Volume 5, No. 3 - September 2001
Volume 5, No. 3 - September 2001
By Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas
Editor's
Summary: The
Jordan-Israel peace treaty, signed in October 1994, was accompanied on both
sides by high hopes of warm relations between the peoples of the two countries.
A wide range of factors, however, led to a deterioration in any public support
for the peace agreement on the Jordanian side. These included: the limits of
economic benefits arising from the agreement; the slow, and uncertain pace of
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; Israel’s 1996 "Grapes of Wrath"
operation in Lebanon and attempted assassination of Hamas leader Khalid Mishal
in September 1997; the strength of traditional anti-Israel feeling especially
among Palestinians; and the vigorous "anti-normalization" movement,
led by the Islamic Action Front and the country’s professional associations.
For almost twenty years, from the 1970s until the Jordanian-Israeli peace
treaty of 1994, Israel and Jordan maintained quasi-normal, albeit secret,
relations. Jordan’s King Hussein reportedly met numerous times with Israeli
leaders, and even visited the country. Armed clashes along the lengthy border
were virtually non-existent. During the Gulf War, despite Jordan’s neutrality,
Israel even officially announced that Jordan’s eastern frontier (with Iraq)
constituted its security border. During all of this period, informed Israelis
had heard of the meetings between leaders and realized that secret
understandings existed, and thus considered that Israel had achieved peace with
Jordan in all but name.
When the Declaration of Principles with the PLO was signed in 1993, most
expected that a treaty of peace with Jordan would soon be forthcoming. When the
treaty was signed the next year, Israelis were almost uniformly pleased, and the
treaty represented one of the few breakthroughs with the Arab world in the 1990s
that received support from virtually the entire Israeli political spectrum.
Partly, this was because Israelis regarded the treaty as the public legitimation
of an existing status quo and the solution did not involve the kind of painful
concessions and risks present in negotiations with the Palestinians and Syrians.
With a Palestinian-Israeli peace process underway, Israelis saw no reason for
continuing enmity between the two countries.
It took a while for Israelis to realize that Jordanian perceptions were
significantly at variance with their own. Jordanians had known nothing about
secret meetings and understandings between their king and Israeli leaders. Less
than four years before, Jordanians had loudly cheered Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein in the Gulf War. Israel was still demonized in Jordan’s press and
certainly in its textbooks. As one academic rather plaintively remarked in 1996,
"We had no warning that this was going to happen. We cannot adjust as
quickly as His Majesty."(1)
What very quickly developed in Jordan was a three-tier relationship with
Israel. On the first tier, military, intelligence, and diplomatic connections
warmed quickly, now with the full awareness of the Jordanian population. By
1996, most Jordanians already referred to it as an "alliance."
The second tier was (and is) the Jordanian opposition, mainly from
Islamist and leftist circles, which steadfastly opposed any opening to Israel
under current conditions or, indeed, under virtually any circumstances other
than the dismantling of the Jewish state. Their views represented what had
formerly been the loose consensus, basically since before 1948, in common with
the entire Arab world. To true believers in the Palestinian cause, the
Hashemites had in any case always been suspect, since King Abdullah I’s
various flirtations with Zionists in the 1930s and 1940s, which eventually
resulted in his assassination in 1951. However, the actuality of relations with
Israel now swung them into opposition to state policy, and created the greatest
rift in the Jordanian domestic consensus. Those absolutely opposed to relations
were understood to be in a clear, if highly determined, minority in the kingdom
as a whole.
The third tier constitutes the general public opinion in Jordan. It is
possible that for a period of about two years, from the signing of the Wadi
Araba treaty until the year following the opening of the Western Wall tunnel in
September, 1996, that Jordanian popular attitudes were somewhat up in the air,
and perhaps susceptible to change. For example, during the spate of bus bombings
in Israel in the spring of 1996, considerable sympathy for Israelis was
expressed on a personal level. This sympathy began to end with Israel’s Grapes
of Wrath campaign. Later, after King Hussein’s brief honeymoon with Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu concluded with the violence sparked by the
opening of the Western Wall Tunnel in Jerusalem and ensuing incidents, Jordanian
public opinion turned against Israel, intensifying over the next few years.
Events since then, such as commercial fairs to which Israelis were
invited but boycotted, the Jordanian reaction to the king’s sharing the grief
of bereaved Israeli parents, the attempted assassination of Hamas leader Khalid
Mishal, and various other incidents all showed that the vast majority of
Jordanians would not share their king’s acceptance of Israel.
The buzzword for such contacts quickly became "normalization."
During the two- year period after the treaty, the concept was discussed fairly
openly in the press, and some Jordanians, though always a minority, actually
advocated, even publicly, closer ties with Israel. However, by late 1996, such
discussions disappeared from the press. Instead, "normalization"
("tatbi’ah (2) in Arabic) and "normalizer" became solely
words of opprobrium. The spearhead of the anti-normalization process was the
Jordanian professional associations, which had, three months before the signing
of the treaty, already threatened disciplinary action against members who dealt
with Israelis.(3) Not long after, the professional associations were the driving
force behind the formation of an "anti-normalization committee," which
was active in researching contacts with Israel with the aim of
"exposing" them.
Results of the Committee’s efforts include the fact that the names of
normalizers--entitled the "List of Shame"--are now available on the
internet, boycotts are publicly urged against all those who work with Israel or
Israelis in any context, while legislators are demanding renunciation of the
peace treaty with Israel. The fact that the regime is now publicly moving
against the "anti-normalization" forces, which it has usually
dismissed as marginal, is an indication of its concern and the impact the
anti-normalizers are achieving in Jordanian society.
This paper will examine the process by which Jordanian public opinion has
moved from a state of some openness vis-à-vis Israel to the hostility
towards normalization which is now apparent.(4)
JORDAN
ON THE EVE OF THE OSLO AGREEMENTS
The reality of Jordanian politics and public attitudes is partly, though
by no means wholly, defined by the fact that over half of the population is
identified as "Palestinian" or is of Palestinian origin(5) (all
Palestinians living in Jordan have been eligible to receive Jordanian
citizenship, in marked contrast to other Arab countries hosting Palestinian
refugees). Thus, a very large number of Jordanian citizens have extended family
in the West Bank and in Israel. That, plus the geographic proximity (most
Jordanians can, and many do, receive Israeli TV broadcasts), make Jordanians
acutely aware of their powerful neighbor. In general, three out of the top five
items on Jordanian TV news appear to involve Israel and/or the Palestinian
territories. Moreover, the influx of an estimated half million Palestinian
Jordanians from the Gulf in the early 1990s--fleeing from the Kuwait war or
expelled in retaliation to PLO support for Iraq, helped increase the sense of
resentment and rootlessness, for which Israel is ultimately blamed.
The general perception in Jordan, both among Jordanians of both
Palestinian origin and East Bank origin is that the large majority of Jordanians
of Palestinian origin would probably prefer to stay in Jordan, even if the
opportunity were offered to freely cross the river. Research on this sensitive
point is discouraged by the government out of fear that more attention given to
it would exacerbate Palestinian-Jordanian tensions in this country. However,
there is a very strong empathy with the plight of the Palestinians and a feeling
that Jordan, with a larger Palestinian population than any other country, has a
duty to remain faithful to the cause. While if a comprehensive peace treaty were
signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority it is probable that most
Jordanians would accept it, a significant number of Palestinian Jordanians would
likely consider such a treaty only another betrayal.
