Volume 4, No. 2- June 2000
Volume 4, No. 2- June 2000
Editor's
Summary: There is a general consensus that Israel, as a “client”
of the United States, uniformly seeks to maximize its leverage over American
policy. But, in fact, different Israeli governments have pursued conflicting
approaches to the United States in the context of the peace process, some with
more success than others, depending on how they interpreted both Israel's core
strategic interests and the relative value of the United States to Israeli
security.
“The people of Israel
have lived for 3700 years without a strategic memorandum with America and will
continue to live without it for another 3700 years.” -Menachem Begin
“For Rabin, the survival
of Israel was inextricably linked to the United States.” -Joseph Sisco, former
U.S. Undersecretary of State
Despite
the many volumes of literature about Israel’s relationship with the United
States, there has been very little discussion of the place of the United States
in Israel’s policy toward the peace process.(1) The general assumption that
Israel, as a “client” state, uniformly seeks to maximize its leverage over
American policy irrespective of internal differences is false. (2) Indeed,
internal Israeli differences provide the key to understanding Israeli policy.
Contrasting interpretations of both Israel's core strategic interests and the
relative value of the United States to Israeli security have led to conflicting
Israeli approaches to the U.S. executive branch, Congress, the pro-Israel lobby,
and the U.S. role in the peace process in general. These different strategies
have important implications for the future of both Israel’s peace policy and
American-Israeli relations.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
After 1967, the relationship with the United States developed into an
extremely important component of Israeli security. The United States became
Israel’s only major arms supplier, balancing Soviet backing of the Arab states
and supplying the technology necessary to maintain Israel’s “qualitative
edge.” After the 1973 War, as Israel’s military budget soared, it became
increasingly dependent on U.S. aid. In the wake of the Arab oil embargo, Israel
also became increasingly isolated and thus diplomatically reliant on the United
States. In addition, its relationship with the United States served as a
deterrent against direct attack from the USSR.
Recognizing
the benefits of such close relations with the United States, most of the Israeli
elite sought to protect and enhance them, though they were also aware of the
dangers of over-reliance, which would limit Israel’s room for diplomatic and
military maneuver in instances when U.S. and Israeli interests diverged. Some
were also wary of the possibility that Washington might attempt to gain favor
with the Arab world at Israel’s expense by seeking to impose an unfavorable
peace deal on Israel.
On the other hand, the United States proved very useful in sounding out the Arab side on ideas for compromise that might be more acceptable coming from Washington than Jerusalem. Yitzhak Rabin in the Sinai II agreement (1975) and Menahem Begin at Camp David (1979) both accepted American mediation in the peace process. Yet as the focus of the peace process moved away from the consensus issue of Egypt toward the more controversial question of the future of the West Bank and the Palestinians, major differences regarding the U.S. role in the peace process emerged.
RELATIONS WITH THE EXECUTIVE
Moving from right to left on the Israeli political spectrum, there are
four identifiable approaches to relations with the U.S. executive regarding the
peace process: Ultra-nationalism, Conservatism, Realism, and Progressivism.
These approaches are distinguishable by their underlying attitudes toward two
issues: the relative value of maintaining control over the territory captured by
Israel in the Six Day War, and the relative value of the United States as a
factor in Israeli security. Given consistent U.S. executive support for the
“land for peace” formula as the basis for an Arab-Israeli rapprochement, the
stronger Israel’s attachment to the 1967 territories, the less likely there
can be a coordinated Israeli-American policy toward the peace process.
In
addition, the more the United States is seen as a central factor in Israeli
security, the greater the likelihood that Israeli leaders will actively seek
U.S. involvement in the peace process as a means of tying America into Israel's
security network and the more prepared they will be to make concessions in peace
negotiations, if deemed necessary to retain American support. The section below
will identify the main supporters of each approach and their position regarding
the two central issues outlined above. Building on this base, the “operational
code” (3) of each approach will be constructed and each approach’s practical
policy will be explored.
ULTRA-NATIONALISM
Ultra-nationalism has been represented strongly on the right of the Likud
Party, within the National Religious Party, and in the far-right parties:
Techiya, Tzomet, Moledet, and Ha-Ichud Ha-Luemi. The most important
ultra-nationalist policymakers were former prime ministers Menachem Begin and
Yitzhak Shamir, former minister of defense and foreign minister Ariel Sharon,
and former army chief of staff and cabinet minister Rafael Eitan. This group was
extremely influential in the 1980s, but it has since moved from the center to
the periphery of Israeli politics, a fact reflected by its poor showing in the
1999 Israeli election.
UNDERLYING ATTITUDES
The
most elevated value of ultra-nationalism and the focus of its idealism was the
unity of the whole land of Israel. Such attitudes were diametrically opposed to the consistent American
position, which advocates territorial compromise as the basis for peace. This
clash was mitigated when the ultra-nationalists’ accepted that territory
captured by Israel in 1967 that lay outside the historic borders of the land of
Israel was open to negotiation. (Thus, Begin returned the Sinai peninsula to
Egypt in return for peace, while Shamir stated explicitly to a high-ranking
Israeli official that he would be prepared to withdraw from the Golan in
exchange for a peace treaty with Syria.) (4) In both cases, the
ultra-nationalists offered territorial concessions in order to buy time for
increased settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza, thereby tightening
Israel’s long-term hold on those territories.
For ultra-nationalists, military self-reliance
coupled with strength of will and assertiveness, (5) represented the key to
Israel’s security. The ultra-nationalists were concerned that reliance on the
United States would damage Israel’s self-image of being capable of defending
itself, which would then weaken Israel’s deterrence posture vis-a-vis the
Arabs. They feared a “Vietnamization of Israel” whereby the Jewish state
would be transformed into an American “protectorate.” (6)
OPERATIONAL CODE: UNILATERALISM AND
SETTLEMENTS
Ultra-nationalism tended to oppose American involvement in the peace process. Most ultra-nationalists favored a strategy based on self-reliance and defiant unilateralism. In the 1980s, they recognized the value of an American cover against any possible Soviet or Soviet client aggression, but not at the price of giving up Israel's freedom of maneuver. It had to be American insurance without American interference. In return for Israeli support on East-West questions, the ultra-nationalists expected the Americans not to interfere in Jerusalem’s attempt to incorporate gradually the West Bank and Gaza into Israel.
