Volume 3, No. 4 - December 1999
Volume 3, No. 4 - December 1999
By David Zeidan
Abstract: Many Middle Eastern state governments, including Turkey, have
tended to deny or ignore ethnic diversity, promote one specific identity as
unitary, monolithic, and characteristic of the entire population.
In Turkey, the suppression of minority identities has affected the
little-known Alevi population, an ethnic group that has not received much
attention in the english-speaking world. The
recent resurgence of Sunni fundamentalism in Turkey and the state’s adoption
of a Turkish-Sunni national identity has heightened the Alevis’ problem. Middle Eastern society is to a large extent
still vertically segmented into ethnic/religious communities with complex
allegiances that rise to the surface in times of stress. Contrary to the
official state line of a monolithic population, Turkey is no exception: Turkish
society exhibits great variety in its composition.
(1) This is especially evident in rural areas where populations live
naturally with their regional, religious, and ethnic differences.(2) These
cleavages have also been transported to Turkey’s urban areas by massive rural
migration. Turkey’s main ethnic divide concerns the
Kurdish population of southeastern Turkey, whose separatist struggle, especially
as waged by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), has made headlines around the
world. A lesser known minority is
the Alevi community.(3) Numbering about 15 million persons, the
Alevis account for some 25 percent of Turkey’s population and constitute the
country’s second largest religious community, after the Sunnis.
Most Alevis are ethnically and linguistically Turkish, descended mainly
from Central and Eastern Anatolia, though some 20 percent are Kurds.(4) Alevis
use Turkish rather than Arabic for their religious ceremonies and literature.(5) Alevis go by a number of names. They are
called Kizilbash after the Turkemen followers of the Safavid Sufi order
of the 15th and 16th centuries from which they emerged, and also Bektashi,
after the Anatolian Bektashi Shi’a Sufi order founded in the 13th century to
which many belong.(6) Other names include Tahtaci, Abdal, Cepni, and Zaza,
which signify specific tribal and linguistic identities.(7) Note that Alevis are
distinct from the Arabic-speaking extreme-Shi’a Alawis of Syria and
Southwest Turkey. Alevis traditionally inhabit rural Central
and Eastern Anatolia, in particular the triangle Kayseri-Sivas-Divirgi. Kurdish
Alevis are mainly found in the Tunceli, Elazig and Mus provinces of Southeastern
Anatolia, and some tribal settlement of Tahtaci and Cepni exist
on the Mediterranean coast. Many
Alevis have migrated from their rural villages, which tend to be peripheral and
underdeveloped, to the large industrialized cities of Western Turkey and to
Western Europe, mainly Germany. While there are many sub-groups among Alevis,
the community tends to close ranks when it comes to the Sunni world, employing
an “us” versus “them” approach and emphasizing its position as a
marginalized religious/ethnic minority.(8) Observers in rural Anatolia
have noticed stark differences between neighboring Alevi and Sunni villages.(9) Alevi opposition to the Sunni Ottomans in the
16th century resulted in geographical and social marginalization.(10) In order
to survive despite majority hostility and persecution, the Alevis developed into
an endogamous religious community with definite ethnic markers and a tight
social-religious network. Like Druze, Shi’a, and Alawis they practiced
dissimulation and secrecy about their religion (taqiya). Not having a
central religious authority, Alevis form a complex matrix of overlapping
groupings based on lineage, regional, and Sufi order links. Despite the Turkish republic’s avowedly
secular stance, Sunni Islam has, especially since the 1980s, been supported as a
quasi-state religion, much to the Alevis’ detriment.(11) Traditionally branded
as heretics by the Sunnis, the Alevis still carry the stigma of being sectarian
“others” today. Many Sunnis think the Alevis are unclean, practice
immorality and orgies, and are not true Muslims. (12) Centuries of persecution,
prejudice and misconceptions at the hands of the majority Sunnis have resulted
in a persistent social gap between the Sunni and Alevi Turks.
Turkey’s secular elite and military tend to
view the Sunni/Alevi rift as artificial and manipulated by various interest
groups. However, the sectarian differences are deeply rooted in Turkish society,
and today they operate in the context of mass media, the information revolution,
and financial support of fundamentalism by the rich Oil states.(13) Fears that Alevism would lose its unique
characteristics were put to rest in the mid-1980s when, in the face of
modernization, the Alevi community began to reconstruct and transform its
communal identity patterns, and reformulate its traditions. This process is
linked to a politicization of group members and an assertive reaffirmation of
the collective Alevi identity. (14) The weakening of Kemalist secularism in the
1990s has yielded two paradoxical trends for the Alevis. First, they have been
threatened by the rise of fundamentalist Sunni political parties, which now
constitute a significant bloc in the Turkish parliament, and even fielded
Turkey’s first ever Islamist prime minister. (15) At the same time, Turkey’s
liberalization and the growth of civil society has encouraged an Alevi revival
which includes the founding of hundreds of Alevi religious societies in major
cities and the public practice of Alevi rituals, kept hidden not so long ago. ORIGINS Alevism originated from a complex mix of
mystical (Sufi) Islam, extreme Shi`ism, and the rivalry between the Ottoman and
Safavid Empires in Anatolia. (16) Some Sufi orders, such as the Safavi,
accepted Shi’a reverence for Ali and the Twelve Imams, and their adherents and
sympathisers, called Kizilbash (red-heads) (17), later developed
into the Alevis. In the 16th century, under Ismail
(d. 1524), the Kizilbash became dominant in Eastern Anatolia, conquered
Azerbaijan, and from there conquered all of Iran. They spread revolt against the Sunni Ottomans among the many
Sufi, Shi’a, and Kizilbash groups in Anatolia and as a result,
Anatolia became the scene of protracted warfare between the Sunni Ottomans and
the Sufi-Shi’a Safavids whose center had shifted from Anatolia to Persia. (18)
A series of battles resulted in an Ottoman victory in Anatolia, pushing the
Safavids firmly into Iran. (19) The peace of Amasya (1555) finally recognized
Ottoman rule over Iraq and Eastern Anatolia and Iranian rule over Azerbaijan and
Caucasia. (20) Anatolia’s Kizilbash found
themselves militarily, politically and religiously separated from their center
in Iran. They retreated to isolated rural areas and turned inward, developing
their unique community structures and doctrines. Following severe persecution
and massacres by the Ottomans which lasted into the 18th century, Alevis went
underground pretending to be Sunnis, using taqiya (religious
dissimulation permitted by all Shi`a groups) to conceal their faith and survive
in a hostile environment. The Kizilbash mixed with another Shi’a-Sufi
group, Bektashis, with which they shared religious beliefs and
practices, and the two intermingled to become Alevis despite local variations.
