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THE PLO CHARTER REVISION: A CROSSROADS IN PALESTINIAN POLITICS

By Barry Rubin

Preface

This analysis of the PLO Charter debate was written before the organization's decision to rescind this document. Afterward, the issue became tremendously controversial in Israeli politics, with the right wing arguing that no change had been made. As this chapter argues, however, the Charter was rescinded and the PLO did fulfill its commitment under the Oslo agreements in this regard. There was no doubt in the minds of the Palestinians voting on this point about what they were doing.

By rescinding its Charter--in effect, the PLO's old constitution--the Palestine National Council (PNC) has posed a paradox to both sides in the Arab-Israel peace process. If, as many Palestinians claimed, the Charter is so unimportant, why was it so hard and emotionally painful for them to change it?

And if, as Israeli opponents of the current process claim, the Charter was such crucial truth of the PLO's nature, how can they not acknowledge that organization's profound transformation into a partner for making a compromise peace?

In truth, the Charter was the central document in the history of the PLO and the Palestinian nationalist movement. It stated clearly that group's main principles, views and policies which made peace impossible for many decades:

--Israel must be destroyed.

--The Palestinian Arabs must rule the entire land between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean.

--Armed struggle was the sole workable tactic.

--Relying on Pan-Arab nationalism, persuading Arab states to fight Israel eternally, was the only strategic choice.

From its founding in 1964 up to 1988, the PLO clung to these tenets with hardly ever a dissenting voice. At the 1988 PNC, serious but tentative change began. In 1993, that alternate road was clearly taken in the Israel-PLO agreement. This week in Gaza, the decree was sealed.

This development's importance cannot be overstated. The central question in the conflict was whether the Arab side would abandon the stance embodied in the Charter. The Palestinian people's fate was the second issue. Yet this problem could never be solved until the conflict was redefined from deciding Israel's existence to seeking a two-state solution.

Many on each side still do not accept this outcome. But the PNC's decision will surely increase both the process's momentum and public opinion's support for it. While PLO and Palestinian Authority chief Yasir Arafat still has much work to do in re- educating his people on this point, his firm leadership in Gaza is a big step in this direction.

Being on the defensive, opponents to Arafat's reforms claimed they only rejected changes in order to get more concessions from Israel. In reality, though, they simply continued to adhere to its hardline ideas. For the Popular Front and the Democratic Front, this was a last stand. Hamas--not the neo-Marxists of the 1970s--is now the critical anti-Arafat force.

Another less visible factor here is the decisive shift toward dominance by Palestinians living in the West Bank in Gaza) over exiles, and for the Palestinian Authority over the PLO or PNC. Just three years ago, not a single member of the PLO Executive Committee or Fatah's Central Committee lived there. The arrival of several hundred PNC delegates, with Israel's approval, continues a geographic shift with major political significance. Those who must deal with practical problems are replacing those who deal only in slogans.

THE PALESTINIAN SITUATION

Background

The 1964 Palestinian National Charter, as amended in 1968, has 33 points, most of which are either dedicated to Israel's destruction or are outdated for ideological and strategic reasons.

The core of the Charter's objectionability and the direct threat to Israel is inescapable in at least 9 of the document's 33 points, especially the second one: "Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate is an indivisible territorial unit."

Other directly anti-Israel provisions include: numbers 5 (which claims all Israeli Arab citizens as Palestinians); 6 (which calls for the expulsion of almost all Israeli Jews); 15 (which demands "the elimination of Zionism in Palestine"); 19 (rejecting the 1947 partition plan); 20 (rejecting any ties between Jews and Palestine as well as denying any validity to Jewish nationalism); 21 (rejecting any solution except "armed Palestinian revolution" to take over the whole country), 22 (demonizing Israel); and 23 (demanding that all nations brand Zionism "an illegitimate movement" and outlaw it.).

To this can be added eleven additional points advocating armed struggle and urging all Arabs to assist violent efforts to liberate Palestine. If all these provisions are dropped or amended, there is little left except for statements on the Palestinian cause's justice and merits, the duty of all Palestinians to support it, and nine final points identifying the PLO as the Palestinians' leader.

