Volume 4, No. 3 - September 2000
Volume 4, No. 3 - September 2000
Editor's
Summary: Beginning in the early 1980s, arms transfers in Sino-Middle Eastern
relations are a relatively new phenomenon. Both China and Israel are
occasionally blamed, primarily by the United States, for upsetting the military
balance in East Asia and the Middle East respectively and for undermining U.S.
security interests. However, these accusations can by no means be substantiated
given the quantity and the quality of the military technology they supply and an
examination of specific deals and weapons' systems.
Washington's
successful pressure on Israel to cancel the sale of the Phalcon early-warning
plane to the People's Republic of China (PRC) has yet again highlighted the
issue of Israel's arms transfers to China and, indirectly, of Chinese arms
transfers to the Middle East.(1) One of Washington's arguments is that Israeli
military technology supplied to China could eventually reach hostile Middle
Eastern end users. Moreover, both China and Israel have been respectively blamed
for upsetting the Middle Eastern and the East Asian regional military balance;
for allegedly transferring unconventional military technologies and equipment
(occasionally illegally) and, thereby, for undermining regional U.S. interests
and putting American lives at risk.
First
formulated in the mid-1980s, these serious allegations persist, with ups and
downs, to this very day. Though recent accusations have been directed against
Jerusalem, the ultimate address is Beijing. The facts notwithstanding, following
the Soviet Union's collapse, and even earlier, China has been singled out by
some U.S. circles as a "threat" bent on a policy of proliferation for
non-conventional military nuclear and chemical weapons of mass destruction,
materials and equipment. Based on its alleged long-term strategic-global
aspirations, Beijing has also been criticized for compromising various
international agreements such as the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF),
the missile technology control regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and, more recently, the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
If
true, the implications of these allegations are by no means limited to the
bilateral relations between Washington and Jerusalem or between Washington and
Beijing. The outcome may well be an increase in regional and even global tension
and a revival of the Cold War, whose obituaries would then have been premature.
Paradoxically, if the allegations prove to be untrue, the outcome could be even
worse, namely, an artificial increase in tension, invented threats, imagined
enemies and a self-fulfilling prophecy. The purpose of this article is to offer
a rational, realistic, balanced and sober analysis of arms transfers in
Sino-Middle Eastern relations.
Chinese Arms Transfers
China
is a newcomer to the Middle East arms market. For three decades, until the late
1970s, the Middle East arms market had been completely monopolized by the United
States, the Soviet Union, and their allies. From 1976 to 1980, the last five
years before Chinese arms sales to the Middle East began, the entire value of
arms transfers to the Middle East had reached $38.6 billion, 35 percent of the
world's total. Of these, the U.S. share was $14.2 billion (nearly 37 percent)
and, together with its allies, $22.7 billion (nearly 60 percent).(2) Practically
excluded from the Middle East until the early 1980s, the Chinese share was too
small even to be mentioned or measurable. Thus, despite the militant attitudes
and revolutionary rhetoric of Chinese leader Mao Zedong and the predominance of
strategic and security considerations in Chinese foreign policy, Chinese arms
had played an insignificant role in the Middle East military balance.(3)
China's
penetration of the Middle East arms market began after Mao's death in 1976 as an
outcome of two processes. At home, the time-honored Maoist revolutionary
ideology of self-reliance was now replaced by an Open Door policy based on
rational economic development and overall reform. Consequently, arms were now
regarded as a commodity that could be legitimately sold and Beijing began
looking for accessible markets. Abroad, the withdrawal of traditional arms
suppliers from the Middle East, primarily the Soviet Union, as well as the
region's persistent conflicts, had created an opportunity that Beijing could not
afford to miss. Some of the Middle Eastern customers, who wanted more weapons,
welcomed Chinese arms because of their low prices, sturdiness, lack of political
preconditions and, last but not least, compatibility with familiar Soviet
weapons.
Since
the early 1980s the PRC began to sell arms to Middle Eastern countries on an
unprecedented scale.(4) For one decade, this was China's principal, in fact
nearly exclusive, arms market. In 1985, for example, the Middle East absorbed
100 percent of all Chinese arms deliveries and in 1986, over 94 percent of all
Chinese arms sales agreements were signed with Middle Eastern countries. Yet,
while the predominance of the Middle East in China's arms sales system is
obvious, the impact of these sales on the Middle Eastern military balance is
doubtful, in terms of both quantity and quality.
To
begin with, China's arms supplies to the Middle East had a rather brief spell of
importance. From 1988 onward, the proportion of China's arms deals with the
Middle East was far lower, reaching 16.7 percent in 1992. In 1994-1997 the share
of the Middle East in China's arms deliveries was 18 percent.(5)
More
important, China's arms supplies to the Middle East have been dwarfed by those
of other arms suppliers. Even at their peak in 1987, Chinese arms transfers to
the Middle East barely reached 12 percent of all sales to the region, while the
average for 1983-94 was 4.6 percent. China may have been the fourth or fifth
largest arms supplier to the Middle East in certain years, but its share in the
region's total arms agreements was still very small. From 4.4 percent in 1983-86
(the U.S.: 16.4 percent) it increased to 8.2 percent in 1987-90 (the U.S.: 28
percent), and then declined to 1.2 percent in 1991-94 (the U.S.: 56 percent),
and to 2.14 percent in 1994-97 (the United States: 35.5 percent).(6) Thus,
Chinese arms transfers to the Middle East have been no more than a fraction of
U.S. and Soviet arms transfers, not to mention their allies'.