The interplay between the strong feelings of support for Palestinians and
Jordanian domestic politics must also be considered. From 1957 until 1992,
political parties in the kingdom were officially banned, reflecting the
instability that marked Jordan’s political life from the 1950s until the
1970s. The only non-tribal and non-governmental political organizations allowed
during this period were the professional associations, which functioned as
guilds in the sense that membership was compulsory in most professions; and the
Muslim Brotherhood, which was officially regarded as a social, religious and
cultural organization. Neither was anti-Hashemite, and relations with the
government were generally good. However, both the associations and the
Brotherhood to some degree served as nodes of opposition, the former more from a
leftist and pan-Arab point of view, the latter serving as the main exponent of
Islamism in the kingdom. After parties were officially legalized in 1992, the
political nature of both the Associations and the Brotherhood increased. The
Brotherhood formed the largest single political party in the country, under the
name "Islamic Action Front" (IAF), while the professional associations
developed into an amalgam of Islamist and leftist sentiment (the former on the
increase, and the latter on the decline), united most strongly by a vehement
anti-Israel attitude and a desire to see more of the power in the country
wielded by the professional classes, instead of by the monarchy.
Following the Gulf War, the Madrid Conference brought together Israel and
PLO delegates for the first time, though the latter were officially part of the
Jordanian delegation, at Israel’s insistence. In June 1992, the Labor Party
was voted into power in Israel for the first time in fifteen years and Yitzhak
Rabin became prime minister. Despite the change, the Madrid framework continued
with regular meetings in Washington, D.C., but little progress was apparent.
However, in August 1993, leaks of secret meetings between the PLO and the
Israeli government emerged. By that time the Jordanian delegation to the
Washington talks had reached a general level of understanding with their Israeli
counterparts. This understanding could have very easily taken on the form of a
framework for talks leading to a peace treaty well before 1993, but the
Jordanian--Israeli track of the peace process had been waiting for progress on
the other tracks. The Jordanians had been unwilling to move too far ahead of
Syria or the Palestinians. Meanwhile, in response to their own stalled talks
with the Israelis in Washington, the PLO had turned to secret negotiations in
Oslo to break the deadlock.
The official Jordanian reaction to the surprise announcement of the Oslo
accords was shaped by two main reservations. First, Jordanian officials felt
"duped" by the PLO’s secret negotiations. While the PLO was
negotiating secretly in Oslo, it had also been working with Jordan on
coordinating committees for the Washington talks. Jordan had felt that it was
the natural partner to link the Israelis and the PLO during in peace
negotiations. However, no mention of the direct contacts between the PLO and the
Israeli government under the aegis of Norway had been revealed to the
Jordanians.(6) Second, the Jordanians held reservations about the nature of the
"interim" agreement. Jordanian leaders feared that Jericho might
become a dumping ground for Palestinians who would then be eventually evicted to
Jordan.(7) King Hussein also wanted more information on what direction such the
interim agreement was intended to head.(8) However, once the King was briefed by
Yasir Arafat on September 3, 1993, he gave his full support to the PLO and the
Oslo agreement.
Jordan was not in fact displeased that the Oslo agreement broke the
log-jam in the Washington talks.(9) Since the PLO, not just the Palestinian
delegation, had agreed in principle to peace with Israel, Jordan could now move
forward with its own agenda. The day after the signing of the Oslo accords in
Washington, Jordanian and Israeli officials signed an agreement on an agenda for
peace talks.(10) Where this agenda would lead, however, was not yet clear. For
example, on November 6, the Jordanian government announced it would only sign a
treaty with Israel along with Syria and Lebanon,(11) a position that seemed to
postpone progress indefinitely.
Like the regime, the Jordanian opposition was caught very much by
surprise by the Oslo accords. Most non-PLO groups in Jordan immediately
criticized the agreement. The IAF "categorically rejected" the accord,
labeling it a sell-out to Israel.(12) Other opposition figures joined the
Islamists in criticizing the PLO’s concessions in the agreement. Arab
Nationalist writers, such as Muna Shuqir and Salah al-Qallab, questioned the
postponement of an agreement on settlements, Jerusalem, and especially refugees.
As Israel was the stronger partner in the agreement, Shuqir saw the Israeli
interpretation of the vague agreement as the more "likely to
stick."(13) However, both felt that the Oslo accords’ main damage was to
Arab unity and political coordination.(14) Nevertheless, in the end, Qallab
found the risky agreement better than the status quo at the time.(15)
The press reported that public opinion was divided in its support of the
PLO’s agreement.(16) The Balqa’ refugee camp--known as a barometer of
Palestinian opinion in Jordan--witnessed demonstrations against the accord.
However, pro-Fatah activists countered the Hamas-sponsored demonstration by
holding one of their own.(17) When questioned, however, most Palestinian
refugees indeed feared that the result of the "Gaza and Jericho First"
plan would be to abandon them.(18) On the other hand, some Jordanians of East
Bank origin saw the Oslo accords as the hopeful first step towards removing the
Palestinians from being a concern of Jordan.(19)
Even before the reports of the secret negotiations in Oslo emerged,
however, King Hussein had been preparing the domestic arena for the eventuality
of making peace with Israel. Jordanian elections had already been scheduled for
November 1993. Over the summer of 1993, a debate over changing the Election Law
had been simmering. With the early reports of the Oslo talks, the Jordanian
regime quickly moved to amend the law. On August 17, amendments were decreed by
the king. The previous ‘open-list’ system, which had significantly benefited
the Muslim Brotherhood, was changed to a so-called "one-man, one-vote"
system which tended to benefit tribal leaders. The opposition was enraged by the
decree, yet eventually acquiesced to the change.(20)
The announcement of the Oslo accords put the election briefly into doubt,
though it eventually proceeded as scheduled. The change in the election law had
its desired effect. Tribal leaders and pro-government candidates won a majority
of the seats. The Islamists and other opposition groups saw their representation
in parliament nearly halved. Some new members, such as Toujan Faisal, even
praised the peace process in general terms but eventually became bitter
opponents of normalization.(21) In larger terms, however, with the election,
King Hussein arranged the removal of most obstacles--internal and external--to
an eventual peace agreement with Israel.(22)
By July 1994, negotiations with Israel had reached the point where the
two sides were willing to formally end the state of war between them. King
Hussein and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin announced the "Washington
Declaration" on July 25, 1994, in the presence of President Bill Clinton.
The declaration opened the way for final negotiations towards a peace treaty
between Jordan and Israel. Through August and September of 1994, negotiators
quickly resolved issues of border, water and economic cooperation. The treaty
was signed on October 26, 1994 in a ceremony at the Wadi Araba border point, to
the accompaniment of considerable international acclaim. Most Jordanians were
pleased to bask in Western approval.
