Volume 4, No. 3 - September 2000
Volume 4, No. 3 - September 2000
Editor's
Summary: Iran has developed a system which allows a larger degree of electoral democracy
than would have seemed likely in the early years following the Islamist
revolution. Popular demands for change were especially visible in the election
of Muhammad Khatami as president in 1997 and the 2000 parliamentary elections.
The author suggests that this situation has encouraged greater participation in
politics, thus giving additional impetus to change. But Iran still faces an
internal power struggle, a relatively weak civil society, and persistent
economic problems that make a thoroughgoing transition far more difficult. At
the same time, though, these contradictions make Iran a particularly interesting
example of factors affecting democratization and the development of civil
society in developing countries.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been experimenting with democracy for
two decades now but the present state of political and civil rights in Iran is a
far cry from a democratic political system. The question is whether such a
system can emerge in the long run. Electoral laws remain restrictive, excluding
"non-desirable" candidates from political offices. Legal and
institutional mechanisms for protecting political and civil rights remain absent
or underdeveloped. Thus far, seemingly unsuccessful government attempts to marry
Islam with its vision of democracy and to build the foundation of an
"Islamic" political and economic society, have raised doubts about
democracy and its future in Iran.(1)
But the absence of a meaningful democracy (2) in Iran cannot be explained
neither by the alleged incompatibility between Islam and democracy (3), nor as a
byproduct of socio-economic underdevelopment (4), nor as a consequence of an
indifferent and repressive state. (5) Indeed, a nascent electoral democracy has
taken root in post-revolution Iran. But the future of democratization will
largely be determined by a power struggle over social, economic, and political
resources both within the state leadership and between the state and society.
The ideological factionalism and polarization of politics within the
government is as much, if not more, about the allocation of socio-economic and
political resources as it is about whose "proper" vision of Islam can
better address problems facing the country. Iran's civil society--led by
intellectuals, professionals, and the media--has challenged the state's hegemony
and helped expand the public space. But civil society in Iran, lacking effective
organizational and institutional foundations, remains largely ineffective in
challenging the state monopoly over socio-economic and political resources.
DEMOCRACY: A
QUESTION OF POWER
Democracy as
a political system is attractive to many--if not most--people around the globe.
It can be said that "nobody likes to be imprisoned, tortured, or killed,
and that everybody tries to escape when confronted with harm."
Citizens in Western countries remain fundamentally free from arbitrary
and random state repression, enjoying rights not shared by people under
authoritarian regimes that often do not respect even fundamental human rights.
These political and civil rights should be not understood as Western or
non-Western but rather as universal rights entitling individuals to shape their
own future and be protected from abusive government. (6)
The debate over democracy, its definition and fundamentals, (7) as well as its impact on governments' domestic and foreign policies, has continued for centuries. Is democracy the best political system for promoting political, civil, and economic rights? Can democracies continue to keep the average citizen involved in politics? Are democracies really more peaceful than non-democracies? (8) Above all, is democracy appropriate or desirable as a political system for non-Western societies (e.g., Middle Eastern countries)? That is, can an essentially Western ideology be applied to non-Western societies?
To answer these questions, proponents of democracy have looked to
socio-economic, political, cultural, historical, and international factors that
help mold forces responsible for the structure of political systems in different
countries. Although this article does not address these important issues, the
proposition that there are prerequisites for democracy seems to hold. (9)
Without these basics in place, prospects for establishing and maintaining
democracy are dim and can lead to democratic breakdown. (10)
The existence of civil society is also correlated with democracy. The
expression "civil society" is used today to indicate how private
clubs, organizations, and groups act as a buffer between state power and the
citizen's life. But in the absence of organized and vibrant agents of civil
society (e.g., labor unions, professional associations, business groups, an
independent media) society remains susceptible to the authoritarian whims of the
ruling elite. Therefore, the emergence and effectiveness of civil society is
undermined where society itself is underdeveloped (e.g., low socio-economic
development, low adult literacy rate) or where the state, through its control of
resources, remains overwhelmingly dominant. (11)
The ruling elite in such circumstances naturally resists expanding
political and civil rights, especially if such a move would threaten its
interests or its very survival and benefit opposition groups. A compromise
resolution can usually emerge only when the cost of oppression to the state
supersedes any potential benefits, and concessions offered to the opposition
ultimately results in a net increase in stability and advantages for the state.
But the civil society debate on Iran, as in the rest of the
Middle East, has focused on changes in formal procedures rather than substantive
change in state-society relations. The emergence of state-regulated
quasi-pluralism in countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Iran is seen as a shift
from unfettered one-party rule to some sharing of prerequisites--but not
necessarily real power--and a certain amount of freedom for membership
associations. (12) Today, most scholars confidently affirm that "both
intermediate powers and autonomous social groups exist in the Middle East."
(13)
However, recent expectations for the emergence of civil society and
democracy in Iran must be viewed with caution. Specifically, the premise that
Middle Eastern states are weak and societies are strong is dubious. Despite the
new optimism, serious questions remain. How autonomous are socio-economic and
political groups challenging the state and how can their autonomy be measured?
