Volume 4, No. 1- March 2000
Volume 4, No. 1- March 2000
By A. W. Samii
Editor's
Summary: The February 2000 Iranian parliamentary elections marked a
major turning point in the battle between reformist and conservative elements in the Islamic republic. This article analyzes the existing
political situation, the campaign, and the election itself, explaining the forces and factors involved, including the reason for the
overwhelming victory for those supporting President Muhammad Khatami and domestic changes in Iran.
On
February 18, 2000, 69.25 percent, or 26.8 million, of Iran's 38.7 million voters
cast ballots in the election for Iran's sixth parliament (Majlis-i Shura-yi
Islami, or Islamic Consultative Assembly).(1) Even as the votes were being
counted, it became clear that mostly conservative or
"independent" candidates had lost to "reformists" identified
with President Hojatoleslam Muhammad Khatami-Ardakani. The final tally will not
be known until May, when run-offs are held in 52 constituencies for 65 seats,
but as of February 26, 148 parliamentary seats were won by reformists, 37 by
conservatives, 35 by independents, and 5 by religious minorities.
Reformist Iranian newspapers said the twenty-ninth of Bahman (February 18) was another second of Khordad (May 23, 1997, the date of Khatami's election). But more cautious political commentators in Iran recognized that the parliament, with or without a reformist majority, will be faced with many difficulties before realization of the reforms demanded by the public.
The sensation over the results of the election was justified. Although candidates did not have to register until December and actual campaigning did not start until February, electoral issues had been a major focus of the Iranian media since mid-1999. This was particularly so because many Iranian newspapers are in one way or another affiliated with a political faction, a state institution, or both.(2)
This article will discuss the sixth parliamentary election using Iran's print and broadcast media as the primary sources. The first section will focus on the pre-election phase, which was marked by newspaper closures, the entry and exit of major political personalities, and the adoption of restrictive legislation. The second section will describe the actual campaigning period, which was marked by disagreements over the disqualification of candidates by the Guardians Council and incidents of violence, but also by candidates' and parties' serious efforts to define their positions on issues. This will be followed by a description of election day, and the conclusion will present a forecast of the parliament's future.
THE PRE-ELECTION PHASE
The print media played an
important role in all phases of the election by raising many important issues
that the state broadcast media tried to avoid. Hardliners in the government
tried to silence reformist voices by imprisoning outspoken journalists
and closing publications such as Salam and Khordad (both closed in 1999).
These were not the only cases, however. Adineh, Fakour, Hoviat-i Khish, Neshat,
and Zan were closed for offenses
such as questioning religious principles or supporting the pre-revolution
monarchy, but all these publications openly criticized government policies.
Other publications and journalists were warned, tried, or closed on a variety of
pretexts. Despite this pressure, new publications kept emerging, often using the
same facilities and personnel of a just-closed publication, and they covered
most aspects of the election.
The Iranian government also tried
to control outside commentary on the election by jamming short-wave broadcasts
by Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty's Persian Service, the British Broadcasting
Corporation, and the Voice of America. It would do so either by direct
bubble-type interference or by over-riding the foreign broadcasts with the
Arabic Service of the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (on the western and
southern borders) and the Dari Service of the Voice of the Islamic Republic of
Iran (on the eastern and northeastern borders). Iranian newspapers, however,
continued to cite the foreign broadcasts because they had access to them through
the internet.
One of the first questions that
cropped up about the parliamentary election was whether or not Expediency
Council chairman Hojatoleslam Ali-Akbar Rafsanjani-the former Speaker of
Parliament and president-would enter the race. Adding fuel to the fire were
persistent rumors that the current speaker, Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri,
would not stand in the election. Finally, a private member's bill in parliament
made Rafsanjani an exception to the rule that a candidate must resign from
government office three months before registering for the election.
Rafsanjani seemed to have wide
appeal, because he was linked with the technocratic Executives of Construction
Party (ECP) that engineered Khatami's successful presidential campaign. Also,
Rafsanjani was linked with the country's two main clerical factions, the
conservative Tehran Militant Clergy Association (Jameh-yi Ruhaniyat-i Mobarez-i
Tehran, JRM) and the more moderate Militant Clerics Association (Majma-yi
Ruhaniyun-i Mobarez, MRM). Some thought this indicated an ultra-factional
nature, but others saw this as political opportunism. Some claimed that
Rafsanjani was "a camel that would sleep at anybody's door."(3)
Yet Rafsanjani's multiple
memberships threatened to split the electoral tickets. The reformist Office for
Strengthening Unity (OSU) refused to include Rafsanjani on its list of
candidates as early as September, although it had other candidates in common
with the ECP and the MRM. Faezeh Hashemi of the ECP ruled out a joint platform
with conservative candidates, although she acknowledged that "there are
certainly candidates whom we (conservatives and reformists) both
support."(4)
Rafsanjani registered in December,
saying the objective of his candidacy was to "bring about national
solidarity in the parliament and help promote government programs." (5)
Conservative commentators welcomed this event and he had prominent defenders,
such as Islamic Culture and Guidance Minister Ataollah Mohajerani. (6) Others
were not so enthusiastic. According to an observer at a December 12 speech by
President Muhammad Khatami, students chanted: "Political Development Cannot
be With Hashemi [Rafsanjani]!" Prominent reformists also spoke
disparagingly about Rafsanjani as a candidate. (7)
By the end of 1999, most of
Rafsanjani's potential rivals were out of the picture. His most prominent
potential rival was Hojatoleslam Abdullah Nuri, the former Interior Minister and
the director of Khordad newspaper. Nuri's trial in November only increased his
popularity, as he discussed every taboo topic imaginable, including the Special
Court for the Clergy's legitimacy, religious leadership, Ayatollah Hussein Ali
Montazeri-Najafabadi's house arrest, and relations with the United States. Nuri
had the courage to say "what all of us want and demand," according to
Ayatollah Abdol-Karim Musavi-Ardabili, who serves as a Friday Prayer leader in
Tehran and is a member of the Assembly of Experts. (8) Nuri's candidacy was
eliminated when he received a five-year prison sentence. (Khordad was
subsequently closed.)