THE
DEBATE OVER THE TREATY
As early as July 1994, the government of Jordan began a media campaign to
sway public opinion towards support the pending agreement.(23) The regime knew
that it would be difficult to garner public agreement to ending nearly fifty
years of hostilities with Israel, especially in the absence of a comprehensive
accord for Middle East peace. For this reason, King Hussein personally took the
lead in promoting the treaty. In contrast to most Jordanian government
campaigns, in which the prime minister appeared as the main policy actor, King
Hussein made it clear that the peace treaty was "his." Thus, any
opposition to the treaty would be interpreted by the regime as opposition to the
monarchy itself--with the resultant consequences.(24) The campaign attempted to
convince Jordanians to support the peace treaty with four major arguments:
First, the regime and its supporters presented the treaty as a strategic
option for Jordan, one in which the country had little choice. In order to
escape its post-Gulf-war isolation, the government urged that Jordan needed to
join the peace camp. King Hussein argued that in the past many opportunities for
peace with Israel had been missed.(25)Government supporters in the Foreign
Affairs committee of the House of Deputies recommended that the house endorse
the treaty as the "best" accord the regime could have reached given
what was "possible and realistic."(26) Economic commentator Fahd
Fanek, for example, argued that "those who reject peace must offer an
alternative, which can only be war."(27) Government supporters argued that
the treaty would end Jordan’s international "isolation."(28) Without
the treaty, Tarek Massarweh of al-Rai’ newspaper argued, the
"noose" that surrounded Jordan since 1991--and especially after the
1993 Oslo accords--would "dry up" the country.(29)
The second argument pointed out that in the peace treaty, Jordan itself
got all that it claimed back from Israel. The government, in a statement to the
lower house of parliament, said that the treaty should quickly be ratified in
order "to regain the Jordanian rights in land and water, to protect the
county from threats and conspiracy and to ascertain the Kingdom’s
borders."(30) Prime Minister Majali emphasized that Jordan had settled all
its outstanding issues with Israel.(31)
He pointed out that the Jordanian territory that Israel held was to
return to full Jordanian sovereignty. In addition, Jordan would gain access to
additional water resources from the Jordan River and Lake Tiberius. More
important than these, however, was the government’s claim that in the treaty
Israel explicitly and conclusively recognized that Jordan was not Palestine.(32)
Cecil Hourani, in the opinion pages of the Jordan Times, emphasized that
the treaty "puts an end, once and for all, to the possibility that a future
Israeli government might revive" such a claim.(33) Making the same point,
‘Abd al-Hafiz al-Shakhanibah asked rhetorically in his speech to the House,
"Weren’t you frightened by the concept of the substitute homeland?
Weren’t you frightened that solving the Palestinian problem would only be done
in Jordan through the establishment of a Palestinian state in this
country?" For Shakhanibah, the treaty ended his fears.(34)
A third argument presented by the regime pointed to the provisions in the
treaty for future multilateral negotiations. Issues such as refugees and
economic cooperation were scheduled for negotiations not just between Israel and
Jordan, but would include Egypt and the Palestinians as well. Prime Minister
Majali argued in his rebuttal to the house debate that such problems could not
just be resolved bilaterally between Jordan and Israel.(35)
Finally, and perhaps most effectively in the short run, the regime
endeavored to sell the treaty based on its expected economic benefits to the
whole country and its potential to create significant for new investment in
Jordan. This message targeted Jordanians of both Palestinian and East Bank
origin. The government argued that Jordan had been promised by the United States
a large package of debt relief and aid. Such a peace dividend would jump-start
Jordan’s sluggish economy and provide new jobs--especially in the tourism
industry.(36) The government reminded citizens of the example of Egypt, and the
rewards it received for signing the Camp David accords in 1978. In the popular
imagination, there appeared the possibility of a new era for Jordan based on
American and Israeli aid and investment. As late as 1996, Jordanians would
(seemingly seriously) argue to private Israelis and Americans the need for
Jordan to receive a billion dollars of aid to stabilize the country and its
economy, based on what Egypt had been receiving since Camp David.(37)
The opposition generally rejected the peace treaty that had been signed
with Israel. However, it should be noted that most components of that opposition
were criticizing the actual treaty but not necessarily the notion of peace
itself, at least in public. The reasons for opposition can be broken down into
four general points.
The first reason given was based on the treaty’s abandonment of Arab
coordination. Arab Nationalists and Leftists faulted the treaty for violating
the principles of UN Security Council Resolutions, 194, 237, 242, and 338. Thus,
the treaty failed "to comply with the requirements of international
legitimacy."(38) However, Islamists also criticized the government for
signing a treaty that "would end Jordan’s ties with other Arab and Muslim
countries.(39)
Second, the opposition criticized the treaty for only dealing with the
issue of Palestinian refugees in later multilateral talks. Many in the
opposition saw the treaty as "depriving the refugees of the right to return
to their homeland."(40) Other Islamists reiterated this point by charging
that the treaty only dealt with the issue of refugees as a humanitarian problem
and not as a political one. Muhammad ‘Uwaydah saw this as a delay in an issue
of great concern for many Jordanians--and not just those of Palestinian
origin.(41)
Other deputies critiqued the treaty on a third point. They rejected the
government’s claim that Jordan had reclaimed its rights to land and water from
Israel.(42) They especially objected to the provision of leasing land returned
to Jordanian sovereignty to Israeli farmers, seeing it as a denigration of that
sovereignty.(43)
Finally, opponents of the peace treaty also criticized the government for
cracking down on political liberties. Since the beginning the peace process with
the Madrid Conference in 1991, the opposition charged, the government had been
reversing the process of political liberalization.(44) The opposition argued
that since the regime could not refute their arguments, the government was now
attempting to silence them. According to Labib Qamhawi, for the government,
"This period requires absolute obedience, and this is why democracy is a
luxury that the government will not tolerate or accept."(45) After the
signing of the treaty, permits for marches protesting it were virtually all
denied by the government. Nevertheless, demonstrations took place anyway, some
of which were broken up by force. For example, on November 28, 1994, Deputy
‘Abd-al’Aziz Abu-Zant was injured after clashes broke out in response to a
Friday sermon by the Muslim Brotherhood. The IAF blamed government agents for
the attack.(46)
Opposition politicians criticized the restrictions on dissent to the
treaty in the press and in their speeches during the ratification of the treaty.
IAF spokesman Hamzah Mansour stated that the "government is acting with
unjustified over-sensitivity"(47) Bassam Haddadin, in his speech to the
House of Deputies, charged the government with restricting public liberties.
"Whenever progress was made in the negotiation process, the government had
tightened its grip on the opposition and limited participation in the decision
making process to the smallest circles and sometimes to a few
individuals."(48) Nevertheless, the opposition generally reiterated its
commitment to express dissent through "peaceful and democratic forms of
protest."(49)
In the end, the treaty was ratified by the parliament by a vote of 55-23.
IAF Deputy Abdullah al-’Akayilah summed up his movement’s reaction to the
treaty passing the parliament by saying that he "was not surprised by the
result. We cannot but accept the decision of the majority in compliance with the
democracy in which we live." He then said that the opposition’s focus
would shift to preparing a program to resist normalization with Israel and the
"coming Zionist invasion of our culture."(50)
This last point was perhaps broadly the most effective. It played on the
Arab fear of Western/Zionist influence overwhelming the Arab world. Islamists
frequently spoke of an Israeli plot to invade the Arab world culturally and
economically through Jordan. This theme has been reiterated by many
spokespersons for the anti-normalization.(51)
It is important to note that at this point, except for the hard-line
opposition, most Jordanians were not actively opposed to the treaty. Many
ordinary people were clearly impressed by the expected economic benefits. Some
saw Amman becoming the new Beirut, and Jordan serving as the bridge between
Israel and the Arab world (precisely the fear of the Islamists). Tourism was
expected to benefit quickly and massively. The month before the treaty was
signed, the admission fee to Jordan’s primary tourist site, the ancient city
of Petra, was quadrupled overnight in expectation of tourists who would divide
their time between Israel and Jordan.