Does autonomy necessarily imply that these groups are organized and
institutionalized and can therefore be effective in counterbalancing state
power? What role do international forces play in the process of democratization?
A major shortcoming of Islamic movements, for instance, is that while
they are often organized and "able to identify and mobilize opposition
against a common enemy or threat, once successful, internal power struggles and
problems quickly emerge in defining and implementing an Islamic system of
government." The success of Islamic movements since the early 1970s in
either seizing power or effectively positioning themselves as a viable organized
opposition has been limited. Indeed, attempts to present an "Islamic
solution" to society's ills have largely failed. "Islamic politics,
like secular politics, is influenced by factionalism stemming from diverse
ideological interpretations or visions of Islam, internal power struggles for
leadership, and the influence of family, ethnic, tribal, or regional ties, and
also like secular politics is constrained by the pragmatic demands and
compromises of an interdependent global environment." (14) In short,
"Islamic" politics, like all politics, is about power. (15)
Ideological and political factionalism among the state's leaders,
combined with a severe economic crisis, can, however, create opportunities for
the state or deepening of a nascent democracy, provided that the level of
political violence remains low and there is little chance of
armed intervention in politics. The state elite can take one of three
paths:
--It can grant concessions to the opposition, hoping to share but not
entirely surrender its control over resources.
--It can use repression to maintain the status quo.
--Or, it can pursue a combination of concessions and repression.
Elections can help the cause of democracy by facilitating popular
participation in the political process, even though socio-economic prerequisites
to democracy might not be fully present and civil society may be underdeveloped.
As India's and Bangladesh's experiences with democracy show, elections mobilize
and encourage popular participation in the political process, and also help
build public confidence in the electoral process itself. Similarly, elections in
the post-Marcos Philippines, in Mexico in the 1990s, in post-Apartheid South
Africa, and in post-revolution Iran have achieved this outcome.
Iran's clergy-dominated state policies must be understood in light of the
above, particularly with respect to the post-Khomeini period. The first 10 years
of the revolution brought a different elite to power whose attempt to build a
new state apparatus was beset by internal unrest, a devastating eight-year-long
war with Iraq, and international isolation. Post-Khomeini Iran has witnessed
intense ideological factionalism, as well as persistent economic problems that
have severely undermined the middle class. The working classes and the poor have
also seen their situation worsen in the past 20 years due to inflation and
unemployment. The imposition of moral codes and the use of security forces to
maintain order have resulted in popular resentment toward the state, especially
against the more conservative elements in the government whose paternalistic
views of state-society relations are more pronounced. Those conservatives see
the 'ulema, authorized by the will of Allah, as ultimately responsible for
pursuing the interests of the individual and society as a whole. The
conservative 'ulema's interpretation of the Shari'a (Islamic law) has stood in
contrast to popular dissatisfaction with the socio-economic and political
situation in Iran, as expressed through protest votes for reformist candidates
such as President Muhammad Khatami.
Since President Khatami's election in May 1997, the Iranian electorates'
demand for change has seemingly put the conservatives on the defensive, a
situation that has helped strengthen civil society in Iran as independent
associations, and labor and business organizations are better poised to organize
themselves. The February 2000 parliamentary elections both demonstrated and
reinforced these trends. The state has been increasingly pressured to accept
criticism for its own shortcomings, including self-criticism by leading
ministers and members of parliament. Tehran's favorite excuse, blaming
"foreign governments and their agents" for its own failures, does not
carry much weight any more. Popular political participation (through elections,
debates, and exchanges of ideas) over the past 20 years has familiarized
Iranians with the norms and rules of procedural, if not substantive, democracy,
a rather unprecedented event in Iran's history.
STATE-SOCIETY
RELATIONS IN IRAN
The creation of an Islamic republic was beset with difficulties from the
start. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini aimed to replace a tyrannical leader with a
just, popular rule under the tenets of Islam. The challenge to the Islamic
republic has been how to establish popular sovereignty under clerical rule and
preserve a government with a divine mission whose real secular task was to run a
modern state in a Western-dominated capitalist world. (16) The ideological
splits that have emerged, as well as the state's persistent economic problems,
have raised doubts about the 'ulema's ability or even legitimacy to direct state
affairs. Consequently, Iran has so far oscillated among democratic tendencies,
autocratic control, and occasional repression.
Iran has a complex cleric-dominated but popularly driven political
system. The institutional framework designed for the Shi'a Islamic Republic
embraces both popular participation and a balance of power within the ruling
elite circle. The supreme authority is the guide (rahbar) of the revolution,
currently Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, was appointed by the popularly elected
83-member Assembly of Experts (majlis-i khubregan) which has constitutional
rights to dismiss him if it decides he abuses his authority. The guide is not
expected to interfere with the daily affairs of the government, although he is
commander-in-chief of the armed forces and has the power to dismiss the
president and to appoint the heads of the judiciary, the revolutionary guards,
the media, and the military.