The last provision specifies: "This Charter shall not be amended save by a majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the PNC at a special session convened for that purpose." It is under this provision that the special PNC session is to be called.

Clearly, this step is required by the commitments undertaken by Arafat and the PLO during the peace process. In his letter of 9 September 1993, on which Israeli recognition of the PLO and agreement to negotiate with it is conditioned, Arafat stated:

"The PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Charter which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Charter which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestine National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Charter."

This promise was reconfirmed at the time of the Cairo accords and once again in Arafat's 28 September 1995 letter to Prime Minister Rabin accompanying the "Oslo-B" agreement:

"The PLO undertakes that, within two months of the date of the inauguration of the [Palestinian Authority's] Council, the PNC will convene and formally approve the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Charter, as undertaken."

Israel gave Arafat two and a half years additional time to fulfill the 1993 commitment, based on his assertion that only after elections would he have the mandate and legitimacy to carry out the promise. It is clear that the PLO's agreement to change the Charter is exclusive of any additional Israeli concession to fulfill this commitment. The promise to alter the Charter is part of the original agreement, by which the PLO received control over territories and other benefits.

An additional question is who actually constitutes the PNC. PLO officials have given different answers. At the 1988 PNC, 447 members were present, there were 483 at the 1991 session. The number of total members is often given as 450. There are also said to be 180 additional members from the West Bank (whose Hebrew name is Judea and Samaria) and Gaza, but it was not clear that this referred to individuals rather than merely indicating the number of seats set aside for this constituency. PLO officials have stated that the members of the elected Palestinian assembly (some of whom are already PNC members) will be added.

That the number of PNC members is highly flexible has been shown in the past, when Arafat named additional people in order to increase the support for himself on critical issues. The members can be divided into the following categories:

--PLO officials, who largely owe their jobs to Arafat, numbering about 20 percent of the membership. The majority of these people have already come to live in the PA-ruled areas. They would mostly--but not unanimously--back Arafat's policy

--Members of the non-Fatah factions in the PLO, constituting about 20 percent of the membership. These come mainly from the internal opposition--the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), almost all of whom would not vote for changing the Charter. Some of these people might not attend the meeting in protest.

--About 60 percent of the members are either Fatah cadre or independents, many of them well-off businessmen. Roughly half of them are now present in the PA-ruled territories, while the largest remaining group are residents of Jordan. While militant and inflexible in the past, this is a conservative rather than a revolutionary group by temperament and social position. Most but not all of them would support Arafat's policy.

--It is equally important to stress that the PNC has no representation by Hamas or Islamic Jihad and only a handful of young intifada activists as members.

--Adding the 88 PA delegates (or 93, if the 5 Arafat will appoint are included) to the PNC (about 20 percent of whom are already PNC members) would give him perhaps 50 more votes, though several would also oppose any changes).

--Finally, by "deciding" how many PNC members exist, Arafat will also determine how many votes he needs to obtain a two-thirds' majority. Incorporating more West Bank and Gaza residents--since the quota for the territories has been set at 180 seats--would give Arafat even more votes.

These facts and methods should guarantee him the number of ballots required. It is also true as Jamal al-Sourani--a PLO Executive Committee member who Arafat has now assigned to lead the group studying changing the Charter--said in 1989 that Arafat does not merely issue "orders and must be obeyed....He and we are partners....[Arafat] does not decide what is right and what is wrong on his own personal whim." Nonetheless, from his statement that the Charter was "caduque," to his signature on three separate occasions in peace process documents, Arafat did unilaterally agree to a revision. The September 1993 note--though not yet fully "legal" given point 33 of the Charter itself--even states that most of the document is already invalid.

Certainly, through a combination of genuine support, patronage, institutional loyalty, and adding more people, Arafat could obtain the needed two-thirds' majority. He merely need decide on the necessity of using sufficient political capital to achieve this end.