Another potential rival was
Hojatoleslam Muhammad Asqar Musavi-Khoeniha, director of the banned Salam daily,
the popular co-founder of the OSU and a leader of the Students Following the
Line of the Imam, the organization that occupied the U.S. Embassy in 1979. He
could have garnered support from clerical groups and from the second of Khordad
front, but in August 1999, he received a suspended sentence from the Special
Court for the Clergy, and his popular newspaper was banned. Musavi-Khoeniha,
furthermore, refused to consider running for parliament. (9)
ELECTION LAWS AND THEIR IMPACT
The Iranian constitution's Article
99 was a particularly acute issue in the 1999 campaign phase. The article
states: "The Guardians Council has the responsibility of supervising the
elections of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the President of the
Republic, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the direct recourse to popular
opinion and referenda." Questions over the meaning and interpretation of
"advisory supervision" were hotly debated in 1999, as the law was used
to disqualify about 600 potential candidates in what had come to be a highly
politicized process. Perhaps what reflected this most strongly was President
Khatami's apology to disqualified candidates during a February 8 speech. (10)
Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri,
who headed the Assembly of Experts that prepared the Islamic Republic's first
constitution, told seminarians in June 1999 that the way Article 99 is currently
implemented, Iran actually has two-stage elections. (11) In the first stage, the
Guardians Council selects the acceptable candidates, and in the second stage,
the public is allowed to choose from among the approved candidates. Montazeri
said, "That is clearly in contravention of the spirit and the wording of
Article 99. Experts who drafted and approved the Constitution at the first
Assembly of Experts never intended Article 99 to convey such a meaning."
Montazeri repeated these sentiments six months later, when he said that,
"The law [constitution] is explicit on the fact that the supervisory role
of the Guardians Council pertains to 'supervision over the elections' and not
'supervision over the candidates'." (12)
In August, the parliament approved
an amendment to the electoral law that said, "the Guardians Council will
have the supervisory task in every stage of the parliamentary elections. This
supervision will be expedient and comprehensive in every election related to the
Majlis." (13) Moderate parliamentarians tried to modify this by introducing
a bill that said candidates must be given the legal reason for disqualification,
so they would have a greater chance to appeal. But the Guardians Council, which
must endorse all legislation, rejected this measure, because "in some cases
the explanation could create corruption and destroy an individual's
reputation." (14)
The other body with responsibility
for elections is the Interior Ministry. Its chief, Hojatoleslam Abdolvahed
Musavi-Lari, complained that, "the Guardians Council is responsible for
supervision and the Ministry of Interior is responsible for administration…Any
move which damages the separation of responsibilities or puts the supervisor in
place of the administrator is contrary to the constitution." (15)
Musavi-Lari added that the government tried to reach an understanding with the
parliament and the Guardians Council on the election law, "but
unfortunately the Guardians Council rejected the single article that was
supposed to be the basis of the agreement." (16) At the end of September,
parliament concluded its discussions on the draft election law, and eliminated
Article 60, which gave the Guardians Council authority to "disqualify any
candidate for the Majlis who commits any type of offense-or any offense which
may affect the outcome of the election-and declare the election null and
void." (17)
The Guardians Council continued to
increase its powers, declaring in January that it is not sufficient for
parliamentary candidates to be Muslims, they also must show commitment to Islam.
This did not go over well, and a government-run newspaper said that judging a
person's faith and religion "is entirely in the hands of Almighty
God." (18) Thirty-two prominent Iranian political figures sent an open
letter urging Khatami to ensure that the parliamentary election is not rigged.
(19)
Other aspects of the electoral
laws caused problems. In January, hardline parliamentarians proposed eliminating
second-round run-offs, suggesting that anybody who gains a plurality should win,
whereas under then-current laws the winner had to gain at least one-third of the
votes. A walkout occurred and a quorum could not be formed when deputies
objected to the proposal. After a closed-door session the next day, a compromise
was reached in which it was decided that whoever earned a minimum 25 percent of
the vote would win, and in case of a second round, the winner just needed to
gain a majority.
THE LAW'S IMPACT
By December 18, about 6860
Iranians, including 504 women and 35 non-Muslims, registered as candidates for
the February parliamentary elections. Five parliamentary seats are reserved for
non-Muslims. Within ten days, 401 candidates had been rejected. (20)
Candidates' eligibility, in terms
of their personal, political, and ideological backgrounds, was investigated
initially by commissions in each constituency. The work of these commissions had
to be endorsed by supervisory councils that fielded the grievances of
disqualified candidates. The supervisory councils endorsed or reversed the
decisions of the local commissions on the basis of evidence offered by the
rejected candidate. And the supervisory councils had the option of explaining
their decisions in cases where doing so will not have (unexplained)
"unwelcome consequences." (21)
Many candidates were rejected on
the basis of Article 28 of the election law, which calls for "belief in and
practical commitment to Islam and the Islamic Republic system" and loyalty
to the constitution and the Vilayat-i Faqih (Guardianship of the Supreme
Jurisconsult). Others were rejected, per Article 30, because they had worked to
strengthen the monarchy in the past or had acted against the theocracy more
recently. (22)
The Guardians Council announced on
January 27 that its investigation of appeals was complete, and it confirmed the
rejection of 600 candidates (out of an original total of 758), and two days
later it announced that 669 candidates were rejected, with 192 candidacies being
reinstated and 99 new candidates being disapproved. (23)
The Guardians Council spokesman
explained that, "[candidates] were rejected because legally their files
were imperfect. The reasons for the rejection of most of the candidates...were
that they did not have the educational qualifications, were not old enough or
had not resigned their posts-only in those professions which they were legally
obliged to resign. Some of them did resign, but their employers did not accept
their resignation within the deadline....The rejection of a candidate did not
mean he [or she] was not worthy. We just observed the law." Possibly
predicting complaints, the Guardians Council spokesman said: "The council
does not favor any particular faction or individuals. And when the final results
are announced, the people will definitely make a fair judgment."(24)
People were complaining already.