Ultimately,
the support of outside powers such as the United States was secondary to
Israel’s ability to act directly with force. Consequently, Begin did not view
coordination with the United States regarding the peace process as especially
important. As he declared after meeting President Carter for the first time in
1978: “We acted in accordance with a new strategy.…We did not try and reach
agreement with the U.S. on the critical issues of the peace negotiations.” (7)
Shamir also reasoned that so long as Israel did not cause too much commotion,
the United States would not interfere with the business of Jewish settlement.
Still, he recognized that Israel could not be seen as the factor holding up the
peace process in American eyes. Shamir believed that Israel could maintain
control of the territories without seriously damaging its relations with the
United States because it had the support of powerful pro-Israel forces in
Washington and was the dominant power in the territories. (8)
POLICY
“If
he [Begin] did something outrageous and we kept quiet, he would say ‘obviously
the Americans don’t object or they would have said something.’ If we did
protest, he would throw a tantrum and complain loudly about interference in
Israel’s affairs... Begin was constantly breaking the outer limits of how far
he could go in trying Washington patience...Sharon seems to believe that no
matter what he does, the United States will have no choice other than to go
along.” (9) -A senior U.S. official
Ultranationalism
reached the zenith of its power between 1981 and 1983, when Begin applied
Israeli law to the Golan Heights without consulting the United States.
Subsequently, Washington suspended the U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Strategic
Cooperation, to which Begin responded, “the people of Israel have lived for
3700 years without a strategic memorandum with America and will continue to live
without it for another 3700 years.” (10) Similarly, having allegedly obtained
tacit support for Israel’s June 1982 invasion of Lebanon from U.S. Secretary
of State Alexander Haig, Begin and Sharon (11) were indignant when, following
Haig’s replacement by George Shultz, the United States began to contradict
Israel’s strategy for dealing with Lebanon, the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), and the broader peace process. From the ultra-nationalist
perspective, the invasion was not simply aimed at preventing PLO terrorist
attacks from Lebanon, it was expected to severely weaken the organization and
facilitate the emergence of a Palestinian leadership that would accept Israeli
supremacy in the West Bank. (12) Subsequently, Begin’s response to the Reagan
Peace Plan of September 1, 1982, which called for territorial concessions by
Israel, was to inform the Knesset: “We have no reason to get on our knees.”
Further, on September 5, the cabinet approved the immediate establishment of
three new settlements in the territories, in defiance of the Reagan Plan’s
call for a settlement freeze.
Shamir
preferred to quietly build settlements in order to prevent the possibility of
territorial compromise by denying the Palestinians territorial contiguity and
instead creating islands of autonomy as in the Sharon Plan. In order to help
prevent the build-up of U.S. pressure for a settlement freeze, Shamir always
tried to appear open to the American executive’s strategy for peace.
Consequently, although he had originally opposed the Camp David Accords, he
accepted them once they were adopted as a pragmatic Likud negotiating stance. He
maintained such a stance throughout most of the 1980s in order to keep Israel on
reasonable terms with the United States without the threat of real concessions,
since no Arab party appeared willing to negotiate anyway. Similarly, Shamir
attended the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, despite his obvious reluctance, in
order to please the Americans. But, as he explained just after he left office:
“I would have carried on autonomy talks for ten years. Meanwhile we would have
reached half a million Jews in Judea and Samaria.” (13) However, his sustained
opposition to the Bush administration’s demand for a settlement freeze, which
cost his government's obtaining $10 billion worth of loan guarantees during its
term, demonstrated his unwillingness to compromise on any issue that threatened
ultra-nationalism’s core Eretz Israel ideology.
Since
1992, the ultra-nationalists have never regained full control over Israeli
policy. In response to the Oslo peace process, they have continued to preach
settlement expansion and were highly critical of Benjamin Netanyahu's
territorial concessions. Nonetheless, as foreign minister, Sharon supported the
U.S.-brokered Wye Accord, which demanded a further 13 percent Israeli withdrawal
from the West Bank. But Sharon’s acquiescence did not signal a real change in
the ultra-nationalist approach. Just days after leaving the Wye plantation, he
publicly encouraged settlers to “grab hills” in the West Bank. (14) Such
defiance ran counter to his own government’s official policy and the spirit of
Wye Agreement, as well as Israel’s verbal pledges at the Wye summit not to
expand settlement activity in this manner. (15) Sharon subsequently asked the
Russians, rather than the Americans, to mediate between Israel and Syria,
without even informing Washington. This move was a blatant appeal to Israel’s
Russian immigrant electorate, but also typical of the ultra-nationalist tendency
to act independently of the United States. (16)
CONSERVATIVISM
The conservative approach has traditionally been represented by Likud’s pragmatic wing, though during Netanyahu’s tenure as party leader the conservative bloc splintered and individual conservatives joined different parties, primarily because of personal conflicts with Netanyahu rather than ideological reasons. Leading conservative figures include former foreign and defense minister Moshe Arens, former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, former ambassador to the United States Zalman Shoval, mayor of Jerusalem Ehud Olmert, and former Likud finance minister and current member of the Center party Dan Meridor. Former Likud MKs Roni Milo and David Levy have been loosely associated with this group.
UNDERLYING ATTITUDES
The conservatives have been united by a commitment to keeping the whole
land of Israel, civic values, and a predominantly realpolitik approach to
foreign policy. Until the intifada, they opposed territorial compromise in the
West Bank and Gaza, favoring autonomy for the Palestinians and continued Jewish
settlement in those territories. However, after the intifada, the conservatives
began to think beyond the traditional model of autonomy, both as a
democratic-moral necessity and as a necessity dictated by realpolitik. As Arens
put it: “Israel must maintain a reasonable correlation
between concrete objectives and resources. As a nation dedicated to Western
values and ideals, we must live by them not only in Israel itself, but also in
our dealings with the Palestinian population.”
(17) Subsequently, Arens and Milo favored a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from
Gaza. (18)
Arens also argued that Israeli settlements in the West Bank should be limited to
blocks, making possible territorial compromise. (19) But it was Netanyahu who
publicly abandoned the Likud’s long-time support for autonomy by embracing the
concept of territorial compromise. His plan envisaged a withdrawal from roughly
half of the West Bank, which would effectively mean abandoning some Jewish
settlements. Netanyahu also talked about accepting a demilitarized Palestinian
state in the West Bank and Gaza with limited sovereignty, (20) a position that
allowed conservatives to cooperate with the United States in a manner that the
ultra-nationalists could not really contemplate.
