ASIA BOOK

NORTH KOREA'S THREAT TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MIDDLE EAST'S THREAT TO ASIA

By Barry Rubin

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereafter referred to as North Korea) though a small country quite distant from the Middle East, nevertheless poses one of the greatest external threats to that region's peace and stability.[i]

North Korea has become a surprisingly important factor in Middle East politics due to its indiscriminate arms' and technology sales to radical regimes. In particular, Pyongyang's supply of missiles and missile technology to Iran, Syria, Libya, and Iraq poses a tremendous threat to regional stability. The possibility that North Korea will transfer nuclear technology to extremist regimes is an extremely dangerous scenario that could plunge the Middle East into disaster.

Given the fact that North Korea may be the most important single leak in the international anti-proliferation effort, it is urgent to publicize, counter, deter and if necessary punish its activity. As Pyongyang weakens and becomes more dependent on rising levels of Western humanitarian aid, using leverage to stop its  activities becomes more possible.

I. THE DANGERS OF NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

North Korea's pattern of activity in the Middle East has been quite consistent. A radical Middle East regime is cut off from Western sources of military technology and arms. The Soviet Union becomes the main supplier but its own interests, concern over escalation, and the customer's inability to pay makes Moscow deny it certain types or quantities of weapons. Even China, the radical regime's second choice, may be deterred by Western pressure from selling it weapons of mass destruction.

At this point, North Korea enters the picture, willing to ignore any external pressure; lacking any constraint whatsoever in terms of what and how much it is ready to sell. The Middle Eastern partner's money helps North Korea survive and expand its own arsenal. In several cases, the client invested funds so that North Korea could develop the weapon for both itself and the customer.

The result is an increased danger of war and instability for both the Middle East and Asia. This has been the effect of North Korean relations with Iran and Syria in the past. It could also become true for Libya and Iraq in the future.  

A. Dangerous Outcomes

As radical regimes like those of Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria obtain weapons of mass destruction this poses a great danger to the world, the Middle East, and the West for several reasons:

• Obtaining such weapons can give them the confidence and ability to attack neighbors, which could lead them to seize or destroy much of the world's oil resources or disrupt petroleum transport routes and international waterways.

• They could transfer such weapons to terrorist groups which might use them to launch bloody attacks in the region or elsewhere in the world.

• Having such weapons makes it possible for them to intimidate others, weakening of moderate regimes and alliances, destabilizing the region and achieving other anti-Western and anti-democratic goals.

• If the potential victims resist, however, the resulting crises could force Western states into costly direct military interventions. Alternatively, the radicals' new leverage could cancel out U.S. and Western leverage by frightening them or allies into backing down. In the words of Dr. Keith B. Payne of Georgetown University, "The combination of more sophisticated missiles and weapons of mass destruction will enable regional foes either to threaten or to annihilate Western military or civilian targets at the outset of hostilities. Indeed, one of the primary motives for developing countries to acquire [these weapons] is for their deterrence and coercive potential--including deterrence and coercion of the United States.[ii]

• Many of the North Korean arms are in the custody of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard. This strengthens the most extreme, pro-terrorist force in Iran which could use these arms to seize power, use them even against the will of the nation's political leadership, or transfer them to terrorist groups.

• By circumventing Western-imposed sanctions, North Korea destroys any chance of this pressure succeeding in forcing radical states to modify their support for terrorism and aggressive policies.

• Since Iran finances most of North Korea's arms supplies to Syria, this triangular relationship strengthens the alliance between two of the most dangerous Middle East radical states.

• As radical states obtain weapons of mass destruction, moderate states must spend scarce resources to buy weapons capable of deterring or defeating them. This arms race can undermine the moderate regime's internal stability, raise regional tension, and increase the possibility of conflict among moderates.

• North Korea and its partners can sell or trade weapons of mass destruction to other states or terrorist movements, increasing the pace of proliferation and destabilizing other parts of the world.

• Iran's growing arsenal of unconventional weapons could tempt it in the future to avenge its defeat in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, whose first round cost both sides an estimated one million casualties.

Thus, North Korea's role in the region is of tremendous importance. It might lead to the deaths of tens or even hundreds of thousands of people in a war or wars both encouraged by and made bloodier by North Korean-supplied weapons of mass destruction. 