Isolated from both the Sunni Ottomans and the Shi`a Safavids, the Alevis
developed traditions, practices, and doctrines that by the early 17th century
marked them as a closed, autonomous religious community, opposed to all forms of
external religion. (21) Unlike Sunnism and mainline Shi`ism, Alevism
does not possess a tradition of authoritative religious scholarship and official
carriers of formal learning. Rather, it is more “a flowing together of various
related movements, doctrines, ideas, rituals and traditions in a flexible
synthesis, its strength lying in shared local traditions and esoteric
interpretations of Islamic belief and practice.” (22) Dartmouth University
professor Dale Eickelman notes some other differences distinguishing Alevis from
Sunnis: the use of wine for religious ceremonial functions; non-observance of
the five daily prayers and prostrations (they only bow twice in the presence of
their spiritual leader), Ramadan, and the Haj (they consider the pilgrimage to
Mecca an external pretense, the real pilgrimage being internal in one's heart);
and non-attendance of mosques. (23) Alevis
were forbidden to proselytise, and Alevism regenerated itself internally by
paternal descent. To prevent penetration by hostile outsiders, the Alevis
insisted on strict endogamy, which eventually made them into a quasi-ethnic
group. Alevi taboos limited interaction with the dominant Sunni
political-religious centre. Excommunication was the ultimate punishment
threatening those who married outsiders, cooperated with outsiders economically,
or ate with outsiders. It was also forbidden to use the state (Sunni) courts.
(24) MODERN HISTORY Long marginalized and discriminated against
under the Ottomans, rural Alevis were great supporters of Kemal Ataturk’s
Young Turk ideology, which stressed European-type nationalism as the basis of
state unity and secularism as the guarantee of modernization and progress. The
new construct of an authentic Turkish nationalism favored the Alevis as the true
bearers of the ancient Turkish Anatolian language and culture, while secularism
promised them equality with the Sunni majority. For his part, Ataturk saw the
Alevis as natural allies in his struggle against the traditional Ottoman elite
and he selectively included Alevi cultural markers in his construct of the new
Turkish national identity. (25) Karen Vorhoff observes that today’s Alevis
are proud of their co-operation with Ataturk, and the fact that their leaders
had supported him. Indeed, the Alevis still see themselves as the protectors of
Kemalism, Turkism, and democracy in Turkey. (26) The early Kemalist republic is
still regarded as the ideal state in which the Alevis were fairly represented
proportionately to their percentage of the total population in the National
Assembly. (27) Vorhoff also notes the positive impact of Kemalism which turned
Alevis into legally equal citizens, built roads through their formerly isolated
areas, introduced compulsory schooling, and improved communications, drawing the
marginalized Alevis into active and deeper contact with broader Turkish society.
In his drive for secularization, however, Ataturk destroyed religious
frameworks, Sunni as well as Alevi. (28) Kehl-Bodrogi notes that the downplay of
religion in public life and the Westernization of the ruling elite turned
Alevism into just one of several cultural themes in Turkish nationalism. As the community opened up to the outside
world, Alevis became increasingly secular and left-leaning, neglecting their
traditional institutions. Solidarity loosened, ritual and ceremony lost some of
their meaning, and the spiritual leadership gradually lost its authority. This
change in Alevi internal structures was accelerated by massive migration to
large cities, at a higher rate than Sunni Turks, leading to some intermarriage
and a new generation not familiar with the Alevi “Way” (yol). (29)
Although Sunni discrimination in employment and education was still a challenge,
forcing some Alevis to return to taqiya to cope with the stigma,
education and migration were seen as the gateway to social upward mobility, and
from 1960s on a new Alevi middle class appeared. (30) As Vorhoff notes, a generation gap emerged in
the 1960s between older Alevis, who remained Kemalist and hoped that the state
would officially legitimize the Bektashi order, and the Alevi youth which became
very politicized and influenced by revolutionary thought in universities, high
schools, and trade unions. Working for a radical restructuring of society, the
young generation viewed all "reactionary" elements which tried to
assimilate them into mainstream Sunni life as enemies and joined extreme leftist
parties, reinterpreting historical opposition to Sunnism in terms of class
struggle and continuing the traditional Alevi role of opposition to the state.