The perception of Jordanians at this time, during the two years following
the treaty, gathered from numerous conversations, was that it was Israel that
avidly, almost desperately, wanted peace. Many Jordanians who fully accepted the
idea of peace between the two countries would have preferred that Jordan take
its time in signing a treaty in order to obtain maximum concessions. The king
was frequently portrayed as succumbing to American and Israeli pressure, and not
obtaining the best deal for his country.
From the other side, Israelis were indeed supportive of peace, but most
saw Jordan primarily as a stepping stone to the Arab world. Few were interested
in or knowledgeable about Jordan in its own right. Though a section of the
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs was kept busy drawing up ideas for grandiose
peace projects, the actions of the government gave no indication that Jordan
was, or would become, a centerpiece of Israeli policy. This gradually became
apparent to Jordanians.
Even those without ideological baggage were suspicious, if also somewhat
hopeful. "We need time to see if Israel keeps its word" or "Let
us see if Israel has really changed," were refrains heard from many
academics interviewed during this period. This expresses a fundamental
difference between the perceptions of the two sides. Israelis saw the peace
treaty as ratifying the fact that there were no state-to-state issues between
Jordan and Israel, and as a long-overdue formal acceptance of Israel’s right
to exist. Jordanians, who had been taught for many years that Zionism was
inherently expansionistic and violent, needed to be assured that Israel’s
attitudes had changed. Since Israelis had never remotely seen themselves in
those terms, they could not imagine why assurance was needed. Israelis, as well
as the Israeli government, often treated Jordanians and Jordan with the brusque,
though non-hostile, impersonality for which Israelis are known. Jordanians, who
looked for more on a personal as well as diplomatic level, were soon
disappointed.
THE
AFTERMATH OF THE TREATY
The basic support for the treaty lasted for about a year and a half. The
mood of those days is captured by an article in LINK Magazine. Israel is
portrayed as damaging its own reputation through over-excitement at the prospect
of regional cooperation, at the October 1994, Casablanca Middle East Economic
Summit. Jordanians are shown as cautiously interested in establishing ties but
wary of being identified as having Israeli partners. The article includes a
prescient quote from Jordanian economist Riad al-Khouri: "The ice has been
broken but the temperature is still below zero. It could easily freeze over
again."(52)
The next Middle East and North Africa economic summit was held in Amman,
October 29-31, 1995. Jordanian observers were extremely pleased with its
results, and even more so that it was seen as recognizing Jordan as an economic
force in the region, undeniably a direct result of the treaty with Israel. It
was recognized by all that the United States had been the driving force behind
the summits and was particularly interested in new Arab-Israel economic
projects. The results included loan agreements for over $300 million from Japan
and the World Bank.(53)
However, as the first year of the treaty progressed, it appeared that,
while no disasters had occurred, in the relationship, most promised benefits,
other than the MENA conference itself, were slow in making an appearance. Trade
grew only slowly.(54) While tourism from Israel did appear, it barely registered
on the economic barometer, as most Israeli tourists came either for day trips,
to see only Petra and one or two other major sites, or stayed only a short time.
Moreover, all Jordanians seemed to know that Israeli tourists brought their
lunches with them and bought no souvenirs. Even worse, while the number of
tourists from third countries increased after the treaty was signed, it became
apparent that many tourists or pilgrims simply added a day or two in Jordan
while spending a week or more in Israel. Many Jordanians regarded this as no
less than an Israeli plot and an attempt to damage the Jordanian economy.
The hard core of the anti-normalization forces did not, of course, accept
the treaty without a fight. After failing to have any effect on its
ratification, the IAF, leftist parties and professional associations tried to
hold a conference on the subject in Amman. After the government twice refused
permission, it was held in September 1995 on the premises of a political party,
thus obviating the need for permission. 300 people attended.(55)
The anti-normalization forces appeared to suffer a setback in the
aftermath of the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on
November 4, 1995. Jordanians mourned the assassination, but appeared confident
that the new government, led by Shimon Peres, would carry the process
forward.(56) King Hussein’s moving eulogy was highlighted around the world. In
fact, the period from Rabin’s assassination until the end of February 1996
was, in retrospect, the high water mark of support for peace and normalization.
During that period, the government felt confident enough to propose
amending the law on Professional Associations, to weaken their power.(57) The
week before that had seen the arrest of Engineer’s Association Head Leith
Shbeilat, the most prominent of the anti-normalization leaders, on charges of
"sedition and slighting His Majesty", based on a speech critical of
government policies and predicting economic austerity, as opposed to the peace
dividend expected by the government.(58)
During that time, Israeli Prime Minister Peres and Foreign Minister Ehud
Barak visited Jordan, and King Hussein visited Israel. In January, five new
bilateral agreements were signed, thus completing the thirteen envisioned by the
Peace Treaty of 1994. After their festive signing, the Monitoring Committee set
up by the treaty was disbanded, having completed its mission.(59) At the banquet
in Eilat given for Crown Prince Hassan to celebrate the signing, the Prince
noted that "today normal life between Jordan and Israel can begin at
last". Similarly, columnist Musa Keilani wrote in an opinion piece,
"We have little reason to doubt the Israeli seriousness and interest to
develop close economic relations with Jordan."(60) In February, Peres
announced new elections for May 29, and polls showed him 15 points ahead, a
figure that had been fairly steady since the assassination two months earlier.
This period of warmth and high expectations (which was shared on the
Israeli side) ended explosively on 25 February 1996, with two bus bombs in
Jerusalem. Twenty-six were killed and (77) wounded. The Jordanian government and
some of the press were outraged at the bombers. The Jordan Times opined
on March 4 that "the bombs are aimed at peace." In private
conversations, many Jordanians expressed their sympathy with Israelis.
However, Israel’s response to the ongoing bombing campaign in order to
stop future attacks, which involved a comprehensive closure of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip and significant hardship to Palestinians, quickly transformed the
sympathy into anger. Soon the press and then the government focused much more on
the ongoing closure and the Palestinian suffering it entailed, in the process
drawing negative conclusions for the possibilities of Israeli-Jordanian
normalization.
On April 9 a new front was opened, when rockets fired by Hizballah in
Lebanon rained down on the Galilee. Peres, whose popularity among the Israeli
public had plummeted in the aftermath of the bombing campaign, felt he had to
demonstrate strength and resolve. Israel began a bombing campaign in Lebanon,
whose intensity was quickly ratcheted up and given the name "Grapes of
Wrath." Jordanian anger, which had been building, was seen in a drumbeat of
daily attacks on Israel. The Jordan Times, which had been the most
pro-normalization of the daily newspapers, editorialized that the Israeli
response to the Katyusha rockets from Lebanon "lacks even the resemblance
of credibility" in its disproportion.(61) The next day it warned that
"peace is being shattered in Lebanon". The Lower House of the
Parliament condemned the bombing in a resolution that proclaimed that it
"expresses to the world the true face of the Jewish state."
On 18 April, an Israeli shell aimed at Hizballah forces killed at least
100 refugees in a UN compound in Qana. Jordanian fury at Israel’s action
reached a crescendo. Few Jordanians could believe that the vaunted, technically
advanced Israeli military had hit the compound accidentally, and detailed
post-mortems rejected Israel’s insistence that it had been unintentional.