Hojatoleslam Hadi Khamenei, secretary-general of the reformist Groups Following
The Imam's Line, said, "some people, feeling a sense of religious duty,
permit themselves to step beyond the bounds of the law when vetting
candidates." (25) The head of Iran's election headquarters said that some
of the candidates were not even told why they were disqualified, and he wondered
why those whose candidacy was approved in previous elections were rejected this
time. (26)
Most of the rejected candidates
were identified as reformists, while others were fairly outspoken opponents of
the system. (27) Among the former group were Islamic Iran Participation Party
(IIPP) founders Abbas Abdi and Ali Reza Farzad. And among the latter group were
Heshmatollah Tabarzadi, director of the banned Hoviat-i Khish and leader of the
Islamic Union of Students and Graduates, and nationalist-religious figures like
Ezattolah Sahabi, Habibollah Peyman, and Ebrahim Yazdi of the banned (but
tolerated) Freedom Movement.
President Khatami also voiced
unhappiness with "advisory supervision" at this time. As if to
reassure any hardliners, Khatami said during a meting with students that,
"even if we leave this society alone and do not place supervision or
conditions over it, the choice of most of the people would be religion,
independence, and honor."(28) In an added warning, he said: "We should
refrain from useless pressure and strictness, which are called for neither by
religion nor by law."
A few days later, Khatami restated
these themes. (29) He said that the public still wants Islam, but it is "an
Islam that has respect for these people...[one] that wants to see the
establishment of a popular government and to have the people decide for
themselves and determine their own destiny." Turning to advisory
supervision and its critics, Khatami remarked that: "Some people may like
this law, some people may not like this law, but the right thing for us to do is
to respect the law." Khatami added that "no right should be trampled,
neither the right of the voter, nor the rights of the people being
elected."
The Guardians Council announced
its ultimate list of 576 rejected candidates on February 7. "The list sent by the Guardian Council to the election
headquarters, dated the eighteenth of Bahman [February 7], is final and should
form the basis for action." (30) But a week later it was reported that the
Guardians Council was trying to reject more candidates. (31) Campaigning
officially started on February 10, and two days before the election the Interior
Ministry announced that there was a total of 6,083 candidates running for
parliament. The same day, the Interior Ministry announced that 890 candidates
had withdrawn, which would bring the total to 5,193. (32)
The Guardians Council announced on
February 15 that all disqualified candidates were provided with written
explanations. Those who appealed got a fair hearing and were shown the relevant
documents, except in cases where "this had to be done for legal reasons and
for the sake of safeguarding the rights of third persons or the country's
interests." (33)
CANDIDATE LISTS ANNOUNCED
Although about 10 percent of the
candidates were disqualified by the Guardians Council, many members of the
18-member pro-Khatami second of Khordad coalition were accepted. In theory, this
would work to their advantage but one interesting analysis suggested that the
conservatives' strategy was to permit many reformist candidates to run so that
they would divide and weaken the reformist vote. (34) Also, voters would be
sufficiently confused that they would just vote for the most familiar-that is,
incumbent-names.
Indeed, splits within the
reformist coalition had emerged in the autumn over Rafsanjani's acceptability.
The OSU and the IIPP refused their support, while the ECP supported him
actively. The chasm became even wider when the ECP accused the IIPP of
eavesdropping on one of its meetings. (35) Eventually, the reformist coalition
fielded several different candidate lists: from the OSU, the ECP, the MRM, and
the IIPP.
In Tehran, the IIPP list had four members on it, while 11 names on the ECP list also appeared on the IIPP
list. Of the 26 Tehran candidates supported by the ECP, 15 were also on the MRM
list. There was greater unity in the candidate lists fielded by the main
conservative factions-the hardline Islamic Coalition Association and the JRM.
There was even a slight crossover, with some ECP candidates appearing on the JRM
list. Rafsanjani also appeared on the Islamic Coalition Association list. (36)
Ayatollah Montazeri suggested that
some candidates should withdraw so that the reformist vote would not be diluted.
He said: "Candidates should consider the expediency of Islam, the country
and their constituency and, if necessary, withdraw in order to create unity and
to allow the best person to win." (37) Presumably this explains the
February 16 withdrawal of 890 candidates.
CAMPAIGNING STARTS
By law, the campaigning period
lasted just one week, from February 9 to February 16. But newspaper coverage of
electoral issues had started much earlier, and as was mentioned earlier, many of
the newspapers are de facto party organs. Party officials, furthermore, traveled
the country to address "meetings" well before the official campaigning
began. Also, the news coverage given to officials in office doubled as a
platform for campaigning.
Rafsanjani was one of the most
flagrant in his attempts to appeal to voters as a reformist. When the JRM
criticized President Khatami at the end of September, Rafsanjani distanced
himself from the organization; "an informed source" said that
Rafsanjani, "had long since discontinued his organic links" with the
group and "in a distant past" he only "routinely and
sporadically" met some of its members. (38)
Rafsanjani also advocated some of
the causes raised by Abdullah Nuri during his trial. He claimed that the
restrictions on Ayatollah Montazeri would be lifted (39) and that he tried to
block Nuri's five-year prison sentence. Regarding ties with the United States,
he said: "severance of ties will not continue. I believe that this issue
must be resolved some day." He added: "the solution is very clear. The
solution is that America demonstrates goodwill."