To
be sure, China has become a more significant arms supplier in the case of two
Middle Eastern countries: Iran and Iraq. From 1983 to 1986, these two countries
absorbed nearly 92 percent of all Chinese arms transfer agreements and nearly 88
percent of all Chinese arms transfer deliveries to the Middle East in terms of
value. In 1987-90, following the end of the Iran-Iraq war, their share declined
to 55 and 56 percent respectively. After the Gulf war, Iran's share increased to
57 and 69 percent respectively, while China has honored its commitment to the
UN-imposed embargo by cutting off military relations with Iraq. In the 1980s
China was Iran's largest single military supplier, reaching about one-third of
Iran's imports.(7) With a share of 27.3 percent and 84.8 percent respectively,
Iran was still China's principal arms customer in 1995-1997 in general, and in
the Middle East in particular. In
the 1980s China's share in Iraq's arms import agreements was 8.3 percent (51.4
percent by the Soviet Union) and 11.7 percent of deliveries (45.8 by the Soviet
Union).
In
sum, the PRC could by no means be blamed for "arming" the Middle East.
Unlike the traditional suppliers, China's opportunity window was rather narrow,
limited to the 1980s. In those years, the estimated share of PRC-made arms in
the arsenals of its main Middle Eastern customers (Egypt, Iran and Iraq) indeed
reached impressive proportions: about one-half of their fighter aircraft,
submarines, and missile frigates; one-third of their gun boatsand patrol crafts;
and one-quarter of their field artillery.
Since
the early 1990s, however, the Chinese share-and the level of its arms transfers
in general-have declined drastically. Traditional suppliers have soon stepped in
to regain parts of their lost markets, forcing China to step out. For the Middle
Eastern customers this was an easy, though more expensive, choice. In a
retrospective view from the vantage point of the high-tech Gulf War, the
advantages of Chinese arms transfers-such as low prices, no strings attached,
sturdiness, and compatibility with existing (Soviet-made) arsenals-have been
overwhelmingly outweighed by their disadvantages: backwardness and poor quality.
Most,
if not all, PRC-made weapons are endlessly recycled and upgraded versions of
outdated 1950s and 1960s Soviet models (some derived in turn from 1930s German
models) which could by no means compete with state-of the-art Soviet, let alone
Western, weapons. For 20 years, from the early 1960s to the early 1980s, China
had been cut of from external sources of military technology and advanced
weapons. Moreover, during those years Beijing accorded first priority to the
development of non-conventional weapons and missiles (to be discussed below)
that absorbed much of China's energy, funds and manpower at the expense of
research and development of conventional weapons. When China opened up to the
outside world in the early 1980s, it could offer a relatively wide range of
upgraded versions of conventional weapons (based on obsolete models of an
earlier generation), various types of missiles, and non-conventional
technologies.
To
be sure, upgraded Chinese weapons are probably better than the Soviet models on
which they are based. Thus, though based on the Soviet 1950s vintage T-54 main
battle tank (MBT), the Chinese Type-59 and Type-69 MBTs (of which 1,850 had been
supplied to the Middle East in the 1980s) have been equipped with modern
fire-control systems, infrared night vision capabilities, enhanced engines, etc.
Also, China's F-6 and F-7 fighter aircraft (known in China as J-6 and J-7, of
which some 350 have been supplied to the Middle East), are modified copies of
the outdated Soviet MiG-19 and MiG-21 respectively. These export versions,
however, incorporate more advanced avionics and other technologies (some of
Western origins) that could considerably improve the aircraft's performance.
Yet,
despite these improvements, PRC weapons still lag far behind more advanced,
sophisticated models of recent generation. There is an obvious limit as to how
much an outdated system could be upgraded, and how many times it could be
recycled. Aware of the shortcomings of Chinese weapons, Middle Eastern armed
forces have rarely tested them under real battlefield conditions. Deployed as a
second line or reserve, PRC weapons have played a marginal role, if any, in
Middle Eastern hostilities (unlike weapons supplied by the United States and the
Soviet Union), except for missiles.