(31) Some leftist Alevi activists also turned against their own religious
hierarchy, branding them feudal exploiters of the masses. The resurgence of Sunni fundamentalism that
began in the 1950s and has recently grown much stronger also pushed the Alevis
to the political left. (32) Many Alevis
reacted by stressing their separate identity and reinterpreting Alevism in
socialist and Marxist idiom that seemed to have an affinity to Alevi ideals of
equality and traditions of revolt. An Alevi leftist political party (The Party
of Union) even appeared in 1966 but was unsuccessful in the elections. (33) Alevis found themselves under violent attack
in late 1970s by right wing ultranationalists and Sunni fundamentalists,
although much of the violence was portrayed by the state and the media as left
versus right (rather than Sunni versus Alevi.) In 1978 in the city of
Kahramanras in Southern Turkey, local Sunnis went on a rampage, slaughtering
scores of Alevis from the nearby villages in the worst massacre in living
memory. (34) The widespread violence of the 1970s led to a
military coup in 1980, whereupon purges of the political left hit the Alevis
hard. For example, their religious
celebrations at Hacibektas were forbidden for several years. In the
mid-1980s, Turkish prime minister Turgut Ozal encouraged Sunni-orthodox and
nationalist unity ideology, promoting a “Turkish Islamic Synthesis.” (35)
Anti-Alevi Sunni Sufi orders, such as the Naqshbandi, Suleimanci, and Nurcu
(36) became more visible, and government propaganda stated that Alevis were
actually Sunnis with some divergent customs, negating the uniqueness of Alevism
and embarking on a plan of “Sunnification.” Infrastructure improvements in
Alevi villages were made conditional on compliance with mosque construction and
the participation of all Alevi children in Sunni religious instruction. Some
Alevis felt that the state had betrayed Ataturk’s original secularism which
was meant to protect them from Sunni oppression. (37) Reacting to the challenges, the Alevis banded
with secular-liberal Sunni groups but were not absorbed by them. They
were not willing anymore to sacrifice their communal identity on the altar of
class-struggle and began consciously to identify themselves as a political group
on the basis of a shared religious identity. (38) The result was an Alevi cultural revival.
Spearheaded by the new, educated Alevi elite, Alevis organized
foundations and trusts, rebuilt Saints’ tombs, and restored rituals in an
effort to reconstruct Alevi culture, community, and identity. A reinterpretation
of Alevi history and religion culminated in an "invention of
traditions" accompanied by a "coming out" for Alevis. For the
first time in modern history Alevis publicly accepted their stigmatized
identity, articulated their collective interests towards the state, and demanded
equality with the Sunni majority. Such efforts have continued into the 1990s.
(39) Parallel to the growth of Islamism, Turkey
experienced a democratic liberalization in 1988-89 which opened up public
discussion on issues that were previously taboo. (40) Liberals pushed for
ethnographic studies of the Turkish society mosaic, and since 1989 the liberal
press has accepted the Alevis as a separate religious community.
Encouraged by the deterioration of the Soviet bloc and increasing ethnic
nationalism around the world, the Alevis increased their political activism.
Along with other marginalized groups, they fought for legitimacy as a unique
Islamic community, legalization of their religious rituals and practice,
integration of their doctrine into the state education system, and a fair
allotment of broadcasting time in the official media. Alevi publications
multiplied, and Alevis supported the claims of other minorities such as the Laz
and the Kurds, alarming the central government.
The pervasive influence of religion in public
life in the 1990s has grave potential for a worsening of Sunni-Alevi tensions.
In 1990 the Ministry of Cults took over the organization of the Hacibektas
festivities under the pretense of making it an international attraction. Alevis
were unhappy with the government interference, especially in 1993-94 when state
officials stressed the Turkish elements of Alevism but ignored its
distinctiveness and did not give it any operating space as a minority community. Renewed inter-communal violence is sadly on
the rise. In July 1993, at an Alevi cultural festival in Sivas, a Sunni
fundamentalist mob set fire to a hotel where many Alevi participants had taken
refuge, killing 35 of them. State security services did not interfere and
prosecution against leaders of the riot was not energetically pursued. (41) In
1994, Istanbul municipal leaders from the Refah Islamic political party
tried to raze an Alevi tekke (monastery) and close the Ezgi cafe where
young Alevis frequently gathered. In January 1995, a comedian on Turkish TV
cracked a joke about "Alevi incest" triggering the first-ever street
protest by thousands of Alevi youths. Some Alevis now demand a political party
of their own to combat Sunni-dominated Islamist parties, while others are afraid
that forming an Alevi party might lead to civil war. (42) In an effort to allay Alevi sensitivities,
President Suleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz attended the 1997
Hacibektas festivities and paid tribute to the Alevi community. BELIEF AND PRACTICE Alevis belong to the extremist Shi’a branch
and like all extreme Shi’a, their reverence for Ali (Muhammad’s cousin
and son-in-law, and according to the Shi’a tradition, his rightful heir)
verges on deification. In fact, Ali is placed above Muhammad as the gate (bab)
to esoteric knowledge. (43) Their stance has caused classical Sunni ulama
to classify them as exaggerators (ghulat), outside the orthodox Islamic
fold. According to Kehl-Bodrogi, Alevis accept Ali
as the only legitimate successor to Muhammad. Muhammad and Ali are both seen as
emanations of the Divine Light—Muhammad is the announcer and Ali is the
preserver of Divine Truth—and both seem to merge sometimes into one divine
figure. (44) Alevis venerate the House of the Prophet (Ehlibeyt -
Muhammad, Ali, Fatima, Hassan, and Hussein) and reject all enemies of ehlibeyt,
especially the Ummayads whom the Alevis believe imposed Sunnism as the dominant
orthodoxy in order to to enslave the masses, distorted true Islam by destroying
the original Quran and persecuted the Shi’a Imams. Alevis have a trinitarian concept of the
Godhead consisting of Allah, Muhammad and Ali. God is approached by four
different "gates": Shariat (Islamic law), the Sunni way of
external duties, the sphere governed by the state and its Sunni orthodoxy; Tariqat
(the path), the core of the community, it is the Alevi mode of worship where
strangers are not welcome; Marifet (knowledge), the esoteric intuitive
knowledge of God; and Haqiqat (ultimate truth), union with God, the
highest degree, to which only a select few (Saints) attain. Each gate has ten makams
(stations, duties) which the faithful must master before progressing to the next
gate. (45) Alevis interpret the Quran in an esoteric,
allegoric, and symbolic (rather than literal) manner and repudiate the external
forms of Islam and its five pillars. Alevi villages lack mosques, save those
that were forcibly built in Ottoman times or built by Alevis themselves in
recent decades in order to gain access to government funds. In addition to the
Quran, Alevis have their own holy books called "buyruk" that
contain doctrine and ritual and are claimed to have been written by important
leaders. Alevis also have many liturgical hymns called nefes attributed
to Shah Ismail and Pir Sultan Abdal. Following a Sufi doctrine of the “Perfect
Man,” Alevis believe that salvation exists in emulating such perfect models as
Ali, Haci Bektac, and other Saints. But, as Kehl-Bodrogi stresses,
the absolute center of Alevi faith is the edeb moral code: the
ideal Alevi is "master of his hand, his tongue, his loins," an ethic
that forbids theft, lies, and adultery. Every man must seek "purity of
heart" and self-knowledge, and piety is measured by lifestyle and not by
ritual. Love and forgiveness are seen as important elements in interpersonal
relationships.(46) Observers note that Alevi society is divided
into two separate endogamous groups: the ocak are the spiritual and
social elite who claim descent from Ali, Hussein, the 12 Imams, legendary Saints
or religious warriors (ghazi) and constitute a priestly caste, and the talips
(disciples), the majority lay members. Religious knowledge is passed down orally
in the ocak families who were responsible for the religious and social
leadership of the community. Among the ocak are the mursits
(teachers), dede (grandfathers), pirs (elders), and rehber
(guides), which stand in a master-disciple relationship to each other in their
hierarchy with each having specific duties towards the lay community. The dede
oversee several villages and visits them annually, with the rehber
representing him in each village. The ocak perform the rituals, teach the
new generation, initiate the young, mediate in conflicts, and aid talips
in need. They are the central authority for the survival of Alevi religious
knowledge and identity. Some 10 percent of Alevis are of ocak lineage.