In short, he must conclude that the step is absolutely necessary--given outside pressure and as a precondition to continue the peace process--and determine how best to proceed, in a way minimizing his concessions and internal friction. Current Situation

From the PA and PLO view point, they are in an intermediate stage that they hope will be no more than three years' long. They are now building institutions and a new political elite, consolidating authority over the lands they administrate, in hopes that this is the prelude to a state.

Arafat draws his power from four different spheres:

--The PLO is an international organization--including the PNC and Executive Committee--which represents "all" Palestinians. He rules here through a majority of Fatah members and independents. The opposition comes mainly from the PFLP and DFLP, though not all independents support Arafat. On the Executive Committee, he can count on 11 of the 18 members, a bare quorum. Even one of the other two Fatah representatives, Faruq Qaddumi, does not support Arafat's policies. Nonetheless, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have no voice in the PLO or PNC.

--Fatah, his own partisan group, which is a movement and an incipient political party. He handled opposition here by coopting people--as was done in the elections by allowing all Fatah members to run despite the existence of an official list--and then reincorporating them into the party's supporters.

--The Palestinian Authority's assembly, dominated by Fatah members and pro-Arafat independents. The opposition here is very small though he might also have to appease critical supporters on this issue. Some pro=Arafat candidates promised to oppose changing the Charter or at lest to demand concessions from Israel for doing so.

--His governing role within the territories, formerly as PA chairman and now as "ra'is," which gives him executive authority. Aside from his control over the armed police force, he also commands considerable financial and patronage resources which he can use to sway votes in the other three institutions. But in this sphere--unlike the other three--he must also deal with a radical Islamist opposition.

The lesson of this emerging structure is that Arafat is very adept at employing power to obtain his goals, as well as being able to reward friends and punish enemies. In great contrast to Arab dictators, he believes that winning a total victory on the domestic front can be counterproductive. At the same time, though, the PLO has become his least reliable, least relevant base. In changing the Charter, he is not only replying to his own commitment--and Israel's demand--but also changing the balance among Palestinian institutions.

In part the PLO/PNC institution is less immediately important for Arafat because it represents "outside" Palestinians, those less affected and involved in the current developments. The end of Israel's presence coupled with self-government directly benefits Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank. But these changes provide no immediate improvement to the lives of "outside" Palestinians in Jordan, Lebanon, and elsewhere. On the contrary, these people can consider themselves being abandoned by Arafat, thrown on the variable mercies of their host government, left to be permanent refugees.

By bringing PLO officials, activists, and "soldiers" to the West Bank/Gaza area, he has been converting activists from "outside" to "inside" Palestinians. This practice will now be applied to all PNC people who return--with Israel's permission. Thus, they will no longer be "diaspora" Palestinians (represented by the PLO and PNC) but "citizens" under the jurisdiction of the PA and "President" Arafat. In short, the holding of a PNC session has become a mechanism for reducing the PNC's importance. This also gives Arafat greater leverage over PNC members, whose political and economic ambitions are now under Arafat's purview, to vote for changing the Charter.

At the same time, there are three internal factors restraining Arafat in changing the Charter, or in revising it more sharply and clearly:

--His own preference for a broad consensus, to promote his own support and to avoid conflict or even civil war. This has always been his leadership style, even when he had the ability to destroy or ignore critics.

--His desire to show that he is not an Israeli puppet or someone who is making too many concessions. Since Israel is demanding a change in the Charter, this then can become a reason to resist doing so, or at least demanding additional concessions in exchange.

--The complaints of opponents that he is giving away too much. In the case of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PFLP and DFLP, this is because they oppose the peace process and do not want to abandon the PLO's traditional positions. Others--including the Communist and Democratic parties, and Haydar Abd al-Shafi--want to use criticism to show that they are better militants than Arafat. A third group, including many within Fatah, have a genuine if largely unjustified fear that Israel will not keep its commitments or that they will not end up with a state.

Thus, Arafat and his colleagues demand more Israeli concessions to justify changing the Charter. Further, whatever they do will be designed to prove that they are not "selling out" and are unyielding in their demand for an independent state with its capital in east Jerusalem. Precisely because they are stepping down from historic positions, they will use every opportunity to show their militancy and continuity with PLO tradition.