The
conservatives’ Realism led them to recognize Washington’s importance in
enhancing Israeli deterrence. To this end they greatly valued the two Memoranda
of Strategic Cooperation (MoU) signed by Israel and the United States in the
1980s. They also recognized Washington’s pivotal role in encouraging the
moderation in the Middle East that helped engender the Madrid Conference in 1991
and subsequent peace negotiations. However, conservatives have not viewed the
United States as the long-term cornerstone of either Israeli strategy or the
peace process. They have expressed doubts as to the continued American
commitment in the face of isolationist tendencies in Congress and public
opinion, which could mean a decreased American political and financial
commitment to peace. (21) Indeed, conservatives calculated after the Cold War
that by the early twenty-first century that the balance of power would have
shifted, American hegemony would have waned, and Iran’s acquisition of nuclear
weapons would change all the regional power equation leading to peace agreements
signed under tremendous pressure. (22) To the conservatives then, the U.S.
regional role did not provide the basis for Israeli security in the long-run.
However, American diplomatic and strategic support for Israel was of great
importance in the short-run.
OPERATIONAL CODE: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT
In place of the ultra-nationalists’ unilateralism, the conservatives
have prefered “constructive engagement.” The conservatives’ less rigid
approach to the land of Israel and their higher evaluation of cooperation with
the United States as a security asset have allowed them to show a greater
willingness than the ultra-nationalists to take the American position into
account. In this vein, they recognized the importance of maintaining credibility
with the administration by engaging seriously in the peace process. (23) In
order to minimize conflict, the conservatives argued that the U.S. role in the
peace process should be confined to that of facilitator—bringing the parties
together to negotiate bilaterally—rather than mediator. (24) They recognized
that divergent interests in the case of American mediation would probably lead
to conflict and pressure on Israel for concessions. Nonetheless, they understood
that Israel could not simply ignore U.S. policy preferences. In the event of
U.S. involvement, they assessed that a tough, but not implacable, negotiating
stance combined with a forceful presentation of their position in strategic
(rather than ideological) terms that the Americans could sympathize with, could
help prevent the continual erosion of the Israeli stance through Arab “salami
tactics.” (25) Nonetheless, because the conservatives continued to attach
great significance to holding on to large chunks of the territories, they had to
be prepared for on-going conflict with any administration over the peace
process, which they sought to neutralize through supporters in the pro-Israel
lobby and Congress, as will be discussed later.
POLICY
The difference between the conservatives and the ultra-nationalists
became apparent during the March 1990 crisis over whether to accept the American
conditions for meeting Palestinian representatives in Cairo. After extended
negotiations, Foreign Minister Arens, supported by Meridor, Olmert, and Milo,
hammered out a compromise with Secretary of State James Baker that was blocked
by Shamir and the ultra-nationalists. As prime minister, Netanyahu was prepared
to make some compromises on ideological issues such as settlements in order to
retain credibility with the American administration, much to the chagrin of
ultra-nationalists like Shamir. (26) Thus, even as Netanyahu announced the
building of a new settlement in Jerusalem, Har Homa, he postponed construction
as a result of a secret promise to President Clinton whereby Israel agreed to
limit settlement activity, a promise reaffirmed at Wye Plantation in October
1998. (27)
Upon entering office, Netanyahu initially sought to minimize the U.S.
role in negotiations with both the Syrians and with the Palestinians. While he
continued this policy on the Syrian track, (28) he reversed his position
regarding the Palestinians after armed clashes between Israeli and Palestinian
forces on the Temple Mount in September 1996 nearly led to the collapse of the
peace process. Subsequently, Netanyahu came to see U.S. involvement in
negotiations as crucial to preventing the collapse of the peace process, which
he feared would result in Israel’s isolation and alienation from the United
States. (29) This did not mean that he was willing to simply tow the Clinton
line regarding the peace process. Indeed, he worked very closely with supporters
in Congress to limit administration pressure on Israel. But after nearly a year
of reluctance, Netanyahu agreed at Wye Plantation in October 1998 to withdraw
from an additional 13 percent of the West Bank, as the administration had
originally requested. From the conservative perspective, if territorial
concessions had to be made, then it was better to make them to the American
mediator and enhance Israel's credibility in Washington, than to make them to
Yasir Arafat. Indeed, Netanyahu accepted the Wye Agreement only after it became
apparent that his virtual alliance with the Republican-led Congress provoked the
administration’s retaliation by subtly weakening strategic cooperation between
Israel and the United States. (30) In contrast, once Netanyahu signed the Wye
Agreement, Israel received a new Memorandum of Strategic Understanding with the
United States. The message was clear.
But
Netanyahu’s willingness to make ideological compromises in order to maintain a
close strategic relationship with the United States was weakened by the
influence of domestic politics. Indeed, Netanyahu's relations with the American
administration were permeated by the requirements of domestic politics to a
greater degree than any previous prime minister. Keeping one eye on the next
election, he feared that if he made too many concessions, he would face not only
a challenger from the left for prime minister but one from the right as well,
which would severely damage his chances of winning the election. The impact of
this reality was most apparent after the Wye Agreement when an early Israeli
election became virtually inevitable. Subsequently, Netanyahu not only froze the
implementation of the agreement but also broke pledges to the United States by
dramatically increasing government support for settlement activity. (31)
REALISM
Realism has been rooted in the political culture of state-building
promoted by David Ben Gurion and the Labor party in the early years of the
state. (32) As a result of the realists’ security emphasis, an elite group of
army officers have high positions in the Labor party after leaving the military.
The most important realist was late prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, a
former ambassador to the United States and army chief of staff. Other
important realists include current Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Minister of
Tourism and former chief of staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Minister of Education,
Culture, and Sport and former deputy chief of staff Matan Vilnai, and former
civil governor of the territories and current Deputy Defense Minister Efraim
Sneh. (33) Though a relatively small group, the influence of the realists is
magnified greatly both by their power base in the military and by the fact that
the Labor party feels it cannot get
elected on its dovish platform without the presence of high-ranking army
officers to give the party credibility.