(47) Observers also stress the double structure of
kinship in Alevi society, designed to protect it against outside pressures and
central government penetration. Beyond
the blood-kinship of family, each lay person is the disciple (talip) of a
spiritual guide from a sacred lineage in a quasi father-child, teacher-disciple
relationship. The talip must appear before his dede once a year
to be questioned as to his conduct. (48) In addition, two unrelated lay men,
together with their wives, enter into an irrevocable kinship relationship (musahiplik)
of total solidarity and sharing of all possessions and responsibility for all
debts, as well as mutual encouragement and exhortation to walk the Alevi path.
The relationship is deeper than a blood relationship and ntermarriage between
the two families is forbidden to the second generation. (49) Alevi rituals (ibadet) are communal,
with the aim of fostering unity (birlik) and love (muhabbet)
within the community. Alevi rituals differ markedly from Sunni rituals.
Alevis, for example, fast in the month of Muharram for 12 days in memory
of Hussein's death at Karbala and the sufferings of the 12 Imams. The early
tragedy of Hussein’s martyrdom symbolizes all the discrimination and
persecution suffered by Alevis since then. (50) Vorhoff notes that the central ritual of
Alevi religious life is the ayn-i cem (cem for short) celebration
(51) replaying Muhammad's legendary heavenly journey (mirac) with the
assembly of forty (kirklar meclisi), combined with a memorial to the
suffering of the Twelve Imams. The celebration includes a sacrificial meal (lokma),
a ritual alcoholic drink, nefes hymns accompanied by music on the saz,
dance (sema), and the ritual lighting and extinguishing of candles. In
the villages of Anatolia the ayn-i cem takes place only in the absence of
distrusted outsiders, and is held at night under great secrecy. (52) The ceremony is held once a year under the
leadership of a dede assisted by a rehber, is held in a private
house or a communal building once a year. Women
are included on an equal footing with men.
Kehl-Bodrogi notes that the ceremony cannot take place unless there is a
general reconciliation among all members of the community, which is achieved by
questioning community members. Punishments for confessed transgressions are
meted out, and include fines, corporal punishment, and excommunication. (53) Other Alevi holy days are Nevruz, the
Persian New Year celebrated on the 9th March, the Khidirellez day on the
6th May in honour of Khidr (Elijah, St, George), and the twelve day
Muharram fast culminating in Ashura. (54) RELATIONSHIP TO SUNNI ORTHODOXY AND
FUNDAMENTALISM The relationship between Alevis and Sunnis is
one of mutual suspicion and prejudice, dating back to the Ottoman period. Sunnis
have accused Alevis of heresy, heterodoxy, rebellion, betrayal and immorality.
Alevis, on the other hand, have argued that the original Quran does not demand
five prayers, nor mosque attendance, nor pilgrimage and that the Sunnis
distorted early Islam by omitting, misinterpreting, or changing important
passages of the original Quran, especially those dealing with Ali and ritual
practice.(55) Alevis see Sunni narrowmindedness as
originating in Arabia and as contrary to the Turkish national character. Sunna
and Hadith were Arab elite innovations, created to ensure Arab dominance
of Islam and to enslave the masses through manipulation. All evil developments
in Islam are seen as the fault of Arab society and character.
Sunnism, according to the Alevis, is not true Islam but an aberration
that by its strict legalism opposes free and independent thought and is seen as
reactionary, bigoted, fanatic, and antidemocratic.
Alevis believe Sunni nationalism is intolerant, domineering, and
unwilling to recognize Alevi uniqueness. (56) The ideals of equality, justice, and respect
for all are prominent in Alevi society and give Alevi women a more respected
status than that of Sunni women. Alevi women do not need to be veiled and are
not as segregated, nor must they fear polygamy or one-sided divorce as Alevis
practice monogamy and divorce is forbidden. Women also partake equally in the
religious life of the community. (57) In today’s political arena Alevis see
themselves as a counterforce to Sunni fundamentalism, ensuring the continued
secularism of Turkey. Alevis, who have a great interest in blocking the rising
fundamentalist influence, are the main allies of the secularist forces, and are
also searching for alliances with moderate Sunnis against the extremists.