Tactical
missiles are not only Beijing's principal military export to the Middle East but
also the most diversified. At least ten different types of Chinese missiles have
been supplied to Middle Eastern countries. These are, probably, the most
effective and successful PRC-supplied weapon systems - more because of their
deployment in strategic locations rather than for their particular
sophistication. In fact, like most other Chinese weapons, they are also based on
earlier Soviet types. Thus, the HJ-73 antitank missile is based on the Soviet
AT-3 Sagger, and the HN-5 surface-to-air missile is based on the Soviet SA-7
Grail or Strella. But it is the HY-2 ship-to-ship or surface-to-ship missile,
known as Silkworm and based on the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx, that came to symbolize
the China's "military intrusion" into the Middle East.(8)
By
the late 1980s, nearly 350 Silkworms had been supplied to Middle Eastern
countries including Egypt, Iraq and, notably, Iran. In early 1987 a number of
HY-2 launchers had been deployed by radical Iranian Revolutionary Guards along
the narrow bend of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most congested, sensitive oil transportation waterways. Ignoring U.S.
warnings that the Silkworms are "a tremendous threat" and "a very
serious escalation," in September and October 1987 Iran fired seven
missiles hitting a Kuwaiti offshore oil terminal, as well as U.S. ships. The
resulting American sanctions imposed on China did not last long but soon
converged with the sanctions imposed on China following the Tiananmen massacre.
These sanctions proved to be not only unproductive but, moreover,
counterproductive as Beijing now felt free to upgrade its arms export to Iran.
It was only in 1998, after 200 advanced C-801 and C-802 PRC-made cruise
missiles, incorporating Western technology, had already been supplied to Iran,
that China agreed not to help Tehran to upgrade its cruise missile systems.
Unlike
these conventional missiles, China has so far been careful not to supply other
types of short-range missiles that could carry a non-conventional warhead. These
include the M-9 (domestic designation, DF-15 [Dongfeng, or East Wind]), an
advanced 600 km-range road-mobile surface-to-surface single-stage
solid-propellant missile with a 500 kg payload capable of carrying a nuclear
device. Well before the M-9 was even flight-tested, Syria and Iran had
reportedly paid a deposit and invested in its research and development revealing
their eagerness to buy the missiles.
Nonetheless,
and despite allegations to the contrary, the M-9 has never been supplied to the
Middle East. More specifically, Beijing has kept its word to Israel, said to be
given as early as 1986 (probably in return for Israeli military transfers, to be
discussed below), not to provide the M-9 to Syria. A year later, the MTCR, just
signed by seven U.S.-led countries, restricted the sale of ballistic missiles
with a range above 300 km and a payload of over 500 kg. The PRC was not one of
the signatories and had never been invited to join the secret discussions
leading to this agreement. Nevertheless, Beijing has still been subject to U.S.
pressure and even intimidation to abide by the MTCR rules, with which it was
finally forced to agree in 1992, when the M-9 had already started production.
Unlike
the M-9, the 300-kilometer-range M-11 is at best a borderline case that is not
covered by the MTCR rules. Nevertheless, while it has reportedly been supplied
to Pakistan, it has not been supplied to the Middle East. This is probably more
related to unofficial understandings with Israel and the United States than to
the MTCR. Beijing's commitment to the MTCR is vague, reluctant, and superficial,
depending to a great extent on the nature of its relations with the rest of the
world, and primarily with the United States, Israel, and the Middle Eastern
countries. Any perceived shift of this delicate balance of understandings (e.g.,
the U.S.-forced cancellation of the Phalcon deal) might release the Chinese from
their unofficial commitments, leading to a revised missile transfer policy. This
could seriously alter the Middle East military balance, which has so far hardly
been affected by Chinese arms, not even by the intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (IRBM) supplied to Saudi Arabia.(9)
Revealed
in 1988, the deal involved an undisclosed number of DF-3 IRBMs
(known in the West as CSS-2), a mobile single-stage liquid-fuel missile
capable of delivering a payload of 2,150 kg, or a 1-3 megaton nuclear warhead,
over a distance of 2,650 km. It has the longest range of all Middle Eastern
missiles, nearly three times that of its nearest rival. When based in Saudi
Arabia, its range covers not only the Middle East but also east Africa, Turkey,
Iran, Afghanistan as well as parts of India, Pakistan, and the former Soviet
Union. Apparently, a deal of such proportions and by such a supplier should have
entailed strong reactions and deep concern among those whose interests could be
affected, primarily the United States, Israel, Russia, etc.
In
fact, and despite the initial surprise, reactions were mild, nearly indifferent,
and for good reasons. Developed since 1964 and test-launched for the first time
in December 1966, the DF-3 is an outdated, vulnerable (on the ground) and
inaccurate IRBM. Transporting and preparing the missile for launch take a few
hours and its circular error probablity (CEP) is 1,500-2,000 meters. More
important, the Chinese had replaced its original nuclear warhead with a
high-explosive (HE) conventional one, less threatening and less lethal. To be
sure, although they had reportedly become operational a few weeks before, the
Saudi-acquired DF-3s provided no deterrence whatsoever against Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait in August 1990 or against Iraq's attacks on Saudi military
installations. Similarly, Saudi Arabia failed to use the DF-3s for retaliation
in response to these attacks.