The next major event in
Rafsanjani's candidacy was the release from prison of former Tehran mayor
Gholamhussein Karbaschi, who was imprisoned in early 1999 on corruption charges.
A commentator opined that Rafsanjani would like to get the credit for
Karbaschi's release, while a reformist newspaper claimed that Rafsanjani
actually wrote Karbaschi's appeal for clemency. (40) A parliamentarian predicted
that Karbaschi's release would bring the second of Khordad front and the ECP
closer together. (41)
Known as a king-maker (shah-saz)
for his part in engineering Khatami's presidential victory, one newspaper asked
whom Karbaschi would coronate this time. (42) Yet, the former major stayed
silent during the campaign period, though he spoke out on Rafsanjani's behalf
after the election. (43)
As a substitute Friday Prayer
leader, Rafsanjani was in a strong position to discuss campaign issues, because
the Tehran Friday Prayers are normally carried by state broadcasting. He used
this platform to call his critics "sanctimonious extremists" who are
acting "just for the sake of gaining a few votes from the people or the
uninformed young people." (44) Rafsanjani later suggested that people who
were once insiders (khodi) were now at odds with the revolution and sought
"refuge in foreign powers and global arrogance." (45) He added that
the so-called reformists are actually extremists: "You wouldn't imagine how
much I suffered in trying to curb their excesses-hangings, trials, and
confiscation of private property-in the early years of the revolution."
(46)
Rafsanjani seemed to garner the
most attention because his candidacy was so controversial. But other candidates
and parties also engaged in early campaigning. Expediency Council secretary
Mohsen Rezai, for example, suddenly became a great fan of the second of Khordad
movement, calling it a "golden page" in Iranian history. (47) Ebrahim
Asgharzadeh of the OSU was "beaten up and seriously injured" when he
visited Rasht, a provincial capital, in January. (48) The IIPP's Muhammad Reza
Khatami got off lightly when he went to Rasht the next month, because protestors
only jeered him. (49) He had less luck when he visited the southwestern town of
Andimeshk, where 30 people chanting anti-reformist slogans attacked him. (50)
In Khuzestan, home to many
Iranians of Arab origin where ethnic sentiments have been a political issue in
the past, "Some of the candidates and their supporters [were] involved in
inciting nationalist feelings and provoking ethnic tendencies among the people
to obtain votes." (51) There also were reports of election unrest in Tabriz
and Ardabil, which have large populations of ethnic Azeris. One source claimed
that voters in Tabriz would boycott the election because the authorities refused
to allow the registration of "independent candidates for deputy, including
Tabriz University Professor Mahmudali Chehragani," (a nationalist figure
who allegedly is being persecuted by the authorities). (52) Another claimed that
in Ardabil, about 50 Chehragani supporters were arrested. (53)
Once the campaign was officially
underway, there were more violent incidents. A hardline pressure group
physically assaulted members of the reformist OSU at a rally in Ardabil, and a
similar incident occurred in Qom. (54) A IIPP candidate's office in Mashhad was
set on fire, and a 16-year-old who distributed IIPP campaign literature was
stabbed. (55) An IIPP candidate was attacked when he said Ayatollah Montazeri
should be released from house arrest, (56) and a man was stabbed to death at an
IIPP rally in the southern city of Bandar Abbas. (57)
Two candidates in Tehran said the
Law Enforcement Forces attacked their office. (58) A percussion grenade went off
near the house of former Minister of Intelligence and Security Ali-Akbar
Fallahian-Khuzestani, a candidate in Isfahan, after another one was thrown at
his election headquarters a week earlier. (59) Hardliners attacked the election
headquarters of another candidate, former Interior Minister Hojatoleslam
Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur. (60)
"Political liberation is
impossible with Rafsanjani," the audience chanted at a IIPP rally, and also
denounced Fallahian. (61) Bystanders at an ECP Tehran rally tore up posters of
Rafsanjani. (62) A meeting featuring nationalist figure Habibollah Payman was
disrupted when a brawl broke out. (63) In Qazvin, nationalist journalist Fatimeh
Govarai was arrested. (64)
In addition to the sensational
violence, the election campaign featured serious debate over issues such as
limiting judicial power, addressing the serial killings of political dissidents,
liberalizing the economy, and improving relations with the United States.
There was also some political
gamesmanship, when the IIPP suddenly changed the order of its candidates list,
choosing the president's brother, Muhammad Reza Khatami, as its top candidate.
In a clever move, the IIPP also selected an Armenian candidate, Artanus
Baghumian, for its Isfahan list. (65) He was one of the only minority candidates
to ever be on a mainstream candidate list. Voters can either choose one minority
candidate or an entire list of regular candidates, but they cannot do both.
The reformists employed Western
campaigning strategies and techniques, recognizing that old methods would not
work on the younger generation. Campaign slogans shifted away from ideology and
revolutionary commitment. The ECP emphasized "Security, Prosperity, and
Freedom" and And the IIPP called for "Iran for all Iranians."
Slogans promoting the twenty-ninth of Bahman (February 18) as another second of
Khordad gained currency. Reformist candidates often described their academic
qualifications or technical experience in promising to build a better future and
spoke of themes such as economic reforms, pluralism, greater individual freedom,
and the equality of all citizens before the law. Reformists were usually
pictured as smiling, like President Khatami, and sporting designer stubble-a two
or three-day beard long enough to meet theological requirements but not long
enough to look like a cleric.
The conservatives also changed
their approach, a little. Two of the main conservative bodies-the Tehran
Militant Clergy Association (Jameh-yi Ruhaniyat-i Mobarez-i Tehran, JRM) and the
Coalition of the Line of the Imam and Leader- emphasized
"understanding" in their slogans. In their speeches, however,
conservatives most often spoke of their religious qualifications as they
promised to maintain the original values of the revolution. Their speeches
stressed spiritual integrity and faith in theocracy. In their campaign posters
the conservatives did not smile, in line with a dictum by the revolution's
founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi-Khomeini, that anyone who smiles is smiling
at Satan. The rationale is that true Shi'a are grieving over the seventh-century
martyrdom of Imam Hussein.