They are demanding that the state recognize Alevism as an official
Islamic community equal to, but different from, Sunnism. ALEVI VIEWS OF ALEVISM There is wide variety in the ways in which
Alevis regard themselves with no consensus view. Above all, the modern Alevi
leadership aims to develop an integrated ethnic community in an effort to
confront state Sunnism and Sunni fundamentalism. Alevis situationally prioritize various
aspects of their identity presenting Alevism as a separate religion, a
belief-system, the true Islam, an Islamic Caferi madhab, a Sufi tariqa,
an ethnic group, a philosophy, a worldview, a way of life, a political position,
a social opposition, a culture, and a civilisation. They believe their religion
is one of reason and wisdom which stresses education, is progressive, stands for
secularism, democracy and science, promotes personal and public honesty, and is
compatible with modernity. In the nationalist discourse of modern times
Alevis see themselves as the "real Turks", maintainers of true Turkish
culture, religion and folklore in face of the Arabizing Ottoman Sunnis. This
view has been strengthened by the Kemalist stress on Anatolian culture as the
authentic source of Turkish national identity. (58) Since the beginning of the
republic, the Alevis claimed Turkishness as a main marker of their community.
Alevism, according to them, is a Turkish-Anatolian religion combining
Islam with elements of Turkish culture including Shamanism.
Their faith is much more suitable for Turks than Arabic Islam as it
includes Turkish traits supposedly suppressed by Sunnism, such as tolerance,
humanitarianism, egalitarianism, and a stress on the inner religion of the
heart. Alevis view themselves as the true preservers of authentic Turkish
culture, religion, and language amidst Ottoman pressures to Arabize or
Persianize. In sum, the Turks are the real guardians of Islam, and the Alevis
are the real Turks. (59) Modern Alevi apologetics trace Alevism back
to the founding stage of Islam. Haci Bektas Veli and other Alevi saints
are used to stress the regional uniqueness of Alevism and its special
relationship to "Turkism", and are presented as national heroes
fighting for Turkish culture. (60) Some Alevis follow the Kemalist secularist
ideology and stress only the liberal and humanistic values of Alevism as a
world-view, downplaying its religious connotations, while a few others would
deny that Alevism is Islamic, and claim the communities’ origins lie in
pre-Islamic religious systems such as Mithraism, Zoroastrianism, or a mythical
“Cult of Angels”, stressing their links to similar groups such as the
‘Alawis, Shabak, Yezidis, and Ali-Ilahis, all assumed to be fragments of the
original community. (61) Another view sees Alevism as the authentic expression
of an Anatolian culture and civilization, and sets up an Anatolian cultural
mosaic in contrast to a specific Turkish nationalism. This mosaic includes
Greeks and Armenians in addition to Turks, Kurds, and Zaza, as these groups
were allied with the Alevis against Ottoman oppression. In this view
three factors combined to create the Alevi community:
local Anatolian heritage; Central Asian Turkic culture and religion,
which migrated to Anatolia beginning in the 11th century; and old
Anatolian Hellenistic, Roman, and Christian inheritance.
These three elements, plus Islam, combined to produce an Anatolian
religion suitable for Anatolian populations. (62) Kehl-Bodrogi adds that some Alevis see
Alevism as the true Shi’a Islam that can adapt to modernity because it is
flexible and tolerant. The Turks accepted Shi’a Islam on conversion out of a
natural sense of equality and justice. Whilst stressing their Shi’a
credentials, these Alevis see Iranian Shi`ism as aberrant and rigorously stress
their separateness from the state and religion of today’s revolutionary Iran.
(63) Alevis also stress the humanism of their
ideology: tolerance, love, and respect for all men created in God's image and in
whom God manifests himself, regardless of race, religion, or nation. Love, help
for those in need, kindness, solidarity, sharing, honesty, self knowledge,
freedom, equality, fraternity, and democracy all are seen as unique humanitarian
Alevi traits. (64) Vorhoff also highlights Alevi leftists who
view their religion as a positive political and social revolutionary ideology
fighting against oppression and evil on behalf of the poor and marginalized
sectors of society. Ali was the defender of the poor and oppressed. Hasan and
Huseyn were martyrs in the cause of the dispossessed. Alevi leftists present Alevism as having always led the fight
for liberation against all tyranny in the succession to Muhammad, while
reactionary Sunnism served the rich and powerful dominant elites. (65) RENEWAL OF RITUALS AND RECONSTRUCTION OF
COMMUNITY After a 30-year hiatus, the new educated
Alevi elite is leading an effort to renew ethnic group construction. The
reformers are committed to adapting traditional knowledge, customs, and
philosophy to modern forms, and also to rehabilitating the spiritual ocak
leadership as bearers of the specific Alevi essence. Ethnic markers like
overhanging mustaches (worn to help recognize each other and symbolize the
secrecy of the Alevi creed), (66)
chains with Alevi symbols, and other customs are being reintroduced as Alevism
is being transformed from a folk religion to a modern competitor to Sunnism. Old Alevi rituals are being taught to the
dislocated urban youth in an attempt to strengthen their Alevi identity in the
face of Sunnism. The Cem rituals, held in town wedding halls and sport
halls, have become a visual training ground in Alevi traditions. In this milieu,
Alevi music and poetry are flourishing again. Whereas revolutionary zeal drove the dedes
out of the villages in the 1960s and 1970s, they are now respected as symbols of
Alevism, and a reform of the institution of dedelik is being discussed
which includes the foundation of a central training institute, a theological
faculty and a central Alevi research institute in Hacibektas. Writing is taking over from oral traditions
as many try to answer the question: What is Alevism? The new Alevi authors
consciously accept the Alevi identity on the basis of traditional lineage
descent criteria - being born to Alevi parents. They also accept other
traditional criteria of Alevi identity: a unique religious faith with its
specific view of God, Saints, values, norms, rites, and customs. A boundary
setting towards others, a "we" as against a "them" group
consciousness is promoted as Alevi authors use idioms associated with ethnic
group identity that stresses "our" culture, our faith, our identity
versus the "other". ALEVIS AND THE KURDS The Kurds have long been Turkey’s most
prominent ethnic minority. Unlike the Alevis, they generally accepted the
Ottoman Caliphate as a legitimate Islamic government that did not infringe on
their linguistic and cultural rights. But, their situation changed with the rise
of Ataturk, who initiated state suppression of Kurdishness. The 1920s and 1930s
saw a series of Kurdish insurrections that gradually engendered the separatist
movement of recent decades. Dersim (Tunceli) province is the center of
the Kurdish Zaza speaking Alevis and it suffers from the double defect of being
both religiously Alevi and ethnically Kurdish. The mixing of Alevi leftism with
Kurdish separatism has made this
remote province a thorn in the side of every central government since Sultan
Selim The Grim in the 16th century, and it remains the least
developed of Turkey's provinces.(67) The year 1938 saw a revolt in Dersim that
provoked large-scale retaliation by Turkish security forces, the repercussions
of which are only now being explored. As Vorhoff states, Alevism historically
united Alevi Turks and Kurds in one Anatolian community. (68) But Alevi Kurds
today face an identity problem. In
the 1980s, the authentic Turkishness of Alevism became a dominant part of the
discourse, causing Kurdish (and Zaza) Alevis to question whether Alevism is
Turkish or supranational. Were they
Alevi first and Kurds second, or was it the other way around?