In
sum, despite repeated U.S. warnings, the DF-3 deal and other PRC missile and
arms transfers have not upset the Middle Eastern balance of power, nor increased
regional tension, weakened U.S. position, threatened Israel or triggered a new
arms race. Occasional reports leaked by the CIA and other U.S. agencies about
China's continued transfer of missiles and missile technologies to the Middle
East, primarily to Iran, have yet to be substantiated and remain small in
proportion to arms transfers by other countries, first and foremost Russia. This
is especially relevant to non-conventional military technologies.
One
of the most serious allegations directed against the PRC, primarily by the
United States, concerns nuclear and chemical transfers. The Chinese still insist
that they have never provided any such weapons or military technology to the
Middle East. This may be true only in the narrow sense, for there are reports on
the "gray area" of non-conventional transfers of technology,
equipment, materials and know-how that could have dual use: civilian as well as
military.
An
early example is Algeria, where a Chinese-designed nuclear research reactor was
built in the second half of the 1980s. Though it is a small 15MW reactor powered
by slightly enriched uranium, reports suggested that it could in fact be a 40MW
reactor capable of producing enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb by 1998.
Algeria not only firmly refuted the allegation but also signed an inspection
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in early 1992.
Nothing much has been heard about it since, meaning that the reactor indeed
serves civilian peaceful purposes.
In
the case of Iran, it is China that withdrew its offers to provide nuclear
reactors. In 1992 Washington thwarted a Chinese attempt to sell Iran two 20MW
research reactors. A year later, Beijing agreed to provide Iran with two 300MW
power reactors. In 1995 China admitted, for the first time, that it had been
providing Iran with nuclear technology for medical, scientific, and training
purposes. Under U.S. pressure, and allegedly due to "financial" and
"technical" problems, the power reactor deal was cancelled. Occasional
reports about nuclear military cooperation between China and Iran have been
consistently denied not only by the two parties but also the IAEA.
China
has also been accused of providing Iran (and Iraq, before the embargo) with
chemicals that could be used for non-conventional weapons. In July-August 1993,
U.S. warships and airplanes were trying to intercept a Chinese ship (the Yin He)
that, according to intelligence reports, was carrying dangerous chemicals to
Iran. A combined inspection team (including Chinese, U.S., and Saudi officials)
found nothing. This by no means imply that non-conventional Chinese equipment,
materials, technologies, and know-how, do not find their way to Iran, Iraq or
other countries. China's defense-industrial system is so complicated and
decentralized as to defy close supervision. Deals through Hong Kong have become
easier since July 1997. China, however, is by no means an exception:
non-conventional military equipment, materials, technologies, and know-how have
been leaked to the Middle East (and to China) by a number of Western countries,
including the United States.
Criticizing
U.S. hardliners, Robert S. Ross, professor at Boston College and research
associate at Harvard University, states matters clearly: "It is true that
Chinese commercial enterprises have exported chemical weapon materiel. But it is
also true that its weapon proliferation policy is in substantive compliance with
all international arms control agreements….China has not exported a single
missile, transferred any nuclear technology, or engaged in proliferation of
chemical weapons' raw materials in violation of any international arms control
regime….Although in May 1997 Congress imposed sanctions on Chinese firms for
exporting chemical weapons materiel to Iran, these exports did not violate the
Chemical Weapons Convention."(10)
To
sum up, China has been a marginal, almost insignificant player in the Middle
East arms market, conventional as well as non-conventional, both in absolute
terms and definitely in relative ones, with the possible exception of tactical missiles.
Comparatively
small in quantity and poor in quality of equipment, as well as short-lived in
duration, Chinese arms transfers to the Middle East have managed to attract a
limited number and variety of customers, who have consistently avoided using
them in battle. Combined objective and subjective reasons have forced (or led)
China to become more responsible and restrained in its arms transfer policy. In
a retrospective view, even U.S. observers admit that "the destabilizing
effects of Chinese arms sales to the Middle East have been exaggerated by both
[U.S.] Congress and the media," and add that, "contrary to popular
perception, China is not looking to create instability in the Middle
East."(11)
Israeli Arms Transfers to China
Israel's
military relations with China began in 1979, as an anomaly. Beijing
not only refused to establish diplomatic relations with Jerusalem but,
for many years, especially in the 1960s, had also consistently backed the Arabs
and the Palestinians, condemning Israel to the point of denying its right to
exist. Yet, developments in the late 1970s created common Sino-Israeli interests
that laid the groundwork for unofficial relations, primarily in the military
field. As China began to emerge into the post-Mao period of economic reform and
growth, it suffered an unexpected blow from the Vietnamese while trying 'to
teach them a lesson'. Beijing suddenly realized that, after 20 years of
isolation and a practical standstill, its military system needed an urgent,
comprehensive overhaul. When China began window-shopping for arms and military
technology in the West, Israel quickly seized the opportunity, and for good
reasons.