GETTING OUT THE VOTE
State officials and religious
figures urged the public to vote in the days before the election, although they
gave different reasons to do so. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei told
prospective Hajj candidates in an address broadcast by state radio that they
should participate wholeheartedly in the election, because "elections
symbolize the people's participation and restoration of their rights." (66)
Saying that voting is both a right and a duty, he added that, "it is
important what percentage of people who could vote take part in the elections
and vote." He urged the public to vote for candidates who are "able to
stand up to coercion, scare-mongering, excessiveness, and avarice of world
powers, and assess the problems of the country and the nation."
President Khatami urged women and
the young, among his greatest supporters, "to participate actively" in
the elections. (67) Khatami said that there has been progress in women's
affairs, but much more remains to be done if women are to have an active
presence in economic, social, and political affairs. In the same speech, Khatami
apologized to disqualified candidates.
Some of Khatami's get-out-the-vote
speeches seemed factionally-oriented. In a speech marking the revolution's
anniversary, he urged people to elect candidates who will not oppose the
executive branch's policies. (68) Khatami said: "The government will be
able to take more confident steps to serve you, if it were to enjoy the
cooperation of a qualified parliament and a parliament which carefully
scrutinizes the behavior and decisions of the executive officials and the
judicial authority."
Two days before the election,
Khatami urged the nation to vote. He said: "Noble and great nation of Iran!
… Friday … is a day for mapping your destiny." (69)
Senior clerics, such as Sources of
Emulation Ayatollah Nasser Makarem-Shirazi and Ayatollah Yusef Sanei urged
massive participation. So did Friday Prayer Leaders such as Ayatollah Abdullah
Vaez-Javadi-Amoli. (70) Hojatoleslam Abbas Vaez-Tabasi, supervisor of the Razavi
(Imam Reza) Shrine Foundation in Mashhad, said: "If the people are united
and if they participate in large numbers in the elections for the sixth Majlis
and choose the best candidates, they will defeat our enemies." (71)
Ayatollah Montazeri urged people to choose their candidates with care, because
if a parliamentarian pursues harmful policies, those who elected him or her are
considered accessories. (72)
Interior Minister Hojatoleslam
Abdolvahed Musavi-Lari also urged massive participation, because the
"election is a manifestation of republicanism of the system and an
opportunity for the entire community to play a role in the management of the
country." (73)
ELECTION DAY--FEBRUARY 18, 2000
On election day, polling stations
were supposed to be open for a maximum of 12 hours, but the Interior Ministry
reported that turnout was so large that voters who had arrived before the
deadline and were standing in line were allowed to vote anyway. In light of the
final reported turnout of 69 percent, it seems more likely that the polls were
kept open in the hope that somebody would show up. The Guardians Council had
rejected efforts to computerize the counting system, so all votes were counted
by hand. It took only a few hours to get the results in the smaller
constituencies, but in Tehran it took a week.
Within two days of the election it
was clear that reformists had gained many seats and conservatives had fared
badly. By February 26, the numbers were 148 reformists, 37 conservatives, 35
independents, and 5 religious minorities. The election headquarters announced
that run-offs would be held in late April or early May in the 65 constituencies
where no candidate attracted 25 percent of the votes. (74)
In the days before the election,
rumors surfaced that there would be attacks on polling places. On election day,
120,000 police officers were on guard to prevent disruptions, and the Interior
Ministry said the army, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, and the Basij
Resistance Forces were ready to assist. (75) While this was unnecessary, there
were some irregularities.
Guardians Council supervisors
never turned up at some of the polling stations in Tehran and other cities, so
polling at these locales was delayed by several hours. A mosque in western
Tehran refused to open its doors for the election officials, so the Interior
Ministry had to use mobile ballot boxes to collect ballots. A candidate in the
Firuzkuh and Damavand voting district campaigned on election day, ignoring
inspectors who told him this was against the rules. (76)
There were complaints that the
Tehran vote-count was delayed so that an unnamed well-known candidate
(presumably Ali-Akbar Rafsanjani, who was faring badly, near the bottom of the
top 30) would benefit. (77) The vote-counting was delayed to favor the
reformists, claimed a conservative daily, because Interior Ministry Deputy
Mustafa Tajzadeh, who heads Iran's election headquarters, is a member of the
IIPP. (78)
Seminarians in Orumieh staged a
rally to protest electoral violations. (79) A losing candidate in Kurdistan
Province claimed that state broadcasting favored one of his opponents. (80) A
candidate in Semnan asked that release of the results be delayed because of vote
rigging. (81) Most serious were post-election riots in Shush Danial, Shadegan,
Izeh, and Dasht-i Azadegan, Khuzestan Province, over allegations of vote buying.
(82)
THE TWENTY-NINTH OF BAHMAN--WHAT
WILL IT MEAN?
As the election results came in,
it became clear that many conservative candidates had lost. Although reformists
did well, voter turnout was not as high as it was during the 1997 presidential
election. At 69 percent, participation was well below the 88 percent of 1997 and
even less than the 75 percent turnout for the 1996 parliamentary race. (83)
But, in terms of significance, the
2000 election was somewhat like the 1997 presidential election in that voters
registered a protest. Iranians both times voted against the status quo. It is
hard to say what the public voted for, however, because the candidates were
members of a wide variety of political factions. Even factions within coalitions
had different candidate lists, and none of the candidates presented what could
be called a substantive platform.