The Council of Guardians (shura'-i negahban), comprised of religious
lawyers appointed by the guide and of lay lawyers elected by the parliament
(majlis) ensures that all legislation conforms to Islamic law. Since 1988, the
Expediency Council (shura-i maslahat-i nezam) has been in charge of resolving
disagreements that often arise between the Council of Guardians and the
popularly elected parliament. The reshaping of the Expediency Council in the
weeks prior to former president Hashimi Rafsanjani's departure from office
resulted in an increase in the power and prestige of the Council, which
Rafsanjani now heads. (17) In contrast to all these appointed bodies, members of
the parliament and the president are popularly elected.
Iran's leadership is divided into broadly defined conservative and
moderate Islamic camps. These
groups, along with their media organs, have provided some debate on issues of
national concern, such as the role and function of Iran's guide. (18) These
issues remain explosive and have already led to arrests, newspaper closures, and
public demonstrations. The central issue is over whether the guide should be
popularly elected or not, given that his leadership is ordained by the Shi'a
belief in the infallibility of Imams and by implication, the leader (i.e., the
guide, not the president).
Iran's civil society resembles that in other developing countries, but is
somewhat livelier and more vigorous. Despite tight state control of society,
"there is also a sense in which society stands apart from and in opposition
to the state," and some "public space exists, even if in a restricted
form." (19) Over the past two decades, socio-economic modernization has
created a fairly large middle class, and the intellectual and professional
community has taken advantage of any possible avenue to press for Iranians'
political and civil rights. Particularly since Khatami's 1997 election, the
Ministry of Culture has been more tolerant of the press, and has allowed serious
debate about civil society, religion and politics, and Islamic leadership.
Independent filmmakers have also enjoyed some degree of freedom, though
outspoken writers, editors, and journals that have criticized the top state
leadership have been punished. (20) The post-revolution generation, deprived of
economic normality or basic social freedoms, and politicized by controversial
events, has also come to question state policies.
However, the presence of some professional, artistic, and cultural
associations does not imply that an effective civil society exists, where
organized groups determine or even influence policy outcomes. Acts of defiance
in Iran, though they might challenge the state, hardly represent the "way
in which society, or groups within in, keep at bay the repressive instincts of
the state." (21) Moreover, the state's tolerance for limited popular acts
of defiance can be attributed to factionalism within its leadership and the
state's inability to combat persistent economic and social problems.
Popular opposition is based on shared frustration among different sectors
of the population with overwhelming economic and social problems (e.g., the
youth, students, educators, artists, and women). An important agent of civil
society, organized labor, is particularly weak in Iran. Powerful labor
federations and confederations can use such tools as collective bargaining,
strikes, and other means to compete with both the state and corporate interest
groups. (22) It is in labor's interest to push for political democratization,
which would improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis
the state and business groups. Organized labor has the potential capability to
either cripple or boost the economy (e.g., the oil workers' strike during the
Iranian revolution that helped defeat the shah's government) and therefore be a
formidable force checking the states' power. (23) The labor force in Iran stands
at close to 16 million (in a total population of just over 65 million) while the
unofficial unemployment rate hovers around 30 percent, with 24 percent annual
inflation. (24) But organized labor remains weak and dependent on the state and
thus unable to translate its collective power into an effective bargaining tool.
In addition, whatever latitude has been given to debate or criticism,
Iran's leadership has resisted and punished opponents. The state has often
dismissed the expansion of political and civil rights as "un-Islamic"
or as threatening the foundation of its political and ideological support. The
state's successful use of Islam to gather legitimacy and support has been
crucial to its survival, given problems with the West, including a 20-year U.S.
economic boycott. In the presence of persistent economic problems, the state
particularly relied in the 1980s on its institutions (e.g., Sipah-i Pasdaran,
Bunyad-i Mostazafin and Janbazan, Bunyad--i Shahid, Basij) to rally popular
support for its policies and to discredit its opposition. The Revolutionary
Guards (Sipah-i Pasdaran) for example made the state less dependent for its
national security on the regular army, whose loyalty to the new Islamic
government was perceived with suspicions. The dispossessed Foundation (Bunyad-i
Mostazafin and Janbazan) meanwhile through government subsidies and various
charitable activities rallied support among the urban and rural poor for the new
regime. The Martyr Foundation
(Bunyad--i Shahid) was set up to disperse economic and social assistance to the
families of the war veterans and those martyred for the revolution, while the
Mobilization Corp (Basij) recruited young Islamic zealots to help control the
general population, as well as in post-war reconstruction efforts.