To
begin with, unofficial military relations could lead the PRC to moderate its
pro-Arab policy, reduce its hostility toward Israel, and ultimately pave the
ground for official diplomatic relations between the two countries. Also, an
opening of the huge Chinese defense market for Israeli military technology could
not have come at a better moment. Israel had just lost some of its most
profitable customers, primarily Iran and South Africa. Consequently, Israel's
military-industrial complex was pushed into an unprecedented economic crisis
that led not only to unemployment but also to a loss of income that brought a
shortage of vital funds for defense R&D. Similarly, the choice of Israel
also conformed to China's military needs at that time. Israel was too small and
remote to create a threat and was ready to provide China with relatively
advanced military technology, rather than off-the-shelf weapons, something that
most Western arms suppliers had been reluctant to do.
Precise
information about Israel's arms transfers to China is not available. For one
reason, in the 1980s, before the establishment of diplomatic relations in
January 1992, both countries had tried to conceal the true dimensions of their
military relations. For another, since some (or much) of Israel's military
supply to China consists of technology, its dimensions have been difficult to
quantify. Finally, Israel's foreign trade statistics exclude arms exports.
Indeed, the United Nations' annual Register of Conventional Arms, that records
arms transfers on the basis of official reports of the governments concerned,
does not mention any Israeli arms transfer to China for its first six
consecutive years (1992-1997).(12) This lack of information has led to wide and
wild guesswork and speculations or "reports" usually leaked by Western
competitive firms, government agencies, or other organizations, occasionally for
reasons that have nothing to do with Israel, China, or both. Consequently,
Israel has been portrayed as one of China's leading military suppliers, thereby
contributing to the disruption of the East Asian military balance and to
undermining U.S. interests in the region, as well as putting the lives of
American troops at risk. Since the early 1990s, Israel has also been accused of
the illegal transfer of U.S. defense technology to China.(13)
As
early as 1984 Western press reports estimated the value of Sino-Israeli military
agreements at $3 billion, allegedly reaching $5-6 billion in the early 1990s. A
1991 RAND Corporation report prepared for the U.S. Defense Department estimated
Israel's military transfers to China at $1-3 billion. In 1993, a former U.S.
State Department analyst reached an estimate of $8-10 billion. Since Israel's
military transfers to China are but one part--perhaps even a small part--of its
overall defense export, the total figure should be three or four times these
estimates. There is no way that these figures can reflect the reality.
Indeed,
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) estimated the value of
Israel's total arms exports from 1984-1997 at $7.78 billion, or an annual
average of $556 million (in current prices). Moreover, ACDA figures for
1984-1994 provide a regional breakdown that puts Israel's arms transfers to
China in a more realistic perspective. The value of Israel's arms transfer
agreements with all East Asian countries in that period was around $300 million
(an annual average of $27 million), slightly over 6 percent of the total value
of Israel's arms transfer agreements in those years. The value of Israel's arms
deliveries to all East Asian countries for 1984-1994 was $1.6 billion (an annual
average of $145 million), 27.6 percent of the total value of Israel's arms
transfer agreements in those years.(14) Even if we accept that most of these
transfers went to China, these figures can by no means be reconciled with the
figures given above, and are considerably lower.
A
detailed Israeli Ministry of Defense document submitted to the U.S. State
Department in mid-1995-in response to criticism of Israel's arms sales to
China-says that their total value for 1990-1994 was $31.5 million, exceeding $10
million in only one year.(15) This means that the most important long-term
framework agreements with China had indeed been signed in the early 1980s.
Implementation peaked in the late 1980s but declined considerably in the early
1990s, despite the allegations that Israel was exploiting Western sanctions
against China following the Tiananmen incident, and precisely when Washington's
accusations against Israel began to surface.
Thus,
Israel's window of opportunity in China - exactly like China's window of
opportunity in the Middle East - did not last long and was closing in the late
1980s, and for a very similar reason. Post-Soviet Russia's urgent need for
income then opened its military warehouses to those ready to pay. For the Middle
East, and even more so for China, this alternative provided a shortcut to
defense modernization and rearmament. For one thing, advanced Russian weapons
have been compatible with China's Soviet-based military infrastructure and
therefore easy to integrate. For another, following its consistent successful
economic growth, Beijing had the money to pay. According to ACDA, in 1995-1997,
Russia's share in China's military market was over 75 percent (80 percent if
Eastern Europe is included) while Israel's contribution was less than 11
percent. Though nominally China's 'second' military supplier, Israel has
inevitably been eclipsed by a big margin.
Yet,
despite the reported decline in Israeli arms transfers to China in the 1990s,
both in absolute terms and even more so in relative ones, Jerusalem has been
under constant U.S. pressure to reduce further its arms transfers to China and,
even better, to cancel them altogether. The Phalcon AWACS deal, to be discussed
below, is but the most recent example. As early as 1983, the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) reported that most Israeli defense technological exports
to China contained significant U.S. inputs and, therefore, may have violated the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the Foreign Assistance Act, and the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Still, these allegations had
not been published in the 1980s for a variety of reasons, including infighting
within the U.S. bureaucracy over effective arms export control mechanisms and
the role of China as Washington's implicit strategic ally before the collapse of
the Soviet Union.