For that matter, there was not
that great a difference among candidates, largely due to the Guardians Council's
vetting process. Political analyst Khosro Abedi warned that the election results
might not be translated into real changes or increased transparency because
"Iranian politics is a lot like a private club." (84)
The last session of the fifth
parliament was held on February 22, and the new parliament will be sworn-in in
May. It will face many of the same issues that its predecessor faced, including
vague press laws, restrictive electoral regulations, social codes that are
unevenly enforced, a weak economy and high unemployment, privatization of
state-owned industries, and troubled relations with the United States.
But the new parliament's ability
to act is severely limited. (85) The Guardians Council must approve all
legislation before it becomes law. State security organizations, the military,
and state broadcasting are under the supervision of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei's office and are not answerable to the executive or legislature. Press
Courts and the Special Court for the Clergy target regime critics.
The judiciary and other
governmental bureaucracies, even when headed by President Khatami's appointees,
still have many employees who have their own personal and ideological agendas.
Influential and powerful personalities with direct financial interests in the
state industries and para-statal foundations will be very resistant to anything
that threatens their wealth and influence. And the Supreme Leader has veto power
over everything.
Rafsanjani's role further confuses
the situation. He barely made it into the parliament, finishing in thirtieth
place in Tehran. As Chairman of the Council for the Discernment of Expediency,
however, he will continue to have a great deal of power over legislation.
Reformist groups must now moderate their hostility toward him to reach a modus
vivendi if legislative impasses are to be avoided. There is, furthermore,
disunity among the various reformist groups, which may result in
intra-parliamentary conflicts. (86)
New representatives' political
affiliations make predicting how they will vote on legislation difficult. In the
previous parliament, the large block of independents did not follow any
consistent voting pattern because the deputies voted in opportunistic, rather
than ideological, terms. On local issues, they voted to benefit their
constituencies, but on wider, national issues, they voted in an ultra-factional
fashion. And when they did so, they were not accountable to any political
organization. (87) Such problems will exist in the new parliament. Many
candidates who called themselves independents are in fact conservatives,
suggesting that once in office they will vote against reformist legislation.
(88)
Political commentator in Iran thus
proceeded cautiously, telling a daily that the new parliament will be able to
work better with the executive branch. But the headline warned: "People
should not have wonderful expectations of the reformists." (89) Another
daily warned: "Let's be careful! Let's study this golden age." (90)
Also, it is not clear what the reformists' plans for the future are. As one
reformist daily asked: "The elections are over, what will happen
tomorrow?" (91)
Said Hajjarian of the IIPP
predicted that the reformists' strategy would not be factional, because all the
factions have worked together in the past, and will therefore enact a four-year
(the length of a term) national strategy. Reformist candidate Behzad Nabavi
warned: "We should not be after outlandish programs and must not create
expectations among people." (92)
The new representatives have made
contradictory statements about their immediate plans. New Isfahan representative
Rajabali Mazrui said a first step would be to change the law banning satellite
dishes. (93) Soheila Jelodarzadeh, on the other hand, said women's issues would
top the agenda. (94)
What is important to the voters?
Certainly intellectuals, journalists, and those seeking prosperity, such as the
residents of wealthier northern Tehran, are keen for more press freedoms and
less state-imposed restrictions on their private lives. The same can be said of
young people whose opportunities for social interaction are restricted. Students
still demand the prosecution of those responsible for the violence at Tehran
University and in Tabriz in July 1999. The case of intellectuals and dissidents
murdered in late 1998 has yet to come to trial. Women, too, resent restrictions
on how they can look, work, and live.
Most Iranians desire economic
improvements. The country suffers an estimated 25 percent inflation rate.
Unemployment is officially at 16 percent, but it is estimated to be at least 25
percent. Even those who are employed often go unpaid for months. This has led to
dependence on government subsidies and a rising rate of drug addiction. Iran is
dependent on food imports because of under-investment, mismanagement, and
corruption in the agricultural sector, which has led to more unemployment and
greater reliance on subsidies. As indicated by violent demonstrations in several
cities in January, people want improvements in basic social services, such as
roads, running water, electricity, and telephones. But reformist Quchan
parliamentarian Muhammad Baqer Zakeri warned, even before he was re-elected,
that none of the political factions has a clear economic plan. (95)
The people who elected the
reformists in February are presumably the same ones who elected President
Khatami. Until now, his supporters have been able to argue that a conservative
parliament has blocked Khatami's plans. A reformist majority eliminates this
excuse. If social reforms are not forthcoming, and if the jobs people need do
not materialize, Khatami may lose much of his domestic public support.
Will reformist dominance in the
parliament have an impact on Tehran's foreign policy? Washington was quick to
praise the election, possibly expecting changes in this area. U.S. Secretary of
State Madeline Albright commended the large public participation, saying on
February 19: "[The Iranian people's] enthusiasm is testimony to the growing
strength of democracy in Iran, which we do welcome." State Department
spokesman James Rubin's February 21 comments were even more enthusiastic. He
gushed: "All indications are that this election is an event of historic
proportions. The Iranian people have demonstrated unmistakably that they want
policies of openness and engagement with the rest of the world. They have also
made clear their preference for internal policies that allow them greater
freedom within Iran. … We welcome that."
Iran's Supreme National Security
Council allegedly voted in favor of improved relations with the United States
recently, a move vetoed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. (96) This veto
power is part of the problem, but long-standing Iranian attitudes are, too.
Leading reformist candidate Muhammad Reza Khatami repeated Tehran's normal
policy stand when he said: "We are interested in détente and in the
birth of relations based on equality and on mutual respect. But we want concrete
acts, like for example the lifting of the embargo, not mere diplomatic bowing
and curtsying." (97)
James Rubin described the kind of
changes the State Department hopes to see in Iran. "For our part, we would
like to see a change in specific policies of concern. They relate to Iran's
attitude towards the Middle East peace process, they relate to the seeking of
weapons of mass destruction and the support for terrorism." Such
expectations regarding the relationship between Iran and Hizballah, Hamas, and
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad are misplaced. Muhammad Reza Khatami said:
"We are defending the right of people whose land is occupied, and America
is defending the people who occupied this land." (98)
President Muhammad Khatami also
addressed the wishful thinking of foreign observers when he said that "The
nation will not lose its path and it will go ahead regardless of what other
think or wish." (99) Iran will not change, he added, "It is up to
others-the analysts and the powers-who with their goodwill, should adjust
themselves with the aspirations and the wishes of the nation."