Ethnic and linguistic differences became stronger in the Alevi camp as
Alevi Kurds claimed that Alevism is a Kurdish religion which the Turkmens
accepted as they migrated to Anatolia. They also claim that rather than become
Sunnis, persecuted Turkish Alevis became Kurds, keeping their Alevism. (69) Current Alevi revivalists have to search for
unifying factors to integrate all linguistic groups into one Alevi community to
strengthen their bargaining position with the state. Since 1992 the Anatolian-mosaic model, claiming plurality and
equality of all communities is replacing the Turkish-centric Alevi thesis as the
dominant model of Alevism. (70) SUMMARY: ALEVI ETHNICITY AND THE TURKISH
STATE The changes in Turkish society that started
with Ataturk’s secularization drive resulted in a greatly accelerated
integration of Alevis into Turkish social and political life. Gradually, their
traditional social-religious organization broke down, and the religion itself
seemed to weaken as younger generations adopted leftist and Marxist attitudes.
Simultaneously some Alevis embarked on a reinterpretation of their religious
idiom and group-defining criteria in socio-political terms. They entered into
alliances with other, non-Alevi "progressive" groups, and have seen a
universalization of their unique Alevi doctrines, now seen by them as an
expression of the general human search for equality and social justice and
freedom from oppression and exploitation. The resurgence of Islamic Sunni
fundamentalism in Turkey over the last two decades has been a mixed blessing for
the Alevis. The Islamist threat to Turkey’s secular orientation, as well as
increased attacks on Alevis in the media and on the street, have triggered a
revival of Alevi identity both in Turkey and in Alevi communities in the West,
especially in Germany. Alevis are now reconstructing their religious traditions,
doctrines and organizations, re-formulating and re-inventing their identity, and
demanding a fair share of access to the state and its resources as a separate
religious/ethnic community in Turkey. Modern Alevi activism has led to the
formulation of political demands for equal treatment with the Sunnis, and for
real democracy, egalitarianism, human rights, and social justice for all groups
in Turkish society. The question for the Turkish state and its
elites is whether they can overcome the Young Turk mentality of suppressing all
variations from their ideal vision of a monolithic and unitary Turkish nation to
the detriment of minority ethnic groups. Can
the state re-construct a national Turkish identity that is not solely based on
Turkish Sunnism, but is secular and pluralistic enough to allow for a
mulitiplicity of identities including Alevism, Kurdism, and other smaller
identity groupings as equal partners in the national formula?
And, can it tolerate legitimate expressions of their cultural, religious,
and linguistic uniqueness, and offer them equal access to all state resources
and power centers? Such a change would require a massive re-construction of a
pan-national consensus on the Turkish identity, that would delegitimize any
attacks on minority groups. If Turkey continues the present trend of
tolerating only the Turkish-Sunni element as an appendage to the
Kemalist-secularist identity, denying and forcibly crushing all other autonomous
identities, it is sure to suffer a long and violent internal struggle which will
weaken the state, damage its international relations, and might in the long-term
lead to its disintegration. NOTES 1)
Binnaz Toprak. “The State,
Politics, and Religion in Turkey”, in Metin Heper & Ahmet Evin, eds.,
1988. State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s,
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp.119-121.
Toprak argues that the Republican state elite, ever since the founding of the
modern Turkish republic in 1923 and right up to this day, have been greatly
concerned at both the religious and
the ethnic diversity in the Turkish population, and have seen any group
solidarity based on religious or ethnic lines as a threat to the unity of the
state and as potential causes for its disintegration. This is why the Turkish
state has for long refused to recognize ethnic or sectarian groups. For a full
list of the mutliple religious and ethnic divisions of Turkish society see:
Peter Alford Andrews, ed., 1989. Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, Wiesbaden:
Reichert. 2)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz
Verlag, pp. 30-32. 3)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz
Verlag, pp. 29-35. Vorhoff examines the ambiguities of the terms “ethnicity,
people, identity, nation” in pp. 14-28. In pp. 31-33 she concludes that Alevis
constitute an “ethnic group” according to most formal definitions of this
term, an “ethnic-religious” community in which Alevi religion defines the
border-functions of the community, and in which endogamy ensures its cohesion
across internal divisions. See also the Introduction to Peter Alford Andrews,
ed., 1989. Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, pp. 18-52, which
includes a discussion of ethnicity and group identity from both emic and etic
viewpoints. Ethnicity is defined as: “..the concepts, sentiments and actions which characterise
ethnic groups. They define these in contradistinction to other, comparable
groups within a state”. Ethnic groups are defined as:
“…generally endogamous groups, whose criteria for cultural
self-definition are common traditions selected from the past” (p. 18). These
criteria include family, language and religion among others. Andrews (p.41) also
notes the prevalence of multiple identities in
Turkey. 4)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp.
32-33. Some 25 percent of Kurds in Turkey are Alevi (Kurmanji and Zaza
speakers). 5)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodorgi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten, p.