Virtually no Israeli could imagine any reason that Israel would deliberately
kill civilians in that fashion, while Jordanians were seemingly unanimously
convinced that Israel, utterly callous about Arab life, were simply trying to
teach a lesson. Columnist Musa Keilani, who only a few months before was secure
in his expectations of normalization, wrote "Israel should not wonder
anymore why its efforts at normalization of relations at the popular level are
sagging. If anything, its bloodbath in Lebanon has already moved many Jordanians
from the center of the road to openly opposing ties with the Jewish
state."(62) On the same day, the Jordan Times editorialized,
"Israeli bullets have rendered the peace agreements in the region nothing
more than ink on paper."(63) As usual, the Arabic language press was even
harsher. Sultan al Hattab wrote in Al-Rai’ that the campaign
"destroyed any lingering hope for coexistence with the Jewish State….The
Arabs have no doubt that Israel does not contemplate a genuine peace with its
neighbors."(64)
Even on the economic front, expectations for normalization were receding.
Seemingly unrelated to the political disillusionment with Israel, the Jordan
Times "Daily Business Beat," headlined "Israeli market seen
unable to plug Jordan’s trade gap with Iraq." Businessmen were quoted as
saying, "I don’t think that any of the Jordanian businessmen will rely on
the Israeli market--this is by far unlikely and we are not enthusiastic for this
market." Much of the article contained warnings against expecting too much
from trade with Israel.(65)
Jordanian hope for and belief in normalization never again reached the
point that it had achieved in the first two months of 1996. Having been taught
all their lives that Zionism was inherently expansionistic and racist, the
moderate forces in Jordan had nevertheless largely suspended their disbelief and
chosen to see a change. When Israel reacted as it always had to attacks, namely,
by retaliating swiftly and forcefully, Jordanians felt betrayed. Though much
else was to happen, the spring of 1996 marked a loss of innocence on the
Jordanian side that was never regained.
Obviously, Israelis viewed the situation completely differently. The
change, from their point of view, had come from the Arabs, who had finally
agreed to recognize the fact of Israel’s existence. When it transpired that
the Palestinian Authority could not do as it had undertaken and prevent terror,
Israelis had little doubt that they had to react forcefully in a justifiable
defense of its citizen’s lives. Likewise, if the Lebanese government was
unable or unwilling to control Hizballah, Israel must make it painful enough for
Lebanon that the government would do so, or at least so Israel hoped. From
discussions at this time with Israelis who wholeheartedly supported the peace
process, it was clear that nothing that had happened since Oslo had caused them
to reassess these fundamental assumptions.
Given this dynamic, which was based on the absolute certainty of each
side that it was the victim in the conflict, it is clear that, even if the bus
bombings and rocket attacks on the Galilee had not taken place, normalization of
relations would have been difficult. Each side believed that it had made
fundamental concessions unmatched by the other. Palestinian and Jordanian
leaders had recognized Israel, despite their belief in the fundamental injustice
of its creation. Israelis saw that as a simple recognition of reality. On the
other side, Israelis had agreed to recognize the enemies they saw as sworn to
their destruction and accept a process that would presumably lead to a
Palestinian state, the prevention of which had been the linchpin of Israeli
policy since 1948. Arabs saw this as a minimal, grudging and belated recognition
of only part of the enormous injustice Israel had wrought.
This mood in Jordan was well expressed by Jordan Times columnist
Walid Sadi, an attorney and human rights advocate of moderate views. He wrote,
four days after the Qana incident, "What worries me is the inevitable
conclusion that even many moderate Arabs are beginning to share, the idea that
peace between Israel and the Arab peoples is unnatural and what is natural is
the continuation of a state of war notwithstanding all the peace treaties that
have been concluded."(66)
Arabs cried foul when Israel responded to attacks. Why should the entire
Palestinian or Lebanese population suffer for the acts of a few fanatics? To
them, this showed Israeli disdain for Arab life. Israel, however, saw it as a
people-to-people confrontation, as always. The Palestinians had failed in their
promise to fight terrorism, and thus Israel would have to do it in the only way
it could. Lebanon had refused to control its own borders, and thus Israel would
likewise have to persuade it to do so.
In Jordan, and in Israel as well, many felt that the primary reason for
the launching of Grapes of Wrath was the need by Shimon Peres to make himself
appear a more aggressive and hardline figure in order to win the election.
Whether connected to Grapes of Wrath or not, toward the end of the election
campaign, rumors appeared that King Hussein’s preferred candidate was not
Peres the dove, but rather Netanyahu the hawk. Interviews with well-connected
Jordanian academics during and soon after the campaign confirmed the impression
that the king, though perhaps not his subjects, was hoping for a Netanyahu win.
Reasons given for this varied. Some asserted that the king was seriously
concerned about Peres’s reputed pro-Palestinian and pro-Syrian orientation.
The king, according to this analysis, was determined that Jordan be Israel’s
primary Arab partner, and was concerned that Peres might not share this
orientation. Others talked of a lack of chemistry between Peres and Hussein, in
contrast to the relationship between the king and the martyred Yitzhak Rabin,
Peres’ longtime political adversary. In any case, it was believed in Jordan
that no tears were shed in the Palace when Benjamin Netanyahu squeaked to
victory on May 29, 1996. The king expressed his "high hopes for
(Netanyahu’s) success in reaching a just, comprehensive and lasting peace for
generations to come." According to the Jordan Times, however, based
on interviews with Jordanians from various backgrounds, Netanyahu’s election
was viewed as a blow to the Middle East peace process.(67)
Whether or not they had a preference before the elections, many
Jordanians were not overly concerned about the victory of the Israeli Right. For
example, at a workshop at the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace of
Hebrew University, inaugurating a program of Israeli-Jordanian academic
cooperation which, coincidentally, began the day after the election, the
Jordanian participants assured their Israeli hosts that the peace process was
irreversible, and that the peace was between countries, not individuals or
parties. Their major concern was whether the Likud party had abandoned its
"Jordan is Palestine" orientation of the late 1980s. However, this
mood of optimism on the part of Jordanians turned out to be short-lived.
During the summer of 1996, the Arab moderates sought to find common
ground with the Netanyahu government. However, the attempt ended for most in the
Palestinian explosion of violence following Israel’s opening of the
"Western Wall Tunnel" in September 1996. King Hussein was particularly
incensed since, shortly before the opening, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s foreign
policy advisor, Dore Gold, had visited him and mentioned nothing of the plans.
However, the tunnel riots energized the anti-normalization forces in Jordan,
where reportedly 37 groups representing a variety of divergent views joined the
IAF in a declaration calling resistance to "all forms of normalization with
the Zionist enemy".(68) Before the tunnel violence, normalization was a
neutral word for many. It could be supported or opposed. However, afterward,
many turned against normalization, a blow from which it never really recovered.
The year following the tunnel riots was the crucial one. Five separate
incidents that made the news illustrate the downward progression of the
Israeli-Jordanian relationship. While only one actually included participation
by the Jordanian opposition, it could not have asked for a better series of
events which helped its campaign to discredit the treaty and the legitimacy of a
Jordanian relationship with Israel.
In January 1997, an Israeli trade fair was held in Amman, sponsored by
Israeli government institutions and organized by a Jordanian businessman. It was
realized on all sides that, while economics could not make the relationship
succeed, the lack of an economic relationship could certainly result in failure
of the treaty. From all accounts, the success of the boycott against the trade
fair pleased and even surprised the organizers. Supported by 20 of Jordan’s 23
recognized political parties, a demonstration against the fair mobilized a
reported 4000 people. Only a few Jordanians braved the protests to visit the
trade fair. The opposition had shown its ability to mobilize the population, in
clear contrast to the government’s goal of greatly increasing economic ties.