Options

Yasir Arafat has three options in the current situation, and little time to choose among them.

1. Do Nothing

Arafat has a number of ways to avoid action. For example, he can demand more Israeli concessions, insist on the need for extra time, allow a PNC session to finish without making a definitive decision on the Charter, or appoint a body to examine the actual changes to be made.

Such an approach has a advantages in terms of internal politics. Arafat can portray himself as a tough leader who does not make concessions to Israeli demands. He can also avoid confrontation with the opposition.

Yet the Palestinian leadership clearly understands the high cost of such a strategy:

--The peace process would be frozen and Israel could take certain actions against the PA (see Section II, below).

--A government might be elected in Israel which would take a harder line against the PA in the future.

--Foreign donors could cut off money.

--The PA's resulting inability to deliver on continued progress might end up by undermining its internal support and emboldening his opponents to escalate attacks on his rule.

Perhaps a more serious danger is that passivity would result not from a deliberate decision but from bureaucratic inertia and poor competence. An inability to decide exactly how to handle the Charter issue could lead to deadlock and delays.

Given the extremely short time frame in which Arafat must act (in the past, organizing a PNC session has taken many months of internal negotiation) a failure to convene the meeting or to carry out the necessary steps remains possible. Yet given the clarity of the pressures and the high stakes involved, the holding of a PNC session seems virtually certain.

2. Amending the Charter

The Charter is the Palestinian's foundation document, the movement cannot long remain without such a constitutional basis. Thus, the Charter must be amended so as to stress the continuity of the struggle while quickly producing a position which will allow the peace process's continuation. In amending the portions calling for Israel's destruction, the PLO could continue its habit of taking language from past declarations, especially the PNC's 1974, 1988, and 1991 resolutions as well as its 1988 declaration of independence.

This approach's advantage is that Arafat would immediately have a fresh basis for national consensus and a document he could use as a mandate. The wording could be carefully constructed to meet the minimum basis of Israel's demands while remaining militant or ambiguous enough to please some of Arafat's critics.

The problem here, however, is that this action could backfire. Leaders could spend endless time disputing over the precise wording of each provision. The new language could be too radical for Israel and not strong enough for opponents or critics. Even a single sentence could create a fierce dispute among Palestinians or between the PA and Israel.

The 1988 PNC provides a cautionary example. Arafat set out to produce a PNC resolution that would persuade the United States that the PLO had fulfilled the conditions necessary to achieve some kind of recognition and talks with Washington. By the time internal negotiations were completed, after months of preparation, the resolution's language was so watered down to please radical critics that it proved unacceptable both to the United States and to Israel. This could happen again. (See Section II. B. below for a detailed discussion.)

Since at least two-thirds of the Charter would have to be changed to fulfill the PLO's obligations, make any sense or be useful at all, the massive amendments would produce virtually a new document. Thus, this is a big, complex, and controversial job in a very short amount of time. The inability to solve these problems could lead back to Option 1 or require Option 3.

3. A Completely New Charter

In the past, Arafat and other Palestinian leaders have argued that PLO statements, agreements, and acts proved that the Charter is obsolete. Arafat's statement that it was "caduque" is a prime example of this approach. But such claims were put forward to render unnecessary any step to revise or drop the Charter formally.

That approach is clearly unacceptable today. But the PNC meeting could fulfill the conditions by formally doing what these statements claimed, declaring the Charter defunct. Face-saving language might be used to avoid any appearance of apology. For example, it could be claimed that the Charter served the Palestinian people well for many years, that it reflected their just and legitimate rights and aspirations, but that in a new era a new document was needed.

The precise way the Charter is made inoperative would be quite important for the Israeli and international interpretation of whether the Palestinians had met the Oslo agreement's requirements. The PNC could leave the writing of a new Charter to the PA assembly or a committee to produce a draft for the next PNC's approval.

If Arafat postpones producing a new Charter, he could portray this as a step forward by denoting the successor document--whose timing and wording he would more tightly control, as the basic law of a ripening Palestinian state. Thus, he could use the PNC meeting to devolve power onto the elected body of Palestinians in the territories, moving away from an international revolutionary organization toward a territorially based, legitimately established government-in-the-making.