B. North Korean Motives

Why has North Korea been so active in selling these weapons and technology?

Originally, its purpose was to win allies and support for its struggle with South Korea. But this strategy has generally failed. Of course, North Korea still seeks foreign associates--especially after being so weakened and isolated itself by the USSR's collapse and China's rapprochement with South Korea in the 1980s. While ideology has become less important, a genuine hatred of democracy, the international status quo, the United States, etc., is an added factor in North Korea's desire to cause havoc in both Asia and the Middle East.

But the main purpose shifted to ensuring the regime's own survival. Now the badly faltering North Korean regime badly needs the money obtained by such sales. This mercenary factor is Pyongyang's primary motive. Remarkably, North Korea has become the world's fifth-largest arms exporter and in 1993 alone signed $300 million of arms transfer agreements, virtually all to the Middle East.[iii]

At the same time, much of the profit has been used to advance North Korea's own military programs. Without Egyptian and later Iranian financing, it would be many years further behind in missile technology. Such contacts have also provided North Korea with access to weapons' systems that it otherwise could not study or obtain. Technologies and testing developed in cooperation with radical states are integrated into North Korea's own forces and weapons.

In the end, there is no contradiction between the motives to make profits, implement North Korean ideology, and prepare for South Korea's destruction.

It should be noted that the other two countries mainly involved in promoting proliferation to radical Middle East states--China and Russia--are also North Korea's historic allies. While in theory these three states are competing for sales, they often cooperate. For example, China and North Korea work together in helping Iran, while in 1993, North Korean Scud-C missiles were delivered to Syria by Russian planes.[iv] This collaboration is likely to tighten their links and increase Sino-Russian support for North Korea.

The North Korean regime's political and economic crisis, including a terrible famine, may cause that government to cast off any inhibitions about selling, developing, or even using weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, the collapse of the Pyongyang dictatorship would be a development which would directly assist Middle East peace and stability.

C. Middle Eastern Radical States: Goals and Intentions

Despite their different regimes, ideologies and sometimes conflicting ambitions, the radical states have very parallel methods and goals.[v] In the short-range this means:

--Ensuring regime survival, including the use of the most severe means of repression.[vi]

--The intimidation or subjugation of neighbors.

--The destruction of the region's current balance of forces which favors moderate forces and Western (especially U.S.) influence that blocks the radical regimes' expansionism.[vii]

In the medium-run, each of the main radical states also has plans for creating a sub-regional empire:

--Both Iran and Iraq seek control over the lands bordering the Persian Gulf.[viii]

--Libya wishes to rule North Africa and adjacent portions of sub-Saharan Africa.

--Syria wants hegemony over "Greater Syria," an area comprising Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority-ruled areas.

And in the long-run, the radical states are each trying to achieve:

--Regional hegemony, uniting all Arabs (or in Iran's case, Muslims) behind its leadership.

--The destruction of Israel.

--Expulsion of U.S. influence.

Indeed, North Korea's assistance to their foes makes it the most dangerous enemy of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait outside of the Middle East.

At the present time, however, the radical states are collectively and individually weaker than at almost any time in the region's modern history. Strategic reverses, economic defects, unproductive wars, the Soviet Union's collapse and America's over-arching power, among other factors, have brought about this situation.

Precisely because of such circumstances, radical regimes are desperately seeking weapons of mass destruction to escape that trap. This is precisely the almost magical reversal of fortunes offered by cooperation with North Korea.

    1. Iran

Iran is the world's biggest supporter of terrorism and subversion, opponent of U.S. influence, and enemy of the Middle East peace process. It backs violent revolutionary Islamic movements in many countries. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, Iran has been more restrained about at least overt challenges to the regional balance of power. Given its limited resources, Iran has not gone all-out to build a huge military force.