The state's leadership was further polarized by slow economic development
since the war ended with Iraq in 1988 and the ideological gulf in the political
leadership after Khomeini 's death. One major confrontation between the
reformist and the conservative camps has been over freedom of the press,
specifically, the print media's right to question state policies or the
legitimacy of the unelected guide. The state has repeatedly, and predictably,
charged the pro-reform press with violating the state's Islamic precepts, and
closed down several popular reformist papers. The reformists' hope to revise the
very restrictive Press Law, passed by the outgoing conservative-dominated fifth
parliament was, at least temporarily, dashed by Khamenei's order to the
parliament to drop the debate on press reforms in August 2000. (25)
The closure of more than 20 reformist papers is no doubt a serious blow
to Khatami and the reformists' position. But
it seems nothing short of open, violent suppression of the general population by
the security forces can stop the process of democratization. The oscillation
between oppression and relative freedom cannot last indefinitely, especially
since socioeconomic problems continue to be serious for the majority of the
population. In other words, Iran's revolution seems to be at a crossroads. It
has declared that Islamic government is the solution to all social, economic and
political ills. Yet if this is true, the leaders must deliver tangible benefits,
ranging from prosperity to stability. The reformists argue that this can be
done, but only in connection with a more open and democratic society. The
conservatives, however, associate such changes not with implementing the
revolution's promises but as steps which could destroy the whole system.
Some of them are now advocating economic reforms without political
change, which is what they perceive China as having done successfully.
In practical terms, these factional disputes can be seen by the existence
of three groups in parliament:
The Association of the Hizb Allah (majma'h-i hizballah-i majlis) consists
of pro-reform minded individuals and parliamentarians who support President
Khatami's agenda for the supremacy of the rule of law and the expansion of civil
society and individual freedoms within an Islamic framework. Its formation after
the 1995 parliamentary election proved instrumental in supporting former
president Rafsanjani, as well as Khatami after his 1997 victory. The Association
is a coalition of the Combatant Clerics' Association (majma'-i ruhaniun-i
mobarez), and the Administrators of Construction and their allies (kargozaran-i
Sazandegi va niruha-i payruv-i khat-i Imam), also known as the Servants of
Iran's Construction.
In contrast, the Hizb Allah Members of Parliament group (Hizballah-i
Majlis) opposes Khatami and his supporters there. It is a coalition of the Combatant Clerics and their allies,
(ruhaniat-i mubarez va guruha-i hamsu). They are generally suspicious about
domestic reforms and closer relations with the West, which they see as tending
to erode the supreme leader's authority and ultimately toward the secularization
and subordination of Iranian society to "external powers" at the
expense of Islam. They perceive the
notion of individual rights as being in opposition to the Shi'a principle of
guided leadership by a Faqih (leader).
The Independent Hizb Allah Members (namayandegan-i mustaqil-i hizballah)
are parliamentarians who supposedly remain independent in their political and
ideological orientations and whose votes in the legislator but can swing between
the other factions. In addition, debates over the ideological and practical
application of clerical rule, and among clerics with and without political power
and without have also intensified in the past 20 years.
This rivalry among factions resembles party politics that can potentially
lead to more meaningful competition among ruling clerics, but it still lacks the
legitimacy needed to bring about the kind of political reform demanded by the
increasingly restless populace. The rather impressive victory by reformists in
the 6th parliamentary elections in March 2000 will bring a more balanced
representation of popular sentiment in the legislative branch. The reformists
seem to be more in touch with the general mode of the population who hunger for
more economic opportunities and more open social space for personal
participation.
Conservatives in Iran generally support the "Chinese" model:
combining a relatively open economic system with limits on human rights and
democracy. But public allegiance to that strategy has been limited in the face
of economic problems, elite factional rivalries, and the ideological exhaustion
of Islam as a unifying force. The solution adopted by Ayatollah Khamene'i and
his conservative colleagues is to give President Khatami expanded responsibility
but not complete authority. Khatami's appeal for the rule of law and expanded
political rights is tolerated but closely watched. Thus, Khatami may address
social and economic problems. He will be blamed if his economic reforms fail,
but the conservatives will no doubt take most of the credit should they succeed.
Khatami has serious challenges ahead. The creation of state-run
foundation-conglomerates following the revolution to help consolidate state
control of society has had long-term economic consequences. The Dispossessed
Foundation also employs hundreds of thousands of people in the thousands of
workshops, factories, hotels and other properties it inherited from their
nationalization in the earlier years of the revolution. These para-statal
foundations enjoy extensive economic endowments and political backing. They have
become a source of wealth and political power. Some of these foundations have
also grown into influential forces blocking any attempts for economic
privatization and reforms and are usually exempt from taxation. Perhaps the most
notable example is the Bunyad-i Mostazafin and Janbazan (which control 60
percent of the entire national expenditure on development). They are both under
the authority of the Spiritual Guide and exempt from any parliamentary
investigation. (26)
The Revolutionary Guards, for example, was created to help the police and
security forces to combat counter-revolutionaries, but it has developed into a
powerful organization--with its own ground, naval, and air forces--to help
defend the country and to maintain social order. For example, during the summer
1999 student demonstrations Revolutionary Guards' leaders threatened
intervention if things were to "get out of hand." A letter signed by
24 commanding officers criticized President Khatami for failing to recognize the
threat to Iran's national security from the demonstrations and suggested their
own armed intervention should Khamenei deems it necessary.