In contrast to the 1988 fiasco of trying to construct a new document proving a changed PLO stance, Arafat might prefer the alternative used in the successful 1991 PNC meeting, which charged the PLO Executive Committee with deciding how to proceed.

Of course, the specific method of handling the Charter is in Arafat's hands. The central issue is that there be a clear break with the existing document: by amending it, canceling it in favor of a newly written Charter, or voiding it now in favor of a substitute to be written in the future.

ISRAELI REACTIONS, LEVERAGE, AND POLICY

Importance

The Palestinians' willingness and ability to change the Charter may be the single most important confidence-building measure for Israel in the entire peace process. This step would validate a belief that the PLO has changed its nature and aims, an indispensable precondition for finding a compromise negotiated solution at all.

For almost a half-century Israelis have seen the Arab definition of the conflict having only one acceptable solution: Israel's destruction and replacement by an Arab state and people. The 1974 PLO program, appeared as a cynical two-stage plan to eliminate Israel. And the PLO's various public relations efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to give the West an impression of moderation without its substance deepened Israeli suspicion. Only when the PLO shifted to a new goal and interpretation of the conflict--a two- state solution with a West/Bank Gaza Palestine alongside Israel-- was a diplomatic breakthrough possible.

Consequently, for PLO leaders to talk of peace with Israel-- and receive material benefits for doing so--while their movement's main programmatic and ideological text still insists on total victory, armed struggle, no compromise, and demonizes Israel is absurd. If indeed the PLO has abandoned the line taken in the Charter, there is no reason not to change the document. Such a step would be a major educational advance in building peace among the Palestinian and Arabs citizenry as well as having a huge effect on Israeli public opinion.

This discussion is put forward to show why changing the Charter is not some obscure or purely symbolic act but so essential for the peace process. Thus, this step is an integral part of the process and must be a high priority for Israel and for all those supporting regional peace and stability.

The question is how Israel should define what constitutes acceptable changes and the way best to ensure that these are made.

Specifics

On a revised or replacement Charter's specific wording, the issue is not how it should fit with Israel's ideal preferences but how it must sustain the PLO's commitments. Disagreements can remain but the boundaries of the peace process cannot be crossed.

The three principal problems from the Charter are the PLO's policies on defining Palestine; antagonism against Israel and Zionism; and call for violence as not only permissible but as the main and only means to achieve its ends.

1. The Definition of Palestine

In the Charter, the PLO defines Palestine as all of Israel plus the West Bank and Gaza. It rejects the 1947 partition plan, Israel's right to exist, and any possible basis for that state. The PLO's commitments in the peace process require this claim to any Israeli territory and rejection of Israel's existence be dropped.

The Charter's very first provision states: "Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation." In the Palestinian Charter, this argument rejects Israel's existence and calls for its destruction. It also, ironically, undercuts Palestinian nationalism on behalf of Pan-Arab nationalism. But these very same words would not be objectionable if "Palestine" was delineated as the West Bank and Gaza.

The PNC's 1988 declaration of independence simply refers to "the State of Palestine on our Palestinian territory with its capital Holy Jerusalem," a deliberately vague formula which many Israelis saw as continuing a claim to all of their own land as well. This kind of statement could be acceptable, however, if put into some kind of context, for instance defining this territory as the land occupied by Israel in the 1967 war, etc.

In accordance with the peace process agreements, Israel seeks a revision of the pre-1967 borders in its favor, while the PLO--by its own agreement--is forbidden from demanding a change in the pre- June 1967 borders to its own advantage. The PLO can, however, claim any and all territory outside the pre-June 1967 borders of Israel. Any resulting language should reflect that situation.

The PLO's proclaimed current goal is an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with its capital as east Jerusalem. This does not accord with Israel's position, yet is a legitimate position within the context of the peace process. The PLO does not accept east Jerusalem as part of Israel and this issue is left for the final status negotiations.