By
the early 1990s, however, the situation had changed. The 1989 Tiananmen incident
had driven a wedge between Washington and Beijing, while the collapse of the
Soviet Union has deprived Beijing of its strategic significance. Consequently,
in 1992 the State Department Inspector-General resuscitated the reports,
applying pressure on the State Department Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs to
take action and to curtail the "unauthorized" transfers to China.
These included Israel's Python-3 air-to-air missile (AAM), allegedly a version
of the U.S.-made AIM-9L Sidewinder AAM; the MAPATZ anti-tank missile, allegedly
based on the U.S.-made TOW-2; U.S.-made Patriot missile or missile technology;
and Israel's support in designing and building the Chinese J-10 fighter plane,
allegedly based on the discontinued Lavi fighter project that had been partly
funded by the United States. Although these accusations are allegedly based on
intelligence they often use qualifying words such as "beliefs,"
"likelihoods," "possibilities," "potential,"
"may have," "might," "reportedly," etc.(16)
Each
of these accusations has received a different answer, yet the bottom line is
simple: Washington's allegations stand on shaky ground. To begin with,
Washington approved the MAPATZ sale of to China in 1986, when it suited its
interests. U.S. components in the Python-3 AAMs exported to China had been
removed and replaced. Also, U.S. investigation found "no evidence that
Israel had transferred a Patriot missile or missile technology" to
China.(17) And, finally, the J-10 project does not incorporate U.S. technology.
In fact, it is based on 1970s' technology and, given China's increased aircraft
acquisitions from Russia, its future production and deployment may not only take
many years, by which time it will be outdated or may not take place at all.
The
Phalcon airborne early warning (AEW) system deal is a different story. Produced
by ELTA Electronics Industries, a subsidiary of Israel Aircraft Industries, the
Phalcon is a long-range and extended-detection, high performance, multi-sensor
airborne early warning system that also offers sophisticated tactical
surveillance of airborne and surface targets and the gathering of signal
intelligence. It is primarily a defensive system but it can also be used for
command and control purposes. The system can be installed on a variety of
airborne platforms.(18) A Phalcon installed on a Boeing 707 was delivered to
Chile in 1994. Negotiations on the supply of one $250 million Phalcon system to
China had begun in the early 1990s but were delayed due to the Chinese
insistence, based on a previous agreement with Moscow, that the Phalcon be
installed on a converted Russian IL-76 (A-50 airframe) transporter. While the
contract was signed in July 1996, it was only in May 1997 that Moscow finally
agreed to become part of the deal, in return for 20 percent of the proceeds. The
Chinese have indicated that if they were satisfied with the first Phalcon, they
would buy at least three more systems, a total deal of $1 billion or more.
Following
its early 1990s criticism concerning Israel's "unauthorized" military
transfers to China, Washington was informed about the deal as early as 1996, if
not before, but kept quiet - until 25 October 1999 when the already modified
Russian aircraft landed at Ben Gurion Airport. U.S. initial response was
cautious, and along the lines of its previous policy. On November 12, State
Department spokesman James Rubin admitted that the deal does not include
U.S.-controlled technologies and therefore American law could not prohibit the
sale.(19)
Washington,
however, suddenly changed its policy. The issue was no longer
"illegal" transfers of U.S. military technology but the
"disruption" and "destabilizing" of the East Asian military
balance of power, first and foremost in the Taiwan Straits, the
"undermining" of U.S. interests in the region, and the
"risks" to U.S. troops. This is a ludicrous argument, both in its
strategic analysis and in its application to the specific Phalcon deal. After
all, if Beijing doesn't get the Israeli Phalcon, it is bent on getting AEW
systems from other sources (probably Russia), and in greater numbers.
This
policy change triggered a pressure campaign using open threats and intimidation
on a scale unheard of in the history of U.S.-Israeli relations, and based on
phony arguments. To begin with, one could question the value of U.S. military
presence in East Asia since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union. As demonstrated in the recent Korean summit meeting, regional
conflicts could perhaps be resolved directly by the parties concerned, without
(or, in this case, even despite) U.S. intervention. In fact, it is quite
possible that it is U.S. military presence that fuels the tension in the region
and artificially sustains friction between the PRC and ROC, since China
fears--whether rightly or wrongly--U.S. military intervention or that this
presence will encourage a unilateral ROC declaration of independence.
Equally
important, inventing enemies where they don't exist could ultimately lead to a
self-fulfilling prophecy with terrifying consequences.(20) This view is shared
by a number of prominent U.S. experts on Asia. RAND Corporation Michael Swaine
considers the analysis that China has become a major threat to peace in Asia as
"fundamentally wrong" and ultimately dangerous to U.S. interests.