The repeated devaluation of the rial in the international market and
persistent inflation and unemployment have also hurt a wide majority of the
people, while benefiting some state organizations and black-marketers, and
helping to spread corruption and bribery in almost every sector of the economy.
As a result, hard currencies such as the dollar have replaced the rial as a
medium of exchange in the open market, popularizing the saying in Tehran
streets: "people make their money in rials but must spend in dollars."
It is quite normal to see individuals working two or three jobs.
(27).
THE POLITICS
OF ELECTIONEERING
Although Iran is not a true democracy, it is also not a totalitarian or
even an authoritarian state indifferent to public opinion. Elections occur
regularly and have been free of rigging and irregularities, even though the 2000
parliamentary elections raised some controversies over the final results of
ballots in Tehran, especially regarding the strange circumstances for the
victory of former president Hashmi
Rafsanjani there. (28) Because the line between the divinely ordained and
decisions based on popular will is very fine in the cleric-controlled
government, ideological infighting is common, exacerbated by jockeying over
socio-economic and political resources. As a result, the "Islamic"
state behaves very similarly to its secular counterparts.
Khatami's election in 1997 caught the conservatives off-guard,
particularly the speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, the
conservatives' candidate for the presidency. Khatami was even referred to as the
accidental president by Professor Shaul Bakhash of George Mason University. (29)
But the election's outcome should not have come as a surprise, given
factionalism within the elite and the poor economic situation. The electorate
seized the opportunity to vote for a candidate who promised the rule of law,
expansion of political rights, and economic improvements. Khatami's message had
broad appeal. The young, women, and the middle class handed him 70 percent of
the vote, a decisive victory. Khatami's election symbolized more than just
popular dissatisfaction with the Iran's socio-economic troubles; it also
indicated the rise of a post-revolution young generation eager for democracy and
expecting meaningful results from their political participation.
The ruling conservatives' pre-screening candidates for elections has thus
far backfired, resulting in either lower voter turnout--as in the elections for
the Assembly of Experts (majlis-i khubregan)--or conservative losses in the 1999
municipal elections for village and city Islamic Councils. The October 1998
election for the Assembly of Experts (majlis-i khubregan), which oversees the
powerful spiritual guide, was considered a testing ground for ideological and
political competition between conservatives and reform-minded clerics. In the
end, conservative candidates won the majority of the Assembly's 86 seats. Over
17.5 million people took part in the election, out of 39 million eligible
voters, a turnout of 46.3 percent, far lower than for Khatami's election. (30)
The low turnout, despite a vigorous campaign by conservatives to rally popular
participation, was a silent protest at how the Council of Guardians (shura'-i
negahban) pre-selected conservative candidates and disqualified a large pool of
qualified moderates running for the Assembly.
This was a defeat for the reform-minded Khatami, but it was by no means
the end of Iran's ongoing political struggle.
The February 1999 municipal elections for village and city Islamic
Councils were the first of their kind, aimed at broadening popular support for
the government by giving control of local councils to elected officials. The
election involved about 330,000 candidates for 200,000 council positions, as
well as 800,000 volunteers, the largest-ever election in Iran. (31) The state's
message was that a partnership between such councils and government bureaucrats
would be more responsive to people's needs. Controversy surfaced before the
elections when critics accused ruling conservatives of using their parliamentary
power to ensure victories for conservative candidates through a Central
Oversight Committee that supervised the selection of those eligible to run.
(32) The election results, however, gave a clear victory to pro-Khatami
moderates. Women and young voters once again poured their support behind
independent and pro-Khatami candidates, helping female candidates to capture
seats in major cities throughout the country. (33) These two voting groups also
continued their support of Khatami and the moderates in the March 2000
parliamentary elections.
The decision to expand political participation to city and village
councils goes back to the early promises of the revolution regarding rural
economic and social development. While it is too early to predict the
implications of the new dispersion of power, the impact of such a process in
terms of organization and mobilization could prove positive for the future of
democracy in Iran. The rural population may be conservative in its social and
religious outlook but as Iran forges ahead with development, the long-term
socialization and politicization of such a process will take hold and may likely
improve prospects for the formation of grassroots agents of civil society.
Elections, of course, do not guarantee the translation of popular demands
into state policy. But, despite their shortcomings, elections are the best
measure of democratic practice in a country. The rotation of public officials as
determined by elections can have a long-term positive impact on the state's
behavior and are an excellent way of alerting the government to necessary
reforms. Further, elections bolster a citizen's confidence in the political
process.