92. 6)
Matti Moosa. Extreme Shiites:
The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, p.
38 states that “In many parts of Asia Minor, the Kizilbash and the
Bektashis are considered one and the same”. Krisztina Kehl-Bodorgi. 1988. Die
Kizilbash/Aleviten, pp.42-47 points to the close links and the overlap
between Alevis and the Bektashi order. Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube,
Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der
Gegenwart, p. 62, suggests that Alevi identity is involuntary and hereditary
– an Alevi is one born to Alevi parents - while the Bektashi order is composed of voluntary members,
mainly but not exclusively Alevis, who have joined the order and been initiated
into it. See also David Shankland. “Social Change and Culture: Responses to
Modernization in an Alevi Village in Anatolia”2, in C.N. Hann, ed., 1994. When
History Accelerates: Essays on Rapid Social Change, Complexity, and Creativity, London:
Athlone Press, p. 244.
Shankland states that in the rural area of Anatolia he studied all Alevis
regarded themselves as being affiliated to the Bektashi tariqat.. 7)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodorgi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten, Berlin: Klaus
Schwarz Verlag, pp. 73-94. See also Matti Moosa. 1987. Extremist Shiites: The
Ghulat Sects, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, pp. 36-49. Dale
F. Eickelman. 1989. The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 283-288 suggests that “The dividing
lines between groups are often ambiguous and clearly shift situationally”.
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp. 32, 57-58. 8)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp. 30-32. See also David
Shankland. “Informants View of the Researcher as an Epistemological Issue:
Among the Turkish Alevi”, Turkish
Studies Association Buklletin, Viol.
17, No.1, April 1993, pp. 119-123. 9)
David Shankland. “Six Propositions Concerning the Alevi: A heterodox Shi’ite
Population of Anatolia”, Turkish
Studies Association Bulletin, Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 104-106. 10)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, p. 59. 11)
Following the military coup of 1980 the military encouraged Sunni Islam as a
counterweight to the Leftist opposition. Ozal continued this trend of
integrating Sunni religion into mainline politics as the officially sanctioned
religion of state. The Directorate on Religious Affairs now appoints Imams and
builds mosques in Alevi villages and communities. The state controlled religious
education in schools is exclusively Sunni. Alevis receive no financial or
institutional aid from the state. See Florian Bieber, “Religious Minorities
Between the Secular State and Rising Islam: Alevis, Armenians and Jews in
Turkey”, published on the Internet at: <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/7647/papers/turkey.html>. 12)
Dale F. Eickelman. 1989. The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, p.
286. See also P.A. Andrews, ed., 1989. Ethnic
Groups in the Republic of Turkey,
pp. 29. 13)
Serif Mardin, “Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey”, in James Piscatori,
ed., 1983. Islam in the Political Process,
p. 146. 14)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. “Die ‘Wiedererfindung’ des Alevitums in der
Turkei: Geschichtsmythos und kollektive Identitat”,
ORIENT, vol. 34, No. 2, 1993. 15) Necmettin Erbakan of the Islamist Refah party, 1995-1997. 16)
Serif Mardin, “Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey” in James Piscatori,
ed., 1983. Islam in the Political Process, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, p. 138, states: “Early Ottoman Islam was deeply marked by
the repercussions in Anatolia of the chaotic social history of the regions that
lie to its north-east. Religious and social movements of great complexity that
were taking shape in the regions of Ardabil, Tabriz and Baku in the fifteenth
century brought to Anatolian soil world-views whose effects are still
discernible today. The religious patterns, solidarity groups, and symbolic
markers which emerged from these influences have been modified by time, but
bthey are nevertheless important. For example, ‘Haydar’ (meaning ‘the
lion’), one title of Caliph ‘Ali as well as the name of one of the founders
of the Sfavid dynasty (1460-88), still has echoes in the Turkish heterodox group
known as the Alevi (‘Alawi).” 17)
Matti Moosa. 1987. Extremist Shiites, pp. 33-35. Kizilbash denotes
“red-hats”. The members of the Safavi order wore red turbans with twelve
pleats or tassels to denote their allegiance to Ali and the Twelve Imams. 18)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 8-15. 19)
Adel Allouche. 1988. The Origins and Developmenmt of the Ottoman-Safavid
Conflict, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, pp. 110-112, 114-124. 20)
Adel Allouche. 1988. The Origins and Developmenmt of the Ottoman-Safavid
Conflict, pp. 138-145. 21)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 38-47. See also Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation
und neuer Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, p.
61. 22)
Dale F. Eickelman. 1989. The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, p.
288. 23)
Dale F. Eickelman. 1989. The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, p.
286. 24)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, “Das
Alevitum in der Turkei: Zur Genese und gegenwartigen Lage einer
Glaubensgemenischaft” in Peter
Alford Andrews, ed., 1989. Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey,
pp. 506-507. 25)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 61-64. 26)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp. 71-72. 27)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp. 157-158. 28)
Binnaz Toprak. “The State, Politics, and Religion in Turkey”, in Heper &
Evin, eds., 1988. State, Democracy and the Military, pp.122. 29)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, p. 58. See also David
Shankland. “Social Change and Culture: Responses to Modernization in an Alevi
Village in Anatolia”2, in C.N.
Hann, ed., 1994. When History
Accelerates: Essays on Rapid Social Change, Complexity, and Creativity, London:
Athlone Press, pp. 240-242. See also Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die
Kizilbash/Aleviten, pp. 68-70 30)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 228-229. 31)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, p. 72. 32)
Serif Mardin, “Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey”, in James Piscatori,
ed., 1983. Islam in the Political Process,
p. 138. 33)
Serif Mardin, “Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey”, in James Piscatori,
ed., 1983. Islam in the Political Process,
pp. 144-145. 34)
Dilip Hiro. 1994. Between Marx
and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia, London: Harper-Collins, pp. 58-59. See also Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen
Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der
Gegenwart, pp. 73-74. 35)
Dilip Hiro. 1994. Between Marx
and Muhammad, p. 62. Ozal
himself had close connections to the Naqshbandi order. 36)
For a detailed survey of the Naqshbandi order today, see Serif Mardin. “The
Nakshibendi Order of Turkey”, in Martin E. Marty & Scott Appleby, eds.,
1993. Fundamentalisms and the State,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
pp. 204-232. 37)
David Shankland. “Social Change and Culture: Responses to Modernization in an
Alevi Village in Anatolia”2, in C.N.