The government was embarrassed, Israelis were confused, and the anti-normalizers
had achieved their first clear success.
The agreement on the Hebron deployment between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority in January 1997 was hailed by the Jordanian government and the press
as a new departure, which was particularly important as it was seen as a defeat
for the Israeli right wing. Peace--and eventual normalization--seemed again
within the realm of possibility.(69) However, precisely because this was indeed
the case, the Netanyahu government now had to make a gesture to its supporters
on the right which turned into a major bonus for the Arab opposition to the
process.
Israel had long been interested in building a housing development on a
wooded hill facing the Palestinian city of Bethlehem but inside the expanded
borders of Jerusalem. Known in Hebrew as Har Homa and in Arabic as Jabal Abu
Ghneim, the hill occupied a strategic position, as, if built on, it would
effectively prevent any Palestinian linkup of the northern and southern areas of
the West Bank near Jerusalem. In February 1997, the Likud government announced
that it would build a new neighborhood there. Har Homa was viewed as a new
settlement by Arabs, who warned it would endanger the entire peace process.(70)
The reaction from the Palestinian Authority was immediate. However, it
also became a major rallying cry in Jordan and through most of the Arab world.
This was precisely the sort of action that Arabs had understood that the Oslo
process was intended to prevent, namely, the change of status of parts of
Jerusalem. For many Israelis, the issue was equally black and white. For them,
Har Homa/Jabal Abu Ghneim was within the Israeli borders of Jerusalem, and
therefore a purely domestic issue of building a new neighborhood. The Israeli
peace camp opposed Har Homa, though, and staged a series of demonstrations
there, with no perceivable effect on the government’s intentions.
If the trade fair had symbolized Israeli economic penetration of Jordan
to the opposition, Har Homa/Jabal Abu Ghneim was a clear example of what Arabs
had always seen in Zionism, namely, expropriation of Arab land under transparent
(or without) pretext. As the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority deteriorated, Jordanians who had pointed out that there was no reason
for Jordan to be "purer" than the Palestinians themselves regarding
dealing with Israel, were abashed.
The cause of the next incident was lost sight of in the light of what
subsequently occurred. Apparently, King Hussein had requested permission of the
Israeli government to fly Yasir Arafat to Gaza in his own plane. In what
appeared to be monumental insensitivity by whichever Israeli official was
responsible, permission was refused. The king responded with a furious
three-page letter sent on March 9 to Netanyahu and very quickly leaked to the
press. The king, whose language was usually extremely circumspect, accused the
prime minister, with whom his public relations had been cordial until then, of
allowing a situation in which the lives of all Arabs and Israelis were
"sliding towards an abyss of bloodshed and disaster, brought about by fear
and despair."(71)
In his letter the king alluded to a number of issues, including Har
Homa/Jabal Abu Ghneim, a U.S. veto in the UN Security Council of a condemnation
of Israel, delays on Israeli withdrawal holding up work on a port and airport
for Gaza and, most dramatically, having almost tested the Israeli refusal to
allow Arafat to travel on his jet, and asking whether the Air Force would have
shot him down. Such an unbridled personal attack was out of character for the
king, and expressed eloquently the frustration that he, Israel’s best friend
in the Arab world, was experiencing in trying to influence the Israeli
government. Netanyahu’s bland response did nothing to soothe matters.
However, the letter incident was almost immediately overtaken by another,
more tragic event. On March 13, a Jordanian soldier, Ahmed Daqamsa, opened fire
on a group of Israeli schoolgirls from a religious school in Beit Shemesh,
killing 7. They were picnicking on the "Island of Peace" in the Jordan
River, called Naharayim in Hebrew and Bequra in Arabic.
Jordanian reaction illustrated the varied attitudes towards
normalization. The regime and its supporters denounced the crime in the
strongest terms. "It was the most heinous crime ever committed in
Jordan", wrote Musa Keilani.(72) However, Keilani went on to state
explicitly that the only gainer was Netanyahu and his anti-peace policies, and
even to imply, with no shred of evidence, that the perpetrator may have intended
that result. From all appearances, the majority of Jordanians disapproved of the
attack and expressed sympathy for the victims.(73) However, very soon Daqamsa
became a hero to anti-normalization Jordanians. Police prevented a pilgrimage to
his house. Two hundred Jordanian lawyers competed to represent him, led by the
Jordanian Bar Association.(74)
The king, meanwhile, in a moment etched indelibly in virtually every
Israeli memory, came to Israel to visit the homes of the dead children, during
the seven-day Jewish mourning ceremony known as the shiva. According to
tradition, mourners sit on the floors or on low stools to express their grief.
Accompanied by television cameras, the king visited each home that would have
him, sitting on the floor with the mourners. Israelis were touched by the human
gesture of sharing their grief, which they had never before seen from an Arab
leader.
Jordanians were also impressed, but very differently. Unfamiliar with
Jewish customs, it appeared to them that the king was kneeling to the Jews,
abasing and humiliating himself, and denigrating the dignity of his office and
his country. A storm of condemnation broke out and the king found himself on the
defensive domestically, though he had made many friends across the river.
Eventually, despite his legions of legal representation, Daqamseh was
convicted and sentenced to life in prison (angering many Israelis, who felt that
was almost an acquittal under the circumstances), and remains a martyr for the
anti-normalization cause. Israelis were perplexed by the spectacle, and were
beginning to understand that peace with Jordan was not as simple as it had once
appeared.
The worst incident with regard to Jordanian pride, however, was still to
come. The anti-normalization forces could not have come up with a better
scenario than the Khalid Mishal episode to discredit normal relations with
Israel. Apparently, the Mossad had been ordered to kill Mishal, a Hamas leader
in Jordan, with a slow-acting poison. However, the attack was badly bungled and
the perpetrators captured at the scene. The king demanded an antidote, which was
provided, the Israelis were released, and Mishal quickly recovered. Jordanians
were more outraged by the intended assassination than by any other event that
had happened since the treaty. While the earlier actions were against the
Palestinians and Lebanese, who had perpetrated the attacks against Israel, this
attack was exactly what the signed peace treaty was intended to prevent.
The Jordanian public response was predictable but not, apparently, to
Israelis. Even many liberal, peace-oriented Israelis seemed to believe that the
only thing wrong with the operation was its failure. After almost 50 years of
overt and covert retaliation against Israel’s enemies all over the world, one
more hit was barely an issue, except for the incompetence it exposed. Yet this
behavior was explicitly and unambiguously prohibited by the Israeli-Jordanian
treaty, exposed King Hussein to ridicule from his own people and the rest of the
Arab world, and dealt a virtual death-blow to any lingering Jordanian feelings
of trust toward Israel. The conflicting reactions made clear the extreme
difficulties facing Jordanian-Israeli popular relations. The King’s mild
public reaction to the incident confirmed for many Jordanians that he was in the
pocket of the Israelis, though, of course, such sentiments could not be
expressed publicly.
King Hussein had by no means given up the fight for peace and for
normalization of Israel’s relationship with the Arab world. However, by the
end of 1997, it appeared that the battle for the Jordanian public’s acceptance
of Israel in the framework set up by Oslo seemed lost. The peace process itself
was caught in a seemingly endless series of crises, only occasionally relieved
by news of cooperation or a new agreement. The stability and progress implied by
the term normalization had never had a chance to take root, and the Jordanian
public had seemingly lost its faith in the possibility of achieving it.