"The analysts routinely employ distortions, half-truths and, in some cases,
complete falsehoods to arrive at policy prescriptions." This
"confrontational stance advocated by the purveyors of the China threat
thesis would divide Asia and fuel destabilizing arms buildups. It would also
likely bring about the very outcome they wish to avoid - the erosion of regional
peace and stability."(21) Professor Chalmers Johnson, one of the leading
U.S. experts on Asia, recently
summed up the situation: "The main security problem for northeastern Asia
today is not a rogue state in its midst but a rogue superpower across the
Pacific."(22)
Given
China's size, the delivery timetable, the dependence on Israel for future
maintenance, the limited time of operational service, and the length of
training, a single Phalcon--or even
four--would by no means destabilize East Asia. According to a senior U.S. Air
Force official, even if China buys four AWACS - the minimum considered necessary
to keep around-the-clock presence during a conflict - it will take the Chinese
"a lot of years" to overcome the difficulty of establishing
procedures, building experience, conducting exercises, and adding communications
needed to make the aircraft an effective combat tool. "Virtually no one
with a knowledge of the industrial, training, logistics or doctrinal
straitjacket worn by the Chinese military see the acquisition of the [Phalcon]
aircraft as a threat."(23)
At
the same time, given the overwhelming U.S. military presence in the Pacific, the
Phalcon deal would have provided China with a minimal legitimate defensive
system which, thereby, contributes to improving the existing regional imbalance
of power rather than to its disruption. As proved throughout the Cold War years,
stability (in a negative sense) has been kept by a rough equality between the
two superpowers, based on mutual deterrence. China and the United States. are by
no means militarily equal. While the United States could squash China many times
over, China could hardly hit the United States.(24) Therefore, the so-called
"China threat" is an invention, a figment of diehard Cold War
imagination, whereas the U.S. ability to enforce its will is very real and
omnipresent - not only in East Asia but also in the Middle East.(25)
When
Israel protested against Washington's sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia in
1981, Jerusalem was told that these are 'defensive' systems. From 1987 to 1996,
the United States supplied four Middle Eastern countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Kuwait and Bahrain) with over $40 billion worth of offensive weapons. While
these sales still go on, by mid-July 2000, Israel was forced to give up the
Phalcon deal with China. Washington has yet again displayed its shortsightedness
and narrow-mindedness. It would have been definitely better for Washington if
Israel would have supplied China with a small number of Phalcons (or, for that
matter, other defense systems). As the Gulf war has shown, "If you want a
potential foe to have electronic, computer-based systems that can be penetrated
surreptitiously with information warfare tools, it's a far easier task if those
systems are provided by a U.S. ally."(26)
Instead,
China would now turn to other suppliers, most likely to Russia, and acquire a
greater number (perhaps 16) of AEW systems. The outcome: a totally unnecessary
erosion of U.S. interests in East Asia, of U.S.-China relations, and of
U.S-Israel relations. Israel's security has suffered a blow in two respects. For
one, funds for military R&D would decline since income from arms exports,
not only to China but also to other potential customers, would be seriously and
adversely affected. For another, by forcing Israel to cancel the Phalcon deal
Washington, in fact, released Beijing from its vague unofficial commitments
concerning weapon proliferation, including a possible supply of missiles to
countries like Syria and increased supply to Iran.
Though
ostensibly unrelated, the offensive value of Chinese arms transfers to the
Middle East and Israel's arms transfers to China has been deliberately inflated
beyond all proportion by Western governments, organizations and individuals,
primarily in the United States.(27) The explicit reasons have to do with a
legitimate, and perhaps genuine, concern about security and stability in East
Asia and the Middle East. Yet a close examination of the quantity and quality of
the respective arms transfers and the problems involved in their effective
absorption refutes this concern. The impact of these arms transfers on the
regional military balance in East Asia and the Middle East respectively is
negligible at best. So, there must be additional implicit reasons to explain the
passion and urgency expressed by those making these arguments..
First
among them is the obsession of some U.S. circles with the "China
threat." This obsession is fed not simply by Cold War mentality but also by
paternalistic and condescending attitudes based on political, cultural and
historical considerations if not outright racism. These converge with, and are
supplemented by, commercial interests that would not allow competitors to seize
potential arms markets - even though the entry of U.S. military equipment
producers to the China market is (still) forbidden. One wonders what would have
been the U.S. reaction to the Phalcon deal if China accepted a Boeing 707
instead of an IL-76.
* Yitzhak Shichor is Michael William Lipson Associate Professor of
Chinese Studies and Political Science, and Senior Research Fellow, the Harry S
Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem. He is now Provost of Tel-Hai Academic College. Formerly Dean of
Students, he has written on China's Middle East policy and defense reform and is
currently engaged in a book-length study of China's defense conversion, as well
as on China's international oil policy and Sino-Muslim relations in Xinjiang.
On Asia and Middle East, see also, Barry Rubin, "China's Middle East
Strategy"
MJ Vol. 3 No. 1 (February 1999) Barry Rubin, "North Korea's Threat
to the Middle East and the Middle East's Threat to Asia," and Bates Gill,
"Chinese Arms Exports to Iran," MJ Vol. 2 No. 2 (May 1998).