UNDERLYING ATTITUDES
For realists, the territories captured in 1967 were assigned significant strategic value as a means for defending the state within its 1967 borders, providing strategic depth and early warning facilities. Subsequently, Rabin viewed some settlements as having security value and others as “political” and, hence, of negligible value. Realists, lacking conservatives’ nationalistic concern for the territories, had a more flexible position on surrendering land for peace to enhance Israel’s security. As Rabin explained: “I am unwilling to give up a single inch of Israeli security, but I am willing to give up many inches of settlements and territory, as well as 1,700,000 Arab inhabitants, for the sake of peace. We seek a territorial compromise that will bring peace and security; a lot of security.” (34)
From
the realist perspective, the balance of power in the Middle East cast the United
States in a central role such that according to Joseph Sisco, former U.S.
undersecretary of state: “For Rabin, the survival of Israel was inextricably
linked to the United States.” (35) Indeed, Rabin stated that U.S. policy on
the Palestinian question was at least as important as Israel’s military
deployment in the West Bank. (36) In contrast to the conservatives, in the
post-Cold War environment, Rabin continued to see the United States as a
cornerstone of Israeli strategy toward the peace process. A deal with the
Palestinians would serve to ease Israel’s position in the region, which, it
was hoped, would facilitate Israel’s entrance into the American-led grouping
of moderate Arab states. This group would weaken the influence of the Iran and
other radicals in the Middle East, reducing their strategic threat to Israel. Realists believed that the U.S. created in the region the necessary environment
for the peace process. However, Rabin always argued against a defense pact with
the United States for fear that it would restrain Israel’s tactical room for
maneuver and, by putting American lives at risk for Israel, possibly undermine
American support for Israel in the long-run.
OPERATIONAL CODE: COORDINATION
“The
central line of Rabin's foreign policy is coordination with Washington and
acceptance of the American position on every issue that does not affect the
security of Israel directly.” (37)
Rabin actively sought diplomatic coordination with Washington in order to
strengthen Israel’s bargaining position in negotiations and, more generally,
to integrate the United States into Israel’s security structure. The primary
American interest in the region had switched from containing the Soviet Union to
maintaining peace and stability in general, including the containment of rogue
states and promoting the peace process. Rabin strongly believed that in order to
retain U.S. support, the United States had to be convinced that Israel was
sincere in its search for peace. (38) Some realists even went so far as to
suggest that the actual peace negotiations were of little value unless
U.S.-Israeli coordination was in place. (39) Yet the realists preferred to
distance the United States from the detailed bargaining, at least until the
latter stages, due to the American tendency to “split the difference”
between the parties, a sort of mediation that could not only erode Israel’s
negotiating position but also lead to unnecessary friction between Israel and
its most important ally. (40)
POLICY
The realist approach was most apparent during the Clinton-Rabin years,
from 1992 to 1995. To begin with, Rabin and the administration agreed on a
“Syria first” strategy, and coordinated regarding the Palestinian track
prior to Oslo. Thus, Rabin was able to amend the U.S. bridging proposal for a
Declaration of Principles (DoP) at the end of the ninth round of the Washington
talks in May 1993, having been shown the draft 36 hours in advance of its
presentation to the parties. (41) Rabin did not want deep U.S. involvement in
the Oslo track, which paralleled the Washington talks, for fear that the
U.S.-Israel relationship would suffer should Oslo fall through. (42) Even after
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres initialed the DoP in Oslo, Rabin only agreed to
adopt it on condition that the Americans supported it. (43) Indeed, Rabin only
attended the Washington ceremony with Arafat at Clinton’s personal request.
(44) Subsequently, Rabin was able to translate Israel’s willingness to advance
peace into an argument for strengthening U.S. military backing for Israel.
Following Oslo, Rabin convinced Clinton to compensate Israel for its risk-taking
by supplying Israel with F-15 advanced bombers and a supercomputer whose
transfer had been previously blocked by the Pentagon. (45)
Similarly,
Rabin was prepared to withdraw from the whole of the Golan in return for a
basket of security measures, including the stationing of American troops on the
Golan Heights, as part of a peace deal with Syria. This idea seemingly
contradicted the long held realist objection to risking American for Israel’s
security, yet the actual role envisaged for American troops was to be quite
limited, similar to the Multi-National Force in the Sinai after Camp David. (46)
Still,
Rabin only allowed the American peace team to become involved in the bilateral
negotiations in the final, decisive stages of the Oslo II talks. (47) Similarly,
Rabin only permitted U.S. direct involvement in the later stages of peace
negotiations with Jordan following secret direct meetings. (48) However, Rabin
was prepared to allow intensive U.S. mediation in the Syrian track, given the
importance placed by Hafez al-Asad on the American role, though he remained
extremely wary of allowing the Americans to represent the Israeli position. (49)
Indeed, despite the United States’ centrality in his strategy for peace, Rabin
was prepared to confront the administration on the tactical level. Even when
Rabin agreed with the administration on a Syria first strategy, he was not
prepared to acquiesce to U.S. demands to put the Syrian track first at all costs
Following a disappointing response to his proposal for direct talks in
August 1993, Rabin became skeptical of Asad’s commitment to reach an
agreement. Subsequently, he argued that the Palestinian track should be given
priority and after a Rabin-Clinton meeting, the Washington accepted Rabin’s
position. (50)
Upon
becoming prime minister, Ehud Barak signaled in numerous in-depth meetings with
Clinton, his desire to prioritize strategic cooperation on the peace process.
These meetings not only restored the intimacy of U.S.-Israeli relations after
the frosty Clinton-Netanyahu period, but also resulted in Clinton’s agreement
to a lower profile in Israel-Palestinian negotiations, just as Barak preferred.
(51) Barak was also keen to limit the role of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) in judging whether or not the Palestinians were fulfilling their security
commitments under the 1998 Wye Agreement.
PROGRESSIVISM
The progressive worldview is closely linked to the outlook and values of
European social-democracy and is represented in the Meretz party and within the
Labor party . Former prime minister Shimon Peres was the leading progressive
decisionmaker, supported by a group of aides known collectively as “the
Blazers,” which included the Oslo architect Yossi Beilin, Israel’s Oslo
chief negotiator in 1993 and current Center party MK Uri Savir, minister of
internal security Shlomo Ben-Ami, and minister of Jerusalem affairs Haim Ramon.