What the Israeli public and other observers found difficult to understand
was that this had virtually no effect on the stability of King Hussein’s
reign--which, in any case, was drawing to a close--and the viability of the
Hashemite dynasty. In a sense, the king and most of the public agreed to
disagree on this matter, with the rhetoric generally muted, as is normal in
Jordanian public discourse. On one hand, attacks on the king and the Hashemite
monarchy are taboo, though attacks on the government are acceptable, as one of
the prime minister’s roles is to be a punching bag for public disapproval. If
he gets too battered, he is dismissed (the average length of King Hussein’s
governments over a period of 45 years was under a year). On the other hand, the
government does not, except under extreme provocation, prosecute or generally
act against the anti-normalizers nor did it "force" any Jordanian to
participate in normalization activities. These were the rules of the game that
developed.
Much of the year 1998 was taken up with the King’s illness, which was
only revealed to be terminal in the weeks before he died in February 1999. He
was undergoing intensive therapy in the Mayo clinic for the last half of 1998
and Crown Prince Hassan was, as always, the regent. Jordanian public life was
low-key. However, the king did make a dramatic appearance, literally from his
sickbed, at the Wye River Plantation negotiations between Netanyahu and Arafat,
moderated by President Clinton. His appearance was clearly part of the reason
for the formal success of the summit, although the agreements were suspended by
Netanyahu shortly thereafter, based on claims of Palestinian violations, and his
government soon fell from power.
Jordanian reaction to the king’s role at Wye Plantation was muted. No
one could criticize it, since it was a personal intervention by the monarch, and
certainly the king’s decisive part was a cause of national pride. The Star
solved the problem by quoting foreign support for the king’s role, and in a
separate article, indicating the skepticism of the Palestinian inhabitants of
Jordanian refugee camps towards the agreement itself, with no word mentioned of
the king’s role.(75)
About January 25, 1999, rumors began to circulate that the king was about
to replace his brother, Crown Prince Hassan, who had been heir apparent to the
throne since 1965, with his son, Prince Abdallah. Within days, this became
official. Israelis and Americans scrambled to decode the relationship between
the unexpected change, the peace process, the relationship with Israel, as well
as to the stability of the dynasty. Within two weeks, this speculation became
that much more intense, when the king returned to Jordan for the second time,
obviously dying. His death came on February 7, 1999.
AFTER
THE DEATH OF KING HUSSEIN
In fact, the change in the succession had nothing to do with Israel.
While speculation and various theories preoccupied the Jordanian public for
months, most agreed that, as his death approached, the king wanted his son
rather than his brother to carry on the dynastic line. As expected, Prince
Hassan, though grievously disappointed, accepted the succession without a murmur
of public protest.
King Hussein’s funeral was the most inclusive diplomatic event in
years, and some of Hussein’s bitterest enemies, most notably President Hafiz
al-Asad of Syria, took the opportunity to extend a hand of friendship to Jordan
and its new king. Most observers predicted that there was every reason to shore
up relations with Jordan’s Arab neighbors and concentrate on domestic reform.
King Hussein had devoted his last five years to reinstating his country in the
good graces of the West, led by the United States, and creating the relationship
with Israel that he and the United States had sought. Now, with the peace
process seemingly stalled, there was every reason to turn inward, which is what
he has done.
King Abdullah II, again as expected, continued King Hussein’s policy
with regard to Israel and the peace process. While his youth and dynamism were
celebrated publicly, in private the grizzled veterans of Jordan’s political
wars decried his American accent and his inexperience. The new, Western-educated
and -oriented king made it clear that his first priority was Jordan, and that he
wanted to see a less corrupt, more prosperous country. King Hussein’s
attachment to Jerusalem soon disappeared from Jordanian priorities, seemingly
not missed by Jordanians.
In September 2000, the second intifada broke out. Perhaps if King Hussein
had been alive he might have played some helpful role in easing tensions and
bridging gaps. At any rate, though, Jordan and its new king were not consulted
at the Camp David negotiations, nor were they involved in the outbreak of the
second intifada, any more than in the first. However, all Jordanians publicly
adopted the cause of the Palestinians, and attitudes toward Israel, already
distant, became icy. Jordan and Egypt fought back an attempt at the Arab summit
to demand that all states break relations with Israel, but their victory had a
price. After the Jordanian ambassador resigned, no successor was sent. Israeli
diplomats were attacked on the streets of Amman, leading to a withdrawal of
diplomats’ families. Israel soon warned its citizens not to travel to Jordan.
At present, the anti-normalizers have routed the normalizers from the
field. Though their leftist and Islamist baggage by no means represented the
views of a majority of Jordanians, working with Israel and consorting with
Israelis was now seen as an anti-Arab, anti-Islamic act. The blacklist that had
been in the process of compilation for years was finally released and generally
available. Many of those who appeared on it were solid and well-known citizens.
These were precisely the people opposed by the Islamists and leftists;
Western-oriented, many Christians, often strong supporters of the monarchy.
It is reasonable to ask, is this so important? With the Hashemite
monarchy still seeing Israel and, with it, the American connection as a
strategic requirement, is public opinion really essential? Jordan is not, after
all, a democracy, and certainly not in the realm of foreign affairs. Jordanian
public opinion, which would have been difficult to acquire and easy to lose was
perhaps not much of a prize for Israel.
From a realpolitik point of view this perception has some merit. Israel
still benefits from intelligence and other security cooperation, even if Jordan
is more attuned to the United States than to Israel. The border is quiet, and
the Hamas presence is low-key At least at this point, there appears to be no
question of Jordan breaking relations with Israel, much less joining the
anti-Israel camp in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Jordan still has Israeli
factories (the number has actually grown since 1999). The borders are (usually)
open.
Yet while having some merit, this approach is also short-sighted. The
fact is that on two major occasions, namely, the 1967 war and the 1990-91 Gulf
war, Jordanian public opinion was probably the major factor in causing Jordan to
take the stands it did. Now, with a more liberalized political system, the
system is that much more responsive.(76)
Jordan is still Israel’s only likely gateway to the Arab world. If
Jordanians are anti-Israel, it is unlikely that any other country will develop
significant business or diplomatic ties. Moreover, Israel now feels surrounded
by a wall of hostility, not that different from the situation before 1994.
In retrospect, the only way an Israeli-Jordanian peace could have
succeeded was if an Israeli-Palestinian peace had done so. This was obvious to
the Jordanians, but much less so to the Israeli government, and certainly not to
the Israeli public. The East Bank Jordanian leadership, and especially the more
nationalistic among the East Bank elite (dubbed by many the "Jordanian
Likud") for its negative attitude towards Palestinians, also had hopes that
Jordan’s particularistic national interest could make the treaty work. And it
has, on a security level, but not on a popular level, since the majority of the
population that is of Palestinian origin will not countenance an
"abandonment" of their Palestinian brethren.
The fight over normalization in Jordan is in some real respects a
conflict that goes beyond the merits of dealing with Israel. On the side of the
anti-normalizers are Islamists, ultimately seeking a Jordanian, or even
pan-Islamic state governed by shari’a, plus assorted leftists and
pan-Arabists. The other side is more complex. Much of the educated, Westernized
elite, especially of East Jordanian background, would prefer to have good
economic, political and even cultural relations with Israel, but recognize it is
impossible without resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. And, as of
this point, that does not seem to be very likely. However, the anti-normalizers
oppose much of the entire world view of those whom they dub normalizers. The
Islamists especially do not want to see Jordan Westernized, whether or not
Israel is involved. Thus, publication of the "List of Shame" is a blow
aimed at their cultural enemies, not just at normalizing with Israel.