This set of issues raised several questions for Israeli policy on the Charter question:

--Is it better or worse that the PLO define the borders for its projected state of Palestine? On one hand, a clear explanation that the PLO is seeking only the West Bank (incorporating east Jerusalem in its definition) and the Gaza Strip would terminate the claim to Israel which is the greatest single problem in this matter. It would be preferable to "Palestine" remaining undefined and thus leaving the door open to a claim for the entire land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean.

Thus, on balance the removal of the claim to all of Israel is required; the definition of Palestine to a territory limited to the West Bank and Gaza is preferable. Though the claimed boundaries do not have to be mentioned specifically--and carry some problem in being so enshrined--it might be difficult to find language which would achieve the dropping of the claim to Israel without stating specifically what the Palestinians do claim.

--Does acceptance of Israel need to be made explicit in the revised or replacement Charter? The language declaring Israel's illegitimacy and calls on others to fight against it must certainly be dropped. It would be preferable that the new clauses somehow make clear that a Palestinian state would exist alongside and in peace with Israel. This might be most easily met by the territorial definition of Palestine as described in the previous point.

--How should the question of Israel's Arab citizens be handled? This is a more problematic and delicate issue than has been recognized. The existing Charter simply states that most Jews be driven out, while all Arabs born or descended from residents in Palestine--thus including Arab citizens of Israel) are Palestinians. Certainly, Israeli Arabs are ethnically Palestinian but what is this fact's political significance?

Any revised or replacement Charter must be carefully worded. The 1988 declaration of independence's formula was, "The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be." The idea that all Palestinians can take pride in a Palestinian state, feel some identity with it, or might some day migrate to it are acceptable in the context of the peace process (and parallel concepts of Zionism). But any suggestion that Arab citizens of Israel should be under the Palestinian state's authority or which might serve as a basis to a claim on Israeli territory where they reside is unacceptable. It poses a problem not only for Israel but for Israeli Arab themselves, as well as for other states (especially Jordan) with large Palestinian minorities.

--Still another controversial point is the Palestinian claim of a right of return. Historically, this has meant that all Palestinians and their descendants who lived on what is now Israeli territory before Israel's independence have a right to go back there. This position is totally unacceptable to Israel. But the terms of the peace process has not required the PLO to give up claims based on property lost in 1948 or that these refugees remain in a permanent state of exile.

The issue of a right of return becomes especially important given the fact that virtually all PNC members were exiles from 1948 residing outside the territories until very recently or even up to this moment. The other refugees abroad--about half of all Palestinians--are their main constituency. To win a two-thirds' majority, Arafat must heed this group's interests and its fear that the current solution leaves them in permanent exile.

A revised or replaced Charter would have two ways to handle this question. One way would be to proclaim an intention to establish a right of return to a future Palestinian state. A second would be to mention relevant UN resolutions and assert a right of return or compensation.

This would be a problem for Israeli interests but not a breach of the Oslo principles. Israel's position would be to rejecting any actual return completely while discussing questions of compensation. Israel is committed to negotiate over allowing 1967 refugees--but not anyone who left in 1948--to come to the West Bank. During the course of negotiations, the "return" issue must be redefined from having an Israeli destination to that of immigration into a Palestinian entity.

--The concept of "Palestinian self-determination" carries some minor implication of being a unilateral right or applying to Israeli Arabs, but this phrase should be acceptable since, in practice, Palestinians do set their goal, but can only attain it through bilateral negotiations, meaning Israeli agreement.

2. Historic Complaints

Historical grievances play a large part in the Arab-Israeli conflict and occupy a major place in the PLO Charter. The PLO has not agreed to give up its historical complaints or claims of past injustice. Yet an emphasis on these can make them the basis for current and future conflicts, including an incitement for Palestinians to kill Israelis.

While these historic emotions and events--and the partisan interpretations of them--cannot be forgotten, a prominent role for such arguments in a revised or replaced Charter could inflame passions, undermine conciliation, and delegitimize the peace process. In the original Charter, such issues include the view of the Jewish presence as an invasion, ridiculing the basis of Jewish nationalism, demonizing Israel, and magnifying Israeli misdeeds against the Palestinians. In later documents, the post-1967 occupation, bloodshed, repression, and so on are presented in the most lurid terms. Even the 1991 PNC declaration called for opposition--ultimately unsuccessful--to the UN revoking the General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism.