Since the end of the 1980s, the progressives have gained growing influence
within the Labor party and support for Meretz among the general public has also
grown. However, their electoral reliance on realist generals such as Barak
weakens their influence over foreign policy.
UNDERLYING ATTITUDES
For the Progressives the whole Land of Israel is neither a core value nor
a great security value. In fact, Jewish settlements were generally considered a
security burden because they inhibited the possibility of reaching a peace
agreement with the Palestinians. In addition, progressives argued that Israel
must make territorial concessions for idealistic reasons, because continued rule
over another people and ensuing human rights abuses threaten the Jewish and
democratic character of the state.
Whereas
conservatives and realists viewed peace as dependent on military security,
progressives saw no security without peace. Ultimately, neither military power
nor a strategic association with the United States could provide security,
because the underlying reasons for conflict would remain. In essence, peace was
dependent on satisfying Palestinian demands for self-determination and on the
“creation of a regional community of nations, with a common market and elected
centralised bodies, modeled on the European community.” (52) Without adopting
this course, progressives argued that the level of poverty and political
frustration in the region would rise, increasing support for Islamic
fundamentalism. In turn, fundamentalist regimes with non-conventional weapons
would seriously threaten both Israel and the whole Middle East. (53) Within this
vision the United States might play the role of peace facilitator, but relations
with Washington were not as central to Israeli security as in the realist
perception.
OPERATIONAL CODE: UNDERWRITER OF PEACE
The progressives’ position on territorial compromise opened up clear
possibilities for close cooperation with the United States, though this was not
nearly as important as in the realist vision. The progressives wanted the
Americans to use their political, economic, and strategic power to underwrite
their vision of multilateral peace. Paradoxically, while the Progressive
approach placed less strategic emphasis on the United States than did realism,
the progressives favored a defense pact (54) with the Americans. Peres saw the
United States as “the glue” that would hold together a multi-lateral
security pact that would serve not as a defense against a common enemy but
rather as an intra-regional security system. (55)
POLICY
After Oslo, Peres obtained American agreement to help create a Marshall
Plan for the Middle East. Subsequently, Washington promoted the 1994 Middle
East-North Africa (MENA) Economic Summit in Casablanca and co-sponsored the
follow up Amman conference in 1995. On a tactical level, the progressives
recognized that the United States was being courted by almost every country in
the region that could attract economic investment and American political
involvement only through supporting peace. According to Peres, Jordan was
encouraged to sign the 1994 peace treaty with Israel by America’s decision to
forgive Jordan’s foreign debt. (56)
Progressives
valued the United States as an external mediator and actually argued for
American pressure on both sides (57) in order to advance the peace process. In
this vein, in 1987 Peres secretly reached the London agreement with Jordan,
after significant American mediation. His problem, as foreign minister in a
national unity government headed by Shamir, was that he lacked the ability to
move forward due to the Likud’s veto power in the cabinet. Thus, the London
agreement had to be presented as an American paper. (58) With U.S. support for
any breakthrough, it was thought that the Likud would either have to acquiesce
or allow Peres to break up the government and go to the people on the issue of
peace with Jordan which was thought to be popular. However, despite support in
the U.S. State Department, Shultz refused to go along with the scheme and the
agreement collapsed. Peres also wanted the Oslo Accords to be presented as an
American proposal to help sell the agreement in Israel, but the United States
refused to comply with his request. (59)
Clearly,
for the progressives, the U.S. role in the peace process was not crucial. Hence,
when they felt that the U.S. sponsored talks were not going to produce results,
they did not hesitate to use other countries as mediators. After the London
agreement fiasco, Peres and Beilin turned to Europe (60) to help facilitate an
accord with the Palestinians. In fact, because they blamed the Americans for the
London agreement’s failure, (61) they feared U.S. involvement in the Oslo
talks might torpedo progress. Consequently, they deliberately distanced the
United States from those negotiations. (62)
CONGRESS AND THE PRO-ISRAEL LOBBY: THE ROLE OF
CONGRESS AND THE LOBBY IN THE PEACE PROCESS
Although
foreign policy is primarily the preserve of the executive, Congress plays an
important secondary role. Without Congress there is no money to implement
foreign policy. Congress also has the ability to propose legislation that can
impact on foreign policy or pass amendments of significance such as the
Jackson-Vanik amendment which linked detente to Soviet Jewish emigration.
Ultimately, it is the president who signs the checks to pay for policy and it is
he that usually directs policy. Nonetheless, the president will always be
keeping a close watch on congressional opinion regarding foreign policy. The
pro-Israel lobby has proven very influential in affecting congressional activity
regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict over the last 20 years. In this way they
have had an indirect impact over the American executive’s policy. Moreover,
given that the American Jewish community represents an important source of
funding during elections as well as an important voting group in presidential
elections, the President also tends to pay consistent attention to the opinions
of the pro-Israel lobby.
ISRAEL, CONGRESS, AND THE PRO-ISRAEL LOBBY
There are two significant Israeli approaches toward the role of Congress
and the pro-Israel lobby in the peace process: Likud and Labor. Each party's
approach is dictated by the compatibility of its attitude toward the peace
process with that of the U.S. executive. Thus, Labor’s support for “land for
peace” has generally made it easier for it to work with the U.S. executive on
the peace process, while since the early 1980s, Likud leaders have recognized
that their hawkish positions tend to find greater support in Congress and the
pro-Israel lobby.
THE LIKUD
During the 1980s, the Likud attained American support not only for Israel
but also for Likud positions among conservative politicians, Christian
fundamentalist groups, key figures in the media and important groups within the
American Jewish community. (63) More generally, the Likud strategy benefited
from the increased power of the pro-Israel lobby organization, the
America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Thus, in 1982, AIPAC was able
to prevent the Reagan administration from linking the level of aid to Israel to
the Likud government’s acceptance of the Reagan Plan. In fact, in December
1982, Congress approved an increase in aid to Israel.
But
it was not until the Bush administration that Likud was forced to emphasize this
congressional strategy. Bush, unlike his predecessor, lacked a special affinity
with Israel and with the end of the Cold War, Israel’s usefulness as a
“strategic asset” seemed to decline. Worse for Likud, the intifada turned
Israel from David into Goliath in the American media and after the Gulf War,
when the Arabs agreed to take part in the Madrid peace conference, it became
much harder to blame the Arab side for lack of progress toward peace. This led
to new U.S. pressure on Israel to make concessions. For example, when the Likud
government asked Washington for $10 billion in loan guarantees to help absorb
Russian immigrants in 1991, the administration demanded a settlement freeze in
order to comply. Shamir was confident that he had the congressional support to
overcome this obstacle, but President Bush appealed straight to the American
people. As a result, Israel’s support in Congress crumbled, the pro-Israel
lobby turned against Shamir’s confrontational approach, and the Likud
government never received the guarantees.
Despite
this failure, the Likud continued its efforts to mobilize Congress against both
the Clinton administration and the Labor government in Israel, even when it was
out of power between 1992 and 1996. Israeli Likud activists worked with American
Jewish groups and key congressional Republicans to stop the flow of American aid
to the Palestinian Authority (PA). (64) Likud’s return to power in 1996
highlighted the strategy of working with Congress. In response to administration
pressure over the extent of the second redeployment from the West Bank during
the spring of 1998, the Likud and AIPAC mobilized the pro-Israel lobby and
obtained a letter signed by 81 Senators opposing U.S. “pressure” on Israel.
Congressional support was enhanced because the Republican dominated Congress
used the issue to attack the Democratic president. Indeed, the Speaker of the
House, Newt Gingrich, allegedly promised Netanyahu that Congress would “back
him to the hilt” against Clinton. (65) Ultimately however, Netanyahu did agree
to the 13 percent withdrawal requested by the administration at Wye.
LABOR
On its return to power in 1992, Labor regarded the pro-Israel lobby as
superfluous. Some key progressives even went so far as to label AIPAC an
“extreme right-wing” group with a negative impact both on the peace process
and Israeli security. (66) As former deputy foreign minister Yossi Beilin
explained: “Labor’s coming to power pulls the rug from under AIPAC. We want
U.S. involvement in the peace process; their agenda was to keep the Americans
out. We want peace based on compromise, and their agenda was to explain why
compromise was impossible.” (67) As a result of this attitude and the growing
sense that Israel was no longer a poor country in need of financial support from
the diaspora, the Labor government downgraded its relationship with AIPAC.
In
fact, Labor viewed the pro-Israel lobby as an irritant to its peace policies.
Rabin thought that aggressive lobbying such as that over AWACS in 1981 and loan
guarantees in 1991, undermined the most important element in U.S.-Israeli
relations, namely the inter-governmental strategic basis of the relationship.
(68) Indeed, in 1992, despite AIPAC’s enthusiasm, Rabin agreed not to
challenge the sale of 72 F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia in return for Apache
helicopters and the pre-positioning of American equipment in Israel. (69) This
approach had the advantage of enhancing Israel's qualitative edge without
threatening its closeness with the U.S. executive.
Indeed,
in order to protect the peace process and close relations with the
administration, Labor occasionally tried to restrain the lobby. Following the
1995 Hebron massacre, a UN resolution condemning the act referred to Jerusalem
as occupied territory. AIPAC wanted the administration to veto the bill but the
unofficial Israeli line was that AIPAC should not do so because the implications
of a U.S. veto might prevent the PLO from returning to the peace negotiations.
As Peres put it at the time: “Too big a victory for Israel is not in the
interests of the peace process.” (70) Indeed, it was only following
congressional and AIPAC initiatives to limit aid to the PA and to question the
viability of U.S. troops on the Golan that Labor took Congress’s role in the
peace process seriously.
CONCLUSION: ASSESSMENT OF PAST AND FUTURE
Despite the fact that Labor has been able to pursue its peace strategy
with the support of various American administrations while Likud has been
increasingly driven to using Congress and the pro-Israel lobby, Labor's
relationship with the United States regarding the peace process has not been as
smooth as one might have expected. In the mid-1980s, the progressives relied too
heavily on the United States to resolve tactical aspects of the peace process,
despite the fact that Washington was less important strategically than it was
for either the conservatives or the realists. Nonetheless, the progressives
seemingly believed that the United States has a singular interest in a peace
accord and should therefore be strongly and unreservedly behind any attempt to
forge a compromise. They ignored the complex way that American foreign policy is
formulated and the tendency of the United States not to impose itself in
negotiations between the parties. Even after the Oslo Accords, the tendency
remained for the progressives to call for more vigorous U.S. intervention to get
the talks back on track. (71)
While the progressives overestimated the American executive’s role in
the peace process, Labor tended to underplay the role of Congress and the
pro-Israel lobby. As a result, the Labor government from 1992 to 1996 had
significant problems in promoting policies that needed congressional support.
However, since coming to power in 1999, the Barak government has been far more
involved in galvanizing support for its peace policies in AIPAC and other
pro-Israel groups and worked especially hard with AIPAC to counter opposition to
funding the Wye Agreement from Republicans and right-wing American Jewish
groups. (72)
In
contrast, Likud under Shamir in the 1980s was able to greatly mitigate its
fundamental clash with the American executive over the future of the
territories. Then, the terms under which American aid was granted to Israel
actually improved and two Memoranda of Strategic Understanding were signed, in
spite of differences over the peace process. However, the two factors that
created that reality—common Cold War strategic interests and a united
pro-Israel lobby—have ceased to pertain such Likud has increasingly looked to
Congress to mitigate administration pressure since the Bush presidency, albeit
without much substantial success.
Part of the reason why Likud’s strategy failed lies with Israel’s supporters in the United States. Since the intifada, the pro-Israel lobby and its supporters in Congress became increasingly disunited over the peace process. (73) They also split with Israel’s government- sponsored religious establishment over the sensitive issue of religious identity and the “Who is a Jew?” controversy. (74) The split was enough to erode unconditional American-Jewish support for the Israeli government in Washington.
But
by far the most important reason for Likud’s failure is that ultimately, it is
the executive, and not Congress, that is the main player regarding foreign
policy. Congress does not conduct American diplomacy nor is it directly
responsible for the strategic aspects of U.S.-Israel relations. Using Congress
to counter-balance the administration can be a useful tactic for Israeli
governments but it can never be a strategy in and of itself for maintaining
close American-Israeli relations. Indeed, in the long run, using party based
congressional opposition to the president is counter-productive. By taking
advantage of Republican opposition to Clinton in Congress, Netanyahu risked
eroding the essentially bipartisan nature of American support for Israel. More
specifically, part of the reason for Republican support for Netanyahu on issues
such as opposing the positioning of U.S. troops on the Golan and the extension
of foreign aid to the PA, stems from isolationist sentiments. In the long run,
encouraging such forces in American politics damages Israel’s position, as
Israel is a major recipient of American aid and greatly benefits from the major
American role in regional and world affairs.