Hann, ed., 1994. When History
Accelerates: Essays on Rapid Social Change, Complexity, and Creativity, London:
Athlone Press, p. 245. 38)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp. 73-75. 39)
Martin Stokes. “Ritual, Identity and the State: An Alevi (Shi’a) Cem Ceremony”,
in Kirsten E. Schulze et al. eds., 1996. Nationalism, Minorities and
Diasporas: Identities and Rights in the Middle East, London: I.B. Tauris,
pp. 188-189. 40)
Erik Jan Zurcher. 1993. Turkey: A Modern History,
pp. 304-306. 41)
Martin Stokes. “Ritual, Identity
and the State: An Alevi (Shi’a) Cem Ceremony”, in Kirsten E. Schulze
et al. eds., 1996. Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and
Rights in the Middle East, , pp. 194-196. 42)
Peter Waldman. “Fading Legacy: As Cultural Restraints Fade, Turks Discover
Freedoms – and Fears”, Wall
Street Journal, Friday-Saturday,
March 3-4, 1995, pp. 1,10. 43)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 120-131. 44) Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 120-131. 45)
David Shankland. “Social Change and Culture: Responses to Modernization in an
Alevi Village in Anatolia”, in C.N.
Hann, ed., 1994. When History
Accelerates: Essays on Rapid Social Change, Complexity, and Creativity, pp.
246-248. See also Krisztina
Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 151-156. 46)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 162-167. 47)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, p. 66-68. See also
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 167-179. See also David Shankland. “Social Change and Culture:
Responses to Modernization in an Alevi Village in Anatolia”2, in C.N. Hann, ed., 1994. When
History Accelerates: Essays on Rapid Social Change, Complexity, and Creativity, London:
Athlone Press, pp. 243-245. 48)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, p. 66-68. See also
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 167-179. See also David Shankland. “Social Change and Culture:
Responses to Modernization in an Alevi Village in Anatolia”2, in C.N. Hann, ed., 1994. When
History Accelerates: Essays on Rapid Social Change, Complexity, and Creativity, London:
Athlone Press, pp. 243-245. 49)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 182-204. 50)
David Shankland. “Social Change and Culture: Responses to Modernization in an
Alevi Village in Anatolia”2, in C.N.
Hann, ed., 1994. When History
Accelerates: Essays on Rapid Social Change, Complexity, and Creativity, London:
Athlone Press, pp. 243-244.
See also Krisztina Kehl-Bodorgi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 179-180. 51)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft: Alevitische
Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp. 66-68. See also Krisztina
Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 181-1182. 52)
David Shankland. “Social Change and Culture: Responses to Modernization in an
Alevi Village in Anatolia”2, in C.N.
Hann, ed., 1994. When History
Accelerates: Essays on Rapid Social Change, Complexity, and Creativity, London:
Athlone Press, pp. 244-245. 53)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
p. 211. See also Martin Stokes. “Ritual, Identity and the State: An
Alevi (Shi’a) Cem Ceremony”, in Kirsten E. Schulze et al. eds., 1996.
Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and Rights in the Middle
East, , pp. 196-198. Stokes describes a cem celebration in a city,
Iskenderun, and notes the differences to the rural ceremonies. The urban
celebration was open to the public and centered more on Sema dances and deyis
music. The dispute arbitrating session was absent. Stokes explained the
differences by the desire of urban Alevis to present an acceptable public image
of Alevism to the general public. Stokes also noticed that on the wall of the
hall hung three portraits: one of Haci Bektas Veli, the other of Ali, and
in between, that of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. 54)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp. 69-70. See also
Krisztina Kehl-Bodorgi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 220-225. 55) Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer
Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp.
107-108. 56) Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer
Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp. 95-96. 57)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 225-228. 58)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp. 46-48. 59)
Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft:
Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp. 97-98. See also
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. “Die ‘Wiedererfindung’ des Alevitums in der
Turkei: Geschichtsmythos und kollektive Identitat”,
ORIENT, vol. 34, No. 2, 1993,
pp. 60)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. “Die ‘Wiedererfindung’ des Alevitums in der
Turkei: Geschichtsmythos und kollektive Identitat”,
ORIENT, vol. 34, No. 2, 1993. 61)
Mehrdad R. Izady. 1992. The Kurds: A Concise Handbook. Excerpts published
on the Internet at: <http://kurdish.com/kurdistan/religion/alevism.htm>. 62) Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer
Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp.
100-101. 63)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. “Die ‘Wiedererfindung’ des Alevitums in der
Turkei: Geschichtsmythos und kollektive Identitat”,
ORIENT, vol. 34, No. 2, 1993. 64) Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer
Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp.
102-104. 65) Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer
Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, pp.
104-105. See also Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. “Die ‘Wiedererfindung’ des
Alevitums in der Turkei: Geschichtsmythos und kollektive Identitat”,
ORIENT, vol. 34, No. 2, 1993. 66)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. 1988. Die Kizilbash/Aleviten,
pp. 230,233. 67)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. “Die ‘Wiedererfindung’ des Alevitums in der
Turkei: Geschichtsmythos und kollektive Identitat”,
ORIENT, vol. 34, No. 2, 1993. 68) Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer
Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, p. 115-116. 69) Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer
Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identitat in der Turkei der Gegenwart, p. 114. 70)
Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi. “Die ‘Wiedererfindung’ des Alevitums in der
Turkei: Geschichtsmythos und kollektive Identitat”,
ORIENT, vol. 34, No. 2, 1993. David Zeidan is a PhD candidate in
comparative religious fundamentalism at London University.