The question now is whether the popular feeling against
Israel will become so strong that the government will some day have to acquiesce
with overt support by breaking relations with Israel. Security cooperation could
still possibly continue, because the fact is that the two regimes share
important geo-strategic interests.
Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that the anger and disillusionment
now expressed will disappear in the near future. Thus, it is possible that the
current Jordanian perception of the ‘real face of Zionism’ will become the
reigning orthodoxy, which would constitute the ‘Egyptianization’ of
Israel-Jordanian relations. This would be a consummation devoutly to be
regretted by those who still hope for a Jordanian-Israel popular rapprochement.
NOTES
A
slightly different version of this article will be published in an upcoming
issue of Israel Affairs.
1.
Interview by Paul Scham, March 1996.
2.
Ahmad Majdoubeh, Jordan Times, 7 December 1995. Majdoubeh discusses the
etymology of the word, but also points out that (already) that it had acquired
connotations and assumptions of Israel politically, culturally, and economically
overwhelming Jordan.
3.
Lori Plotkin, "Jordanian - Israeli Peace: Taking Stock, 1994-1997,"
Washington Institute Policy Focus, Research Memorandum 32 (May 1997), p. 27.
4.
While it is beyond the scope of the current paper, it would be instructive to
compare it to a roughly parallel situation in Egypt. In the early 1980’s,
concurrently with Israel’s incursion into Lebanon, Egyptian public opinion,
led by the intellectual class, solidified into solid opposition to Egypt’s
diplomatic relationship with Israel. Over the next twenty years, such opposition
became a hallmark of that class, uniting political factions otherwise at odds.
Those who support the idea of people- to-people relations between Jordanians and
Israelis must bear that generation-long development in mind as a warning.
5.
Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle
East Peace Process. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 1999.
6.
Middle East Mirror, 2 September 1993.
7.
Middle East Mirror, 2 September 1993.
8.
BBC-Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC-SWB), 4 September 1993.
9.Curtis
R. Ryan, "Jordan in the Middle East Peace Process: From War to Peace with
Israel," in Ilan Peleg, (ed.), The Middle East Peace Process:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Albany: SUNY Press, 1998. p.161.
10.
The Financial Post, 15 September 1993.
11.
Jordan Times, 6 November 1993.
12.
BBC-SWB, 31 August 1993.
13.
Middle East Mirror, 13 September 1993.
14.
Middle East Mirror, 2 September 1993, 13 September 1993, 14 September
1993.
15.
Middle East Mirror, 14 September 1993.
16.
Jordan Times, 14 September 1993.
17.
Middle East Mirror, 14 September 1993.
18.
The Associated Press, 1 September 1993.
19.
The Guardian, 24 September 1993.
20.
Russell E. Lucas, "Institutions and Regime Survival Strategies: Collective
Action and Path Dependence in Jordan," Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown
University, 2000. p.126-136.
21.
Jordan Times, 10 November 1993, p.1.
22.
Mark Power Stevens, ed., Post-Election Seminary: A Discussion of Jordan’s
1993 Parliamentary Elections. Amman: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center,
1994.
23.
United Press International, 17 July 1994.
24.
Christian Science Monitor, 5 August 1994.
25.FBIS-NES,
11/2/94, 42
26.
Jordan Times, 6 November 1994.
27.
International Herald-Tribune, 25 July 1994.
28.
Fawaz al-Zu’bi, Jordan Times, 6 November 1994.
29.
Middle East Mirror, 26 October 1994.
30.
Jordan Times, 31 October 1994.
31.
Jordan Times, 2 November 1994.
32.
Marc Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of
Jordan’s Identity. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. p. 166-197
33.
Jordan Times, 2 November 1994.
34.
Jordan Times, 7 November 1994.
35.
FBIS-NES, 7 November 1994.
36.
Al-Dustour, 3 November 1994.
37.
Discussions with Paul Scham
38.
Mustapha al-Shunaykat, Jordan Times, 31 October 1994.
39.
Ahmad al-Kassibah, Jordan Times, 6 November 1994.
40.
Ibrahim Zeid al-Kilani, Jordan Times, 6 November 1994.
41.
Jordan Times, 7 November 1994.
42.
‘Abd al-Rahim al-’Akor, Jordan Times, 7 November 1994.
43.
Hamzah Mansour, Jordan Times, 6 November 1994; Toujan Faisal, Jordan
Times, 7 November 1994.
44.
Al-Majd, 11/14/94; Laurie Brand, "The Effects of the Peace Process on
Political Liberalization in Jordan," Journal of Palestine Studies,
Vol. 28 No.2 (Winter1999), p. 52-67.
45.
The Star, 3 November 1994.
46.
Jordan Times, 29 October 1994.
47.
Jordan Times, 29 October 1994.
48.
Jordan Times, 7 November 1994.
49.
Middle East Mirror, 24 October 1994.
50.
Jordan Times, 7 November 1994.
51.
See also the opinion article by Ahmed Majdoubeh, JT, 7 December 1995
52.
LINK Magazine, (November - December 1995), p. 3.
53.
Jordan Times, 4 November, 1994.
54.
LINK Magazine, (November - December 1995), p.2.
55.
Plotkin, p.28
56.
Jordan Times, 5 November 1994.
57.
Jordan Times, 16 November 1994.
58.
Jordan Times, 10 November 1994
59.
Jordan Times, 10 January 1995, 17 January 1995, 20 January 1995.
60.
Jordan Times 20 January, 1995.
61.
Jordan Times 17 April 1996.
62.
Jordan Times, 20 April 1996.
63.
Jordan Times, 20 April 1996.
64.
Jordan Times, 20 April 1996.
65.
Jordan Times, 21 April 1996. On the other hand, an unpublished study
indicated that while Jordanian businesspeople understated their actual
willingness to deal with Israel, while Israelis, on the contrary, were upbeat in
their conversations regarding joint trade, but actually overstated their
willingness in practice. Avi Kluger, Muhsen Makhamreh, and Hisham Gharaibeh,
"Prospects of Business Cooperation Between Jordan and Israel: The Attitudes
of Business Leaders in Both Countries," unpublished manuscript.
66.
Jordan Times, 22 April 1996.
67.
Jordan Times, 1 June 1996.
68.
Rami Khouri, Jordan Times, 15 October 1996.
69.
Jordan Times, 18 January 1997.
70.
Jordan Times, 23 February 1997.
71.
Jordan Times, 12 March, 1997.
72.
Jordan Times, 15 March, 1997.
73.
Jordan Times, 15 March 1997.
74.
Jordan Times, 18 March 1997.
75.
The Star, October 29, 1998.
76.
see Lynch.
*Paul
L. Scham, trained in the U.S. as an attorney, has been a researcher at the Harry
S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem since July 1996. He has studied at Columbia, Princeton
and the University of California at Berkeley, where he obtained his J.D. He
spent the period February through June of 1996 in Amman researching attitudes of
Jordanian academics towards Israel.
Russell
E. Lucas is an independent scholar currently working in Jerusalem. He holds a
Ph.D. in Government from Georgetown University. His dissertation is titled
"Institutions and Regime Survival Strategies: Collective Action and Path
Dependence in Jordan." He has held grants from the US Institute of Peace,
Fulbright, and ACOR and is a Research Associate at the Truman Institute.