rioting as a defensive but popular
struggle of the masses.
Equally important, Arafat surely knows that an exposure of the PA's true
military capabilities might confirm the Israeli claim that the PA has been
clandestinely developing an army under the disguise of a police force. Exposing
the PA's military capabilities at this stage would be self-defeating because it
would enforce the legitimacy of the Israeli demands for Palestinian
demilitarization as part of future negotiations.
Indeed, to show the capability of the PA's military could also be a
serious disincentive for Israel to make concessions or accept the creation of an
independent Palestinian state. Beyond a certain point, it is against Arafat's
interest to expose the threat that Palestinian forces could pose to Israel under
such circumstances.
A month into the clashes, when Palestinian casualties were 12 times
higher than those of Israel, Jibril Rajub commented in an interview: "So
far the PA has shown restraint in its conflict with Israel but the crimes of the
settlers, the closure, the collective punishment and the heavy hand of the IDF
will leave no other alternative to the PA but to respond." (10) Rajub's
comment should indicate to Israel that it would be imprudent to draw premature
conclusions on the PSS's poor military effectiveness based on its performance
during the events of autumn 2000.
NOTES
(1)
Ha'aretz, July 12, 2000.
(2)
Yediot Ahronot, Weekend Supplement, June 23, 2000.
(3)
Ha'aretz, June 23, 2000, Yediot Ahronot, November 3, 2000.
(4)
The Washington Post, October 22, 2000.
(5)
See Norville de Atkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 4,
no. 1 (March 2000) and Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture
on Arab Military Effectiveness," Ph.D. Dissertation MIT, 1996.
(6)
Interview with Maj. General Yom-Tov Samia, Yediot Ahronot, October 8,
2000.
(7)
Interview, Jerusalem Post November 2, 2000.
(8)
Yediot Ahronot, Weekend Supplement, October 13, 2000.
(9)
For a discussion of the security forces, the Tanzim, and their political
positions, see Barry Rubin, The Transformation of Palestinian Politics
(NY, 1999). See also Gal Luft, "The Palestinian Armed Forces," MERIA
Journal, Vol. 3 No. 2 (June 1999). Available at <http://meria.biu.ac.il>.
(10)
Ha'aretz, internet edition, October 27, 2000.
* Lieutenant colonel IDF (Res.) Gal Luft is a doctoral candidate at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and author of "The Palestinian Security Forces: Between Police and Army (Washington, DC: 1998)." His article, "The Palestinian Armed Forces" appeared in MERIA Journal, Vol. 3 No. 2 (June 1999).