Elections therefore:
1)
provide for the expression of popular support or
defiance toward the state;
2)
help bring accountability to the political process;
3)
provide the state with a warning mechanism to
respond to popular concerns and expectations;
4)
have a psychological impact on people's perceptions
of the role of government in society and the place of the individual within it;
and
5)
help raise the social consciousness of citizens
regarding social problems. The Iranian experience is merely one example of a
developing country experimenting with democracy by holding local and national
elections as an avenue to resolving the larger issue of distributing
socio-economic resources and political power in the process of democratization
CONCLUSION
Explanations focusing on Islam, tribalism, and dominant states have been
offered for why the Middle East is still rife with authoritarian regimes. More
recently, the absence of a vibrant civil society has been cited as the
determining factor in explaining the absence of democracy in the region. (34)
But Middle Eastern countries either lack the prerequisites to democracy (e.g.,
an adequate level of social and economic development and a vibrant civil
society) are dominated by strong and domineering states, or both.
Iran's experience "has shown that fundamentalism-in-power cannot
solve every problem, and actually complicates the challenge of implementing
Islamic values in public life." (35)
President Khatami's repeated call for the supremacy of law in politics must be
understood in light of his realization that, given Iran's tremendous
socio-economic problems, time is working against the Islamic Republic. The
resolution of the debate over the extent of popular sovereignty remains an
essential element in determining the future of Islamic movements and the
traditional 'ulema themselves.
Iran's ruling clerics have come to allow increasing "civilian"
participation in all branches of government, including the powerful Council of
Experts which selects the leading official, the spiritual guide. Despite its
proven capability for the brutal suppression of the opposition, the state has
been amenable to change under pressure (from socio-economic problems as well as
an ideological rift within its political leadership.) The state is bound by its
ideological foundation to give--within an "Islamic" context--credence
to the popular will. Furthermore, with severe socio-economic problems
threatening the regime's very existence, both conservatives and moderates have
contemplated relinquishing some power to rival social and economic groups. The
election of Khatami as president and the reformists' impressive victory in the
2000 has signaled to conservatives that the time and patience of the population
is running out.
Iranians have participated in elections in large numbers and have become
increasingly vocal in expressing their views. Defining what is
"Islamic" and the role of an Islamic government remain hotly debated
issues, both in Iran and elsewhere in the Islamic world. (36) But the ascendance
of Khatami has prompted optimism in Iran about a less domineering government, a
more open society, and a less radical and more conciliatory Iran in the
international community.
At any rate, the idea of economic development without political
liberalization given a continuing economic crisis and factional polarization at
the top cannot last indefinitely. The situation is bound either to develop into
a freer society or degenerate into political chaos and perhaps even
revolutionary upheaval. The closure of more than 20 reformist papers between
April and August 2000, the arrest and detention of leading journalists, and
Ayatollah Khamenei's blocking moves in parliament to repeal draconian press
restrictions have been among the latest moves by the conservatives to curb their
continuing loss of popularity and legitimate power.
In the long run, though, conservatives and reformists alike may realize
that the very survival of the Islamic government and the quest to marry Islam
with republicanism and democracy requires discourse and open dialogue at the
national level. In the end, the formation of independent political parties,
associations, and labor unions is a likely response to inadequacies in Iran's
civil society and the present status of democracy.
NOTES
1. The
research for this paper was supported by a student-faculty research grant from
the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire. The help of my students Marlin Hardinger
and James Hanke in researching materials related to this article, as well as
others in progress is hereby acknowledged and appreciated.
2. Democracy
is referred to a political system that guarantees and observes the political
rights (e.g., competitive, free and fair elections) and civil liberties (e.g.,
freedom of speech, expression, assembly, religion, association) of its citizens.
3. The list
of studies claiming Islam as monolithic, aesthetic and incompatible with
democracy includes, for example, Daniel Pipes, Slaves, Soldiers, and Islam: The
Genesis of a Military System (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988);
Samuel P. Huntington, "Will more Countries become Democratic,"
Political Science Quarterly 99 (Summer 1994): 193-218; Samuel P. Huntington, The
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and London,
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
4. The
relationship between the level of development and democracy has been discussed
extensively. For the classical example, see Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social
Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,
"American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959): 69-105.
5. The state
plays a central role in discussions of socio-economic and political development.
See, for example, Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1985); Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds.,
Understanding Political Development: An Analytical Study (Boston, MA: Little,
Brown and Company, 1987).
6. Giovanni
Sartori, "How Far Can Free Government Travel?" Journal of Democracy 6,
no. 3 (July 1995): 101-11, p. 103.
7. Whether
there are prerequisites or requisites to democracy has been debated in the
literature on democracy, but need not contain us here. See Seymour M. Lipset,
"Some Social Requisites of
Democracy:
Economic Development."
8. On this
topic see, for example, William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Management of
Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37, 1(March 1993): 42-68.
9. The
literature on democracy and its requisites is rich. For a brief discussion of
qualitative and quantitative approaches to democracy and its requisites, see
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, Capitalist
Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). See,
also, Ali R. Abootalebi, "Democratization in Developing Countries:
1980-1989," Journal of Developing Areas 29 (July 1995): 507-30. A more
comprehensive list includes:
Seymour
Martin Lipset, Political Man (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1981); Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Arend
Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the
Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Dankwart A.
Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward A Dynamic Model,"
Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970), pp. 337-63; Robert Dahl, Polyarchy:
Participation and Opposition (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1971); Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1976). On Democracy and dependency, see Edward N. Muller,
"Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States, and
Democratic Breakdown in the Third World," International Studies Quarterly
29 (1985): 445-69; Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and
Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley
Institute of International Studies: University of California, 1973); Andre
Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical
Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); Fernando H.
Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1979); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern
World System (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, The World
Capitalist System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). On Culture and
Democracy, see Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism and Democracy (New York: Harper and
Row, 1942); Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle
East (New York: Free Press, 1958); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic
Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1963); Gerhard Lenski and Jean Lenski, Human
Societies (New York: McGraw Hill, 1974); Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae On
Kim, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison
. Barnes and
Max Kaase, et al., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western
Democracies (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba
eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company,
1980); Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, "Political Democracy and
the Size Distribution of Income," American Sociological Review 50 (August
1985): 438-57; Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Edward N. Muller and Mitchell
A. Seligson, "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal
Relationships," American Political Science Review 88 (September 1994):
635-52.
10.
Democratic breakdown in developing countries are caused by a number of sources,
including foreign intervention, dependency, and military intervention in
politics. See, for example, Edward Ned Muller, "Dependent Economic
Development, Aid Dependence on the United States, and Democratic Breakdown in
the Third World," International Studies Quarterly 29, 1985: 445-69.
11. I have
elsewhere discussed in detail the role of organized labor, professional groups
and organizations and the state-society relations in the overall determinants of
the level of socio-economic and political development in the Middle East and
other developing countries. See, Ali R. Abootalebi, Islam and Democracy:
State-Society Relations in Developing Countries, 1980-1994 (New York and London:
Garland Publishing, 2000).
12. Hudson,
"After the Gulf War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World,"
Middle East Journal, 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991).
See, for example, the article by Emmanuel Sivan for the Social Science
Research Council project on Civil Society in the Middle East, entitled "The
Islamic Resurgence: Civil Society Strikes Back," Journal of Contemporary
History, 25 (1990): 353-64. See also Michael Hudson," After the Gulf
War."; John Esposito and James Piscatori, "Democratization and
Islam," Middle East Journal, 45, no. 3 ( Summer 1991): 427-40.
13. Yahya
Sadowski, "The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate." Middle East
Report (July-August 1993): 14-21, see p. 17.
14. John L.
Esposito, Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality (New York: Oxford University Press,
1992), p. 207.
15. See Ali
R. Abootalebi, Islam and Democracy.
16. It
should be clear to Muslims that in the Quran and Shari'a, Allah is the ultimate
sovereign, and everything on earth and heaven is under His command. Yet, there
is nothing in either source to deny Muslims' freedom of action to improve their
individual and communal lives, nor does Shari'a promote subservience to the
state as a proof of proper Muslim behavior. On the contrary, individuals are
regarded as responsible for the salvation and well being of themselves, their
families, and their communities. See, The Quran, Surah (chapter) 10, Aya (verse)
108 (NJ. Dawood, trans., New York: Penguin, 1993). The writings of Hasan Turabi,
Mehdi Bazargan, Abd al-Karim Soroush, as well as the late Ayatollah Taleqani,
also discuss the sovereignty issue. Mehdi Bazargan, for example, in response to
Samuel Huntington's assertion of "the clash of civilizations,"
commented, before his death, on the positive relationship between Islam and
individual rights, peaceful coexistence with non-Muslims, economic development,
freedom of action, and democracy. See Mehdi Bazargan, "Is Islam a Global
Threat?" (Aya Islam yek khatar-i Jahani Ast?), Rahavard no. 36 (Tir 1373
[1994]): 48-57. For a recent discussion of various Islamic concepts with
implications for democracy (e.g., tawhid, shurah, khilafah, etc.) see, John
Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996).
17. The
decision by Ayatollah Khamene'i to reshape the expediency council has led to 13
more members being added. It has also taken jurisdiction concerning questions
unrelated to constitutional matters away from the six religious lawyers of the
Council of Guardians who are also members of the expediency council.
18. For an
account on news media in Iran, see A.W. Samii, "The Contemporary Iranian
News Media, 1998-1999," Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol.
3, 4 (December 1999).
19. Shaul
Bakhash, "Iran's Remarkable Election," Journal of Democracy, Volume 9,
No. 1 (January 1998): 80-94, 83, 84.
20. Among
better-publicized cases have been the earlier closure of newspapers
"Jama'ah" (Society) and "Gozaresh-i Ruz" (Daily News) in
Summer 1998. Both were supporters of President Khatami. They were charged with
violating rules of ethics.The harassment, detention and eventual death of
activist Sa'idi Sirjani while in custody is another well-publicized case of
abuse of power by factions within the government. Conservatives' crackdown on
pro-reform papers between April 22-24, 2000, alone
resulted in closure of 12 pro-democracy papers. See A.W.: The
Contemporary Iranian News Media, 1998-1999," MERIA Journal, Vol. 3, No. 4,
(December 1999).