NOTES
1)
An unidentified Interior Ministry spokesman initially said 80-83 percent;
AP, February
19 2000. Muhammad Reza Abbasifard of the Guardians Council said that
70-80 percent of the electorate voted; Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 18
February 2000. A hardline daily accused the Interior Ministry of intentionally
falsifying the numbers to deceive the public and to exaggerate support for the
reformists; Jomhuri-yi Islami, February 26, 2000.
2)
See A.W. Samii, "The Contemporary Iranian News Media,
1998-1999," MERIA Journal, v. 3, n. 4 (December 1999).
3)
Arya, February 23, 2000.
4)
AFP, September 13, 1999.
5)
IRNA, December 15, 1999.
6)
See comments by Habibollah Asgaroladi-Mosalman, secretary-general of the
hardline Islamic Coalition Association, IRNA, December 11, 1999; Jebheh editor
Masud Dehnamaki, Sobh-i Imruz, November 8, 1999; and parliamentarian Ali
Movahedi-Savoji, Asr-i Azadegan, November 9, 1999.
7)
Among those who were unenthusiastic about Rafsanjani's candidacy were
Abbas Abdi of the Islamic Iran Participation Party, Asr-i Azadegan, November 17,
1999; parliamentarian Alireza Mahjoub of the Islamic Labor Party, Entekhab,
November 11, 1999; and former Deputy Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance
Ahmad Burqani, Sobh-i Imruz, November 11, 1999.
8)
Reuters, December 2, 1999. Others who spoke out against Nuri's conviction
were Grand Ayatollah Yusef Jannati-Sanei, Isfahan Friday Prayer leader Ayatollah
Jalal Taheri, Ayatollah Montazeri, President Khatami, parliamentarian Elias
Hazrati, the Executives of Construction Party, and the Islamic Iran
Participation Party. On the other hand, the hardline Ansar-i Hizbullah stated
that "the verdict of the Special Court has mended the broken hearts
of Hizbullahis and has been like a heavy blow to corrupt people;"
Kayhan, November 28, 1999.
9)
Aftab-i Imruz, December 20, 1999.
10)
Mosharekat, February 9, 2000. State radio did not broadcast this part of
the speech, which is why Mosharekat, a daily affiliated with the Islamic Iran
Participation Party, wrote about it the next day.
11) Aban, June 12, 1999.
12) Reuters, January 13, 2000. See also, The Guardian, January 13, 2000. The
directors of Sobh-i Imruz, Fath, and Asr-i Azadegan had to appear in court
because they published parts of these interviews.
13)
Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, August 12, 1999.
14)
Sobh-i Imruz, September 21, 1999.
15)
Khordad, September 20, 1999.
16)
IRNA, September 24, 1999.
17)
Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, September 28, 1999.
18)
Iran, January 5, 2000.
19)
IRNA, January 4, 2000. Among the letter's signatories were the
secretary-general of the Militant Clerics Association, Hojatoleslam Mehdi
Mahdavi-Karrubi; Hojatoleslam Muhammad Asqar Musavi-Khoeniha; parliamentarian
and secretary-general of the Islamic Assembly of Women, Fatemeh Karrubi; Islamic
Labor Party founder Soheila Jelodarzadeh; and former Khatami adviser Seyyed
Mehdi Imam-Jamarani.
20)
Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, December 28, 1999.
21)
Iran News, December 20, 1999.
22)
IRNA, December 29, 1999.
23)
Ayatollah Reza Ostadi, quoted by Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Network 1, January 27, 2000. Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1,
January 29, 2000.
24)
Ayatollah Reza Ostadi, quoted by Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Network 1, January 27, 2000.
25)
Sobh-i Imruz, January 25, 2000.
26)
Interior Ministry Deputy for Socio-Political Affairs Mustafa Tajzadeh,
quoted by IRNA, February 2, 2000. 40 people who had served in previous
parliaments were rejected this time, according to Mosharekat, January 13, 2000.
27)
Muhammad Rezai-Babadi, Tehran deputy governor for political and security
affairs and head of the Tehran Province Election Headquarters, quoted in Iran,
January 31, 2000.
28)
Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, January 25, 2000.
29)
Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, January 31, 2000. It
also is possible that Khatami urged voter participation in order to avoid the
embarrassment of a boycott. The regime cites voter participation as a mark of
its legitimacy, so a boycott of any sort could undermine such claims. This
interpretation finds support in Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's warning
that "the enemy is trying to prevent people from massively participating in
the parliamentary elections so as to claim that people have distanced themselves
from the revolution and system." Through their massive participation,
Khamenei said, the Iranian people will "slap America's face." IRNA,
February 2, 2000.
30)
Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, February 8, 2000.
31)
Interior Minister Musavi-Lari, cited by Hamshahri, February 14, 2000.
32)
IRNA, February 16, 2000.
33)
Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, February 15, 2000.
34)
Iran Focus, v. 13, n. 1 (January 2000).
35)
Faezeh Hashemi of the ECP claimed that Sobh-i Imruz director Said
Hajjarian, who is a leader of the Islamic Iran Participation Party, bugged an
ECP meeting and then published the transcript in his newspaper. RFE/RL Iran
Report, January 3, 2000.
36)
On candidate lists, see IRNA, February 7, 2000, Sobh-i Imruz, February 8,
2000, and Iran News, February 9, 2000.