Despite this caution and the election of a relatively moderate president in 1997, Iran's basic goals and doctrine remains. In addition to its covert activities, Tehran could still attack or subvert more systematically Gulf Arab monarchies. Victory for another Islamic revolution elsewhere could make Iran the leader of a powerful radical Islamic bloc.[ix]

Ironically, Iran's lack of funds to spend on arms may have pushed it more toward acquiring weapons of mass destruction, which are relatively cheaper than the outlay required to buy huge numbers of tanks and planes. This same financial consideration makes Tehran want to manufacture the weapons it needs internally, which again makes North Korea an attractive partner.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye stated in 1995 that Iran was seeking advanced weapons in order to "control the area around the Straits of Hormuz and intimidate the smaller countries" so as to gain "hegemony over the Persian Gulf." This is why the United States has tried to impose international sanctions against Iran and to block its obtaining weapons of mass destruction.[x]

    2. Iraq

Iraq attacked Iran in 1980, Kuwait in 1990, and fired missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia in 1991. Saddam Hussein's regime used chemical weapons against Iran and its own Kurdish citizens; and put huge resources into obtaining nuclear weapons.  While currently in eclipse, Iraq's regime is eagerly awaiting the day when sanctions against it are abandoned.  He has in no way abandoned his goals of dominating the Gulf and leading the Arab world.

In the 1980s, Baghdad developed nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as a missile force while circumventing international efforts to stop such proliferation. These efforts were carried out through rogue companies and some European government's laxness in enforcing their own laws limiting arms and military technology exports.[xi]

Given the close relationship between North Korea and Iran, Pyongyang-Baghdad ties were limited. But this could change if and when Saddam Hussein is once again able to export freely the country's oil and escape from the current regime of inspections and regulation.[xii]

    3. Syria

The Syrian regime has been forced by circumstances to put on a more moderate face and to participate, intermittently at least, in peace talks with Israel. Nevertheless, its self-image as the proper leader of militant Arabs and ambitions remain unchanged. Damascus wishes to torpedo the peace process and move the Arab world in a more radical direction. It continues to control Lebanon, direct terrorist groups, and give a free hand to the Iranian-backed Hezbollah to attack Israel through southern Lebanon.

Syria's missile force--derived in part from cooperation with North Korea--is its key military asset in confronting Israel. Any Syrian decision to attack Israel would be out of a belief that missiles would provide the decisive edge for victory. Equally, this confidence is an important element in Syria's inflexibility about making concessions in the peace process. By strengthening Syria, North Korea has also helped sabotage negotiations.

    4. Libya

The mercurial Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi, was forced onto the defensive by the U.S. air attack on his capital in 1986. Within two years, however, Libya was responsible for terrorist bomb attacks which downed an American and a French civilian airliner with heavy loss of life. In turn, these attacks helped bring international sanctions against Libya.

Qadhafi has long sought to obtain longer-range missiles and nuclear weapons. He has plenty of oil money to pay for military equipment. His unpredictable and adventurous nature makes him perhaps the world's ruler most likely to use weapons of mass destruction. The Russians and the Chinese know this and have been restrained in helping Libya. North Korea has no such qualms.

II. SUPPLYING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

North Korea's main role in the Middle East is as a supplier of arms, technology, and equipment to radical states. As U.S. CIA Director Jim Woolsey remarked, "It is willing to sell to any country with the cash to pay."[xiii] Because of embargoes or laws against exporting such weapons to these extremist regimes, the items North Korea supplied have been unavailable from any other state (with the exception of China in some cases)

Aside from selling arms, North Korea also made deals to improve these weapons, develop new ones, and build production facilities in radical Middle East states. In some cases, the Middle East state financed the development and testing of these arms in North Korea. The improved or new technology is passed back to North Korea for its own armed forces. Thus, this collaboration simultaneously threatens both Middle Eastern and Asian peace.

According to Israeli intelligence, North Korea has exported 370 ground-to-ground missiles to Syria, Iran, Libya and Egypt over the last decade. It continues to produce about 150 missiles a year--for which Iran is the main customer--and has given Iran, Syria, and Egypt the capability to produce their own missiles.[xiv]

A. Missiles

The import of huge numbers of increasingly longer-range missiles into the Middle East marks an important change in the area's strategic picture:

• States considering aggression are encouraged by a belief that unconventional weapons will make up for other shortcomings and bring them victory.

• Civilians are increasingly targeted and in any future war casualties among them will be far higher than ever before.

• Missiles make the use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons far more practical.

• Radical regimes can attack distant states previously out of their range (like Iraq's 1991 missile attacks against Israel.)

• Moderate neighbors--especially those lacking these types of weapons--are easier to intimidate into concessions, paying blackmail money or not helping other victims.

• Given their greater confidence, the radicals more strenuously resist efforts to pressure them toward peaceful behavior and ceasing support for terrorism.

Thus, the growth of missiles makes war more likely and probable casualties higher than ever before. Surrender is the alternative to fighting. North Korea would bear a large share of the responsibility for creating this situation.

North Korea's most important single activity in the region has been cooperation with Iran in developing missiles. Since these two states have both been shunned internationally because of their own behavior, there is a natural tendency for them to collude.

David Welch, acting assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs told a congressional hearing on 17 April 1997: "Iran's acquisition of ever‑more sophisticated missile technology from North Korea and China presents an increasing threat to our friends and to our own military presence in the Gulf."[xv]

The alliance was based on North Korean technology and weaponry combined with Iranian money. By around 1993, however, the two sides were acting more equally, with improvements in weapon design and technology coming from both partners. North Korea helped Iran start its own missile factories; Iran financed North Korea's missile projects.

After its break with the United States following the Islamic revolution's triumph in 1979, Iran increasingly switched to Soviet-style arms but lacked the quantity and quality of weapons it needed during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Tehran thus turned toward Pyongyang for help.

High-level Iranian government delegations visited Pyongyang in 1983 and 1985 and made a deal to receive help in building antiaircraft, artillery, and improved Scud-B missiles, as well as buying missiles. The deal, worth an estimated $500 million to North Korea, financed its own missile program. A joint commission was formed to foster cooperation.[xvi]

North Korean deliveries of around 200-300 improved Scud-B missiles (range: 280 km.) began in 1988. About 80 of them were fired at Iraqi cities during the war.[xvii]

Less appreciated is the North Korean-Iranian cooperation on anti-ship missiles. When Chinese sales of Silkworm missiles ostensibly ceased around 1987, Iran turn to North Korea for help. The HY-2 Silkworms, part of the same deal as the Scud-B missiles, were delivered by sea in 1987 and 1988.[xviii] It is quite possible that the Silkworm missiles fired at Kuwait and at neutral tankers at this time (one of which blinded an American ship captain) were made in North Korea.

In 1990, Iran began ordering modified Scud-C missiles (range: 600-650 km.) from North Korea, eventually receiving about 100 of them. Starting in 1991, North Korean advisors arrived in Iran, while Iranians went for training in North Korea.[xix] The United States was very concerned about these deals and raised the issue with the North Koreans directly.[xx]

But North Korea ignored any warnings and went on to help Iran manufacture its own Scuds, which Iran test-fired for the first time in May 1991, at a factory near Isfahan.[xxi] Between 1991 and 1993 Iran conducted a total of nine such test-firings.[xxii] To this day, North Korean technicians work at Iranian missile factories producing both surface-to-surface and anti-aircraft missiles.

Meanwhile, Iran placed orders for North Korea's Nodong missile, an improved Scud-C which can carry payloads (including nuclear weapons) for 900-1200 kilometers. Obtaining this weapon is one of Iran's highest military priorities.[xxiii] One report, citing a U.S. intelligence official, placed this deal's value at $320 million--30 percent to be paid cash and 70 percent in the form of oil exports--in exchange for 120 Nodong missiles.[xxiv] This would mean that Iran could reach virtually any target in the Gulf area, Turkey, or Israel. The American CIA estimated that deliveries would begin between 1997 and 1999.[xxv]

Israeli analysts have concluded that Iran was financing the impoverished North Korean regime's development of the Nodong. This weapon would allow North Korea to hit any target in South Korea or Japan. In April 1997, Israeli intelligence reported that North Korea sold Iran computer programs for constructing Nodongs and estimated Iran would be able to build them within two years, even earlier if Russia helped.[xxvi]

Slowing down this process has become a high priority for Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asked the United States to pressure North Korea to cease cooperation with Iran over the Nodong, while urging Russia to cease selling technologies to Tehran like those used in the SS-4 missile (range: 1,250 km.).[xxvii]

Assistant Secretary of State for Proliferation Robert Einhorn told a 17 April 1997 congressional hearing: "We are extremely concerned...by North Korea's supply of Scud missiles and Scud‑related technology to Iran as well as reports of missile-related cooperation with Russia and Chinese entities."[xxviii]

One important question is whether the North Koreans are able to deliver the Nodong, which, so far, was only flight tested once, in the Sea of Japan in May 1993. Iranian observers were present at this launch. Some analysts suggest that since the Nodong is not really a new weapon but mainly just a modified Scud for longer range (it has also been dubbed the "Scud-D"), it does not need extensive testing before being built in larger numbers. Moreover, geographical and political constraints do not allow a test flight on North Korea's own territory, leading a U.S. intelligence analyst to suggest that Pyongyang would prefer testing to be done in Iran.[xxix]

North Korea, Iran, and their friends seem to have encouraged stories in the international media saying that the Nodong project has been abandoned or delayed due to North Korea's structural problems. But this seems to be misleading.

Even if North Korea is unable to sell complete Nodong missiles, Iran prefers to make them at home any way using technology and advice largely coming from North Korea. Domestic production saves Iran scarce funds and improves the security of its supply. Israeli Air Force commander Major-General Eitan Ben-Eliahu said that the Iranians ground-tested the Nodong in March 1997.[xxx]

Current Israeli assessments is that Iran will field its version of the Nodong by 1999. So serious does Israel take this threat that the timetable for deployment of the Arrow has been set to ensure it is available at that time.[xxxi]

If the Israeli assessment is correct--and even U.S. officials have admitted that Israel is often better informed on matters concerning Iran's arms programs--than the Nodong project is moving ahead far faster than is generally realized. The mistake has been to assume that North Korea itself must finish the missile, whereas this work can be done in Iran. Once complete, the North Koreans can also deploy the Nodong.

Developing such a missile--or the even more advanced Nodong-2 or Taepodong 2 missiles now in the early stages of development--would allow Iran to hit Israel, Turkey, and Gulf Arab monarchies or even Europe; interfere with shipping traffic in the Gulf and Indian Ocean; attack U.S. installations; and greatly extend its reach and power in the region.

    2. Egypt

Egyptian-North Korean cooperation on missile development, is another case of how North Korea's Middle East involvement has benefitted it militarily and economically.

North Korea provided Egypt with a squadron of MIG-21 pilots in 1973. When North Korea first embarked on its own missile program (China and the USSR were either unwilling or unable to provide the assistance and arms North Korea wanted), it cooperated with Egypt. This is how North Korea--despite the USSR's opposing this transfer of its own technology--acquired Scud-B missiles and advanced launchers between 1976 and 1980, which it then studied to learn how to produce and improve them.[xxxii]

For North Korea, arms contracts with Egypt were the most profitable in its history. In a 1984 deal, Egypt obtained North Korean help in building its own Saqr-80 missile. In later years, U.S. satellites detected shipments of Scud-C missile parts from North Korea to Egypt, including motors and guidance systems.[xxxiii]

It would seem that having a reliable U.S. source of arms would turn Egypt away from working with North Korea. But Egypt continues to import Scud-C missiles from North Korea in 1997.[xxxiv]

    3. Syria

Syria acquired a large missile force in order to gain at least strategic parity with Israel. Russia played the main role in building up this arsenal but Damascus was dissatisfied with the quantity or quality of weapons Moscow supplied. Moreover, Syria's lack of money and $11 billion debt to the USSR (now owed to Russia) were also barriers to obtaining the quantity and quality of missiles it desired.

Damascus thus turned to China in 1988 to supply it with missiles. But when China (responding to U.S. pressure in 1989) canceled their agreement, Syria approached North Korea to obtain Scud-B missiles in 1989-1990. In 1991, the Syrian ship al-Yarmouk delivered 24 improved Scud-B missiles with a 500-km range and about 20 launchers. These missiles, wrote Joseph Bermudez, "provide Syria with an enhanced capability to strike with greater accuracy anywhere within Israel" and allow them to deliver Syrian-made chemical warheads.[xxxv]

Between 1991 and 1993, North Korea helped Syria set up its own advanced Scud manufacturing facility and sold it about 60 more advanced Scud-C missiles and 12 launchers, capable of carrying chemical or biological weapons. This deal was financed by Iran, with some Libyan help as well as Saudi subsidies for Syrian involvement in the anti-Iraq Gulf War coalition. That money financed North Korea's production of the Nodong.

Using technology and material supplied by North Korea, Syria test-fired its first locally made Scud-C in mid-1996, produced in a factory funded by Iran.

North Korea has held discussions with Syria about selling it the Nodong missile.

    4. Libya

North Korea has sold missile technology to Libya in the past and according to some reports has helped Libya develop its own missile-manufacturing capability, though this is not confirmed.[xxxvi]    In 1991, the two countries are said to have agreed that Libya would invest in developing the Nodong in exchange for receiving missiles, discussions confirmed by the CIA in 1994. An Italian news report claimed that Libya offered its own territory for testing the Nodong-1. Libya's possession of the Nodong would put European cities and U.S. bases in range for Muammar Qadhafi's notoriously adventurous regime.[xxxvii]

Especially significant are Israeli reports that after international reaction and a sabotage action against its own chemical weapons factory, Libya decided that it would be safer to buy the arms from North Korea.[xxxviii]

5. Iraq

An Iraqi military delegation visited North Korea seeking to produce Scuds and launchers in 1990, as part of Baghdad's build-up toward the invasion of Kuwait, but no deal was concluded. The critical issue is what might happen after sanctions against Iraq are partly or fully lifted. As Iraq accumulates oil money and seeks to rebuild its armed forces for future wars, it should find--like Iran and Syria--that North Korea is a good source for weapons of mass destruction.

6. The future

Reports of North Korea's developing even more advanced missiles‑-the Taepodong-1 (range: 2000 km.) and -2 (range: 3,500+ km)--threatens an even wider area of the Middle East and Asia. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutsch warned in October 1995, shortly after discussing the issue with Israel, that the Taepodong-2 would allow North Korea to hit Alaska and Hawaii, and its Middle Eastern allies to strike at much of Europe using conventional, chemical, biological or even nuclear warheads. But North Korea had not yet overcome a number of problems, especially concerning accurate guidance systems, for these weapons.[xxxix]

The development of these weapons would require many years--the CIA has estimated 10 to 15 years in a declassified 1995 report--and may prove beyond North Korea's capacities altogether.[xl] But even if North Korea is never able--or chooses not to--build these weapons itself, it can help radical Middle East states obtain them, with an option to receive them from these states.

B. Nuclear Weapons

It is extremely difficult to uncover information about North Korean nuclear cooperation with Middle Eastern states. But this does not mean that these links do not exist. Libya and Iraq avidly sought nuclear weapons since the early 1980s, while Iran has been energetically seeking to develop nuclear weapons since 1988. It is hard to believe that these states, faced with so many barriers in seeking the needed technology, would neglect the North Korean route.[xli]

There are credible reports that in the late 1980s North Korea had contacts with Iran, Libya, and Syria discussing ways to develop nuclear arms. It may have trained some of their technicians and sold data on weapons designs and enrichment and reprocessing technologies. The most active contact has been with Iran, where North Korea also sold uranium mining equipment. To some extent, North Korea may have helped its own nuclear arms program by obtaining information from Western-educated Iranian scientists.[xlii]

Ironically, Russian officials have defended their own sales of nuclear technology to Iran by saying that the controls are superior to those of the 1994 U.S.-North Korea arrangement. Moscow points out that Iran's used-up fuel is supposed to be returned to Russia (preventing its employment in weapons) and that Iran has agreed to quarterly international inspections, while North Korea has refused any such oversight.

To make matters worse, the United States accepted North Korea possessing precisely the same type of reactor it was trying to block Iran from obtaining. But if North Korea has this technology, Iran is the most likely state to share in the reward.

In a 26 June 1997 report, the U.S. Defense Department estimated that Iran would possess nuclear arms by the year 2000. As in the case of other issues, if the West fails to pressure Russia and China to stop helping Iran than this time table would be speeded up. But if Western efforts succeed in discouraging Moscow and Beijing, this only makes North Korean cooperation more attractive and necessary for Tehran.[xliii]

C. Chemical and Biological

"We know," said Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai in May 1997, "the Syrians have several hundred Scud missiles which can reach everywhere in Israel. These missiles can carry nerve gas which can be launched against the population centers in Israel."[xliv] This ability was gained in large part thanks to North Korea.

North Korea has one of the world's largest chemical warfare forces. Again, there is a lack of reliable intelligence. North Korea reportedly cooperated with Syria, Iran, and Libya to develop chemical warheads for missiles.[xlv] North Korea probably helped Iran develop its own chemical weapons and perhaps with Syria to build biological weapons.[xlvi] Cooperation on these weapons--which are far simpler to develop than nuclear or missile technology--may focus more on delivery systems.

III. TERRORISM AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Up until the late 1980s, North Korea trained Palestinian terrorists, both those belonging to the PLO and from Syrian and Libyan-backed groups. At various times, North Korean pilots were deployed in Egypt, Syria, and Libya, flying missions in support of those countries. North Korea became a covert combatant in Tehran's war effort when its ships gathered intelligence for Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf launching attacks on oil tankers in 1987. In 1988 and more recently, there have been reports of 300 North Korean advisors training terrorists inside Iran.[xlvii]

In Lebanon during the 1970s and in Libya and Syria from the 1980s down to the present, North Korean soldiers have also trained terrorists for many groups including the Basque Spanish ETA, Palestinian Abu Nidal organization, Irish Republican Army, Italian Red Brigades, Japanese Red Army, Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines, Turkish radicals, and others. While many of these links have lapsed, in the 1990s, North Korea added Hezbollah and the anti-Turkish Kurdish PKK group to its roster of clients.[xlviii] 

North Korea has also sold 2 mini-submarines to Iran with improved navigation and battery equipment extending their range, night and foul weather capability, and payload size. By using plastic components, North Korea has made the ships less detectable by sonar. Iran, perhaps with North Korean and probably with Chinese help, is now building its own submarines. Such vessels could be effective in attacking U.S. or other warships or tankers in the Gulf. The same considerations apply to North Korean naval mines sold to Iran and assistance in maintaining and operating two Russian-built submarines purchased by Iran.[xlix]

North Korean training of Iran's pilots and help in maintaining its aircraft also help keep Iran's air force functioning.

The relationship with Libya has also involved a great deal of North Korean help for terrorists. Starting in the late 1970s, North Korea sold Libya a variety of conventional military equipment, from mortars to uniforms, and trained pilots. The Libyan connection gave North Korea its first access to the Soviet-built MIG-23. Since the two countries' alliance treaty of 1982, up to 400 North Koreans have been stationed in Libya.

Finally, according to intelligence sources, North Korea has also been involved in such lucrative criminal activities as drug‑running and counterfeiting.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Significantly, the U.S. armed forces global plan is to be prepared to fight simultaneous wars in the Middle East and on the Korean peninsula. These two potential conflicts--deemed the most likely crises to force direct U.S. intervention--would be brought about by bizarrely disparate allies who have in common anti-American, anti-democratic doctrines and shared weapons systems.

The growing arsenals of such arms in the Middle East are especially dangerous at present:

First, this poses the principal threat to the current relatively favorable, peace-oriented Middle East balance of forces. It could return the area to an era of crisis, war, and instability. Second, the next step in escalation, involving the presence of longer-range missiles and nuclear weapons--both originating in large part from North Korea--might spin the region to the edge of war either through the radicals' aggression or the moderates' efforts at deterrence.

Third, Syria's possession of a large missile stockpile could embolden it to attack Israel.

Fourth, one or more radical states are within a few years of having nuclear weapons which could be used to intimidate or destroy neighbors far beyond any assets they have ever previously held. 

Fifth, extremist states could use weapons of mass destruction to neutralize American power, the main pillar supporting regional peace and the moderate states' survival. As Payne pointed out, this could mean, "The United States and its allies will be subject to deterrence and coercion by otherwise third‑rate powers armed" with such weapons. This might make it too risky for the United States "to project force into regional theaters."[l]

Finally, as sanctions against Iraq gradually weaken and at some point end, North Korea would probably find a new, extremely aggressive customer for its weapons. In future, North Korea could play a major role in creating--or, rather, rebuilding--the single biggest threat to regional peace. If anything deterred such an outcome it would not be Western objections but Iranian opposition.

U.S. Anti-Proliferation Efforts

In light of such behavior and the resulting serious threats, international pressures against North Korea have been shockingly weak. While the United States has had sanctions against North Korea since that country's establishment and has kept it on the list of countries sponsoring international terrorism, Pyongyang's leading role in proliferation has not figured directly in these efforts. North Korea is, after all, the most serious violator of U.S.-sponsored sanctions against Iran, Iraq, and Libya. On the contrary, it could be argued that the 1994 U.S.-North Korea nuclear deal and easing pressures regarding humanitarian help may have further eroded this leverage.

Public statements of U.S. policy have been firm but carefully avoided making serious threats. Typical in this respect was the formulation used by State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated in 1992: "We have stated both publicly and privately our concerns about...possible North Korean missile transfers [to the Middle East]....And we have said that we would view with great concern any transfer of this type....So those views are well-known to the North Korean government I'm sure." These are good intentions but not phrases likely to make North Korean leaders tremble.[li]

Five years later, in February 1997, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Toby Gati told a congressional committee, perhaps over-optimistically, that the United States had succeeded in freezing the North Korean nuclear weapons program, "an achievement that demonstrates what can be done to stop proliferation through sustained and multifaceted diplomatic intervention."[lii]

Gati added that the United States also gave "a strong reminder to North Korea that addressing our concerns on missile proliferation is required for bilateral relations to improve."[liii]

Europe, Japan, and North Korean Proliferation

Other democratic industrial states have done far less. German and Japanese trade and loans have helped keep North Korea's dictatorship in power, without ever being conditioned on its ceasing Middle East arms sales. There is no known occasion when any of these countries acted to put pressure on North Korea to cease its proliferation policy.

Israel's Strategy

Israel's policy regarding the North Korean arms supply activity in the Middle East has gone through three phases.

The first was the threat of force. In October 1991, Israel reportedly threatened to attack a North Korean ship carrying missiles to Syria. The ship turned around. But North Korea--with Soviet and Chinese help--simply shifted to other routes which could not be so easily blocked.

Frustrated by this failure and increasingly worried about escalating supplies of missiles, Israel tried a diplomatic route. In 1992 and 1993, Israel had covert contacts with North Korea. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres thought the chances for success were very small but that the danger from Iran was so great as to require an effort. Israel offered tentatively to invest in North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang not selling the Nodong to Iran. But the North Koreans demanded $500 million immediately while Israel offered an initial investment of $25 million. Israel also recognized that it could not effectively monitor whether North Korea was honoring any commitment to end sales. In addition, the United States objected. The offer was quickly dropped.[liv]

The third phase, which has continued to the present, is to depend on the United States to take effective action. Israel has asked the United States several times to press North Korea to cease missile sales in the Middle East. But U.S. efforts have also been almost totally unsuccessful.[lv]

A possible fourth phase is now on the horizon. A great deal of Israel's strategic thinking and spending priorities has focused on obtaining satellites to gather intelligence on the radicals' weapons of mass destruction, warplanes capable of destroying them on the ground, and defensive missiles able to shoot down attacking missiles. As was seen in Israel's destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1991 (and perhaps in the mysterious fire which damaged Libya's chemical weapons' factory), military options are available as a last resort in preventing the deployment of certain threatening weapons' systems.

CONCLUSIONS

What is most clear today is the lack of any coherent Western strategy to deal with the threat posed by North Korea and its Middle East allies. The starting point here must not be a defense of anti-proliferation efforts as well-intended but the recognition that they have been totally ineffective.

Today, Iran, Syria and Egypt all produce missiles in large part due to the North Koreans. Equally, Iran and Syria can use them to fire chemical and biological weapons because of North Korean assistance. North Korea is also able to mount a much more devastating aggression against South Korea (and against U.S. troops in that country) because of the money and help it has received from radical Middle Eastern dictatorships.

As a new era starts, involving longer-range missiles and nuclear arms in the Middle East, the inadequate methods of the past no longer suffice. With the Pyongyang regime totters on the edge of collapse--or a decision to attack South Korea in a desperate attempt to avert it--intelligence-sharing and deterring proliferation should be an important priority to avert a much bigger crisis ahead.

In the words of Dr. Shai Feldman of Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, "The only way to prevent the missile deliveries from North Korea to Syria and Iran is by intelligence sharing and cooperation between Israel, the United States, Japan, and Korea."[lvi]

NOTES

Professor Barry Rubin is Senior Resident Scholar at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies and Editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs. He is author of 12 books and 15 monographs as well as editor of 11 books on international affairs. These include works on the Persian Gulf, the PLO, the Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. foreign policy, Third World dictators, and terrorism.

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