Language glorifying the Palestinian Arabs, their history, culture, and so on, or identifying them with the Arabs as a whole, is no problem for Israel. But a long indictment against Israel, Zionism, the post-1967 Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza, or a militant justification of PLO behavior and views during the conflict, could make a new Charter seem more of an anti-Israel document than a basis for conciliation. Thus, Israel's interest requires that such language be kept to a minimum in magnitude and fervor.

3. Violence, Strategy and Tactics

A large portion of the Charter contains explicit language rejecting any compromise and urging that armed struggle is the only road for the PLO to follow. Any such language advocating, justifying or glorifying violence--with the unpalatable but understandable exception of general references to past martyrs and heroes--would be unacceptable. There is no need to insert language explicitly disavowing terrorism since the PLO has always defined this as armed struggle any way. Ideally, there would be references to diplomacy, negotiation, and international legitimacy as ways to win Palestinian goals.

Israel has no problem with a Charter defining the PLO as the Palestinians' leading group. On the contrary, it has been a premise of the entire negotiating process that the PLO, and institutions with PLO leadership such as the PA, are able to speak on the Palestinians' behalf. The problem of the relative authority of the PLO and PA is one which Palestinians have to resolve and in which Arafat himself has a major interest.

Especially important would be new language discussing the Palestinians' future goals. Any implications about the struggle being unfinished, etc., should refer to achieving the Palestinians' goals in negotiations, state-building and economic progress. While probably vague, these words should not hint broadly at a "second stage" in which Israel should be conquered.

The Danger of Preconditions

>From the standpoint of Israeli policy and interests, the most dangerous trend in the current Palestinian debate has been a demand for preconditions before the Charter is revised. Various Palestinian leaders have raised the idea that Israel must agree that a Palestinian state will be created by the negotiations or make further concessions on other issues before the PNC acts.

Such a position on the part of the Palestinians would not only freeze the peace process but would undermine it severely by throwing into question the credibility of all Palestinian commitments. There is absolutely no basis in the Oslo series of agreements for such a claim, popular and effective in Palestinian domestic politics as it may be. Ironically, the setting of preconditions would only delay or jeopardize the very steps that are being sought.

Arafat does, however, retain a legitimate loophole here. By repealing the existing Charter and not replacing it, he could argue that the formulation of a new version will only take place further down the road when Palestinians see Israel meeting its own commitments.

Israel's Leverage

Israel has a great deal of leverage to secure changes in the Charter and the PA's adherence to its commitments in general. In terms of the Charter issue, however, at this point Israel need not take active measures, either through concessions or pressures. Rather, it must proceed with the agreed timetable, simply continuing to make clear that failing to alter the Charter would bring multiple pressures and cost the PA both currently scheduled benefits and potential new gains through the future negotiations.

Aside from this, Israel need only take steps directly linked to facilitating the holding of the PNC meeting. Giving any new concessions would not alter Arafat's strategy or the PNC vote while undercutting the stance that changing the Charter is not some Palestinian favor to Israel but a meeting of commitments already made and absolutely necessary for the peace process's survival.

Permitting the Return of PNC Members

In this context, Israel decided to admit all PNC members and allow them to remain in the PA-ruled areas. This undercut any ability of either Arafat or the opposition blaming a failure to hold a PNC and revise the Charter on Israeli action. It also gave Arafat a useful card in lobbying for support among PNC members who would benefit from attending the session and would seek his patronage as residents of the territory under his control.

This was not an easy choice for Israel, which continues to control the PA-ruled territories' international borders under the Oslo agreement. Around one-third of the PNC members still abroad belong to groups which not only murdered Israelis but still commit terrorism, trying to destroy the peace process. In some cases, they have been directly implicated in specific terrorist killings.

In practice, however, this step will primarily benefit PNC members who are more likely to support the peace process and back changing the Charter. The most extreme and actively terrorist elements are suspicious of Israel's intentions; reluctant to place themselves in the jurisdiction of their old rival, Arafat; and worried lest coming back lends legitimacy to the peace process or to revising the Charter (even if they were to vote against doing so). Even if they do come back, the PLO's internal opposition is losing influence and facing splits from members in the territories, a rift widened by their wish to run in the Palestinian elections. These groups' involvement in the politics of the PA-ruled area will only further show their small base of support.

Thus, the decision to allow the return of PNC members enhanced the likelihood of revising the Charter, intensified the obligation of the PLO to do so, and strengthened Arafat's hand against rivals.

The Effect on Israeli Policy

Unquestionably, the PLO's willingness to alter the Charter in an acceptable manner will affect Israeli policy toward the Palestinians, the PA, and the peace process:

--The Charter's revision would greatly contribute to the peace process's success. Israel would not make any specific concessions based on the PLO's actions, but the steps agreed to in Oslo-B (outlined in the previous section) would be fulfilled in a full and timely fashion. The way would be cleared for the onset of final status negotiations.

--In the event that the Charter is unaltered, there would be a national Israeli consensus to freeze the peace process. A serious crisis would ensue in which Israel enjoyed far stronger leverage. Whatever internal benefit Arafat gained by being tough, he would lose far more in international support and ability to deliver material gains for his constituents. Palestinian interests would suffer greatly.

--An amended or replaced Charter would be studied by Israel and Israelis to decide whether the new version is sufficient, debatable, or inadequate. If the new Charter is deemed as showing a real change in the PLO's historic policy, support for the peace process would increase dramatically within Israel. If the new text was improved but its degree of breaking with the past was subject to serious debate, Israel's policy would depend on the interpretation of the government empowered by the next elections.

Given the timetable for changing the Charter, the outcome will be known well in advance of the next Israeli elections. Any freezing of the peace process resulting from a PLO failure to act would be done by the current government.

The imminence of election has neither affected nor need it affect Israeli policy on the Charter. The main two parties agree that the PLO has committed itself to change the Charter and want it to do so. Israeli policy on this issue is neither partisan nor influenced by electoral considerations, but rather is set on the basis of national interests.

Indeed, the Israeli government's desire for the peace process to work makes it all the stronger in pressing for the Charter's revision. Under any circumstances, a Palestinian failure to act appropriately would make the Israeli government show its strength and determination by freezing the peace process.

Israeli voters will decide whether they think the peace process has been a reasonable success and whether the Palestinian leadership is a credible negotiating partner. The election result will, in turn, shape the peace process's future. Clearly, however, a Palestinian failure on the Charter issue will bring a strongly negative Israeli response and jeopardize progress under any conditions. A serious change in PLO policy would open a new era, significantly improving bilateral relations.

Conclusions

Arafat seems ready to change the Charter and has the power to do so though exactly how he will act is still unclear. Palestinian leaders also demand gestures and concessions from Israel to persuade them to revise the Charter. Israel insists on living up to previous agreements which require the formal revision of the document. Israel should maintain its position that states a clear intention to freeze the process if the Palestinians side does not live up to its commitments. It should seek--and obtain-- international support for this stance.

This issue is neither marginal nor purely symbolic. The Arab- Israeli conflict's central problem for almost a half-century was the Arab refusal to recognize or make peace with Israel. Any resolution of the Palestinian problem or the territories' fate has depended on redefining the conflict into one solvable by diplomacy and compromise rather than by Israel's destruction.

The basis of Israeli policy became that the PLO could emerge as a negotiating partner only if it accepted Israel's existence, agreed to UN resolutions 242 and 338, and abandoned the use of terrorism. The Oslo and subsequent agreements have been based on a pledge by the PLO leadership of a big change in its historic policy. Arafat's personal pledge was to bring about the full, legal alteration of that position in the Charter.

Such a clear, permanent change constitutes the most important single confidence-building measure for Israel. It builds support for the peace process within Israel and internationally while also serving Arafat's interest by redefining Palestinian beliefs and goals in a way that supports his policy and undercuts the radical opposition's legitimacy.