This
danger to Israel could become particularly acute regarding final status
agreements with the Palestinians and Syria. In these cases, Israel and its Arab
partners will likely demand very large sums of money both to underwrite and
implement the agreements. In the past American financial support was seen by all
concerned as a fundamental component of all peace agreements. Indeed, most of
the increases in American military aid to Israel since 1975 have been granted as
compensation for the strategic risks Israel has taken by withdrawing from
territory in return for peace agreements.
However,
given the growing reluctance to spend money internationally in the post-Cold War
era, it could be very difficult for Israel to get Congress to agree to
underwrite such an expensive peace this time. At the very least, Barak will have
to pay more attention to cultivating Congress and will also have to consider
encouraging American allies such as Japan and the European Union to help
shoulder the burden of any deal.
Finally,
in the post-Cold War era when Israel’s status as a U.S. strategic asset is
more open to debate and Congress is increasingly hostile to foreign aid, two
points are worth stressing. First, the overall quality of American-Israeli
relations is increasingly linked to the degree to which Israeli policy dovetails
with the American executive’s overall strategy for peace. Second, Congress is
likely to play an increasingly important role in the peace process as its
financial underwriter. This reality might tempt right-wing forces in Israel and
the pro-Israel lobby to adopt a congressional strategy. But, apart from
frustrating the Israeli left’s peace policy, in the long run, such a strategy
carries the potential to severely damage the American-Israeli relationship.
NOTES
1) Even in Hebrew there has been no systematic analysis of Israeli policy
in this regard, despite the fact that many opinion pieces are constantly being
written in newspapers and journals. Only one Hebrew book has addressed itself to
the question, Ezra Zohar, Pilegesh BeMizrach Ha Tichon [Mistress in the Middle
East] (Tel Aviv: 1994) but this effort is more rhetorical than analytical in
style.
2) Avraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the
Special Relationship (NY: Columbia UP 1993); Moshe Efrat and Jacob Bercovitch
Eds., Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: The Imbalance of
Influence (London: Routledge 1991).
3) Alexander George, ‘The Operational Code’, International Studies
Quarterly 13/1 (1989).
4) Interview with a former senior Israeli official; see also Itamar
Rabinovitch, The Brink of Peace: Israel and Syria 1992-6 (Tel Aviv: Yediot
Achronot 1998) [Hebrew] pp. 63-4.
5) Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel’s Fateful Hour (NY: Harper and Row, 1988)
p. 72.
6) Jerusalem Report, August 7, 1997 p.19; see also Ariel Sharon
& David Chanoff, Warrior: The Autobiography of Ariel Sharon (NY: Simon &
Schuster, 1989) p. 345.
7) Sasson Sofer, Begin: An Anatomy of Leadership (NY: Blackwell, 1988) p.
121.
8) Interview with Yitzhak Shamir, November 1995.
9) John Goshko, “Events Test Strength Of Us-Israeli Ties,” Washington
Post, January 7, 1986.
10) Yossi Melman & Dan Raviv, Friends in Deed: Inside the US-Israel
Alliance (NY: Hyperion 1994) p. 209.
11) Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (NY:
MacMillan 1984) pp. 326-32.
12) Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s
Lebanon War (London: Allen & Unwin 1985) pp. 43, 260-8, 300.
13) Clyde Haberman, “Shamir Admits Plan to Stall Talks For 10 Years,”
New York Times, June 27, 1992.
14) Margot Dudkevitch, “Sharon Tells Settlers to ‘Run, Grab Hills,’”
Jerusalem Post, November 16, 1998.
15) Jerusalem Report, November 23, 1998, p. 10.
16) David Makovsky, “Indyk Attacks Sharon,” Ha’aretz, April 12,
1999.
17) Moshe Arens, Broken Covenant (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p.
278.
18) Ibid. pp. 209, 268.
19) Arens Interview; Zalman Shoval, “Security Zones in Judea, Samaria
and Gaza,” Nativ 8 (July 1995) [Hebrew].
20) Makovsky, “Bar Ilan: We May Accept a Limited Palestinian State,”
Jerusalem Post, December 20, 1996;
Makovsky, “Netanyahu presents Allon-Plus plan for final Settlement to Security
Cabinet,” Ha’aretz, June 5, 1997; Schiff, “Netanyahu’s Map,”
Ha’aretz, August 19, 1997; Nadav Shragai, “Shahak: Settlements will be
Evacuated,” Ha’aretz, November 4, 1998.
21) Dore Gold, “Handle this Package with Care,” Jerusalem Post,
April 22, 1994.
22) Ari Shavit, “The Prime Minister Would Like a Few Minutes of Your
Time,” Ha’aretz Weekend Supplement, November 22, 1996, pp. 18-24,54.
23) Chemi Shalev, “One Of Their Own,” Ma’ariv Weekend Supplement,
July 12, 1996, p. 5.
24) See for example Dan Meridor, Annual Conference Proceedings
(Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1991); Hillel Kutter,
“Shoval Supports Low Key US Role,” Jerusalem Post, July 28, 1998.
25) Arens quoted in Washington Jewish Week, February 10, 1989, p. 10.
26) Chaim Misgav, Conversations with Yitzhak Shamir [Hebrew](Tel Aviv:
Sifriat Poalim 1997), pp. 181-4.
27) Shragai, “Har Homa Building Secretly Frozen by Netanyahu,”
Ha’aretz, December 10, 1997; Jerusalem Report, November 23, 1998, pp. 26-30.
28) Schiff, “Netanyahu's Failed Historic Opportunity,” Ha’aretz,
July 7, 1999; “Syria Agreed to Foreign Troops on Hermon,” Ha’aretz, May
28, 1999.
29) Makovsky, “Netanyahu’s Road to Oslo,” Jerusalem Post, December
31, 1996: “US meets ‘New Age' Likud leader,’ Jerusalem Post, February 17,
1997.