37)
Reuters, February 12, 2000.
38)
IRNA, September 29, 1999.
39)
AFP, December 21, 2000. As of late-February, Montazeri was still under
house arrest.
40)
Professor Sadeq Zibakalam, interview with RFE/RL's Persian Service,
January 26, 2000. Aftab-i Imruz, January 22, 2000. Karbaschi told the February
10, 2000 Newsweek that Rafsanjani had consistently defended him, and he served
as the intermediary in getting Karbaschi released.
41)
Parliamentarian Muhammad Baqer Zakeri, quoted by Arya, January 26, 2000.
42)
Iran-i Vij, January 26, 2000.
43)
Mosharekat, February 23, 2000.
44)
First sermon, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, January
21, 2000.
45)
Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, January 26, 2000.
46)
Iran, January 26, 2000. Rafsanjani did not name names, but he was
referring to individuals like Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali (the "Hanging
Judge" who toyed with the corpses of American soldiers killed in the 1979
hostage rescue mission) and hostage-takers like Abbas Abdi (now a member of the
IIPP) and Ebrahim Asgharzadeh (now the leader of the Office for Strengthening
Unity).
47)
IRNA, January 29, 2000.
48)
Sobh-i Imruz, January 5, 2000.
49)
Iran Daily, February 8, 2000.
50)
Iran, January 22, 2000. According to the February 8 Kayhan, there were
three reasons for this violence. First of all, the town was plastered with
posters of the president and signs welcoming "Dr. Khatami," so locals
had prepared petitions and letters of complaint for the president. They were
somewhat unhappy when his brother showed up instead. Secondly, Muhammad Reza
Khatami was effectively campaigning before campaigning could legally start.
Finally, the IIPP's parliamentary candidate was not a local.
51)
Jomhuri-yi Islami, February 3, 2000.
52)
The United Azerbaijan Movement, cited by Baku's Turan news agency,
January 28, 2000. 120 candidates ran for Tabriz's six seats. Two reformist
candidates, one of them an incumbent, won in the first round of voting in
Tabriz, but run-offs will be required for the four remaining seats. Rather than
the apathy suggested by Azerbaijani sources, the week of campaigning was
"hectic;" Robin Allen, "Tabriz gripped by election fever as
Iranians prepare to vote," Financial Times, February 18, 2000.
53)
The National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan, cited by
Azadlyg, January 25, 2000. For more on this subject, see A.W. Samii,
"Ethnic issues in Iran-Azerbaijan relations," Caspian Crossroads, v.
4, n. 3 (Spring 1999).
54)
Hamshahri, February 11, 2000.
55)
AP, February 11, 2000.
56)
Ahmad Shirzad, quoted by Reuters, February 13, 2000.
57)
Jomhuri-yi Islami, February 15, 2000.
58)
Sobh-i Imruz, February 12, 2000.
59)
Kayhan, February 14, 2000.
60)
Asr-i Azadegan, February 14, 2000.
61)
AFP, February 13, 2000.
62)
Kayhan, February 16, 2000.
63)
Fath, February 17, 2000.
64)
Fath, February 17, 2000.
65)
AFP, February 14, 2000.
66)
IRIB, February 15, 2000.
67)
Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, February 8, 2000.
68)
Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, February 11, 2000.
69)
Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, February 16, 2000.
70)
Qom Friday Prayers sermon, Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
February 5, 2000.
71)
Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, February 4, 2000.
72)
Sobh-i Imruz, February 12, 2000.
73)
IRNA, 12 February 2000.
74)
Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, February 19, 2000.
75)
IRNA, January 31, 2000.
76)
Sobh-i Imruz, February 19, 2000.
77)
Payam-i Azadi and Bayan, February 23, 2000.
78)
Resalat, February 23, 2000.
79)
Sobh-i Imruz, February 23, 2000.
80)
Ham-Mihan, February 23, 2000.
81)
Sobh-i Imruz, February 21, 2000.
82)
IRNA, February 19, 2000.
83)
Ayatollah Abdullah Javadi-Amoli, in the February 25 Qom Friday Prayer
sermon, asked why 12 million people (31 percent) did not vote. Vision of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, February 26, 2000.
84)
AFP, February 17, 2000.
85)
It has been suggested that: "The range of action open to the Majles
is very wide and essentially unexplored." It could use its power under
constitutional Article 76 to investigate the activities of the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security, state broadcasting, the judiciary, the para-statal
foundations, and the military. Also, laws passed by the parliament define the
structure of courts and other agencies. Parliament elects the six non-clerical
members of the 12-member Guardians Council from a list prepared by the judiciary
chief, and in theory they could choose reformists. See Gary Sick, "Iran's
Elections: Out of Chaos, Change," Middle East Economic Survey, February 28,
2000.
86)
Iran News, February 24, 2000. AP, February 27, 2000.
87)
Ahmad Shirzad, "What are the independent candidates committed
to?" Mosharekat, January 13, 2000.
88)
Abolfazl Bazargan, cited in Sobh-i Imruz, January 25, 2000.
89)
Ham-Mihan, February 23, 2000.
90)
Payam-i Azadi, February 23, 2000.
91)
Arya, February 19, 2000.
92)
Reuters, February 21, 2000.
93)
AFP, February 22, 2000.
94)
IRNA, February 27, 2000.
95)
Javan, February 9, 2000.
96)
Scott Peterson, "Iran opens door - a little - to U.S.,"
Christian Science Monitor, February 25, 2000. In a direct reference to this
report, presidential adviser Ali Rabii said, "Basically relations with
America was never a topic discussed on the agenda of Iran's SNSC;" Voice of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, External Service, February 27, 2000.
97)
La Stampa, February 22, 2000.
98)
The Independent, February 23, 2000.
99)
Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, February 26, 2000.
Dr. A.W. Samii is a Regional Specialist with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc.