Israel's elections are often considered to be more affected by external factors than those of any other democratic state. Such potential influences were especially apparent in the 1996 voting. The New York Times remarked--with some hyperbole--that it was the most internationally scrutinized election in modern history and claimed that there was widespread intervention by many parties: "President Clinton has virtually campaigned for Prime Minister Shimon Peres, and Israel's peace partner in the Arab world--Yasir Arafat, of the Palestine Liberation Organization, King Hussein of Jordan, and President Mubarak of Egypt--have made no secret of their preference for him."(1)

Several clarifications, however, should be immediately added to the above statement. First, these elements' existence-- with the main important exception of terrorism, discussed below- -did not have much, if any, affect on the voting. Voters are usually indifferent to such endorsements or even react against them out of patriotic motives or if the source is considered to be unfriendly or to have conflicting interest to oneþs own country. These reactions are reinforced by opposition candidates.

There is no constituency in Israel responsive to such endorsements, with the possible exception of Israeli Arabs. Even in this case, however, this group already holds parallel views to foreign Arabs--ie, favoring the Arab-Israeli peace process and creation of a Palestinian state. Similarly, Jewish Israelis either may already agree or disagree for their own reasons with the views expressed by foreign leaders or media but are not going to be swayed by them.

Ironically, it is far easier for Israeli factors to have at least some impact on an American election than vice-versa. This is due to the fact that in the United States there exists a constituency which is attuned to Israel's views and problems. And since members of Congress are elected individually--rather than by party list, as in Israel--the high proportion of Americans friendly to Israel (including non-Jews) may take into consideration a candidate's record on the issue. These considerations do not apply in Israeli elections. 

Second, outside forces whose behavior can affect Israel's election indirectly--the United States, the Palestinians, Arab countries, Iran, revolutionary Islamic terrorist groups--were merely pursuing their own interests and carrying out existing policies during 1996, rather than purposefully trying to influence Israel's election. In short, they did not act differently from what they would have done if there had been no Israeli election at the time.

To draw examples from different areas, the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 or of Afghanistan in 1979 could be said to hurt the incumbent Democratic governments in America and help the Republicans in upcoming elections. Similarly, China's rapprochement and the USSR's detente with the United States during President Richard Nixon's administration might be assessed as a deliberate effort to aid conservative Republicans to remain in the White House. Hundreds of other such cases can be elucidated. But internal U.S. electoral considerations had nothing to do with the aims being pursued by foreign regimes.

THE U.S. FACTOR

The 1992 Israeli elections offers an important example and a necessary case in point for analyzing the 1996 elections.(2) During the months before the 1992 voting, the United States conditioned the provision of $10 billion in loan guarantees over five years on Israel slowing or ceasing the construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.

It could be argued that this policy was both intended to help and did help the Labor party opposition. In fact, this is precisely the interpretation made by many Likud party leaders, most notably then-Defense Minister Moshe Arens in his book on the era, whose pointed title was Broken Covenant: How U.S. Foreign Policy Compromised Israel's National Security. Arens wrote:

"[President George Bush's] administration's repeated attempts to interfere in Israel's internal politics had been without precedent in the history of the relations between the United States and Israel, and probably without precedent in the relationship between any two democratically elected governments. The traditional diplomatic dialogue between the President and the prime minister of Israel...was often replaced or supplemented by backstage consultations and maneuvering between the White House and State Department and the leaders of Israel's Labor party.

"...in the months after the Likud defeat [in the 1992 elections] Bush gave [newly elected Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin everything he had withheld from [Prime Minister Yitzhak] Shamir, including the loan guarantees...."(3)

Inasmuch as it concerns the 1992 elections, Arens' thesis rests on two ideas:

--That American policies were designed to bring about the Shamir government's defeat and its replacement by the Rabin government.

--And that these U.S. actions did have some impact favoring Rabin in the 1992 elections.

A brief examination of these two points helps illuminate external influences on the balloting four years later. Clearly, the Bush administration did not have good relations with the Shamir government from the moment that U.S. president took office in 1989. Some of this tension was a result of personal frictions but it mainly was based on differing interests and policies. Tensions between the White House and Likud prime ministers went back at least as far as differences over the 1982 Lebanon war.

Since the 1970s, the U.S. government long favored a land- for-peace deal as the centerpiece of its efforts to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. It viewed the expansion of settlements as a barrier to diplomatic progress. During the 1988-1990 era, the United States was trying to encourage a new round of negotiations. After Shamir rejected the American plan, Israel's national unity government collapsed and a new center-right cabinet was formed in early 1991. This new government made rapidly increasing the size and extent of Jewish settlements on the West Bank one of its highest priorities.

There is, therefore, nothing surprising about the conditioning of loan guarantees on a slowdown of settlement activity. The U.S. government did not want to pay for a project totally opposed to its own views and strategy. Other problems in bilateral relations in 1992 also grew out of tactical differences over arranging negotiations. Thus, while there can be no question but that Bush and his advisors preferred a Labor party victory in Israel's elections, there is not the slightest evidence that they did anything to further this goal, or deviated in the slightest from what they would have done had their been no election. Indeed, given the conflicts between U.S. and Israeli policy, American pressure was far less than might have been expected.

Further, there was no speck of proof that Bush's hostility so affected Israeli voters as to hurt Shamir or help Rabin at the polls. Given a general Israeli perception that Bush was hostile to their country, any such U.S. effort might have easily backfired. The Likud tried to use nationalism to gain voters' support against any perceived American interference. As then- Prime Minister Menahem Begin said during another era of U.S.- Israel friction, over Lebanon, Israel was not a "banana republic" to be manipulated or bullied by the United States.

Roughly parallel situations existed for the 1996 Israeli election. This time, however, the relative situations of Israel's government and opposition were reversed. Now, the incumbent, Prime Minister Shimon Peres, enjoyed excellent relations with the United States while cooperating with it in a peace process while his opponents, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, were highly critical of the government's policy.

Thus, it was obvious to everyone that the Clinton administration preferred the Labor party-led government's reelection. As a Washington Post article put it, "The Clinton administration...has unabashedly aligned with Peres."(4) But what did this actually mean in practice? Great powers do not distance themselves from allied leaders merely because their country is having an election. The important question is whether the U.S. government did anything differently in order to seek Peres' victory. Were significant special benefits given to Israel's incumbent government to sway voters? Did the United States alter its policies or positions to make a Peres victory easier? The answer on both points is clearly: No.

The U.S. government was merely continuing to follow its own consistent policy agenda. For instance, it never argued for slowing down the peace process in order to help Peres show he was moving more cautiously. Nor did it ease up on encouraging Israel toward the very domestically unpopular idea of giving up the Golan Heights as part of a negotiated settlement with Syria. This course was pursued even though the Peres government was showing signs of increasing skepticism about the Syrian track. On the contrary, the Clinton Administration pressed hard for advancing talks with Syria in early 1996. During Secretary of State Warren Christopher's Middle East visit, on January 10, he said that it was vital that negotiations move forward at an "intensified pace."(5)

This strategy was maintained for strategic, personal, and American domestic political reasons. The U.S. government argued that an Israel-Syria peace was a necessary precondition to a wider regional solution. To improve its own image at home and to achieve a foreign policy success before its own November 1996 elections, the Clinton administration wanted a breakthrough with Syria and even rashly predicted that it would happen during 1996. Despite Israeli urgings,  Washington had been reluctant to pressure Syria either on the talks or on clamping down against anti-Israel terror in southern Lebanon. U.S. policy did not shift to help Peres in the months before the election.

Similarly, the Clinton administration did not change its position on Israel-Palestinian negotiations, consistent since the 1993 signing of the Oslo accords, or offer any additional benefits to Israel in the context of the ongoing peace process. American policy was totally consistent in urging that progress be made and commitments be fulfilled, while calling on Arafat to act more firmly against Palestinian terrorism. A year before the Israeli elections, for example, in May 1995, Clinton had stated that U.S.-Israel "strategic cooperation is now deeper than ever," citing the holding of the largest-ever joint military exercise with Israel and US Defense Department contracts to buy more than $3 billion of military products from Israeli companies.(6)

A strong U.S. reaction against the bloody February-March 1996 terrorist attacks on Israel were totally consistent with existing policy and probably would have occurred no matter who was in power there. Following this series of bus-bombings, which seemed to jeopardize the Israel-Palestinian peace process, Clinton called an anti-terrorist meeting of world leaders at Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, which expressed support for the peace process and promised international cooperation against terrorism. This effort was in line with long-term U.S. attempts to mobilize European allies against Iran, Libya, and other sponsors of terrorism.

After attending this gathering, Clinton flew to Israel for a brief visit on March 14, addressed the Knesset, and met with both Peres and Netanyahu. As a result of this crisis, the U.S. government provided additional bomb-detection equipment and other counterterrorist assistance to Israel, valued at $100 million, some of which had been in negotiation for over a year. (7)

To suggest that the international counterterrorist conference and Clinton's visit to Israel were designed to assist Peres in a partisan manner does not seem to have any basis. The U.S. counter-terrorist efforts and general attempts to promote the peace process were long-term American policies. Clinton also met Netanyahu during his visit. It seems likely that the U.S. actions would have been precisely the same if there had been no Israeli election scheduled.

This analysis is equally true for U.S. policy toward Israel during the next bit regional event, its Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon. In fact, this was a somewhat bipartisan policy within Israel, since the Likud supported a tough stance against Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel. "We want the katyushas to stop," said a U.S. official, "for a long period, not a week or 10 days." Clinton stated, "Clearly the truce was violated by Hezbollah." (8)

But the administration still refused to put more pressure on Syria to deter that threat, a step that might have helped Peres' popularity at home. Even Christopher's humiliation during his April shuttle, when Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad snubbed him during a visit to Damascus, did not provoke this kind of harder position.

Similarly, Peres's April visit to Washington was a routine trip, given the important bilateral issues between the countries, the recent Lebanon crisis, and the escalating U.S. campaign against terrorism. The talks were focused on these issues with no spectacular departures in order to reward Peres or raise his standing at home. (9)

The main claim of actual U.S. interference in Israel's election is made in reference to a remark by Clinton shortly before the balloting, during a general answer to a question on the subject. He remarked that the election was a referendum on whether or not to continue with the peace process but added that no matter what the election's result, the United States would continue to stand alongside Israel:

"We believe that, ultimately, it's the only way to bring peace and security. And we want both peace and security. I think that's what they all want. I think that's why the race is so close....If they decide to stay on the path of peace, we will share the risk....Whatever decision they make, we, obviously-- all countries--will accept and respect. But if they decide to stay with peace, we will do what we can to make sure they can have security as well." (10)

Clinton's statement mainly noted the obvious--that Israel's election largely hinged on attitudes toward the current peace process--and repeated the same phrases used by high U.S. officials repeatedly during the three previous years. It could be interpreted as saying that a victory for the Likud, which opposed the existing process, would damage the prospects for peace and lead to a diminution of U.S. support. But the text shows that this was not Clinton's intention.

After all, Clinton said that whatever decision Israeli voters made, the United States would accept and respect it. He noted that the United States would continue helping Israel seek peace, stating that he believed both candidates sought this goal. The "race is so close," he implied, because the differences between them were not so wide. If the winner chose "to stay on the path of peace"--which Netanyahu said he would do, albeit in his own way--the United States would assist the effort.

The key phrase that might provoke controversy was, "If they decide to stay on the path of peace, we will share the risk." Of course, if Israel did not make compromises--by, for example, giving up territory--then there was no such ventured potential risk for the United States to share as a guarantor of the process.

This was a common U.S. formulation for many years. For example, Vice-President Al Gore had said on a March 1995 visit to Israel, "We understand that peace is not an unmixed achievement for Israel, that every step you take in its direction not only involves risk, but too often precious and innocent blood." (11) Clinton had remarked in May 1995 that if the United States failed to aid "allies who take risks for peace...we will never convince anybody else that we stand behind our commitments." Using almost exactly the same words as in the 1996 statement, he added that Israeli risks for peace would be "minimized" by U.S. help to Israel allowing it to "defend itself by itself." (12)

Clinton was attempting in May 1996 to give a noncommittal answer. His statement's wording may have made it open to a partisan interpretation, implying that one candidate would continue to seek peace and the other would not do so. But the context makes it clear that this was not his intention. And the reaction has more to do with observer's expectations and the intensive scrutiny being given any syllable rather than any U.S. attempt to intervene in Israel's election.

White House spokesperson Mike McCurry repeatedly clarified these points in a May 28 press briefing. Asked whether Clinton, "by implication, is...saying one candidate is for peace and the other is not?"

He replied, "No, I think he made it very clear that's a decision that has to be made by the people of Israel and those issues have been debated in the context of their election....The President reiterated [an often-expressed U.S. theme], that as Israel takes further risks for peace towards the goal of a just and comprehensive lasting peace in the region, the United States will stand with Israel as it takes those further risks....I'm not going to endorse any candidate and neither did the President." As an example of the need for U.S. assistance in response to Israeli risks, he added that if Israel moved toward an agreement with Syria, "there will be substantial security risks that Israel would need to look at carefully, and we are prepared to be there."(13)

While there can be no doubt that the Clinton administration preferred a Peres victory, this stance remained implicit. There was no significant interference in Israel's election. Nor is there any reason to believe that any Israeli voters were swayed by this U.S. preference. Ironically, however, the issue found its way into the American election. The Republican party's platform stated, "We strongly oppose the Clinton Administration's attempts to  interfere in Israel's democratic process." (14)

Both the public neutrality and private partiality of this American attitude were clear immediately after Netanyahu's victory. On an official and public level, Clinton noted, "We ought to give the new prime minister a chance to put his government together and develop a policy," while promising to continue support for Israel. At the same time, a U.S. official privately professed himself "absolutely devastated" by the outcome and predicted, "The consequences will be catastrophic." (15)

In short, the United States carried out business as usual during the period leading up to the Israeli elections. Aside from the arguable wording of a single Clinton statement, there was no hint of explicit partisanship or interference. If Washington was following a strategy largely parallel to that of Peres, this was simply a result of a long-standing American policy and perception of its own interests unrelated to the imminence of an Israeli election.

On the Israeli side, Peres' camp could claim that he had built U.S.-Israel relations to an unprecedented closeness and that his reelection would guarantee the continuation of such tight links. Netanyahu's partisans could counter that their man knew America very well and would maintain good ties or-- conversely--that U.S. efforts to push Israel into actions that were against its own interests should be resisted.

ARAB STATES AND THE "FRUITS OF PEACE"

By moving toward normalization with Israel, Arab states were in effect helping to make Peres and his policy look better. Improving relations seemed to demonstrate that there was a new Middle East. Continuing the peace process along the lines favored by Peres would, then, seem to be working, reducing the risk of war and giving Israel new foreign investment and trade opportunities. Several Arab states opened offices in Israel; Israeli and Arab officials met increasingly within a number of frameworks and over a range of issues. (16)

As in the case of the United States, it was widely assumed that most Arab rulers favored Peres's reelection and additionally conjectured that they would act to help him. But in practice, moderate Arab states did not make gestures toward Israel along these lines during the campaign.

For example, after conducting interviews in several Arab capitals, a Washington Post article stated, "Moderate Arab leaders are quietly pulling for...Peres, albeit with little enthusiasm." because they feared that Likud's victory "could delay or even derail Middle East peace talks" by its opposition to a Palestinian state and support for expanding Jewish settlements. More indifference toward who won, or at least less enthusiasm for Peres, was deepened, however, by anger over Israel's April bombardment of Lebanon and post-March closure of Gaza and the West Bank. Still, a senior Saudi official said "a Likud government...will definitely not just delay the peace process, it will unravel it," perhaps leading "to the brink of war." "Arab leaders would prefer to see Peres as "the lesser of two evils," wrote Muhammad Sid-Ahmed, a moderate Egyptian intellectual writer. (17)

But to argue that, objectively, a Peres government was more likely to follow a policy closer to what moderate Arab governments preferred does not prove that, subjectively, they saw the situation in this way. Arab leaders, intellectuals, and journalists often contended that there was no real difference between the two candidates. (18)

Such an attitude arose from several factors including long hostility to Israel (believing, in essence, that all Zionists were alike), focusing on continuing conflicts of interest with Israel, distrusting Peres' intentions in fulfilling the agreements, lack of knowledge about Israeli politics, and the concept (especially strong in Egypt) that a Likud government would--as had happened with the Camp David accords--be better able to make a compromise agreement. Some also claimed that a harder-line leader might be better able to make concessions, in the tradition of French President Charles de Gaulle with Algeria, or Nixon's withdrawal from Vietnam or detente with China and the USSR.

Al Hayat, a London-based Arabic newspaper generally backed by Saudi Arabia, published a cartoon showing Peres and Netanyahu both with fists in the air as they deliver the same speech through a single megaphone. "Without a doubt there is a difference between Labor and Likud, but I don't think it's the difference people are talking about," said a senior Egyptian official. "I don't think Likud is anti-peace, and I don't think Labor is for peace at any price." (19)

The peace treaty with Jordan was a great gain for Israel and the most dramatic transformation outside of the Israel-PLO breakthrough. After almost a half-century of conflict, the border was opened, friendly exchanges began, and Israelis could travel freely to their eastern neighbor.

Jordan's situation was especially intimately tied to political developments regarding Israel and the peace process. The two countries had a number of common interests. Israel gave Amman a good counterweight against threats from Iraq, Iran, and Syria, while King Hussein's peacemaking dramatically improved U.S.-Jordan relations. Both countries opposed radical groups in the region or the spread of revolutionary Islamic fundamentalism. Moreover, they had a mutual goal of preventing a Palestinian factor aligned with radical regimes or dedicated to subverting the Palestinian populations in their own countries.

Jordan was the least enthusiastic of all Arab countries in supporting an independent Palestinian state. Yet at the same time, Amman had to worry about a breakdown in the peace process producing violence, radicalizing Palestinians (including those in Jordan itself) and leading to a large flight of refugees from the West Bank, and a harder-line swing in Arab politics that would isolate Jordan.

King Hussein had a long, close personal relationship with the incumbent prime minister. Jordan's decision to make a full peace treaty with Israel objectively helped Peres by demonstrating a success for his policy. The warm relations created and the ability of Israelis to travel to Jordan after a border closure of almost a half-century provided striking evidence of a change in the region and an improvement in Israel's situation.

Thus, Jordan's interests were mixed, making its interlocking security considerations with Israel and the Palestinians required it to safeguard its interests regardless of any successor regime in Israel. "We have a neutral position," Jordan's Minister of Information (and before that, its first ambassador to Israel) Marwan Moasher said during the Israeli election campaign. Jordan's treaty was with Israel, not with any specific government there. (20)

Similar positions were taken by other moderate Arab states whose move toward normalization with Israel provided the Peres government with "fruits of peace" which it could argue showed the success of its policy. Aside from Jordan, these states included Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, Mauritania, and Qatar. Some Muslim, non-Arab states--notably Indonesia--had also warmed in their ties with Israel. But these moves were related to the new regional situation and the peace process's breakthroughs. No special bonuses for Peres seemed timed to coincide with--and thus affect--the election campaign.

Similarly, Egypt and Saudi Arabia did nothing to make Peres's strategy look better in the context of Israeli elections. While Cairo had earlier been moving to some improvement in relations with Israel, despite three years of U.S. urging to be cooperative, the Saudis continued trying to slow Israel's normalization with other Arab states. While being a leading Arab promoter of the peace process, Cairo, too, remained relatively cool toward Israel, especially jealous of its successes in building relations with other Arab states. (21)

For the moderate Arab regimes, to help Peres would require special concessions on their part. For example, President Husni Mubarak might have made his long-promised visit to Israel, or the Saudis could have taken a major step toward recognition of Israel or normalization. Such an act, however, would have conflicted with their own domestic and inter-Arab interests. Consequently, they did nothing in that direction. 

Thus, Egypt, Jordan, other moderate Arab regimes, and some non-Arab countries (including Turkey) had made the foreign policy of Israel's Labor party government look successful by improving political and economic relations with Israel after the Oslo agreements. Peres and his supporters could argue that these "fruits of peace" showed that their strategy was worthwhile and bringing benefits to Israelis. To what extent this assertion affected Israeli voters is uncertain but it is clear that these Middle East and Third World countries made no concerted or conscious effort to affect the election.

Peres's argument was that continuing the peace process along the lines he had been following would produce a full peace with all the Arab states except the most extreme ones. The progress made since 1993 was said to confirm this fact and to be a benefit brought about by the incumbent government's policy.

The Israeli opposition's view was less clear. It fully supported the rapprochement with Jordan, but sometimes suggested that the advances had been exaggerated, while on other occasions attributing them to other factors that would continue to prevail even if Israel would take a tougher policy toward the Palestinians and Syria.

THE PALESTINIAN FACTOR

Objectively, the Palestinians had the most important effect of any external factor on Israeli voters' perceptions and decision making. Since the 1996 election was largely a referendum on attitudes toward the peace process, it was also a poll about the performance of Yasir Arafat and his Palestinian Authority (PA) as peace partner, neighbor, and ruler.

Among the questions Israelis pondered were: Has the situation of deep hostility over so many decades really changed? Are the Palestinians truly ready to make peace? Is Arafat willing and able to live up to his commitments? Could a Palestinian state be a stable and peaceable neighbor, or would Israel's security require continued retention of the West Bank and Gaza? And the foremost issue of all in the elections became the debate over whether a Palestinian regime could or wished to reduce anti-Israel terrorism.

The government side said Arafat was doing a reasonable--if imperfect--job in trying and succeeding at containing terrorism, while generally living up to his other commitments. The fact that Arafat's supporters had completely ceased involvement in anti-Israel terrorism was highlighted. Continuing the peace process would increase both his ability and willingness to do more, thus enhancing Israel's security.

The opposition challenged Arafat's credibility, calling him either unwilling to constrain Hamas and other groups involved in terrorism or even secretly helping them. PA violations of its commitments were highlighted--including its semi-clandestine operations in east Jerusalem and failure to extradite wanted terrorists. The Likud's most provocative commercial showed the two leaders walking hand in hand, interposed with pictures of the February-March terrorist attacks. Tying Peres to Arafat was certainly seen as a way to discredit the prime minister.

At least some leading figures in the Israeli government miscalculated about Arafat's priority on ensuring its reelection.(22) Certainly, Arafat could be expected to favor Peres's reelection. As with other external factors, however, his willingness to do something to further that outcome was a horse of a different color. In short, Israeli electoral considerations had little to do with Arafat's strategy or tactics even though one could argue that the outcome was of major importance to his- -and the Palestinians--future.      Above all, the PA leader was motivated by his more immediate--in this context one might say shorter-range--self- interest. An air of wishful thinking prevailed within the PA. (23) This meant that he was responsive to making concessions due to Israeli pressures and the opportunities offered by a compromise negotiated solution (i.e., the existing peace process's success). But he also had to balance these factors off by taking into account domestic pressures against making more concessions to Israel, as well as certain differences he had with Peres's offers and positions. 

Actions he undertook which did--or should have--helped Peres were undertaken in order to preserve or stimulate parallel Israeli cooperation, like the scheduled Israeli withdrawal from Hebron and an end to the closure of the territories. Most important of these were his post-March crackdown on Hamas and other groups committing terrorism, involving hundreds of arrests. This step was effective in greatly reducing the level of violence in the last two months of Israel's election campaign, but it was too late to reverse the credibility Arafat had already lost on this issue.

One area where Arafat and the PA might have been expected to help Peres directly was by influencing Israeli Arab voters to cast their votes for the prime minister. Exactly how much Arafat did behind the scenes in direct contacts with this group of Palestinians is not known. But Israeli Arab voters were going to overwhelmingly choose Peres over Netanyahu, no matter which party they backed for parliament. During the course of the campaign, the Israeli Arab parties told their supporters to vote for Peres.

They would have done so whether or not Arafat urged such a stance. Dr. Ahmad Tibi, an advisor to Arafat who had formed his own party to contest the race, withdrew when it became clear that he would only split the Arab parliamentary vote and had little chance of winning a seat. It was said that the PA might have pressed him to pull out as his poor showing would prove an embarrassment to them.

Arafat had less influence over the two largest Arab- supported parties: the Communists and the Democrat party, whose coalition included Islamic fundamentalists who did not like Arafat. Discontent with the government's performance, especially the Lebanese Arab casualties during the Grapes of Wrath operation, seemed likely to produce a higher rate of Arab abstentions.

While quiet contacts took place between the PA and Israeli Arab parties, these did not change what would have happened otherwise. At any rate, while Israeli Arabs gave Peres a huge amount of support, the degree to which they did not vote at all or cast blank ballots for prime minister may well have cost him the election. By discouraging east Jerusalem Arab residents from voting at all in the election (to reject Israel's claim of sovereignty over that part of the city), the PA also cost Peres thousands of votes. Consequently, if Arafat lobbied for Peres, he did not do so very effectively.

The PA's bigger problem was the difficulty in establishing credibility among Israelis for Palestinian groups that had been so long at war with that country, used terrorism against it, and openly called for its destruction. The dramatic events involved in the peace process's breakthrough between 1993 and 1996 had healed many wounds and produced real hope and enthusiasm within Israel. But deep suspicions remained. Continuing problems of terrorism, shortcomings in Arafat's performance and rhetoric, and real differences or fears about the future all exacerbated these problems.

In the end, some Israeli voters found Arafat's performance a reason to vote for continuing the existing peace process by voting for Peres; others took a critical view of Arafat's record and backed Netanyahu. Given that so many Israelis were already committed to a particular view of the situation, and that Netanyahu's margin of victory would be so small, it is hard to estimate precisely how this factor balanced out on May 28, 1996.

RADICAL ANTI-ISRAEL FORCES

There were many radical forces opposing the ongoing Arab- Israeli peace process and seeking to wreck it. Anti-Israel terrorist groups tried to attack the country, its citizens, and its interests by all possible means and at all possible times. Such states include Iran, Iraq, Libya and--to some extent--Syria and Sudan, as well as a range of revolutionary movements using terrorism, most notably the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas.

The existence of these facts were not themselves issues in the Israeli election. They were universally accepted within the country and there was also a basic consensus about what to do about this problem: try to isolate and weaken the main state sponsors of terrorism, and decisively defend Israel's security from such threats. The two sides in Israeli politics also had generally similar views on strategic policy and on the military aspects of handling the attacks from Lebanon.

But this factor did affect Israel's election in two particular respects: Through the anti-Israel terrorist campaign of Hamas and smaller extremist Palestinian groups; and from attacks on Israel's northern border by Hezbollah, with Syria'säJpermission and backing. There were alternative interpretations of these situations' meanings held by the main parties and voters.

--The Radical Palestinians' Terrorist Campaign

Those Palestinian groups opposed to the existing peace process--Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)--had launched many terrorist attacks since the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 and continuing during the months leading up to the election campaign. Some of these operations took place within Israel itself; others were directed against Israeli civilians, soldiers, or installations in the West Bank and Gaza.

Although a large portion of such plans were foiled--by prior arrests, the terrorists' mistakes, or the action of defensive forces on the scene, enough were successful to inflict several hundred casualties. The attacks were of many types, including individual knifings, drive-by shootings at automobiles or passers'-by, kidnappings, and--most significantly--suicide bombings directed against buses or pedestrians.

This phenomenon was a constant presence but reached its peak in a wave of five fatal attacks in Israeli cities during February-March 1996. The most important were three suicide- bombings, two on Jerusalem buses, and a third at a major Tel Aviv intersection. These events had a tremendous effect on the mood in Israel. In fact, they can be said to be a turning point- -perhaps the turning point--in determining the election's outcome.

The level of terrorism significantly declined between early March and the election, a development attributable to tougher Israeli security measures and a PA crackdown. Still, this issue- -and especially the February-March wave--became not only a campaign's central debate, the most important theme in the opposition's advertising, and perhaps in decision making by hitherto undecided voters.

The incumbent government, its allies, and supporters had two main arguments to explain these events. First, the high level of terrorism was labeled the desperate acts of those who knew that the peace process was defeating them. The January Palestinian elections, resulting in victories for Arafat and his supporters, coupled with splits in Hamas showed that events were moving in the right direction. Since the assaults were an effort to destroy this progress, for Israel to change course would be to give the terrorists a victory.

Second, the government insisted that the ongoing peace process would reduce terrorism by strengthening the PA and giving it the willingness and power to repress or constrain these forces, and the Palestinian population an incentive to reject them. In short, the terrorism upsurge was said to be a transient phenomenon that would be eliminated most quickly and completely by continuing the policy of negotiation and compromise. Arafat's crackdown on the terrorist groups following the February-March attacks was taken as proof of this assessment's correctness. 

During the election campaign, the opposition and its supporters portrayed the upsurge in terrorism as proof that the government's policy had failed. In contrast, it claimed that terrorism was increasing precisely because of the compromises implemented in the peace process. The PA was said to be ignoring or even, at worst, abetting Hamasþs activities. Thus, continuing the existing policy would further intensify the level of anti- Israel violence. There was no real peace, but only intensified violence, while Israelis were said to fear going about their daily activities.

There is little evidence as to the intentions of Palestinian terrorist groups directly vis-a-vis Israel's election. Certainly, they wished to wreck the peace process by undermining support for it within Israel, while "proving" to Palestinians that Israel had no intention of fulfilling its commitments and that they were more effective battlers for Palestinian rights than was Arafat.

Generally, they looked on the existing peace process as an Israeli trick and as a betrayal by Arafat of the traditional goal of destroying Israel. The PA's consolidation of power weakened the prospects for Islamic forces to seize hegemony among the Palestinians. At the same time, Hamas was constrained by fear of Arafat's repression, knowing also that by acting to split the Palestinian people it would become a pariah. Finally, trying to prevent Israeli withdrawals put Hamas in the ridiculous--and unpopular--position of seeking to preserve the occupation.

There is very little evidence that the Hamas attacks were connected with the election. According to Muhammad Abu Warda, a Hamas activist who recruited the suicide bombers, the goal of the February-March terrorist attacks was to bring down the Peres government. Israeli army intelligence officers made similar suggestions, and even Christopher suggested that Iran was dispatching terrorists for such a disruption. It is possible that the PA's police--who had arrested him--urged Abu Warda to say this. During his trial in August, however, Abu Warda's boss, Hasan Salama, said that the attacks had nothing to do with the elections.(24)

Perhaps intimidated by the PA's crackdown, stronger Israeli security measures, and a closure of the territories, the terrorist groups were far less effective during the latter part of the election campaign. Nonetheless, the impact of their attacks on Israeli voters--no matter what the radicals' intentions--was undoubtedly the most powerful external factor influencing the election.

--Fighting in Lebanon and Perceptions of Syria

Hezbollah and radical Palestinian groups had been carrying out attacks against Israel since the 1970s. Iran sponsored these attempted cross-border raids, while Syrian forces which occupied much of Lebanon, permitted and facilitated them. Israeli forces operated in a security zone in southern Lebanon, in conjunction with the Israel-backed South Lebanese Army. The level of attacks rose and fell, often increasing at times when Syria had an interest in showing its leverage. Since Lebanon was a virtual Syrian satellite, any Israeli effort to make peace with that country was subject to a Syrian veto.

In contrast, the Syria-Israel front in the Golan Heights had been quiet since 1974. Bilateral negotiations began after the 1990 Madrid conference but made little progress, often being broken off for months. Despite offers by Prime Ministers Rabin and Peres implying that the entire Golan Heights would be returned to Syria in exchange for a full peace, Damascus did not accept this offer and raised new demands.

Israel's government had argued that a peace with Syria was necessary to achieve a comprehensive agreement with almost all the Arab states. Yielding this territory--albeit with early warning stations and troop limits in the zone--was said to enable a true peace that would thus make war unlikely and thus reduce the military value of Golan for Israel. Finally, an agreement with Syria was the necessary precondition for peace with Lebanon and a new situation that would pacify southern Lebanon. Conversely, the failure to make progress on negotiations would make a war with Syria more likely.

Many Israelis opposed yielding the strategic Golan Heights to Syria. Indeed, a new party--the Third Way--was formed by those splitting from the Labor party largely over this issue. The opposition charged that giving up this high land would endanger Israel's security. In other words, it asserted that concessions to Syria would be too risky, making a future war with that country more, rather than less, probable. Moreover, it argued that continuing the talks should be conditioned on Syria ceasing to support Hezbollah and other attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon. 

How did Syria and Hezbollah relate to Israel's election? Hezbollah clearly subscribed to the "all Zionists are alike" school of thought. As one of its leaders, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, put its, "The only difference between Peres and Netanyahu is that Peres is a better liar." (25)

The question of Syria's intentions in the negotiations is both complex and unresolvable. Many observers assumed that Damascus wanted a deal over the Golan and, thus, would prefer Peres to be reelected since he was offering something much closer to Syrian demands. This was the view held by Israel's government and by the United States for most of the 1993-1996 period, though both of them were increasingly doubtful toward the end of this time. (26)

An alternative view, however, is that Syria had good reasons in terms of national and regime interests for avoiding a negotiated settlement. If Israel's regional situation was normalized, it could act more effectively against Syria's interests and ambitions while undermining Damascus's domination over Lebanon. In addition, Syria's leverage within the Arab world would be greatly reduced, the Palestinian card lost forever, and its arguments for obtaining Arab aid sharply limited. U.S. power would be increased as well, to Syria's detriment. According to this approach, Syria would be equally, or more, pleased to see Peres replaced by a government which did not present a "threat" of a political solution.

Whether or not Asad had any conscious preference, he made things harder for Peres. By refusing to be more conciliatory in negotiations, the Syrian leader undercut the Israeli government's theory that a diplomatic agreement was probable and that Damascus was flexible. By continuing to back anti-Israel terror, especially in southern Lebanon which produced Israeli casualties, Asad raised Israeli voters perceptions that external dangers and a need for defense were more salient than regional opportunities and chances for peace. By helping extremist Palestinians carry out terrorism within Israel and the territories, while inhibiting Arafat's flexibility toward compromise, Asad also damaged the process's success and hence, indirectly, Peres's standing at home.

As the election approached, Hezbollah--with Iranian help and Syrian compliance--escalated its attacks. During April, Hezbollah fired large numbers of katyusha rockets into northern Israel, leading to Israeli retaliation and the large-scale Grapes of Wrath operation in April-May. Although sometimes portrayed abroad as a vote-seeking effort by Peres, his refusal to react to a major assault on Israeli citizens would have guaranteed his defeat. Moreover, by angering some Israeli Arabs- -who may have been moved to abstain from voting at all--this campaign may have sealed his defeat.

Whatever their intentions--if they had any--toward Israel's election, Hezbollah, its sponsor, Iran, and also Syria viewed the incumbent Israeli government as an enemy and sought to injure it. Their actions damaged Peres' reelection effort.

SUMMARY

Unquestionably, the United States, to a slightly lesser extent Arafat, and to a somewhat lower degree moderate Arab states, preferred a Peres victory. These parties, however, did little to affect the election campaign. In each case, they easily could have done more to help Israel's existing government. In some of his actions, Arafat might have harmed Peres' standing.    Radical regimes and terrorist groups might have objectively favored an opposition victory as a way of weakening a peace process they opposed. Again, however, there is little evidence that a wish to affect Israel's election shaped their behavior.

Some Israeli voters were likely swayed in the government's direction because they accepted its claim that such a choice would ensure good U.S.-Israel relations, reward progress in normalizing Israel's links with moderate Arab states, and lead to a stable solution in negotiations with the Palestinians. Such voters would consider the government's combination of flexibility and toughness an effective tool in combating and defusing the terrorist threat from radical forces. A vote for the opposition would constitute a victory for the terrorists and lead to a greater threat of tension or even war in the future.

By the same token, others voted in a different manner, doubting that an opposition victory would damage U.S.-Israel relations (or considering this a necessary risk since U.S.- supported policies could hurt Israel's security). They thought the current government's policy to be disastrous, or at least felt that Israel could get more from the Arab states and the Palestinians while giving up less. They deemed Arafat's performance as unsatisfactory, not proving a real change in Palestinian intentions, failing to meet his commitments and as thus not meriting concomitant Israeli concessions. Giving up the Golan was considered more of a risk than as a way to attain peace; Lebanese and Palestinian terrorist attacks were viewed as more the result of the existing peace process than as a last- ditch, doomed effort to block it.

In short, the external factors were perceived through two alternative world views. Israeli voters were divided almost exactly evenly in holding these different concepts. While specific conclusions about the external factors were often after-the-fact rationales to justify an individual's already held convictions, Netanyahu's tiny margin of victory might be attributed to such issues, most notably the terror of extremist Palestinian groups, doubts about Arafat's credibility or performance, and concerns over Syrian behavior and intentions.

* This article originally appeared in Israel Affairs, Vol. 4 No. 1, Autumn 1997 and in Dan Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, Israel's 1996 Election (Frank Cass, 1998). 

1.  New York Times, May 28, 1996. 

2. Barry Rubin, "U.S.-Israel Relations and Israel's 1992 Elections," in Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, Elections in Israel (SUNY Press, Albany, NY, 1994). 

3. Moshe Arens, Broken Covenant: How U.S. Foreign Policy Compromised Israel's National Security (NY, 1995), p. 301. 

4. John Lancaster, Washington Post, May 27 1996. 

5. Reuters, January 10, 1996. Ironically, Christopher himself was becoming increasingly doubtful about Syria's willingness to make peace with Israel at the same time. But this resulted in no change in U.S. policy. See LAT May 3 and WP May 22. 

6. Clinton's speech to the AIPAC conference, May 7, 1995. Text in Near East Report, May 15, 1995, pp. 66-67. 

7. United Press International, March 6, 1996; New York Times, March 14 and 17, 1996. 

8. New York Times, April 16, 1996. 

9. Clinton's speech to AIPAC conference, op. cit.; April 30, 1996 joint statement, New York Times, April 29, 1996. 

10. Jerusalem Post, May 29, 1996. 

11. Mideast Mirror, March 24, 1995. 

12. Speech to AIPAC conference, op. cit., pp. 66-67. 

13. Text from White House Office of the Press Secretary, May 28, 1996 

14. Text of the Republican party's platform, August 1996. 

15. Jerusalem Report, June 27, 1996, p. 32. A New York Times editorial of June 2, 1996, said that Netanyahu's election meant that the Arab-lsraeli peace process which the Clinton administration worked so hard on "is effectively dead." 

16. On the government's conception, see Efraim Inbar, "Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 41-64. 

17. Lancaster, op. cit. 

18. This was repeatedly confirmed in the author's own off-the- record interviews. 

19. Lancaster, op. cit. 

20. Lancaster, op. cit. 

21. For a discussion of these issues, see the author's Assessing The New Middle East: Opportunities and Risks Bar-Ilan University BESA Center, Security and Policy Studies, 1995. On Egypt's attitude, see also the author's article in The European Wall Street Journal, June 21, 1996. 

22. Author's interviews with Israeli leaders, both before and after the election. 

23. Author's interviews with Palestinian leaders both before and after the elections. 

24. Muhammad Abu Warda, interview with Israel television, March 6, 1996; Ha'aretz, March 7, 1996. Salama interview with Israel television, August 11, 1996. 

25. Interview in the Financial Times, cited in Yediot Aharnot, August 14, 1996. 

26. Washington Post, May 22 1996.