30) Melman, “US kept Israel in Dark on Iranian Missile,” Ha’aretz,
August 19, 1998.
31) Makovsky, “US says Netanyahu Broke Secret Promise to Stop
Settlements,” Ha’aretz, April
29, 1999; Kuttler, “US: Israel Misleading us on Settlements,” Jerusalem
Post, April 18, 1999.
32) On Realism (also referred to as Statism) see Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don Yehiya, Civil Religion
in Israel (Berkeley: University of California Press 1983).
33) Yitzhak Mordechai, leader of the Center Party, current Minister for
Transport, and Minister of Defense in the Netanyahu government, can also be
included in this group. His roots lie in the army officer corps and he was the
most moderate member of the Netanyahu Cabinet regarding the peace process.
34) Yitzhak Rabin, “Pragmatism and Compromise,” Jerusalem
Post, June 1, 1992.
35) David Horowitz (ed.), Rabin, Soldier of Peace (London: Peter Halban
1996), p. 47.
36) Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Near East, March 13, 1989, p.
30.
37) Mideast Mirror, January 26, 1995.
38) Efraim Inbar, “Rabin and Israeli National Security,” BESA
Security and Policy Study no. 25 (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University).
39) Makovsky, “Rabin Hoping To Work With US Administration on
Autonomy,” Jerusalem Post, July 8, 1992; Efraim Sneh, “Rabin Can See the
Whole Picture,” Jerusalem Post, February
5, 1993.
40) Rabinovitch, (note 4), pp. 209, 225-6.
41) Makovsky, “Rabin Opposes US Proposal,” Jerusalem Post, May 20,
1993.
42) Makovsky, Making Peace Between Israel and the PLO (Boulder CO:
Westview, 1995), p. 65.
43) Rabinovitch (note 4), p. 44.
44) Makovsky, Making Peace, p.
65.
45) Ibid, p. 121.
46) Steve Rodan, “PA Not Doing Enough Against Hamas,” Jerusalem Post,
September 5, 1994; Elaine Sciolino, “Christopher sees Arafat at PLO
Headquarters,” New York Times, January 9, 1994.
47) Uri Savir, The Process (NY: Random House, 1998), p. 205.
48) Thomas Friedman and Elaine Sciolino, “Crossing the River: The
Israel-Jordan Pact,” New York Times, July 31, 1994.
49) Thus, in 1995 Rabin refused to acquiesce to the U.S. request to send
Asad a letter from President Clinton stating that Israel had “deposited”
with the U.S. a commitment to withdraw from the Golan Heights to June 4, 1967
lines; though he did not object to Christopher raising the issue verbally as an
American question to Asad. See Schiff, “Did Clinton and Assad Conspire Against
Rabin?” Ha’aretz, November 30,1999.
50) Rabinovitch (note 4), pp. 173,209,225-6.
51) Aluf Benn, “US to lower its profile in talks with PA,” Ha'aretz,
July 13, 1999; Akiva Eldar, “People and Politics,” Ha’aretz, July 15,
1999; Benn, “Barak Multi-Stage Plan Presented to US,” Ha'aretz, July 18,
1999.
52) Shimon Peres & Aryeh Naor, The New Middle East (New York: Henry
Holt, 1993), p. 62.
53) Ibid, pp. 39, 76.
54) See for example, Meretz MK Amnon Rubenstein, “Inching toward Pax
Americana,” Ha’aretz, October 15, 1998.
55) Shimon Peres, Special Policy Forum Report (Washington DC: Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, April 30, 1996) p. 3; Yossi Beilin, Touching
Peace (Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot, 1997), p. 25 [Hebrew].
56) Savir (note 48), p. 285.
57) See for example, Colin Shindler, Ploughshares into Swords (NY: I.B.
Tauris, 1991), p. 106.
58) George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: Memoirs (NY: MacMillan, 1993), p.
939.
59) Makovsky, Making Peace, pp. 49,75.
60) Beilin (note 55), pp. 38, 53.
61) Interview with a Progressive decision-maker.
62) Beilin (note 55), pp. 104, 113, 138.
63) Jonathan Rynhold, “Labor, Likud, the ‘Special Relationship’ and
the Peace Process 1988–96,” Israel Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3 and 4
(Spring/Summer 1997), pp. 239–64.
64) Ibid.
65) William Drozdiak, “Netanyahu's Backers on Capitol Hill Foment Split
With White House,” Washington Post, May 23, 1998.
66) Nitzan Horowitz, “Labor Accuses AIPAC of Being 'Extreme Right-Wing'
Group,” Ha’aretz, August 4, 1998.
67) David Horowitz (note 35), p. 159.
68) Melman & Raviv (note 10), pp. 103, 192-3.
69) Marvin Feuerwenger, “Israeli-American Relations in the Second Rabin
Era,” in Robert. O. Freedman, Israel Under Rabin, (Boulder: Westview 1995), p.
55.
70) David Horowitz (note 35), p. 155.
71) Makovsky, “US Urges Israel to Make Concessions,” Jerusalem Post,
March 1, 1994.
72) Nitzan Horowitz, “The Jewish Lobby: Left Face,” Ha’aretz,
August 11, 1999; “What Will Happen to the Wye Money,” October 20, 1999;
“Lobbying Pays Off,” Ha’aretz, November 21, 1999.
73) Rynhold (note 63).
74) Eldar, “People and Politics,” Ha’aretz,
January 15, 1998. In 1988, when it looked as though the Likud might agree to
amend the Law of Return, to explicitly exclude non-Orthodox converts to Judaism,
American Jewry (the vast majority of whom are non-Orthodox) responded by
refusing to help the Israeli government fight against the recently opened US-PLO
dialogue, until the Likud decided not to go through with the amendment. While,
in 1996 AIPAC warned the Netanyahu government that American Jewish support could
not be guaranteed if the Law of Return was amended along the lines demanded by
the religious parties in Israel. On neither occasion did the Likud actually
amend the Law of Return, but the threat of such a change was enough to erode
unconditional American-Jewish support.
Jonathan Rynhold is a lecturer in the Department of
Political Science at Bar-Ilan University and a research associate at the
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. His most recent publication is
“British Policy Towards the Middle East in the 1990s” in G. Steinberg Ed.,
Euro-Atlantic Security and the Middle East (Frank Cass 2000) (forthcoming).