NOTES
1)This article is an expanded version of a talk given at the Asia Forum
held at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, on
May 3, 2000. It forms part of a larger study of Israel's military relations with
China, supported by a grant given by the Levi Eshkol Institute of Economic,
Social and Political Research, Faculty of Social Sciences, the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem, for which I am grateful.
2) U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971-1980 (Washington, 1983), pp. 117, 119.
3) For more details see: Yitzhak Shichor, "The Chinese Factor in the
Middle East Security Equation: An Israeli Perspective," in: Jonathan
Goldstein (Ed.), China and Israel, 1948-1998: A Fifty Year Perspective
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), pp. 153-178, on which this section is based.
4) For a comprehensive compilations and analysis of Chinese military
sales, see R. Bates Gill, Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns, and
Prospects in the New World Order (Westport, CT: Preager, 1992), and Daniel L.
Byman and Roger Cliff, China's Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications, Report
MR-1119-AF (RAND Corporation, 1999).
5) Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing
Nations, 1990-1997, CRS Report for Congress (Washington: July 31, 1998), p. 58.
6) Ibid., p. 59.
7) For details on Sino-Iranian military relations see: Bates Gill,
"Chinese Arms exports to Iran," in P.R. Kumaraswamy (Ed.), China and
the Middle East: the Quest for Influence (New Delhi: Sage, 1999), pp. 117-141.
See also yman and Cliff, pp. 8-13.
8) Yitzhak Shichor, "The Year of the Silkworms: China's Arms
Transactions, 1987," in: Richard H. Yang (Ed.), SCPS Yearbook on PLA
Affairs 1987 (Kaohsiung: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, National Sun
Yat-sen University, 1988), pp. 153-168.
9)Yitzhak Shichor, East Wind over Arabia: Origins and Implications of the
Sino-Saudi Missile Deal, China Research Monographs, No. 35 (Berkeley: Institute
of Asian Studies, Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1989)
and idem., A Multiple Hit: China's Missile Sale to Saudi Arabia, SCPS Papers,
No. 5 (Kaohsiung: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen
University, 1991).
10) Robert S. Ross, "Why Our Hardliners Are Wrong," National
Interest, No. 49 (Fall, 1997), p. 42.
11) Alexander T. Lennon, "Trading Guns, Not Butter: Chinese Arms
Exports," China Business Review (Washington, D.C.), Vol. 21, No. 2
(March-April 1994), pp. 47-49.
12) For two main reasons. One, Israeli arms transfers to China indeed
declined considerably in the 1990s, compared to the 1980s. And two, the Register
covers seven armament categories that exclude advanced technology, components,
sub-systems, and know-how - Israel's typical military exports items.
13) The following discussion is based on: Yitzhak Shichor, "Israel's
Military Transfers to China and Taiwan," Survival, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring
1998), pp. 68-91.
14) ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996); See also: ACDA,
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1998 (Washington DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, February 2000).
) Ha'aretz, 6 January, 6 June, 14 July, 1995.15
16) See, for example Richard D. Fisher, Jr., "Foreign Arms
Acquisition and PLA Modernization," in James R. Liley and David Shambaugh
(Eds.), China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp.
85-126.
) New York Times, 3 April 1992, p. A1.17
18) Details in SIBAT, Foreign Defense Assistance and Defense Export
Organization, Israel Defense Sales Directory 1997/1998 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of
Defense, 1997), p. 72. See also "Airborne Surveillance Takes Command,"
Journal of Electronic Defense, January 1999, p. 43
19) "Mixed U.S. Signals on Israel-China Deal," Arms Control
Today, Vol. 29, No. 7 (November 1999).
20) See, for example, Joseph Nye (dean of Harvard University's John F.
Kennedy School of Government and former assistant secretary of defense for
international security affairs), "The Case Against Containment: Treat China
Like an Enemy and That's What It Will Be," Global Beat, 22 June 1998.
21) "Don't Demonize China: Rhetoric About Its Military Might Doesn't
Reflect Reality", The Washington Post, 18 May 1997, p. C01.
22) Chalmers Johnson, "Liberate Okinawa From a 'Rogue
Superpower'," Los Angeles Times, 24 June 2000.
23) David Fulghum, "Israel Builds China's First AWACS
Aircraft," Aviation Week & Space Technology, No. 22 (29 November 1999).
24) Lieutenant Colonel Rick Reece (U.S. Marine Corps), "On the Myth
of Chinese Power Projection Capabilities," Breakthroughs, Vol. VIII, No. 1
(Spring 1998).
25) On the 'China threat' see Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The
Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997); Edward Timperlake and
William C. Triplett II, Red Dragon Rising: Communist China's Military Threat to
America (Washington: Regnery Publishing Co., 1999); Kenneth de Graffenreid
(ed.), The Cox Report: U.S. National Security and Military Commercial Concerns
with the People's Republic of China (Washington: Regnery Publishing Co., 1999).
26) Fulghum.
27) Richard D. Fisher, "How America's Friends Are Building China's
Military Power," Backgrounder, No. 1146 (The Heritage Foundation, 5
November 1997).
Author's name & description.