21. Bakhash,
"Iran's Remarkable Election," p. 84.
22. For
discussions of corporatism, see Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century
of Corporatism?" in Frederick Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds. The New
Corporatism (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974);
Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation
(Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage, 1979); John H. Goldthorpe, ed. Order and Conflict
in Contemporary Capitalism, 1985; Abootalebi, Islam and Democracy.
23. On labor
and democracy, see Ali R. Abootalebi, Islam and Democracy.
24. Such
economic figures on Iran are subject to debate as the official numbers are
usually lower but less reflective of economic realities in Iran. The cited
figures here are from, Global Studies: The Middle East, 8th ed. (Dushkin:
Guilford, Connecticut, 2000), p. 54.
25.
Following the parliamentary elections, the state closed down more than 20
newspapers including such reformist dailies as "Asr-e Azadegan,"
"Fath," and "Mosharekat." Leading reformist journalists like
Mashallah sham al-wa'zin, Akbar Ganji, and Ahmad Zeid-Abadi found themselves in
jail on charges that their newspapers had "undermined" the Islam
precepts of the state and had violated the Press Law--a set of vague or
undefined principles passed by the outgoing fifth Majlis that virtually made any
criticism of the top leadership a serious crime, punishable with long-term jail
sentences.
26. Akhbar-e
Iqtisad, vol. 2, April 24, 2000, p. 2.
27. For
Iran's post-revolution economy, see, for example, Hooshang Amirahmadi,
Revolution and Economic Transition: The Iranian Experience (N.Y.: State
University of New York Press, 1990); Jahangir Amuzegar, Iran's economy under the
Islamic Republic (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993); Massoud Karshenas and M. Hashem
Pesaran, "Economic Reform and the Reconstruction of the Iranian
Economy," Middle East Journa,l vol. 49, No. 1, (Winter 1995): 89-111.
28. The
Council of Guardians announced the final results on May 20. It said that 534 out
of
3,000 ballot
boxes involving more than 726,000 votes had been invalidated, contradicting its
own initial approval of the ballots. In response, 3,000 students demonstrated at
Tehran University on May 22 accusing the Council of tampering with the election
results. Hojatoleslam Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani announced on May 25 that he
would not take a seat in the parliament because of the controversy regarding his
election. He finished 29th in the initial results but was moved up to the 20th
position. See Iran Report 29 May
2000, volume 3, no. 21, compiled by William Samii at http://www.rferl.org/iran-report//2000/05/21-290500.html.
29. Bakhash,
"Iran's Remarkable Election, p. 90.
30.
Ettela'at International, No. 1084, Monday, October 26, 1998. pp. 1-2.
31.
Ettela'at, No. 1093, Friday. November 6, 1998, p. 2.
32.
Ettela'at, No. 1098, Friday, November 13, 1998, p. 2.
33.
Ettela'at, No. 1171, Friday, March 5, 1999, pp. 1-2.
34. For a
more recent discussion on Civil Society and Democracy, see Gurdun Kramer,
"Islamist Notions of Democracy," Middle East Report (July-august
1993): 2-8; Augustus Richard Norton, Civil Society in the Middle East (New York:
E.J. Brill, 1995); Emmanuel Sivan, "Constraints & Opportunities in the
Arab World," Journal of Democracy, 8, 2 (April 1997): 103-13.
35. Laith
Kubba, "Recognizing Pluralism," Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (April
1996): 86-89, quote from p. 88.
36.
Political Islam, Islamic movements, civil society and democracy have been
subjects of debate for years. See, for example, John L. Esposito, ed., Political
Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997);
Augustus Richard Norton, Civil Society in the Middle East (New York: E.J. Brill,
1995).
Ali R.
Abootalebi has taught at the University of Arizona and Union College. He is
currently assistant professor of Political Science at the University of
Wisconsin, Eau Claire. He is author of "Democratization in Developing
Countries: 1980-1989," The Journal of Developing Areas 29 (July 1995):
507-530; "Elections Matter," Center for Iranian Research and Analysis,
CIRA14 (March 1998): 30-33; "Ideological Currents in Islam" Center for
Iranian Research and Analysis, CIRA, vol. 14, No. 2 (September 1998);
"Civil Society, Democracy, and the Middle East,"Middle East Review of
International Affairs (MERIA), vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1998); "Islam,
Islamists, and Democracy," MERIA, vol. 3, no. 1 (March 1998); "Middle
East Economies: A Survey of Current Problems and Issues," MERIA, vol. 3,
no. 1 (September 1999); "Huquq-i Melli, Aqaliatha va Hamgarai"
(National Rights, Minorities and Integration), National Studies (Tehran, Iran),
vol. 1, no. 1, 1378 (Autumn 1999): 132-153; Islam and Democracy: State Society
Relations in Developing Countries, 1980-1994 (New York and London: Garland
Publishing, 2000).